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Safety Assurance Case

Responsible

Esaias Målqvist
emt21001@student.mdu.se

Contributors



Andrea Haglund <i>ahd20002@student.mdu.se</i>	Yonatan Michael Beyene <i>yme21001@student.mdu.se</i>
Claire Namatovu <i>cnu21001@student.mdu.se</i>	Emily Zainali <i>ezi21001@student.mdu.se</i>

Examiner: Luciana Provenzano

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Author: Esaias Målvqvist	Role: Safety Manager	Page 1 of 8

DOCUMENT APPROVAL

Name	Role	Version	Date	Signature
Andrea Haglund	Chief Engineer	1.1	2025-12-05	
Yonatan Michael Beyene	Q&C Manager	1.1	2025-12-05	

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Glossary

ARC

initial Air Risk Class. 5

ARP4761A

Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) providing guidelines for conducting the safety assessment process on civil aircraft systems and equipment, covering techniques such as FHA, FMEA, and FTA to support system safety analysis throughout the development lifecycle. 4

FHA

Functional Hazard Analysis. 3, 5

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. 3

FSA

Flight Safety Assessment. 4

FTA

Fault Tree Analysis. 3, 5

GSN

Goal Structuring Notation. 2, 6

iGRC

intrinsic Ground Risk Class. 4

PDSSA

Preliminary Drone Swarm Safety Assessment. 5

PSA

Preliminary Safety Assessment. 5

SA

Safety Assessment. 5

SAC

Safety Assurance Case. 4

SAIL

Specific Assurance and Integrity Level. 5

SAR

Search and Rescue. 4

SORA

JARUS guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA). SORA is a guideline for creating UAVs. 4

TMPR

Tactical Mitigation Performance Requirement. 5

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. 4

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The safety assurance case (SAC) will use documents produced throughout the project to demonstrate that the system is acceptably safe. The document will describe the system overview, safety objectives and arguments. The Safety case will be described using GSN argumentation.

1.2 Related Documents

Document ID	Document Title
SM-01	Safety Management Plan [1]
SM-03	Preliminary Safety Assessment [2]
SM-04	Flight Safety Assessment [3]
SM-05	Safety Assessment [4]
SM-06	Safety goals and requirements [5]
VVP-01	Test Case - Drone Swarm Requirements [6]
VVP-05	Verification - Safety Requirements [7]
VVP-06	Verification - Safety Goals [8]

Table 1: Related documents.

2 Safety Objectives

- 1) The system shall not cause unnecessary injury or bodily harm to people.
- 2) The system shall comply with the relevant requirements and processes defined in:
 - **SORA** (Specific Operations Risk Assessment), as applicable to operational risk and containment.
 - **ARP4761A**, for safety assessment processes and analysis methods.

3 System Description

The system under consideration is a communication and control protocol for a Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operating collaboratively in Search and Rescue (SAR) missions.

The protocol governs:

- **Inter-drone communication**, including coordination and data exchange.
- **Behavioral logic**, including formation management, area coverage, and fault response.

4 Safety Objective

Goal: It is demonstrated that the system is acceptably safe for its intended operation.

Strategy: Safety will be demonstrated by:

- 1) The identified potential hazards through structured analysis.
- 2) The safety goals and safety requirements derived from the identified hazards.
- 3) The verification of the safety goals and requirements.
- 4) The effect of the safety requirements on the system.

5 Safety Activities to Identify Hazards

5.1 Activities Based on SORA

Relevant safety activities defined under SORA are documented in the Flight Safety Assessment (FSA). These include:

- intrinsic Ground Risk Class (iGRC) determination.

- initial Air Risk Class (ARC)determination.
- Tactical Mitigation Performance Requirement (TMPR) and robustness level assessment.
- Specific Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL) determination.
- Containment requirements definition.

5.2 Activities Based on ARP4761A

Relevant safety activities derived from ARP4761A are documented in the Preliminary Safety Assessment (PSA), these include:

- Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA).
- Preliminary Drone Swarm Safety Assessment (PDSSA).

5.3 Safety Goal and Requirement Elicitation

Safety goals and requirements are documented in safety goals and requirement document (SM-06).

5.4 Verification

All verification can be found in these three documents:

- Test Case - Drone Swarm Requirements.
- Verification - Safety Requirements.
- Verification - Safety Goals.

5.5 Mitigation effects

The requirements' effect on the system is documented in the Safety Assessment (SA) document and mostly consists of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).

6 Argumentation




Figure 1: GSN

6.1 Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) statements

6.1.1 Goals

- G1: The system is acceptably safe for its intended operation.
- G2: All preliminary hazards have been identified.
- G3: All identified hazards have been addressed with relevant safety requirements.
- G4: Requirements are proven to be effective in mitigating hazards.
- G5: All safety goals and requirements have been verified.
- G6: All mitigations have proven to increase system safety.

6.1.2 Strategy

- S1: Argument by showing hazards are identified, addressed through safety goals and requirements, verified.
- S2: Show effect of mitigation and verification of requirements.

6.1.3 Assumptions

- A1: The agents will be able to detect internal faults.
- A2: The mitigations reduces risk when hardware failure occurs, they do not reduce the risk of hardware failure.

6.1.4 Context

- C1: systems operational boundaries are defined as rural areas with population < 5 per km^2 .

6.1.5 Solutions

- Sn1: PSA document [2].
- Sn2: FSA document [3].
- Sn3: Safety goals and requirement document [5].
- Sn4: Verification - Safety Requirements [7].
- Sn5: Verification - Safety Goals [8].
- Sn6: Safety assessment document [4].
- Sn7: Test Case - Drone Swarm Requirements [6].

References

- [1] E. Målqvist, *Safety Management Plan*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Oct. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [2] —, *Preliminary Safety Assessment*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Nov. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [3] —, *Flight Safety Assessment*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Nov. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [4] —, *Safety Assessment*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Nov. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [5] —, *Safety Goals And Requirements*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Oct. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [6] E. Zainali, *Test Case - Drone Swarm Requirements*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Nov. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [7] —, *Verification - Safety Requirements*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Nov. 4 2025, Version 1.0.
- [8] —, *Verification - Safety Goals*, Intelligent Replanning Drone Swarm, Nov. 4 2025, Version 1.0.