

32 Hamilton Road APT 207  
Arlington, MA 02474

mangini@g.harvard.edu  
(T) 2037885545

# Michael-David Mangini

PhD Candidate in Political Economy and Government

Government Track

Harvard University

## 1 Education

B.A. May 2014 *summa cum laude* in Economics and International Relations  
University of Pennsylvania

## 2 Working papers

2019-2020

### **Escape from Tariffs: The Political Economies of Protection and Classification**

*Under Review*

Abstract: Firms avoid paying the costs of protection in many ways – their actions lobbying against tariffs or relocating production are well known. What is the political economy of protection between opportunities to change the tariff schedule? This paper reveals another escape path through administrative lobbying to redefine products. Import-dependent firms seek lower tariffs by requesting that their products be classified into categories of the tariff schedule with lower duties. When firms substitute lobbying resources away from the determination of tariffs and towards the classification of their products, they undermine collective action because the narrow scope of the rulings delivers a private benefit to the firm. Using a unique dataset of over 200,000 classification rulings by US customs officials between 1990 and 2020, I find evidence that firms request classifications in response to rising protection. In particular, demand for classification rulings rose in response to textile quotas and President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products. Classification requests are also concentrated in tariff headings that contain high variance in tariff rates. The empirical patterns suggest that firms treat lobbying over tariff levels and lobbying over tariff classification as strategic substitutes.

2020

### **The Economic Coercion Trilemma**

In progress

Abstract: Why do states often design self-undermining programs of trade conditionality? For example, the United States Generalized System of

Preferences (GSP) excludes any state from eligibility which does not sufficiently protect both labor rights and intellectual property rights. If the US follows through on the conditionality by excluding a state that violates labor rights from the GSP then it loses its leverage to encourage that state to respect intellectual property rights. The program's design undermines its own credibility because in order to punish a state for violating labor rights the US must harm its own interests by relinquishing leverage over intellectual property rights policy. An analysis of the US GSP indicates that the program's self-undermining design reflects an underlying trilemma. The design of any one program of economic coercion can only achieve two of the following three objectives: 1) a broad domestic support for conditionality, 2) not self-undermining, and 3) maximum leverage on each issue. The trilemma applies to the GSP but also to economic sanctions, trade negotiations, and other instruments of economic coercion. I analyze the consequences of the trilemma in a formal model and discuss its application to other domains of economic coercion such as trade agreement negotiations and economic sanctions.

2018-2020

**When Do Trade Relations Shape Behavior? Influence in the Context of the US Generalized System of Preferences**

In progress

Abstract: Is trade conditionality effective at influencing the policies of foreign states or can it only be explained as an expression of domestic politics? This paper evaluates the effectiveness of conditionality under the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) at causing beneficiary states to change policy. The program offers beneficiary developing countries the opportunity to export a wide variety of goods duty free to the US, but eligibility for the program is conditional on respect for labor and intellectual property rights. Using a panel dataset and a differences-in-differences framework I find evidence that the US enforces the conditionality sincerely and that states respond accordingly. Leveraging exogenous variation from administrative discontinuities in the GSP authorizing statute, I find that states who gain more from GSP membership also implement more compliant policies. The evidence suggests that the US is both sufficiently able to commit to the conditionality and a sufficiently important market for domestic states to cause them to change policies.

2018-2020

**Conflict Technology as a Catalyst of State Formation: Urban Fortifications in Medieval and Early Modern Europe** (with Casey Petroff)

In progress

*Honorable Mention for Best Poster at the Harvard Government Department Poster Session*

The rise of the modern European state coincided with the arrival of a new technology, artillery, that changed the balance of offensive vs. defensive capabilities. What role did this technological shift play in the development of centralized nation-states? We propose a theory of how the Gunpow-

der Revolution encouraged European political entities to cede sovereignty to proto-states in exchange for security by significantly raising the costs of defense. States could provide defenses more efficiently by coordinating resources, constructing defenses in strategic locations, and wielding authority to alleviate collective action problems. We test our theory empirically with data on the locations of early European gun manufacture and on the fortifications of over 4,000 European localities.

### 3 Invited Talks

2020 American Political Science Association

2020 International Political Economy Society

2018-2020 Seminar Presentations at Harvard

### 4 Honors and Awards

2020 Graduate Student Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs

2018-2020 Graduate Student Associate of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science

2019 Harvard Kennedy School Distinction in Teaching Award (for masters level microeconomics)

2018 Harvard Distinction in Teaching Award (for PhD level microeconomics)

2014 JOSEPH WARNER YARDLEY PRIZE  
The Yardley Prize is awarded to the best thesis on political economy by a senior in any undergraduate school at Penn. Awarded for the thesis titled, "A Tale of Two Controversies: Impact of IMF Bias on Moral Hazard 1990-2010."

2014 ERIK ARNETZ INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE AWARD  
Awarded to an International Relations major whose "ingenuity, initiative, creativity, and academic achievement exemplify the values of connecting research to practice throughout the entirety of their classroom study, internship and work experience, research opportunities, and thesis writing."

2014 Phi Beta Kappa inductee

2010 Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program

2012 Special Delegate to West Point SCUSA Conference on International Affairs and Public Policy

## 5 Professional Experience

*Aug 2017 - Present*

Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences

- BGP610: The Political Economy of Trade (for Professor Robert Z. Lawrence). Masters of Public Policy and Masters of Public Administration students.
- Econ1400: The Future of Globalization (for Professors Robert Z. Lawrence and Lawrence H. Summers). Undergraduate students.
- Gov40: Introduction to International Relations (for Professors Dustin Tingley and Stephen Chaudoin). Undergraduate students.
- Econ2020a: Microeconomic Theory (for Professor Maciej Kotowski). PhD students.
- Gov1780: International Political Economy (for Professor Jeffrey Frieden). Undergraduate students.
- API101: Markets and Market Failure (for Professors Pinar Dogan, David Ellwood, Janina Matuszeski, and Marcella Alsan). Masters of Public Policy students.

*March 2019 - July 2019*

Research Assistant to Professors Josh Kertzer and Marcus Holmes

- Reviewed the political economy literature on the problem of conceptualizing the aggregation of preferences and biases of individuals.

*July 2016 - Feb 2017*

Research Assistant to Professor Dani Rodrik

- Assisted the construction and analysis of an original dataset on the rise of populism and its connection to globalization.

*Mar 2014 - May 2015*

Bates White Economic Consulting  
*Consultant*

- Analyzed economic datasets using econometric techniques and briefed senior consultants on the results.
- Conducted damages and penalties analysis with an expert in corporate litigation involving pharmaceutical pricing and marketing using Stata and SQL.
- Supported an expert in analyzing the economics of blood plasma donation.
- Contributed to expert witness deposition preparation.

*Jun 2011 - Feb 2013*

International Assessment and Strategy Center

*Research Assistant to Professor Anne-Louise Antonoff*

- Project 2030: An analysis of international trends through the year 2030 in critical infrastructure and resource management. Studied cyber-security, rare earth metals, international finance trends, energy technology, and many other trends for a major report on issues and concerns anticipating 2030.
- Transnational Organized Crime: Researched and wrote reports on various aspects of transnational organized crime. Specifically, the team studied the crime-terror nexus and the relationship between ungoverned physical spaces and crime. The territories of Mexico, Russia, Italy, Afghanistan, Ghana, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and others formed the foundation for case studies.

## **6 General Skills**

- Software: R, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, Qualtrics, Stata, MATLAB
- Language: Italian