

Chapter 1: Varieties of Emotions in the Animal Motive Soul¹

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A desire for food and fear of a predator. Wonder at art and a longing for freedom. Some would insist on calling the latter two states “emotions,” and the former “animal appetites.” Naturally, how we parse this depends on what we say emotions are. If emotions are something more elevated, constituted by evaluative judgments, while animal appetites are just hardwired impulses towards specific objects, then such a distinction makes sense.² Avicenna—notable within classical Arabic philosophy for his optimism about what animal nature is capable of—approaches the matter differently. But this is not because he thinks there is no difference between animal and human emotional life. Rather, it’s because he thinks that states seemingly as different as the above-mentioned pairs are fundamentally actualizations of the same faculty, shared by all animals, human and non-human. That is, all these states are *inclinations* (translating *inbi’āth* or *nazzā’*), with cognitive causes of varying complexity. They are emotions insofar as they incline their subject to various acts and objects, and insofar as they are inclinations, they are basically alike.

In what follows I will argue that Avicenna’s understanding of emotion³ captures a wider range of affective states than had previously been recognized in his tradition, by showing how Avicenna deemphasizes traditional Aristotelian terminology (Gr. *orexis*, Ar. *shawq*), and instead makes use of this idea of “inclination (again, *inbi’āth* or *nazzā’*)” as that which is fundamental to being an emotion. My argument will largely be born out through a detailed contextualization and analysis of some difficult texts that have not thus far been treated in detail: Avicenna’s most comprehensive account of the motive faculty, in his *Healing: Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4.⁴ We will see Avicenna begin by discussing basic concupiscible and irascible emotions, and then slowly

1 All translations of the Arabic in this dissertation are my own, unless noted.

2 See Martha Nussbaum, developing a theory she takes to be in the Stoic tradition, in Nussbaum (2001) 131.

3 A problem facing any study of emotion in the history of philosophy is that it is difficult to locate a historical category that precisely overlaps with our modern category of emotion. But the reason for this is not that premodern philosophy did not deal with the same topic. Rather, it is that even today it is notoriously hard to agree upon what counts as an “emotion,” leading to a wide range of theories of what an emotion is. So it is no use looking for something in the history of philosophy that fills the same functional role as our modern category for emotions, since we are far from agreement on what that role is.

Yet it is clear that Avicenna and contemporaries are attempting to explain similar phenomena as modern day emotion theorists if we take our cues from particular emotions. That is, there are certain states (fear, joy, envy) that basically everyone wants to call emotions, though for different reasons, and if we look at how Avicenna deals with terms like that, we see a more clear picture emerge.

Nonetheless, once we have identified the texts where emotions are dealt with, the best way of understanding them is to follow the inner logic of Avicenna’s own system. That is, as psychological states, emotions are fundamentally explained through major divisions of psychological faculties. So in what follows I will present how Avicenna deal with things we would call emotions, according to his own schema.

4 The first scholar to draw attention to Avicenna’s usage of *inbi’āth* and *nazzā’* was Helmut Gätje, in “Zur Psychologie der Willenshandlungen in der islamischen Philosophie,” pp. 357-359. What I present here will not disagree with Gätje, but it will show that Avicenna’s picture is complex in ways Gätje’s brief treatment does not address. The only other place this topic has been discussed is in Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 218-225. Again, there is little I disagree with in his treatment of Avicenna, but much remains to be filled in.

broaden the category of emotion to include emotions that are *like* concupiscible emotions, but which have what he calls “internal” goods as their object, as opposed to “external” goods. From there, I will show how he expands the category of emotion to include affective states unique to humans, and then, finally, varieties of pleasure. These are all presented as states of the animal motive faculty, which makes the last of these especially unexpected, since pleasure is a completion-state, not a state wherein any new object is desired. But since inclination is a broader concept than desire or appetite, all these states end up able to be grouped together in a meaningful way.

1. Aristotelian Background for the Concept of "Moved-Mover"

Avicenna’s notion of “inclination” fills roughly the same role in his psychology as that of “moved-mover” for Aristotle, being an elaboration of the terrain covered by Aristotle in *De Anima* 3.9-11.⁵ At the start of 3.9 Aristotle divides animal and human psychological faculties into two kinds: those enabling cognition, and those enabling voluntary motion.⁶ Aristotle says that voluntary motion involves four things: two causes of movement, the means of movement, and the moving subject. This is seen in the following text, where Aristotle initially says there are “three factors,” but he then specifies that the first factor is in fact of of “two kinds”:

But movement involves three factors: first the moving cause, secondly the means by which it produces movement, and thirdly the thing moved. The moving cause is of two kinds: one is unmoved and the other both moves and is moved. The former is the practical good, while that which both moves and is moved is the appetite (for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement), and the thing moved is the animal.⁷

The last two factors involved in voluntary motion are the most straightforward: in the case of animal motion, the *subject* of movement is the whole animal, and the *means* of movement are the various organs and muscles that operate by pushing and pulling. Shortly after this text, Aristotle argues that there must be a central axis for all this pushing and pulling, which later commentators understood to be the heart.⁸

Prior to the means and the subject of motion is the cause of motion, which Aristotle breaks down into the practical good and appetite. Aristotle does not explain what he means by “practical good” in this context, but Themistius interprets him to simply mean a good that is relevant to and within reach of some agent, as opposed to goodness in some unqualified and universal sense.⁹ Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias understands the starting point of movement to mean some external object understood as something to be pursued or avoided.¹⁰ This would make a “practical good” any specific object, understood in such a way as to be relevant to appetite. For example, not *the* good, but *a* good, like food; and not just food, but food *grasped as* pleasant or nutritious. The reason the practical good is an “unmoved-mover” is because it is the end of

5 Aristotle’s *De Motu Animalium* is of course another key text for the motive faculty, but—despite Averroes’ later awareness of *De Motu* in broad strokes—the text itself does not seem to have ever been translated into Arabic. See Gutas (2014) 361, n. 5.

6 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.9, 432b.

7 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b.

8 Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (1996) 223.

9 Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (1996) 220.

10 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima* (1980) 98, section 2.89.

action. In a commentary attributed to John Philoponus, we read that God is called an unmoved-mover of the world for similar reasons: God is not changed, but is rather the goal towards which changeable things direct their actions.¹¹ So the practical good is an unmoved-mover because an object, when evaluated in a certain light, can be the goal for motion.¹²

The proximate cause of motion, on the other hand, is a *moved-mover*, and it is this component of Aristotle's psychological schema that has traditionally been associated with emotion. Aristotle himself explains what he means by "moved-mover" as follows: "for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement."¹³ The first half of this simply tells us that appetite is one of the causes of motion, the second half tells us that appetite causes motion by itself being a kind of motion, or change. Just like how the sense in which practical good remains *unchanged* helps us understand the sort of mover it is, so here the sense in which appetite *is* a change helps us understand why it is a mover. Again, (Pseudo) John Philoponus attempts to explain the core of what it is to be a moved-mover when he says that appetite is a change "insofar as it reaches out."¹⁴ This is an appeal to the origins of the word appetite (or *orexis*). As Martha Nussbaum relates, prior to Aristotle, the verb *orego* was fairly common outside of philosophical literature, and was used to refer to a literal reaching out (with one's hand, for example) towards some physical object (like a cup).¹⁵ Aristotle is obviously not using *orexis* in this context to refer to the literal, external reaching, since he is focused on the internal causes of motion, rather than motion itself. Nussbaum considers it a major contribution of Aristotle's to use *orexis* to refer to an inner reaching out, which is the cause for action in the more literal, prior sense of the verb. If we are talking about an appetite to avoid, rather than to pursue, then the distance of Aristotle's usage from the literal sense of *orego* is even more clear.

So the four factors involved in movement can be summarized up as follows:

- 1) unmoved-mover: a practical good, i.e., an object cognized/represented in the subject
- 2) moved-mover: an act of the motive faculty/appetite, in response to (1)
- 3) means of motion: muscles and the ligaments
- 4) that which is moved: the subject as a whole¹⁶

11 See (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (2013) 39, section 587.5ff.

12 Towards the end of the section on voluntary movement, there is a text where it might seem that Aristotle is identifying the unmoved-mover with the cognition, not the object, saying "the cognitive faculty is not moved but remains still (3.11, 434a)." But, of course, cognition is a kind of change, which means it is not the best candidate for being the unmoved-mover, precisely speaking. So what must be meant here is that the object, *as presented by some cognitive, evaluative act*, is the end which to which appetite responds, and that cognition does not have to undergo any further change in order to serve its purpose. The process of cognition is not the object of appetite, but is rather a necessary condition for the object to be relevant to appetite. In other words, one reaches out not for the thought of their object as pleasant, but rather just for the pleasant object. The thought of the object as pleasant merely occasions that reaching out.

13 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b.

14 (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (2013) 41, section 591.10ff.

15 Nussbaum (2001) pp. 130–31.

16 Avicenna most explicitly replicates this fourfold schema in *Healing: Metaphysics*, section 6.5.3. Some of the precise terminology differs between Aristotle and Avicenna. For example, Aristotle calls *orexis* the proximate principle of motion, while Avicenna calls the means of motion the proximate principle, and differences in labeling ripple out from there. But the ordering and general point is the same.

In the *De Anima*, Aristotle further subdivides appetite into concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), irascible appetite (*thumos*), which are moved-movers in response to objects of sensation, and will or choice (*bouleisis*), which is in response to an object of thought¹⁷. But he is less concerned in this text to define and distinguish these appetites from one another than to clarify the role of appetite in general as a cause of movement.

2. Basic Emotions in Avicenna: Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite

The portions of Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* (*Al-Shifā' : Kitāb Al-Nafs*) where he treats emotions, and questions similar to those of *De Anima* 3.9-11, are his discussions of the animal motive faculty (*al-quwwa al-muḥarrika*), and the practical intellect considered as a motive principle (*mabda' muḥarrika*). But to be a motive *principle* is just to be a cognitive cause (an unmoved-mover) for acts of the animal motive faculty (moved-movers), so our discussion here will focus on the animal motive faculty.

Avicenna introduces the motive faculty in *Healing: Psychology* 1.5, in his initial enumeration of all psychological faculties, where motive faculties are distinguished at first from the apprehending (*mudrika*) faculties.¹⁸ The motive faculty, next, is divided into two types: the motive faculty as inclining (*bā' itha*)¹⁹ with respect to movement, and the motive faculty in the sense of actually moving (*fā' ila*).²⁰ The inclining (*bā' itha*) side is roughly synonymous with Aristotle's idea of moved-mover, while the actually moving side is constituted by the muscles and ligaments, which Aristotle called the means of motion. So the inclining side instigates movement, and the actually moving side carries it out.²¹ As we will see, actualizations of the inclining (*bā' itha*) side of the motive faculty constitute emotions, and so emotions on Avicenna's schema can be thought of as fundamentally inclining with respect to movement. This does not mean that emotions are always *successful* in triggering movement, just that they incline towards it.²² The terms inclination and emotion can thus be used interchangeably when discussing Avicenna's views.

Avicenna's first foray into explaining varieties of emotions in *Psychology* begins, him being a good Aristotelian, by distinguishing the concupiscible and irascible faculties. This is expected, but we need to understand *how* Avicenna goes about introducing the motive faculty here in 1.5, as it will help us see how he identifies and contrasts other varieties of inclinations beyond concupiscible and irascible appetites later in 4.4:

17 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.9, 432b.

18 Lest this sound overly obscure, we should recall that talk of "psychological faculties" is just a way of describing the sort of abilities that living organisms have. One of the things some living organisms can do is engage in voluntary motion, and the "motive faculty" is an umbrella term for any faculty involved in voluntary motion.

19 Avicenna elsewhere further subdivides the inclining side into inclination to act *and* resolution to act (*ijmā'*). For example, Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement 25, page 435.

20 A more literal translation of *fā' ila* would be "acting" or "doing," but "moving" is appropriate because the act in question is specifically physical motion (from place to place, or in place).

21 In his *Psychology*, Avicenna is most interested in discussing motive faculty in the sense of being a motivating moved-mover. Like Aristotle, who spent more time talking about the means of movement elsewhere, for example in his *De Motu*, Avicenna discusses means of motion in his medical and biological works.

22 See footnote 19 about the distinction between inclination and resolution. \$

The motive faculty has two divisions: the motive faculty insofar as it instigates movement, and insofar as it carries out [movement]. And the motive faculty insofar as it instigates is the appetitive [*al-nazū' iyyah al-shawqiyyah*] faculty, and this is the faculty that, when a form to be sought or to be avoided [*ṣūra maṭlūbah aw mahrūb 'anhā*] is inscribed in the imagination—a faculty we'll discuss soon—it [the appetitive power] impels the other [loco]motive power—that we're about to discuss—towards movement.

And the appetitive faculty [*al-quwwa al-nazū' iyya al-shawqiyya*] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [*al-shahwāniyya*] faculty, which is a faculty that instigates motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [*al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfi'atan*], seeking pleasure [*al-ladhdha*]. And the other faculty, called the irascible [*al-ghaḍabiyya*] faculty, is the faculty which instigates motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [*al-ghalba*].²³

Two things need to be observed in this text to understand Avicenna's general approach to emotions: 1) concupiscible and irascible appetite have attractions and aversions, with their objects of attraction constituting their final object, and 2) concupiscible and irascible appetite's final objects are best construed as a kind of pleasure and dominance, respectively. By understanding the sense in which the concupiscible and irascible faculties have final objects, and what those objects are, we'll be able to better see the *further* distinctions Avicenna makes between types of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, since he appeals to distinct final objects for distinct types of emotions. (1) and (2) will be explained in more detail in sections 2.1 and 2.2 that follow presently.

2a. Innate Attractions and Aversions in All Psychological Faculties

A crucial point needed to understand Avicenna's description of concupiscible and irascible emotions in *Psychology* 1.5, and how he categorizes further types of emotions, is that voluntary motion (motion in response to cognition) and involuntary, natural motion (motion that does not involve cognition) both involve faculties that have attractions and aversions. In talking about motive faculties, he is talking about faculties most directly responsible for voluntary motion, and these faculties themselves have natural, *involuntary* attractions and aversions. In one of Avicenna's early works, *Treatise on Love*, he makes the following point about how all psychological faculties incline towards their final objects, and away from the opposites of those objects:

There is no doubt that each of the animal faculties are characterized by a type of behavior, impelled by an innate love [*'ishq gharīzī*]. If animal faculties did not possess a natural aversion [*nufūr ṭabī'ī*] whose principle is an innate hatred [*baghḍa gharīziyya*], and a natural desire [*tawaqān ṭabī'ī*] whose source is innate love [*'ishq gharīzī*], then their existence in the animal body would be superfluous. And it is apparent that that is the case for each of the divisions [of psychological faculties].²⁴

As Avicenna's examples in *Treatise on Love* go on to show, this is essentially a statement that every psychological faculty is meant for some particular final object, or end, and is in a state of completion when it attains that object. The external and internal senses are made for perceiving certain types of sensibles, and are averse to perceiving others. This is *natural* attraction and

23 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, p. 41.

24 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 251.

aversion and, like the stone's natural attraction towards the earth, it results in natural, *involuntary* movements. The eye flinches at something that is too bright; the imagination quakes at a ghastly thought. The only objects that can naturally attract or cause aversion to some faculty are those specifically in the domain that faculty is designed for.

But animals are capable of voluntary motion, and this is due to faculties that have attraction and aversion in response to *cognized* objects. This is what Avicenna is trying to capture in Psychology 1.5 when he says that the motive faculty is the faculty that responds to things inscribed in the imagination as “to be sought or to be avoided.” If all he were saying here is that the motive faculty is attracted to its object, and averse to the opposite of its object, this would be nothing new—it would be natural attraction and aversion. What makes the motive faculties unique is that they respond to the specific objects of *any* faculty, provided they are cognized as “to be sought or to be avoided.” Rather than just being in response to objects that are naturally attractive or repugnant to some faculty, there is an added layer of processing: one person might cognize a bit of food as attractive, another might see it as repugnant. There follows from that evaluative cognition an attraction or repulsion in the motive faculty. It's the motive faculty's aversion or attraction to things *cognized* in a particular way that makes it a capacity for voluntary motion.

So when Avicenna says in the text from Psychology 1.5 that there are at least two branches of the motive faculty, he is not saying that there is one faculty for “seeking,” and one faculty for “avoiding.” Based on the fact that the concupiscible faculty is the faculty associated explicitly with pleasurable things, and the irascible with harmful things, it would be tempting to associate the former with attraction, the latter with aversion, and to assimilate all motivation related to negative objects with the irascible faculty. But we know from the more general facts just mentioned about how *all* faculties are structured that both branches have a certain function, and will lead to some emotions that constitute attractions to their final object, and some emotions that are aversions to its opposite. Clarifying that every faculty has attractions and aversions allows us to more precisely specify the objects of concupiscible and irascible emotions, as follows.

2b. The Final Objects of Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite

Knowing that both concupiscible and irascible faculties have objects to which they are attracted as *final* objects, we need to read the text from *Psychology* 1.5 with a view to characterizing what those objects are. But this requires some careful parsing, since Avicenna mentions several things about each faculty. Here is the relevant text again:

And the appetitive faculty [al-quwwa al-nazū'iyya al-shawqiyya] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [al-shahwāniyya] faculty, and it is a faculty that incites motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfi'atan], seeking pleasure [al-ladhdha]. And the other faculty, called the irascible [al-ghaḍabiyya] faculty, is the faculty which incites motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [al-ghalba].²⁵

The concupiscible appetite *seeks* pleasure, in response to something “*imagined* to be necessary or beneficial,” and it aims to *acquire* that imagined thing. Likewise, the irascible appetite *seeks*

25 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 41.

dominance in response to something “*imagined* to be harmful or corruptive,” and it aims to *defend* against that imagined thing. There seems to be some goal, some cognition, and some associated action.

We can orient ourselves to determine which of these three items constitutes the faculties’ proper, final objects with a clue from, again, the *Treatise on Love*. After mentioning the attractions and aversions of the perceptive faculties, Avicenna says that the irascible faculty is attracted to revenge and dominance (*al-intiqām wa-al-taghallub*), and is averse to lowliness and submission (*al-dhull wa-al-istikāna*).²⁶ In the *Psychology* 1.5 text, dominance is that which the irascible appetite “seeks,” so the parallel for the concupiscible appetite would be its “seeking pleasure.” Avicenna does not say so in the *Treatise on Love*, but we can assume that the opposite of pleasure would be pain, so the concupiscible appetite is attracted to pleasure, and averse to pain.

The associated cognitions and actions, then, flesh out what it means to be attracted to pleasure and dominance, respectively. Attraction to the possibility of pleasure can occur when something is “imagined to be necessary or beneficial,” and the movement prompted by such attraction would be an attempt to acquire pleasure. Attraction to the possibility of dominance can occur when something is “imagined to be harmful or corruptive,” and the logical way of achieving dominance in light of such an imagination would be defensive, or retaliatory behavior. So the other aspects of the *Psychology* 1.5 text simply capture the cognition which occasions attraction from the concupiscible or irascible faculty, which we could call the faculty’s *intentional* (as opposed to final) object, and the associated *generic behavior* that would constitute acting on that emotion. For example, a puppy might see some food left on the table as delicious (an intentional object), and so try to eat it, on account of its final object, pleasure.

To be clear, these terms (final object, intentional object, and associated behavior) are my terms for clarifying what Avicenna is getting at, and are not in the text itself. By final object, I mean that towards which the act is directed (e.g., pleasure or dominance), and by “intentional” I mean how some other object is cognized so as to make it relevant to that final object (e.g., some object conceived of as pleasant or harmful).²⁷ Motive acts are not cognitive, of course, so to say they have intentional objects means they are preceded by intentional cognitions.

To summarize, concupiscible and irascible faculties give rise to emotions that are attractions to their final objects, and to aversions to the opposites of those final objects. Since these are faculties for voluntary motion, they are actualized by cognized, intentional objects that make the final object (or its opposite) clear, which leads to characteristic behaviors. Avicenna has a similar discussion of the concupiscible and irascible appetite at the start of *Psychology* 4.4, and apart

²⁶ Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 251.

²⁷ The fact that there is something like an intentional object (i.e., an object cognized in such a way as to be relevant to the motive faculty), is supported by the following text, occurring later in *Psychology*:

“For the irascible faculty is not affected by pleasures, and the concupiscible power is not affected by harmful things [*al-mu’ dhiyyāt*], and the apprehensive power is not influenced by that which influences these two, and nothing is conceptualized by these two [irascible and concupiscible faculties] insofar as these two are receptive of the apprehended form (5.7, 252).”

This text makes it clear that one and the same object can have various properties: sensible properties and evaluative properties. Insofar as some object is grasped as pleasant or harmful, it is relevant to the concupiscible and irascible faculty, respectively.

from some minor variations in terminology, he gives the same general picture.²⁸ A comparison of the two texts is as follows:

	<i>Healing: Psychology</i> 1.5	<i>Healing: Psychology</i> 4.4
Generic Name for Appetites	<i>al-shawqiyya</i>	<i>al-shawqiyya</i>
Concupiscible Name	<i>al-shahwāniyya</i>	<i>al-shahwāniyya</i>
Concupiscible Final Object	Pleasure <i>al-ladhdha</i>	That which is pleasant <i>al-ladhīdh</i>
Concupiscible Intentional Object	Imagined to be necessary or beneficial [<i>al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfi‘atan</i>]	Imagined to be beneficial [<i>al-mutakhayyil nafi‘an</i>]
Concupiscible Associated Behavior	Getting closer/approaching [<i>yaqrab</i>]	Acquiring [<i>tajlab</i>]
Irascible Name	<i>al-ghaḍabiyya</i>	<i>al-ghaḍabiyya</i>
Irascible Final Object	Dominance [<i>al-ghalba</i>]	Dominance [<i>al-ghalba</i>]
Irascible Intentional Object	Imagined to be harmful or corruptive [<i>al-mutakhayyil ḍarran aw mufsidan</i>]	Imagined as an obstacle [<i>al-mutakhayyil munāfiyan</i>]
Irascible Associated Behavior	Defense [<i>yadfa‘</i>]	Defense [<i>tadfa‘</i>]

While the above table captures details of the concupiscible and irascible faculties related to their natural *attractions*, Avicenna is not explicit about the details concerning these faculties’ *aversions*—but we can work to fill in the blanks. We know from the *Treatise on Love* that the irascible appetite is averse to lowliness (the opposite of dominance),²⁹ and we have inferred that the concupiscible appetite is averse to pain (the opposite of pleasure).

Support for the concupiscible appetite being averse to pain is evident from prior texts in the Aristotelian tradition, since it is because of the concupiscible faculty’s aversion response that, for example, zoophytes (plant-like animals) can still have voluntary responses to pain.³⁰ Though traditionally thought of as lacking the conceptual apparatus for full defensive, retaliatory irascible behavior, zoophytes shrink away from things their meager imaginations conceive of as painful. So concupiscible behavior averse to pain would be occasioned by imagining something as painful (an intentional object), and the likely result of such an aversion would be an attempt to avoid, escape, or turn away.

28 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195, 4.4.

29 See above, footnote 26. \$

30 Aristotle discusses zoophytes in *De Anima* 2.3. Themistius, commenting on that passage, makes it clear that they only have concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), yet are still able to voluntarily shrink away from pain. See *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima* (1996), p. 62.12-14

Avicenna’s own discussion of zoophytes proceeds along similar lines, but does not draw quite as explicit a conclusion about their lacking irascible appetite as does Themistius. In *Healing: Psychology* 2.3, the chapter on the sense of touch, Avicenna incorporates zoophytes into his wider psychological scheme by drawing a basic distinction between two types of voluntary motion: motion in place, and motion from place to place (i.e., locomotion). He says that zoophytes’ attraction and aversion responses entail that they have the sense of touch, and this explains why they are able to move in place.

The intentional object and associated behavior for the irascible faculty's aversion to lowliness are a bit more difficult to tease out. Avicenna describes the irascible faculty's intentional object on account of its attraction to dominance as "harmful," "corruptive," or "qua obstacle." But whereas the opposite of qua pleasant (i.e., qua painful) makes good sense as an intentional object for the concupiscible appetite's aversive side, the opposites of harmful, corruptive, or qua obstacle (perhaps: beneficial, salubrious, or helpful) don't make sense as probable intentional objects for the aversive side of the irascible faculty. A disposition to avoid lowliness would not be triggered by something "cognized as helpful," without further qualification. What *would* trigger a response based on someone's aversion for lowliness? Presumably something like, "imagining x as in a position of dominance over oneself," or "imagining x as impossible to overcome." But this is far too specific to be the converse for what Avicenna actually says about what the irascible faculty is attracted to (again, all he says is that it is for some object cognized "as harmful," etc.). This seems to indicate a lacuna in how Avicenna describes the intentional object of the irascible faculty, which later Latin medieval authors take up. Aquinas, for example, thinks of the irascible faculty's positive response as triggered by something conceived of as, roughly, a "surmountable obstacle," while its negative response is triggered by something conceived of as an "insurmountable obstacle."³¹ There is no reason to think Avicenna would reject this approach, but is not yet there in his sparse description of the irascible faculty's final object. Avicenna's work is, nonetheless, a major step towards clarity on these issues.³²

2c. Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite as Varieties of *Shawq*

A last thing we should notice from Avicenna's introduction of the motive faculty in T1 is his identification of concupiscible and irascible emotions as varieties of *shawq* (or more precisely, *al-quwwa al-shawqiyya* in *Psychology* 1.5), which is the Arabic translation of the Greek *orexis*/appetite. This is an important thing to notice because it paves the way for a major division between types of emotions. While Aristotle (and the Greek commentators following him) used the idea of appetite generically for all motive faculties (including *bouleisis*), Avicenna reserves *shawq* for the concupiscible and irascible faculties in *Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4. To look ahead a bit, Avicenna seems inclined to restrict the usage of *shawq* to concupiscible and irascible appetite, because he thinks of concupiscible and irascible appetites as responses to a perception of some sort of lack or vulnerability, especially to the external senses: things that would bring pleasure to the external senses signify concrete goods, and things that would bring pain to the external senses signify concrete obstacles or vulnerabilities.

31 The distinction is helpful, in part, because defensive or retaliatory behavior is not best thought of as a push away from some object. Rather, it is pull towards that which, as an obstacle, could be painful. On this distinction see Peter King (2012) 220.

32 Avicenna's careful characterization of the nature of the concupiscible and irascible appetites is a systematization of some various lines of thought in his source material. We see in the Greek commentators and Al-Farabi some reference to the idea of the irascible faculty as a faculty for retaliation, but more consistently animal movement is explained in terms of pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain (see Themistius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* (1996) 139, 112.33ff. In Farabi's *Political Regime* (1971) 33.8, the irascible faculty is narrowly associated with things like fleeing, loathing, or avoidance. In the *Virtuous City* (1985) 10.6, p. 170, the appetitive faculty (containing the concupiscible and irascible) is boiled down succinctly to that which moves us "towards [*ilā*]" or "away from [*an*]" an apprehended object. Appetites in Farabi are conceived of primarily as pulls (concupiscible) and pushes (irascible), with the ideas of defensiveness, attack, or retaliation being mostly absent.

As mentioned when discussing the Aristotelian background, the term *orexis* originally related to the idea of a literal reaching out for the sake of some concrete concern or lack. Avicenna would not have been aware of the Greek linguistic background per se, but he would be aware of the associations surrounding these two faculties and the generic idea of *shawq*.³³ For example, in the *Healing: Metaphysics* he describes God as having a will, but not *shawq*, because he is not in need of anything.³⁴ The focus on pleasures and pains of the external senses in particular is suggested by Avicenna's examples later in *Psychology* 4.4: "greed, avarice and lust" are given as examples of the "bestial concupiscible faculty," clearly in an effort to portray the concupiscible appetite as resulting in emotions oriented towards something like lower goods.³⁵

These distinctions between significantly different types of final objects have a basis in Aristotle's *Ethics*, where Aristotle distinguishes between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul.³⁶ Avicenna, as we will see, makes things more fine grained by distinguishing between three broad types of final objects/faculties we can be attracted to: sensory, imaginative and intellectual goods. Avicenna's distinction between emotions in response to objects of the external senses and those whose objects are unique to the internal senses will be clarified and verified and as we examine *Psychology* 4.4 presently.

3. Emotions Oriented Towards Internal Pleasures of the Imagination

In *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna takes up the motive faculty again, but in more detail: after reviewing the distinction between the two types of *shawq* (concupiscible and irascible appetite), Avicenna immediately proceeds to describe animal emotions that *seem* related to *shawq*, but which are better described as something "belonging to the imagination." This is Avicenna's most in-depth explanation of emotions beyond concupiscible and irascible appetite, so it is worth unpacking in some detail. As we will see, what makes these emotions unique is that they are in response to final objects of a different kind: objects of the internal senses. This is contrasted explicitly with acts of the concupiscible appetite, which are attractions to objects of the external senses. His discussion of this new category of emotion spans three continuous paragraphs, but context helps clarify the obscurities, so we need to have the whole text at hand to begin the analysis:

[a] And we may [*wa-qad*] find in animals impulses [*inbi' āthāt*] not [just] for [*ilā*] the objects of concupiscible appetite [*shahwātihā*],³⁷ but also [we find] an inclination [*nazzā'*] of the one who begat for [their] offspring,

33 I am not arguing that the restriction of *orexis/shawq* to goods or harms of the external senses accurately reflects what is going on in Aristotle—just that this is how Avicenna seems to use and understand the terminology.

34 Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing* (2005) 8.7, p. 292.

35 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 196.

36 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1117b24-1118a1. For the interpretation of Aristotle as considering *epithumia* to be primarily concerned with pleasures of the external senses, see John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul*, 2.1-6 (2005) 253.20ff.

37 Two notes on translating *shahwātihā* as "objects of the concupiscible appetite:

1) I take *hā* to refer to the concupiscible appetite, which is discussed in the sentence just prior to what is quoted here.

2) Taking *shahwa* to refer to an object requires more explanation. Sometimes this term is used to refer to lower forms of appetite (e.g., Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.3, p. 68). But if it meant that here, this first line would be saying something like, "there are inclinations for appetites," which sounds something like a second-order desire, and is obviously not what Avicenna means. Lane's *Lexicon*, however, says that this term can

and of the one who befriends for the friend, and similarly their desiring escape from bonds and chains. This, even though it is not an object [*shahwa*] belonging [*lil*] to the concupiscible faculty, it is a certain longing [*ishtiyāq mā*] for [*ilā*] an object [*shahwa*] owing to [*li*] to the imagination [*al-quwwa al-khayāliyya*].

[b] For [*fa-inna*], there is particular to the apprehending faculty—in what it apprehends, and in what it is transformed with regard to among the things that are renewed through sight, or [other] forms, for example—a pleasure that is particular to it. So when [*fa-idhā*] it [the apprehending power] suffers the loss of that pleasure, it [the animal] longs [*ishtāqat*] for it naturally, then the decisive faculty resolves that the organs should move towards it, similar to how it resolves [to act] for the sake of concupiscible and irascible appetite, and for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good also.

[c] And so to concupiscible desire there belongs the increasing of appetite towards pleasure, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and to the irascible power there belongs the increasing of appetite towards dominance, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and likewise to the imagination [*lil-takhayyul*] there is also something [*mā*] particular to it, and to the inclining power the resolution to act.³⁸

The basic thrust of [a-c] is that there is some set of emotions, similar to concupiscible emotions, but more related to objects of the imagination. The first thing to notice about these texts is all the ways in which he signals in [a] that he is picking out something new, distinct from concupiscible and irascible appetite. Specifically, the generic vocabulary he uses to capture what he is now discussing is broader than what he has used before. Concupiscible and irascible faculties were types of *shawq*, whereas this is a new kind of inclination (*nazzā'*), distinct from concupiscible desire, under the heading of “impulses (*inbi' āthāt*).” He is careful to not call this *shawq*, though it is related (it is an *ishtiyāq mā*, or “some sort of longing,” a word derived from the same root). We do not want to hang too much on a couple of words, but in context he is clearly picking out a new category of emotions, something similar to but different concupiscible appetite. Again, towards the end of [b] Avicenna compares the way that this new type of emotion, on the one hand, and concupiscible and irascible appetites, on the other, lead to movement. In making such a comparison, he affirms the difference between the two types of emotions. Finally, [c] summarizes the preceding, emphasizing that, broadly, three things have been discussed: concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite, and “something” particular to the imagination.

Avicenna tells us, in [a], that what distinguishes this new type of emotion from what has already been discussed is that it is more attributable to the imagination. By this, he cannot mean that the imagination itself is a type of motive faculty, since in an earlier part of 4.4 Avicenna reaffirms the distinction between the apprehending and motive faculties, saying that the apprehending powers have “nothing” of appetite.³⁹ What he must mean, then, is that the imagination is involved in a distinct or more central way with these emotions than with concupiscible appetite. This does not mean that imagination is involved in these emotions, and has *nothing whatsoever* to do with concupiscible appetite, since the intentional objects of the concupiscible faculty are those “imagined” to be pleasant, and we are eventually aware of perceptibles of the external senses in various internal senses. He is focusing on a difference in the *extent* to which imagination is involved, not *whether* there is imagination involved.

sometimes be applied to “objects of desire,” citing Quran 13:4 as an example, where it speaks of “love of desires (*ḥubb al-shahwāt*),” where examples of desires include women, gold, and horses. So “desires” can also loosely refer to objects, in the sense of “objects of desire.”

38 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 195.

39 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 194.

His examples of this new type of moved-mover in [a] are meant to explicate this new category of emotions. He mentions that animals have emotions towards things like distant friends and relations, and towards something as abstract as freedom when they are in captivity. One might think that what these examples have in common is that they are not oriented towards any type of pleasure at all: indeed, it might seem somewhat crass to think of seeking out a distant friend or relation just for the sake of one's own pleasure, and likewise with freedom. Seeking out friends and relations is distinctly others-oriented in a way that activities of concupiscible appetite are not. However, in [b] Avicenna elaborates, clarifying that what these examples have in common is that they are inclinations oriented at the *imagination's* pleasures, as opposed to mere sensory pleasures. This can be seen in the details of the text as follows.

The transition word at the beginning of [b], *for/fa-inna*, tells us that this paragraph is meant to be in some way an elaboration of the new sort of emotion introduced in [a]. The second half of [b] is fairly straightforward, saying that there is a pleasure, or set of pleasures, particular to the imagination, and when they are absent, the animal soul can have inclinations for them, similar to how there are inclinations for concupiscible objects, irascible objects, and intelligible objects—the last of which we will say more about later. The italicized portion of [b], towards the beginning, is somewhat enigmatic: this new category of pleasure, is found “in what [the apprehending faculty] apprehends, and in what it is transformed with regard to among the things that are renewed through sight, or [other] forms, for example.” This is a way of talking about the imagination, which is a kind of apprehending faculty. Given that perception is a kind of reception, it makes sense to talk of the apprehending faculty as “transformed” by the objects whose forms it *receives*, and its objects as “renewed,” in that they have their forms conveyed through increasing *levels of abstractness*, information moving from the external senses, to the imagination.⁴⁰ [B], then, is just a condensed way of describing what it means to grasp objects in the imagination, in contrast to grasping objects at the level of the external senses.⁴¹ So this category of emotion introduced in [a] has as its object a kind of pleasure that is available to the imagination, but not the external senses.

In [c], Avicenna's summary of the preceding paragraphs, he makes parallel claims about concupiscible emotions, irascible emotions, and these new emotions related to the imagination. Concupiscible appetite, he says, is oriented towards pleasure, irascible appetite is oriented towards dominance, and then there is “something particular to” the imagination. This last phrase on its own is concise to the point of being enigmatic, but in context he is clearly just referring to the unique class of pleasure he has picked out, towards which animals also incline. Thus, the main thrust of this passage is to distinguish emotions related to “external” pleasures (concupiscible emotions) and these new emotions more related to “internal” pleasures. This distinction between types of pleasures, which is the basis for a distinction between types of emotions, is borne out elsewhere in his works, as we will see presently.

3a. Clarifying the Nature of External, Internal and Rational Pleasure

40 For another usage of this term in the context of perception, see elsewhere in the Avicenna, *Remarks: Metaphysics* (1960) p. 256.

41 All these inclinations at the animal level can be contrasted with that which is “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to good,” as mentioned at the end of the main text discussed in section 3. This is a reference to the unique sort of goods the human rational soul is able to appreciate, discussed more at length in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Avicenna's discussion of pleasure and pain at the beginning of book eight of *Remarks and Admonitions* provides framework that can help with understanding the types of emotions distinguished in *Psychology* 4.4. Over the course of his discussion in *Remarks*, he distinguishes between pleasures of the external senses, internal senses, and the rational soul.

He begins by pointing out that the majority of people make an incorrect judgment concerning internal and external pleasures: "It has occurred to the imaginations of the masses that the strongest and highest pleasures are those of sensation [*hiyya al-hissiyya*], while what is contrasted with that are weak pleasures, all of which are of the imagination, [which they think of as] not being real."⁴² His examples of the pleasures of sensation include drink and sex, while those of the internal senses include things like the pleasure of offering a gift to someone, or achieving victory in a game. Avicenna goes on to partially affirm, partially criticize this opinion of the masses: he affirms that there is a distinction between external and internal pleasures, but he denies that the external is more worthwhile. Proof of this is that we will often sacrifice external pleasure for the sake of an internal pleasure, as when one gives their own food to a friend. This is prioritizing the internal pleasure of friendship over the external pleasure of food.

The superiority of internal and rational pleasures to external pleasures is further clarified towards the same section, *Remarks* 8.1. The overlap with *Psychology* 4.4 is especially evident in the examples he uses to describe animals having internal pleasures:

It has been made clear that internal pleasures [*al-ladhdhāt al-bāṭina*] are more lofty than sensible pleasures. And this is the case not only in rational beings, but also in speechless animals. For among hunting dogs there is the fact that they hunt, regardless of hunger, then grasp [the prey] for their master, and sometimes carry it to him. And the nursing animal prefers its offspring to itself, and sometimes takes risks [for the sake of] protecting [the offspring], greater than the risk-taking they take with regard to themselves.⁴³

One of the examples Avicenna provided of the new type of emotion he introduced at in *Psychology* 4.4 (beyond concupiscible and irascible appetite) was the emotion of the "the one who begat for [their] offspring." Here there is a parallel in *Remarks*, since a nursing animal gets internal pleasure from taking great risks for their offspring, regardless of whether this means they lose out on some external pleasure. At the end of this section in *Remarks*, Avicenna briefly mentions that just as internal pleasures are higher than external, so intellectual pleasures [*al-aqliyya*] are higher than both.⁴⁴ This aligns with Avicenna's offhand comment in *Psychology* 4.4 that the animal motive faculty also moves "for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good."⁴⁵ So the types of pleasures distinguished in *Remarks* correspond to the final objects of the varieties of emotions discussed in *Psychology* 4.4. In other words, Avicenna's distinctions between types of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4 parallels his distinctions between types of pleasures in *Remarks*.

What makes some pleasures external, internal, or rational, is whether they are the perfection of an external sense faculty, an internal sense, or the rational soul, respectively. Shortly after distinguishing the three types of pleasures in *Remarks*, Avicenna goes on to define pleasure as follows:

42 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 7.

43 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 9.

44 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 9.

45 See above, footnote 38. §

Pleasure is the perception and reaching of the attainment of that which, according to the perceiver [*‘ind al-mudrik*], is a perfection and good, insofar as it is such [*min haythu huwa ka-dhālika*]. And pain is the apprehension and reaching of attainment of what is, according to the perceiver [*‘ind al-mudrik*], a defect and evil. [...] Every pleasure is related to [*tata‘allaq bi-*] two things, a good perfection, and the perception of that [perfection], insofar as it is like that [*min haythu huwa ka-dhālika*].⁴⁶

As mentioned above,⁴⁷ every faculty tends towards some final object. According to Avicenna, when that object is achieved, and we are aware of it having been achieved, we experience pleasure. This is clearly building upon Aristotle’s definition of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.12 as something that supervenes on the “unimpeded activity of a natural process.” The key difference between the two definitions is between whether the pleasure and pain consist simply in *undergoing* some activity (shared by both Avicenna and Aristotle’s definitions), or awareness of and judgment *about* the activity (only in Avicenna’s).

The pleasures of food are external pleasures, because they amount to doing what the faculty of taste is designed for. The pleasures of giving someone a gift, or winning a game (to use Avicenna’s examples from above) are internal pleasures because they fulfill some capacity we have at a level of the animal soul, higher than the level of the external sense.⁴⁸ The faculty of estimation and memory also have objects that can be desired for, and when those forms are acquired, or take shape (*takayyuf*) in the respective faculty, there is an internal pleasure particular to those faculties. Avicenna says that we could make similar descriptions of unique pleasures for the rest of the internal senses.⁴⁹ The pleasures of the rational soul include the attainment of truth, for the theoretical intellect, and the good, for the practical intellect. Avicenna also says that rational goods can include "receiving gratitude, and an abundance of praise, respect, and honor."⁵⁰ It is not totally clear whether those are meant to be goods particular to the theoretical or practical intellect, or if they are just obviously goods of some capacity in the rational soul that fall outside of the standard two faculty distinction.

One thing worth making clear is that the difference between external, internal and rational pleasures has to do with which faculties’ perfection constitutes the *experience* of something as pleasant, not which faculty is involved in knowing *that* something would be pleasant. On the animal level, the judgmental faculty “estimation [*wahm*]" is involved in awareness *that* various things would provide pleasant experiences, even if those pleasant experiences are as different from one another as external and internal pleasures. Through estimation, a dog naturally judges that food would be pleasant to eat,⁵¹ and estimation would similarly explain how an animal

46 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.3, p. 11 & 15.

47 Section 2a.

48 It might seem odd to think of imagination as having a capacity that is fulfilled in some way when we play a game, or give a gift. One might think we were veering precariously close to something like Franz Gall’s phrenology, where the fact that some people are good at chess means that they have a chess-playing faculty, while others do not. A major problem with Gall’s view is that it posits faculties that are not common to all members of a species, and so ceases to be explanatory (see Fodor (1983) section I.3, p. 14 ff.). Avicenna does not go into detail about what all the sub-faculties in the imagination are whose activity amounts to internal pleasure, but whatever he would say about this, they would be common to anything with a sensitive soul. We are not in the habit of distinguishing such faculties, and they are not as obvious as the external sense faculties which have obviously distinct organs, but that does not mean they are not there to be actualized.

49 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9, 21.

50 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9, 25

51 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 184.

identifies its offspring as something worth caring for. Doing the latter would bring with it a type of internal pleasure, while the former is a pleasure of the external senses. To put the point conversely, the sense of taste doesn't judge *that* something would be pleasant, but when something appropriate is tasted, this constitutes a pleasurable experience. The external senses perceive objects according to their material, sensible properties (shapes, colors, sounds, and so on), while all properties like something's being good, beneficial or pleasant, and their opposites, amount to aspects that are perceived by estimation.⁵² Estimation can judge that food is good (an external pleasure), and that friendship is good (an internal pleasure), which can in turn lead to emotions related to both sorts of objects. The same faculty—estimation—is involved in judging *that* two things would be pleasant, even if they would be pleasant experiences of generically different varieties, owing to the fact that they would be completions of different types of faculties.

In the *Psychology* 4.4 text from the prior section, Avicenna referred to internal pleasures as pleasures of the imagination, using the term imagination loosely. That being the case, it is worth clarifying this category of "internal pleasure" that is relevant to the discussion of emotions from another sense in which pleasure is sometimes talked about in relation to the imagination. As a reminder, in *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna mentions a pleasure "particular to" the imagination, which is longed for when imagination "suffers its loss." This is his way of saying that internal sense faculties have particular perfections which they naturally tend towards, and which give pleasure to the subject when they are achieved. This is different than the sort of pleasure of the imagination Avicenna discusses in his *Healing: Rhetoric*, where he says we can long for an object of sense perception, based on the pleasurable vestige of its image in the imagination, retained and recalled after the actual object is no longer directly perceived. That is, regardless of what sort of pleasure we are talking about (external, internal or rational), there is some pleasure involved in remembering the experience of that pleasure, which Avicenna describes as follows:

As for the imagination, it has a type of pleasure [i.e., it experiences pleasure in a way], except that imagination is a weak sensation, like a vestige from sensation, and it delights in recalling or in hoping. Most of what is hoped for coincides with what is remembered, especially hoping for structures/arrangements from prior sensed particulars, for there is pleasure in memory or hope following sensible pleasure [initially] observed/experienced, then recalled, then hoped for. For sensation pertains to the present, memory to the past, hope to the future.⁵³

Just as we can experience some sensible particular as pleasant when in contact with it, we can recall the form of that same sense object, and our awareness of its form in the imagination conveys a similar, but weaker, kind of pleasure than the initial experience, which might lead us to long for the direct experience once again. Remembering a delicious meal can be pleasant, and make you want to have the same meal again. But this is not what is meant by a pleasure "particular to" the imagination in *Psychology* 4.4. It is one thing to long for and then experience an internal pleasure, it is another thing to fondly recall an internal pleasure, and then long for it. The vestigial pleasures of imaginative memory are not equivalent to the present experience of an external, internal or rational pleasure.

⁵² Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.2, 60 and 4.3, 182-3.

⁵³ Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.6, p. 100.

A sub-variety of animal emotions towards internal pleasures of the imagination that Avicenna treats elsewhere are those towards aesthetic pleasure, especially musical pleasure. As Luis Xavier López-Farjeat has shown, there is a clear strand of thought in Avicenna's *Healing: Book of Music* which discusses how animals perceive, incline towards, and take pleasure in aesthetic beauty, even though they cannot label it as such, or produce it.⁵⁴ Emotions related to music would be different than emotions related to external, concupiscible pleasures, because aesthetic experience is not the perfection of any particular external sense: neither the ear nor the eye have any capacity to perceive aesthetic pleasure on their own. Only once particular sensibles are arranged in the imagination is it possible for aesthetic properties, like harmony, to be appreciated. So while it might seem strange to think of brute animals as being moved to seek out aesthetic pleasure, we should remember that this is still something short of the full engagement with aesthetic beauty of which humans are capable. Moreover, it does not need to be a terribly complicated sort of aesthetic pleasure. We can easily imagine an animal being affected by a potential mate's colorful feather arrangement, and this is beyond the ability of any particular external sense to appreciate.

3b. Varieties of Pleasures and Varieties of Emotions

To bring this discussion of pleasures back to emotions, we can now see how the distinctions Avicenna makes in *Psychology* 4.4 are grounded in these prior distinctions between types of pleasures. There are three major types of emotions: those towards the goods of the external senses, those towards goods of the internal senses, and those towards rational goods.

Despite the neatness of this organization, one might wonder why the organization matters. Avicenna does not provide an answer to this in his emotion texts, but we can make some inferences. On the one hand, it is likely that the impetus for making these distinctions is the same as the impetus for distinguishing faculties in the first place: trying to come up with a more orderly body of scientific explanations for common phenomena. Beyond this, it is also clear that emotions involving objects of the external senses would result in very different behavior from those that have internal and rational objects. You would not necessarily want to "acquire" your friend or relative, just because you long for them. Upon being told that there is a beautiful landscape around the bend, you might be moved to go appreciate it, but not consume it. On the other hand, inclinations towards pleasures of the external senses require direct contact for their satisfaction.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Luis Xavier López Farjeat (2013) esp. p. 103ff.

⁵⁵ One might wonder, still, why it is necessary to distinguish different *faculties* for these emotions, rather than just noting that there is a difference between types of pleasures, and supposing that the concupiscible faculty responds to both. Avicenna does not explain why he chooses to make this distinction, but it is likely because these higher emotions are not found in all animals. That is, we have already discussed how some animals, namely zoophytes, have the concupiscible faculty but not the irascible (see section 2b). Presumably zoophytes also lack these higher emotions, for the same reason (i.e., their diminished cognitive capacities). Where there are significantly distinct final objects, and separability in terms of existence, there is a good reason to insist on a distinction of faculties

Avicenna's principle of distinguishing faculties based on objects occurs in *Healing: Psychology* 1.4. The separability in existence argument is normally used to distinguish types of souls, or groupings of faculties, but it is also used to distinguish individual faculties at the beginning of section 4 of Avicenna, *Compendium on the Soul* (1875).

One might wonder, still, why it is necessary to distinguish these emotions related to internal and rational pleasures from emotions of the concupiscible faculty, rather than just noting that there is a difference between types of pleasures, and asserting that the concupiscible faculty responds to all of them. Again, Avicenna does not answer a question like this directly, but it is likely because these higher emotions are not found in all animals. That is, we have already discussed know that some animals, namely zoophytes, have the concupiscible faculty but not the irascible.⁵⁶ Presumably they also lack these higher emotions, for the same reason (their diminished cognitive capacities). Where there are significantly distinct final objects, and separability in terms of existence, there is a good reason to insist on a distinction of faculties.⁵⁷

To summarize, there are certain classes of objects that individuate major groupings of capacities of the animal soul. Some are objects of the external senses, some are objects of the imagination and intellect, broadly construed. Emotions towards pleasures of the first sort are acts of the concupiscible appetite. Emotions towards pleasures of the second and third sort are acts of higher capacities for emotion—more elevated than concupiscible appetite, and more related to the imagination and intellect, respectively.⁵⁸ The key thing to notice is that there are distinct classes of emotions, based on major differences in final objects, but still treated as similar in *Psychology* 4.4 insofar as they are inclinations.

3c. Ruling Out an Alternative Interpretation

Having looked at the *Rhetoric* text about pleasures remembered in the imagination in section 3.1, one might object to my interpretation of the texts in *Psychology* 4.4, arguing that in *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna actually saying is something more along the lines of what he says in the *Rhetoric*. That is, one might think concupiscible and irascible appetite are appetites in response to objects one is aware of as *present and nearby*, whereas it is also possible to recall *distant objects* in the imaginative memory and be motivated towards them. On this interpretation, Avicenna's examples in *Psychology* 4.4 would actually just be referring to remembered objects (e.g., a desire for a friend or child *when they are not present*, or for *what life was like* outside of the bonds of captivity). When Avicenna refers to the idea of the apprehending faculty "suffer[ing] the loss of that pleasure," he could be taken to be emphasizing the fact that the object is no longer present, but is recalled in the imagination.

Despite its simplicity, the major problem with this alternative interpretation is that Avicenna never suggests that concupiscible and irascible appetite are only for things the animal is aware of as present and nearby. There is, no doubt, a line of thought in the tradition, going back to Aristotle, which distinguishes animal from human appetites on the grounds that animal appetites are only concerned with what seems pleasurable *in the present*, but this is a different distinction.⁵⁹ Avicenna deals with this latter distinction in *Psychology* 5.1, and the idea is basically that humans can evaluate whether something is worth pursuing all-things-considered,

⁵⁶ See section 2b.

⁵⁷ Avicenna's principle of distinguishing faculties based on objects occurs in *Psychology* 1.4. The separability in existence argument is normally used to distinguish types of souls, or groupings of faculties, but it is also used to distinguish individual faculties at the beginning of section 4 of *Compendium on the Soul* (1875).

⁵⁸ Such a distinction between different types of pleasures at the level of the animal soul is seen later in Al-Ghazali's distinction between biological, social/political, and intellectual pleasure. See Fakhry (1994) p. 203.

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5-10.

whereas animals simply see a pleasure and go towards it, without consideration for how it fits into their larger goals. For this reason humans can decline present pleasure for the sake of the future. Concupiscible appetite is for anything that seems good to the animal soul in that moment, but this does not mean that object of appetite needs to be something the animal is aware of as present and nearby, and it would be odd if it did: most appetites involve things that are not present or nearby, as opposed to what is, which is the very reason why one is in a state of desire, rather than satisfaction.

4. Deepening the Category of Emotion: More on the Irascible Faculty

In the final part of his overview of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, Avicenna lists concrete examples of various types of emotions, which not only add to our understanding of previously distinguished types of emotions, but also introduce new types. We can view what this section does as *deepening* our understanding of previously distinguished irascible emotions, and then *widening* the category of emotion to include some pleasurable completion-states as types of emotions. This section follows directly upon the key text from *Psychology* 4.4, quoted at length at the beginning of section 3 above:

Fear [*al-khawf*] and distress [*al-ghamm*] and sadness [*al-ḥuzn*]⁶⁰ are actualizations [*‘awāriḍ*] of the irascible faculty with the participation [*bil-mushārīka*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. And the irascible faculty, if it is opposed, following upon intellectual or imaginative conceptualization, there is fear. And if it does not fear, it becomes strong. Distress occurs to the irascible faculty on account of that which [at other times] causes anger, when something is prevented from defending against something else, or when one fears something else’s occurrence. And joy [*al-farah*] which belongs in the category of subduing, is the end/final cause [*ghāya*] for this faculty also.⁶¹ Greediness [*al-ḥirṣ*], gluttony [*al-naham*], and lust [*al-shabq*], and what is similar to them, they belong to the bestial concupiscible faculty.

Enjoyment of people [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*‘awāriḍ*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we’ll talk about soon.⁶²

60 The fact that distress and sadness are states of the irascible faculty is something that will be discussed in chapter five, the chapter on pain and pleasure. This text makes it seem like pain-like states have the irascible faculty as their subject, while in Avicenna’s *Rhetoric* pain-like states show up as component parts of definitions of irascible emotions. So the precise relationship between the irascible faculty and pain needs more analysis, but must wait until we can focus on pleasure and pain on their own.

61 The statement that the irascible faculty seeks “joy in the category of subduing” coheres with the points we made in sections 2a-b about the final objects of motive faculties. Just as reaching an object of the concupiscible appetite brings a kind of pleasure, so a certain kind of pleasure attends any instance of overcoming an obstacle. The difference is that while concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure qua pleasure, the irascible appetite seeks overcoming qua overcoming, and when this goal is achieved, one experiences pleasure. The state of the person fighting for the love of fighting is different than the state of the person fighting out of self-defense, even though both might lead to pleasure. They both seek overcoming, but under different aspects: one qua overcoming, one as a pleasure. In fact, the person fighting for the love of fighting would best be classified as seeking a kind of internal pleasure of the imagination, as opposed to a concupiscible object. So “joy in the category of subduing” is just another way of saying that “subduing” is the final object of the irascible faculty, and by definition, achieving a final object brings satisfaction.

62 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

In the first paragraph of this final section Avicenna deepens our understanding of what he has already discussed, showing how the irascible faculty's tendency to achieve dominance results in different particular emotions, depending on how exactly some intentional object is conceived.⁶³ Our general inclination to achieve dominance takes on the specific character of fear when it is in response to a conception of some obstacle as especially imposing (and hence unlikely to be successfully opposed), anger or courage if in response to an obstacle we think we can overcome, or distress if we simply know it cannot be overcome.⁶⁴ These different inclinations all fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these are states that occur on account of our being oriented towards dominance.

One thing to notice is that, whereas Avicenna spent the lengthy prior section distinguishing different types of emotions that are similar to, but more complex than, concupiscible appetite (e.g., concupiscible emotions and emotions more related to the imagination), he does not do anything similar here. One might think it worthwhile to distinguish emotions associated with dominance over threats that would pain the external senses, from dominance over obstacles that would pain one inwardly. Indeed, in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*, following Aristotle, he provides examples of states we would think of as irascible, like anger, but which are associated with dominance over obstacles that would cause *inward* pain. For example, anger can be directed at a verbal slight or scorn.⁶⁵ Further, we can imagine obstacles to the internal pleasures Avicenna mentioned in *Remarks* 8, such as an obstacle to achieving victory in a game. This is clearly a different type of obstacle in comparison to actual physical threats.

Avicenna does not discuss why he focuses on the external/internal distinction when it comes to pleasure, but does not do the same for dominance over external/internal threats. But it seems likely that the reason behind this lack of distinction is that irascible faculty, even when it is seeking dominance over physical threats, *already* involves a higher level of cognition than concupiscible appetite. That is, while paradigmatic cases of irascible acts involve responding to physical threats, recognizing something as an obstacle already requires a more abstract type of judgment than just knowing whether something is pleasant or painful. This is why, as discussed earlier,⁶⁶ some animals with lesser cognitive capacities are taken to only have concupiscible appetite. External, internal and rational pleasures correspond to different clusters of faculties, and their perfections. But achieving dominance is the perfection, simply, of the irascible faculty. So while it seemed worthwhile to Avicenna to make a distinction between types of pleasures, there is apparently no reason to make a similar distinction between types of obstacles.

A second thing to notice from the first paragraph above is the idea that evaluations are necessary but not sufficient causes for emotion. This is implied by the fact that fear, distress and sadness are said to be acts of the irascible faculty "with the participation" of the perceptive faculties, and presumably what is true of these acts is true for defining other particular emotions in general. To specify what fear is, you cannot just say, "it is a variety of irascible appetite." Instead, you need to reference the associated intentional object, i.e., the way in which the pleasure or obstacle is cognized. This idea is just an extension of Avicenna's general descriptions of the motivating side of the motive faculty (from *Psychology* 1.5, discussed in section 2 above),

63 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

64 These different inclinations nonetheless fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these states that occur on account of being oriented towards dominance.

65 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 3.1, p. 130.

66 Section 2b.

where he has already stated that the motive faculty is dependent on evaluative acts of a particular sort. The point here is related to Martha Nussbaum's argument for the centrality of evaluation to emotion, where she claims that anything but the cognitive component of an emotion is too underspecified to be the essence of an emotion. Emotions just aren't the sort of thing it is easy to put into words.⁶⁷ Avicenna would not agree with her view entirely, since he clearly thinks that the most central thing that makes anger what it is, for example, is that it is a type of moved-mover (an "actualizations of" the motive faculty, in the words of the text above). Since it is possible to have the very same evaluative act with or without an emotion, the two things are distinct. But what allows us to *describe* a specific type of emotion is the cognition that causes it.

So in the first paragraph of the above text, Avicenna deepens our understanding of emotion, by showing how the single irascible faculty is posited to account for our tendency to seek dominance over a variety of threats, and by showing how cognitive evaluations are necessary, but not sufficient, causes of emotions.

5. Widening the Category of Emotion: Uniquely Human Emotions and Pleasurable Completion-States as Types of Emotions

In the final part of Avicenna's overview of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, he briefly mentions two varieties of emotions: pleasure-states particular to the perceptive faculties, and states dependent on the rational soul. It is important to remember that this text comes directly after Avicenna lists his further examples of irascible emotions, as this shows that we are still in the middle of a discussion of types of emotions:

Enjoyment of people [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*min al-'awāriḍ*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we'll talk about soon.⁶⁸

In the second half of this text, Avicenna refers to emotions of the rational soul, indicating that he will discuss them later. Indeed, in the very next section of *Psychology*, 5.1, he identifies some uniquely human emotions, such as shame and wonder, that are caused by cognitions of which only humans are capable. Nonetheless, his mentioning them here indicates that he wants us to think of uniquely human emotions as acts of the animal motive faculty, despite their being caused by uniquely human types of evaluations. This idea is reflected by Avicenna's argument in the *Treatise on Love*, that the rational soul "partners with" and "makes use of" the animal motive faculty for its particular emotions.⁶⁹ This is a significant conclusion in that it suggests that all emotion is fundamentally animal, in that all emotions are acts of the common animal motive faculty, regardless of how complex the judgments causing them are. These points, and human emotions more generally, will be discussed in chapter two of this dissertation.

In the first half of this text, Avicenna mentions two emotions, "enjoyment of people and gladness," calling them actualizations of the perceptive faculties, and in doing so indicates that the category of emotion can be widened to include pleasurable-completion states. Given that Avicenna is in the midst of explaining and listing various types of emotions that involve the

⁶⁷ Nussbaum (2001) 29.

⁶⁸ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

⁶⁹ Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

animal soul, there is no reason not to take these actualizations of the perceptive powers under that general heading, as well.

To better understand the significance of these two emotions, we should first better understand them on their own. “*Surūr*/gladness,” is used elsewhere as a generic term for pleasure, contrasted with pain.⁷⁰ Nothing too specific beyond the general idea of pleasure seems intended. The definition of “*istīnās*/enjoyment of people” is less straightforward. Given the linguistic form of the Arabic word (form 10), which often carries with it the idea of “seeking,” and the root in that form (‘*alif-nūn-sīn*), which refers to the idea of persons, one might think that it means something like “desire to be around people.” This would make sense of its place in the chapter on emotions, but no classical sources attest to such a definition. Instead, one of the main classical definitions is “enjoyment of people”—not *seeking* out people, but *enjoyment* once their presence is attained. The 12th century Latin edition of Avicenna's *Psychology* translates *istīnās* as “*solatium*/relief from distress,” which might feel like a different notion altogether. But it makes sense as a translation if one considers that a primary way of finding consolation is to be around people. So *solatium* is a bit of a loose translation, but it supports taking Avicenna to be talking about enjoyment of people as a completion-state, alongside gladness. Both of these emotions, then signify pleasurable-completion states.

Pleasurable-completion states make sense as a new type of emotion, but they are importantly different than any other type of emotion Avicenna has mentioned. At the start of *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna has said that perceptive faculties “have nothing” of appetite/*shawq*.⁷¹ Cognitions cause appetite, but the two are acts of fundamentally distinct types of faculties. Moreover, the emotions we have been discussing thus far involve seeking things, like pleasure and dominance, whereas in a pleasurable completion-state some object or perfection is acquired, not sought.⁷²

This might seem to put Avicenna in a bind, but if we recall that throughout *Psychology* 4.4 we have seen Avicenna gradually *widening* our understanding of what can count as an emotion, this can be seen just as an extension of that project. Perceptive emotions do not involve *shawq*/appetite, because they are inclinations that do not involve any kind of lack, or reaching out: they are emotions of completion, where the object is already attained. But we could see completion-states as emotions in a wider sense, in that they directly affect behavior by orienting us towards some object (i.e., the thing being enjoyed). They incline us, in the words of some contemporary emotion theorists, to “keep going” in whatever it is we are doing.⁷³ Indeed, in *Remarks*, Avicenna says that experiences with the spiritual realm in this life bring with them a kind of pleasure that motivates one to pursue truth more fully.⁷⁴ Likewise, bodily pleasures affect behavior in that they *distract* us from such pure pursuits.⁷⁵ Apparently, appetite and pleasure-states can both be emotions, in a broad sense, even if pleasure states are not *appetitive*.⁷⁶ That is,

70 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.3, 31-32.

71 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 194.

72 See above, section 3a.

73 See, for example, Matthen (2015) p. 179.

74 Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) 8.15-16. In this text he uses the term *bā' ith* for “motivate,” a term we have seen in *Healing: Psychology* 4.4.

75 Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) 8.15-16.

76 In this we can notice a contrast with how pleasure states are handled by, for example, Aquinas, who considers pleasure to have the concupiscible appetite as its subject. What he means by this is that pleasure is a state of the concupiscible appetite, when it achieves its object King (1999) pp. 18-19. For Avicenna, pleasure is not necessarily tied to the completion of an appetite, though completing appetites (concupiscible, irascible, or otherwise) does bring

the broader category for all these states is “emotion/inclination,” not appetite, so it is consistent for Avicenna to think of them all as emotions, while also affirming that appetite and perception are distinct.

Insofar as Avicenna is committed to a fundamental division between motive and cognitive faculties, including these pleasurable completion-states (which are “actualizations of the perceptive faculties”) as types of emotions does create a kind of tension. An alternate way of reading the above text would be to say that Avicenna’s mentioning enjoyment of people and gladness as acts of the perceptive faculty here is a way of reminding us that they are *distinct* from the sort of thing he has been discussing in *Psychology* 4.4. In other words, he could just be choosing to mention some states that we *might* think of as emotions, in order to clarify that they are not. It would be as if Avicenna were saying, “as for states like these, they might seem to be emotions, but they’re really just acts of the perceptive faculties.”

Of course, such a reading would involve a tension of its own, since it would be a break from common sense to consider something like “gladness” to not be an emotion. Avicenna’s predecessors in the field of psychology, like Al-Balkhī and A.B. Al-Rāzī, included states like gladness and pain in their discussions of emotions,⁷⁷ and Avicenna himself groups joy (another pleasurable completion-state) and pain with other emotions in his medical texts.⁷⁸ Indeed, part of why it makes sense to group pleasure and pain with appetitive and irascible emotions is because of the felt, bodily aspect to all such states. So it may indeed be that pleasurable-completion states (and their opposites, pain states) do not fit neatly into the sort of explanatory schema offered by *Healing: Psychology*, centered around divisions of faculties. This is perhaps why Avicenna’s more in depth treatment of pleasure and pain occurs in *Remarks*, as has already been discussed. But insofar as they could fit into the schema offered by *Psychology*, it makes sense to think of them as emotions.⁷⁹

6. The Variety of Emotions Involving the Animal Motive Soul According to Avicenna

Now that we have seen the varieties of emotions Avicenna attributes to the animal, sensitive soul in *Healing: Psychology*—his most comprehensive overview of such matters—we can step back and consider his overall contribution. The preceding texts from *Psychology* 4.4 are somewhat meandering, but this befits the messy task of wrestling with the nature of emotion, and what emerges is an innovative, wide array of animal affective states, unified under a carefully honed central concept. To review, Avicenna has discussed the following as types of emotions:

pleasure, since pleasure occurs whenever *any* faculty achieves its object.

⁷⁷ Al-Balkhī discusses pleasure and pain as emotions in the beginning of chapter 4 of his *Sustenance of the Soul* (2005). A.B. Al-Rāzī likewise discusses pleasure in chapter five of his *AB Razi* also discusses pleasure in chapter 5 of his *Spiritual Physick* (1950).

⁷⁸ Avicenna concurs with prior thinkers on this point at *Cardiac Drugs* (1984) 226.

⁷⁹ Still yet another way of reading the text would be to argue that when Avicenna says that gladness and enjoyment of people are “min al-‘awāriḍ” of the perceptive faculties, the “min” does not mean “among,” but “on account of.” In other words, enjoyment of people and gladness are emotions (acts of the motive faculty) that have perceptive faculties as a prior cause. This reading, however, leaves the status of these emotions even more ambiguous. It is unclear why Avicenna would need to mention this mundane fact, since all emotions have prior cognitive causes, and it does not give any new insight into the sort of state these emotions are.

- Acts of the concupiscible appetite, ordered towards pleasures of the external senses
- Acts similar to those of the concupiscible appetite, but ordered towards pleasures of the imagination (i.e., internal pleasures)
- Acts of the irascible appetite (higher and lower varieties)
- Pleasurable completion-states (and conversely, pain-states)
- Uniquely human emotions (i.e., affective states of the animal motive faculty, caused by cognitions of the rational soul)

The terms in *Psychology* 4.4 that are used generically to capture all of these states are *inbi' āthāt* and *nazzā' āt*, both of which convey the idea that these emotional states are, at their core, something like impulses, inclinations, or motivations. Avicenna uses these terms early on in the key text we looked at from *Psychology* 4.4, when he says that “we find in animals impulses [*inbi' āthāt*] not [just] for their concupiscible pleasures, but also an inclination [*nazzā'*] towards” internal pleasures.⁸⁰ These two Arabic terms, *inbi' āth* and *nazzā'*, and words related to their Arabic roots, are used elsewhere by Avicenna and others in the tradition to connote something related to but broader than concupiscible or irascible appetite.⁸¹ For example, when introducing the motive faculty in *Psychology* 1.5, Avicenna says that “the motive power insofar as it motivates is the *inclining* [*al-nazū' iyyah*], appetitive faculty.”⁸² Al-Farabi and Averroes likewise use *nazzā'* in a generic sense.⁸³ In 1.5, Avicenna uses a word related to *inbi' āth* to distinguish the motive faculty qua motivating (*bā' itha*) from the motive power in the muscles that actually moves (*fā' ila*). Of course, Avicenna also uses appetite/*shawq* to convey something generic, capturing both concupiscible or irascible appetite, but we have seen that this has a more narrow scope for him, and was not as useful as *inbi' āth* or *nazzā'* for referring to all of the affective states listed above.

While it would be correct to call the above affective states *inbi' āthāt* or *nazzā' āt*, it is *nazzā' āt* that seems to more precisely pick out the phenomena that belongs exclusively to the discussion in *Psychology* 4.4. This is because sometimes *inbi' āth* has an even broader sense in Avicenna's writings than *nazzā'*, used to mean “something instinctive,” as when he uses the term to refer to the evaluative judgments made by the faculty of estimation in animals.⁸⁴ But in any case, both of these terms point to the fact that Avicenna thinks of emotions as states wherein animals (human and non-) are disposed to act in a certain way, without yet actually acting.⁸⁵

80 See section 3.

81 Helmut Gätje has suggested that *inbi' āthāt* and *nazzā' āt* in Avicenna's philosophy have roughly the same scope as the Greek *hormē* (impulse), used by some of Aristotle's commentators and the Stoics in the context of emotions, which seems correct. See Gätje (1974) p. 359.

82 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 41.

83 See Al-Farabi, *Virtuous City* (1985) 10.6, p. 170; also Averroes, *Epitome of the De Anima* (1950), pp. 96-100.

84 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 182.

85 What finally pushes us towards actual motion is a motive state called resolution, discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Chapter 2: Avicenna on Uniquely Human Emotions

Word Count: 11,824

The goal of this chapter is to present Avicenna's views on the uniquely human aspects of emotional experience. Specifically, I will show that for Avicenna there is a sense in which human emotions are similar to animal emotions, and a sense in which they are unique. Human emotions are *similar* to animal emotions in that involve activations of broadly the same psychological hardware, that is, the same motive faculty shared between animals and humans, albeit caused by a variety of higher cognitions. But because of those unique cognitive causes, we get distinctive activations of those animal faculties, and these constitute uniquely human emotions. In the same way that animals experience different appetites in response to different objects (different types of concupiscible and irascible acts being the main subdivisions), there are further shades of appetitive, motive activity brought about by human cognition. These are activations of the shared animal motive faculty, but they are not reducible to concupiscible or irascible acts. Thus, human emotions are *unique*, both in terms of the more complex cognitions which *cause* them, and in terms of the specific shades of inclination, or motivation, which *constitute* them.

1. Overview of the Evidence that Human Emotions Involve the Animal Motive Soul

The above schema is not presented unambiguously by Avicenna, but there are texts which could be taken as direct affirmations of it, and an accumulation of adjacent texts that suggest they should be taken as such. In other words, the above schema seems to underly his numerous texts that deal with the topic, though it is not stated explicitly. Before diving into the particulars, then, an overview of the evidence is in order, so that it is clear not too much weight is being put on any one text.

This chapter builds off of two key pointers Avicenna gives us in the texts from *Psychology* 4.4 (discussed in chapter one of this dissertation). Firstly, when Avicenna distinguishes between animal emotions that are caused by external pleasures, and those caused by internal pleasures, he says that the motive faculty responds to both of these causes, and it likewise activates “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good.”¹ Here Avicenna has not shifted away from discussing the shared motive faculty—this is still a continuation of the overall goal in 4.4 of explaining the animal motive faculty—but he has listed a new cognitive cause for activating it. So this seems to be an indication that at least *some* uniquely human motive states (i.e., uniquely human emotions) are activations of the shared animal motive faculty. Secondly, shortly thereafter, as he is widening our understanding of what sorts of things count as emotions, he mentions pleasurable completion states (e.g., enjoyment of people and gladness), and follows this by mentioning that “as for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we’ll talk about soon.”² Again, given that this comes in the context of his enumerating various states of the animal motive faculty (i.e., emotions), it seems natural to take this as simply saying that there are also uniquely human activations of the animal motive soul, but that he is postponing talk about them (until 5.1, as we will see). If this were *not* a

1 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 195.

2 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

reference to uniquely human activations of the animal motive soul, there would be much less of a reason for him to mention it here. Unlike philosophers in the Latin West, Avicenna does not have any human faculty of the will, so there is no new faculty later introduced that this could be referring to. So neither of these points is unambiguous, but they begin to paint a picture of how uniquely human emotional life involves the animal motive faculty, a picture which the texts we will look at in this chapter support.

Before we turn to those new texts in detail, it is worth pointing out what we will see in them that is relevant to supporting the above picture. First, Avicenna's discussions of specific human emotions (from *Psychology* 5.1) and the practical intellect (from 1.5) together show that certain states of the practical intellect (i.e., virtues or vices) dispose humans towards or away from some uniquely human emotions. Avicenna specifically says that this is a way that the practical intellect is related to the animal motive faculty. So the virtues and vices here are states of the practical intellect, but they lead to uniquely human emotions, and those emotions (not the virtues and vices) are states of the animal motive faculty. Secondly, in Avicenna's *Treatise on Love*, he describes how the rational faculties "adapt" the lower faculties to their aims, this being a kind of "partnership."³ The animal motive faculties are among those ennobled by their proximity to higher faculties in humans, and one result of this is emotions that non-human animals do not have. As cognitive faculties, the reason the rational faculties are able to cause unique states of the animal motive faculties is because of their unique goals and cognitions. The key thing to see in both of these texts is that human emotions are presented as a partnership between the rational faculties (as cause) and the animal motive faculties (as constitutive of the emotion), just as animal emotions are presented as a partnership involving the animal cognitive faculties.⁴

Of course, there are also places where Avicenna discusses human emotions and does not mention the animal motive faculties, so this is—again—not unambiguous. But Avicenna's numerous assertions and suggestions that human emotions *do* involve the animal motive faculty, and a dearth of texts to the contrary, strongly supports the idea that Avicenna has the previously-mentioned schema in mind. Moreover, it just seems in keeping with Avicenna's general habits as a philosopher to think in this way: wherever possible, Avicenna builds more complex activities on existing psychological faculties, and highlights ways in which the intellect depends on animal faculties.⁵ There is ample evidence that some distinctly human cognitive capacities engage the internal senses, and the schema being described here would just be a parallel to that on the motive side of the soul.⁶

2. The Practical Intellect as a Motive Principle

The practical intellect is relevant to the discussion of emotions insofar as the practical intellect is a "principle of motion." In chapter one we saw how Avicenna refers to appetitive faculties as motive *faculties*, strictly speaking. Motive *principle* is a more general category for

³ Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256, 259.

⁴ See *Healing: Psychology* 4.4, discussed in chapter 1, section 4.

⁵ As Avicenna says in *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, the practical intellect depends on the body and its faculties for "all" its actions, and the theoretical intellect is in mostly the same position (with an exception later made for the reception of intelligibles). See 5.1, 208.

⁶ The chief example of this on the cognitive side of things is how Avicenna calls the imagination the cogitative faculty when it is engaged in carrying out functions for the intellect. See Black (2013).

Avicenna, comprising appetitive faculties, and closely related cognitive faculties. This distinction between motive principles and motive faculties gets across both what is unique about human emotions (they have a uniquely human cognitive causes, here the practical intellect) even though they are ultimately activations of the shared animal motive faculty. He uses this terminology in two main places in *Healing: Psychology*. The notion of the practical intellect as a motive principle first arises in Avicenna's overview of the human soul's faculties in 1.5:

The practical [intellect] is a power that is the motive principle [*madba' muḥarrrik*] for the human body towards concrete acts that are particularly associated with deliberation [*rawṭya*]⁷—deliberation, that is, in accordance with the demands of beliefs that are particularly associated with it [the practical intellect] about that which is appropriate to do.⁷ And it [the practical intellect] has an aspect in relation to [*lahā i'atibār bil-qiyaṣ ilā*] the animal appetitive [*al-nazū'iyya*] faculty, and an aspect in relation to the animal imaginative, estimative power, and a relation to itself.⁸

From this text, it seems that for the practical intellect to be a motive principle is for it be related to motion, but not necessarily in as direct a sense as a motive faculty (“the animal appetitive [*al-nazū'iyya*] faculty”), to which it merely has a relation. We will unpack those relations shortly, but to continue understanding the basic terminology, we can see Avicenna again using the specification of “motive principle” in *Psychology* 5.1, just after giving a more detailed account of the practical and theoretical intellect:

For there is in a person a sensible judge, and an estimative judge in the realm of imagination, and an intellectual and practical judge. And the motive/inclining principles [*al-mabadī al-bā'itha*] relevant to faculty that resolves on the movement of the organs, are the estimative imagination, and the practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Other animals have three of these.⁹

Here he says that the soul not only has four types of “judges”—sensation, estimation, and theoretical and practical intellect—it also has four types of “motive principles [*al-mabadī al-bā'itha*],” namely, estimative imagination, practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties.¹⁰ As we saw when Avicenna initially distinguished the animal motive faculties from the animal apprehending faculties, there is a basic division between the motive and the apprehensive, so by calling all four of these faculties motive principles, he cannot mean that the faculties which show up in both of these lists are primarily motive *and* cognitive. Rather, practical intellect and estimation are primarily identified as cognitive faculties, but they are also more relevant to motion in some way than sensation and the theoretical intellect (which are left off this list), making the former motive principles, and the later not. The practical intellect is *not*, on its own, the subject of an inclination, or appetite, but it accounts for different types of judgments that

7 “That which is appropriate to do,” translating *iṣṭilāḥiyya*. This term is a bit difficult to translate in a way that makes sense of the passage. In his translation of a similar passage in the *Najat*, Rahman translates this term as “purposive,” a definition which I am unable to find evidence for elsewhere. “Conventional” would seem appropriate, given that the practical intellect often urges action on the basis of widespread opinion, but when this word is used to mean “conventional,” it is typically in the context of of technical “conventions” in language. The translation of “that which is appropriate to do” picks up on the core idea of the root of this verb, and fits with what the practical intellect in fact does.

8 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 45-46.

9 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 208.

10 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 208.

result in different actualizations of the animal motive faculties. The appetitive faculties are motive faculties, and can be called motive principles, but “motive principle” is a broader designation than “motive faculty,” since the former includes cognitive faculties, while the latter does not.

In a general sense, the practical intellect is related to actions, because it deliberates about what it is appropriate to do. Both the mode (deliberation) and the content (pertaining to action) distinguish the practical intellect from the theoretical intellect. The Arabic word for deliberation, *rawīya*, is a translation of the Greek *bouleisis*. Unlike the theoretical intellect, the goal of the practical intellect is not to receive new, universal information as a result of emanation from the Agent Intellect. Rather, information we already possess is used to make judgments that relate to action in the realm of the variable and corruptible. Nonetheless, Avicenna’s way of describing the practical intellect in the above text is quite broad, as there are multiple processes that affect what sort of action is ultimately taken. These multiple processes require that the practical intellect cooperates with other faculties, which is why Avicenna says at the end of the above text that the practical intellect has an “aspect in relation” to several powers. This is just another way of saying that, because humans have rationality, they have the capacity to guide their actions by reason, and this capacity augments or makes use of other capacities already present in the animal soul.

Avicenna goes on to specify three ways that our ability to deliberate about action plays out, i.e., the “aspects in relation” to several powers that belong to the practical intellect. Avicenna presents them in following order: the practical intellect in relation to 1) the motive faculties, 2) imagination and estimation, and 3) the intellect itself (practical and theoretical):

[1] Its aspect in relation to the animal appetitive power is the respect, in view of which there occur in it [the practical intellect] states [*hay’āt*] that characterize a human by which one is prepared for quickness of action or passion, such as shame [*khajl*], embarrassment [*hayā’*], laughter [*dahika*], crying [*bakā’*], and [other actions or passions] similar to those.

[2] And its aspect in relation to the animal imaginative and estimative power is the respect that joins to them when it is occupied with deducing methods of management in generable, corruptible matters and humans arts.

[3] And its aspect in relation to itself is the respect in which beliefs are engendered between the practical intellect and the theoretical intellect that relate to actions and [which beliefs are] commonly accepted, [being] widely known [*dhā’ir’a*], like that lying is bad and injustice is bad—not by means of demonstration or anything like that [derived] from defined premises. The distinction [between these practical beliefs] and the primary intelligibles is set out in the books of logic, even though were [the beliefs of the practical intellect] logically considered, they would come from the intelligibles in accordance with what is in the books of logic.

These are presented as three separate aspects, but they add up to a complete picture, showing how judgments of the practical intellect lead to acts of the animal motive faculty. Since acts of the animal motive faculty are equivalent to emotions, seeing how these three aspects relate this can help us understand how at least one variety of uniquely human emotions occurs.

Beginning at [3], the first thing deliberation needs to get off the ground is a universal judgment of some class of objects or actions as having some value. It is thanks to our capacity to engage in theoretical thought that we know things like “lying and injustice are bad,” to use Avicenna’s examples. In *Psychology* 5.1 Avicenna says that the practical intellect is “supplied

by” the theoretical intellect for these, the major premises of syllogisms related to a practical matters.¹¹ The typical way of coming to such evaluative judgments is through something less epistemically strong than demonstration,¹² but as they are a type of universal judgment, they nonetheless are grasped by the theoretical intellect, and then supplied to the practical intellect.

Of course, universal judgments on their own cannot lead to action in the realm of particulars, which is why Avicenna clarifies at [2] that the practical intellect needs to cooperate with the internal senses, in particular imagination and estimation. Prior to cooperation with the internal senses, universal judgments of value are being used to label particular objects as worth pursuing or not, and to evaluate courses of action, or “methods of management,” as worth pursuing or not. But it is one thing to know that lying is bad, and this the practical intellect gets from the theoretical intellect. It is another thing to identify a particular instance of lying (actual or possible) as good or bad, and to in fact pursue or avoid it. This is why Avicenna later says, in 5.1, that the practical intellect needs, in all its actions, the body and its faculties¹³: the practical intellect does not need the body to deliberate in a general sense about what sort of actions are appropriate—this is its relation “to itself.” But the point of these general judgments is to judge particular objects and initiate action, and that cannot be done without dealing with particulars.¹⁴

Avicenna’s discussion of the practical intellect’s “aspect in relation” to the motive faculty at [1] focuses on the fact that the practical intellect can develop unique dispositions towards emotions that are not present in animals. He is not focused simply on the fact *that* the practical intellect causes acts of the motive faculty, which appears to be something he takes for granted. What he is focused on explaining here is one of the ways in which the state of the practical intellect (that is, the state of our habits of mind and beliefs about practical matters) can influence the motive faculty.

Just as animals can develop dispositions towards certain emotions without the practical intellect, so humans can develop a unique variety of dispositions because of the practical intellect. Some of the actualizations of the animal appetitive faculty mentioned above are emotions of the sort also experienced by animals, and some, as we will see, are uniquely human emotions,¹⁵ but Avicenna’s point here is not to go into detail about emotions as such. Rather, it seems that he is describing something like character traits, rooted in the practical intellect, which govern emotions. That this is the case is confirmed as he goes on in the following paragraphs of 1.5 to elaborate on how the practical intellect’s relation to the body accounts for good or bad moral dispositions (*aklhāq*).¹⁶ If the practical intellect is influenced by what is “above” it (the judgements of the theoretical intellect), good morals are developed. If influenced negatively by what is “below” it (the needs of the animal and vegetative faculties), bad morals are developed. Since the practical intellect is primarily a cognitive faculty, and influences the appetitive faculty

11 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207.

12 This is why Avicenna says that they “spread out” and become “widely known,” referring to the sort of premises they are: not scientific or primary premises, but premises accepted on the basis of authority or communal consensus. This is discussed more in chapter three.

13 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 208.

14 There is quite a lot summarized quickly in the text we are unpacking here, and much of chapter three will be dedicated to unpacking the particular cognitions that give rise to acts of the motive faculty. In this chapter we will mostly be taking for granted that animals and humans have the capacity to evaluate particular objects, and that these evaluations give rise to the moved-movers of the motive faculty.

15 See the next section of this chapter.

16 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 46-47.

insofar as it is a cognitive faculty, these character traits are probably constituted by firmly held beliefs, or habitual modes of thought. For example, if you firmly hold the belief that lying is bad, that is a kind of good character trait, and it will have implications for when you experience shame: if you yourself lie, and firmly believe lying is bad, you are likely to experience shame with little need for new deliberation. This “aspect” of the practical intellect, then, is just an extension of its standard, deliberative role.

More could be said about the topics brought up in the above text. We will examine the cognitions that give rise to inclinations and actual motion in chapter three in more detail, and moral dispositions in chapter four. But for now it is enough to see that the practical intellect is a cognitive faculty, and gives rise to motive states, unique to humans, thanks to its particular cognitions. It depends on the theoretical intellect to form evaluative judgments, and it depends on the internal senses to apply these evaluations to particulars.

3. Avicenna’s Discussions of Specific Uniquely Human Emotions

The distinction between motive faculties and motive principles is at the core of Avicenna’s view on human emotions, but he actually spends time unpacking particular human emotions in a portion of 5.1 that is not explicitly related to either the theoretical or practical intellect. As mentioned earlier, Avicenna says in *Psychology* 4.4 that he will eventually discuss “states unique to the rational soul.” This seems to have been an indication that he would continue his discussion of states of the animal motive faculty (i.e., emotions), but with respect to cognitions that are uniquely human.

Avicenna begins 5.1 by discussing activities unique to humans, such as engaging in trade and linguistic communication. These are obviously activities unique to humans, but they do not necessarily involve uniquely human emotions. Trade can be a way of acting on concupiscible appetite, and linguistic communication could help fulfill an inclination towards the internal pleasure of familial relations.

It is when Avicenna switches to talking about “affections [*infī’ ālātī*]” unique to humans in 5.1 that he is clearly not just interested in behavior unique to humans, but in unique emotions. *Infī’ āl* is another generic term Avicenna sometimes uses to circumscribe similar phenomena that fall under the heading of *inbī’ āth* and *nazzā’*. *Infī’ āl* does not as precisely pick out the functional role that these phenomena serve in his psychology as does the idea of “inclination,” since it means more generally “passion,” or “that which one undergoes.” But it is a term that was in use to refer to emotions/inclinations prior to Avicenna, so it makes sense that he would use it here.

The uniquely human emotions discussed in 5.1 do not seem to be chosen with an eye to being comprehensive or systematic, but each emotion is analyzed with an eye to what makes the cognitions that cause it uniquely human. The discussion can be broken in roughly three sections: 1) a discussion of anxiety and wonder, uniquely human emotions that also have uniquely human physical manifestations, 2) shame, a uniquely human emotion in response to behavior grasped as bad according to social norms, and 3) fear and hope with respect to the future, emotions based on a sense of time that is uniquely human.

As we look through these three sections, there will be two main take-aways. Firstly, we will see these uniquely human emotions all depending on uniquely human judgments, as would be expected. But secondly, Avicenna makes no mention of which intellectual faculty—practical or

theoretical—is behind these emotions. They do not all seem obviously related to the sorts of concrete actions practical intellect is posited to explain, so it is possible that some of them are just inclinations humans have as a result of more theoretical judgments.

3a. Wonder and Grief

When Avicenna discusses wonder and grief, he is interested in showing that these emotions are caused by uniquely human cognitions, but also that they are accompanied by noteworthy, uniquely human physical manifestations:

One of the distinguishing characteristics of humans is that there follows upon his apprehension of rare/witty [*nādira*] things an affection [*infī'āl*] which is called wonder [*al-ta'ajjub*]¹⁷, and laughter follows [wonder]. And following his apprehension of harmful things there is an affection [*infī'āl*] called grief [*dajār*], which is followed by crying.¹⁸

Wonder here is likely a reference to the way that imaginative speech can affect humans, as described in Avicenna's logical works. Generally speaking, imaginative speech, or speech that evokes images in the listeners, is the sort of speech found in most poetry. Avicenna's most sustained discussion of imaginative speech comes in his *Healing: Poetics*, where he contrasts the sort of acquiescence caused by poetry with the sort of acquiescence caused by more scientific syllogisms:

Imaginative speech [*al-mukhayyil*] is speech to which the soul acquiesces [*tadh'an*], such that it accepts or rejects matters without deliberation, cogitation, or choice [*min ghayr rawiyya wa-fikr wa-ikhtiyār*]. In sum, the soul is affected on account of [such speech] emotionally [*infī'ālan nafsāniyyan*], not in terms of discursive thought [*fikriyyan*].¹⁹

When we connect with some bit of poetry, or hear a persuasive scientific argument, in both cases the soul acquiesces to something. But in the case of poetry, the images affect us emotionally, while scientific arguments cause what Avicenna terms assent. To use Avicenna's example of imaginative acquiescence, if a poet describes so-and-so as a moon, because they are handsome, the listener may come to be convinced—in a manner of speaking—that that person is a moon, even when they know that this is literally false.²⁰ On the other hand, when someone is convinced by a scientific argument, they assent to the proposition as literally true.

Of course, this raises the question of just what constitutes imaginative acquiescence. In the prior text Avicenna glosses it as a kind of emotional affect, and shortly thereafter he fills out the picture.

Imagination is a kind of acquiescence, and assent is a kind of acquiescence, but imagination is acquiescence owing to the wonder [*ta'ajjub*] and pleasure caused by the speech, while assent is acquiescence owing to acceptance that the thing is as it is said to be.²¹

17 No relation to the "wonder/aporia" discussed at the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which is a different sort of phenomenon, and is translated in Arabic as *ḥayra* or *ʿawīṣ*.

18 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 204.

19 Avicenna, *Healing: Poetics* (1973) 161.

20 Black (1990) 212.

21 Avicenna, *Healing: Poetics* (1973) 162.

So when you acquiescence to the thought that so-and-so is a moon, the acquiescence is based on an imagination of the relevant image, but it is constituted by the fact that you take wonder or pleasure in the speech. Imaginative acquiescence requires a skilled poet to deploy images in creative and evocative ways,²² but the acquiescence is achieved when the image stirs up an emotional reaction. To react emotionally to an image is to acquiesce to it.

In a section on imaginative propositions in the logical part of Avicenna's *Remarks and Admonitions*, Avicenna unpacks the nature of wonder in more detail: "Imagined propositions are such that, when they are stated, they leave in the soul an astonishing effect [*ta 'thīr 'ajīb*] of tension or release [*qabḍ wa-bast*]." ²³ The word translated as "astonishing" is the same same root as the word for "wonder" in the text from the last paragraph. The connection is unlikely to be an accident, and indeed it would make sense if this were a way of clarifying that wonder is characterized by feelings of both tension and release. Often the flow of great poetry is designed to do just that, and the release can itself lead to what Avicenna says is a characteristic physical manifestation of wonder, namely, laughter.

As for laughter itself, this is clearly something that comes after the emotion of wonder, but presumably Avicenna includes it here because of its uniqueness to humans. Laughter holds a notable place within Aristotelian works on psychology, because of Aristotle's statement in *Parts of Animals* that humans are the only animal that laugh.²⁴ *Parts of Animals* was translated in the 8th century, along with *History of Animals* and *Generation of Animals*, by Yahya Ibn al-Batriq, so Avicenna would have been aware of this specification. In *Parts of Animals*, Aristotle mentions laughter as unique to humans due to the physical makeup of their diaphragm. Given Avicenna's focus on the cognitions leading to wonder and laughter here, it is plausible to take this as a suggestion that laughter is also unique to humans because of the sort of cognitions required to give rise to laughter. That is, we may laugh in response to the wondrousness of art, broadly construed, insofar as it thwarts expectations, surprises, grips us, and creates a kind of tension and release. poetry,

Returning to Avicenna's original definition of wonder in Psychology 5.1, then, we see that wonder is caused by an apprehension of rare/witty things, paradigmatically found in poetry. Wonder can be further glossed as a feeling of tension and release, which often leads to laughter, a uniquely human behavior. That Avicenna does not mention poetry in 5.1 suggests that wonder need not be limited to poetry. But the sort of creativity and rational activity that goes into poetry, and thereby the sort of rational activity required to appreciate what is wondrous about poetry, makes it clear why this emotion would only be available to humans.

The other uniquely human emotion Avicenna discusses here is grief (*ḍajār*). This is the only time Avicenna uses this term in the context of emotions, so it is difficult to know exactly how to translate it, yet grief seems appropriate for several reasons. Lane's *Lexicon* gives numerous instances of translating *ḍajār* as being vexed, annoyed, frustrated, due to some sort of grief or loss. It appears to be a negative emotion, caused by the loss of something, especially a loved one. Moreover, Avicenna lists a characteristic physical manifestation following *ḍajār* to be crying, which does seem uniquely tied to grief. The Latins translated *ḍajār* as *anxietas*, which is of

22 Discussed at Harb (2013) 28-29.

23 Remarks: Logic (1960) p. 362 (Dunya). Here using Inati's translation (p. 127), modifying her translation of "distress or pleasure" to "tension or release."

24 Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* (2002) 3.10, 673a.

course an emotion that pervades human life²⁵, and could lead to crying. But mere anxiety does not seem as uniquely human as grief: no doubt animals miss their loved ones when they are apart (we saw Avicenna describe as much in Psychology 4.4, which we looked at in chapter one)²⁶, but there is no clear parallel in the animal world to what humans do in terms of funerals, lamenting and grieving.

In addition to these observations, comments in two predecessors suggest that grief over the loss of a loved one is likely what Avicenna may mean by *ḍajar*. Though the terminology is not set, there was apparently an awareness of the idea that grief was uniquely human, and a sense that this was worth discussing. On the one hand, the term *ḍajar* is used in Al-Balkhī's *Sustenance of the Soul*, grouped together with *ḥuẓn* and *ghamm*, (two other general negative emotions) and *ghaḍb* (anger), and opposed to pains that afflict the body.²⁷ On its own, this is not illuminating, but by seeing *ḍajar* associated with *ghamm* in a generic context, we can assume that there is some fluidity between the terms. Then, in a work written around the same period, A.B. Al-Rāzī's *Spiritual Physick*, we see *ghamm* described as a kind of unbearable suffering caused by rational reflection on loss of a loved one.²⁸ *Ghamm*, according to Rāzī, is uniquely human, apparently both because of the unique bonds humans make with family and friends, and because of our ability to conceptualize a loss as a loss. Both of these points suggest that there was some notion of "grief over the loss of a loved one" as a uniquely human emotion floating around prior to Avicenna, and it makes sense that that is what he would be referring to in this section under the heading of *ḍajar*.

Humans' propensity to cry is common throughout ancient discussions of emotions, but Avicenna seems to be the first to group it with laughter as a manifestation of a uniquely human emotion. Galen is the first to discuss the tear duct in detail, and he notes that one of its functions is to release moisture from the lacrimal glands.²⁹ His discussion makes no mention of this being unique to humans, since of course it is not. But animals moistening their eyes out of physical necessity is different from what it is like to cry, and Avicenna seems to pick up on the difference.

Today there is debate about whether humans are, in fact, the only animals that cry or laugh, and after many more years of animal observation it is by no means clear that these physical manifestations do signify uniquely human inclinations. But the fact that there is lively debate about these phenomena shows that it was astute for Avicenna to have pointed it out.

Avicenna does not state explicitly why he chose to group these two emotions together. The most obvious reason would be that wonder and anxiety are uniquely human emotions, known to be so because of the uniquely human cognitions that cause them (apprehensions of rare/witty wondrous things, and apprehensions of loss, respectively), *and because* they lead to apparently uniquely human physical manifestations. Not every uniquely human emotion Avicenna goes on to discuss also has a unique physical behavior associated with it, so that makes wonder and grief a suitable pair.³⁰

25 Avicenna, *Liber de anima* (1968) 5.1, vol. 2, p. 74.

26 See chapter one, section 3.

27 Page 515 in the Arabic text.

28 Chapter 12, *Spiritual Physick*, page 23 in the Arabic edition.

29 Galen, *On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body* (1968) 489-490.

30 It is certainly going beyond what is explicit in the text, but one might speculate that these emotions are also the two key emotions associated with the poetic genres of comedy and tragedy, respectively. Though Aristotle's treatise on comedy was lost, Avicenna would have known that comedy and tragedy were two main poetic, dramatic forms, one typically leading to wonder and laughter, and the other to grief and tears.

3b. Shame as a Response to Social Order

Avicenna's overview of uniquely human emotions continues with shame, which Avicenna builds to by discussing the way that humans set up moral standards for communal benefit in a way that animals do not. Picking up where he left off the analysis of wonder and anxiety, Avicenna paves the way for his definition of shame by explaining the difference between animal and human moral standards:

And something that is particular to humans is that there are some acts which it is not appropriate to do—for the sake of mutual association and what is beneficial. One begins to learn this when they are small, and grow up learning it, accustomed from youth to hearing that such-and-such is not appropriate to do, so that this belief becomes like an instinct [*ka-al-gharīzī*]. And there are other acts contrary to [the inappropriate ones], and the first are called bad, the latter good.

This is not the case with other animals. For if other animals abandon the acts which it is their wont [205] to do (like when a lion is trained not to eat its master or its offspring), the cause for this is not a belief [*i' tiqād*] in the soul or a kind of knowledge [*ra'y*], but rather a different kind of disposition [*hay'a*], e.g., that the animal prefers by nature the existence of what pleases him [i.e., food], and the survival of [the person who gives him food], such that the one who provides for him and who feeds him becomes pleasurable to him, because everything which is beneficial is by nature pleasurable to the one benefited. So the thing preventing [the lion's] tearing apart [its owner] is not a belief, but rather some disposition [*hay'a*], some other psychological state [*'arīḍ nafsāniyya*].

And it is possible that this state could occur due to nature [*jibla*], or as a kind of divine inspiration [*ilhām ilāhī*], as in the love of every animal for its offspring. And this happens without any kind of belief at all. Rather, [this state] is like the imagining by some human [that] something is beneficial and pleasurable, or his distaste for something in whose form there is that which repels him.

Humans form complex societies, and standards have arisen in order to promote the common good. The way we typically come to learn these standards is not by way of logical proofs, but rather by indoctrination: we are told that something is wrong over and over, until this belief becomes ingrained in us.³¹ This is an illustration of how "widely known" practical beliefs spread, something we have already seen Avicenna say is characteristic of the practical intellect's activity.³²

This is not the most epistemically strong sort of belief, but it is more than non-human animals have. Non-human animals might seem to be cooperating for the common good at times, such as by not eating their masters, but what is actually going on there is something more basic and related to simple sensory pleasures and pains. Animals want to eat, because this gives them pleasure, and they know that their master brings them food, so their master is associated with pleasure. At no point are animals motivated by any kind of propositional belief, much less a societal standard. They just do what is in their interest, for the sake of pleasure.

Because of this cognitive difference, a difference in emotional experience follows. Avicenna uses the above insights to offer his analysis of the uniquely human emotion of shame:

31 The way Avicenna discusses human moral development here is reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of virtue, acquired as a second nature, in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 2.1.

32 See section 2.

And there follows from a person's awareness that someone else is aware that he did something which it is agreed upon that one should not do a psychological affection [*infī' āl nafsānī*] called shame [*khajl*]. And this is also one of the distinguishing characteristics of humans.³³

The reason humans can experience shame, and brute animals cannot, is that animals do not set up moral standards for communal benefit. Shame occurs specifically when you know that you have done something wrong (according to agreed-upon societal standards) and you know that someone else also knows that you have done that same thing wrong. This would make shame different than guilt, which seems able to be felt even if no one else is aware. Shame requires the scrutiny and judgment of another person, and reference to agreed-upon standards. One does not typically feel shame as a result of the judgment of someone from another culture, with whose moral standards they are not in agreement. Non-human animals cannot feel shame since, of course, they do not have communal moral beliefs, or the capacity to form them

3c. Fear and Hope: Emotions Related to a Uniquely Human Awareness of Time

Avicenna concludes his discussion of uniquely human emotions by describing those that are in response to objects that might cause harm or pleasure in the future. The two names he uses for emotions that can be about future objects, fear [*al-khawf*] and hope [*al-rajā'*], are sometimes also used for animal inclination. However, Avicenna explains that certain types of fear and hope are unique to humans.:

And because someone believes something in the future will harm them, there could occur them a person a psychological emotion [*infī' āl nafsānī*] called fear [*al-khawf*]. Other animals only have [an emotion concerning harm] in relation to what they think of as likely to occur in the present, and connected to the present.

And a human has, in contrast with [future-oriented] fear, hope [*al-rajā'*], while [the emotion] animals have is merely in relation to the present, and what is not for that which is far off from the present. That which animals do is rote, and not because they are aware of time and that which pertains to it. Indeed, that also is a kind of instinct [*ḍarb min al-ilhām*]; for example, that which ants do in terms of moving provisions to their burrow (which signals rain) [this behavior is because] they imagine that that is something which is happening in that time, just like when an animal flees an opponent when he imagines that the other one is going to strike him at that time.³⁴

Aristotle noticed the relevance of time to psychology in *De Anima* 3.10, saying that it is humans' ability to perceive time that allows them to resist now-oriented animal appetite, putting off such immediate pleasures for the sake of future goods.³⁵ Avicenna is less interested here in conflicting inclinations, than in the fact that perception of time makes certain uniquely human emotions possible. It is one thing to attempt to restrain a present concupiscible appetite out of considerations for the future, and this is what Aristotle was focused on in *De Anima* 3.10. It is another thing to be aware of a possible pleasure or harm that does not yet exist, and to hope or fear, respectively, that it might.

33 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 205.

34 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 205-206.

35 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5-10.

Avicenna explains elsewhere what he means by time, and human perception of it,³⁶ but it is uncontroversial in his tradition that humans have the ability to perceive time, and other animals in general do not.³⁷ Admittedly, some animals exhibit behavior where it looks like they are aware of time, and even seem to prepare for the future. Themistius, commenting on *De Anima* 3.10, speculates that this may be because select animals, like ants and bees, do in fact perceive time.³⁸ But in the above text Avicenna has a different explanation for that behavior: some sort of instinct prompts them to imagine that it is raining in the present, and presumably to imagine that it is just about to rain in the present, which provokes behavior that to us looks like preparation.

Despite Avicenna seeming to talk about present- and future-oriented hope and fear, it is perhaps just as likely that his point in this passage is that hope and fear—properly understood—are themselves uniquely human emotions, with animals simply having analogous emotions related to the present. We may sometimes call the animal analogues "hope" and "fear," but they are really something substantially different. Even in the above text, Avicenna never explicitly says that animals have hope and fear. He says that humans have hope and fear, which are future-oriented, and that animals also have emotions that are similar, but related to the present. Beyond the ambiguity of the above text, Avicenna's definitions of these emotions elsewhere in his work support thinking of them as uniquely human.

Avicenna discusses fear in his *Healing: Rhetoric*, and hope earlier in the *Psychology*, and both of these discussions focus on these emotions as future-oriented. The opening of his discussion of fear is as follows:

And as for fear, it is a pain [huzn] and agitation [ikhtilāt] of the soul, on account of [li] imagining an expected, debilitating evil either reaching [total] corruption or not. Not every evil is feared. For envy or a person's being licentious are among the sort of things that are not feared. Among evil things, that which is feared is that which will harm the one to whom it will occur, with corruption or pain, and it [the object of fear] is *something in the future*. As for that which has passed, or that which occurred, fear about it has passed away. And the object of fear is, despite its *being in the future, expected, i.e., close to happening*. For that which is far off is not feared. For that reason not everyone fears death, but rather only he fears it who is on the brink of it. So objects of fear, then, are those things which have the ability to inflict this sort of harm.

For something to be an object of fear, it must be some appropriate distance in the future. Fear is not about things in the present, but it is also not about things so far off in the future that they do not seem to be a reality. Death is certainly not a pleasant thought, but according to Avicenna, only those on the brink of death (for whom it is something expected) fear it. The rest of us, perhaps, just have angst or worry about death.

Avicenna's definition of hope earlier in the *Psychology* comes in the midst of his discussion of the estimative faculty and memory. Specifically, he is trying to show how connected the internal senses are, such that experiencing an emotion could arouse memories of something that previously caused that emotion, or how thinking of some prior cause of an emotion could re-trigger the emotion again. When he switches to talking about hope and wishful thinking, he does not draw these points as explicitly:

³⁶ Avicenna, *Healing: Physics* (2009) 2.10-11.

³⁷ Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5ff.

³⁸ Themistius, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, p. 221, 120.10ff.

Wishful thinking [al-'amānī] and hope [al-rajā'] also do that. And hope [al-rajā'] is different than wishful thinking [al-amaniyya], for hope [al-rajā'] is the imagination of something with the judgment or belief that it *probably [will] exist*, while wishful thinking [al-amaniyya] is the imagination of something and the desire for it [shahwatihi] along with the judgment that *[it] would cause* pleasure [iltidhādh] if it came about. And fear [al-khawf] is opposed to hope [al-rajā'] by means of contrariety, and despair [al-ya's] is the opposite of [wishful thinking]. And all of these are judgments belonging to estimation.³⁹

Both wishful thinking and hope are future-oriented emotions, directed at good objects. But hope, according to Avicenna, brings with it the expectation that the good in question will probably exist, whereas wishful thinking just has the expectation that the good in question would cause pleasure. So hope is a bit more expectant, wishful thinking a bit more like daydreaming. In any case, hope, like fear, is defined as fundamentally future-oriented.

But, of course, animals wait for their food with expectation, and they shrink away from their master's rod, which is why in the above texts Avicenna does not deny that animals have something like fear and hope. So what is the difference? If it were just a matter of degrees (something in the near future versus the far off future) that would not be much of a difference.

The key difference seems to have to do with the idea of expectation. When animals wait for food in the present, the focus is on wanting the food, not expecting it to occur. When animals "fear" their master's discipline in the present, they are aware that the bad thing is in fact about to happen. There is no reckoning up of probability and expectation-forming, there is just the reality that they are about to be punished.

It is worth mentioning that there is a similar classification of emotions in history of philosophy that might seem related to what Avicenna is doing here—since it makes key distinctions related to time—but which is importantly different. That is, the Stoics generally held to a fourfold of basic emotions, divided according to object (good or bad) and time (present or future). An emotion towards the good in the present is called pleasure, towards a good in the future is called desire. An emotion towards something bad in the present is pain/distress, towards something bad in the future is called fear.⁴⁰ The difference between this set of distinctions, and the one Avicenna is unpacking in Psychology 5.1, is that pleasure and pain/distress have to do with the actual occurrence of some good or harm. There is no expectation. Whatever analogous emotions Avicenna thinks animals have to future-oriented fear and hope, they are not pleasure and pain/distress.

To summarize, the three new types of emotions Avicenna points out here, unique to humans, are distinguished as follows: wonder and grief, which are typically accompanied by laughter and crying, respectively, shame in response to others being aware of your violating social norms, and future-oriented fear and hope (which may just be standard fear and hope). In Avicenna's descriptions of these emotions, explanatory emphasis is placed on the intellectual acts that precede them, but he does not specify whether it is the practical or theoretical intellect at work. Presumably it is some combination of the two.

4. Pleasures of the Rational Soul

³⁹ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 187.

⁴⁰ Knuuttila (2004) 51-52.

The third broad category of uniquely human emotions Avicenna discusses are pleasures of the intellect, and here again Avicenna does not specify whether he has the theoretical or practical intellect in mind. As discussed in chapter 1, some complex emotions have pleasure or pain as a component part, but Avicenna also considers pleasures or pains as types of emotions when they occur on their own. A pleasurable emotion occurs when a faculty attains some completion, and the agent is aware of having done so, while pain is awareness of some defect or lack of completion. So a pleasure of the theoretical intellect is what happens when the theoretical intellect performs its function of grasping intelligibles. This is an activity that does not seem to involve the practical intellect. So, whereas the unique emotions in the prior section (shame, wonder, etc.) were not clearly assigned to any intellectual faculty in particular, and may be interpreted as belonging to the theoretical intellect, the practical, or a combination of both, these human emotions are more clearly emotions of the theoretical intellect alone.

In *Remarks and Admonitions* Avicenna discusses intellectual pleasures of the theoretical intellect as the highest sort of pleasure. It is the highest sort of pleasure, both because of the nature of the object being apprehended, and because of the nature of the faculty apprehending that object. Avicenna describes various things that fall under the scope of the theoretical intellect's object: the First Truth, celestial substances, and indeed the whole of existence, in the sense of the various essences that exist, free of material attachments.⁴¹ These objects are more abstract and stable than the objects of sensation, and to grasp them requires a faculty more able to penetrate to those depths.

When any of those objects are grasped by the theoretical intellect, humans experience the highest pleasure available to them, in this life or the next. Of course, it is more difficult to experience the pleasures of the theoretical intellect in this life, because we are prone to be distracted by the body, but Avicenna insists that we do get glimpses of it nonetheless, if we work hard at reducing those distractions.⁴² Some people might question whether such pleasures are actually more intense than those of lower faculties, but to this Avicenna simply responds that they must be the sort of people who are weighed down by worldly distractions.⁴³

Despite the fact that the theoretical intellect does not attain its specific acts of grasping intelligibles through a physical organ, when that is done in this life these acts nonetheless they have an affect on lower faculties. An example of this comes early on in *Healing: Psychology*, in the midst of Avicenna's initial effort to define the soul as a substance and first actuality of the body. There, he explains the soul's relationship to the body in a way that highlights the effects from distinctly human emotions on the vegetative faculties. The point of this in context is just to show that the human soul's being potentially separable does not prevent it from having important connections to the body in this life. The complex passage has been numbered throughout for the sake of reference below:

And the governance of the soul over the body causes the strengthening of the faculty of *growth* and its weakening, in view of [1] the soul's awareness of propositions [*qaḍāyā*] that it [2] hates or loves with a hate that is not at all bodily. And that is when there is [3] occurring to the soul a certain assent [*tasḍīqan mā*], and that is not at all that which affects the body insofar as it is a belief, but rather there follows from that belief [4] the affect [*infī'āl*] of joy [*surūr*] or pain [*gham*], and that also is one of the psychological apprehensions, and does not occur to the body insofar as it is body, [5] and [that joy or pain] affects the *growing, nutritive*

41 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9.

42 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.15-16.

43 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.2.

power such that there occurs in it, on account of the occurrence that first occurs to the soul—let that be intellectual joy [*al-farah al-naṭqī*]—a strength and effectiveness in its act, and on account of the contrary occurrence—let that be intellectual pain [*al-ghamm al-naṭqī*], in which there is no physical pain—a weakness and an impotence that corrupts its effectiveness. And perhaps the temperamental disposition will be broken down through that [weakness and impotence].⁴⁴

To clarify, humans sometimes experience intellectual joy and pain, the terms he uses at [5]. At their core, these are intellectual acts, and as Avicenna says they do not occur to "the body insofar as it is a body ([4])." Intellectual joy and pain are caused by some sort of assent to a proposition ([1, 3]), which is also something that is "body and all bodily ([2])", but it is not specified whether he is talking about the practical or theoretical intellect. Presumably intellectual joy or pain could be caused by either faculty reaching one of its completion states (i.e., doing that which they are uniquely suited to do).

The key thing to see for our passages is that the assent and intellectual joy or pain, despite being in themselves intellectual and non-bodily, have an effect on the body, described at ([5]). Intellectual joy causes a "strength of effectiveness" in the vegetative faculties, whereas intellectual pain causes a "weakness and an impotence" in the vegetative faculties. The only further description Avicenna gives of what he has in mind here is that because of intellectual pain, we might experience some sort of breakdown or corruption of our temperament. But it is not difficult to fill in the blanks: as a medical doctor, Avicenna's basic point is probably just the observation that positive emotions effect the whole person, whereas negative emotions do the opposite. Examples are most easily identifiable in what we know today about the negative physical effects of mental distress: stress can affect fertility, digestion, and more.

The way that higher pleasures are integrated with the body in this life for humans can be contrasted with discussions of pleasures experienced by celestial substances, and God, which Avicenna never refers to with the language of "passion (*infī'āl*)," that would imply passivity, or bodily affect. In particular, in the *Metaphysics*, in the midst of Avicenna's account of the attributes of God (i.e., the Necessary Existent), he says that God experiences pleasure in apprehending God's own nature. In keeping with the above definition, this means that God is in a state of perfection, and being aware of this is pleasurable. Indeed, paralleling his descriptions of human intellectual pleasure above, Avicenna says God's pleasure of the highest sort, because it is the greatest perfection apprehended by the one who is most able to apprehend things.⁴⁵ As to the pleasure of the celestial substances, one place this comes up is when Avicenna describes the sort of pleasure humans will have once their rational soul is no longer associated with a body. He says that it is difficult to grasp this sort of pleasure, but that we know it will be like that which the celestial substances currently experience.⁴⁶ The pleasures of God and celestial substances are indeed pleasures, as they fall under the heading of "awareness of a perfection," but they involve no bodily passivity, and so do not really pertain to the discussion of emotions as such.

5. Ennobling of the Lower Faculties by Higher Faculties

⁴⁴ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.3, 31-32. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁵ Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 8.7, 297.

⁴⁶ Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 9.7, 352.

The prior senses in which humans' emotional life goes beyond animals' emotional life can be supplemented by some further distinctions made by Avicenna in an early work, *Treatise on Love*. That is, in *Treatise on Love*, Avicenna discusses how various higher faculties ennoble the lower faculties to which they are joined. The ennobling of the lower by the higher can take many forms, from correcting, to providing unique goals, to providing better methods of obtaining goals. This relationship is not necessarily exclusive to an emotional context (since, e.g., sensation is also ennobled by proximity to the intellect), but it provides us with language for further describing, and perhaps gives us further instances of, the intellectual faculties functioning as motive principles. To the extent that the intellect corrects, or provides reasons and goals for different activations of the animal motive faculty, this adds to our picture of how Avicenna understands human emotional experience. Though Avicenna does not explicitly draw the connections in his later works (which we have been discussing) to what he discusses here, it is possible for the concepts discussed in *Treatise on Love* to shed light on what is going on in some of the previously discussed aspects of uniquely human emotional experience.

The *Treatise on Love* is so called because its broader goal is to show how everything—from inanimate objects to celestial bodies—moves on account of a love for that which is suitable for it. Avicenna's basic point here is teleological: everything flows from God, the source of existence, and naturally desires to return to God. That is, everything, owing to the sort of thing that it is, tends towards the Good to the extent that it is able. It is suitable for rocks to tend downwards, and to this extent they partake of the Good. Plants' characteristic acts—nutrition, growth, reproduction—reflect the Good, insofar as they aim at preservation of the species, which is an imitation of divine eternity.⁴⁷ Humans, here the subject of our focus, naturally desire knowledge, which is much closer to the nature of the Good.

What the *Treatise* has to say about uniquely human emotional life primarily comes up as an explanation of the senses in which animal appetites are integrated with the rational faculties, involved in human pursuit towards the good. The issue he appears to be concerned with is that—having just described the objects of love for the vegetative and animal faculties—it seems as though humans, with still yet a third set of faculties in their nature, will be pulled in too many directions. He gets around this by arguing that, when combined in the same subject, lower faculties are ennobled, and thereby subordinated to the highest faculty's goals. The following passage is his most explicit statement to this effect:⁴⁸

Every one of the psychological faculties, whenever it is joined to a higher, more noble faculty, there occurs in it [lit: passes over into it] an increase in refinement and nobility, on account of this connection and the height of [the higher faculty's] beauty, such that actions proceeding from the lower faculty experience an increase, either in terms of number, or excellence of mastery, or elegance of their method and quest towards their end. For every higher faculty has an ability to support the lower and strengthen it, and to prevent the lower from harm in such a way that it causes the lower to receive an increase of beauty and nobility [...] like the support of the concupiscible animal faculty for the vegetative faculties, and how the irascible faculty protects [the vegetative faculties] from something that could harm their matter (though they cannot prevent the vegetative

47 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 267. Also discussed in section 4 of his *Compendium: Psychology* (1875).

48 Avicenna was possibly influenced in this by Alexander of Aphrodisias: "For this reason, even though there are many soul powers in [living] things in which the rational power is present, the soul constituted from them all is one, because no subsequent power can occur without the power that comes before it. Rather, they all belong to it as parts, where successive [powers] are joined to the preceding ones and the preceding ones are because of this expanded and developed." See *On the Soul: Part I* (2012) section 30.

faculties' natural tendency towards degeneration) [...] and likewise the rational faculty adapts the animal to its goals.⁴⁹

In this text, we see how the various faculties work together in several ways. First, higher faculties help the lower faculties by *defending* them from harms. For example, the animal soul helps the nutritive faculty (in animals) avoid harm (the nutritive faculty in plants get no such help). A plant is defenseless against something that wants to make a meal of it, but the digestive tract of an animal is somewhat more secure, since it is protected by the same instinct to flee a predator that every other part of the animal benefits from. Second, higher faculties provide *better methods* to achieve lower goals, as with how humans acquire nourishment much more efficiently than most animals, from the way we store food, to the way we cook it. Finally, lower faculties can be given *more objects* than they would otherwise have. For example, animals only know to eat what instinct tells them to, but humans have invented all manner of new dishes.

All these modes of integration of the higher and lower can be summed up by the phrase in the last line of the text, where Avicenna says that higher faculties “adapt (*tawqīf*)” lower faculties to higher goals. Avicenna elsewhere calls this a “partnership (*ishtirāk*).”⁵⁰ This adaptation or partnership does not essentially change the lower faculties, but it does integrate them with the higher. Of course, Avicenna acknowledges that sometimes lower faculties are disordered and need reigning in,⁵¹ so the ideal form of this integration is not a given.

Of particular interest for our purposes here is the sense in which the rational faculties can provide different objects for the animal motive faculty. Avicenna's discussion in *Treatise on Love* seems to suggest two ways in which we can understand this. First of all, intellectual faculties can provide uniquely human reasons for the pursuit of concupiscible and irascible objects. Normally, the concupiscible appetite is actualized when we are thinking about some pleasure to the external senses, the irascible when we are thinking about some obstacle that would cause pain to the external senses. In non-human animals objects are presented in the imagination more or less at random (“*min ghayr qaṣd*.”)⁵² Humans, however, can attempt to rouse our appetites for physical pleasure or dominance for more noble reasons, such as preservation of the species, or defending a city, and they can do so at will. Insofar as these are inclinations, they are not uniquely human. They are actualizations of the specifically same sort of inclinations that animals can have, just stirred up intentionally.⁵³ But insofar as animals are not able to govern inclinations in this way, the phenomena is uniquely human.⁵⁴ That makes these sort of acts of the motive faculty unlike

49 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 254.

50 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

51 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 259.

52 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

53 As we will see in the next chapter, objects can be evaluated in a natural, instinctual way, or a rational/deliberative way.

54 Another example of the higher being integrated with the lower is between the vegetative faculties and the concupiscible appetite. the generative faculty is oriented at reproduction of the species. The concupiscible appetite, likewise, while it is *ultimately* oriented towards sensory pleasure, often seeks to find sensory pleasure in acts related to reproduction. A major difference between the generative faculty and the concupiscible appetite, however, is that the concupiscible appetite is a faculty for pursuing goals in a voluntary manner (*bil-ikhtiyār*), whereas the vegetative faculties act in a natural, albeit psychological, way (*bi-naw' ṭabī'ī*). When in partnership, however, Avicenna says the vegetative faculties can concur (*tuwāfiq*) with the concupiscible appetite, such that it *seems* vegetative faculties reach their goal in a voluntary manner. In other words, when partnering with a voluntary faculty pursuing the same generic sort of goal, vegetative faculties experience the benefits of voluntary action, which means seeking a goal on

the particular uniquely human emotions from section 2, which do not seem to be activations of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, strictly speaking.

On the other hand, sometimes the governs the animal motive faculties according to its own objects, in a way that goes beyond simply providing different reasons for concupiscible and irascible appetite. Recall from chapter one that in *Psychology* 4.4, text T1.5b, Avicenna briefly mentioned that the animal motive faculty can be actualized “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good.” No further explanation is given for this sort of remark in 4.4, or anywhere else in Avicenna’s later works, about what this means. But in the *Treatise on Love*, after describing the way that the intellect can guide the concupiscible and irascible faculties, he mentions something similar:

And acts could proceed from a person, from the core of their rational faculty, such as the conceiving of intelligibles, inclination [*nazzā*] towards important matters, love of the next life and [love of] being close to the noble one.⁵⁵

These activities, which we could summarize as seeking intelligibles and seeking the divine, are objects to which non-human animals simply do not have access, and therefore cannot experience emotions towards. We can see the connection of this passage to 4.4 because, summarizing still further, these things are objects which it would be appropriate to call good.

The good, as Avicenna defines it in his *Rhetoric*, is that which is sought for its own sake.⁵⁶ We can understand this in two ways. Firstly, in this context, the good is that which is not sought merely for the sake of pleasure. While there is a broad sense of “good” which Avicenna will sometimes use to refer to sensible objects, and activities which are done well, he does not use the term “good” when discussing the final objects of strictly animal inclinations. Rather, as we have seen, they are for the sake of external and internal pleasure. Humans, on the other hand, have the capacity to seek out that which is good in and of itself. Of course, experiences of the good (intelligibles and the divine) are pleasant, but they are not sought for that reason. The second way of understanding the good is as that whose goodness is not dependent on anything else. In this sense, God is the true good.⁵⁷ It is not always clear which sense of good Avicenna is using when he refers to uniquely human objects of inclination, but what is clear is that he thinks such uniquely human objects of inclination exist. We have inclination towards the good insofar as it is presented to the animal motive faculty as something “to be sought after,” in the language of *Psychology* 1.5.

Avicenna’s discussion of the integration of higher and lower faculties, then, covers cases where rational faculties modify preexisting concupiscible and irascible appetites, and cases where uniquely human objects are pursued, resulting in truly uniquely human inclinations. The former seems more relevant to the discussion of the practical intellect as motive principle in section one, and the latter to our discussion of uniquely human emotions in section two, but ultimately the discussion in *Treatise on Love* stands on its own as a distinct contribution to Avicenna’s thoughts on human emotional experience.

one’s own terms, in one’s own way. A plant cannot choose when to blossom and scatter seed, but animals and humans can choose mates. Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 217.

55 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

56 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.3, p. 80.

57 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 263.

In his later works, Avicenna does not repeat his in-depth discussion of the fact that lower faculties are integrated with higher faculties, but he takes it as a given and applies the framework. One place he does mention it explicitly is at the beginning of his analysis of the estimative faculty, in *Psychology* 4.3:

Animals, and animal-like humans, only follow estimative judgment in their acts, even though for the human there could occur—to his senses and [lower] faculties, because of the proximity of reason—that which almost makes their internal senses rational, contrary to beasts. And on account of this, [humans] attain things to which other animals do not attain—benefits [*fawā'id*] like composite [*mu'allafa*] sounds, composite colors and smells, and composite tastes, and hoping and wishing. And this is because it is as though the light of reason emanates, roaming about over these faculties.

And the imaginative faculty also in humans becomes a subject for reason, after being [merely] the subject for estimation in animals, so that humans can make use of the sciences. And memory is also beneficial in the sciences, as with the experimental, which memory attains to, and the particulars of astronomy, and suchlike.⁵⁸

Animals and humans both have the faculties of estimation, imagination and memory. In animals these faculties perform their basic functions, involving the grasping and retaining of intentions and forms. But humans are able to make use of these basic functions to carry out more complex activities. In the second paragraph, regarding imagination and memory, it seems clear that Avicenna's point is that reason requires their grasp of particulars, past and present, for the data of sciences.

Similarly, his point about estimation in the prior paragraph seems to be that reason takes the basic information given to it about particulars by estimation, and makes use of this in more complex thoughts. Avicenna speaks above of the "benefits" of composite objects, and hoping and wishing.⁵⁹ Throughout the rest of the chapter, he comes back to estimation as that which tells us of something being beneficial or harmful, so presumably his point is that humans making use of reason can make judgments about the value of some complex object, or benefits and harms in the future. For example, an animal could perhaps judge whether all the individual ingredients for some dish on the menu at a fine dining restaurant would be good for it to eat, and would likely even be inclined to eat a slice of gourmet quiche, but they would not be able to appreciate it as a gourmet, culinary achievement.

In all these examples of from *Psychology* 4.3, the ennobling of the lower faculties by the higher involves reason making use of the lower faculties' basic functions. The lower faculties are transformed, not essentially, but by being wrapped up in a larger, more complex project.

6. Conclusion

What we see, then, having looked at all these cases of uniquely human emotional experience, is that some aspects of human emotional life are unique in that they are ways of ennobling the same sort of acts or impulses already found in animals, while others are unique in that they do not fit as well under the heading of animal concupiscible and irascible appetite. The former would include instances of when practical judgments lead to actions that depend upon, or govern,

⁵⁸ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 183.

⁵⁹ We discussed the text on hoping and wishing in section 3c of this chapter, above.

animal appetites, while the later would include cases of uniquely human emotions (e.g., shame and wonder), inclinations towards the good in and of itself, and intellectual pleasures. But all of these cases seem to involve the cooperation of the rational faculties (as a cause) with the animal motive faculties (as constitutive of the emotion). Avicenna's picture of human emotional life, then, is well integrated with his account of animal emotion, but keenly attentive to the wide variety of emotions it seems humans experience, beyond those experienced by animals.

Chapter 3: Emotions and Resolution-to-act

Word Count: 15,194

Introduction: emotion is not sufficient for action

A major theme we saw from the texts discussed in chapters one and two is that all emotions—animal or human—are called emotions insofar as they are acts of the animal motive faculty qua inclining (i.e., emotions are inclinations, or impulses, towards objects). This raises the issue for Avicenna of how we get from inclination to actually carrying out an act. After all, at the start of *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna makes it clear that his primary purpose in this text is to explain actual voluntary motion,¹ and to inline towards some object or course of action is not the same thing as to actually move. Unpacking Avicenna's way of dealing with the relation between inclination and actual motion involves seeing how the various parts of his overall schema for voluntary action fit together, and helps clarify emotions' role as inclinations.

What this chapter will show is that emotions tend towards, but are not sufficient to cause, voluntary motion. Emotions are caused by one sort of cognition, an evaluation, but there needs to be a further, practical judgment in order to bring about what Avicenna calls the "resolution-to-act." The term "resolution (*ijmā'*)" is how Avicenna refers to the motive faculty when it reaches a stage where it necessarily causes motion, provided there are no external impediments. There are uniquely human ways of *evaluating* something (which lead to uniquely human emotions) and ways of evaluating things that all animals share (which lead to standard emotions). Then, there are uniquely human ways of making a *practical judgment* (which leads to resolution), and there is an analogue to this on the animal level (which also leads to resolution). In such a schema, emotions play an important role in setting goals and focusing attention, but they do not ultimately determine what we do.

Although Avicenna uses this schema consistently, there is no one place where he attempts to unpack it directly, in all its detail. Moreover, there are some places where he elides certain components, especially when it is not the main subject under discussion. So, the analysis here will rely on several key discussions, each of which individually only gives part of the picture, but which nonetheless fit together. Avicenna is clear enough in the separate texts that it seems reasonable to assume we are describing a schema he has in mind, rather than imposing something from the outside.

In discussing resolution alongside emotion, we are following Avicenna's lead, who most often discusses the two topics alongside one another. Presumably one reason for this is that getting clear on both aspects of the motive faculty together (emotion and resolution) helps clarify each aspect individually. Since emotion and resolution are both closely related acts of the motive faculty, it would be easy to erroneously map the role of one onto the other. So while some of this discussion will focus on resolution, and the cognitions behind resolution and emotion, Avicenna nonetheless thinks this is relevant to clarifying the role of emotion.

¹ "Since we have spoken of the apprehensive animal powers, it is appropriate for us to discuss the animal motive [*muḥarrikah*] powers. We say that the animal, unless it has an appetite for [*yashtaq*] something with an appetite that it is aware of, or that it imagines, or [even] that it is not aware of, it is not impelled towards seeking that thing through movement." Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 194.

1. Inclination is distinct from resolution

The distinction between two branches of the motive faculty—inclination and, as we will see shortly, resolution—shows that, for Avicenna, there is more nuance to the four factors involved in voluntary motion than just what we looked at in chapter one. As a reminder, the four factors required for voluntary movement in the Aristotelian schema, to which Avicenna generally subscribes, are as follows:

- 1) unmoved-mover: the cognized object, a practical good represented to the subject in some way
- 2) moved-mover: an act of the motive faculty, in response to (1)
- 3) means of motion: muscles and the ligaments
- 4) that which is moved: the subject as a whole.²

As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out in reference to Aristotle, this four-element schema, found in Aristotle's *De Anima*, leaves some things unspecified³. In particular, it does not specify in what way exactly a practical good is represented to the subject, and how we account for all the cases where we seem to want something, but don't actually *do* anything about it. In the *De Motu* Aristotle goes into more detail, distinguishing various ways in which the object can be cognized relevant to action, and explaining how we get from inclination to actual motion. Avicenna would not have had access to the *De Motu*,⁴ but we nonetheless find him nuancing parts of the four-element schema of voluntary motion in a similar way. What Avicenna ends up affirming, in brief, is that there are two of types ways in which the unmoved-mover (the practical good) is grasped, which lead to two distinct types of moved-movers (inclination, then resolution). That is, there are two types of cognitions related to practical goods, which lead to two different acts of the motive faculty, before the means of motion are actually engaged.

The two types of moved-movers are distinguished in the following text, which occurs towards the beginning of Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* 4.4, just before Avicenna explains the various types of emotions that we looked at in chapter one:

And appetite [*shawq*] may vary.⁵ For among [different kinds of appetite] there is that which remains weak, and there is that which strengthens to the point where it brings about [*yūjib*] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]—though resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] is not the same as appetite. Appetite might strengthen towards something yet there be no resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] towards movement at all, analogous to when the imagination grows strong while there is no appetite for what is in the imagination.

2 Some of their precise terminology differs. Aristotle calls *orexis* the proximate principle of motion, while Avicenna calls the means of motion the proximate principle, and differences ripple out from there. But the ordering and general point is the same.

3 Nussbaum (1983) 136-137.

4 Gutas notes this at (2014) 361, n. 5. While the Latin *Book of Animals* did have *De Motu* folded into it, and was made using some Arabic intermediaries, Burnett notes that the intermediaries only included *Hist.*, *De part.*, *De gener.* (see Burnett (2014) 795). We know from Averroes that there was a summary of Aristotle's works on animals by Nicolaus Damascenus, including the *De Motu*, that was translated into Arabic. On that, see Steel (1999) 74. But whether this made it to Avicenna, we do not know.

5 Not yet having made careful distinctions between types of animal emotions, Avicenna is using the term appetite [*shawq*] here loosely, simply with the goal of sketching how emotion can lead to action. As we saw in chapter one, his more technical way of referring to emotions is with the terms *inbi' āthāt* and *nazzā'āt*.

And when the resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] happens properly, the locomotive powers (whose function is simply to contract and expand the muscles) obey—though this is not the same thing as appetite, nor [is it the same as] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]. For someone prevented from movement is not prevented from having a strong appetite, nor from resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]—but [when constrained] he will not find obedience from the other powers, whose only function is locomotion, and which are in the muscles.⁶

Here Avicenna is making the point that there are three distinct capacities of the motive soul: an appetitive/inclining/emotion capacity, a resolving capacity, and a locomotive capacity. He shows that these are distinct by showing how it is possible to have a full actualization of one, without the others. For example, it is possible to have an emotion, even a very strong emotion, yet still not have the resolve to do anything about it. Again, one could be resolved to take some sort of action, yet be physically prevent from doing so (e.g., because they are in captivity).

Avicenna is not always clear about how we should categorize *al-ijmā'*, in terms of its being merely an activity of an existing faculty, or a distinct faculty/capacity, but it seems the available evidence suggests the latter. He does not mention *al-ijmā'* in his initial enumeration of faculties in *Psychology* 1.5, but in 4.4 and elsewhere he does use the term faculty (*quwwa*) to refer to the *al-ijmā'*: "The decisive faculty follows the previously mentioned [emotional] faculties, so that when their inclination grows strong, it resolves to act."⁷ Moreover, in a previous section of *Psychology*, 1.4, he specifies that some things which make actions different do not thereby necessitate positing of new faculties, such as: differences in movements of the will (you can will to move to point A or point B, but you do not need two locomotive faculties to do so), states of the organs used (someone with an impaired memory does not have a different kind of memory, just an impaired one), external impediments (if you put on tinted glasses, this does not change the basic structure of the visual faculty), strong/weak or positive/negative manifestations of the same activity (we can believe, be certain, and doubt, from the same faculty).⁸ His concern to show in the above text that *al-ijmā'* is *not* merely the same as strong inclination suggests that he has the last of these points in mind: if *al-ijmā'* were equivalent to a strong appetite, we would not need to posit two distinct faculties—but it is something more than strong appetite. So while Avicenna does not single out *al-ijmā'* in his overview of psychological faculties, there is evidence that he thinks it is worth considering a distinct faculty.

Granted, there are cases where Avicenna is not careful with this distinction, and sometimes refers to the appetitive faculty itself as resolving, but these should not be taken to override his more focused discussion in *Psychology* 4.4. For example, the following text from his *Marginal Glosses on Aristotle's De Anima* blurs the lines between inclination and resolution:

And he [Aristotle] says that by appetite, there is not meant the trivial appetite that increases and diminishes and goes away and differs, but rather decisive, resolving appetite [*al-shawq al-'azmī al-ijmā'ī*]; for it moves necessarily if there is no impediment. This is not like the appetite of the ascetic, for that is merely concupiscible desire, along with which there is not the decisive resolution [*al-'azim al-ijmā'ī*] whose course of action is from the mind [*allādhī huwwa min al-'aql mashīhu*]⁹.

6 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 195. Emphasis mine.

7 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 196.

8 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.4, 33-34.

9 Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947) 113.19.

Here Avicenna is commenting on *De Anima* 3.9, 433a9, where Aristotle discusses how some people are especially good at controlling their desires. These are the self-controlled, the *egkrateis* in Greek, which is here discussed under the heading of those who are ascetics, or pious devotees (*nāsik/nussāk*). Since Aristotle does not make a clear distinction between his faculties of appetite and resolution, Avicenna follows suit, calling the difference between the ascetic's inclination and one who acts on their inclination the difference between "mere" appetite and "decisive, resolving" appetite. So this blurring of lines here makes sense, given that Avicenna is glossing Aristotle, who himself did not make this distinction. Moreover, there certainly is a sense in which both inclining appetite and *al-ijmā'* are sub-faculties of the more generic animal motive faculty. So depending on how finely we want to slice faculties, inclination and resolution could be more or less identified.

In the secondary literature and translations of scattered texts, *al-ijmā'*, or *al-quwwa al-ijmā' iyya*, is sometimes referred to as the "decisive faculty," sometimes the "resolving faculty."¹⁰ Here I will prefer translating *al-ijmā'* as "resolution," because "decision" has cognitive overtones, and Avicenna is clear that *al-ijmā'* is not a cognitive function. Taking the background of this term into account, one might be tempted to think otherwise: Al-Farabi's single use of the term *al-ijmā'* is at the beginning of *Conditions of Certitude*, as a synonym for knowledge (*ra'ī*), under the genus of certainty (*yaqīn*).¹¹ However, the term does not show up in Avicenna's own logical section of the *Healing*, instead consistently being brought up under the heading of the motive faculty, which shows that he is not following Al-Farabi's usage, instead wanting us to think of resolution on the motive side of the motive-cognitive division.¹² *Al-ijmā'* is also an important term in Islamic law, signifying the unanimous agreement of a group of authorities on some moral or doctrinal issue.¹³ Yet this cognitive, juridical use is a technical usage of a term with a broader meaning, and Avicenna gives no indication that he means to evoke that particular legal meaning in his discussion of *al-ijmā'*. Rather, he refers to *al-ijmā'* as part of (*min*),¹⁴ or belonging to (*li*),¹⁵ the motive faculty. Taken together with the fact that he introduces *al-ijmā'* in his discussion of motive faculties, there is little doubt he intends us to think of resolution as something distinct from, but following, cognition.

One particularly striking text that distinguishes the notion of resolution from the cognitive faculties occurs at the beginning of Avicenna's section on the animal motive faculties in his *Remarks and Admonitions*:

As for voluntary motion, it is more lively [*ashadd nafsaniyyatan*], and it has a determining, resolving [*'āzim mujammi'*] principle, [which is] acquiescent and passive to [*mudha'inan wa munfa'ilan 'an*] imagination, or estimation, or intellect [*khayāl aw wahm aw 'aql*], from which proceeds the irascible power, which pushes away from harm, or the concupiscible, which attracts to that which is necessary or the beneficial for animals. That which stretches out in the muscles obeys it, the locomotive faculty, is subservient to those commands.¹⁶

10 See, for example, Marmura usage of the translation "decisive" in 4.2 of *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005).

11 Al-Fārābī, *Conditions of Certitude* (1987), 98.5.

12 See prior discussion of Avicenna's *Psychology* 1.5 in chapter 1, section 2.

13 Bernand (2012).

14 Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.3.

15 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195.

16 Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement, 25, page 435.

What is noteworthy about this text is that the resolving faculty is clearly linked with appetite and inclination as an “acquiescent and passive” counterpart to cognitive principles of imagination, estimation and intellect. So even though resolution is active in the sense of directly activating the means of motion in the muscles, it is nonetheless responsive to cognition, just like inclination. This coheres with what we saw in the previously quoted text from *Marginal Glosses*, that decisive resolution gets its “course of action” from the mind, but it is motive, rather than cognitive.¹⁷

So it seems appropriate to render *al-ijmāʿ* as resolution, keeping in mind that this is non-cognitive, and always a resolution-*to-act*, not simply resolution *that* some action would be good to do. That is, it is not a mere thought, but an embodied resolution towards action caused by a thought. This leads directly to the next issue that is central to clarifying how inclination and resolution fit into the schema for voluntary motion: the differing cognitions that trigger each of them.

Looking at the differing cognitions that trigger inclination and resolution in Avicenna’s psychology will show him to have a coherent picture of how they fit together. This coherent picture has not always been recognized, as prior comments by Gätje and Van Riet on the term *al-ijmāʿ* in Avicenna have shown. Both point out that the Latin tradition had a difficult time translating *al-ijmāʿ*, variously using *desiderium*, *voluntas*, *effectus*, or *optare*,¹⁸ blurring the lines between inclination and resolution, and sometimes even using *consensus communis*,¹⁹ suggesting a conflation of Avicenna’s use of *al-ijmāʿ* with the Islamic legal use. Gätje reports that in the 20th century some scholars have tried to understand *al-ijmāʿ* as related to the Stoic notion of *synkatathesis*—a kind of cognitive assent—which Avicenna might have absorbed in some manner through Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Stoic-inspired writings.²⁰ A close look at the cognitive causes behind both inclination and resolution will show that Avicenna is consistent in distinguishing inclination from resolution, and in holding that both are states of the motive faculty, rather than themselves types of cognitions.

2. Different cognitions for different motive faculties

Though emotion and resolution are not cognitive, the cognitions that trigger them constitute an important part of understanding their place in Avicenna’s schema for explaining voluntary motion. In other words, emotions and resolution are acts of the motive faculty, each caused by a different type of cognition that is distinct from the motive act, and precedes the motive act. Moreover, there is an order to all these acts, with resolution occurring last, preceded by a practical judgment, which practical judgment in turn must be preceded by a relevant emotion, caused by some evaluation.

Avicenna’s clearest explanation *that* there are cognitions that trigger inclination and resolution, and that they differ, is in *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2. It is part of Avicenna’s explanation of the concepts potency and actuality, specifically natural potencies versus powers over a thing and its opposite, paralleling Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Theta. Avicenna’s way of framing the issue and figuring out what to focus on seems to be a true development unique to

¹⁷ See above, footnote 9. §

¹⁸ Gätje (1975) 360.

¹⁹ Van Riet (1967) 646.

²⁰ Gätje (1975) 356.

him, as there was little in the way of source material other than Aristotle's text itself. The only Greek commentaries translated into Arabic on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* were the Book Delta portions of the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius.²¹ And while Al-Farabi's *Aims of Aristotle's Metaphysics* was helpful in orienting Avicenna towards the work as a whole, it does not contain analysis of this specific section.

What is at issue, according to Avicenna, is how to best conceive of the distinction between capacities for motion that act automatically upon encountering a suitable object (natural faculties), and those that do not. That is, some capacities, like fire's ability to heat, operate automatically when put in proximity with something capable of being heated. Other capacities, like a doctor's ability to heal, do not. If we conceive of the doctor's ability to heal as a kind of knowledge, there must be something else, beyond the mere ability to heal, that explains whether the doctor actually heals or not in a particular situation. That "something else" that makes the difference between whether these non-automatic faculties actualize or not is what Aristotle calls "appetite" or "choice," which, to use Avicenna's language, are various states of the motive faculty. We will unpack the core Avicennian text that deals with these issues by breaking it into three parts.

Avicenna begins by circumscribing the particular type of powers he plans to discuss. In the text Avicenna bases his discussion on, Aristotle distinguishes between rational and non-rational faculties that cause motion, while Avicenna broadens the focus to any cognitive and non-cognitive faculties that lead to motion:

[a] [To turn to] those powers that are principles for motions and actions,²² some are associated with reason and imagination, while some are not associated with these. Those associated with reason and imagination are of the same genus as reason and imagination. For it is almost the case that man and not-man are known by one power and that it belongs to one power to imagine pleasure and pain and, in general, to imagine a thing and its opposite. Likewise, these powers themselves are, in their individual instances, each a power over a thing and its opposite.²³

Here Avicenna first makes a distinction between powers that are principles for motion which are "associated with" reason and imagination, and those which are not. He immediately clarifies this locution, "associated with," saying that he just means faculties that could be considered rational or imaginative in some generic sense, and those that are not. In other words, he is making a distinction between cognitive faculties at the level of the animal and human soul, on the one hand, and non-cognitive faculties, on the other.

The reason for the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive faculties is that cognitive faculties, insofar as they are principles of motion, are "a power over a thing and its opposite." Powers over a thing and its opposite can be principles of motion, or not, and Avicenna's first example of being a power over a thing and its opposite is just the ability to know and not know someone. These two acts are opposite, and they can both be performed by the same cognitive faculty. The idea at this point is just that a power is a power over a thing and its opposite if it has different types of act with respect to one and the same object. Cognitive faculties related to

21 Bertolacci (2006) 73.

22 As we saw in chapter two, section one, something can be a principle of motion, but not necessarily a motive faculty.

23 [T4a-c] are a continuous text taken from Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005), 4.2.10-11. The translation used here is Marmura's, slightly modified.

motion are “likewise” a power over a thing and its opposite, as Avicenna says in the final line of the text. A doctor’s medical knowledge can be used to heal or not heal, to heal or to harm. Upon seeing some raw materials, a builder with the knowledge of how to build can build, or not.

Given that cognitive principles of motion do not just have one sort of action upon encountering their object, it cannot be that they actualize on their own when the subject encounters their object, at least insofar as they are principles for motion. Avicenna continues in *Metaphysics* 4.2 as follows:

[b] In reality, however, it would not be a complete power—that is, a principle of change, complete and in actuality, of one thing in another (inasmuch as [the latter] is another)—unless the will [*al-irāda*] conjoins it, impelled either by an estimative belief [*i’ atiqād wahmī*] that follows an appetitive or irascible imaginative act [*takhayyul shahwānī aw ghadabī*] or by a rational belief²⁴ [*ra’ī ‘aqlī*] following a cogitative idea [*fikra ‘aqliyya*] or the conceptualization of an intellectual form [*taṣawwur ṣūra ‘aqliyya*]. Then, if that will, still not being a will that [only] inclines [*irāda mumīla*], but a decisive will [*irāda jazima*] (namely, the one which constitutes the resolution [*al-ijmā’*] that necessitates the movement of the organs), conjoins [the power, then the latter] becomes necessarily the principle of necessitating action.

Aristotle made it clear in the original discussion of these ideas that powers over a thing and its opposite need something else to actualize when encountering their object, in order to avoid the absurd conclusion of automatically doing x and not-x at the same time.²⁵ The doctor’s knowledge of the healing arts equips them to be able to heal and not heal, but without some additional factor, it would seem that they would do both upon encountering a patient, which of course they do not. Avicenna does not repeat this line of reasoning, but he clearly endorses the need for an additional factor, as seen in this text.

In unpacking the additional factor needed for a cognitive principle for motion to actually enact motion in this text, Avicenna orders some of the factors involved in voluntary motion in a way that is consonant with the psychological literature, and more explicit. In general, Avicenna is stringing together an array of psychological functions in text [b] in order to show the relationship between different types of cognitive and motive faculties. When Avicenna says that “will [*irāda*]” must join to the cognitive faculties in order for motion to actually occur, “will” is being used generically for any species of motive faculty associated with voluntary motion, in the same way that “power associated with reason and imagination” was used generically earlier for various cognitive faculties. What we see in text [b], then, are basically two processes, two ways for cognitive principles of motion to lead to actual motion:

Process leading to action	Cognition 1 (evaluation) —>	Motive Act 1 —>	Cognition 2 (practical judgment) —>	Motive Act 2
Animal	Imaginative act	Inclining will	Estimative belief	Resolved will
Rational	Conceptual act	Inclining will	Rational belief	Resolved will

24 Marmura had “opinion” for *ra’ī*, but the following text from Psychology suggests “belief” or “knowledge” would be better: “Knowledge [*ra’ī*] is belief that is settled, while opinion [*ṭann*] is belief one is inclined towards, along with the admission that the alternative might be true. And not everyone who opines believes, just like not everyone who senses thinks, or everyone who imagines opines or believes or knows.” *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207-208.

25 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006) 1048a.

The two processes are how voluntary motion takes place at the level of the animal and rational soul, respectively. The column “Cognition 1” contains the two cognitive principles of motion at issue, and what follows are the factors Avicenna says need to follow them, respectively, in order for actual motion to occur. Midway through text [b] Avicenna makes a clear distinction between two processes, one where an estimative belief follows an imaginative act, and another where a rational belief follows a conceptual act. What the second cognitive act (the estimative or rational belief, respectively) leads to in both processes, according to [b], is a *resolved* will, as opposed to a merely inclining will. Prior to the second cognitive act, the first cognitive act (the imaginative or conceptual act) merely leads to an *inclined* will, which corresponds to inclination, or emotion. Avicenna does not describe these components in more detail, because, individually, they are all discussed at more length in the psychological texts. His main point in this section is just to show what the “something else” is that enables a cognitive principle of motion to actually enact motion. That additional faculty is the resolved will, *al-ijmāʿ*.

Distinguishing *al-ijmāʿ* as a “something else” necessary for a cognitive principle to enact motion is a development on Avicenna’s part, though that may not be obvious at first. Some recent work on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Theta renders the Greek of Aristotle’s way of referring to desire and choice as “that which is decisive [*kurios*].”²⁶ Since one of the translations of *al-ijmāʿ* in the literature is “decisive faculty,” as mentioned before, this could make it seem like Avicenna is in some way getting the core of his idea for *al-ijmāʿ* from the Aristotle text, even if Aristotle did not present it so explicitly. However, the Arabic text of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that Avicenna would have had access to, at least as it is preserved in Averroes’s *Long Commentary on the De Anima*, makes no mention of *al-ijmāʿ*. Rather, the phrase (in Greek) that describes the additional motive component as “that which is decisive [*kurios*]” is rendered (in Arabic) as the “true ruler [*al-masūd al-ḥaqqī*].”²⁷ That is, Avicenna would have read that the motive faculty (in particular appetite/*shawq* and choice/*ikhtiyār*) is the true ruler when it comes to whether powers associated with reason act or do not act. There is no mention of *al-ijmāʿ*, in the Arabic of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, nor even a clear distinction between inclination and resolution. Rather, in Aristotle’s text, we just have the equivalent of inclination, and this alone somehow makes the difference between whether a doctor would choose to heal or not. If Avicenna were speaking loosely, he would broadly agree with something like that. But in texts [a] and [b] above he is careful to distinguish inclination from resolution, since it is not merely having an emotion that makes the difference in whether the doctor heals or not, it is having a resolution to act.

One phrase in text [b] that needs explanation is how this additional motive component renders the cognitive principle of motion a “complete power.” Avicenna goes on to unpack this idea in the remainder of his discussion of cognitive principles for motion in *Metaphysics* 4.2. There are several paragraphs which follow, but their first two sentences sum up the idea:

[c] For we have shown that, so long as a cause does not become a cause in terms of necessitation whereby a thing is necessitated by it, the effect would not come into existence through it. Before this state, the will [*al-irāda*] would have been weak, [resolution] [*al-ijmāʿ*] not having taken place.

26 See the translation at Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006) 1048a and Nussbaum’s discussion of the term at (1983) 139, 146, and 150.

27 Averroes, *Long Commentary on the De Anima* (1967) 5.2, Book Theta, p. 1149.

For Avicenna, a power is called a complete power when an effect is necessitated by the power, given the appropriate circumstances.²⁸ He says he has already argued for this, likely referring to an earlier section in the same book, *Metaphysics* 4.1.10, where he argues that if a cause, x , were a “complete cause” of y , yet x did not necessitate y when x and y coexist, then the only thing that would make the difference in terms of whether x is a cause of y is whether y exists or not. Since that is absurd, x is a complete cause for y only when y is necessitated by x .

A cognitive principle for motion, like the doctor’s knowledge of how to heal, does not on its own necessarily cause motion, so it is not a complete cause for motion. It is only with something additional, namely, *al-ijmāʿ*, that the motion follows necessarily, assuming there are no impediments. When the will is “weak”—when it is mere “inclination,” as described in text [b]—action will not take place, even when the appropriate object is at hand. Of course, cognitive faculties are not always thought of as principles of motion. It is possible to just imagine or conceptualize something, with no relation at all to motion. But insofar as cognitive faculties imagine or deliberate *about* action, they are principles for motion, and only complete when accompanied by a resolution.

Avicenna’s concluding analysis in [c] shows that the idea of some act being necessary is not opposed to the idea of it being voluntary. Avicenna concludes his discussion of cognitive principles for motion in 4.2 by saying that when resolution accompanies a cognitive principle for motion, the subject would “then act by necessity.”²⁹ What precisely is necessitated was mentioned earlier, in text [b] when Avicenna says that the resolution-to-act [*irāda jazima*, translated by Marmura as “decisive will”] “necessitates the movement of the organs.” A doctor is not bound to conclude that healing some patient is the right thing to do, but once they do so conclude, and then have resolution to heal, they will act to heal the patient when in proximity to the patient. Of course, the cognitive faculties and the resolving faculty are themselves complete capacities in their own domains, and so certain cognitions or resolutions are necessary in appropriate circumstances. It is not random that a doctor with a certain web of beliefs would determine that healing is the best course of action. And there is no indication that the resolving faculty is self-determining or self-moving—it is responsive to cognition under normal circumstances. So necessity seems to run straight through the process. This highlights the fact that the key difference between voluntary and involuntary motion for Avicenna is not that one involves necessary actualization of faculties, and the other does not. Rather, one involves cognitive and motive faculties, while the other does not.³⁰

The preceding analysis of *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 has shown that cognitive powers are principles for motion only insofar as they work through the motive faculties. In clarifying what he means by this, Avicenna shows that there are two levels as which cognitive powers can trigger motive faculties: first by making the motive faculty *incline* towards some object, and then by making the motive faculty resolved towards some course of action. When there is resolution, this

28 McGinnis, & Ruffus (2015) 161, 174.

29 Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 4.2.11.

30 You could argue that, on this view, if we had a detailed enough understanding of someone’s web of beliefs, we would be able to predict what they will conclude is good for themselves or not in a given situation, in the same way that we could predict what type of nuts an oak tree will produce. Even if this is true, a key difference would remain between the two cases, in that the later is entirely predictable based on the nature of thing (oak trees always produce acorns), whereas nothing about the nature of a human being tells you how a particular human being will actualize their powers over opposites. For an interpretation of Avicenna’s texts that relate to the issue of human freedom, see McGinnis, & Ruffus (2015).

is when there is a complete principle of motion, necessitating movement of the muscles and organs.

In order to get a more detailed better grasp on the distinction between inclination and resolution, and how one leads to the other, we need to better understand the cognitive causes by which each occur. Since Avicenna is not focused on clarifying the cognitions themselves in *Metaphysics* 4.2, in what follows I want to show that other Avicennian texts fill in the picture, and that Avicenna endorses the following schema:

[Stage 1] First, some practical good (the object, unmoved-mover), imagined as having some sort of value, can lead to an inclination (e.g., food is seen as beneficial, then desired).

[Stage 2] Then, some practical judgment about a course of action can lead to a resolution-to-act (e.g., someone decides to open the cupboard to get a snack, and the motive faculty actually attempts to instigate action).

To be clear, the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text mere shows *that* there is a progression of cognitions and motive states, but I think other texts fill in the picture in this way. Some cognitions of unmoved-movers lead to inclinations, others lead to resolutions-to-act. The evaluation in [Stage 1] and the practical judgment in [Stage 2] are supposed to correspond to what is mentioned under Cognition 1 and Cognition 2, respectively, in the above table. In other words, two types of evaluations (one at the animal level, one human) lead to inclination, and two types of practical judgments (one at the animal level, one human) lead to resolution. In the following sections, I will explain the components of [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] in more detail, showing that these distinctions are ones Avicenna is interested in making, and what they amount to.

3. Emotions for means, resolution for ends

The distinctions made in [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] are made more plausible when seen as a development of Aristotle's distinction between ends of motion versus means of motion. In *Nicomachean Ethics*—a text Avicenna would have had access to, despite not writing a text of similar scope—Aristotle says that “[virtue] determines the end and [practical intellect] makes us do the things that lead to the end.”³¹ The general idea here is relevant to the discussion of emotions because virtues determine ends to the extent that some of them govern appetites and emotions, and therefore what we are inclined to pursue or not pursue.³² The practical intellect, on the other hand, decides how to pursue that which emotions incline towards. If someone is disposed to feel merciful to another person (i.e., they have the virtue of being merciful), helping that person in need of mercy becomes an object towards which they incline. Exactly what emotions we have is governed by the sort of dispositions or virtues we have, but it is because of the emotion that we are actually oriented towards some end in a given situation. Then a practical judgment of the sort, “I ought to help them in such and such a way” could lead to action. This determines the means. The practical judgment shifts the focus from the value of the object (in this case, helping someone), to how the subject ought to carry out the act. Avicenna's schema, as

31 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 6.13, 1145a.

32 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 2.5, 1106a.

summarized by [Stage 1] and [Stage 2], likewise has a place for judgments that determine ends as well as judgments that determine means.

One text where we see Avicenna using means and ends language in the context of voluntary motion is, again, in *Healing: Metaphysics*. In 6.5.4-6. Avicenna's main goal is to show that all voluntary motion has an end. Say there are two points, A and B. In some cases the end is identical with what the motion itself achieves, as in simply having the desire to move from point A to point B. Here, the end is to move, and the end is achieved through that very motion. In other cases, the motion is in the service to some other goal, like meeting up with a friend at point B. In order to meet with a friend at point B, you still need to move from point A to point B, so the motion (the means) *looks* the same as in the previous case, but the *end* differs. Avicenna's main point is that in both cases there is a goal, and a means to serve that goal, even in cases where the goal and the means to the goal are difficult to distinguish, as in the first case.

What this shows for our purposes is that the idea of an end, the object of inclination, is not the same as the means of movement towards that object. It is one thing to desire to meet up with a friend, it is another to resolve on concrete steps to get to them. Even the case of desiring to get from point A to point B requires actually resolving on doing those actions. The two steps—desiring an end and resolving on a practical course of action—are distinct.

4. Evaluations lead to inclination

What triggers emotions is just an evaluation of some object, without any decision about a particular course of action. That is, emotions are triggered when we judge some object to have a certain value. The main place we see evidence of emotions being caused by evaluations is in the opening to Avicenna's descriptions of the inclining motive faculty. He tends to describe emotions as caused by things "imagined to be" beneficial or harmful, not by decisions that something ought to be pursued or avoided through a particular course of action. This can be made most clear by referring back to the table in chapter one where we broke down Avicenna's descriptions of the inclining motive faculty³³ There we see that, in *Psychology* 1.5, concupiscible appetite responds to that which is "imagined to be necessary or beneficial," and again, "imagined to be beneficial" in 4.4. The irascible appetite actualizes in response to that which is "imagined to be harmful or corruptive," in 1.5, and "imagined as an obstacle" in 4.4. The word for "imagined" in all these cases is *mutakhayyil* and his purpose in using it will be clarified shortly. But the consistency with which the locution "imagined as" is chosen to discuss the cause of inclinations, and *not* used to discuss the cause of resolution (as we will see), strongly suggests that he intends to contrast merely imagining something as harmful or beneficial with making a practical, imperative judgment.

This close association between emotions and evaluations is not unique to the *Healing*, but recurs in his other texts, for example in the later psychological part of his *Salvation*:

The motive faculty insofar as it is motivating, it is the inclining, appetitive faculty, and it is the faculty which, when there is inscribed in the imagination [*irtasima fī al-takhayyul*] [...] an image of something to be sought or avoided, it incites [*hamalat*] to motion.³⁴

³³ See chapter 1, section 2b.

³⁴ Avicenna, *Salvation: Psychology* (1985) p. 197.

Avicenna is again specifically discussing inclination, as opposed to resolution, and the cause is described solely in terms of something being imagined in a particular way. This text is especially vivid, talking about the harmful or beneficial object as “inscribed” in the imagination. It appears that certain objects, when conceived in the imagination with some value, simply have the ability to trigger inclinations. But, as was said, the turn of phrase “imagined as having some sort of value” is in need of explanation.

Avicenna’s writings provide two ways of better understanding this locution, which require keeping straight two usages of words related “imagination.” On the one hand, for something to be “imagined as having some sort of value,” is for it to be an evaluation that is undergirded by images in the imagination, and affects appetite via those images. On the other hand, something can be evaluated in various ways, the two main divisions being “imaginatively” or arrived at through discursive, reasoned thought. So the phrase “imagined” in “imagined as having some sort of value” picks out that this evaluative process is *undergirded by images*, but the evaluative process itself comes in *various modes* (all undergirded by images), one of which modes is called “imaginative,” and another which is called “discursive” or “reason-based.” The next two sections will examine the key texts where these distinctions arise, so as to get a better understanding of [Stage 1], where evaluations trigger emotions.

4a. Evaluations are about particulars

All evaluations that lead to emotion are undergirded by images in the imagination because they are in response to particulars, and the sensitive faculties required to perceive particulars are loosely referred to as “imagination.” Avicenna makes clear that imagination is necessary for any particular inclination in a text from his *Remarks an Admonitions*. The text comes from a supplement he added to the psychological part of the *Remarks*, addressing issues that are not normally treated so explicitly in his psychological texts. A main issue he takes up in the supplement is that of distinguishing the different types of volitions belonging to celestial beings and humans. In making these distinctions, human voluntary motion is described in ways that emphasize the role of imagination. The distinctions he makes about the volitions of celestial beings are necessary for understanding the discussion of human volition.

The motion of celestial bodies, moving in their circular orbits, is identified as voluntary rather than natural because it has more than one sort of movement with respect to its object. In keeping with the description of voluntary motion from *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 as stemming from a power over a thing and its opposites,³⁵ Avicenna says that because the motion of the celestial bodies is circular, it by definition goes away from *and* towards its object—he does not specify exactly what the object is—and this is enough to be sure that it is voluntary, not natural. Natural motion would only go either towards some object, or away from it, but celestial bodies repeatedly switch between the two, owing to some sort of volition.³⁶

Avicenna next clarifies that the movement belonging to the “first body,” or the outermost sphere, is also voluntary—even though it does not move in terms of position. To make that claim he first needs to make a distinction between types of voluntary motion: sensible and

³⁵ See section 2 above.

³⁶ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement 26, p. 438.

intellectual.³⁷ Sensible volitions are directed at sensible intentions, and intellectual volitions are directed at intellectual intentions. Intellectual intentions are defined as those which “are predicated of many, being unrestricted.”³⁸ As examples he provides “son of Adam,” or “human being.” He does not define sensible intentions, but we know from other similar discussions in *Psychology* that sensible intentions are particular,³⁹ in that what is being conceived cannot be predicated of a whole species (Adam himself, as opposed to human being in general).

Avicenna then makes use of this distinction to show that the volition of the first body is “intellectual,” being directed at a general intention, contrasting this with the volitions of humans and animals, which are sensible, in that they are directed at particulars. That the first mover’s volition is directed at a general intention is manifested in that it seeks position in general, rather than specific positions. The notion of position “in general” makes sense if we remember that the first body, the outermost sphere, is beyond even the sphere of the fixed stars, and does not have any planets or particular bodies inside it that move from place to place.⁴⁰ Rather, its motion is just the rotation of its entire area, which therefore would amount to no particular motion. Avicenna admits that this is difficult to conceive of, but the next section, on particular volitions, is more familiar, and directly bears on the nature of the evaluations that can trigger inclination in animals and humans.

Animal and human motion, in contrast with volitions of the first body, but *similar to* volitions of the other celestial bodies, involves particular movements, and is due to cognition of particulars. Avicenna initially bases this claim on what he takes as an axiom:

No particular, determined thing proceeds from universal knowledge. For [universal knowledge] is, of course, only determined to this particular rather than on account of some determination joined to it. This [the proceeding of some particular thing from the universal] does not happen through [universal knowledge] alone.⁴¹

Before any concrete action can be taken, universal knowledge must first be related to some particular object. As Avicenna goes on to illustrate, the cause of an animal seeking food is not simply its considering food in general to be nourishing, but considering this particular thing nourishing. In his words, “the desiring animal [...] desires and imagines particular nourishment, and there proceeds from that [desire and imagination] a particular animal volition.”⁴² There first needs to be imagination and appetite towards a particular, and only then is it possible for concrete action to be conceived of and resolved upon.

But, of course, there is a sense in which it seems that we *do* incline towards general objects, and Avicenna immediately faces this objection. Playing devil’s advocate, he notes that animals, when hungry, can be satisfied by multiple specific instances of nourishment, suggesting that they

³⁷ This distinction is of course compatible with other divisions Avicenna makes, such as dividing voluntary motion in terms of in place or from place to place. For the later distinction, Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) beginning of 2.3.

³⁸ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 27, p. 438.

³⁹ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.2, 60. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁰ Discussion of the “first body” at Davidson (1992) 45, 74.

⁴¹ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 442-443.

⁴² *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 443-444: “[443...] The desiring animal, [who desires] nourishment through its animal faculty, desires and imagines particular nourishment, and there proceeds from that [desire and imagination] a particular animal volition. [444] And then it seeks nourishment through its movement.”

do not have one particular type in mind to begin with, but rather something general. For example, if a dog is hungry, it will not care which of two bowls of dog food it is offered. Continuing to play devil's advocate, he adds a related worry: when desiring to cross some distance, it seems that we want something quite general (that is, crossing the entire field), which is then carried out by crossing bits and pieces of it. In both cases, it seems that the initial object is general, not particular.

Avicenna's response to both of these worries is to argue that specific objects can be pursued via related actions and related objects, without this meaning that there was some first, more general object of desire, of which the objects of these related actions are species. This core of this response, which he makes explicit at the end of his discussion, is as follows:

We say also that we might draw a universal conclusion from universal premises [...] ⁴³ then we follow that with a particular conclusion from which proceed appetite and volition, determined by a kind of estimative determination [*al-ta'ayyun al-wahmī*]. Then from there the motive power proceeds towards particular movements, which [movements] become the object of volition [*murāda*], for the sake of the initial object of volition. ⁴⁴

In this text, Avicenna is focused on the distinction between cognitions that orient us towards some initial object of pursuit, and the particular cognitions and movements that actually constitute the pursuit of that object. As such, there is some overlap between [Stage 1], evaluations that set goals (which are now discussing), and [Stage 2], practical judgments that set means to goals (which we will discuss shortly). But the general idea seems to be that once there is an inclination towards the “initial object of volition,” then practical judgments—according to the process described in section III—settle on a course of actions, which become objects that are then sought for the sake of that initial object of inclination. Object-evaluations are oriented at particulars, and they are sought through particular actions, determined by practical judgments.

With this in mind, we can understand his responses to the above worries about seeking nourishment and crossing a distance. To the worry about multiple instances of nourishment being acceptable to an animal, he simply says this “does not mean that that [universal knowledge] is represented to it [as the object of desire].” ⁴⁵ Presumably what he means is that the animal initially desired some particular instance of nourishment. Towards the end of a series of actions of nourishment-seeking it will finally encounter some object it knows to be nourishment. Though slightly different than what it had initially imagined, it will nonetheless make something akin to the practical judgment, “I ought to eat this thing to satisfy my initial appetite.” We can notice similarities between the actual objects we encounter, and the particular objects we initially desire, and so fulfill the initial inclination. Even if this reasoning process requires noticing similarities that rely to an extent on a more general concept, this does not show that the initial object of desire is general.

His response to the worry about crossing a distance is more extended:

And similar to [the prior worry], in crossing a distance particular limits are represented to someone, which they intend, and perhaps that representation [of the distance] would be cut off, and perhaps its existence [i.e.,

⁴³ A universal conclusion is different than a universal volition. A universal conclusion is a precursor to particulars volition in humans. A universal volition is something that only the first body is capable of, as described above.

⁴⁴ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 445-448.

⁴⁵ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 444.

the existence of the representation] would be renewed in some manner, by a renewal of continual, connected motion. And that does not prevent individuality and particularity in the representation, just as it does not prevent motion.⁴⁶

His point here is that an initial volition—to cross some distance—is carried out by a series of more discrete, but equally particular volitions, based on successive representations. Once you get started crossing a distance, the initial representation and desire to cross it is inevitably “cut off” as your focus is turned to navigating the new particulars of the path. In navigating these particulars, the initial representation is renewed “in some manner,” in that your more specific goals bear some relation to the initial goal. For example, first you desire crossing the distance as a whole (which is itself a particular), then you desire getting to the tree that is a third of the way across the distance, then you desire getting to the rock that is two thirds of the way across the distance, and so on. In any case, the fact that an initial desire is carried out by a series of smaller actions does not show that the object which actualized inclination in the first place was a universal. The broader view of the distance was still a view of a particular distance.

To summarize, Avicenna’s discussion in *Remarks* shows that emotions occur in response to particular cognitions by diffusing the worry that having an initial goal—to which successive actions are related—somehow means that the initial object was a universal. This way of moving voluntarily is similar to that of the celestial bodies, insofar as it is based on particulars, but different than that of the first body, which moves simply on the basis of general knowledge. Actions in animals and humans can be related to an initial particular object, whose representation either persists or is replaced, while nonetheless allowing a connected, coherent series of actions for the sake of that initial particular object.

The passage therefore shows that particular representations in the imagination undergird the evaluations that cause emotion. A similar point is articulated, though not defended, in a brief passage from Avicenna’s *Discussions* [*al-Mubāḥithāt*], when Avicenna’s interlocutor asks, “How do we understand the idea that the appetitive and resolving faculties are corporeal?” Avicenna’s answer is as follows:

Estimative resolution is the faculty arrived at by the influence of the particular, such that [the particular] moves it [estimative resolution] towards causing motion insofar as it is affected/moved by the particular. And this is on account of corporeality. And the appetitive faculty enters into this, for there is conveyed to it [the appetitive faculty] a taste, or smell, or an imaginative memory of suchlike, and it is affected/moved towards seeking.

Again, there is overlap here between emotion and resolution, because the point being made here about the evaluations that trigger emotions also applies to resolution: emotion and resolution are rooted in the corporeal, in the sense that the cognitions that cause them are about particulars, known via the internal senses that make use of bodily organs. This is true whether emotion and resolution are about things currently being sensed, or simply recollections. In the sense of being based on particulars, emotion is based on corporeal imagination. That this is also asserted for the cognitions that undergird resolution shows that it is not something that makes the evaluations undergirding emotions particularly unique. But the point nonetheless helps us between understand what Avicenna means when he says that inclinations are in response to something “imagined with some value.”

⁴⁶ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 444.

4b. Object-evaluations can be imaginative or reason-based

All evaluations that lead to emotions are undergirded by particular imagination, but not all such evaluations are “imaginative,” since “imaginative” is merely one of the modes in which evaluations can take place, alongside “cogitative.” The distinction between imaginative and cogitative evaluation is the distinction between an evaluation that proceeds with the aid of reason (cogitative), and that which proceeds via the internal senses alone (imaginative). Cogitative evaluations are not always correct, but they involve a discursive process that imaginative evaluations simply do not.

Avicenna’s division between imaginative and cogitative evaluations is most clear in two texts from his *Healing: Rhetoric*. The first comes in the midst of his distinguishing various sources of human action, as part of an attempt to describe acts that constitute wrongdoing from those that do not, in order to help rhetoricians paint their subjects in a positive or negative light⁴⁷: some acts are unintentional and involuntary [*bi-ghayr qasd wa-irāda*], and thus not blameworthy, such as those due to chance, nature, or compulsion. The category of intentional, voluntary acts, on the other hand, includes acts due to habit (since we have control over which habits we develop) and those due to appetite. Under the category of intentional, voluntary action, he makes two further distinctions: between acts in response to objects evaluated *imaginatively*, and objects evaluated *rationally*. This division is most evident in the second of the following two paragraphs, since Avicenna initially uses some language from the text on which he is basing the discussion (Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*), and then clarifies the matter in his own terminology:

As for the acts that are from the will, they include [*min-hā*] those [...] that follow upon animal appetite [*shawqan ḥayawāniyyan*], either desire for pleasure, and this is the concupiscible power, or desire for repelling and overcoming, and this is the irascible power. And among them [appetite-based acts]⁴⁸ there are those that follow upon cogitative desire [*shawqan fikriyyan*], or those that follow upon rational desire [*shawqan manṭiqiyyan*].

And it seems that what is meant by “cogitative [*al-fikrī*]” is what proceeds from cogitation [*al-fikr*] towards any goal whatsoever, even though the goal is not rational or good [*ghayr ‘aqlī aw ghayr jamīl*], and [what is meant by] “rational [*al-manṭiqī*]” is what proceeds towards the good and the rational. And it seems that what is meant by “cogitative” is “imaginative,” and by “rational,” “cogitative in the proper sense.”⁴⁹

Avicenna encounters some difficulty here in his effort to clearly articulate the distinction between types of evaluative bases for emotions, while remaining faithful to the distinctions in Aristotle’s text as it appears in Arabic. Thus we see him, in the second paragraph, modify a way of speaking from the first paragraph that he finds imprecise. Prying apart why Avicenna shifts his vocabulary over the course of these two paragraphs will help us see exactly what his core point is.

In Aristotle’s original *Rhetoric*, the distinction is simply made between rational and non-rational appetites, identifying concupiscible and irascible appetite with non-rational. In the

47 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96ff.

48 Here Avicenna, less careful than in *Psychology* 4.4, seems to be using the term appetite [*shawq*] to refer to inclination in general.

49 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96.

Arabic translation, however, two distinctions are made: first, between *cogitative* desire and rational desire, and then between *non-rational* and rational desire, with concupiscible and irascible appetite being given as example of the non-rational. So the Arabic text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* text makes it seem as though "cogitative" and "non-rational" are different ways of talking about the same category of emotion, to be contrasted with what is rational. What follows is a translation of the problematic Arabic rendering of Aristotle's text:

[Among acts involving appetite] there is that which is for the sake of *cogitative* desire [*al-shahwa al-fikriyya*], and what is for the sake of rational [*al-mantiqiyya*] [desire]. Volition is thought-based and rational [when] the agent only wills that which they think to be good. As for *irrational* appetites, they are irascible and concupiscible appetite.⁵⁰

Since cogitative and non-rational are parallels in this text, they seem to be different ways of talking about the same sort of phenomena. But for Avicenna cogitation is the process wherein reason has control over the internal senses, so it just does not seem right to lump cogitation together with the non-rational. Thus, the first paragraph of Avicenna's text from *Healing: Rhetoric*, above, follows the terminology of the Arabic Aristotle more closely, but he corrects this in the second paragraph, saying that "imaginative" is what should replace "cogitative" as that which is "irrational," in opposition to the "rational." Aristotle's original text merely distinguishes between rational and irrational desires, so Avicenna's clarification has the advantage of being closer to what the original text intended. In other words, Avicenna must have noticed that the Arabic text he was looking at infelicitously seemed to use the term "cogitative [*fikriyya*]" to describe a process that does not involve reason. Of course, this raises the issue of just what is the distinction between the cognitions underlying imaginative/non-rational desires, on the one hand, and cogitative/rational desires, on the other, and this is something he clarifies shortly in a second text from *Healing: Rhetoric*.

In the section of his *Rhetoric* immediately following the distinction between different types of acts, Avicenna describes what pleasure is, again for the sake of improving the rhetorician's understanding of the motivations of their audience. Avicenna distinguishes pleasures as rational or non-rational, the difference corresponding to the way in which something is evaluated as worth pursuing or not. A non-rational pleasure is defined negatively, as having been evaluated as worth pursuing *without* any kind of discursive thought:

And what is longed for [*al-mushtahā*] has a pleasurable quality, whether [it is] a rational [*naṭqiyya*] pleasure or a non-rational pleasure. The non-rational [object of desire] is what desire [*shawq*] is directed towards without being due to cogitation [*fikra*] or knowledge [*ra'ī*] or analogy [*tamthīl*] that has clarified whether it is necessary that one pursue or not pursue it. And this [desire towards non-rational objects] is what pertains to nature and sensation.⁵¹

If non-rational pleasures are those things longed for on the basis of object-evaluations that *do not* involve deliberation, knowledge, or analogy, then, by implication, rational pleasures are longed for on the basis of object-evaluations that *do* involve deliberation, knowledge, or analogy. The terminology here is not fleshed out, but he clearly means to contrast, on the one hand, any kind

50 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96. Emphasis mine.

51 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.6, 100. Emphasis mine.

of process where one uses some sort of discursive thought (analysis and synthesis)⁵² to arrive at an evaluation, as opposed to the evaluation just naturally arising due to the natural operations of the internal senses.

“Nature and sensation” are provided as examples of how non-rational evaluations of pleasures are arrived at, meaning that animal faculties are hardwired to evaluate certain objects as pleasant or painful, without any need for discursive thought. When an animal sees food, that image is joined to the intention of pleasure in their memory or instinct, and they want to pursue it. Since this might be based on prior experience, it is based on a reason in a sense, but it is not discursive—it is automatic.⁵³ In contemporary terms, we could think of merely imagining something to be beneficial or harmful as “construing” it to be so, or “entertaining the thought that” it is so, without making a considered judgment that this is the case.⁵⁴

It is worth making two clarifications about the initial *Rhetoric* text quoted above, related to what imaginative and cogitative desire are not, respectively. First of all, cogitative desire is always towards that which is determined to be “good and rational,” but this does not mean that the agent will necessarily be correct that their goal is good. Avicenna’s emphasis has been on the discursive process behind cogitative desires, not their validity. Secondly, although non-rational, imaginative desire can proceed towards “any goal whatsoever,”⁵⁵ this does not mean that the agent could pursue something that it has evaluated as *not* good, all things considered. It is a truism in Avicenna’s tradition that no one pursues any object unless they think it is worth pursuing, in some way. Again, by saying that imaginative desire proceeds towards “any goal whatsoever,” the emphasis seems to be on the unguided nature of the process leading to the evaluation. So to call a desire cogitative/rational, or imaginative/non-rational, relates more to the way in which an evaluation is arrived at.

Avicenna makes use of the distinction between imaginative and cogitative evaluative bases for emotion in at least two other texts. First, there is Avicenna’s discussion in *Metaphysics* 6.5 about how no voluntary action is pointless, because voluntary action is always in response to some emotion, and that emotion is always for some object. Key for our purposes is where Avicenna says that this object is grasped either imaginatively or cogitatively:

Hence, the proximate principle of every psychological movement is a motive power in the muscle of the organ, and the principle that comes after it is desire—desire, as you have learned in the *Psychology*, being necessarily consequent on some [act of] imagination or cogitation [*takhayyul aw fikr*], so that the most remote principle would be either imaginative or cogitative [*takhayyulan aw fikran*].⁵⁶

He goes on to classify actions that proceed from imagination or deliberation, respectively, with special attention to how we should think about acts that proceed from imagination. If imagination alone is involved, and no discursive, we call the end towards which an act is directed “trivial” and the act itself “haphazard.”⁵⁷ There is still an end, or an object, but it would merely be due to “nature and sensation.”

⁵² Black (2013) 70.

⁵³ In contemporary terms, these would not be reasons on a reason internalist view. See Tappolet (2016) 164.

⁵⁴ Deonna & Teroni (2012) 55.

⁵⁵ This is the way he describes what he initially calls deliberative desire, but which he corrects as imaginative in the last sentence. So this descriptor more truly applies to imaginative desire. See text above at fn. 49. \$

⁵⁶ Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.7.

⁵⁷ Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.10, 12.

Finally, the distinction between imaginative and deliberative is evident in a text from Avicenna's *Notes* [*al-Ta'liqāt*] titled "Explaining [the Necessary Existent's] Volition [*bayān irādatihi*]." The main purpose of this particular "note" is to clarify the sense in which the Necessary Existent has volition, but along the way voluntary action in general is explained in such a way as sheds light on imaginative versus cogitative evaluation, especially in the following passage:

[E]very action that proceeds from a will, the principle of that will is either knowledge [*ilm*] or opinion [*ẓann*] or imagination [*takhayyul*]. An example of what proceeds from understanding is the action of the geometer or physician. An example of what proceeds from opinion is being cautious of that in which there is risk, while an example of what proceeds from imagination is seeking something that appears to be either noble or excellent in order that a likeness to the noble or excellent thing is obtained.⁵⁸

For our purposes this text can be seen as augmenting the merely twofold distinction between imagination and cogitative thought, subdividing cogitation into processes that lead to understanding or opinion. Avicenna does not explicitly say that understanding and opinion are meant to be grouped together, in contrast to imagination, but they fit well with the description of discursive/reason-based evaluations that we have seen in this section. Consider Avicenna's examples: to *know* something as good is to have a deep grasp of why it is the way it is, such as a geometer or physician have of their objects. One's reasons are firm and have been made explicit. To believe something as good *according to opinion* is to have a reason for preferring one thing over another, but to admit that the other option is possible. This is not as firmly grasped of a reason, but it is still explicit.⁵⁹ On the other hand, when something is construed as good according to the imagination, there is no mention of reasons—something simply "appears [or seems: *yushbih*]" worth pursuing, and that is that. Appearances are not necessarily wrong, they are just not based on discursive thought.

So in the last two sections we have seen two senses in which imagination relates to emotion. On the one hand, all emotions are triggered by evaluations, insofar as those evaluations are based on particulars, conceived in the imagination (even if higher faculties are also involved in the evaluative process). On the other hand, some emotions are based on imaginative evaluations (not involving discursive thought), while others are based on cogitative evaluations (which do involve discursive thought). Both these senses in which imagination is involved are important for an overall understanding of Avicenna's views on emotion. But in Avicenna's initial definition of the inclining motive faculty, when he says that emotions are due to "imagining" some object as worth pursuing or not, it seems most likely that he has the former sense of imagination in mind. That is, he is simply pointing out that inclinations/emotions are caused by evaluations of particulars.

58 Avicenna, *Notes* (1973) p. 16. Avicenna goes on to show that while most voluntary actions are passive, in the sense that the agent is acted upon in forming an evaluation of it as worth pursuing, it is possible for understanding-based volition to not be passive, this being characteristic of the Necessary Existent. So voluntary action can be rooted in a cognition that is active or passive, which McGinnis and Ruffus takes to correspond to the difference between the act being free or determined. For more on the later point, see McGinnis & Ruffus (2015).

59 A related distinction is between knowledge and opinion: "Knowledge [*ra'ī*] is belief that is settled, while opinion [*tann*] is belief one is inclined towards, along with the admission that the alternative might be true. And not everyone who opines believes, just like not everyone who senses thinks, or everyone who imagines opines or believes or knows." Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207-208.

For the purposes of this chapter, this confirms that Avicenna indeed has the view expressed in [Stage 1]: some practical good (the object, unmoved-mover), imagined as having some sort of value, can lead to an inclination/emotion. In the next section, we will see how different cognitions are involved in Stage 2, leading to the resolution-to-act.

5. Practical judgments lead to resolution

Once a subject has an emotion/inclination (*nazʿa/inbiʿāth*) towards or away from some object, triggered by an evaluative judgment ([Stage 1]), they are in a position to determine what to do about that object. With respect to what I have called [Stage 2], Avicenna describes how we form a practical judgment about what to do or not do, which leads to the motive state called resolution (*al-ijmāʿ*). Avicenna describes practical judgments, particularly with reference to the rational soul, in *Healing: Psychology* 5.1. This section off of the general sketch of the practical intellect in 1.5 that we looked at in chapter two, on human emotion, but in it he more fully unpacks the nature of practical judgments and their relation to the resolution-to-act is more fully unpacked. The main thing that we need to see in this text is that not just any judgment leads to a resolution-to-act, but only the conclusion of a practical syllogism, or the analogue to a the conclusion of a practical syllogism at the animal level.⁶⁰ In the language of Aristotle looked at earlier, it is this cognition which determines the *means* to achieve some end.

Avicenna introduces his discussion of practical judgments with a contrast, clarifying that judgments of theoretical intellect are *not* essentially related to action:

[a]⁶¹ Humans have governance in particular matters and in universal matters. In universal matters there is only belief, even if it is about action. For one type of belief is the universal belief about how a house should be built. From this [universal] belief alone and primarily, however, there will not issue the enacting of a particular house. For actions deal with particular matters, and issue from particular judgments, and that is because the universal, insofar as it is universal, is not related to this rather than that. Let us postpone explanation of this, relying on what will come to you in the metaphysical art, in the last part.⁶²

Here, human thought about universal matters is contrasted with deliberation about particular matters. Beliefs on a universal level can be about action in general, and could theoretically apply to many particulars and situations. But enacting motion requires selecting and interacting with one set of particulars, with “this rather than that,” so universal beliefs are too general to have immediate implications for what one ought to do. You can have a general belief about the best way of building houses, but without deciding to build a particular house nothing will get done. You can believe that apples are nutritious and worth eating, but without deciding to eat this particular nutritious apple, you will never eat any apple at all.

60 The animal equivalent to a practical judgment is not the same thing as the conclusion of a practical syllogism, since animals cannot reason discursively. Non-human animals do, however, have cognitions that settle on courses of action. Avicenna says this in an aside at the end of the a text discussed below: If this [the practical intellect] judges, there follows a movement of the faculty that resolves on [*al-quwwa al-ijmāʿiyya ilā*] movement of the body, just as [movement of the body] follows judgments of other faculties in animals. (*Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207).

61 The texts labeled [a-e] are a mostly continuous section from *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 206-207.

62 The “postponement” Avicenna mentions refers to further discussion of universals qua universals, which he returns to in the *Healing: Metaphysics* 5.2, but this is his primary explanation of the difference between universal and practical judgments.

With the universal judgments of the theoretical intellect determined to be insufficient for prompting action, Avicenna contrasts this with the sort of judgments that *can* lead to action, these being the particular judgments of the practical intellect:

[b] Humans have, then, a faculty concerned with universal matters and another concerned with deliberation [*al-rawiyya*] in particular matters, about what should be done and not done, about what is beneficial and harmful, beautiful and ugly, good and bad. And that [is done] through a type of syllogism and thought process, [which can be] correct or faulty, whose goal is to produce a knowledge [*ra'ī*] about some particular, future thing from among that which is possible. For one does not deliberate about whether or not to do things that are necessary or non-existent, nor [does one deliberate about whether or not to do things] pertaining to what is past [because] the past cannot be enacted. If this faculty judges, there follows a movement of the faculty that resolves on [*al-quwwa al-ijmā' iyya ilā*] movement of the body, just as [movement of the body] follows judgments of other faculties in animals.⁶³

In this last sentence Avicenna says that the judgments described in this paragraph lead, directly, to an actualization of the resolving faculty, not mere inclination. He does not specifically say that judgments of the practical intellect lead to acts of the resolving faculty, *as opposed to* inclination, but the distinctions from the immediately preceding book 4.4 (examined in section 1 above), are supposed to be fresh in our minds. So he has just finished describing emotion and its causes in 4.4, and now in 5.1 is describing how to get from emotion to resolution, via practical judgments. At the end of this section (text [e] below), he again connects practical judgments to the resolution-to-act, with no mention of emotion, showing that he is indeed meaning to talk about the cognitions leading to *al-ijmā'* here.

The thought process leading to practical judgments, at the human level, is described in text [b] as syllogistic, but involving syllogisms of a different sort than lead to universal judgments. Avicenna says that the syllogisms constructed by the practical intellect have two features: 1) they are about what should and shouldn't be done, and 2) they are about the particular, future, and possible. Avicenna is not saying that the practical intellect is the only human faculty that can think about what should and shouldn't be done, or that can think about particular, future, or possible things. As we have seen, the theoretical intellect can indeed make judgments about good or evil in a general sense, such as that all apples are nutritious. With the aid of estimation and imagination, we identify particulars as this or that (i.e., this is an apple, that is not), and then the practical intellect is posited specifically to account for identifying particular things or courses of action as good or bad. In order for this to be done with any coherency, Avicenna specifies above that the things identified as good or bad need to be in the future, and possible. Since the conclusions drawn by the practical intellect involve action, it wouldn't make sense to draw those conclusions about things in the past ("I will spend more time studying for that last exam"), or courses of action that are impossible ("I will give out lots of square circles as party gifts"). We can have such thoughts, but presumably these would be the "faulty" acts of the practical intellect, which he mentions in [b]. What Avicenna describes in this text is, as he says, the "goal," or the ideal operation of the practical intellect.

From here, Avicenna goes on to describe the relationship between the theoretical and practical intellect in light of the practical intellect's goal of arriving at conclusions about what ought and ought not be done. He begins by emphasizing that the practical intellect does not do this entirely on its own:

63 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207.

[c] And this faculty [the practical intellect] is supplied by the faculty that deals with universals, and from there it [the practical intellect] takes major premises concerning what it deliberates about, and draws conclusions in the realm of particulars.

Avicenna does not provide examples of how this works, but we could take for example the following simple practical syllogism: apples are healthy, this is an apple, eat this apple. Avicenna says that the major premise of such syllogisms (in this case, “apples are healthy”) would be “taken from” the theoretical intellect, which deals with universals. Even though this major premise is here used in a practical syllogism, the aim of this premise, considered on its own, is truth. On the other hand, the conclusion, “eat this carrot,” aims at action. Avicenna consistently relates notions of benefit and harm, and their synonyms, to the practical intellect, even though the theoretical intellect can make general judgments about benefits and harms, because the practical intellect is concerned with commanding the pursuit of benefits and avoiding harms, while the theoretical intellect is concerned with affirming truth, and rejecting falsehood. The concepts Avicenna repeatedly associates with both faculties have to do with their *goals* as faculties (truth vs. action), not the *content* of the premises they make use of.

In the penultimate section of Avicenna’s discussion of the practical intellect, he elaborates on the structure of the practical syllogism, in comparison to the sort of syllogisms the theoretical intellect constructs. The first few sentences are a review of what has already been said, but about halfway through he provides new details by distinguishing the “principles” of both faculties:

[d] The first power belonging to the human soul is a power related to intellection, and so it is called the theoretical intellect. And the second is a power related to action, and it is called the practical intellect. The former pertains to truth and falsehood, the latter to good and evil in particular matters. The former pertains to the necessary, the possible and the impossible, the latter to the evil, the good and the morally permitted. The principles of the former are the primary premises, and the principles of the later are well known, accepted, opined, weak experiential [premises]—the ones that are not among the strong experiential [premises] [...]

When Avicenna says that the principles of the theoretical intellect are “primary premises,” he is referring, as defined in *Remarks and Admonitions*, to propositions “that are necessitated by the essence and instinct of a clear intellect, and not by any cause external to it.”⁶⁴ In other words, propositions like “the whole is greater than its parts,” are axiomatic in the sense that their truth is automatically assented to, once they are understood.⁶⁵ Assent to them is given because they appear to be necessarily true in themselves, on the basis of the essences under consideration, not on the basis of any external evidence.

On the other hand, Avicenna says that the principles of the practical intellect include those that are “well known, accepted, opined, weak experiential [premises].” Each of the descriptors in this sentence refer to a different type of premise, or a different way of knowing a premise.⁶⁶ Avicenna elsewhere discusses each of these types of premises in more detail, but his point here seems to simply be that the sort of premises involved in practical syllogisms are not known with axiomatic certainty. When discussing “well known” premises in *Remarks*, such as that “stealing the wealth of others is an ugly act and that lying is an ugly act which must not be pursued,”

⁶⁴ Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 119.

⁶⁵ “Axiomatic” is Inati’s word. See Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 119, fn. 5.

⁶⁶ Black (2013a) 124.

Avicenna says that these are premises that we typically accept merely thanks to our social and moral upbringing.⁶⁷

These weaker premises are still “taken from” the theoretical intellect, in the language of [c], above, in that they are general premises initially accepted by the theoretical intellect, and then made use of in a practical syllogism. The practical intellect is not posited for every aspect of a practical syllogism, but rather for the unique ability to draw a conclusion that makes some general value judgment into an imperative for an individual in a particular situation. These non-axiomatic premises are “principles” of the practical intellect in the sense that they are the premises the practical intellect needs in order to perform its unique function of drawing practical judgments.

Though Avicenna thinks that the practical intellect *typically* relies on a weaker sorts of premises, a text we looked at earlier in chapter two from Avicenna’s *Psychology* 1.5 shows that practical judgments can also be verified in a more certain way.⁶⁸ As we saw, in 1.5 Avicenna briefly indicates that the premises the practical intellect uses, like “lying and injustice are bad” are “well known” and “not demonstrated,” which coheres well enough with what we have seen in 5.1. However he also adds in 1.5 that “were [the beliefs of the practical intellect] logically considered, they would come from the intelligibles in accordance with what is in the books of logic.”⁶⁹ It is difficult to read this as saying anything other than that premises like “lying and injustice are bad” could also be demonstrated by way of “primary premises,” which is much stronger than being based merely on social and moral upbringing. What this suggests is that the distinctions Avicenna makes in 5.1 refer simply to the *typical* way in which we arrive at practical conclusions. Even though it would be possible to demonstrate that lying is bad from primary premises, most people take this to be a premise simply on the basis of moral upbringing. Avicenna is not a subjectivist about ethical judgments, he just thinks that most of the time action is guided by less than axiomatic premises.

In the conclusion to 5.1’s discussion of the practical intellect, Avicenna reaffirms that he has been discussing the sort of cognition undergirding the transition to, specifically, resolution. At the same time, he reaffirms the point that this same sort of function exists, albeit via a different mechanism, in animals:

[e] For there is in humans a sensible judge, and an estimative judge in the realm of imagination, and an intellectual and practical judge. And the motivating principles that belong to [*al-mabadī al-bā’itha li-*] humans’ power that resolves upon [*quwwatihi al-ijmā’iyya ‘alā*] the movement of the organs are imaginative estimation [*wahm khayālī*], the practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Other animals have three of these.

Of the four main types of cognitive faculties, two of them (estimation and the practical intellect) make judgments oriented especially towards causing an act of the resolving faculty. Sensitive judgments and theoretical judgments may provide data or premises to estimation and the practical intellect, but on their own they do not trigger resolution. When Avicenna says that other animals “have three of these,” he means that estimation alone, without the practical intellect, is responsible for the analogous sort of practical judgments in animals that lead to resolution.

67 Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 122.

68 See discussion in chapter 2, section 2.

69 Avicenna *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 46.

Again, this analogous judgment is not the conclusion of a practical syllogism, but it nonetheless settles on a course of action. This coheres with the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text we looked at earlier (text [b], section 2) which said that the judgment prior to a resolved will can just be a kind of “estimative belief [*i’atiqād wahmī*],” when resolution is reached without the involvement of rational faculties.⁷⁰ These texts are not linked in a straightforward way, but the general picture is the same in both, with analogous practical judgments on the animal and human level able to lead to resolution.

Avicenna is not explicit in any text in his corpus about the precise role estimation plays in non-human animals for the sake of bringing about resolution. Of course he has plenty to say in *Psychology* 4.4 about how animals make general value judgments: some knowledge of harms and benefits is built into animals as instinct, some is learned through experience.⁷¹ But it is not clear whether these are meant to be merely evaluations, such as can lead to emotion, or whether they are the animal analogue to practical judgments. He seems to leave the matter at assuming estimation somehow produces something analogous to the intellect’s practical judgments, despite not sharing in the human ability to construct syllogisms.

In text [e], the conclusion, Avicenna has emphasized the importance of both emotion and practical judgment as causes of resolution-to-act, because if either of these things are missing, there can be no resolution. Judging something to be worth doing, but having no initial inclination to do it, provides no motive state for the practical judgment to help push into a resolution, while having an emotion without a practical judgment is bound to remain mere inclination. Sometimes Avicenna will talk about the practical judgment alone as a proximate cause of resolution-to-act, and sometimes he does a similar thing with emotion, as in a text from 4.4 we looked at earlier, where inclination “strengthens to the point where it brings about [*yūjīb*] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā*].”⁷² The different emphases in each makes sense, since both inclination and practical judgment need to come together if there is going to be resolution.

The preceding analysis of the text on the practical intellect in 5.1 has confirmed the general picture summarized in [Stage 2]: some practical good (the object, unmover-mover), represented as part of a practical judgment, can lead to a resolution-to-act (e.g., someone decides to open the cupboard to get a snack, and the motive faculty actually attempts to instigate action).⁷³

6. Conclusion: reviewing the distinctions

We can summarize the distinctions that have been made as follows. Inclination and resolution are two separate acts of the motive faculty (or two separate faculties, depending on how finely

⁷⁰ See chart in section 2 of this chapter.

⁷¹ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 183-184.

⁷² Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195. Discussed at the beginning of the section 1, above.

⁷³ Avicenna is aware that any illustration of the factors involved in voluntary movement is going to seem overly simplistic, as this one may have. In his *Healing: Physics* (2009, trans. McGinnis) 1.15.5, he says concerning volition that “it is difficult to produce the cause completely, for the will is incited to act [only] after a number of factors are fulfilled, the enumeration of which is not easy. Also, one might not even be conscious of many of them so as to include them in the account.” A single decision of the practical intellect, such as that planting a garden would be good, does not lead to actual planting without a number of further judgments, influenced by numerous factors, conscious and unconscious. But the general schema could be applied to any of these intermediary judgments and actions, as well.

faculties are being parsed), and they are triggered by different cognitive processes. Those two cognitive processes are as follows:

- Evaluations: cognitions that ascribe value to objects/ends in some way
- Practical judgments: cognitions about the course of action to take regarding some evaluated object/end

Evaluations lead to emotions, practical judgments lead to a resolution. Avicenna's standard way of describing the evaluation that leads to inclination involves the phrase that something is "imagined as having some sort of value." We have understood the sense in which imagination is relevant to the evaluations that cause emotion along two lines:

- Evaluations are cognitions that involve particular imagination.
- Evaluations can ascribe value to their objects via imaginative or cogitative processes.

When Avicenna says that emotions are triggered when something is "imagined as having some sort of value," he probably does *not* have the second sense sense of "imaginative" involvement in mind. That is, the evaluations leading to emotions can be imaginative or cogitative, where imaginative means "lacking discursive thought." But this does not apply to all evaluations (cogitative evaluations *do* involve discursive thought), so it wouldn't make sense to interpret this as what Avicenna means in the phrase "imagined as having some value." On the other hand, all emotions (animal and human) are in fact based on cognitions that engage the imagination for the sake of particularity. So when Avicenna says that emotions are caused when something is "imagined as having some sort of value," he is merely emphasizing the particularity of the evaluation leading to emotion. This is not unique to the evaluations behind emotions, since practical judgments engage the imagination as well,⁷⁴ but he nonetheless seems to think it worth emphasizing.

Going back to some of the previously mentioned earlier understandings of *al-ijmā'*, it should be clear that the Latin tendency of sometimes translating *al-ijmā'* with terms that capture inclination was a mistake, since inclination and resolution are distinct. Moreover, *al-ijmā'* in Avicenna does not have any particular association with *al-ijmā'* in Islamic legal theory. It describes a state of the motive faculty, not the coming together of various faculties in any way that resembles a number of legal judges coming together. We could think of motion in fact occurring at the point where cognition and motive faculties finally "come together" to cause movement, but this is not precisely what Avicenna picks out by the term *al-ijmā'*. Finally, there is no obvious Stoic influence on Avicenna's concept of *al-ijmā'*. On the contrary, given that it is motive, rather than cognitive, it seems uniquely unsuited to be a successor to the Stoic concept of *synkatathesis*. It might be that the *practical judgment* leading to *al-ijmā'* fulfills a similar role in Avicenna's psychology as *synkatathesis* does in the Stoic tradition, but the practical judgment is, of course, something distinct from *al-ijmā'* itself.

Avicenna's formulation can be seen as a development of Aristotle's ends-means distinction, in that emotions focus us on some evaluated end, while resolution enacts motion according to the means clarified by a practical judgment. Avicenna is not always careful about making these

⁷⁴ See section 5, above.

distinctions, which is understandable, since he is really just talking about two different branches, or functions, that follow from the one animal motive faculty, and he is introducing a new concept (resolution) alongside older terms (e.g., appetite) that previously were used to capture everything in this conceptual terrain. But despite the fact that in some places he glosses over the careful distinctions he makes elsewhere, we should take seriously his careful distinctions when considering his overall schema. Emotions, then, according to Avicenna, are best thought of as varieties of inclination, which orient us towards objects or goals, but are not in themselves directly action-guiding.

Chapter 4: The Physiology of Emotions in Avicenna

Word Count: 16,909

In this chapter, I will present the aspects of physiology found in Avicenna's philosophical and medical texts that are relevant to his affective psychology. What Avicenna has to say about the physiology of emotions can be categorized under three headings: physiology of occurrent emotions, dispositions for emotions, and effects of emotions. By physiology of an occurrent emotion, I mean the matter or organ that underlies the core notion of an emotional "impulse," or "inclination," that we looked at in chapter one. We might refer this organ as the "material cause" of an emotion, though that is not language Avicenna uses in this context.¹ Avicenna actually has comparatively less to say about the physiology of occurrent emotions, and comparatively more to say about *dispositions* for emotions (which are prior to emotions), and the characteristic *effects* of emotions (which follow).

Both of these latter two aspects of physiology are best framed by prior distinctions he makes in his philosophical psychology, and can be seen as responses to two corresponding points of discussion in his philosophical tradition. First, his focus on physiology when it comes to emotional *dispositions* is in part a response to the need to explain why the same evaluative judgment sometimes causes an emotion, sometimes not, and, when it does, why the emotion varies in strength. For example, your physical state partially determines whether seeing someone with a pleasant thing you want will give rise to envy. As for Avicenna's focus on the physiology of emotional *effects*, this is due to the sort of changes he thinks, properly speaking, do and do not constitute emotions. If Avicenna had circumscribed emotions and their underlying matter differently, a lot of what he calls an emotional effect might rather be considered the material cause for the emotion itself. For example, one might think of turning red as a core component of what it means to experience shame. But Avicenna would consider this merely a possible effect of shame, and there are good reasons why Avicenna draws the lines where he does.

1. Avicenna's writings on the physiology of emotions

In addition to the philosophical texts that frame Avicenna's discussion of emotions, there are three texts relevant primarily to the physiology of emotions: section 5.8 of Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology*, the *Canon of Medicine*, and his *Cardiac Drugs*. *Psychology* 5.8 is the final section of Avicenna's main work of philosophical psychology, and it is an overview of the human physiology relevant to psychology. Much of the chapter is taken up with the question of whether there is one organ that has priority over all the other organs, that being the heart, (a la Aristotle), or whether there is more of a cooperative foundation for life's activities between the heart, brain and liver (a la Galen). Avicenna takes a middle-way between Aristotle and Galen, saying that the heart, with the vital spirit, is in some sense the source of life, but that the brain and liver have governance in different domains. So Avicenna calls the heart the "principle" organ (*al-madba'*), while also allowing that other organs can be principles of more specialized activities. As we will

¹ Avicenna is certainly aware of the Aristotelian four-cause explanatory schema, but he does not use this terminology in his explanations of psychological acts to the extent that some later philosophers in the Latin tradition would.

see, 5.8 is primarily valuable for the discussion of emotions insofar as it clarifies the matter underlying occurrent emotions.

The *Canon* is, of course, Avicenna's systematic, influential work on the nature of medicine, along with the causes of diseases and their treatments. It is written in five sections, of which the first and third are most relevant to the discussion of emotions.² The first is relevant for its discussion of the vital spirit, which is referred to frequently when discussing the dispositions and effects for emotions, while the third is relevant because it contains Avicenna's discussion of some mental illnesses, the most detailed of such discussions concerning melancholy.

As Avicenna explains at the outset of the *Canon*, medicine has both a theoretical and a practical component. This is not a distinction between, say, thinking about medicine versus going out and actively performing it. Rather, the distinction is between different types of principles: those that need to be known in order to understand the treatment of disease and maintenance of health, and then the concrete principles for doing so.³ For example, you need to understand what a liver is, in general, before you are able to understand the specific instructions for diagnosing and treating its ailments. The theoretical component of medicine thus contains discussion on roughly the same level of generality as what we found in the *Psychology*, albeit restricted to the general theory needed for the art of medicine. This means that some of Avicenna's discussions of emotions in the *Canon* give us insight into the general nature of emotions, not just their treatment.

The *Cardiac Drugs* is a much shorter treatise than the *Canon*, focused on the workings of the heart, along with its particular ailments and treatments.⁴ *Cardiac Drugs* is thought to initially have been a stand-alone treatise, but has been inserted both into the *Canon* and the *Healing: Psychology* at different points. More recently, *Cardiac Drugs* has been inserted into English translations of the *Canon*, as a way of supplementing the *Canon*'s discussion of the vital spirit.⁵ However, there was a premodern tradition, apparently begun by Avicenna's disciple Jūzjāni, of including *Cardiac Drugs* after section 4.4 of *Healing: Psychology*. As described by Tommaso Alpina, some Arabic and Latin manuscripts reflect this tradition, though modern critical editions of the Arabic *Healing: Psychology* do not. Simone Van Riet's modern Latin edition of the *Healing: Psychology* does include *Cardiac Drugs*, albeit as an appendix to the work as a whole. In any case, the impetus for attaching *Cardiac Drugs* to *Psychology* 4.4 is Avicenna's own remark, at the end of 4.4:

And we have discussed in our books of medicine, to a degree of detail and accuracy not found in any predecessors, the reason for the dispositions [*isti' dādāt*] of different people—on account of their natural temperament [*jibla*] and their different states [*aḥwāl*]⁶—to joy, depression, anger, gentleness, rancor, calmness, and suchlike. So let someone read [*about such things*] there.⁶

2 There is so far only a critical edition of the first book of Avicenna's *Canon*, published by Vikas in 1982. For the rest, the standard version to use is that edited by Al-Qashsh in 1987, which is a more readable version, with commentary and index, of the 1877 Būlāq (non-critical) text.

3 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.1.1, 33-34.

4 There is no critical edition of *Cardiac Drugs*, though the Arabic version used here (ed. al-Bābā) is based on three different manuscripts. See Alpina (2017) 371.

5 For example, this choice is described in Bakhtiar's introduction to Avicenna, *Canon* (1999), lxvi. Texts from *Cardiac Drugs* are also inserted into the edition of Gruner (1973). See final note on page 122, introducing the insertion of *Cardiac Drugs* which follows.

6 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4. 201.

As has been shown in previous chapters, 4.4 is where Avicenna gives his most fundamental, general account of the nature of emotion, as part of a discussion of the motive soul. As this text makes clear, though, there is more to be said about emotions, which can be found in Avicenna's medical texts. Avicenna's *Canon* does contain some discussion of emotions, but it makes sense to take the above text as pointing us towards *Cardiac Drugs* in particular. As a percentage of the text, *Cardiac Drugs* is much more focused on emotions, and in particular on the sort of dispositions for emotions to which Avicenna's concluding remark refers.

2. The physiology underlying occurrent emotions

Avicenna's brief remarks about what underlies occurrent emotions can serve as a foundation to his discussions of the physiology of emotional dispositions and effects. When we experience an emotion, triggered by some cognitive evaluation, what we experience most fundamentally is an *inclination/impulse* (that is how Avicenna likes to describe the initial act of the motive faculty, prior to the resolution to act). Physiologically, what underlies that inclination/impulse is the heart, and the vital spirit that is in the heart. This can be seen by putting together several texts. First, there is Avicenna's remark about the organ of the irascible faculty in 5.8 of his *Healing: Psychology*:

As for the faculty of anger and what is related to it, it does not need an organ other than the principle [*al-mabda'*], because its act is one and it is suited to the strong, hot temperament [therein], and it needs this.⁷

As mentioned above, Avicenna affirms in 5.8 that the heart is the principle organ, with the brain and liver being principles in a subsidiary sense, in more specific domains. So when Avicenna says in the above text that the organ of the irascible faculty is the "principle," without any kind of qualification, we should take him to be referring to the heart. The heart in the Aristotelian tradition is considered the source of the body's vital heat, so identifying the "principle" with the heart is supported by Avicenna's ensuing explanation that this organ is suited to the irascible faculty because of its "strong, hot temperament." What Avicenna says about the underlying organ for the acts of the irascible faculty applies to other types of emotions, as well, as seen by the qualifier that what he says is meant for the faculty of anger and "what is related to it." Nowhere else in 5.8 does Avicenna discuss an organ for concupiscible acts, or any other types of emotions, so it is best to take this as a way of saying that the matter which underlies *any* emotion is the heart.

In the next two texts, we see that in addition to the heart, the vital spirit that is in the heart underlies an occurrent emotion:

For anger and fear and what is similar to them are passions[s] [*infī'āl*] of this [vital] faculty, even though their principle [*mabda' uhā*] is sensation and estimation and the apprehensive faculties related to these faculties.⁸

⁷ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 5.8, 268.

⁸ Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 128.

It seems that the sages and their followers among the doctors have agreed that joy [*al-farah*] and depression [*al-ghamm*] and fear [*al-khawf*] and anger [*al-ghadb*], [that] they are among the affections [*al-inf' ālāt*] particularly associated with [*al-khāṣa bi*] the vital spirit [*al-rūḥ*] that is in the heart.⁹

As seen in chapter one, the proximate cause of an emotion is an evaluative cognition. But the emotion itself is realized in the vital spirit that is in the heart, which is distinct from the brain and the vital spirit in the brain (where the cognitive faculties are localized). The first text makes it fairly clear that Avicenna wants to localize occurrent emotions in the vital spirit, and the second text clarifies that this is the vital spirit “in the heart” in particular. This is an important clarification because, as we will see in the next section, the vital spirit taken generally underlies *all* psychological faculties, so it wouldn’t mean much to just say that the emotions are passions of the vital spirit, taken generally.

So the idea is that when an emotion is triggered, the impulse or inclination is realized in a unique activity in the heart, and the vital spirit in the heart. This is a fairly circumscribed view of what the matter or organ of an occurrent emotion is, but it fits with what we will see Avicenna say about the broader effects of emotions, which extend well beyond those confines.

3. The nature of the vital spirit

Avicenna frequently links emotions to the vital spirit, [*rūḥ*], also called the vital faculty [*al-quwwa al-ḥaywāniyya*]. For example, the following text begins Avicenna’s discussion of the vital spirit in the *Canon*:

As for the vital faculty [*al-quwwa al-ḥaywaniyya*]—and they mean by this, the power whereby if it occurs in the organs, it prepares them for receiving the power of sensation and movement and the acts of life—they [prior scientists] link [*yuḍṭifūn*] to this the movements of fear [*al-khawf*] and anger [*al-ghadb*] on account of what they find in them in terms of expansion and contraction of the vital spirit [*al-rūḥ*] related to this faculty.¹⁰

The vital spirit is initially posited to account for how a body comes to receive psychological faculties, that is, how it becomes living. In addition to this, it is also frequently appealed to as part of emotional experience, both as that which underlies occurrent emotions (which we have seen), and as a key component of emotional dispositions and effects (which we will look at shortly). These discussions of dispositions and effects will make more sense if we already have in hand an understanding of the vital spirit on its own terms.

The first step towards understanding all this terminology is to see it in the context of Avicenna’s division of faculties in his medical texts, which differs from that of his psychological texts. In the *Canon*, Avicenna groups the faculties of living organisms into three broad categories, and discusses them in the following order: the natural [*al-ṭabī‘iyya*], the vital [*al-ḥayawāniyya*],¹¹ and the psychological [*al-naḥsāniyya*]. The “natural faculties” of the *Canon* correspond to the “vegetative faculties” in the *Psychology*, which include faculties for nutrition,

⁹ Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

¹⁰ Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126.

¹¹ ‘Animal’ would also be an appropriate way of translating this term, but “vital” is common in the literature on the topic. “Vital,” is also more helpful than “animal,” since the vital faculty has more to do with making something living [ḥayy] than making it an animal.

growth and generation. The *Canon's* “psychological faculties” explicitly correspond to the sensitive and motive faculties described in book IV of the *Psychology*, with particular emphasis in the *Canon* on the sensitive faculties.

Most fundamentally, the vital spirit is a lightweight, fine physical substance produced by the heart.¹² It flows to not-yet-animate organs, giving them life, and enabling them to receive the further vegetative, sensitive or motive faculties that we typically associate with them. Avicenna relates the development of the vital spirit in an almost poetic section of *Cardiac Drugs*, describing how all of life derives from God. Vital spirit, Avicenna says, is “a physical substance, coming from the mixture of the elements, approaching a likeness to the heavenly bodies.”¹³ The vital spirit is often described in physical terms, but it also has a functional description, which leads to Avicenna shifting between referring to it as a “spirit” or “faculty” unceremoniously, suggesting that neither label is meant to refer exclusively to its material aspect. Rather, either “vital spirit” or “vital faculty” refers to this fine substance, which can also be described in terms of its form, or function.

The vital spirit is initially posited to account for the beginning stages of the development of living organisms. In broad strokes, this process unfolds via elements being combined together, composing humours, which ultimately compose organs and substances, ranging from the crude and coarse, to the fine and harmonious. In *Cardiac Drugs* and the *Canon*, Avicenna explains how this process of organ and substance development works in the case of humans: the heart emerges prior to all other organs (except possibly the liver) as a “storehouse” for vital spirit (*khizānat al-rūḥ*), and proceeding from there the vital spirit gives life to the other organs.¹⁴ Other organs, to which the vital spirit gives life, originate from the liver. Whereas the heart produces the fine spirit that gives life, the liver produces something much more coarse, which is suitable for shaping the matter of the other organs.¹⁵ In other words, the liver produces the matter of the organs, and the heart produces the vital spirit which enlivens them. It is not apparent from these texts how the liver and the heart themselves first arise, or which one comes first, but presumably the important thing for the physician to know is the role the liver and the heart play once they in fact exist.

In the medical discussions of human life, “life” refers to the existence of the vital spirit in various organs.¹⁶ Once these organs have the vital spirit, they by that fact have a vital faculty,

12 In positing something like this, Avicenna is depending chiefly on Galen, though the theory of vital spirit (Greek: *pneuma*) goes at least back to Aristotle. For a discussion of *pneuma* in Aristotle, see *Generation of Animals* (1943), Appendix B. For a discussion of *pneuma* in Galen, see *On the Natural Faculties* (1916), introduction, xxxiv-xxxv.

13 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

14 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 221.

15 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126.

16 Excursus on the notion of “life” in Avicenna: Most would, of course, say that plants are also alive, yet they do not have the vital spirit. Avicenna discusses the status of plants with respect to “life [*al-ḥayā*]” towards the beginning of his *Healing: Book of Plants*. He argues that this is primarily a verbal dispute:

“One strays from truth if they argue that plants have sensation for the sake of [i.e., because they also have] thought and understanding, like Anaxagoras and Empedocles and Democritus. Now if activity in the realm of nutrition were called life—so that a body, if it persists through nutrition, is [called] living, and then, if it is unable to maintain its individuality through nutrition, outside corruption has power over it so that its mixture changes, and its power dissipates, then it [is said to] die—then [if that is what we mean by life] it is appropriate to call a plant living. And if [calling a plant living] is on the condition that [life means] perception and non-voluntary movement, then it is not permitted to call plants living in any respect. And this dispute is mostly verbal (*laftī*). (Avicenna, *Healing: Book of*

which is essentially the ability to receive the vegetative or sensitive faculty we more typically associate with those organs.¹⁷ In other words, taking the lungs as an example, there are three states we can distinguish: 1) the to-be-enlivened matter of the lungs, from the liver 2) the lungs, enlivened by the vital spirit, and technically “alive” in Avicenna’s medical terminology, and 3) the lungs, with the power for respiration, able to do the breathing we typically associate with them.

It might seem strange to think of the lungs as “living” when they are not yet breathing or even *able* to breath, but Avicenna argues that this distinction is necessary to account for the fact that sometimes an organ is not “dead,” yet it seems to have lost its ability to perform the act which we uniquely associate with it. For example, as described in the *Canon*, an organ of sensation might have some obstruction, or be paralyzed, and so be unable to sense, lacking the power of sensation, but it would not thereby *also* be dead. On the contrary, precisely in virtue of having vital spirit, it is still alive—just lacking its particular power.¹⁸ So in the *Canon* and *Cardiac Drugs*, the primary function of the vital spirit is to provide life, and thereby the ability (the vital *potentiality*) to acquire further abilities.

Plants, 3.)”

Because plants are capable of nutrition, growth and reproduction, some call them alive. If that is all we mean by “living,” Avicenna has no problem calling plants alive. But some, conflating the idea of life with thought, understanding, and sensation, assume that plants must have the later faculties in some measure as well, since or if they are to be considered alive. This is a mistake, Avicenna thinks, because we know those later faculties are only given to living beings capable of voluntary motion and, as mentioned in the paragraph just prior to the above quote, plants cannot act on the basis of information concerning harms and benefits. So it is appropriate to call plants living, provided we understand that there is life capable of voluntary motion (animals and humans), and life which is not (plants).

This exposition runs contrary to a recent article, titled “Avicenna’s Denial of Life of Plants.” In this article, Tawara argues that while Avicenna early on, in the *Compendium*, attributed life to plants (because they have souls), he later revised his view in the *Book of Plants*. The key text for Tawara’s claim is the one just presented, where Avicenna says towards the end that “it is not permitted to call plants living in any respect (see Tawara (2014) 129).” But as we have seen, this statement is part of Avicenna’s permissive stance that we can either call plants alive or not alive, *depending on what we mean by life*. So Avicenna does not decisively deny life to plants in this text.

Tawara claims to find further support for his view in Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine*. There, according to Tawara, Avicenna says life is not present in plants, because plants lack the vital faculty. The vital faculty is “the faculty that makes the organs prepare for accepting the faculty of sensation and movement, and the functions of life (ibid., 135).” Based on this, it may seem Avicenna is denying life to plants in the *Canon*: life is associated with sensation and movement, and other functions of life, and if anything is certain, plants do not have these sorts of abilities.

But context suggests that Avicenna is, again, not going so far as to deny plants life. In the *Canon*, Avicenna is dealing primarily with humans from a medical point of view. The vital spirit is indeed a condition for a certain kind of life, namely, animal and human life. But just because plants lack the same conditions for life as humans, does not mean that we have to say that plants lack life.

Again, in *Healing: Psychology* Avicenna insists that plants have a soul, and says that he is perfectly happy with calling something alive, if by alive we mean “has a soul (1.1, p. 15).” So viewed, Avicenna’s later statements concerning of life of plants are ambivalent and less dramatic.

¹⁷ Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126-127.

¹⁸ Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 126-127.

While the *Canon* and *Cardiac Drugs* are substantially in agreement about the nature of the vital spirit, there are some surface differences worth clarifying. In brief, these texts use somewhat different language when discussing 1) whether there is one “spirit,” or three, and 2) whether the further vegetative, sensitive and appetitive powers exist in the vital spirit *before* mingling with the unique temperament of the to-be-enlivened organ, or after the vital spirit encounters the matter of the organ. To illustrate the first point, in *Cardiac Drugs*, Avicenna says that there are three things properly called spirits [*arwāh*]¹⁹—vital, natural/vegetative, and psychological—with the vital spirit being the foundation for the others.¹⁹ On the other hand, in the *Canon*, he firmly asserts that there is only one thing that should properly be called spirit, and that is the vital spirit,²⁰ with the vegetative and psychological simply being labeled faculties. As for the second point—whether the vital spirit bears the further faculties prior to mingling with the temperaments, or whether these come to be after the organs are enlivened—in *Cardiac Drugs* he mentions both views, without taking a side²¹. In the *Canon* he is again more decisive, saying that the further faculties do *not* appear until vital spirit mingles with the organs.²²

The difference between the two texts is only on the surface, and can be explained for reasons historical and philosophical. Though Avicenna lists three “spirits” in *Cardiac Drugs*, only one of the them is the vital spirit, and only it has the function that has been described above. Further, even though Avicenna is not firmly settled on the temporal priority of the vital spirit in the *Cardiac Drugs*, he lists it as a legitimate option, and says nothing against it.

As for why there is the divergence, as a point of history, Avicenna’s disciple Juzjānī records that *Cardiac Drugs* was finished in 1015 and given to a patron,²³ with Avicenna never going back to modify it. The *Canon*, on the other hand, continued to be modified until 1024, being finished during Avicenna’s last stay in Isfahan.²⁴ So the time lapse provides space for development.

Philosophically, there are two possibilities for why such a development might occur. On the one hand, since the vital spirit is that which enlivens and makes possible all the remaining faculties, it plays a role in medicine akin to the soul. As Avicenna argues in the *Canon*, if we were to talk about three spirits—even if they are not all vital spirit—we would verge precariously close to affirming the view that there are three souls, as some prior physicians have done.²⁵ So Avicenna’s considered view on the vital spirit’s fundamental nature seems to be found in the *Canon*: there is only one “spirit,” not three, whose function is to give the organs (produced by the liver) potentiality for receiving further faculties, as opposed to these faculties already existing in the separate vital spirit. On the other hand, Alpina speculates that the *Cardiac Drugs*’ more complex schema of the vital spirit’s function may simply be due to its more philosophical orientation.²⁶ That is, in general, Avicenna tends to avoid philosophical nuances in the *Canon*, whereas the *Cardiac Drugs*, as discussed above,²⁷ appears to have been conceived by Avicenna as more of an extension of his philosophical project in *Healing: Psychology*.

19 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 222-223.

20 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 127.

21 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 224.

22 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 127.

23 Gutas (2014), 514.

24 Gutas (2014), 512.

25 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), I.6.4, 127.

26 Alpina (2017) 376-377.

27 See section 1, above.

The vital spirit is not only active at the beginning of life, but continues to play a role as life persists. That is, The vital spirit remains in the body, passing through the brain as it circulates, where the brain alters it as needed it, and then redistributes it in such a way as facilitates the other functions of and communication between different organs (vegetative, sensitive and motive).²⁸ That is, the material cause for every faculty includes vital spirit of a particular variety, and it is the brain that tailors the vital spirit to serve those functions. Moreover, the specific varieties of vital spirit distributed throughout the body can fluctuate in minute ways, and these changes affect how exactly a particular act of that faculty occurs. For example, Avicenna explains some vagaries of vision via the disposition of the vital spirit in the eye.²⁹ So the vital spirit remains coursing through and between all the organs, similar enough in all of them to provide some unity and communication, but distinct enough in each locale to play a role in particular functions. In brief, the vital spirit enlivens organs, and then undergirds those organs' functions and cooperation.

Avicenna describes the activities of the vital spirit as located conceptually in some middle-ground between vegetative faculties and the animal faculties. The vital faculty is like the vegetative, in that its acts are not volitional. As we saw in Avicenna's distinction in *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 between volitional and non-volitional faculties, this means that it is not a power over opposites, and not part of the belief-appetite system of faculties.³⁰ Yet the vital spirit is also like the animal, sensitive faculties, in that it exhibits contrary movements. Whereas the vegetative faculties just act according to one pattern (e.g., nutrition heats food), the vital spirit can expand and contract, can heat and cool. So its varied movement makes it similar to animal, sensitive faculties, but not quite the same since it lacks will.

With an understanding of the vital spirit in hand, we will now turn to Avicenna's discussions of the physiology of emotional dispositions and effects, which incorporates the concept of vital spirit throughout. In addressing each, we will begin with the philosophical framework into which the physiological texts fit, and then discuss the physiology itself.

4. Physiology of emotional dispositions

4.1 Observations in need of an explanation

In *Healing: Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna lays out some observations that give rise to several related questions: why do acts of the motive faculty occur at some times, and not others, and with greater or lesser degrees of intensity? For example, why might one person get sad as a result of hearing some piece of news, and another person not? Coming at the start of 4.4, as Avicenna transitions away from his discussion of the sensitive powers of the animal soul, the most direct impetus for these observations is to show that the motive faculty is distinct from apprehensive faculties:

For people agree in apprehending what they sense and imagine insofar as they sense or imagine, but they differ in what they have appetites for from among those things they sense or imagine. For one person's own state [hāluhu] might differ in regard to this. For he imagines food and has an appetite for it at the time of

28 On the role of the brain in redistributing vital spirit, see: Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 5.8, 263 ff.

29 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 3.8, 155.

30 See chapter 3, section 2. §

hunger, and does not have an appetite for it at the time of satiety, and also the person with good morals [al-ḥasn al-akhlāq], if he imagines despicable pleasures, he does not have an appetite for them, while another person does. And these two states don't only belong to humans, rather, they also belong to animals.³¹

Avicenna's point is obvious once stated: it is possible to have an evaluative judgment, but no emotion. Since the same evaluative apprehension sometimes does and sometimes does not lead to acts of the motive faculty, the two are thereby distinct, not essentially connected. This shows us both that acts of the motive faculty are distinct from apprehensions, and gives us some information about how emotions function.

It is important to specify we are talking about *evaluative* apprehensive acts, because if that were not the case, Avicenna's point would be trivial. No one expects a non-evaluative judgment, like solving a math problem, to result in an emotion. But when we judge something to be good, pleasant or useful, there is some expectation that these judgments have relevance to feeling and behavior. We thus need an explanation for why sometimes the motive faculty is triggered by those judgments, and at other times it does not.

Avicenna indicates in the above text that the explanation for why this is someone's "state" upon having some judgment. As his examples show, one's state can include cognitive as well as physiological dispositions. Someone who is satiated from food will not respond to a judgment of something as delicious or nutritious in the same way as a hungry person, nor will a person of good morals respond to something judged as pleasant, but immoral, in the same way as a vicious person. So physiology is an important part of the explanation for why judgments sometimes result in emotions, and other times not. As we will see, however, in his medical texts he even appeals to physiology as a way of explaining what grounds virtues and vices, though these latter types of dispositions would not be *reducible* to physical states.

Our responsiveness to evaluative judgments not only varies along the lines of *whether* we will have certain emotions, or not—there is also a difference in *intensity*. Immediately following the above text, Avicenna observes that:

Appetite may vary. For among [different kinds of appetite] there is that which remains weak, and there is that which strengthens to the point where it causes the resolution [to act]—though the resolution is not the same as appetite.³²

Avicenna is making two points here: first, that appetite grows strong and diminishes, and that sometimes it grows strong enough to the point where the resolution to act occurs. As we have seen in chapter three, part of what accounts for the transition to the resolution to act is the move from mere evaluative judgment to practical judgment. But even prior to the resolution to act, the motive faculty can incline with varying strengths. You see something, judge it as delicious, and the inclination grows from mild to all-consuming, without any change in the evaluative judgment. So there needs to be some other explanation for why one and the same value judgment can see to different degrees of intensity for emotions.

Avicenna does not provide a complete answer in *Psychology* 4.4 for these issues, but two points within the chapter suggest that he is particularly interested in the role of physiological dispositions. Firstly, about halfway through 4.4, as a conclusion to his overview of the motive

31 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 194.

32 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 195.

faculty, Avicenna states that emotions “do not occur without the participation of the body” because,

...the bodily temperaments [*amzija*] changes with [these emotions], and also, these [emotions] come about with the occurrence of [various] bodily temperaments. For from some temperaments a disposition towards anger follows, and from some temperaments, a disposition towards concupiscible desire. And cowardice and fear follow upon certain temperaments. Some people have angry dispositions, such that they are quick to anger, and some are fearful, that is, cowards, quick to fear.

As becomes evident in what follows, Avicenna is claiming that an emotional episode *causes* changes in the body’s temperaments—that is, the state of the elemental properties and humours in the body—and also that an emotional episode is, at least in part, *caused* by changes in the body’s temperaments.

Moreover, at the end of the chapter he points us in the direction of his more full response, in a text we looked at earlier. Concluding 4.4, he says:

And we have discussed in our books of medicine, to a degree of detail and accuracy not found in any predecessors, the reason for the dispositions [*isti’ dādāt*] of different people—on account of their natural temperament [*jibla*] and their different states [*aḥwāl*]³³—to joy, depression, anger, gentleness, rancor, calmness, and suchlike. So let someone read [about such things] there.

The terms he uses here, *jibla* and *ḥāl*, do not on their own clarify that we are talking about physiological dispositions, but *jibla* is certainly suggestive of that, being used often in that context. In any case, taken alongside the reference to his medical texts, we can infer that he wants to explain dispositions (*isti’ dādāt*) by way of physiological states—and that is in fact what Avicenna does in his medical texts, *Cardiac Drugs* in particular. Thus, Avicenna begins 4.4 with his observations about how people are disposed in different ways towards emotions, and he concludes 4.4 by pointing us in the direction of what he thinks to be a key (though not total) part of the explanation, which is an appeal to the state of the body and its temperaments.

4.2 Physiological dispositions as a response to issues in the tradition

In tying both these sorts of dispositions (whether an emotion occurs, and its intensity) to the body and its temperaments, Avicenna is dealing at once with several concerns from his predecessors. First, there is a set of issues Aristotle raises in *De Anima* 1.1, 403a19-24. Here Aristotle is primarily concerned to argue for the notion that psychological states depend on the soul and body together. He cites emotions as prime examples of this, because we so readily associate certain physical acts with certain emotions (e.g., shame is partially constituted by the face going white). But Aristotle says that even more solid evidence of the hylomorphic nature of emotions is the fact that peoples’ temperamental dispositions affect whether and how they have certain emotions. For example, some people are physically constituted so that they will become fearful at the least provocation, while others are so disposed that they will not evince any sign of fear, even when something fearsome is right in front of them.

Avicenna’s discussion of physiological dispositions for emotions is clearly reminiscent of this passage in Aristotle, but the two have different aims in bringing up these observations.

33 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 201.

Aristotle is providing preliminary evidence that most acts of the soul must be embodied, contrary to what is true of states of the rational soul—an notion with which Avicenna concurs and deals with elsewhere. So when Avicenna brings up similar observations about the ways that the motive faculty depends on temperamental dispositions, it is to illustrate something about *how* the motive faculty operates, not about what *sort* of state motive states are (e.g., hylomorphic or not). Nonetheless, this *De Anima* text is clearly foundational to the Aristotelian tradition's tendency to discuss physiological dispositions for emotions. Themistius and John Philoponus similarly discuss physiological dispositions for emotions at this juncture, extending the points Aristotle makes, but they ultimately subordinate it to the point that these states are hylomorphic.³⁴ Avicenna's contribution lies not in the fact that he notes the dependence of emotions on temperaments, but on extracting this point from the discussion of the nature of hylomorphic states in general, to be a part of his philosophical analysis of emotion in its own right.

The second bit of the tradition that Avicenna's analysis bears on is a debate in the Stoic tradition, available to Avicenna in the Arabic version of Galen's *Harmony of Plato and Hippocrates*.³⁵ In *Harmony*, Galen reports that two early figures in the history of Stoic theorizing about emotions, Zeno and Chrysippus, associated emotions with judgments, but in different ways.³⁶ For Zeno, the emotion itself is a kind of non-cognitive movement of the soul that in some way accompanies or supervenes on a judgment. Chrysippus thought emotions themselves are, in fact, types of judgments—linguistic, but not-rational. Since emotions are linguistic, according to Chrysippus, animals and infants are not able to experience them. As Galen recounts, into this debate later comes Posidonius, who objects to both of Zeno and Chrysippus, criticizing the notion that emotions are tied in any essential way to judgments. Posidonius's first concern, more directed at Chrysippus, is that it seems obvious animals and infants *do* experience what we call emotions, especially fear and anger. Secondly, and more relevant to our conversation here, is that it is possible to have one and the same judgment, but to fail to have the associated emotion. If emotions were types of judgments (of whatever kind), or necessarily supervened on judgments, they would track our affirming or denying particular propositions. But he notes that in the case of grief, the relevant judgment (e.g., that someone you love has died) does not change, while nonetheless grief may lessen over time.³⁷

Though he does not mention this debate explicitly, Avicenna would have been well aware of it, and his presentation strikes a middle ground. Judgments are necessary causes of emotions, but they are not sufficient, either for the occurrence of an emotion, or for determining the strength of a particular occurrence. This is particularly relevant to Posidonius's formulation, since Avicenna's view provides a multi-faceted explanation for why emotional occurrences and strengths can vary in the face of one and the same judgment. Even if we still value someone and

34 See John Philoponus (2005), 67-72 and Themistius (1996), 21, 6.34.

35 Avicenna never cites this text, but it is a prominent enough debate within the ancient tradition that it is reasonable to think he would be aware of it as a central concern with which to be dealt.

36 The debate is recounted in *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* books 4-7. The following key text (5.1.4–6) is cited at Knuuttila (2004), 53: "In the first book of his *On Emotions* Chrysippus tries to prove that emotions are certain judgements of reason while Zeno did not regard them as the judgements themselves but contractions, expansions, elations and dejections of the soul which supervene on judgements. Posidonius, disagreeing with both, praises and accepts Plato's view. He disputes the view of the followers of Chrysippus arguing that emotions are neither judgements nor supervenient upon them, but certain movements of other irrational powers, which Plato called appetitive and spirited." The exchange is also discussed at King (2012) 1-11.

37 Nussbaum (2001) discusses grief on page 79.

cognitively acknowledge their loss as tragic, one's physiological disposition and background beliefs will partially affect just how strongly grief follows from that judgment, if at all.

In sum, through his analysis of dispositions for emotions, Avicenna moves the *De Anima* conversation forward by honing in on physiological dispositions as a matter of analysis in its own right, and he moves the concerns expressed in the Stoic tradition forward by offering an account of how emotions relate to judgments.

4.3 Dispositions for emotions in Avicenna's medical texts

Avicenna fills in the picture of how the body's states amount to dispositions for emotions in his medical texts. In the *Cardiac Drugs*, after Avicenna's overview of the the vital spirit's origin and dual purposes (described above in section 3), he immediately makes the following remark:

It seems that the sages and their followers among the doctors have agreed that joy [*al-farah*] and depression [*al-ghamm*] and fear [*al-khawf*] and anger [*al-ghadb*] are among the affections [*al-inf' ālāt*] particularly associated with [*al-khāṣa bi*] the vital spirit [*al-rūḥ*] that is the in heart. Moreover [*thumma inna*], every affection which grows strong or weak, [it does so] not because of the active cause [*fā' il*], but rather it accords in its intensification or weakening with the intensification or weakening of the passive substance [*al-jawhar al-munfa' il*].³⁸

The first part of this text is making the general point, discussed above in section 2, that occurrent emotions supervene on the vital spirit in the heart (and the heart itself). The second part of the text is making the point that intensity or weakness of a particular emotion is due in a significant way to some sort of bodily state. He does not clarify what bodily factors he is referring to here (he just references the “passive substance”) but it becomes clear in the sections that follow that he is particularly concerned with the state of the vital spirit. That is, he proceeds from here to talk about how what sort of emotions arise from people with vital spirits of characteristic varieties. For example, people with a less harmonious, murky vital spirit (like the sick, the tired, or the elderly) tend towards more marked sadness, while those whose vital spirit remains harmonious and light tend towards joy.³⁹ Of course, as we saw in the section on the nature of the vital spirit, the vital spirit undergirds the functioning of all psychological activities, so emotions are not unique in being affecting by the state of the vital spirit. We will return to that point below.

Emotional dispositions in the vital spirit are distinguished from the “active cause [*fā' il*]” of some emotion in the above text. Avicenna does not return to this precise language of to unpack what he means, but it would make the most sense to take “active case” as referring to evaluative judgments, which are discussed as the proximate cause of emotions in his more philosophical texts. Understood in that sense, a discussion a few pages in the same section amounts to an elaboration on this point, where he briefly enumerates various “strong [*quwīyya*]” and “obvious [*zāhira*]” causes of joy and sadness, as distinct from those that are disposing, and less obvious. The strong and obvious causes of joy include things like good conversation, being surprised by something pleasant, acting freely according to one's wishes, and so on.⁴⁰ Described as such, these

³⁸ Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

³⁹ Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 226.

⁴⁰ Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 232.

“strong and obvious” causes might seem more like *occasions* for making an evaluative judgment that triggers an emotion, rather than being the judgment itself. But in listing examples of proximate causes of emotions, Avicenna frequently switches between the two ways of talking. This happens frequently in his *Healing: Rhetoric* (*Kitāb al-Khaṭāba*) where Avicenna (like Aristotle) discusses various objects of emotions, such as how an insult can lead to anger.⁴¹ The implication, of course, is that the insult is cognized as something offensive. In this portion of the *Cardiac Drugs* Avicenna even mentions his “*Book of Rhetoric* [*Kitāb Rīṭūrīqa*]” as a place where more such “strong and obvious causes” are discussed. So it seems fair to assume that in both cases these objects are proximate causes of emotions, insofar as they are evaluated in the relevant way. Thus, the above text is saying that if we want an explanation for why an emotion grows strong or weak, we should look to one’s physiological state, not the evaluation that can trigger the emotion.

Later in the *Cardiac Drugs*, Avicenna also describes how the vital spirit similarly constitutes dispositions for whether emotions *happen or not*, plain and simple. Avicenna makes this point in the following two texts, which bookend a discussion of the effects of wine, and the “clear and obvious” causes of joy we just looked at:

[For] the one who is prepared for something, the weakest of its causes suffices for it, like sulphur for conflagration, for it is set aflame with the slightest spark, while wood is not set aflame with twice as much. So when the soul possesses a vital spirit prepared for passions from joy-causing things, it rejoices at the slightest cause⁴².

[R]egarding preparation: the one who leans towards one side is *uninfluenced* by causes from the other side, unless they are strong, and they *are* influenced by the causes [of the side he leans towards], even though they are weak⁴³.

In the first text, Avicenna’s point is that when someone is disposed in one emotional direction, very little is needed to trigger that emotion. In fact, he says, when people drink wine, it seems that they sometimes experience emotions for no reason whatsoever. But of course this is not possible, since every effect needs to have an active cause. Wine simply makes the vital spirit more abundant and active, which makes it more likely for some judgment to result in an emotion. In the second text, Avicenna asserts that one’s vital spirit can be so far in one direction that some active causes rarely if ever leads to the emotion it normally would in most people. For example, while it is possible to be disposed towards grumpiness such that a positive evaluation will only make you a little pleased, it is also possible to be so strongly disposed towards grumpiness that a positive evaluation won’t trigger any emotion whatsoever. So we see that the state of the vital spirit affects whether some judgment will result in an emotion and, if so, the strength of the emotion.

These two points—whether an emotion occurs and its strength—are obviously related along a kind of spectrum. If your vital spirit is only disposed partially towards grumpiness you will experience weak positive emotions, but if your vital spirit goes too far in that direction, you will experience no relevant emotion. Presumably Avicenna emphasizes them as distinct points, because they account for phenomena that we typically classify as different. Just because the

41 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 131.

42 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 230.

43 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 233, emphasis mine.

answer to two questions (i.e., “Why did that emotion occur?” “Why did it occur in that strength?”) make reference to the same sort of solution, does not make them the same question.

Returning to a point made earlier, it is important to note that the link Avicenna is drawing between emotions and vital spirits in terms of dispositions should not be taken to imply that other psychological phenomena do not have similar relations to the vital spirit. As we saw in a prior section, the vital spirit underlies all psychological activities. Insofar as the vital spirit facilitates the functioning and communication of various faculties, those faculties will all have dispositions and effects in the vital spirit, to some degree or other.⁴⁴ For example, Avicenna explains some vagaries of eyesight by an appeal to the vital spirit.⁴⁵ Elsewhere Avicenna says that what parents imagine during intercourse can have an effect on the color [*lawn*] of child conceived, for example, thinking about red can add a tinge of red.⁴⁶ He admits that this latter point may sound far-fetched, but he says it follows from his fundamental principles that cognitions work by way of the vital spirit. Whether we agree with that reasoning or not, these are all illustrations of the basic idea that it is not just emotions which are affected by the state of the vital spirit.

Further, in the *Canon*, Avicenna makes reference to the vital spirit in explaining treatment for other sorts of mental disorders, beyond the emotional. In book three (of five), Avicenna has a discussion of mental illness (*amrāḍ al-ra's*) which includes emotional disorders, such as melancholy and lovesickness, but also non-emotional mental disorders, such as sleep disorders, defects of the imagination or memory, and general mania.⁴⁷ For some of these cases, Avicenna recommends altering one's mode of thinking, but there are also many references to changing one's diet, and procedures like cupping, in order to affect one's temperament, and ultimately the vital spirit.

Given that Avicenna acknowledges and attend to the role of the vital spirit in relation to emotional and non-emotional psychological disorders, we might wonder why the treatise dedicated to unpacking the vital spirit in detail, namely, *Cardiac Drugs*, is almost solely concerned with emotions in terms of its examples. There are several plausible explanations. Perhaps Avicenna simply had more to say about emotions in relation to the vital spirit, or perhaps the states of the vital spirit that play a disposing role for emotions are just much more apparent than those that affect, say, imagination and memory. That would make sense, since the heart is not just the seat of the emotions, but also the organ that produces the vital spirit in the first place. So, relative to other psychological functions, emotions supervene on the vital spirit in a much more significant way. Or, perhaps, since we know that *Cardiac Drugs* was written specifically for a wealthy dignitary (as mentioned in section 1), such a treatment was specifically asked for. Such interest would not be surprising, since emotions are a major part of one's overall wellbeing and enjoyment of life (or lack thereof). In any case, although Avicenna is most explicit about the disposing role of the vital spirit in relation to emotions, what is unique about this discussion in Avicenna's writings is its specificity and the particulars of what is discussed—not the role of the vital spirit in general.

4.4 Psychological emotional dispositions in relation to moral formation

⁴⁴ See end of section 3.

⁴⁵ See end of section 3.

⁴⁶ Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.2.1.14, 160.

⁴⁷ Avicenna, *Canon* (1987), vol. 2, 877-901.

Avicenna makes the connection between the physiological side of how we are disposed to emotions, and the broader topic of moral formation. To be sure, development into a virtuous person involves more than physiological dispositions towards certain emotions, but the physiology is a factor Avicenna chooses to emphasize. In *Cardiac Drugs* he makes the following comment in the midst of his discussion of different types of preparatory causes for emotions:

[W]hen acts and emotions [*infi' ālāt*] recur, a strong disposition [*malakā quwwiya*] is formed, and character traits [*al-akhlāq*] are acquired in this way. And it is possible that the cause for this is that every emotion leads to an actualization suitable to it, and what is suitable to something is unsuitable to its opposite. And that which is unsuitable for the opposite, if it is repeated many times, diminishes preparation for the contrary, and increases preparation for [that which is repeated] [...] If that is the case, then repetition of joy disposes to joy, and repetition of depression disposes to depression.⁴⁸

The term for translated here as character traits (*al-akhlāq*) is a flexible Arabic term, but it clearly has moral overtones to it. For example, in Al-Farabi's *Directing Attention to the Way of Happiness*, he says that "all ethical traits [*al-akhlāq kulluhā*], from the virtuous to the vicious [*al-jamīl wal-qabīh*], are acquired [traits]."⁴⁹ Since physiology affects our disposition to certain emotions, and part of what it means to act virtuously or viciously involves how we respond emotionally to a situation, then it makes sense that our moral character would to some extent supervene on our physical, non-cognitive state.

Yet this is all Avicenna says about the relation of physiology to moral formation in *Cardiac Drugs*, and context from elsewhere suggests that we should take him to only be making a point about preliminary stages of moral formation, or something about the mechanism on which virtue supervenes, and not anything about how complete virtue is achieved. In the Arabic version of Galen's *On Character Traits* (*Kitāb Al-Akhlāq*), Galen makes the distinction between different types of virtues and vices. Some virtues and vices involve the exercise of thought, while others do not. The latter are called *akhlāq*. Galen goes on to describe the process of moral formation, where young people grow out of their *akhlāq* and into more complete virtue or vice, as they add judgment to their character, or use thought and habit to modify their character (for better or worse). This is similar to the point Aristotle makes in *Nicomachean Ethics*, where there are two types of excellence, excellence of thought, and excellence of character, but excellence of character is not complete without being guided by thought (in particular, practical wisdom).⁵⁰ Presumably part of why Aristotle thinks this is that we are disposed to certain emotions and actions for reasons outside of our control, and it would not make sense to attribute virtue to someone solely on the basis of, say, good genetics.

Although Avicenna does not have any well-attested, canonical work in the same vein as *Nicomachean Ethics*, other texts suggest that he would be fully on board with this notion that full virtue requires rational control. In his *Healing: Rhetoric*, after finishing his discussion of individual emotions in 3.1-4, he opens 3.5 by saying that he is going to discuss the "states that move/dispose [*al-aḥwāl al-muḥarrikah*], by way of [discussing] each character trait [*khulq khulq*] with respect to occurrences [*al-'awāriḍ*] [of the just discussed emotions]."⁵¹ Each "state that disposes" is another type of "character trait," and each disposition has different emotions

48 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 235.

49 Al-Farabi (1992) 235.

50 On the two types of excellence, see *Nicomachean Ethics* (1994) 1103a. For the need to add practical wisdom on top of character traits in order for them to be complete, see 1144a-b.

associated with it. From there, he focuses on the dispositions typical to people of different ages, with brief remarks about differences in money and societal rank. Some of the dispositions he discusses are cognitive, others are physiological. For example, in contrast to the young, whose hopefulness boils down primarily to their hot temperaments,⁵² the elderly are said to be so disposed towards hopelessness not only because of the coldness of their temperaments,⁵³ but also because they have experienced so many difficulties and setbacks in life (a cognitive disposition).⁵⁴ Nowhere in his discussion of these “character traits” does Avicenna say that these circumstantial or physical dispositions constitute virtue, nor that they are guided by reason. Similarly, in *On Governance* (a text that is attributed to Avicenna, but with less surety than his canonical works), he exhorts his readers interested in ethics to “take count of their character traits and temperaments,” and then use reason to cultivate what is good, and rein in what is bad.⁵⁵

Thus, though Avicenna’s remarks in the *Cardiac Drugs* about the sense in which our physiology contributes to character are quite brief, it seems likely that they refer to something less than complete virtue. It is possible that he is referring to preliminary stages of moral formation, where people have dispositions towards certain types of emotions and actions, which it is then up to them what to either cultivate or rein in. As we saw in the last section, in relation to mental illness, it is possible for doctors to get rid of certain conditions that would make it all but impossible for someone to exert rational control (e.g., extreme depression or madness). But Avicenna never suggests that a medical doctor could positively inculcate virtue by improving physiology. So the role of physiology in moral formation is likely something more preliminary. It is also possible that he is partly referring to the mechanism on which supervenes an aspect of complete virtue. That is, when someone *does* take rational control of their moral formation, and develops into, say, a joyous person, part of this will be reflected in their physiology. There couldn’t be a person with a perfected disposition towards courage whose physiology looked just the same as a coward, because physiology affects how we respond to situations. But the more ethically relevant part of the virtue will be what the virtuous person has done with their thought life, not the hand dealt to them in their circumstances, upbringing, and physiology.⁵⁶

5. Physiology of emotional effects

51 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 156. *Psychology: Healing* 4.4 also uses the term ‘*awāriḍ*’ to refer to emotions.

52 And their natures are prone to believing quickly whatever falls at their feet on account of what is in them of optimism, and a lack of suspicion, and wideness of hope. And all of that follows on account of their hot temperament, which resembles the intoxicated, [and this temperament] strengthens the soul very much (Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 157).

53 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 159.

54 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 160.

55 Avicenna, *On Governance* (2007), 229-230.

56 Though the texts on the relation of physiology to ethics are not copious, Avicenna is the main exemplar in the Arabic tradition of this approach. Among Avicenna’s predecessors, Al-Kindi and Al-Farabi wrote works on soul-care in the Stoic/Cynic tradition, emphasizing the need for correcting one’s thoughts to dispel unwanted emotions (*Dispelling Sorrows* and *Directing Attention to the Way of Happiness*, respectively). A.B. Al-Rāzī and Al-Balkhī, both medical doctors like Avicenna, but they distinguish their works on medicine from their works on soul-care and virtue cultivation, the latter being dealt with through cognitive therapy (the *Spiritual Physick* and *Sustenance of the Body and Soul*, respectively). Avicenna has relatively less to say overall about moral philosophy, but what he does have to say skillfully combines medical and cognitive points of view.

5.1 Temperamental effects considered to be primarily of the body

In *Psychology* 4.4, in addition to discussing the nature of emotions, and the importance of physiology to our dispositions for emotions, Avicenna eventually comes to discuss the nature of emotional effects. What we see in the following quote is a distinction made between emotions, and the sort of physiological changes that we often associate with emotions. Avicenna wants to consider the latter effects, rather than a part of the emotion itself:

And [as for] fear and anger and depression, the passion [*infī' āl*] whereby they occur happens primarily on account of the soul. Anger or depression, insofar as they are anger or depression, are *not passions among those passions afflicting the body*, even though they are followed by passions which afflict the body, like the rising or abating of heat, and suchlike. *For those things are not anger or depression itself* [*laysa nafs al-ghaḍb wal-ghamm*], but rather things that follow [*yatba'*] anger or depression.⁵⁷

Emotions exist “primarily on account of the soul,” and they need to be distinguished, according to Avicenna, from the temperamental effects that follow them, which “afflict the body.” In order to understand what Avicenna means by these specifications, referring some things more the soul, some to the body, we need to understand the section leading up to it, in which Avicenna discusses a variety of states that “belong to the soul with the participation of the body.”⁵⁸

In *Psychology* 4.4, after the initial discussion about the motive faculties, but before the above text concerning emotional effects, Avicenna makes some distinctions about different types of psychological states: imagination, emotions, hunger, physical pain, health, and so on. Some such states are “primarily” psychological, while others are “primarily” physical. To be clear, the issue is not about whether any of these states are psychological, or even hylomorphic, in general. Rather, Avicenna is making distinctions between different types of states, all which involve the soul to some degree, and *all* of which “do not occur without the participation of the body.” His distinctions are as follows:

[...] conditions/states⁵⁹ [*aḥwāl*] that belong to the soul with the participation of [*bi-mushārikah*] the body come in different types. One of them is [1] what belongs to the body primarily but because it has a soul, and another is [2] what belongs to the soul primarily but because it is in a body, and [3] what is between the bodily and soul equally.⁶⁰

Avicenna goes on to provide examples of these three categories. His references to [1] and [2] are clearly laid out. That which is [1] “primarily body” includes sleep, waking, health, sickness. That which is [2] “primarily of the soul” includes imagination, memory, irascible and concupiscible appetite, depression, pity and sadness. If he provides any examples of [3], it is somewhat less clear, but the following seems meant to be an explication of states that belong to body and soul equally:

57 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 198.

58 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

59 *Aḥwāl* is often translated as “states.” But, as shown in the introduction § to this dissertation, Avicenna distinguishes between *malakah* and *ḥāl* in his *Categories* in a way that is useful for the discussion of emotion, and that distinction is best made by translating *ḥāl* as “condition,” and reserving “state” for *malaka*.

60 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

As for pain from a strike, or from the transformation of [one's] bodily temperament, the event therein is *something that exists in the body* because of a fracturing of the connection and the temperament, on account of the *states of the body insofar as it is a body*. And it is also *something existing in the senses* which sense it insofar as it is sensed—but [the event that is sensed occurs] because of the body. And it seems that hunger and appetite [*shahwah*]⁶¹ are of this sort.⁶²

Physical pain and hunger here are discussed as states that are due to states of the body, insofar as it is body, but they are *also* something that exists in the senses. This is markedly different from the way he talks states that are “primarily of the soul,” about which he says “there is *nothing* in [such states] which is an occurrence of the body insofar as it is a body.”⁶³ States like imagination and emotions are primarily psychological, and though embodied, are not caused by anything in the body insofar as it is body. States like physical pain and physical hunger, however, are both sensed, *and* owed to the body insofar as it is body.

With these distinctions, Avicenna appears to unpacking a similar distinction from the beginning of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. It is not surprising to find Avicenna incorporating discussions stemming from the *Parva Naturalia* in *Psychology* 4.4 since, as Hansberger has shown, much of Book 4 as a whole picks up on themes found in *Parva Naturalia*, in addition to *De Anima*.⁶⁴ The distinction in Aristotle's text is somewhat different from that which Avicenna makes, which is likely due to the transmission history of this Aristotelian text. As shown (again) by Hansberger, the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia*, which went by the name of *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, is less of a translation and more of an adaptation. But in this case we need to start with the original *Parva Naturalia* as a frame of reference, since the first part of *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* is not extant⁶⁵

In the beginning of Aristotle's original *De Sensu*—the first book of *Parva Naturalia*—he distinguishes between several ways of approaching the discussion of the soul. On the one hand, he says that he has already (in *De Anima*) talked about (1) *common* features of the soul, when the soul is taken “by itself.” This includes sensation, memory, passion, desire, and appetite generally, and in addition to these pleasure and pain.”⁶⁶ Thus, he says, there remains two further categories to discuss. There are (2) other *common* features of the soul, but *not* with respect to the soul “by itself.” This second category includes which includes “waking and sleep, youth and old age,

61 Despite this being the same term as “concupiscible appetite,” which is classified as a state that is primarily of the soul, it seems to be a way of referring to very basic animal urges, of which hunger would be a prime example, as opposed to emotions based on cognitive evaluations. Avicenna also uses *shahwah* as a genus that includes hunger in *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.3, 67: “hunger is [simply] the appetite [*shahwah*] [for] the hot and dry, and thirst is the appetite [*shahwah*] for the cold and moist.”

62 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 198.

63 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197.

64 Hansberger (2010) 158.

65 Hansberger (2010) 144.

66 See Aristotle, *On Sense and Sensible Objects* (1986), 463a. These sort of functions the essence of the soul which, as Avicenna explains at the beginning of the *Psychology*, is that which accounts for behavior that is “not according to a single pattern, or which does not lack will. (Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.1, 4). In other words, all psychological behavior exhibits some sort of goal-directed behavior. Plant life is “not according to a single pattern,” which can be seen by way of contrast with, say, rocks, that remain constant in terms of their capacities and tendencies. Plants grow in complex ways, changing over time, and adapting to their environment. Animal and human behavior is more clearly psychological, since it is voluntary, meaning that its actions are based off of appetites or choices in response to cognition. None of the sorts of states in category [1] (waking and sleep, etc.) are manifestations of goal-directed behavior.

inhalation and exhalation, life and death.”⁶⁷ Finally, there are (3) states that are particular to certain species. The last of these—faculties particular to species—are discussed in Aristotle’s biological works on plants and animals, so *Parva Naturalia* is thus primarily concerned with type (2) states. But some of the activities given as examples of type (1) nonetheless show up in the discussion of *Parva Naturalia* (e.g., *De Sensu* and *De Memoria* discuss sensation and memory, respectively). This suggests that the distinction being made between (1) and (2) is not primarily between groupings of faculties, but between ways of approaching a discussion of psychological faculties. In other words, you could talk about sensation solely with respect to the soul, giving it a more abstract, formal account. Or you could integrate issues of physiology into your account about sensation, as done in the *Parva Naturalia*. So much for the distinctions Aristotle makes towards the beginning of the original *Parva Naturali*.

It is the distinction between (1) and (2) that Avicenna and (and perhaps the adaptor in *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*) appear to be trying to capture with the language of “primarily soul” and “primarily body.” These are both, of course, discussions of faculties that must be embodied in order to exist. But it is one thing to discuss common psychological faculties in the abstract, on a purely functional level. It is another thing to discuss how those common functions play out, when realized in bodies, and affected by strictly material changes. As Avicenna explains, “Sleep, waking, health and sickness are states that belong to the body and its principles, so they belong to [the body] primarily, but nevertheless they only belong to the body because it has a soul.”⁶⁸ Non-living things do not experience sleep, waking, health and sickness. Sleep would not occur if there were no such thing as sensation. Health would not occur were the body not to have an ideal, soul-given function in the first place. But what causes a living being to need sleep, or to fail in health, is not anything to do with the soul’s function, considered in the abstract. Rather, it has to do with the needs and failings of the body’s matter. We sleep not because sensation needs rest, but because sensation, as an embodied function, taxes physical resources, and those physical resources need time to recover.

So Avicenna’s distinction between “primarily of the soul” and “primarily of the body” can be summarized as follows: for a state to be “primarily of the soul” is for it is be a psychological state, talked about strictly from the point of view of a living being’s soul-given, goal-oriented functions. For a state to be “primarily of the body,” is to discuss a psychological state that would not arise, were it not for the nature and demands of the particular body that the soul is embodied in.

Avicenna’s distinction is thus different than Aristotle’s in the following way: Aristotle is trying to distinguish ways of talking about faculties, and some faculties can be discussed in both ways (e.g., sensation in the abstract, or the particulars of embodied sensation). Avicenna, on the other hand, is trying to distinguish categorically different types of psychological states: [1] those that are psychological, but whose root cause lies with the particular body the soul is instantiated in, and [2] those pertaining to the essence of the embodied soul and its goal-oriented functions.

Whether the development comes from Avicenna himself, or the adaptor of the text (and Avicenna is just mirroring it) is impossible to tell, since, as mentioned above, the first part of *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* is not extant. One bit of evidence that the development stems from the adaptor is that in Averroes relates the same categories [1] and [2] in his *Epitome of the Parva*

67 Aristotle, *On Sense and Sensible Objects* (1986), 463a.

68 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 197

Naturalia, which was also based on the *Kitāb al-ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*⁶⁹, and Averroes generally tries to stick close to the text he is commenting on or summarizing, where possible. Averroes explains that “primarily body” states, like sleep, are in some sense more necessary, and are related to the “primarily soul” functions as a genus is related to species. That is, sleep is a state wherein all the senses are “at rest.”⁷⁰ What this sort of talk captures, that Avicenna would agree with, is that “primarily body” states are in a sense conditions without which the more essential functions would not exist. But of course, were there no essence of the soul, there would be no “primarily body” psychological states either, so this merely is a matter of emphasis. Nothing in Averroes’s analysis clashes with Avicenna’s analysis that what sets “primarily body” states apart is that they are most directly explained by material changes.

5.2 The distinction between emotions and their temperamental effects

With Avicenna’s distinction between states that are “primarily of the soul” and “primarily of the body” in hand, we can return to his remarks about emotions and their effects. If we keep in mind that this text comes just after the texts we have been unpacking regarding the three categories of psychological states, it is clear that he is appealing to those distinctions:

And [as for] fear and anger and depression, the passion [*infi’ āl*] whereby they occur happens primarily on account of the soul. Anger or depression, insofar as they are anger or depression, are *not passions among those passions afflicting the body*, even though they are followed by passions which afflict the body, like the rising or abating of heat, and suchlike. *For those things are not anger or depression itself [laysa nafs al-ghaḍb wal-ghamm]*, but rather things that follow [*yatba’*] anger or depression.⁷¹

When Avicenna says that emotions are not passions that “afflict the body,” contrasting this with passions that do, like “the rising or abating of heat,”⁷² we should understand this to reflect the division between states that are primarily of the soul, versus those that are primarily of the body. Neither of these sort of states happens in anything that is inanimate, so they are psychological states that happens with the participation of the body—just of different kinds.

Given how these distinctions were just discussed, it makes sense why Avicenna would draw the lines where he does. When an emotion occurs, it is some kind of inclination or impulse, supervening on the heart, and the vital spirit that is in the heart. In most cases, an emotion would then have effects throughout the rest of the body, simply due to the fact that the vital spirit proceeds to course through the various organs and arteries. But what shape these effects take

69 These faculties are of two kinds: first, those that are attributed to the body of an animal by virtue of the existence of the soul in it, as for instance, sense-perception and motion; second, those that are attributed to the soul by virtue of the body [in which it exists]. The faculties of the second kind constitute genera, such as sleep and waking, youth and old age, death and life, inhalation and exhalation, health and disease, and length and shortness of life. See Averroes, *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia* (1961), 3. Averroes has a similar discussion, expanded to four distinctions, in his Long Commentary on the *De Anima* (2009), section 3.

70 Averroes, *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia* (1961), 3-4.

71 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 198.

72 This phrasing recalls Aristotle’s suggestion at the beginning of *De Anima* that things like rising or abating of heat count as the “material causes” of emotions, with what Avicenna calls their “essence” constituting their “formal cause (403a30).” Avicenna might not necessarily disagree with Aristotle on this point, since as we have seen, the emotion itself supervenes on the heart and the vital spirit that is in the heart, which could itself get hot in certain emotions. But Avicenna is here concerned with something beyond the “material cause” of emotions.

precisely would be due to the material conditions of the body. Emotional effects are far more variable than the essence of an emotion.⁷³ Anger is anger, from one person to another. But how this physically effects a person will be largely determined “on account of the states of the body insofar as it is a body.” Of course, given that humans have roughly the same physiology, certain emotions have characteristic effects: anger mostly makes us feel hot all over. But this physical effect could be otherwise, and anger would nonetheless still be anger. Two people might both feel the same sort of shame, but one person might be far more prone to turning red.

One might argue that Avicenna is not describing two different events in the above text, but two different aspects of the same event. Yet Avicenna makes a sharp distinction in this text between that which is, precisely speaking, the emotion (*naḥs al-ghaḍb wal-ghamm*), and that which follows (*yatba*) the very emotion. This language of characteristic effects “following” emotions is repeated in one of Avicenna’s medical texts, the *Cardiac Drugs*, so we know that his usage here is intentional⁷⁴. For something to “follow” something else implies a close relationship, but also distinction. It would be possible to translate “follows” as “entails” in this case, as well. So Avicenna realizes that these characteristic effects are vital to how emotions fulfill their role in animals and humans. But we wouldn’t want the closeness of the two phenomena to obscure the fact that Avicenna thinks it important to draw attention to their distinction, presumably due to the variability of the effects, which are dependent on the state of the body.

5.3 Further examples of emotional effects

The place where Avicenna most schematically spells out the “primarily body” effects which follow of emotions is in a later section of the *Canon* on the pulse, titled “the pulse of psychological emotions [*nabḍ al-‘awāriḍ al-naḥsāniyya*].”⁷⁵ The pulse, Avicenna holds, is an act of the heart and the arteries that move and modify the vital spirit.⁷⁶ Avicenna describes different pulse states caused by five key emotions, and the analyses are not surprising: anger [*ghaḍb*] causes an increased pulse, and an agitated vital spirit throughout the body. Pleasure [*ladhdha*] and gladness [*surūr*] lead to a calm pulse, and a calm vital spirit. Depression [*ghaḍb*] slows things down too much, with a sluggish pulse. Fear [*khawf*] makes the pulse erratic. Since the pulse is felt throughout the whole body, the vital spirit is affected in these ways throughout the whole body, which in turn affects the functioning of various organs.

That is, it is important to note that the changes in the vital spirit are just the beginning of the “primarily body” effect that emotions have. When Avicenna talks about emotional effects, he more often talks about “temperamental changes,” as opposed to changes in the vital spirit, and this is because every part of the body has a temperament that can be changed by the character of the vital spirit that runs through it. For example, in the following text (which we already looked

73 A contrast could be made between a view like Avicenna is describing here, and a Jamesian view on emotions. On William James’s view, emotions are constituted by an awareness of the characteristic bodily changes (i.e., sadness is awareness of crying, anger is awareness of getting heated throughout the body). A neo-Jamesian view adds to this that the bodily changes one is aware of are in some way intentionally directed at objects. (Deonna, & Teroni, (2012) 63-66). But Avicenna would say that the emotion is prior to these changes, and able to be fully grasped, without them.

74 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 235-236. Sometimes this term is used to describe the way that emotions follow dispositions, sometimes to describe the way temperamental effects follow emotions.

75 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.3.1.1.1, 200.

76 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.3.1.18, 215.

at in the context of human emotions)⁷⁷, Avicenna discusses how emotional pain can eventually lead to a break-down of the temperaments in the vegetative faculties, using some of the same “primarily body/soul” language that we have just seen in 4.4:

The emotion [*infi'āl*] of joy [*surūr*] or pain [*gham*], [...] is one of the psychological apprehensions, and does not occur to the body insofar as it is body, and [that joy or pain] affects the growing, nutritive power such that there occurs in it, on account of the occurrence that first occurs to the soul—let that be intellectual joy [*al-farah al-naṭqī*]—a strength and effectiveness in its act, and on account of the contrary occurrence—let that be intellectual pain [*al-ghamm al-naṭqī*], in which there is no physical pain—a weakness and an impotence that corrupts its effectiveness. And perhaps the temperamental disposition will be broken down through that [weakness and impotence].⁷⁸

The familiar experience Avicenna seems to be describing here is how negative emotions can effect digestion, and make us physically unwell in a variety of ways. Those temperamental changes are contrasted in this text with the emotional states, which “do not occur to the body insofar as it is body.” To supply another example (not Avicenna’s), when someone’s face turns red because they are embarrassed, this has to do with changes in the blood vessels in the skin. The vital spirit would only be a remote cause for such a change. Again, anxiety might cause someone to sweat, which is something beyond an initial change in the vital spirit. Such physical changes go beyond mere changes in the vital spirit, though there is no doubt a connection.

How exactly an emotion plays out, in terms of its “primarily body,” temperamental effects, depends on the physical state of the emoter, which is why Avicenna’s approach of distinguishing these effects from the essence of the emotion makes sense. Some emotions frequently lead to sexual arousal,⁷⁹ others increase or mitigate disease symptoms.⁸⁰ But despite certain temperamental changes being commonly associated with each emotion, things could be otherwise from species to species, or for individuals within species, without changing the core of what it is to experience a given emotion. Were Avicenna to build particular physical effects into the essence of a given emotion, it would compromise our ability to provide any kind of unified definitions of emotion-types.⁸¹

5.4 Emotions and the necessity of some sort of physical effect

77 See chapter 2, at fn. 44. §

78 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.3, 31-32. Emphasis mine.

79 Avicenna, *Cardiac Drugs* (1984), 229, emphasis mine.

80 Avicenna, *Canon* (1982), II.2.1.14, 160.

81 Such is the problem that James’s view, mentioned above (section 5.2, footnote 73 falls into. James thought that the defining feature of a given emotion was the physical change, awareness of which constituted the emotion. But as Walter Cannon’s criticisms of James’s theory (that emotions are constituted by awareness of internal bodily changes) was that the internal physical changes we associated with emotions are too indistinct to support the strong distinctions we make between emotion-types. Modern neuroscience has since shown there are more physical consistencies between people with respect to particular emotion-types than Cannon granted, but this has variously only been shown to be true for basic groups of emotions (e.g., fear and sadness are both correlated with high heart rates and low skin conductivity responses), or a few basic emotion types (e.g., anger, happiness, sadness and fear can be shown to be distinct along different physical measures)—not a wide variety of individual emotions. The idea that each emotion-type has a unique neural pattern is more promising, at least in theory (since neural scanning is not fine-grained enough to pick up on all the differences between emotion types). See Johnston, & Olson (2015), 51-55.

§

Although emotions are essentially something distinct from their particular physical effects, it is essential that emotions have *some* physical effect. This is a point Avicenna makes in separate text, his *Marginal Glosses on Aristotle's De Anima*, but it helps balance out the conclusions of the preceding sections. The relevant discussion occurs in Avicenna's commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* 1.1, where Aristotle mentions "common affections" that involve both body and soul. In this text, Aristotle cites the following as examples of common affections: sensation, emotions like courage, pity and joy, and the concupiscible appetite and irascible appetites more generically. As seen in section 5.1 of this chapter, Avicenna understands there to be a variety of ways that states can be said to "involve both body and soul." Aristotle's discussion of common affections provides Avicenna fertile grounds to make some similar distinctions, this time under Aristotle's heading of states that "only exist with the body." What emerges from Avicenna's analysis of Aristotle is that he thinks emotions (and the internal senses more generally) are states that, while "primarily of the soul," *necessarily* have effects in the body. Up to this point we have been emphasizing the distinction between emotions and their effects, but *Marginal Glosses* shows that we should not take from this distinction that we could have emotions without any physical effect whatsoever.

In order to understand what Aristotle means when he says that emotions and appetites cannot exist without the body, Avicenna distinguishes three senses in which something can be said to "not exist without a body." Avicenna summarizes the three senses upfront as follows:

I know that "the thing which does not exist except with the body" is understood in three senses: [1] One of them is that that thing is a bodily form; [2] the second is that its cause is a state of the body; [3] the third is that there is together with it a bodily passion, necessarily.⁸²

This list is different than the schema of psychological states we saw earlier from *Psychology* 4.4, because these are not all necessary states of an ensouled organism: Avicenna is just describing different states that could be referred to as requiring a body, in some way or another. The first and most straightforward sense refers to corporeal forms, Avicenna's example being the smoothness of some body.⁸³ By definition, smoothness is an accidental form which cannot be predicated of anything that is not material. The second and third states that cannot exist without a body are both states—as Avicenna later makes clear—that exist because of the *participation* between body and soul, rather than just being straightforwardly corporeal forms.⁸⁴ Before discussing them further, we can outline them as follows:

- States that "do not exist except with a body":
 - States that are *not* due to the the participation between body and soul:
 - 1) Corporeal forms (e.g., smoothness)
 - States that *are* due to the the participation between body and soul:
 - 2) State of the soul *caused by* a body
 - 3) State of the soul that necessarily *causes something in* a body

⁸² Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.16-18.

⁸³ Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.20.

⁸⁴ Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.21, 25.

Turning to (2), this sort of state is due to the participation between body and soul, but such that the body is the cause.⁸⁵ Avicenna's immediate example of this sort of state is a hypothetical scenario, reached by reversing the normal situation between celestial intellect's and spheres. To start with the normal scenario, Avicenna first recalls celestial intellects' ability to influence the spheres that they are associated with. Intellects influence those spheres, but they do not inhere in the spheres as forms in matter. Having reminded us of this, Avicenna then constructs a hypothetical situation where the causality is reversed, such that we get an illustration of this second category of "only existing with a body": if the celestial spheres were able to influence their associated intellects to be in some state, that state would only exist *because* of a body (the sphere), even though the intellect (a non-body) would not be "joined" to the body which is doing the causing. As mentioned, Avicenna presents this as a hypothetical scenario, since celestial spheres do not in fact causally influence their intellects. But in his discussion of (3), we see that there are also more mundane examples of the way that body can influence soul.

Avicenna distinguishes states of type (3) as those which "do not exist except with a body" in the sense of entailing that something is necessarily caused *in* a body, by a soul, as opposed to entailing (as in the second type) that something is caused *by* a body, in a soul. Avicenna chooses to explain this third type by using appetites/emotions as an example, although he later makes clear that the rest of the acts of the animal faculties fall under this heading as well. And it is immediately apparent that appetites are actually examples of both the second *and* third way in which something "only exists with a body," because the second way is pointed out in the explanation of appetites even before the third. In other words, in his illustration of the third distinction Avicenna actually incorporates both (2) and (3), as follows:

[77.25] And likewise the cooperation [of the body and soul is sometimes] such that, given a passion in one of them, there follows from that fact [78.1] a passion in the other. He [Aristotle] brings up an example of this: concupiscible and irascible appetite. It cannot be shown that [lit: it does not suffice for proving that] concupiscible and irascible appetite are purely corporeal simply on the basis of the fact that the body, according to its states, is affected in an angry or desiderative way [by concupiscible and irascible appetite]. For [Type (2)] it is not unthinkable [i.e., it is reasonable to think] that the body, when it enters into [such] a state, there occurs to it—that is, to the soul, [which is] essentially separate from the body [but] connected to the body through a certain relation whose occurrence in it the soul is prepared for—a passion particular to the soul due to bodily causes.⁸⁶ [And it is reasonable to think that] [Type (3)] when the soul enters a state which is particular to it, there follows from that [78.5] a state in the body in terms of the boiling of the blood or the spreading of the organ. And we know that the soul is not joined to the very blood dispersed in the body, [but nevertheless] there could happen to [the blood] passions following passions of the soul or [following passions] of the organ [i.e., the heart] by which there is the first connection to the soul.⁸⁷

At the beginning of this text, Avicenna is cautioning against the idea that just because emotions are partially caused by bodily states, this "does not suffice to prove" that they are merely physical. The view Avicenna seems to be cautioning against here is the Galenic idea the animal and vegetative soul's capacities just are equivalent to the mixture of the body, and that their activities are just constituted by changes in the body. This confirmed by his later mention of

85 Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.21.

86 The Arabic of the parenthetical in this sentence is difficult, but the rest seems clear.

87 Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 77.25-78.7.

Galen in the same section, and a reference to the work wherein Galen affirms such a view, his *The Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixture of the Body*.⁸⁸

Continuing to unpack this text, it is perfectly plausible—contra Galen—that acts of the animal and vegetative soul are acts of the soul, with various relations to the body. Referring back to type (2) states, Avicenna reaffirms that emotions could have causes that can be construed as bodily, despite the emotion itself being something psychological. Presumably the non-psychological bodily causes in mind here are dispositional physical causes, as seen in section 4 of this chapter. More to the point, Avicenna adds that, once caused, emotions themselves necessarily cause something in the body, despite being in themselves something of the soul (i.e., something “primarily psychological,” in the language of *Psychology* 4.4). The effects described at the end of text above text are more explicitly of the temperaments, exemplified in involuntary rising blood pressure and sexual arousal. So this is what it means to “not exist except with a body” according to sense (3): to be something primarily psychological, which nonetheless necessarily has an effect in the body.

Not only is it plausible that one of the soul’s acts have such relations to the body, but in the case of the emotions, we have other evidence that their “first principle” is the soul:

And evidence that anger and desire have some sort of separate account [*lahumā infirādu hukmin bi-wajhin*], is that the intellect prevents [*yamna*] anger and desire, but it is not able to prevent sensible pain or pleasure. So it is understood that the first principle of these [anger and desire] is the soul. [...] For it is reasonable to think that anger and desire are something in the soul from which follow something in the body, without their being understood [merely] as an intention in the body or subsisting in it.⁸⁹

The idea here seems to be that emotions, unlike sensible pleasure and pain, are (to use contemporary terminology) “cognitively penetrable.”⁹⁰ In other words, we are able to change things about occurrent emotions with our thoughts in ways that we cannot change sensible pleasure and pain. When you stub your toe, you cannot will or think the pain away. But when you experience emotional sadness, you can probe the beliefs underlying that emotion, and possibly make it go away.

So, we have seen in this section that Avicenna thinks acts of the animal and vegetative soul—using emotions as the most obvious example—are acts of the soul, despite the fact that they are “necessarily” followed by some sort of bodily passion. It is the word “necessarily” from the first text cited above that provides much of the payoff for the sake of our discussion.⁹¹ In previous sections we saw Avicenna take pains to distinguish emotions (“primarily of the soul”) from their temperamental effects (“primarily of the body”). What we see here adds to that picture by showing that emotions are part of a class of acts where the effects that are “primarily of the body” are to some extent necessary. Insofar as emotions are acts of the animal soul, they must be followed by changes in the body. We saw in the prior section that the precise physical changes

88 Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 78.19. Galen’s work, *The Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixture of the Body*, was translated into Arabic and available. See Gutas (2010) 807. Such a view is affirmed in the text at Galen, *Capacities* (2013), 386.

89 Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947), 78.14-18.

90 For a discussion of this concept in Aquinas’s theory of emotions, see King (2012), 216.

91 See above at footnote 82. \$

that follow are variable, but now we see that—despite this variability—there must be *some* physical change, or we are no longer talking about the same sort of stat⁹²e.

5.5 Further effects: action-readiness and cognitive influence

Though Avicenna does not draw the connections explicitly, there seems to be some explanatory payoff to his emphasis on emotions' temperamental effects. The first and most obvious is that it helps make sense of how emotions play the role they do in animals and humans, in terms of putting us into states of action-readiness. As we saw in chapter three, emotions are the stage of the motive faculty prior to a practical judgment, which practical judgment leads to concrete action. Emotions merely *incline* towards some object or goal. That inclination, we have seen here, is essentially born out in terms of a state that is “primarily of the soul.” But as a matter of fact, emotions in animals and humans have temperamental effects throughout the body that put the organism, as a whole, into a state of inclination. Though Avicenna is writing far before the distinction between the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems, his descriptions of what emotions do parallel their functions: the sympathetic system pumps blood rapidly to divert resources to muscles and action-oriented organs (as in anger), while once a goal is achieved, the parasympathetic system restores balance (as in joy).⁹³

A second payoff, albeit more tenuous, concerns the effect of emotions on cognition. The effect of emotions on cognitions is stated most bluntly in Avicenna's definition of emotion at the start of his *Healing: Rhetoric*:

The emotions [*al-infi' ālāt*] [...] are states [*aḥwāl*] through which one's judgment differs [*yakhtaliḥ*], through a difference [brought about by] the transformation [*takayyuf*] of the judger [when they are in that emotional state].⁹⁴

This definition occurs at the beginning of a discussion designed to help the rhetorician bring about emotions in the judge and jury, emotions that are suited to garnering sympathy for their defendant, or stoking animosity towards the accused. That this change in judgment is the result of undergoing an emotion helps explain why Avicenna earlier in the same section describes the rhetorician's task as a kind of “subtle manipulation”: to get someone convicted of a crime merely

92 Though Avicenna does not draw this point explicitly, an implication of the fact that emotions necessarily cause things in a body is that states analogous to particular emotions, but in subjects without a body, might not properly be called emotions. Or at the very least, we would need to be aware of the significant difference between emotions that are necessarily followed by a bodily passion, and “emotions” that are not, if we wanted to stretch the terminology that far. Delight of the animal soul and intellectual joy, experienced in this life, with a body, are clearly emotions. But intellectual joy experienced once the rational soul is separated from the body, or the joy experienced by the Necessary Existent, while they could still be called a type of joy, would only be an emotion in a much looser sense. One of the things that seems essential to an emotion (and all other acts of the animal soul, for that matter), is that it has *some* effect on the body. This is presumably why Avicenna, whenever discussing outlier “emotion” states, never uses the standard generic terminology that we see around his discussions of emotions, such as *infi' ālāt*. See the introduction of the thesis for an overview of such terminology.

93 See discussion in Johnston and Olson (2015), chapter 1.

94 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954), 130. This of course parallels Aristotle's own definition of emotions in the Arabic version of his *Rhetoric*: “The passions [*al-' ālām*] are those things which, when the one judging is changed [*yataghayyar*] by them, their judgments differ [*yakhtaliḥ*], and pleasure [*al-ladhdha*] and pain [*al-adhā*] are necessarily involved in their occurrence [*yalzamuḥā*].” See: Aristotle, *Ars rhetorica* (1982), 83.

because the jury is angry with them leaves plenty of room for error, since anger can be stirred up by causes that have nothing to do with their guilt, and then misplaced on the accused. If you become envious towards someone, you might be more likely to inflict the harm of a harsh sentence on them, however unjustified that might be.

However, the mechanism by which emotions “transform” the emoter is not discussed in detail. We know that the transformation is not simply a reference to the evaluative perception that triggered the emotion, since that is prior to the emotion, and we are here talking about an effect of the emotion itself. Moreover, as mentioned in the prior paragraph, emotions don’t always have the same targets as the causes which trigger them: you might be mad about your performance at work one day, and then take this out on your spouse, who had nothing to do with work. What seems more likely is that the general physiological changes which emotions cause, which can affect the body as a whole, cause our judgments to change. For example, cognitive function is affected by the temperament of the brain, and since the body is a connected system, emotions can affect that temperament.⁹⁵ As mentioned, Avicenna does not make this point explicitly, but he seems to have the resources to do so. Of course, emotions do not always affect cognition, nor do they do so in predictable ways. which is perhaps another reason why Avicenna keeps these whole-body temperamental changes distinct from the essence of an emotion.

6. Conclusion

Avicenna’s discussions of the physiological of emotions show a striking level of detail—as he himself reminded us in the text from the end of *Psychology* 4.4—and they help him explain a variety of philosophical issues related to emotions. By separating out temperamental dispositions and effects from that which underlies an occurrent emotion, he isolates the core of an emotion itself. His discussions ground preliminary aspects of moral formation, and help fill out the picture of how emotions prepare us for action. Moreover, physiology helps explain why emotions occur in the face of the same object at some times, while at other times they do not, and why their strength varies when the objects stays the same.

To conclude, we should pause to reflect on the significance of Avicenna’s assertions in his medical writings that there is a strong link between emotions and the vital spirit. For example, in in texts cited in sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, emotions are “linked” to the vital spirit,⁹⁶ in they are “passions” of the vital spirit,⁹⁷ and they are “particularly associated” with the “vital spirit that is in the heart.”⁹⁸ At first glance these descriptors might have be taken to mean that the vital spirit is in some way an organ solely dedicated to emotional functions. Yet, as we have seen, most of what Avicenna has to say about the vital spirit and its relation to emotions could be said of other psychological faculties, and indeed *is* said of other faculties, though not in as much detail. Emotions do supervene on the heart, and the vital spirit *in the heart*. But insofar as the vital spirit throughout the rest of the body facilitates the functioning and communication of various faculties, all the soul’s faculties will all have dispositions and effects in the vital spirit, to some degree or other.

95 Aquinas later says that this is how emotions affect changes in cognition. Discussed at Pickavé (2008), 193.

96 See footnote 10 above. \$

97 See footnote 8 above. \$

98 See footnote 9 above. \$

Finally, what Avicenna in fact says about the dispositions for emotions and effects of emotions in the vital spirit is significant, but it is not the whole story for either emotional dispositions or effects. We are disposed to emotions for cognitive reasons as well as physiological reasons, and while the vital spirit might be the most immediate effects of an emotion, characteristic effects of emotions involve other aspects of the body as well, as discussed in section 5.3 above. Thus, Avicenna manages to unpack the physiological of emotions to the high level of detail that he does, all while keepings these details in their proper place in an overall theory of motivation and action.

III.1 On persuasive/manipulative rhetorical speeches

[129] Let us now discuss the rhetorical speeches by which judges and listeners are manipulated.

That [the type of rhetoric used] can differ according to the level of those judging, in terms of their minds and the sophistication of their beliefs, or the lack thereof, and that is especially the case in deliberations. As for lawsuits/trials, it seems that in them there is more of a dependence on preserved laws than on distinct traits [of the speaker]. So if the rhetorician is cognizant of the state of the judge/audience, and the state of the prosecutor, he benefits from that. For those judging are not all the same in their inclination towards those they like, and those they dislike.

And their judgment about one they bear ill will towards is fixed, in other words, they keep him from peaceful resolution. Likewise, if the judge of the the person who is the subject of the address [i.e., the judge of the defendant] is manipulated towards hatred [of the defendant], he believes the prosecutor, and he hates [the defendant], and [if he is manipulated towards love] he believes the rhetorician and the respect [he proclaims] about [the defendant]. And so forth among the things which incline [the judge] towards [the defendant] and harden him against the prosecutor. Or [another thing which affects judgment is] when [the judge] has a good opinion about the rhetorician [then the judge] trusts in him, on account of what he imagines in terms of his virtue and refinement, or something like that, by which it is probable that he would do good, just like it is probable that he would have scruples with doing the suspicious and harsh. For gentle natures easily do what is gentle, and harsh natures do what is harsh.

And the speaker could achieve persuasion on account of confidence in his practical wisdom, or [confidence] in his virtue, or [confidence] in his good will and friendship. And [arousing] disbelief is on account of the opposite of these. Similarly, telling a falsehood could happen in the deliberations among deliberators, either because of: their ignorance, their wickedness [130] and their love of doing evil to people, or because of they do not care about what is being discussed, so they do not sincerely look into the matter, and they do evil through failure of knowledge.

As for scrutinizing a person and getting to know a person in terms of the strength of their practical wisdom and the integrity of their nature, grasping this is only facilitated through a consideration of the types [of people] given in the chapter on praise and dispraise¹.

As for the state of good-will and friendship, and their relation, we will deal with their types in such a way as will get rid of the cause for the need to know about them [any further] when we mention the emotions. And [emotions] are states through which one's judgment differ, through a difference [consisting of] the transformation of the judger [when they are in that emotional state].²

1 CF

Section II.4 of Avicenna's Rhetoric

2 Aristotle:

فالآلم هي التي حين يتغير الحاكم بسببها تختلف أحكامه، وقد تلزمها اللذة والأذى، وهي الغضب والرحمة والخوف وما كان نحو هذه، ثم اعداد هذه ايضا

So let's begin discussing these states with anger³, and the one who is angry, and the one toward whom anger is directed.⁴ As for anger⁵, it is a psychological pain⁶ owing to a desire⁷ on the part of the person for bringing about a punishment that they see as appropriate because of the thought of a slight or scorn to him, from the one toward whom he is angry. On account of this, anger does not deal with universal humanity, for scorn does not issue from universal humanity, and revenge is not hoped for on account of it, but rather the object⁸ of anger is an individual person or a group of people. And you have learned about what pertains to anger in terms of pleasure⁹, [which pleasure] draws out an increase in the anger.

And as for scorn/disregard¹⁰, it is that which rears its head on account of something said or done [indicating] that one is not deserving of another's concern, or of regard for their honor, and that one's befalling evil is not feared, and that one's good is not wished for.

And scorn/disregard can be divided into three divisions: disdain¹¹, [131] abuse¹², and insult¹³.

Disdain is the doing of that which indicates the worthlessness of the one disdained.

Three important things to discuss:

كيف وبأية حال

مما

على مَنْ

Disposition disposing one towards the emotion

Object of the emotion (typically personal)

Reason for the emotion

Interesting that he skips over the fact that pleasure or pain accompany the emotions. Perhaps because he doesn't think pleasure and pain merely accompany emotions, but are rather an essential component of them?

Keep in mind here that the type of judgments being affected are "for" and "against" someone in a courtroom context. So the point of arousing particular emotions is to get someone too feel good or bad in a general way towards someone. Nothing more specific than this is discussed.

غضب 3

4 Interesting that he skips over Aristotle's statement of intent to analyze each emotion in three different ways.

5 Def: anger

6 'adhā

7 shawq

8 Obj: anger

9 Anger is both pleasant and painful.

10 استحقار

11 استهانة

12 عنت

13 شتيمة

Abuse is dealing with someone in such a way that [the abuser] tries, by intentionally doing or not doing something, to prevent someone [from something] for no other reason than his [own] pleasure¹⁴ with the other's discontent and helplessness. And this is not done except with someone who is considered not suitable for one's concern or respect, as if he were not revered or feared.

And as for the manner of being harmed by insult, and the fact that it does not come about except from disregard, these are two clear phenomena which do not require elucidation. And insulting also is among those things which please¹⁵ the one insulting, on account of the dominance he imagines when he insults, and that which he conceives of in his soul in terms of his being superior to the one insulted in terms of virtue, on account of his being free of that disgrace which he hurls at the other. The young and the rich are excessive insulters for this reason.

And mockery is a combination of abuse and belittlement, or abuse and insult, understood as [will be/is] explained in its place.

And the person who has the least ability to bear¹⁶ external annoyances or the sharpness of anger-inducing things, is the one who considers himself better intrinsically, or due to his power, or some virtue in himself, or [his] authority, as well as those who live in luxury, and those who expect to be honored or given favors and are then disappointed in this, or who encounters, from the one from whom he expects that [honor], belittlement and disregard towards himself or his kinfolk, intentionally from the other.

And the one focused on a pain in his body, or undergoing harm from someone else or some disasters that afflicted him or some mishaps that burdens him, [such a one] is disposed towards anger on account of the least annoyance. So, one who suffers some trial, or fails to reach one of their desired goals, he does not detach himself from the appetite and the [missed] pleasure, and he is struck by and occurrence of anger. Anger comes quickly to the one whom [132] [some other person] makes light of some occurrence belonging to him of physical or psychological harm, or [makes light] of that which concerns one in terms of news about some state, or the presentation of killing, or one [due to some person] paying little mind to his duty in terms of friendship. Similarly, one failing in their hope, the burning in their anger falls upon that which denied him his hope, and even on other things.

And from the [same] genus of insult¹⁷ and scorn¹⁸ is disdain¹⁹ which those who make official judgements about worship and virtue afflict [upon others] or [which is found] in the teaching and learning of some judgement from those who make official judgments, and [this also occurs in their] casting someone out as a sinner.

And the audience/masses frequently mock these [intellectuals] on account of the failure of their [the mass's] imaginations to realize the use in what they are working at, so they attribute to [the

14 Pleasure as a motivating factor

15 Pleasure as caused by or accompanying insult (for the one doing the insulting)

16 dispositional state: anger

17 شتيمة

18 استهانة

19 تحقير

intellectuals] that they are floundering in what their is no use in, and [in which there is] no beneficial power. And if the judge or the scholar [happens to be] clever in their craft, they become angry and grieved [at the mocking from the masses].

And the average folk also are in a different situation, for it might be that [emotional] states compel him be satisfied with securities trusts and favors which they expect on account of the goodness of their keeping promises, and the goodness of their moderation in various matters, insofar as the average folk understand their religion as the charity of giving]help to the poor for their being set aright, in the manner of the creed which it is necessary to follow. So then they endear and seek the sympathy of [one another's] hearts, and they see in their being repelled by [others] a loss and a humiliation.²⁰

And among those things which make a person angry: the breaking of custom in charity, and refraining from repaying the gracious with something gracious. And the manner [is this]: if the repayment is done poorly, and the acceptance of a great amount of kindness [is met with] with evil or ungratefulness, or with the considering vile that the charitable offering and placing it in a position less than what is deserved. And one of these ways of being [a bad repayer] is vile, and it is the breaking of custom, and one is even more vile, and it is failing to repay, and for [yet another] one there is no way to speak of its repugnance, and this is repaying [good] with bad.²¹

And a man might get back at his friend ²²[133] if [the friend] considers it fine to pass over in silence the lovely thing from the other, and especially if there strikes him some misery and it is ignored by him [the friend], and he [the friend] does not get frustrated about it, and does not try to do good by his sharing with him in it [the misery]. Or if need afflicts him, and he is in the midst of its trial, and [the friend] does not say a word to him. And similarly if his place is among the people [the friend is supposed to] take care of, and those whose matter concerns him. And that is because all of this signifies disdain.

And the types of disdain²³ leading to abuse²⁴: disdain for a person himself, distain for the one that some person respects, disdain for the one that the person marvels at, distain for that which brings humiliation on a friend. And from these divisions: the anger of a father towards towards his children, the anger of a female in power over her husband.²⁵

20 No Parallel in Source Text

21 No Parallel in Source Text:

more of a concern for repayment here than in Aristotle

22 CF:

1379b in Greek Aristotle

23 استهانات

24 العنت

25 No Parallel in Source Text:

Unique examples

And belittling each worthy [person] is on account of disdain. And similarly returning the seriousness of a serious person with a joke. And appropriating/determining/excluding the prohibition/deprivation/two holy sites from among the types.²⁶ And being neglectful of a friend to the point where his name or tale is blotted out of memory. Thus has the explanation of that which is related to anger been laid out fully.

So let us move onto explaining the nature of [anger's] opposite²⁷, and it is the slackening of anger²⁸. For example, anger slackens towards one who did not intend to disdain an act of kindness, but [who was simply] absent-minded or made an error; and towards one who passes from anger to torture, such that the pain diverts from the annoyance²⁹; and towards the one who is treated as he treats the other; and towards the one acknowledging [their wrong] and seeking forgiveness via repentance (Similarly/on the other hand, towards the one persistent in denying and disavowing the insolence or slight, such a one brings about more anger in addition to what was already directed towards him.)

And [anger slackens] towards the submissive, humble, yielding, quiet one, [134] who does not take recourse to obstinance or argument, and one retracts solidifies the abating [of anger]³⁰ on account of the shameful acknowledgment [from the other]. And [for example] you might find quarrelsome dogs³¹ [who] when they are prone to attack some [people], some of them [the people] sit down, and some of them hasten as if to fight the dogs, and [the dogs] refrain from the one who is submissive by sitting down, and they attack the one who is making to fight.³²

And anger slackens a lot towards a people that is very cheerful. For the generosity that is perceived in some on account of their festivity, it moves the soul towards something similar in its category, as if cheerfulness is a gift that requires repayment.

26 Arabic Uncertainty:

None of the options here seem to make sense. The bit sandwiched between similar texts in Aristotle is as follows, but does not seem similar to this: "And [they become angry] at those who do good to others if they do not do it also to them; for this, too, is contemptuous, not to think them also worthy of what they do for all [others]."

27 CF:

1380a in Greek Aristotle

28 فتور الغضب

29 No Parallel in Source Text:

Interesting in that it shows how one may move between emotional states

30 السكون

31 CF

1380a in Greek Aristotle

32 No Parallel in Source Text:

The dogs are Aristotelian example, but Avicenna seems to take more interest in unpacking it.

33

And similarly the poor, those whose [emotional] state is distress, and hostages seeking forgiveness, and ones well known for refraining from harm, and avoiding the extreme, and not talking too much, their dangers and their unexpected occurrences born [well] by them [so they are not easily angered]. And similarly the ones who revere [others] and the ones embarrassed by others [they are not easily angered], for anger does not join to reverence or embarrassment.³⁴

And disdain, if it comes from someone shy, it is thought to be a result of their wrath³⁵, so that it is not thought to be purely disdain, but rather it is thought to be emphasis or solidifying, and it is considered something preparing him for anger towards the other person, contrary to scorn.

The one reaching the fall³⁶ does not descend to wrath, and sadness does not strike him, and there is no pain felt with the awareness of his [being an object of] disdain.³⁷ And likewise [is] the disdain that is in the case of the place of retirement³⁸, for it signifies the taking pleasure of the one doing the disdaining in the proximity of the one who is disdained and his mixing with him. And this is on account of his strength of character, not on account of his scorn.

The one who is ignored might not get angry³⁹ on account of his hoping for the good of the one who ignores him. And that is like when one does an anger-causing action mixed with preventing some lack, and a known service.⁴⁰

33 No Parallel in Source Text:

Interesting in that it shows how perceiving a virtue in someone else can shift your emotional state towards them.

34 No Parallel in Source Text:

Interesting in that it shows how certain emotions are incompatible with one another.

35 sukht

36 Arabic Uncertainty:

Very vague

37 No Parallel in Source Text:

Interesting because it shows how you can be aware of something that normally causes an emotion, but due to extenuating circumstances, not feel it.

38 Arabic Uncertainty:

Not sure what this means, so the sentence doesn't make sense.

39 No Parallel in Source Text:

You can be aware of something that normally causes anger, but have it not cause anger in that moment because of some other psychological fact.

40 i.e., you hope for someone's best even though they ignore you, because you want to get something from them.

And when some time passes⁴¹ from the angering occurrence, its impact abates, so that one does not get angry, or anger abates from them.

[135] And among those things which lessen anger: triumph, taking revenge, and the pouring out of agonies on the one's causing anger, even if from heaven. And the one acknowledging their mistake and their crime [slackens anger], [as well as] and making known his admission of [not in dictionary⁴²], and the one deserving the shame he is experiencing, for he does not have recourse in his chastisement to denial, especially when there are first punishments in terms of speech, that is, he agrees to the badness of his deed, and he is chastised about it. And [the kind of person who] gets angry in this sort of case in one who is plunged into testiness.⁴³

And that which lessens the feeling of anger⁴⁴ at some bad thing is one's being ignorant of its offense, and not being mindful of the difference between good and evil.⁴⁵ And the death of the angering one, and his reaching the other house [lessens anger also], on account of that which pulls out the resentment from the heart, to say nothing of anger.⁴⁶

III.2 On the types of friendship, and hope and fear, and courage and cowardice

Friendliness⁴⁷ is the state of a person insofar as they wish the good for another person, for the sake of that other person, and not for their own sake. For he has some trait/disposition [malakah] motivating him to do the good for that other. The friend is one who both loves and is loved, and who shares in happiness and adversity, for the sake of his friend [136], not for his own sake.

The verification of friendship appears when there is joy at what makes the friend happy, and sadness and what is bad for him. For the enemy [does] the opposite of that. Those people who love you are those who do good either to you, or to one of yours, for some reason, and especially when they do some big thing in terms of their charity from the goodness of soul, absolutely, without finding it difficult.⁴⁸ And similarly those who hope for something similar for them. Similarly, the beloved of the beloved [is one that you feel friendship towards], and [one feels

41 CF

1380b in Greek Aristotle

42 Arabic Uncertainty:

Not in dictionary

43 Arabic Uncertainty:

Alternative: Indeed, one gets angry about this sort of person on account of one who steals/kills out of maliciousness.

Which one makes more sense?

44 See Wehr 1231 for this definition

45 No Parallel in Source Text:

Highlighting the cognitive causes of emotions.

46 No Parallel in Source Text

47 الصداقة

48 The emotion is stronger when it is done more naturally/habitually.

friendship for] the enemy of [your enemy] who hates [your] enemy, or who [your] enemy [likewise] hates.

[One has friendliness toward] those who covet others and are coveted⁴⁹, like the generous and the courageous and the upright. And those who are content with that which they gain by the work of themselves, and those who strip ⁵⁰away the objects of greed from others, like those who make a living by plundering [one's] enemies. ⁵¹Likewise the sincere of heart are loved, on account of their curbing one's pains and protecting one from harms. And similarly people of virtue who do without others, and do not venture upon another's hospitality without their permission⁵², and who are conscious of those who do them a great kindness when they agree to accept.

And similarly the victorious, those who are delightful in their companionship, on account of what is expected of their being forbearing, and [what is expected of] their help, and [those who are delightful] on account of the [delightful] person worrying about their unkempt hair⁵³, and their lack of being scolding at failure⁵⁴, and the strength of the belief [in] the friends [that] that scolding is in a lax manner. And the opposite of this is those who are quarrelsome, hostile, and critical. And [this is true] even if each [of the above-mentioned unpleasant tendencies] is not on account of being bad-tempered, but on account of pity. And among them [who we feel friendship toward] are the hardy, those who bear well under various types of punishment, and those who are in bonds, for they [the punishers] only do that [punish/bind them] on account of the baseness of their [the punishers'] morals.⁵⁵

49 Arabic Uncertainty:

The examples that follow clearly relate to Aristotle's saying that we love those who wish good for others, so the choice of "covet" here is very odd. Why would we feel friendship towards those who covet?

Perhaps more related to 1381b, line 24 in translation.

50 Arabic Uncertainty:

Feel like this is the correct Arabic, but it is odd enough to bear double-checking.

51 No Parallel in Source Text:

Unique examples in this whole paragraph.

52 No Parallel in Source Text:

Interesting focus on hospitality, easy to see a slightly different context at work here. Not that Greeks did not care about hospitality.

53 more generally, having a good appearance?

54 CF

1381b in Greek Aristotle (126.16 in English)

55 Arabic Uncertainty:

Not totally clear who the subject of all these verbs are, or if the person in question is good or bad. My translation makes assumptions.

[137] Among those who are loved are those who praise excessively and flatter, and those who are well adorned in terms of clothes, and those who are not reproachful, and not critical, and those who do not hold onto anger in their hearts, and those who abhor obstinacy.

And when this kind of habituation is present in a person, each one of them hopes for something similar to that in themselves.

And similarly those who have control over their tongues⁵⁶, for they do not talk nonsense nor do they abound in mentioning evil. For something like this reason there is that which the knot/contract [?] of the creator [?] weakens, when it [?] is accepting [of an order] with tranquility and subservience.⁵⁷ And the one who is a partner in trade and custom [is one who is loved]⁵⁸.

And one who thinks a person to be virtuous or admirable, and who is friendly to him, he feels love towards the one he is thinking of. Similarly the one giving respect and honor [is lovable].

And similarly one who you would like that—were he jealous of you, but not reaching the point of lying in wait to assassinate you—that you, were not aware of it, you would not like his jealousy towards you⁵⁹. And the one who is considered, if he protects [someone from] evil befalling them, he is exposed to love. Similarly the one you love that he loves you.

And among those who you love also is one who offers his resources to those near and far without flattering or doing a favor. And among them is one who holds firm to the goodness of his restraint [in relation to] what befalls him from the evil deeds of the [some other] person. Therefore the shameless loves the tribe because he protects⁶⁰ him.

As for the kinds of friendship, there are three: the first is companionship, and it is a state that takes root between two people on account of the length of time they spend seeing one another; the second is sociability/intimacy, and it is delight at meeting [the other person], and the third is a bond or partnership, either in kinship, as in a relationship by marriage, or in benefaction, as in the exchanging of presents.

⁵⁶ CF:

1381b in Greek Aristotle (126.18 in English)

⁵⁷ Arabic Uncertainty:

Just difficult and confusing.

⁵⁸ CF:

1381b in Greek Aristotle (126.20 in English)

⁵⁹ CF:

1381b in Greek Aristotle (126.24 in English)

⁶⁰ Note that “protection” was a topic towards the end of the last paragraph, too.

And as for enmity⁶¹, its states are known from the states of friendship, according to the manner of the contrary. And among the causes of enmity and hatred are: anger⁶². But anger is only for a person, [138] and hatred might be for a species/group, and what is similar to a species, like your hatred for a thief of any kind. And from these types it is possible that we would classify someone a friend and someone an enemy, and by means of [these types] it is possible that we would place enmity and hatred for an adversary in the soul of the judge or the hearer by means of [rhetorical] manipulation⁶³, and/or love for the speaker and an inclination towards him.

And as for **fear**⁶⁴, it is a pain⁶⁵ and agitation⁶⁶ of the soul, on account of imagining an expected, debilitating evil either reaching [the level of] corruption or not approaching it. Not every evil is feared. For jealousy or a person's being licentious are among the sort of things that are not feared. Among evil things, that which is feared is that which will harm that one who it occurs to with corruption or pain, and it [the object of fear] is something in the future. As for one who dies, or that which happens [unexpectedly], fear is not properly spoken of with respect to it. And it the object of fear] is, despite its being in the future, expected, that is, close to happening. For that which is far off is not feared. For that reason not everyone fears death, but rather only he fears it who approaches it. So objects of fear, then, are those things which have the ability to inflict this sort of harm. And undertaking some dangerous thing is an action which either gets rid of the proximity of the harm, or intensifies its closeness.

And among the things that cause fear⁶⁷, there is signification⁶⁸, and that is the sight of something similar to the harm, and its having happened to another. And the one from whom came a feared thing [is a cause of fear], and one who experienced harm frequently he is also feared. The one who is powerful who does not defend except with obsequiousness [i.e., being given to him first?] is feared, even if he has not perpetrated any harm, especially when he is [known to be] unjust, despite [having not done anything yet].

And that which comes suddenly⁶⁹, [139] unlike those things which are thought about [beforehand], is feared on account of its surprising the person. And this sudden thing, as long as it does not shake him, is [only a] feared thing in view of its startling him, especially when he is aware of some [malicious] purpose behind it.

61 العداوة

62 Similar to Aristotle, but noteworthy in that some emotions are causes of other emotions.

63 استدراج

key word keeps coming up

64 الخوف

65 *huzn*

66 *ikhṭilāt*

67 CF

1382a, towards end, in Greek Aristotle

68 *i'atibār*

69 No Parallel in Source Text:

This whole paragraph.

And the one who is quarrelsome/fighting insofar as he does not bear well with cooperation, he is also feared. And the high of hand are feared, especially if one is aware of some sort of [malicious] purpose from them.

And among those who one fears is the one who is most virtuous, and he is feared by the inferior. And the friends of the unjustly treated. And enemies. And those who are quick to cause harm to you. And those who think carefully, from among the sly, for they are more harmful than the quick to anger, and they are those whose intentions are not known very quickly, and they do not weary of length [of time when it comes to] their having patience with enmity⁷⁰.

And among those things which are feared is that which it is not easy to achieve preventing it, or exchanging it with its opposite, and that for which there is no one to triumph over it.

And as for the one who is disposed to fear⁷¹, he is the one who is in one of these states, for he is expecting a looming evil, with no one to triumph over it, and no way of changing it.

And those who do not fear are the rich, those who have mastery over many, and servants. Therefore you see them vilifying, and shouting, and putting people down, and taking possession of things; especially in the age of youth, and [in the] health of the body and its power, and those who have a lot of followers and enough friends.

And taking refuge in counsel is among the signs of fear.

One who wants to deepen fear, or instill it in the soul or the imagination⁷², let him consider each thing we have said, and let him make use of what is suitable.

As for **courage**⁷³: it is a trait [malakah] by which a person is good at hoping for deliverance⁷⁴, and prepared for the occurrence of that which is hateful. It is as if the hateful thing in the view of the courageous person does not exist, or is far off.

And each one [of those courageous persons] [140] has courage in view of his belief that the causes of his deliverance are near; and in view of his skill at thinking that he can overcome the

70 CF:

1382b in Greek Aristotle, 129.11 in English

71 Dispositions can be psychological as well as physiological

72 DB: Is the imagination ever used as a generic term for even the motive faculties? If not, the fact that he would suggest instilling fear "in the imagination" (Rhetoric 139) suggests that emotions have as their subject something broader than just the appetites.

73 الشجاعة

74 Some emotions function as dispositions for other emotions.

expected evil, and the strength of his souls feeling the ability of his displacing the loathsome thing by [means of?] a ⁷⁵comparable competitor⁷⁶.

Then the great amount of supporters [makes someone courageous], and their strength, altogether, [or] also freedom from injustice along with a paucity of suffering [i.e., if one hasn't gone through too much suffering to be discouraged], if they occur together, they make the person courageous. For insofar as he has not been wronged he thinks well, and insofar as he has not suffered injustice he is daring in competition. For he is not able to undertake the battle and and that by which there is suffering of body or soul⁷⁷.

And whenever there is [one who has] strength, and another person has become to him a friend, and he is free from facing harm from him [from the powerful one] towards him [the less-powerful friend], and indeed, on the contrary, he continues to be favored by the [strong] person, either in actively or passively—as for in action, they might help him with money, and the passivity, it is like undergoing severe things while he returns to the friend with advantages— this sort of person is very courageous towards one who harms him on account of his friends, whose relation to him is as we have described.

Then the one who is at rest, by means of nobility in rank, or excellence in lineage, or the two of them together, [he is] daring [and] bold, on account of his scorning those below him.

And the things towards which one is courageous are things that do not reach the point of causing harm, and for which one expects⁷⁸ some sort of remedy. And [as for] matters of suffering for the sake of deliverance sometimes, the one experienced in fearful matters of suffering might venture them for the sake of his people, and sometimes might avoid them for the sake of his people. And that which has not been experienced is something towards which one is courageous also, when its end/result is not conceived of.

And the experienced person is courageous towards that which is feared, if there is met for it a support on whose ability he depends, like one who is courageous about sailing the sea, [141] having confidence in the wise captain.

And one might be courageous towards a fearful thing on account of the person's knowing⁷⁹ about the deliverance of a group of those suffering it from it, though the [frightful] person himself would not [otherwise] strike fear in the person.⁸⁰

75 Arabic Uncertainty:

not sure of the the sense of *احلال* here

76 qirn

77 JM Help: this seems backwards... why is the courageous person not able to do this?

78 Cognitively penetrable

79 Cognitively penetrable

80 JM Help: if I have correctly understood the first part of this, the second is hard to fit with it.

And when the ruler is under some different rulership [and] he thinks that he is better and higher in age standing than the other, he is courageous towards him. And likewise if he sees himself as a peer to him.

And as for when the higher one is more virtuous and greater in the abundance of money, or [in] the strength of his ruthlessness, or the ability of his supporters and the throng of his country and the greatness of its numbers, or in something which is dangerous from that group, then he is a feared, awe-inspiring person. And when the person who is ruled is of good conduct, someone who has himself well in order in terms of that which is between him and God, he also is little concerned about the one dominating him. Similarly, if the wise, and the jurists, and the orators present good opinions about him, and give a good account about him, then they do not worry about him.⁸¹

Among the things that give courage is the burning of anger; for when one is warm, it emboldens the cowardly, strengthens the weak, and the person is moved the the side of the bold.⁸² And among the things that bring about this sort of anger is injustice falling upon the innocent, for one judges favorably of God's backing him up.⁸³

Likewise [the sort of things that make one confident are] the trust in feeling safe from the [possibility of] death of the undertaking, or [trust] in an increase of the benefiting in it in proportion to the harm, or the harm's occurring on account of the remedy.

III.3 On the types of embarrassment⁸⁴, and the opposite of embarrassment, and kindness⁸⁵.

Let us discuss shame⁸⁶ and disgrace⁸⁷ and their causes.

Shame and embarrassment are a sadness/pain and an agitation⁸⁸ because of some evil deed by which the person becomes blameworthy, whether its occurrence preceded, or is present, or is expected.⁸⁹

81 No Parallel in Source Text:

Unique examples.

82 No Parallel in Source Text:

Unique level of specificity: Causal relation between emotions, explained in physiological terms

83 No Parallel in Source Text:

Unique examples

84 استحياء

85 المنة

86 الخجل

87 افتضاح

88 Pain in definition of an emotion again.

89 Obviously involves cognition/imagination.

And shamelessness is a moral ⁹⁰trait⁹¹ with which a person doesn't care about a lapse of honor, and cares not about the spreading of disrepute [about themselves].

Things which cause disgrace are evil things of this description: like running away from the army, and taking out your weapon sheepishly, and like the objection to/refusal of a trust/deposit, with timidity, and like the committing of injustice, and similarly the relations/intercourse of an adulterer, and their having intercourse in places of suspicion, and a greedy desire for shameful things and the pursuing of worldly things, as in plundering the down and out and exhuming the grave-coverings of the dead, and stinginess with wealth, and asking the poor [for money], and borrowing to the point of shame, and refusing one asking for a gift with entreaties, and conflating a gift with a claim, so that one makes a claim when given a gift, and [claims to] give a gift when doing a duty [i.e., a claim made upon] them.

And among [the disgraceful things] there is extolling greediness, or criticizing the unsuccessful, and [when] one is a flatterer who neglects spreading the virtues of a person which are beyond what is necessary, and [when] one is a pretender by being sad for what saddens another over and above that which is hidden in [the pretender's] soul.

And among the disgraceful things there is anxiety/regret about what is easy [143] from among the pain or a harm that afflicts the old, or the lazy, or the powerful, or the weak [and which they manage to bear], and likewise reproaching those who do well for their actions or feelings, for that is bad and [a signifier of trying to act with] superiority, for these things are a sign of smallness of soul.

And likewise the glorying of the soul in lying and boasting, and claiming that which someone else does for one's own on account of egoism, for that is among the signs of vainglory.

And among those who are disgraceful are those who follow the course of [i.e., run with, or are similar to] those [disgraceful ones], even if they don't do the [exact] deed. And the one who follows their course is one who is satisfied with their approval, and who enters into their advice, and inclines to their companionship.

And among shameful things are feelings of submissiveness that a person has in his soul and inner self, the a person's being okay with being ridiculed for foul things, and his enemies exposing him to foul treatments, and his enduring evil happening to him willingly or unwillingly, on account of his keenness and greediness/covetousness and his expecting something good in return for it. And a lot of endurance is cowardice, not courage, and that is like resisting retaliation, and what is similar to that. Then disgrace or shame, in general, is conceived of on account of the fleeting of honor and the descending of blame, and the loosening of tongues about one, with blame in the eyes of someone who [the disgraced person] cares about.

90 Seems to use *khalif* and *malakah* interchangeably to describe these states. Makes it hard to know if they are things that occur every once and a while, or if they are more like character *traits*

91 *khalq*

As for the passing away of honor among the shameless/jokers and boys, well, it is something that they are not ashamed of. For the ones they are embarrassed in front of are the ones they admire, or those who admire the embarrassed one, and he is one who prefers the embarrassed one to be respected or revered by them, and he is prepared by what he has obtained in terms of his honor,⁹² and that is on account of [144] his preferring him who respects him, or who is in need of him, or who is praising him, or who is his peer. Or maybe he strives towards the peer as long as he does not strive towards another. And one whom someone is embarrassed around is someone known as having sound judgment, known for the strength of their belief, or an older person, or an educated person.

⁹³

And dishonor before [another's] eyes is more severe than dishonor that was been reported, and dishonor made public is more severe than dishonor kept secret. And dishonor in front of those who are close and friends is greater than dishonor before those who are far away and left behind.

And dishonor before those who do not hold the place the evaluator⁹⁴ and educator for him [who is dishonored]⁹⁵ is greater than dishonor before those standing in the position of the evaluator and educator [of the one who is dishonored]. For such a person is like one being discovered by one who does not hold the place of the educated, and [by one] who acted chummy/presumptuous with with him [the disgraced one] and [the disgraced one] is like one who shrinks from the one who causes him to be in that place, and he does not disclose to him the core aspects of his mind, or the hidden things or his inner self, and he hates that he [the one who he is ashamed in front of] is aware of his mistakes, yelling at him, or not yelling at him, whether he is right or wrong, after there is some [offense] imagined. And not everyone who has knowledge [of someone's shameful deeds] is chummy/presumptuous towards him, for many who are aware [of shameful deeds] by means of friendship are leaders of the stumbles/mistakes at the military post, and [are ones] charged with investigating the wrongdoers.

And dishonor before your peers/those like you is the greatest kind of dishonor. And the peers of those [peers], one is not shamed before them because they themselves are the community [wherein one feels] shame, but rather [one is ashamed of] their broadcasting that which one is ashamed of, so that it reaches those before whom one is ashamed. And they are those who mock friendships and who are quarrelsome with acquaintances.

⁹² Arabic Uncertainty

⁹³ CF:

104.15 Arabic Aristotle, perhaps also 106.19

⁹⁴ Arabic Uncertainty:

This whole paragraph is hard to get the sense of. I think it is saying in some way that you are not only embarrassed by those above you, but also by those below you. Meaning that it is obvious you'll be embarrassed by teachers, but being unmasked by those you are above is shameful too. This seems especially true based on what comes next. (CF 104.15 Arabic Aristotle edition, perhaps also 106.19)

⁹⁵ Arabic Uncertainty:

not sure about the particle here

And one might be embarrassed before one who still considers the person [doer of the shameful things] great, and who has despised him with scorn, like how one is embarrassed before the one who marvels at the person [who did the shameful thing], and before the one with whom the renewal of friendship is desired, and the continuance of communication with him, and before the one who one will eventually meet with.

And old acquaintances who [145] have not uncovered the person in what had passed [are people one feels ashamed in front of].

And one is not merely embarrassed by a shameful deed and the obscene gain, but also from the evidence of it and its signs, and by the one who gives voice to them.

As for one who one is not ashamed in front of, that is the sincere friend from among [one's] brothers, and the people one looks down on from among the riffraff that act like beasts, and children, and strangers that have no learning. And shame before one you know is true shame, while before foreigners it is like mere opinion.⁹⁶

And it is not necessary to repeat the speech about recalling what can intensify shame [among the audience].

And since we have spoken about proper shame and shamelessness, let us discuss the thankfulness⁹⁷ of kindness and the the ungratefulness of it [i.e., in relation to kindness], for it is connected with it.

Kindness is something by which someone is called kind. And it is something beneficial which, if it happens by one person to another, it is necessary that that other person be thankful towards him, or mindful [of him], or even more thankful, or compliant of soul.

And the types of kindness [are as follows]: either a service, that is, any physical, beneficial deed; or a boon, like the giving of a jewel from which one can benefit; both of which, were they not given, the benefit itself [thereby acquired] would not possibly be grasped.

And this sort of service or boon is only kindness if one does not want with it anything other than the very giving itself [i.e., no strings attached]. And great kindness is that which meets a severe need, or at a time in which the aid is difficult to replicate, or when the giver⁹⁸ is singled out by his giving it, [i.e.] no one else did it, or he is the first one who bestowed [a benefit], [and perhaps] then someone else did it, and [the one on whom it is bestowed] is made even more comfortable by it.

96 No Parallel in Source Text

The last line is interesting in that it suggests there can be more or less appropriate types of shame.

97 شكر المنة وكفرانها

is he modifying the subject there, to make it seem more emotion-related?

98 م ن ن

And need, it is either an object of desire which one longs to obtain, or an object of desire whose loss one is sad about, like a lover.⁹⁹ Especially what is longed for in misery, either because it [would] dispel misery, or because the desire is for the thing in such a way that the depression and sadness of the misery do not diminish the desire.

And the impact¹⁰⁰ [146] of kindness among the recipients of kindness in poverty and the ones driven to poverty is greater. And similarly among the afflicted, and the forgotten, and those hiding from enemies and adversaries, and those who are in similar positions, and among those who are in a worse state. And the most kind person is one who does not want any acknowledgement for their kindness, and does not conceal the spread of their good deed, for concealing the doing of good is a kind of pride¹⁰¹, just as broadcasting it is loathsome.

And this is what is put forth in stressing kindness.

And what is put forth for the sake of making kindness look false and diminishing it is saying: you wanted nothing by your good deed except a display from which you benefited, and that you didn't complete the kindness, and you failed in some duty incumbent upon you in something similar,¹⁰² since you did not achieve by that the dispelling of the need, and it compelled its acceptance in view of a disposition/property,¹⁰³ you did not do the thing intentionally, but rather by coincidence or necessity, or on account of a desire for repayment, or without knowing or without will¹⁰⁴. For all of that is the sort of thing that together weakens [the feeling of] kindness. And if [some deed] were on account of necessity, kindness is lessened with it. And [a good deed] could be voluntary by necessity, as when the will is compelled,¹⁰⁵ and that is when someone is compelled to choose to do some kindness. And a kind deed could be without any will, and that is when the compelled person has their money taken from them, and the other person squanders it, and likewise that can happen with knowledge, or without knowledge.

99 No Parallel in Source Text

The Arabic Aristotle more or less equates desire with pain here, but Avicenna does not do the same.

100 mawqa'

101 No Parallel in Source Text

In other words, don't be so quiet about your deed for the wrong reasons.

102 CF:

1385b in Greek Aristotle

103 Arabic Uncertainty:

Especially the second half of the sentence. Clearly related to 1385b

104 No Parallel in Source Text

What is the difference between intention and will? See 2.5, probably.

105 No Parallel in Source Text

Interesting point: our will is still a "will" even when it is compelled. Clearly will does not mean "free will"

And these types are beneficial for accusing and making a plea. And the known signs [used for] causing gratitude with a kindness, or strengthening such a reaction,¹⁰⁶ is when the coming forth of [the kindness/benefit] is on account of will and love, and that there is no slighting in it, and that nothing like that has come forth from them [the one offering the benefit] to the enemies of the one being benefited. For if two enemies share in a kindness [147], it indicates that necessity caused that kindness. And similarly if kind one does a similar [kindness] to his own enemy [this would have been on account of necessity]. And likewise when charity is not done to someone a similar position of deserving as the one given to, or above him, [then this increases the sense of kindness]; For [when it is given to someone more deserving] that suggests that the kindness did not come forth on account of generosity.¹⁰⁷ For were one's charity a charity intended for the sake of kindness and an act pleasing to God, the judgment of the enemy about it would not be his judgment, and the other deserving person would not fail to attain it like him.¹⁰⁸

And likewise if the kindness is tarnished with evil that diminishes it. For then there is no goal by the kindness corresponding to the need. And acknowledging the kindness demands acknowledging a need, and no one one acknowledges a need for evil.

III.4 On concern for a man and pity for him, and envy and revenge, and jealousy, and zeal and scorn.

Let us mention concern¹⁰⁹/anxiety for another, and this is close to pity¹¹⁰, or the concern of the heart for a person by means of care, and [let us mention] the one who is cared about.

Concern is a pain¹¹¹ that strikes a person on account of something [148] corrupting or saddening that happened to another person without the other person deserving it, and without it being expected. The person feeling concern is the one who has this pain¹¹² on account of what happened to the other person, or something arrived at on account of that happening.

As for those who are passing away, one does not have concern for what happens to them, because what occurred to them, it is not reasonable for it to be said about it that it is unexpected.

106 No Parallel in Source Text

107 Arabic Uncertainty:

I'm having a supply a lot here... does it seem right?

108 Arabic Uncertainty:

I feel like the idea here is that true generosity doesn't take things like enemies or deserving into account, but I don't see that playing out in the prior sentences... perhaps I'm not following the grammar.

109 اهتمام

110 This looks non-Aristotelian in terms of vocabulary, but the Arabic Rhetoric actually leads with hamm as well.

111 Pain involved in the definition of an emotion.

112 Pain involved in the definition of an emotion.

Likewise those who are happy of luck, one does not have concern for them, because one does not associated anything bad with them, [nor] the encountering of evil.

And those who do not have concern, or who do not care [about things], they are those who are accustomed to the enduring of evils on account of age, or on account of a plethora of experience. And the ones abiding in good fortune, and whose souls are good, do not get stressed out by a circumstance.

And the ones well known for [their] ascension to office and progress [are ones that do not have concern]. And the educated people about whom good thought prevails. And those upon whose beloved ancestors befell some evils [are those who do not feel pity]. And the ones moved by happenings of courage, like the angry and the heart-hearted. And likewise those who despise and those who revile [do not have concern], and [likewise] their counterparts, fearful slaves and miserable, downtrodden folks [do not have concern], for they have that which diverts from caring for others, rather, the moderate person between [those two states] is the one who has concern.

113

And one is not concerned for the unknown [and] despised, for they [exist] in the mass of the unknown. And the powerful ones/tyrants do not care about individuals, on account of supposing about them that one is not different than the others.

As for the reasons on account of which one has concern, one may be apprised of them on account of the definition of concern. And these reasons are like perishing from torture, and starvation, and strenuous effort, and old age, and illness, and destitution, and bad luck, and lack of supporters, and especially when evil strikes someone expecting¹¹⁴ good instead of that evil, [149] and when the evil [being experienced] is free from the mixture of the good, or if the time of enjoyment of the mixture of the good [in with the evil] has passed away.

And one has concern for those who are acquaintances, partners, and fellow-workers.

And as for the type of person who is like oneself, such as a child, it is not said that the person “has concern” for a pain that afflicts them, just as it is not said that one “has concern” for what happens to oneself. For it is not said that a person pities oneself,¹¹⁵ or is preoccupied with himself, but rather [what happens then] is the intensification of fear, not “care” or “pity.” On account of this is what is said about one that his eye did not shed a tear at his son being on the

113 Causal relation between different emotions. Some push out others.

114 Cognitively penetrable/beliefs as a cause

Expectation is a key to many of these emotions, which shows how they are tied up with belief.

115 No Parallel in Source Text

Distinguishing pity from fear in this way is not in Aristotle

The object is important for the nature of the emotion. If the object is determined by the perception, then the perception is integral to the emotion. Or the appetite itself would have to be intentional.

brink of destruction, while [nevertheless] he saw a friend shamed by poverty, and he cried for him. The intensity [of the fear] rids the mind of pity, and causes one to forget about care for the other.¹¹⁶

And among the ones that one has concern for [there are those] who have various types of characters, including peers, and different types of moral characters, and [people with various] ages and ranks, and due to the influence of beauty.

¹¹⁷

And everything whose happening is feared by a person, it is something which causes him concern if it befalls [his] brothers.

Therefore one does not have concern for those living in opulence or old age.¹¹⁸

And among those whom one has concern for are the sort who are unjustly treated, and the tormented, those sorely tried and tested, even when one does not see what afflicts them nor fully ascertained their trial. For his [outer] appearance represents his [inner], and one seeing his shape is like the one seeing his state.

Also, signs of the harms can cause concern, if they indicate the happening of harm, even if it has not happened yet. For this reason a trial/tribulation that it not deserved can cause concern. And it seems like this pain is contrary, that is, a counterpart in some way, to the pain that strikes [a person] on account of a success that is not deserved, and this is what is called in this book indignation¹¹⁹ [jaza'], even though [150] it is not a true contrary. For the source of each one [pity and indignation] is an honorable disposition.¹²⁰ And the general idea that captures both of them [is that] something of good or evil comes in each case to one to one not deserving it.

And the occurrence of what one does not deserve causes sadness¹²¹ justifiably. However if, if there is no known cause for the [thing that befalls], but rather it is a happening along the lines of of providence and divine decree¹²², then the sadness towards it is moderate. For it is not

¹¹⁶ Causal relation between different emotions. Some push out others.

¹¹⁷ Arabic Uncertainty:

Not sure about this whole section. Not sure what it is trying to get at, so the particulars are hard to pin down.

¹¹⁸ Arabic Uncertainty:

Why are these form six masdars?

¹¹⁹ جزع

¹²⁰ Emotions are true contraries if they stem from opposite dispositions. Avicenna is mostly just agreeing with Aristotle here, but Avicenna makes the distinctions clearer.

It almost seems that emotions are not able to be distinguished from one another insofar as they are pains... we need to know about their causes/objects to really distinguish them.

¹²¹ The verb for sadness is being used in the context of envy and indignation. It seems that this is sometimes a generic way of referring to any kind of emotional pain.

¹²² No Parallel in Source Text

Unique examples

unreasonable that someone says, “the good that comes to him suddenly would not be decreed for him except deservedly, and the evil which is decreed for him which comes to him suddenly is only on account of his deserving it,” and the sadness thereby diminishes, even the going away [of the evil] isn’t necessarily going to be sudden or entire. However, providence and decree are not limited only to what is deserving¹²³, although they are imagined as such, but it is well known that the matter of providence and decree is a murky matter entrusted to God.

And it is stated in the primary teaching¹²⁴: as for those who arrive at that without inevitability or providence. It seems that the expression “without” is extraneous, owing to negligence on the part of the translators or others, or it seems that its meaning is “without inevitability from the ones acquiring [it], and without a determination on their part,” so it is as if it said: without expectation and determination on the part of people.

And that which is opposite of concern [i.e., pity] and indignation, which have been mentioned, is envy¹²⁵. For concern is a pain¹²⁶ that strikes a person on account of an evil that befalls [some other] person, and [the pain] strikes because the [other] person is undeserving [of the pain], and on account of that person. Envy is a pain¹²⁷ that strikes one on account of a good befalling someone who deserves it, and on account of the fact that it befell him. And as for indignation which has been mentioned, it is like a mean between the two, [though] indignation is closer to concern, and since it is closer to concern it is like a contrary to jealousy.¹²⁸

And it is not necessary [151] to get into a discussion also about contraries¹²⁹, trying to give rise to the facts, not [just] opinions. For it has been said about this what is sufficient for this section.

123 Arabic Uncertainty:

can I translate the fa as contrastive here?

This seems contradictory to what he has just said. He should have said something like, “nevertheless...”

124 Presumably the Arabic Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but need to comb through it to locate this reference.

125 الحسد

126 Pain central to this passion.

127 Pain central to this passion.

128 No Parallel in Source Text

This is in the spirit of Aristotle, but more explicitly stated.

129 Not sure why he says this when he has said that envy is opposite of pity/indignation. Perhaps he is saying that he does not need to get into the sort of systematic ethical discussion that Aristotle starts to get into at 1386b27.

Aristotle starts talking about not only how these feelings are contraries, but about how they come from contrary dispositions. But Avicenna talks about this elsewhere, in the medical texts.

Or, it could be that he just thinks Aristotle’s text is repeating itself here, and he has spoken enough about the sense in which these are contraries.

Envy is only envy, when the sadness¹³⁰ in something is because of a good that befell another. And if the sadness is not because of this, but rather because of a lack of a similar [good] with respect to the one who is sad, this is not jealousy. [Rather] it is something very close to being necessary, [different] dispositions are not free of it. For each person is sad for the gifts and blessings that pass him by which are wont to exist for another.

Similarly, [it is not envy] if the sadness is because of a fear that strikes a person on account of the success of an enemy, understanding by that that his success makes him wider in terms of power, and enables him in acts of hostility.

And along these lines, a joy¹³¹ strikes the person on account of an evil happening to those who deserve it, like those who kill people and obliterate monuments and live in the land attempting to corrupt [the land]. And another [natural] type of joy is at the failure of one who deserves [failure] and the bad state of one who does well; and these two are contraries: one comes from a virtuous state, the other from vice.¹³²

And there are two kinds of sadness¹³³: a sadness which occurs account of the good state of one who deserves it, for the sake of the goodness of the state, and this is envy. And there is a sadness that occurs on account of the good state of one who does not deserve it, because he does not deserve it, and this is vengeance or wrath. And these two are contraries. One of the stems from vice, the other from virtue.¹³⁴

And these¹³⁵ are different compositions of sadness and joy, and good and bad, and merit and non-merit.

¹³⁶

And the envious person is envious toward every good thing, even charity and beauty and suchlike. As for the wrathful¹³⁷ one, he is not jealous towards virtuous things, because the the meaning behind the sort of thing he feels [does not include reference to] the existence of a

130 Interesting: envy and indignation are both kinds of sadness. What distinguishes them is their causes and objects.

131 Not everything discussed here is a pain. You can also feel joy at someone getting what they deserve.

CF just before 1387a

132 This makes me think we're no longer talking about natural virtues: one depends on a good nature, one depends on bad. So when did the topic switch?

133 Huzn, similar to gham, being used in a generic way.

134 This seems like the sort of discussion he said he did NOT need to engage in a couple paragraphs ago, related to Aristotle 1386b27

135 CF:

151.14 in Avicenna's Rhetoric

136 No Parallel in Source Text

Again, this is in the spirit of Aristotle, but Avicenna makes it more clear that he has in mind something compositional when describing all these emotions

137 ناقم

“virtue without deserving.” [152] For a non-virtuous person is not gifted virtue¹³⁸. Rather, [the wrathful one] is wrathful towards external goods [received without deserving]. For the non-virtuous person does not deserve them, and the non-virtuous person is granted them, yet only the best sort of people deserve them.

Likewise [a virtuous person] is not sad about good things occurring by nature such as loveliness or beauty, nor about inherited goods that are not acquired recently, for he sees these things as a fixed right. And similarly when one does acquire something recently, [but] he is an authority or [the authority’s] subordinate. For even though [such a] one might not deserve such good things on account of [their] virtue, it is as though this were merited to them from long ago¹³⁹ [and we accept this fiction] on account of power and authority. And one those [who] one is not wrathful towards [is such] because they are among those who who possess something from of old, although it is acquired recently¹⁴⁰, and some of them because [they possess something] that is not acquired recently, but rather belongs to the person as by right.

And the amount of merit in every person is not the same¹⁴¹, and each person is not deserved of every good, but rather each person is suited to a particular good, and he is wrathful if it flits away. For an ascetic is not entitled to be thought lovely or good on account of the beauty of clothing or armament.

Likewise the one who considers excessive palaces/columns of troops and whatever is like that is not suited to that which is exquisite of ease. For the excessive it is fitting one who¹⁴² afterwards¹⁴³ resembles one whose state is like the poor, to the end that he is acquainted with his ease.

Likewise the base does not deserve victory over the highborn, especially if they are both involved in¹⁴⁴ one religious denomination¹⁴⁵. For this reason there are examples of these states

138 That would be unjust, but since it doesn’t occur, there is no injustice for the wrathful person to feel indignant toward.

139 Arabic Uncertainty:

Any better translation for this adverb?

140 Arabic Uncertainty:

What sort of thing could he be talking about here? The general idea of newly rich being more obnoxious is in the Aristotle, but what is this “old and new” bit?

141 No Parallel in Source Text

This whole discussion of merit

142 Arabic Uncertainty:

Difficult vocabulary, not sure what is being said.

143 ba’dū

144 Arabic Uncertainty:

I think I have the translation right, but the meaning is odd.

145 No Parallel in Source Text

Unique examples

which are reckoned among the effects of divine decree, and [examples] that are not [reckoned] among the effects of divine decree. And were that not the case [i.e., that divine decree acts in various ways] the impotent would not rule over the powerful, and the rich would not despise the poor¹⁴⁶. And the issues from this chapter related [153] to divine decree¹⁴⁷ are two: one of them is that one who does not deserve it obtains victory over a great danger, and the second is that a deserving, virtuous person fails in the thing he deserves.

And the wrath of the wrathful one intensifies towards examples of both cases if he himself is a lover of honor. For the lover of honor is more attentive to merit, or lack thereof.

For this reason the one content with worldly stuff¹⁴⁸, and relying on deception, on which he bases his life, who does not pay attention to blame, he is not “wrathful,” because such people do not pay attention to what someone deserves. Rather, the objects of their jealousy are those on whom befall some good, and due to that they [those content with worldly stuff] are in [the same] category as the people who are jealous.

And the one who is different in category, it is as though he is not an object of jealousy; and likewise with the one who is different in relation/property, or age, or profession, or rank, or wealth. If what distinguishes levels is far away, envy abates. For if they are not equal of leveling the shared sense, but they are comparable, then they will also be envious of one another.

And the jealous person is the one who fails in a goal, even though he got close to it.

Therefore there is that which multiplies jealousy among those who are ¹⁴⁹capable¹⁵⁰. For one who knows is more jealous towards a knower than one who does not know. And one who does great things is more jealous toward the one who surpasses him than one who does not even try. For in such cases [noticing] likeness or comparison is inescapable. And the most jealous one is the lover of respect, and, in short, the one who loves honor, on account of what we have said. And likewise those ones dressing up with finery and riches. For dressing up is a feature of those who put on airs about their respectability.

And likewise for everything deemed good an observer is jealous, especially if the good thing is among those things that the jealous person seeks.

146 The first is an example of the topsy-turvy things that happen thanks to divine decree, the second is what we feel when we have earned something.

147 No Parallel in Source Text

All this talk about divine decree and its relation to our emotions.

148 Arabic Uncertainty:

Is this a technical term?

149 CF

1387b.20 in Greek Aristotle

150 No Parallel in Source Text:

Avicenna develops this idea that competent people more easily experience jealousy more thoroughly.

And you can tell from this who/what the objects¹⁵¹ of envy are; and there is no need to repeat mention of it, on account of what has been said.

[154] As for those whom people do not envy: those who are dying first in terms of time, those who are perishing in a miserable way, those who are in a far away place who one is cut off from, like those living at the Pillars of Heracles, for no one from these [i.e., Eastern] countries envies them. And the severely punished [are not envied], nor the insignificant, nor those with whom there is no comparison, but one envies one whom it is appropriate [to say] that he is a rival¹⁵², and [whom] it is appropriate [to say] that they have in common some love or desire.

And the envied good is something which the jealous person expects, or that he had at one time. For such a reason is the fact that the older of two youths envies the younger of them if [the younger] prospers, since [the old thinks] he had the right in what [the younger] prospered. Likewise one who squandered something envies the one who does things properly, and likewise the one who only obtains the good with effort envies the one for whom obtaining the good was easy. And in general if he saw himself worthy of something like that which has come sooner to someone else. However when [people] are in different stations, then there is not jealousy.

So with these types, the rhetorician is able to arouse vengeance, jealousy, sadness, concern, comfort/cheer¹⁵³, and other such emotions.

And there is something related to vengeance: it is zeal, and it is also from the set¹⁵⁴ of good [emotions]. And zeal is a pain¹⁵⁵ that strikes [a person] at the flitting away of goods that a person deserves [along with] others attaining them, and there is in a attainment of the others an indication of the permissibility/possibility of attaining it. For the possibility of attaining it is in the path of/category of deserving.¹⁵⁶

This kind of zeal only strikes one who loves the good, and is grieved at its passing, and sees that [the good] is something honored, [155] and it [zeal] does not occur except to the great of soul, and the ones who are concerned with higher matters.¹⁵⁷

151 Objects were worked into the discussion of causes, I think.
152 CF

1387b.20 in Greek Aristotle
153 تسليية

When did he discuss this in this text? Does he discuss it anywhere else?

154 Need to clarify the principle for distinguishing good and bad emotions. He says above that they come from good or bad dispositions, but that is not illuminating.

155 Again, pain is common/central to most of these emotions.

156 Arabic Uncertainty:

This does not seem like a good summary of zeal/emulation as it is later described. I must be mistranslating.

157 Emotions dependent on psychological dispositions, not just bodily temperaments.

The type of people who most have zeal are the one whose predecessors, or companions, or peers, had an easy time with such a good, and especially when the good is among those things which is respected, and by which honor is obtained—like money or beauty, not like health, for health does not always expose a person to honor; rather, one is zealous¹⁵⁸ of things like courage, and wisdom, and leadership; for these are things which are made possible by the virtues, good will and acquired knowledge that belong to the honorable person.¹⁵⁹

So zeal¹⁶⁰ then only is directed towards those who have these virtues and what are like them, and on all whose friendship is desired on account of virtue, and to the ones impressed by [the virtuous], and the one praising [the virtuous]¹⁶¹.

And the ones who are scorned [by a zealous person] are those who are not as good as the ones they are zealous towards, and who are opposed to [the ones they are zealous towards] and fight against them. For scorn is opposed to zeal.

So ¹⁶²zeal¹⁶³ comes from zeal¹⁶⁴ [towards the one to-be-emulated], and scorn comes from a lack of zeal¹⁶⁵ [towards the underwhelming person]. And if scorn is opposed to ¹⁶⁶zeal¹⁶⁷, then the contrary movement stirs it up [and the contrary pain] increases it¹⁶⁸. The one scorned by the possessor of zeal is moved on account of his [the scorner's] zeal when he is scorned.¹⁶⁹

¹⁵⁸ *yaghāru*

¹⁵⁹ Arabic Uncertainty:

I'm not sure what sort of causal relationship this is describing, but it seems important, since it is a clarification unique to Avicenna.

¹⁶⁰ ghayrah

¹⁶¹ CF:

^{119.15} in Arabic Aristotle

¹⁶² No Parallel in Source Text

Has he actually explained the difference between these two? Maybe he is noticing that "zeal/emulation" as it is described in Rhetoric is more like an action, and he is trying to focus on the state behind the action.

¹⁶³ hamiyyah

¹⁶⁴ ghayrah

¹⁶⁵ ghayrah

¹⁶⁶ Arabic Uncertainty:

This seems like it could be a hugely important causal clarification, but it is difficult to follow.

¹⁶⁷ hamiyyah

¹⁶⁸ No Parallel in Source Text

¹⁶⁹ Arabic Uncertainty:

Is the idea that a zealous person's scorn moves the scorned person, presumably to some good?

As for the one whom zeal strikes, he is the one who lacks the good that he is zealous towards. As for the one who is scorned¹⁷⁰ and whom one does not feel zealous towards, he is the one to whom good luck gives something without deserving it, and without its coming about on account of firmness [of character] and stern effort. Suchlike is what is scorned, and [scorn] is based on the weakness of the foundation of his condition.¹⁷¹

III.5 On the foundations of the differences of people in respect of morals.

It is appropriate now to discuss the states that incline, by way of [discussing] each moral disposition, with respect to traits/occurrences¹⁷² [of the just discussed emotions] and concerns, and according to ages, and according to limits/definitions/intensities¹⁷³ and according to souls.

As for accidents, these are like anger and inclination¹⁷⁴. As for concerns this is like the preference of a soul for one kind among many things, such as ruling, or politics, or asceticism; and religions and the practical arts enter into this [concept]. As for ages there is adolescence, youth, and the graybeard. As for [limits/definitions/intensities] there is the noble, the easy/insignificant and the strong¹⁷⁵/patient. As for the types of souls there is the Arabic and the foreign, and the great and the small.

Let us begin with ages. The movement of appetite¹⁷⁶ might be more prevalent in the young¹⁷⁷, and they have the vigor for it¹⁷⁸, and their appetite is limited to matters encompassing the body, and

170 CF:

120.5 in Arabic Aristotle

171 Arabic Uncertainty:

I think this is further describing scorn, rather than being a concluding thought, but I'm really stretching the sense of it to mean something like "you feel scorn for someone because they are weak of character."

172 عوارض

Same word as in Psychology IV.4

173 Arabic Uncertainty:

See below when this is taken as a generic germ for noble/easy/strong. Hard to see what definition fits.

174 الغضب والميل

I think he is distinguishing irascible from concupiscible here, though why he uses ميل when he typically does not, I am not sure.

175 Arabic Uncertainty:

This category and its constituents makes no sense to me. Would you read these as a set in any standard way?

176 شهوة

177 al-ghalmān

178 Arabic Uncertainty:

related to beauty, such as women and clothes and perfume. And they are quick of transforming and changing ¹⁷⁹[for] boredom has power over them, and they desire immoderately and [then] they grow bored quickly, on account of the keenness of their passions/loves and [their passions'] restlessness and the non-abundance of their beliefs. [157] And their beliefs are like a deceptive thirst that makes use of¹⁸⁰ a cold wind.

And anger comes upon them quickly, and it is strong in them, especially on account of their love for honor¹⁸¹, such that they do not bear injury well. And their love for honor is immoderate in them, and their love for dominance is an inclination of theirs towards renown and rank. And their love for that is stronger than their love for money. Indeed their desire for money is fairly well-behaved/moderate, for they have not [yet] suffered from need, nor have they [had to] endure poverty.

And their natures are prone to believing quickly¹⁸² whatever falls at their feet on account of what is in them of optimism¹⁸³, and a lack of suspicion, and wideness of hope. And all of that follows on account of their hot temperament¹⁸⁴, which resemble the intoxicated, [and their temperament] strengthens the soul very much¹⁸⁵.

Therefore they do not go far astray, and they are not beaten down, and they seek the best in life on account of hope. For the future is in their power, while the past is in the power of the old. For since there is not much of the past belonging to them, their experience is small, and on account of the generosity of their belief, tricking them is easy.

The bold¹⁸⁶ are like this, too. Therefore both of these types [the young and the bold] have quickness towards anger in common. So they are optimistic, and quick to anger. Generosity of

Other options: they are empowered by it/have power over it, but both seem counter-intuitive

179 Is he just referring to their preferences, or their physical constitutions, too.

180 **Arabic Uncertainty**:

Any idea what this phrase could mean? Seems very idiomatic.

In the Arabic Aristotle it reflects the Greek: "their desires are like the thirst that afflict the sick"

181 No Parallel in Source Text:

The irascible faculty depends upon the passion of the prior concupiscible faculty. This is much clearer here than in Aristotle.

182 سرعة التصديق

183 حسن الظن

184 Their psychological dispositions depend on the temperaments of the body.

This is in the spirit of Aristotle, but Avicenna makes the causal connection more clear. The final bit about the temperament "strengthening the soul" is unique to Avicenna.

185 CF

121.11 in Arabic Aristotle

186 شجاعان

thought does away with anxiety/indignation. And the strengthening of anger emboldens the natural disposition, so that a lack of fear follows¹⁸⁷, not on account of generosity of thought only, but also because of the strength of heart. So fear and anger do not come together. And it seems that optimism¹⁸⁸ is a part of courage.

And shame is a dominant force on the young, for they have not yet plunged into shameful obscenities, and they remain according to nature. And they accuse themselves out of a lack of experience in themselves with knowledge and experience.

And the bigness of their souls¹⁸⁹ follows upon the generosity of their thought [their hopefulness?]. And they do not think that they will be deprived, since they have not yet experienced harms. On account of this is the fact that their concerns are turned [158] towards great things, and beliefs abound in their souls.

And their inclination towards the beneficial [al-nafi‘] thing that they have encountered is stronger than their inclination toward the lovely thing [al-jamīl] that¹⁹⁰ they are not yet acquainted with.¹⁹¹ And indeed their thought and the notions in their souls and held fixedly on the most beneficial thing. For of they good they only know the beneficial that is before them on account of their age, and it is as if it [the beneficial good] is pleasure and what goes along with it, and [their] thought [is] based upon nature [fiṭrah]¹⁹². And this thought is attracted to the beneficial, which is [beneficial] in relation to the thinker and present to him As for that which pulls towards the lovely, it is virtue, and not nature.¹⁹³

It is in this way that this type [of character] needs to be understood.

187 Causal relation between emotions. Also basically in Aristotle.

188 I think this must mean “optimistic,” since when talking about the old he calls them سوء الظن to refer to their cynicism

Now that that is clarified, why is this “part of” courage?

189 Aristotle: magnanimity

190 The Arabic Aristotle seems to botch the Greek, saying that the young pursue the “good” rather than the “beneficial.” Avicenna flips this around in a way that is more in line with Aristotle’s sense.

But this is one of the clearest statements I’ve read that pleasure/benefit are those things which nature goes towards, whereas the good is only pursued by virtue.

191 CF

122.5 in Arabic Aristotle

192 In Black’s “Estimation” she shows how in Salvation Avicenna clarifies that this type of “nature” corresponds to the estimative faculty.

193 No Parallel in Source Text:

A clear statement that there is one type of pleasure [the beneficial] that estimation judges by nature, and virtue is something distinct from this.

As for you¹⁹⁴**th**¹⁹⁵, they are strong of love for their family and brothers and relatives, and that is because they are spirited, and they love gaiety. And gaiety is only realized by health and friendship together.

And their goal in what they prefer is not true benefit, but rather benefit leading to pleasure. Therefore their friendship-making is for pleasure, not for a benefit in intellectual interests.¹⁹⁶ So they love friends, in order that they might make merry with them.

And their mistake-making in reaching [something] to their benefit, and in everything [for that matter], is greater than the mistakes of the old in [seeking benefit], because they are excessive and they are not moderate. And excess is that which is in error.¹⁹⁷

And their thinking¹⁹⁸ themselves as comprehending all things¹⁹⁹ is owing to the severity of their immoderation.

And on account of their natures is [their] committing of public injustice, even though shameful disgrace is returned to them [for such acts], because they tend by nature to bad actions, on account of their being by nature very strong in terms of anger, and low on fear.

Nevertheless pity is strong in them, on account of their believing the one known to be wronged to be good. And they are, on account of the paucity of their guiltiness and deception, hostile to deceptive evils.

And they are lovers of jest and joking, on account of [their] love of joy and gaiety, and [the] weakness of their deliberative faculty which, if it were strong, [their] care [would rather] falls upon serious matters.

194 No Parallel in Source Text:

How is this different, in terms of age, than the group just discussed, al-ghalmān? He discusses both remaining kinds below (old, prime of life) so it is possible he is just making further points about the young (i.e., he is still talking about the same group)

195 al-ahdāth

196 No Parallel in Source Text:

Uses benefit as a genus term that includes pleasurable benefit and intellectual benefit [true benefit].

How does this square with the fact that intellectual benefit is, ultimately, pleasurable? Is the different just in terms of what is sought? i.e., you cannot get to true pleasure by just seeking pleasure?

197 No Parallel in Source Text:

Is he possibly incorporating Aristotle's ethics here? Is Aristotle ever this theoretical in this section? No he is not. This feels straight out of the NE.

198 Okay, now he is back to where Aristotle is at the end of his section on the young. So everything from al-ahdath up until this point has been unique to Avicenna.

199 Cognition influenced by disposition.

[159] **As for the old**, most of their moral dispositions²⁰⁰ are opposite of them [the young]. Their moral dispositions²⁰¹ are weak²⁰² and grumpy, and they do not give into anything on account of all that they have experienced, and all that has happened to them in terms of deception and error—thus they are on high alert for such things—and all the evils they have fallen into, and [even] those they have intended [to commit].

It is on account of their moral dispositions that they do not ever speak about anything with decisive speech. And if they judge, they judge on the basis of what they have experienced²⁰⁴. And everything in their view is according to a prior judgement, or there is not judgement about it [in their eyes] ever. And it is as if, owing to the abundance of their experience, they never try anything [new], and that is on account of their skepticism about anything that has no precedent in their eyes, and in which they are like the unlearned. And their concern for praise and blame is little. And when they talk about something in the future, they speak about it with misgivings, attaching the expressions, “possibly,” and “perhaps.”

And their moral dispositions are bad,²⁰⁵ on account of their²⁰⁶ pessimism²⁰⁷ [about everything, i.e.,]. And it is not typical of them to go very far into good will or hatred, except about things necessitating it. And you see them in their love to be like those who are angry, and in their anger like those who love.²⁰⁸

And they are small of soul [i.e., non-magnanimous] and belittling [of others]. They don’t act in the manner of the resolute and determined person, [acting] as though they might do badly.

Therefore their desire for things is weak, except for what is connected with livelihood/income, for they are intent on that, out of a fear for the realization of death. And on account of that their souls do not rise up to generosity and chivalry, on account of stinginess with respect to worldly goods. And experiences have made them conscious of the difficulty of acquiring [goods], and the bad result of losing [them] and of [their] destruction.

And cowardice rules over them. And they are good at cautioning about what there is, on account of all the experiences they have benefited from. And they are opposite of youth in terms of how

200 akhlāqihim

201 akhlāquhum

202 i.e., not as passionate as the young

203 sakhīfah

204 Cognition influenced by disposition.

205 CF

123.9 in Arabic Aristotle

206 Is Aristotle this clear about the connection between belief and moral dispositions? Are moral dispositions just habits of emotion?

207 sū’ zunihim

208 CF

151.4 in English Aristotle

they are motivated [fī al-maʿānī al-muḥarrikah], indeed they incline towards rest on account of the coldness of their temperament.²⁰⁹ Therefore they are cowardly and fearful.

And because of cowardice and fear their greed is stronger. And also [they are greedy] on account of their excessive love for life, because of its getting near to vanishing in them.²¹⁰

And their desire has ceased [160] for women and visible sights, on account of the abating of their need for them. And [this is] despite the fact that they do indeed [continue to] desire, and especially [do they desire] food.

And they incline towards justice, and they love just leaders/imams, and this is on account of their cowardice and weakness. For the inclination towards justice is on account of love of peace. And love of peace is either on account of excellence, or smallness of soul. For virtue is impelled towards it, and smallness of soul also necessitates it.²¹¹ So in whoever it is not virtue impelling him towards it, there is nothing else impelling him except smallness of soul.

And [the old] prefer the beneficial, and they do not prefer the noble²¹². And all of that is on account of their love of themselves. For love of self inclines one towards the beneficial, rather than the noble. For the beneficial is commensurate with the person himself, while the noble is in accordance with the other.²¹³ And they are shameless, not being embarrassed, for they do not have any inclination towards the noble, rather their disposition stops upon the beneficial. Therefore they little esteem the noble.

And on account of their moral dispositions [they have] a paucity of hopefulness²¹⁴, since they have found failure in the world more often than success. And [what we call] experience is in accordance with what happens most often, and belief in them is in accordance with experience²¹⁵.

209 Similar to Aristotle, but evidence that dispositions follow temperaments.

210 Arabic Uncertainty:

"getting near to" is relying on a secondary definition from HW, and "life" is a guess... does this seem okay?

Same word for "life" at end of 160

211 No Parallel in Source Text:

Interesting examples.

Also shows that different dispositions can strive for the same object.

212 No Parallel in Source Text:

Again, distinction between beneficial and noble. Avicenna expends energy delineating what types of goods each virtue inclines towards.

213 Benefit is relative to the person, good does not just concern personal interests.

214 Hope is described as an emotion, so there must be a difference between emotional dispositions, temperaments, and occurrent emotions.

215 Relation of dispositions to belief. It seems that dispositions do not just affect emotions.

And rather than taking pleasure in hoping, they take pleasure in remembering. And on account of the paucity of their hopefulness, their cowardice grows.

And their anger is sharp [yet] weak²¹⁶. The sharpness is due to quickness of feeling, as if they are sick, and as for the weakness [of the anger], it is due to the weakness of their natural disposition.²¹⁷

Their appetitive power is dwindling, or abating, and their appetite is towards the beneficial, not the pleasurable,²¹⁸ therefore it is thought about them that they are self-controlled. Yet they are self-controlled by necessity, not one account of virtue. And their desire for seeking the virtuous and the beneficial declines, on account of their deeming short the time of life²¹⁹.

And they associate [161] with people who are adherents to what they prefer, on account of their [having] settled dispositions²²⁰ for the sake of which they do what they do, not [with people] insofar as they [the others] are adherents to thoughts that are in accord with what is beneficial.²²¹

Their wont is to feign the dispositions of the pure of heart, even though what they do is for certain ends and contrivances. For when they feign as pure of heart, they seek some benefit, but they do not acknowledge it. They are enormous seekers of acquiring benefits²²², but by means of skill and deceit and cunning, not by means of things done in the open, and the doing of that which one is embarrassed by, contrary to the wont of the young.

And they may have compassion [by for reasons] contrary to [the reasons behind] the compassion of the young.²²³ For the young are compassionate on account of their love for people, or their belief in [the other's] complaints. These ones are compassionate on account of the weakness of their own selves, and their imagining the evil complained about and witnessed as if it were happening to them.

216 CF

152.13 in English Aristotle

217 No Parallel in Source Text:

He is providing argument/details where Aristotle merely asserted.

218 Same terms used here as Arabic Aristotle. Pleasurable ≠ beneficial ≠ virtuous

219 Same word for "life" I could not identify at the end of 159, but the usage here is more clear.

220 No Parallel in Source Text:

As you get old, your أحلاق settle down.

221 No Parallel in Source Text:

I think this means that even though old people only seek the beneficial, they do not seek to associate with people who do likewise. Rather, in their relations they just look for people like themselves.

222 But on the previous page he said they're not big seekers of فائد so that must be different than the نافع

223 Again, different dispositions, same outcome.

Along with that they are patient in the face of harms, not worried. And they are not jokers, for joking is incompatible with seriousness, and different than patience.

As for those in the **prime of aging**²²⁴, and they are those who have reached their strongest, and have not passed over [it], their dispositions are a mean²²⁵ between the two previously mentioned dispositions: between destructive courage and cowardice, and between believing everything and considering everything to be false.

Rather, they are courageous insofar as it is appropriate, and they believe things insofar as it is appropriate. And their concerns are a mixture of [being concerned with] the beneficial and the noble, and of seriousness and jesting. For they are self-controlled along with courageous. As for the young, they have courage along with voracity. Likewise, the old have cowardice along with continence.

The beginning of these years is from thirty to thirty five, and their completion is at fifty.
226

[162] As for those people of noble descent who possess a [good] lineage, they greatly desire honor, striving to resemble their ancestors. And it is thought [by them] that everyone who is older is more illustrious and greater, and therefore they desire rank and honor. Therefore they tend towards pride and presumptuousness and self-control²²⁷.

Nevertheless, their honor compels them towards justice, and that is the case at least as long as honor still remains in them, and the passage of time has not dispelled their habits inherited from their predecessors.

Then eventually they break down with the passage of time, on account of their lack of humility for [submitting to] education. And their seeking high office²²⁸ [is] on account of decline owing to deviance, and [their being involved in] industry, and and base profits. And when time encroaches upon them, they continue breaking down, and provisions²²⁹ and competencies fall away from them, and they go on as idiots, or the worst of the lazy.

عنقوان التشيخ 224

225 Might make sense why Avicenna doesn't need to discuss NE, if the main point of its ethical sections is addressed here.

226 No Parallel in Source Text:

Aristotle distinguishes between the prime of the body and the prime of the mind... Avicenna does not.

ربط الجأش 227

this is in Wehr

228 Lane says that

اعتلاء

Is the same meaning as form I for ل و ع

229 Arabic Uncertainty:

"Numbers" doesn't make sense, but I cannot think of anything else.

As for the dispositions of the rich: [they are characterized by] domineering, scorning people, engaging audaciously in insults, and puffed-up thoughts about themselves, as if they are victorious in all good things, and they never take note of [those in] slavery or servitude. For they are luxuriously equipped with the good life, swaggering about in a good state. And they love are lovers of praise and opulence, owing to the amount of both [praise and opulence] that they are accustomed to. And their won't is to be jealous of everyone, as if everyone were jealous of them for their lot.

Therefore one of them [i.e., wife of Hieron, from source text] considers, in terms of the virtues of wisdom—owing to their need for the wealthy, and their suffering poverty—that the sage is perceptive of [all] states,²³⁰ not thinking badly about people, not doing badly to them through domineering judgement. And the doing bad of the wealthy increases in them weakness of judgement on account of their belittling the need for it.

And their good qualities resemble the good qualities of women

Moreover, the one who has a history of wealth is more high minded than one who has newly acquired it, who may have suffered ignominy prior to his wealth, and in whom smallness of soul may have crept in.

[163] And the wealthy resemble the young in [their] committing manifest acts of injustice without a care, as if money protects them from blemish.

And in them grow strong the dispositions inclining [one] towards the direction of power. And among the dispositions ²³¹inclining²³² [one] towards the direction of power are: that which is more base, and that is [the disposition] which exchanges the good of power for the increase of acquisition, and there is that which is more sagacious, such as love of seeking excellence. For the one among them [the wealthy] who is concerned with higher things, uses his power for excellence. And these are the ones who love honor. And they are superior in terms of dispositions, and better equipped of thought²³³, and they are more capable than those inclining towards the acquisition of goods, because their activities of power are those that are in accordance with superiority and honor and augustness.

As for acquisitiveness and seeking plenty□□—in terms of [mere] quantity□□—these are due to weakness. For whenever the soul is stronger, it is more inclined towards living well and pride. And those ones acquire, by the power of their soul, excellence of mind, and they refrain from laboriously seeking the highest place, and therefore they see no need for haughtiness—on

230 No Parallel in Source Text:

The spirit of Aristotle's text is that some think the rich are better than the wise because the wise beg from the rich (CF 127.14 in Arabic Aristotle). So not sure where this is coming from. Seems like he is saying the opposite.

231 الاخلاق المائلة

232 Dispositions incline a person in various ways

233 Good morals go alongside good thought.

account of their [strength of] soul²³⁴—for they are moderate, the ones of good character in society. They do not strive for vile injustice, for if they do injustice, they do it on a great scale.

As for the ones made recently [in terms of their wealth], their dispositions are as follows: comfort-seeking, pleasure-enjoying, presumptuous, [and] having little concern [for others], owing to a great amount of capability [of taking care of themselves]. And they are serious lovers of God, trusting in him, trusting in providence, because they are used to benefiting from luck, without hard work.²³⁵

And the states contrary to these can be made known from the states of those [just mentioned].

Hence²³⁶, the benefit [sought] in persuasive speech is the attainment of persuasion. And persuasion will not occur [164] except when an answer is brought to an end, and speech is completed. And the individual is difficult to silence, and to prevent his broadcasting, especially in persuasive matters.

So it is even more important—in terms of completing the arrangement for the sake of persuasive speech—the appointing of a judge that reproofs the one committing [some act] from his committing it, and the one doing badly from his doing badly, along with his having total power over his speech, not being hindered or proceeding on to idle prattle. And it is necessary that he indeed exert restraint on the participation of his audience in the prattling of the speaker.²³⁷ And [it is important for the judge to also restrain] the testimony of the listeners from the outset so that [one] is not connected to [any particular] inclination.²³⁸

So it is fitting then that there is there a speaker, and a judge, and an audience. And if that is the case, then it is necessary that the rhetorician knows²³⁹ about the types that pick out the emotions and moral dispositions.

234 No Parallel in Source Text:

Strong souls are good souls. Does “strong soul” just mean “good dispositions,” or is it a separate way of understanding humans? Doesn’t seem like this just means “magnanimous,” which was “big of soul”

235 No Parallel in Source Text:

Is he being scathing here?

236 Here picks up the beginning of II.18 in Aristotle’s Greek

But this particular paragraph doesn’t seem to correspond.

237 No Parallel in Source Text:

Unique way of describing what conditions are needed for persuasion. Though this could be from a much earlier or later section of Rhetoric.

238 **Arabic Uncertainty**:

Hard to make this fit with the preceding parts of the paragraph.

239 CF

129.10 in Arabic Aristotle

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