Varieties of Animal and Human Emotions in Avicenna's Psychology

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For Avicenna, the broadest way of understanding what emotions are in the psychological literature is as actualizations of the motive faculty. In order to understand the significance of this specification, we need to understand what a motive faculty is, in general, and distinguish sub-varieties of motive faculty from one another. As we will see, Avicenna builds upon the Aristotelian idea that to be a motive faculty is to be a moved-mover, which means to be something *caused by* an evaluative judgment about an object, and *the cause of* action with respect to that object. Moved-movers can cause different sorts of action, but the primary way of distinguishing moved-movers is by the sort of evaluative judgments to which they are in response. So, ultimately for the sake of understanding how emotions fit into the picture, this chapter will unpack varieties of motive faculty in Avicenna's psychological texts with respect to their cognitive causes. In an effort to see the nuances of Avicenna's approach to these issues, we will follow the progression of Avicenna's main texts concerning them as closely as possible.

As we will see, there is no single category in Avicenna's thought that corresponds to our modern category for emotions. Rather, the sort of phenomena we would call emotions come up as examples of different types of moved-movers, and the terminology most reflective of Avicenna's writings that we could use to refer to them would be as "inclinations" of the animal motive faculty. The animal motive faculty inclines towards action, and Avicenna classifies these inclinations according to the judgments that give rise to them.

texts? lit usually implies 2ndary

Aristotle ref?

respond?

Arabic important here!

I. Aristotelian Background for the Concept of "Moved-Mover"

Avicenna's discussion of the motive faculty, in which emotions are discussed, is an elaboration of the psychological terrain circumscribed by Aristotle in *De Anima* 3.9-11. At the start of 3.9 Aristotle broadly divides animal and human psychological faculties into two kinds: those that enable cognition, and those that enable voluntary motion.[1] Aristotle spent most of the prior part of *De Anima* discussing faculties associated with cognition, and he now turns to consider how voluntary movement comes about.

Voluntary motion for Aristotle involves four things: two causes of movement, the means of movement, and the moving subject. In the following ~~key source~~ text, Aristotle initially says there are "three factors," but he then specifies that the first factor is in fact of of "two kinds":

> But movement involves three factors: first the moving cause, secondly the means by which it produces movement, and thirdly the thing moved. The moving cause is of two kinds: one is unmoved and the other both moves and is moved. The former is the practical good, while that which both moves and is moved is the appetite (for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement), and the thing moved is the animal.[2]

The last two factors involved in voluntary motion mentioned in the first line are the most straightforward: in the case of animal motion, the subject of movement is the whole animal, and the means of movement are the various organs and muscles that operate by pushing and pulling. In this text, Aristotle argues that there must be a central axis for all this pushing and pulling, and later commentators understood him to be indicating that that is the heart.[3]

Prior to the means and the subject of motion is the cause of motion, which Aristotle breaks down into the practical good and appetite. Aristotle does not explain what he means by "practical good" in this context, but Themistius interprets him to simply mean a good that is relevant to and

1 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.9, 432b.
2 Ibid., 3.10, 433b.
3 Themistius, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's* De Anima, 2:223.

within reach of some agent, as opposed to goodness in some unqualified and universal sense.[4] Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias understands the cognitive starting point of movement to mean some external object understood as something to be pursued or avoided.[5] This would make a "practical good" any specific object, understood in such a way as to be relevant to appetite. For example, not the good, but a good, like food; and not just food, but food grasped as pleasant or nutritious. The reason the practical good is an "unmoved-mover" is because it is the end of action. In a commentary attributed to John Philoponus, we read that God is also an unmoved-mover in this sense: not by being changed, but by being the goal towards which changeable things direct their actions.[6] So the practical good is an unmoved-mover because an object, when evaluated in a certain light, can be the goal for motion.

Appetite, on the other hand, is a cause of motion that is itself a kind of movement. Aristotle himself glosses what he means by "moved mover" as follows: "for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement."[7] The first half of this gloss simply tells us that appetite is one of the causes of motion, the second half tells us that appetite causes motion by itself being a kind of motion, or change. Just like how with the practical good the sense in which it was "unmoved" helped us understand why it was a mover, so here the sense in which appetite is a change helps us understand why it is a mover.

John Philoponus attempts to explain the core of what it is to be a moved-mover when he says that appetite is a change "insofar as it reaches out."[8] This is an appeal to the origins of the word

4 Ibid., 2:220.
5 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *The* De Anima *of Alexander of Aphrodisias: A Translation and Commentary*, 98, section 2.89.
6 (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *"PHILOPONUS" On Aristotle On the Soul 3.9-13 with STEPHANUS On Aristotle On Interpretation*, 39, 587.5ff.
7 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.10, 433b.
8 (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *"PHILOPONUS" On Aristotle On the Soul 3.9-13 with STEPHANUS On Aristotle On Interpretation*, 41, 591.10ff.

appetite (or *orexis*). As Martha Nussbaum relates, prior to Aristotle the verb *orego* was fairly common outside of philosophical literature, and was used to refer to a literal reaching out (with one's hand, for example) towards some physical object (like a cup).[9] Within philosophical literature, this literal usage was fairly uncommon prior to Aristotle, and the noun *orexis* is undocumented before Aristotle, in philosophical texts or otherwise. Aristotle is obviously not using *orexis* in this context to refer to the literal, external reaching, since he is focused on the internal causes of motion, rather than motion itself. So Nussbaum considers it a major contribution of Aristotle's to use *orexis* to refer to an *inner* reaching out, which is the cause for action in the more literal, prior sense of the verb. If we are talking about an appetite to avoid, rather than to pursue, then the distance of Aristotle's usage from the literal sense of *orego* is even more clear.

Aristotle is brief is his description of what an appetite is, but his commentators, and a moment's introspection, make clear the sort of phenomena he is attempting to single out. Appetite is some sort of inner impulse which precedes and partially explains voluntary movement, in response to an object that has been evaluated in some way. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle further subdivides appetite into concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), irascible appetite (*thumos*), which are moved-movers in response to objects of the sensitive soul, and will or choice (*bouleisis*), which is in response to an object of thought[10]. But he is less concerned in this text to define and distinguish these appetites from one another than to clarify the role of appetite in general as a cause of movement.

One ambiguity in this discussion is whether the "unmoved-mover" should be thought of as the external object, or the cognitive act which evaluates the external object in such a way as to

9 Nussbaum, "The Common Explanation of Animal Motion," 130–31.
10 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.9, 432b.

give rise to appetite. Towards the end of the section on voluntary movement, Aristotle seems to identify it with the later, saying "the cognitive faculty is not moved but remains still."[11] But, of course, cognition is a kind of change, so what must be meant here is the the object, *as presented by some cognitive, evaluative act,* is the end which to which appetite responds, and it does not have to undergo any further change in order to serve as end. The process of cognition is not the object of appetite, but is rather a necessary condition for the object to be relevant to appetite. In other words, one reaches out not for the thought of their object-as-pleasant, but rather just for the pleasant object. The thought of the object-as-pleasant merely occasions that reaching out. why hyphens?

II. Sketching Motive Faculties and Principles in *Healing: Psychology*

Now that we have seen the four factors involved in voluntary motion in Aristotle, and the significance of the category "moved-mover" as a proximate cause of motion, we can see more clearly how Avicenna's psychological writings deal with the same conceptual terrain. The portions of Avicenna's *Psychology* where he is most clearly treating questions similar to those of De Anima 3.9-1 center around issues related to the animal motive faculty (*al-quwwa al-muḥarrika*), and the practical intellect considered as a motive principle (*mabdaʾ muḥarrika*). 4.4 is dedicated to the animal motive faculty, and 5.1 contains a substantial portion on the practical intellect as a motive principle, and both of these ideas are outlined initially in I.5. So we will begin with 1.5.

IIa. Sketching the Animal Motive Faculty in *Psychology* 1.5

In Avicenna's initial sketch of the animal motive faculty in I.5, we see components resembling some of Aristotle's four factors involved in voluntary movement. This comes, of

11Ibid., 3.11, 434a.

course, within Avicenna's initial enumeration of all the psychological faculties, so motive faculties first come up when he distinguishes them from the apprehending (*mudrika*) faculties. Motive faculties, in turn, are divided into two types: the motive faculty as motivating, or inclining (*bāʿitha*) with respect to movement, and the motive faculty in the sense of actually moving (*fāʿila*). The motivating side includes branches corresponding roughly to Aristotle's concupiscible and irascible faculties, which constitute moved-movers in response to particular evaluations, while the actually moving side is constituted by the muscles and ligaments, the means of motion.

In *Healing: Psychology*, Avicenna is most interested in discussing motive faculty in the sense of being a motivating moved-mover. Like Aristotle, who spent more time talking about the means of movement elsewhere, for example in his *De Motu Animalium*, Avicenna discusses the means of motion in his medical and biological works. The most relevant portion of the overview of the animal motive in 1.5, then, is as follows:

> The motive has two divisions: the motive power insofar as it motivates movement, and [the motive power] insofar as it is carries out [movement]. And the motive power insofar as it is motivates is the appetitive [*al-nazūʿiyyah al-shawqiyyah*] power, and it is the power that, when a form to-be-sought or to-be-avoided [*ṣūra maṭlūbah aw mahrūb ʿanhā*] is inscribed in the imagination (a faculty we'll discuss soon) it [the appetitive power] impels the other [loco]motive power (that we're about to discuss) towards movement.
>
> And the appetitive faculty [*al-quwwa al-nazūʿiyya al-shawqiyya*] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [*al-shahwāniyya*] faculty, and it is a faculty that incites motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [*al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfiʿatan*], seeking pleasure [*al-ladhdha*]. And the other faculty is called the irascible [*al-ghaḍabiyya*] faculty, it is is a faculty which incites motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [*al-ghalba*].[12]

I really find this hyphenation off putting, and I don't think that it's needed

12 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 1.5, 41.

A crucial point needed to understand what Avicenna is describing in the above text is that both voluntary motion (motion that involves cognition) and involuntary, natural motion (motion that does not involve cognition) involve faculties that have attractions and aversions. In talking about the motive faculties, he is talking about faculties most directly responsible for voluntary motion, and these faculties themselves have natural attractions and aversions. So voluntary motion is a phenomena built up out of faculties that, on their own, have natural, involuntary tendencies. In Avicenna's *Treatise on Love*, he makes the following point about how all psychological faculties inline towards their objects, and away from their opposites:

?consistency: natural or innate would be better

> There is no doubt that each of the animal faculties are characterized by a type of behavior, impelled by a basic love [*ʿishq gharīzī*]. If animal faculties did not possess a natural aversion [*nufūr ṭabīʿī*] whose principle is an inborn hatred [*baghḍa gharīziyya*], and a natural desire [*tawaqān ṭabīʿī*] whose source is basic love [*ʿishq gharīzī*], then their existence in the animal body would be numbered among the superfluous. And it is apparent that that is the case for each of the divisions [of psychological faculties].[13]

As Avicenna's examples go on to show, this is essentially a statement that every psychological faculty is meant for some particular final object, and is most fulfilled when engaging those objects. The external and internal senses are most at rest when perceiving certain types of sensibles, and are averse to perceiving others. This is natural attraction and aversion and, like the stone's natural attraction towards the earth, it results in natural, involuntary movements. The eye flinches at something that is too bright; the imagination quakes at a ghastly thought. The only objects that can naturally attract or cause aversion to some faculty are those specifically in the domain that faculty is designed for. The theoretical intellect is repulsed by falsehood, but would have no reaction to ghastly images.

?? Avicenna's term? if not, a bit misleading

13 Avicenna, *Risāla Fi-Al-ʿishq [Treatise on Love]*, 251.

Animals are capable of voluntary motion, and this is due to faculties that have attraction and aversion in response to cognized objects. This is what Avicenna is trying to capture in the above 1.5 text when he says that the motive faculty is the faculty that responds to things inscribed in the imagination as "to-be-sought or to-be-avoided." If all he were saying here is that the motive faculty is attracted to its object, and averse to the opposite of its object, this would be nothing new—it would be natural attraction and aversion. What makes the motive faculties' objects unique is that they can respond to the specific objects of any faculty, provided they are cognized as "to-be-sought or to-be-avoided." Rather than just being in response to objects that are naturally attractive or repugnant, there is an added layer of processing: one person might cognize a bit of food as attractive, another might see it as repugnant. It is the fact that the motive faculty is averse or attracted to things *cognized* in a particular way that makes it a capacity for voluntary motion.

Another crucial point needed to understand the 1.5 text is that when Avicenna goes on to say that there are at least two branches of the motive faculty, he is not saying that there is one faculty for attraction, and one faculty for aversion. Based on the fact that the concupiscible faculty is the faculty associated explicitly with pleasurable things, and the irascible with harmful things, it would be tempting to associate the former with attraction, the later with aversion, and to assimilate all inclination and activity related to negative objects with the irascible faculty. But we know from the more general facts just mentioned about how *all* faculties are structured that both branches, both moved-movers, will have a certain function, and will be attracted to objects that allow it to carry out its function, and averse their opposite.

With that in mind, we need to read the above 1.5 text with a view of characterizing the object of both faculties. But this is not totally clear in the above text, since Avicenna mentions several

things about each faculty: the concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure, in response to something "imagined to be necessary or beneficial," and it aims to acquire that imagined thing. Likewise, the irascible appetite seeks dominance in response to something "imagined to be harmful or corruptive," and it aims to defend against that imagined thing. There is some goal, some cognition, and some associated action, and it is not clear which of these is best thought of as the faculties' final object, such that it would be averse to its opposite.

We can orient ourselves to determine which of these parts of the description in 1.5 are the faculties' proper, final objects with a clue from, again, the *Treatise on Love*. After mentioning the attractions and aversions of the perceptive faculties, Avicenna says that the irascible faculty is attracted to revenge and dominance [*al-intiqām wa-al-taghallub*], and it is averse to lowliness and submission [*al-dhull wa-al-istikāna*].[14] In 1.5, dominance is that which the irascible appetite "seeks," so the parallel for the concupiscible appetite would be its "seeking pleasure." Avicenna does not say so in the *Treatise on Love*, but we can assume that the opposite of pleasure would be pain, so the concupiscible appetite is attracted to pleasure, and averse to pain.

The other parts of the 1.5 description flesh out what it means to be attracted to pleasure and dominance, respectively. Attraction to the possibility of pleasure can occur when something is "imagined to be necessary or beneficial," and the movement prompted by such attraction would be an attempt to acquire the pleasure. Attraction to the possibility of dominance can occur when something is "imagined to be harmful or corruptive," and the logical way of achieving dominance in light of such an imagination would be defensive, or retaliatory behavior. So the other aspects of the 1.5 description simply capture the cognition which occasions an attractive inclination from the concupiscible or irascible faculty, which we could call the faculty's

14 Ibid.

intentional (as opposed to *final*) object, and the associated *behavior* that would constitute acting on that inclination.

No mention is made in any of Avicenna's texts as to what the associated cognition and behavior would be for the concupiscible appetite's aversion to pain, or the irascible appetites aversion to lowliness, but it is not difficult to fill in the blanks. An aversion to pain would be occasioned by imagining something as painful (an intentional object), and the likely result of such an aversion would be an attempt to escape. It is because of the concupiscible faculty's aversion response, for example, that zoophytes (plant-like animals)—which the tradition did not think of as having the conceptual apparatus for irascible behavior—could still have voluntary responses to pain.[15] Though lacking full defensive and retaliatory behavior, zoophytes shrink away from things their meager imaginations conceive of as harmful. An aversion to lowliness or humiliation would be occasioned by imagining something else in a position of dominance over oneself (an intentional object), and the associated behavior might either again be retaliatory, or perhaps evasive. But there would be different ways of evading pain as compared to evading lowliness or humiliation, and it is from this difference that a wide variety of animal inclinations, emotions and behavior result.

So the concupiscible and irascible faculty are moved-movers that each have a final object, to which they are attracted, and they are averse to its opposite. Since these are faculties for voluntary motion, they are actualized by cognized, intentional objects that provide an opportunity to seek their final object, and such seeking involves characteristic behaviors.

15 Aristotle discusses zoophytes in *De Anima* 2.3. Themistius, commenting on that passage, makes it clear that they only have concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), yet are still able to voluntary shrink away from pain. See Themistius, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's* De Anima, 2:62.12-14.

There is one possible counterexample to this line of interpretation that should be dealt with before moving on. Later in *Psychology*, in 5.7, Avicenna discusses competing views of how to divide up psychological faculties, and defends his own view as follows:

> For the irascible faculty is not affected by pleasures, and the concupiscible power is not affected by harmful things [*al-muʾdhiyyāt*], and the apprehensive power is not influenced by that which influences these two, and nothing is conceptualized by these two [irascible and concupiscible faculties] insofar as these two are receptive of the apprehended form.[16]

One might think this runs counter to the idea of the concupiscible faculty having an aversion to pain. If the concupiscible faculty is "not affected by harmful things," then it seems like it should not have anything at all to do with pain, even as an opposite. However, in this passage Avicenna is talking about what each part of the soul is designed for—its final object—and the innate attraction and aversive tendencies of any individual faculty would be assumed. It does seem a bit careless to suggest that the concupiscible faculty has *no* relation to pain, even as an adverse object, but Avicenna's focus in this passage is on broad divisions of the soul, not the details of individual faculties.

When we turn to Psychology 4.4, we will see that the concupiscible and irascible appetite do not fully capture all of the moved-movers Avicenna thinks arise in the animal soul, but they do provide the basis upon which Avicenna expands. Before getting to 4.4, we will look at one more section of 1.5, where Avicenna introduces the practical intellect, and its relation to the animal motive faculty.

16 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 5.7, 252.

IIb. Sketching the Practical Intellect in *Psychology* 1.5

The practical intellect is relevant to the discussion of the motive faculty insofar as the practical intellect is a principle of motion. We begin to see the difference between a motive faculty and a motive principle Avicenna first mentions the practical intellect in the outline of 1.5:

> [T1a][17] The practical [intellect] is a power that is the the motive principle for the human body towards concrete acts that are particularly associated with deliberation—deliberation, that is, in accordance with the demands of beliefs that are particularly associated with it [the practical intellect] about that which is appropriate to do.[18] And it [the practical intellect] has an aspect in relation to [*lahā iʿatibār bil-qiyās ilā*] the animal desiderative power, and an aspect in relation to the animal imaginative and estimative power, and a relation to itself.[19]

To be a motive principle is to be related to motion, but not necessarily in as direct a sense as a motive faculty. He uses this broader specification again in 5.1, when he says that the soul not only has four types of "judges"—sensation, estimation, and theoretical and practical intellect—it also has four types of "motive principles [*al-mabadī al-bāʿitha*]," namely, estimative imagination, practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties.[20] As we saw when Avicenna initially distinguished the animal motive faculties from the animal apprehending faculties, there is a basic division between the motive and the apprehensive, so it cannot be that the faculties which show up in both of these lists are primarily motive *and* cognitive. Practical intellect and estimation are primarily identified as cognitive faculties, but they are also more relevant to motion in some way than sensation and the theoretical intellect, which makes them

17 Throughout I will use specifications like T1a, T1b, etc, to signify when we are dealing with successive portions of a continuous text.
18 "That which is appropriate to do," translating *iṣṭilāḥiyya*. This term is a bit difficult to translate in a way that makes sense of the passage. In his translation of a similar passage in the *Najat*, Rahman translates this term as "purposive," a definition which I am unable to find evidence for elsewhere. "Conventional" would seem appropriate, given that the practical intellect often urges action on the basis of widespread opinion, but when this word is used to mean "conventional," it is typically in the context of of technical "conventions" in language. The translation of "that which is appropriate to do" picks up on the core idea of the root of this verb, and fits with what the practical intellect in fact does.
19 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 1.5, 45-46.
20 Ibid., 5.1, 208.

former motive principles. What exactly that relevance is in the case of the practical intellect is something Avicenna goes on to explain here in I.5.

In a general sense, the practical intellect is related to actions, as the above text from I.5 states, because it deliberates about what it is appropriate to do. Both the mode (deliberation) and the content (pertaining to action) distinguish the practical intellectual from the theoretical intellect. The Arabic word for deliberation, *rawīya*, is a successor to the Greek *bouleisis*. Unlike the theoretical intellect, the goal of the practical intellect is not to receive new, universal information as a result of emanation from the Agent Intellect. Rather, information we already possess is used to make judgments that relate to action in the realm of the variable and corruptible. Nonetheless, Avicenna's way of describing the practical intellect in T1a is quite broad, as there are multiple processes that affect what sort of action is ultimately taken. These multiple processes require that the practical intellect cooperates with other faculties, which is why Avicenna says at the end of T1a that the practical intellect has an "aspect in relation" to several powers. This is just another way of saying that, because humans have rationality, they have the capacity to guide their actions by reason, and this capacity augments or makes use of other capacities already present in the animal soul.

?? what is a successor?a translation?

Avicenna goes on to specify the three ways that our ability to deliberate about action plays out, or the "aspects in relation" to several powers that belong to the practical intellect. Avicenna presents them in following order: practical intellect in relation to the motive faculties, in relation to the imagination and estimation, and in relation to the theoretical intellect. It is easier to understand his point by working backwards, so what follows is the text in order, which will be followed by an analysis beginning with T1d:

> [T1b] Its aspect in relation to the animal appetitive power is the respect, in view of which there occur in it [the practical intellect] states [*hayʾāt*] that characterize a human by which one is prepared for quickness of action or passion, such as shame [*khajl*], embarrassment [*ḥayāʾ*], laughter [*ḍaḥika*], crying [*bakāʾ*], and [other actions or passions] similar to those.
>
> [T1c] And its aspect in relation to the animal imaginative and estimative power is the respect that joins to them when to if it is occupied with deducing methods of management in generable, corruptible matters and humans arts.
>
> [T1d] And its aspect in relation to itself is the respect in which beliefs are engendered between the practical intellect and the theoretical intellect that relate to actions and [which beliefs are] spread out, [being] widely known [*dhāʾiʿa*], like that lying is bad and injustice is bad—not by means of demonstration or anything like that [derived] from defined premises. [Their] distinction from the primary intelligibles is set out in the books of logic, even though were [the beliefs of the practical intellect] logically considered, they would come from the intelligibles in accordance with what is in the books of logic.[21]

?? widespread: "spread out" makes no sense in English; the standard translation of mashhūrah is "commonly accepted" or "popular"

The first thing deliberation needs to get off the ground is a universal judgment of some class of objects or actions as having certain values, and this is what Avicenna describes in T1d. It is thanks to our capacity to engage in theoretical thought that we know things like "lying and injustice are bad," to use Avicenna's examples. In 5.1 Avicenna says that the practical intellect is "supplied by" the theoretical intellect for these, the major premises of a practical syllogism.[22] The typical way of coming to such judgments is through something less epistemically strong than demonstration,[23] but as they are a type of universal judgment, they nonetheless are grasped by the theoretical intellect, and then supplied to the practical intellect.

Of course, universal judgments on their own cannot lead to action in the realm of particulars, so in T1c Avicenna clarifies the practical intellect needs to cooperate with the internal senses, in particular imagination and estimation. At this state, universal knowledge about value is being used to label particular objects as worth pursuing or not, and to evaluate courses of action, or

21 Ibid., 1.5, 46.
22 Ibid., 5.1, 206.
23 This is why Avicenna says that they "spread out" and become "widely known," referring to the sort of premises they are: not scientific or primary premises, but premises accepted on the basis of authority or communal consensus. This is discussed more in chapter three.

"methods of management," for pursuing them or not. It is one thing to know that lying is bad, and this the practical intellect gets from the theoretical intellect. It is another thing to identify a particular instance of lying (actual or possible) as good or bad, and to in fact pursue or avoid it. This is why Avicenna later says, in 5.1, that the practical intellect needs, in all its actions, the body and its faculties[24]: the practical intellect does not need the body to deliberate in a general sense about what sort of actions are appropriate—this is its relation "to itself." But the point of these general judgments is to initiate action, and that cannot be done without dealing with particulars. There is quite a lot summarized quickly in T1c, and much of chapter three will be dedicated to unpacking the particular cognitions that give rise to acts of the motive faculty. In this chapter we will mostly be taking for granted that animals and humans have the capacity to evaluate particular objects, and that these evaluations give rise to the moved-movers of the motive faculty.

Avicenna's discussion of the practical intellect's "aspect in relation" to the motive faculty in T1b, however, is not a discussion of the fact that the practical intellect leads to a moved-mover. Rather, he discusses the practical intellect's ability to create unique dispositions towards moved-movers. This is because what he is focused on explaining here are the ways in which the practical intellect can influence the motive faculty, and it is taken for granted that such influence occurs.

seems needlessly complicated

What is further specified in T1d, then, is that just as animals can develop dispositions towards certain moved-movers without the practical intellect, so humans can develop a unique variety of dispositions because of the practical intellect. Some of the actualizations of the animal appetitive faculty mentioned in T1d are what we would call emotions, and some, as we will see,

why keep using m-m here? why not perceived objects or something less jargony?

24 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 5.1, 208.

are uniquely human emotions,[25] but Avicenna's point here is not to go into detail about moved-movers as such. Rather, it seems that he is describing something like character traits, rooted in the practical intellect, which govern moved-movers. That this is the case is confirmed as he goes on in the follows paragraphs of 1.5 to elaborate on how the practical intellect's relation to the body accounts for good or bad moral dispositions (*aklhāq*).[26] If the practical intellect is influenced by what is "above" it (the judgements theoretical intellect), good morals are developed. If influenced by what is "below" it (the needs of the animal and vegetative faculties), bad morals are developed. Since the practical intellect is primarily a cognitive faculty, and influences the appetitive faculty as a cognitive faculty, these character traits are probably something like firmly held beliefs. For example, if you firmly hold the belief that lying is bad, that is a kind of good character trait, and it will have implications for when you experience shame: if you yourself lie, and firmly believe lying is bad, you are likely to experience shame with little need for new deliberation. This "aspect" of the practical intellect, then, is just an extension of its standard, deliberative role.

yes, but these are not in animals

??

this doesn't work, and Avicenna doesn't say this:how is a belief a character trait?

Of course, more can be said about T1a-d. We will examine the cognitions that give rise to inclinations and actual motion in chapter three, and moral dispositions in chapter four. But for now it is enough to see that the practical intellect is a cognitive faculty, and gives rise to motive states, unique to humans, thanks to its particular cognitions. Later in this chapter we will see examples of what those inclinations in fact are. Having examined Avicenna's overview of faculties related to motion in 1.5, we are in a better position to look at his more in depth accounts of these faculties in 4.4 and 5.1, and see the varieties of moved-movers he thinks exist.

25 See [insert location in final draft]
26 Ibid., 1.5, 46-47.

As noted, you seem to be complicating aspects of the account that are perfectly standard for anyone who is familiar with the NE

III. Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite in *Psychology* 4.4

The first specific types of moved-movers Avicenna mentions in 4.4 are, once again, the concupiscible and irascible appetites. It is worth comparing the accounts from I.5 and 4.4, because it helps us see what is essential to the two accounts, despite the varying terminology. The account in 4.4 is as follows:

translation? this power has two branches!

> [T2a] And this appetitive power, from its branches there is the irascible power and the concupiscible power. And the one that proceeds, with an appetite for that which is pleasant [*al-ladhīdh*] and the thing imagined to be beneficial [*nāfiʿan*], for the sake of acquiring it [*li-tajlabahu*], it is the concupiscible. Then the one that proceeds, with an appetite for dominance [*al-ghalba*] [over another] and the thing imagined as an obstacle [*munāfiyan*] for the sake of warding it off [*li-tadfaʿahu*], it is the irascible.[27]

The broad strokes of the sketch are the same: there are two distinct faculties, with particular final objects, intentional objects to which they respond, and types of motion to which they lead. There are differences in terminology used to express these points, and I have summarized them in the table below. By summarizing the terminology in the table, my goal is not to systematize what is going on here anymore than Avicenna himself does. On the contrary, what we see is that he is consistent about the main points he is trying to make, even while there is slight variation about the exact terminology he uses in his most canonical accounts from the Psychology:

but the differences are minimal, close to nonexistent;they really don't call for a chart, it's just not that complex!

27 Ibid., 4.4, 195.

	Healing: Psychology 1.5	*Healing: Psychology* 4.4
Generic Name for Appetites	*al-shawqiyya*	*al-shawqiyya*
Concupiscible Name	*al-shahwāniyya*	*al-shahwāniyya*
Concupiscible Final Object	Pleasure *al-ladhdha*	That which is pleasant *al-ladhīdh*
Concupiscible Intentional Object	Imagined to be necessary or beneficial [*al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfiʿatan*]	Imagined to be beneficial [*al-mutakhayyil nafiʿan*]
Concupiscible Associated Behavior	Getting closer [*yaqrab*] approaching	Acquiring [*tajlab*]
Irascible Name	*al-ghaḍabiyya*	*al-ghaḍabiyya*
Irascible Final Object	Dominance [*al-ghalba*]	Dominance [*al-ghalba*]
Irascible Intentional Object	Imagined to be harmful or corruptive [*al-mutakhayyil ḍarran aw mufsidan*]	Imagined as an obstacle [*al-mutakhayyil munāfiyan*]
Irascible Associated Behavior	Defense [*yadfaʿ*]	Defense [*tadfaʿ*]

Putting the basic sketches in 1.5 and 4.4 side-by-side, we see confirmation of the various aspects (final object, intentional object, behavior) into which Avicenna wants to analyze the concupiscible and irascible appetites, despite the varying terminology. For example, given the structure of the text from 4.4, it is clear that Avicenna is using "that which is pleasant" to describe the final object the concupiscible faculty, which it attains by seeking after some beneficial object, even though the precise term used in 4.4 ("that which is pleasant") is different from that of I.5 ("pleasure"). Again, Avicenna uses the term obstacle/*munāfiyan* to describe the irascible faculty's intentional object in 4.4. This is different from how the irascible intentional object was described in 1.5 ("harmful, corruptive"), but the core of what he is trying to communicate has not changed: the irascible appetite responds to objects conceived of in a variety of negative terms, and wants to exert dominance over them. In other words, even in Avicenna's most canonical accounts of the concupiscible and irascible faculties, he is clear about his main points, but not overly fastidious about most of the terminology. This will be helpful to keep in

mind, since it makes sense of why Avicenna attributes a variety of states to each faculty: so long as the intentional object can roughly be described as some species of pleasant or harmful, it is enough to trigger the concupiscible and irascible appetite, respectively.

One bit of terminology, however, that is significant, is Avicenna's identification of concupiscible and irascible appetites as varieties of *shawq*, which is the Arabic translation of the ref? Greek *orexis*/appetite. While Aristotle (and the Greek commentators following him) used this term generically for all the moved-movers he discusses (including *bouleisis*), Avicenna reserves the term for the concupiscible and irascible faculties in the *Psychology* 4.4. In brief, the reason for Avicenna's restricted use seems to be twofold: first, there are certain connotations that the term *shawq*/*orexis* had, which fit better with the concupiscible and irascible appetites than other moved-movers; and second, Avicenna simply noticed significant differences between the concupiscible and irascible appetites and other moved-movers, and needed a way of grouping them apart from one another. Both of these reasons will become more clear when we look at T2b-d in a moment, where Avicenna explicitly contrasts concupiscible and irascible appetite with some sort of inclination more attributable to the imagination, but we can say something preliminary about the connotation of *shawq* here.

As mentioned when discussing the Aristotelian background, the term *orexis* originally related to the idea of a literal reaching out for the sake of some concrete concern or lack. Avicenna would not have been aware of the Greek linguistic background per se, but he would be aware the associations surrounding these two faculties and the generic idea of *shawq*. For example, in the *Metaphysics* he describes God as having a will, but not *shawq*, because he is not in need of anything.[28] More specifically, Avicenna seems to think of the concupiscible and irascible

28 Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing [Al-Ilahīyyat Min Al-Shifā']*, 8.7, 292.

appetites as responses to a perception of some sort of lack or vulnerability to the external senses: things that would bring pleasure to the external senses signify concrete goods, and things that would bring pain to the external senses signify concrete obstacles or vulnerabilities. The focus on pleasures and pains of the external senses in particular is suggested in Avicenna's examples in the *Psychology*: later in 4.4, in text T2e which we'll come to eventually, he provides "greed, avarice and lust" as examples of the "bestial concupiscible faculty," clearly in an effort portray the concupiscible appetite as an appetite in response to something like lower goods. These distinctions have a basis in Aristotle's *Ethics*, where Aristotle distinguishes between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul.[29] Avicenna, as we will see, makes things more fine grained by distinguishing between three things: sensory imaginative and intellectual pleasures. As for the irascible appetite, it too is most often portrayed as a response to physical danger, as in his standard example of a sheep being afraid of the wolf's attack. That Avicenna is in fact interested in distinguishing inclinations in response to objects of the external senses from those unique to the internal senses will be verified as we continue examining *Psychology* 4.4, but hopefully the distinction itself is at least clear for now.

not a standard example of the irascible appetite, so misleading

Avicenna's careful characterization of the nature of the concupiscible and irascible appetites is a systematization of some various lines of thought in his source material. We see in the Greek commentators and Al-Farabi some reference to the idea of the irascible faculty as a faculty for retaliation, but more consistently animal movement is explained in terms of pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain.[30] In Farabi's *Political Regime*, the irascible faculty is narrowly associated

29 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1117b24-1118a1. For the interpretation of Aristotle as considering *epithumia* as primarily concerned with pleasures of the external senses, see John Philoponus, *PHILOPONUS On Aristotle On the Soul 2.1-6*, 253.20ff.

30 For example, Themistius speaks of the two animal appetites as concupiscible and irascible, with concupiscible appetite being motivated by pleasure. He never directly defines what is meant by irascible, but he does explain animal behavior in terms of a basic pull towards pleasure and push away from pain, leaving the impression that the

with things like fleeing, loathing, or avoidance.[31] In the *Virtuous City*, the appetitive faculty (containing the concupiscible and irascible) is boiled down succinctly to that which moves us "towards [ilā]" or "away from [ʿan]" an apprehended object.[32] Appetites in Farabi are conceived of primarily as pulls (concupiscible) and pushes (irascible), with the ideas of defensiveness, attack, or retaliation being mostly absent.

The ambiguity is problematic, in part, because defensive or retaliatory behavior is not best thought of as a push away from some object. Rather, the this sort of behavior is a pull towards that which, as an obstacle, could be painful.[33] Of course, when the irascible faculty's final object, dominance, is achieved, there would be a kind of pleasure, but this is different than the final object towards which its behavior is directed. Unless there is some basic impulse that draws us towards obstacles, it is not clear why our response to something perceived as an obstacle would go beyond mere avoidance—but of course animals and humans do go beyond mere avoidance. So Avicenna's consistency across his works in how he describes the final objects of the concupiscible and irascible faculty is a much needed clarification.

IV. Moved-Movers Triggered by Internal Pleasures of the Imagination

After discussing the distinction between the two basic types of *shawq*, Avicenna immediately proceeds to describe some phenomena that seem related to concupiscible appetite, but which are better described as inclinations belonging to the imagination. His discussion of this second type of inclination spans three continuous paragraphs, and the texts are obscure in parts, but context

irascible faculty is meant to account for the later. See Themistius, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's* De Anima, 2:139, 112.33ff.
31 Al-Fārābī, *Al-Siyāsa Al-Madaniyya [Political Regime/Treatise on the Principles of Beings]*, 33.8.
32 Al-Fārābī, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*, 10.6, 170.
33 On this distinction, see King, "Aquinas on the Passions," esp. p. 14.

makes it clear what he seems to intend. Thus, it is necessary to have all three texts at hand to begin the analysis:

> [T2b] And we may [*wa-qad*] find in animals impulses [*inbiʿāthāt*] not [just] for [*ilā*] the objects of concupiscible appetite [*shahwātihā*[34]], but also an inclination [*nazzāʿ*] of the one who begat for [their] offspring, and of the one who befriends for the friend, and similarly their desiring escape from bonds and chains. This, even though it is not an object [*shahwa*] belonging [*lil*] to the concupiscible faculty, it is a certain longing [*ishtiyāq mā*] for [*ilā*] an object [*shahwa*] owing to [*li*] to the imagination [*al-quwwa al-khayāliyya*]. trans?
>
> [T2c] For, [*fa-inna*] there is particular to the apprehending faculty—*in what it apprehends, and in what it is transformed with regard to among the things that are renewed through sight, or [other] forms, for example*—a pleasure that is particular to it. So when [*fa-idhā*] it [the apprehending power] suffers the loss of that pleasure, it [the animal] longs [i*shtāqat*] for it naturally, then the decisive faculty resolves that the organs should move towards it [*taḥrik ilayha*], similar to how it resolves [to act] for the sake of concupiscible and irascible appetite, and for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good also.
>
> [T2d] And so [fa] to concupiscible desire there belongs the increasing of appetite towards pleasure, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and to the irascible power there belongs the increasing of appetite towards dominance, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and likewise to the imagination [*lil-takhayyu*l] there is also something [mā] particular to it, and to the inclining power the resolution to act.[35]

The first thing to notice about these texts is all the ways in which he signals in T2b that he is picking out something new, distinct from concupiscible and irascible appetite. Specifically, the generic vocabulary he uses to capture what he is now discussing is broader than what he has used before. The concupiscible and irascible faculties were types *shawq*, whereas this is a new kind of inclination (*nazzāʿ*), distinct from concupiscible desire, under the heading of "impulses

34 Taking *hā* to refer to the concupiscible appetite from the prior paragraph. Taking shahwa to refer to an object requires some explanation. Sometimes this is used to refer to lower forms of appetite (e.g., Avicenna's *Psychology*, 2.3, p. 68). But if it meant that here, this first line would say something like, "there are inclinations for appetites," which sounds something like a second-order desire, and is obviously not what Avicenna means. Lane's Lexicon, however, says that says that this term can sometimes be applied to "objects of desire," citing Quran 13:4 as an example: "Enticing to people is love of desires [ḥubb al-shahwāt]: women and sons, qintars upon qintars of gold and silver, and the finest horses, cattle and fields. That is the provision of this present life. But God—with Him is the best place of return (trans. Droge 2013)." In this text, "desires" refers to objects, in the sense of "objects of desire."
35 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 4.4, 195.

(*inbiʿāthāt*).” He is careful not to call it *shawq*, but something related (it is an *ishtiyāq mā*). A lesson learned from the prior sections is that we do not want to get too hung up on the terminology here, but in context these terms are clearly used to pick out a new type of moved-mover, something similar to but different than concupiscible appetite. Again, towards the end of T2c Avicenna compares the way that this new type of inclination leads to movement to the concupiscible and irascible appetites, and in making such a comparison, affirms the difference. Finally, T2d summarizes the preceding, from T2a-T2c, emphasizing that, broadly, three things have been discussed: concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite, and “something” particular to the imagination. In the last section we saw that Avicenna’s conception of concupiscible and irascible appetite have a broad scope, but apparently not broad enough to capture every kind of animal moved-mover.

Avicenna tells us, in T2b, that what distinguishes these moved-movers from the appetites that have already been discussed is that they are more attributable to the imagination. By this, he cannot mean that the imagination itself is a type of motive faculty, since earlier in 4.4 Avicenna reaffirmed the distinction between the apprehending and motive powers saying that the apprehending powers have “nothing” of appetite.[36] What he must mean, then, is that the imagination is involved in a distinct or more central way with these impulses than with concupiscible appetite. This does not mean that imagination is involved in these impulses, and has *nothing whatsoever* to do with concupiscible appetite, since the objects of the concupiscible faculty are those “imagined” to be pleasant. He is focusing on a difference in the *type* of relation to imagination involved, not *whether* there is imagination involved.

this is rather unclear

36 Ibid., 4.4, 194.

His examples of this new type of moved-movers in T2b leave some doubt as to what exactly he is talking about, but the context of T2c-d makes it more clear. He mentions in T2b that animals have an inclination towards things like distant friends and relations, and towards something as abstract as freedom when they are in captivity. One might think that something these have in common is that they are not oriented towards any type of pleasure at all: after all, it might seem somewhat crass to think of seeking out a distant friend or relation just for the sake of your own pleasure, and likewise with freedom. Seeking out friends and relations are distinctly others-oriented in a way that objects of concupiscible appetite are not. However, in T2c Avicenna elaborates on the previous paragraph, making it more clear that what these new inclinations have in common is that they are oriented at goods that are not grasped as pleasant by the external senses, but whose pleasure is only graspable once they are processed and experienced in the imagination. So they still aim at pleasure, but we now have two different types of pleasure as final objects.

The transition word at the beginning of T2c, *fa-inna*, suggests that Avicenna means T2c to be an elaboration on what was in the previous paragraph. The second half of T2c is fairly straightforward, saying that there is a pleasure, or set of pleasures, particular to the imagination, and when they are absent, the animal soul can have inclinations for them, similar to how there are inclinations for concupiscible objects, irascible objects, and intelligible objects—the last of which Avicenna does not discuss in detail in 4.4. The italicized portion of T2c, towards the beginning, is somewhat enigmatic: this new category of pleasure, is found "in what [the apprehending faculty] apprehends, and in what it is transformed with regard to among the things that are renewed through sight, or [other] forms, for example." But if we remember the context, that Avicenna is generally talking about objects grasped by acts of the imagination, in contrast to

objects as grasped by the external senses, we should lean towards interpreting this as a description of apprehension at the level of imagination. Indeed, given that perception is a kind of reception, it makes sense to talk of the apprehending faculty as "transformed" by the objects whose forms it receives, and its objects are "renewed" in that they have their forms conveyed through increasingly levels of abstractness as information is conveyed first from the external senses, then to the imagination.[37] T2c, then, is just a concise way of describing the difference between grasping a pleasant object in the imagination, contrasted with grasping a pleasure at the level of the external senses.[38]

In T2d, Avicenna's summary of the preceding paragraphs, he makes parallel claims about concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite, and this moved-mover related to the imagination. Concupiscible appetite, he says, is oriented towards pleasure, irascible appetite is oriented towards dominance, and then there is "something particular to" the imagination. This last phrase on its own is concise to the point of being enigmatic, but in context he is clearly just referring to the unique class of pleasure he has picked out, towards which animals also incline.

It would be best to refer to this new type of moved-mover as having internal pleasure as its final object, for two reasons. First, we'll see in the very next section how the distinction between internal and external pleasures fits with distinctions made elsewhere in his corpus. Second, the concupiscible and irascible appetites also involve the imagination, but Avicenna is reinforcing the idea that some moved-movers depend more or less on the imagination, or in more subtle ways than is normally thought. The words "imagination" and "imaginative" are used in a variety

37 For another usage of this term in the context of perception, see elsewhere in the *Remarks*: *Al-Ishārāt Wa-Al-Tanbīhāt [Pointers and Reminders]*, Vol. 3, *Al-Ilāhiyāt*: 256.
38 All these animal inclinations at the animal level can be contrasted with that which is "for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to good," as mentioned at the end of T2c. This is a reference to the unique sort of goods the human rational soul is able to appreciate, and will be discussed more in section IX of this chapter.

of ways in Avicenna's psychological texts (we'll see still more in chapter 3), so it is better to use more specific language whenever possible.

It makes sense why Avicenna would want to distinguish a branch of the motive faculty that has pleasure of the external senses as its final object from a branch that has internal pleasure as its final object. Though both are oriented towards a type of pleasure, they result in very different behavior. You would not necessarily want to "acquire" your friend or relative, just because you long for them. Upon being told that there is a beautiful landscape around the bend, you might be moved to go appreciate it, but not consume it. On the other hand, inclinations towards pleasures of the external senses require direct contact for their satisfaction.

IVa. Internal and External Pleasures in Avicenna's Corpus

Interpreting the above texts as making distinctions between pleasures of the external senses, and internal pleasures, can be corroborated by seeing these distinctions reflected elsewhere in Avicenna's corpus. Pleasure and pain in general will be the subject of discussion in chapter five, but we can briefly point to the beginning of book eight of Avicenna *Remarks and Admonitions*, where he begins by pointing out that the majority of people make an incorrect judgment concerning pleasures of the external senses and imagination:

> It has occurred to the imaginations of the masses that the strongest and highest pleasures as those of sensation [*hiyya al-ḥissiyya*], while what is contrasted with that are weak pleasures, all of which are of the imagination, not being real [in their opinion].[39]

Examples of the pleasures of sensation include drink and sex, while those of the internal senses include things like the pleasure of offering a gift to someone, or achieving victory in a board game.[40] Avicenna goes on to criticize this opinion of the masses, in part: he affirms that there is a

39 Avicenna, *Al-Ishārāt Wa-Al-Tanbīhāt [Pointers and Reminders]*, Vol. 4 *al-Taṣawwuf*: 8.3, 7.
40 The fact that "victory" in games and fighting is an example of internal pleasure which animals and humans seek highlights an issue about the irascible faculty that we will raise in section V of this chapter. In brief, though

distinction between external pleasures and those of imagination, but he denies that the external is more worth pursuing. Proof of this is that we will often sacrifice external pleasure for the sake of an internal pleasure, as when we give of our own food to the friend. That the category of internal pleasures from *Remarks* aligns with what we see in *Psychology* 4.4 is made clear towards the end of the section when he speaks particularly about animals having internal pleasures:

> It has been made clear that internal pleasures [*al-ladhdhāt al-bāṭina*] are more lofty than sensible pleasures. And this is the case not only in rational beings, but also in speechless animals. For among hunting dogs there is the fact that they hunt, regardless of hunger, then grasp [the prey] for their master, and sometimes carry it to him. And the nursing animal prefers its offspring to itself, and sometimes takes risks [for the sake of] protecting [the offspring], greater than the risk-taking they take with regard to themselves.[41]

One of the examples Avicenna provided of the new type of moved-mover he introduced at T2b was the moved-mover of the "the one who begat for [their] offspring." One way in which a parent cares for offspring is exemplified by the fact that nursing animals will take great risks for their offspring, regardless of whether this means they lose out on some external pleasures. At the end of this section in *Remarks*, Avicenna briefly mentions that just as internal pleasures are higher than external, so intellectual pleasures [al-ʿaqliyya] are higher than both.[42] This aligns with Avicenna's remark at T2c that the animal motive faculty also moves "for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good." So the types of pleasures distinguished in *Remarks* correspond to the objects of the varieties of moved-movers discussed in *Psychology* 4.4.

overuse of this again

A prominent sub-variety of animal moved-movers towards pleasures of the imagination are those towards aesthetic pleasure, especially musical pleasure. As Luis Xavier López-Farjeat has shown, there is a clear strand of thought in Avicenna's *Healing: Book of Music* which discusses

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Avicenna does not make the same distinctions between levels of irascible appetite, it seems that many of the same distinctions are in fact there, and he would not object to making them.

41 Avicenna, *Al-Ishārāt Wa-Al-Tanbīhāt [Pointers and Reminders]*, Vol. 4 *al-Taṣawwuf*: 8.3, p. 9

42 Ibid., 8.3, p. 9

how animals perceive and take pleasure in aesthetic beauty, even though they cannot label it as such, or produce it.[43] This is different than concupiscible appetite, because concupiscible appetite is for objects experienced as pleasurable by the external senses, which primarily means the sense of touch. Sensations from sight or sound are pleasurable once the objects they convey are structured in the imagination—neither the ear nor the eye have any capacity to perceive pleasure on their own. So while it might seem strange to think of some brute animals as being moved to seek out aesthetic pleasure, we should remember that this is still something short of the full engagement with beauty of which humans are capable. Moreover, it does not need to be a terribly complicated sort of aesthetic pleasure. There is something pleasant about seeing a nice shade of blue, but this is not picked up directly by the sense of sight.

??this just seems wrong, and I don't see how it arises from the Isharat text.

That animals are inclined towards this lower level of aesthetic pleasure is made clear in another of Avicenna's texts, his *Treatise on Love*: "The rational soul, and the animal soul also, always love everything that is beautiful in terms of orderliness, composition and harmony, such as sounds arranged in a balanced way, dishes composed of different, well-arranged foods, and suchlike."[44] The *Treatise on Love* is dedicated to explaining the various tendencies found in nature as stemming from a basic inclination towards that which is fitting. Animals and humans both tend towards aesthetic pleasures—the same object—but for different reasons. In each case, music is a pleasure of something constituted in the imagination, and there are moved-movers associated with it in the animal soul.

I remain surprised there is no reference here to intentions, estimation. I also don't find the excursus on aesthetic pleasure helpful here: it seems to rest on a misinterpretaiton.

43 López Farjeat, "Avicenna on Musical Perception," esp. 103ff.
44 Avicenna, *Risāla Fi-Al-ʿishq [Treatise on Love]*, 257.

IVb. Clarifying the Nature of Internal Pleasure

Having seen that there are moved-movers associated with both external pleasures and internal pleasures, there are two clarifications worth making to help fill out Avicenna's point. First, we should emphasize that the difference between moved-movers associated with internal and external pleasures has to do with what faculties *experience* something as pleasant, not how it is known *that* something *would be* pleasant. On the animal level, estimation is involved in awareness that various things would provide pleasant experiences, even if those pleasant experiences are as different from one another as external and internal pleasures. With estimation, a dog not only naturally comes to know that food would be pleasant to eat, it also learns to fear a stick in the hands of its angry master.[45] On the other hand, estimation would similarly explain an animal identifying its young as something worth caring for or being around. The latter would bring with it a type of internal pleasure, the former pleasures of the external senses. The same faculties can be involved in telling us that something would be pleasant, even if the pleasant experiences are of generically different varieties.

I don't really understand this point, nor its textual basis.

The second clarification worth making is that saying that there is a type of pleasure *particular* to the imagination is different than saying there is a general sense in which it is possible to experience pleasure in the imagination. In his *Healing: Rhetoric*, Avicenna discusses the way in which we can long for an object of sense perception, based on the pleasurable vestige of its image in the imagination, retained and recalled after the actual object is no longer being directly perceived, as follows:

> As for the imagination, it has a type of pleasure [i.e., it experiences pleasure in a way], except that imagination is a weak sensation, like a vestige from sensation, and it delights in recalling or in hoping. Most of what is hoped for coincides with what is remembered,

45 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 4.3, 184.

> especially hoping of structures/arrangements from prior sensed particulars, for there is pleasure in memory or hope following sensible pleasure [initially] observed/experienced, then recalled, then hoped for. For sensation pertains to the present, memory to the past, hope to the future.[46]

Just as we can experience some sensible particular as pleasant when in contact with it, we can recall the form of that same sense object, and our awareness of its form in the imagination conveys a similar, but weaker, kind of pleasure, which might lead us to long for the direct experience once again. Remembering a delicious meal can be pleasant, and make you want to have the same meal again. But this is not what is meant by a pleasure particular to the imagination. It is one thing to long for and experience a pleasure, it is another thing to remember a pleasure, and then long for it. The vestigial pleasures of imaginative memory are not equivalent to the present experience of an external pleasure, nor the present experience of an internal pleasure.

I think the basic point is correct, but the longing for or memory of a pleasure seem more complicated (say than just dreaming of some past sensory item and re-experiencing the pleasure of that sensation.)

IVc. A Possible Alternative Interpretation

Having looked at this last text from the *Rhetoric* about pleasures remembered in the imagination, one might object to my interpretation of the above texts in *Psychology* 4.4 as making a distinction between moved-movers associated with external and internal pleasures, on the grounds that what Avicenna is actually saying is something more along the lines of what we just understood him to say in the *Rhetoric*. That is, you might think concupiscible and irascible appetite are appetites in response to objects one is aware of as *present and nearby*, whereas it is also possible to recall *distant objects* in the imagination and be motivated towards them. On this interpretation, Avicenna's examples in T2b would actually just be referring to remembered objects (e.g., a friend or child when they are not present, or what things outside of the bonds of

46 Avicenna, *Al-Shifa', Al-Khaṭāba [Rhetoric]*, 2.6, 100.

captivity were like). T2c, when it refers to the idea of the apprehending faculty "suffer[ing] the loss of that pleasure," could be taken to emphasize the fact that the object is no longer present, but is recalled in the imagination.

The major problem with this alternative, possibly simpler interpretation, is that Avicenna never suggests that concupiscible and irascible appetite are only for things the animal is aware of as present and nearby. There is, no doubt, a line of thought in the tradition, going back to Aristotle, which distinguishes animal appetites from human appetites on the grounds that animal appetites are only concerned with what would be or seems pleasurable in the present, but this is a different distinction[47]. We will see Avicenna deal with this latter distinction 5.1, but the idea is basically that humans can evaluate whether something is worth pursuing all-things-considered, whereas animals simply see a pleasure and go towards it, without consideration for how it fits into their larger goals. For this reason humans can decline present pleasure for the sake of something in the future. So concupiscible appetite is for anything that seems good to the animal soul in that moment, but this does not mean that object of appetite needs to be something the animal is aware of as present and nearby, and it would be odd it did: concupiscible appetite is meant to be an explanation for much of animal behavior, but much of animal behavior involves wanting what is not nearby, as opposed to wanting what is.

V. Different Types of Dominance?

One issue that might occur to the reader after seeing these two types of moved-movers associated with different types of pleasures, is why no similar distinction is made between varieties of moved-movers associated with dominance. For example, we might distinguish a

47 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.10, 433b5-10.

moved-mover associated with dominance over threats that would pain the external senses, from dominance over obstacles that would pain one inwardly. Indeed, in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*, following Aristotle, he provides examples of states we would think of as irascible, like anger, but which are associated with dominance over obstacles that would cause inward pain (e.g., anger can be directed at a verbal slight or scorn).[48] And in the very next section we'll see Avicenna continue in 4.4 with some examples of acts of the irascible appetite, and in these Avicenna is obviously aware that irascible acts can vary depending on the complexity of, at least, the intentional object involved. So the pieces are there, but Avicenna never explicitly distinguishes different levels of moved-movers towards external or internal types of dominance over obstacles. It is possible he does not feel this need because he takes it to be clear: having made the distinctions for varieties of moved-movers associated with pleasure, it is easy enough to fill in the gaps for the irascible appetite and its analogues. In any case, since talk of different faculties, or different moved-movers, is really just a way of systematizing what sorts of things animals and humans are capable of, little of substance changes, provided the range of moved-movers is recognized one way or another.

too weak: faculty distinctions are not merely rational for Avicenna, are they? especially not when organs are involved, or competing operations.

Va. The Intentional Objects for Particular Acts of the Irascible Faculty

In the final part of his overview section on moved-movers in *Psychology* 4.4, Avicenna lists concrete examples of various types of moved-movers, which not only add to our understanding of previously distinguished types of moved-movers, but also introduce new ones. He begins by listing particular states of the concupiscible and irascible appetites. Text T2e will show us two things: 1) the irascible faculty's tendency to achieve dominance results in different particular

48 Avicenna, *Al-Shifa', Al-Khaṭāba [Rhetoric]*, 3.1, 130.

emotions, depending on how exactly the intentional object is conceived, and 2) defining any particular moved-mover involves specifying the moved-mover *and* the cognitive component that causes it:

> [T2e] Fear [*al-khawf*] and distress [*al-ghamm*] and sadness [*al-ḥuzn*][49] are actualizations [*ʿawāriḍ*] of the irascible faculty with the participation [*bil-mushārika*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. And the irascible faculty, if it is opposed, following upon intellectual or imaginative conceptualization, there is fear. And if it does not fear, it becomes strong. Distress occurs to the irascible faculty on account of that which [at other times] causes anger, when something is prevented from defending against something else, or when one fears something else's occurrence. And joy [*al-faraḥ*] which belongs in the category of subduing, is the end/final cause [*ghāya*] for this faculty also. Greediness [*al-ḥirṣ*], gluttony [*al-naham*], and lust [*al-shabq*], and what is similar to them, they belong to the bestial concupiscible faculty.

(1) is apparent in the different examples of the irascible appetite Avicenna provides here. Our general inclination to achieve dominance takes on the specific character of fear when we conceive of some obstacle as especially imposing (and hence unlikely to be successfully opposed), anger or courage if we think the obstacle can be overcome, or distress if we simply know it cannot be. These different inclinations nonetheless fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these are ways of being oriented towards dominance.

(2) is implied by the fact that fear, distress and sadness are said to be acts of the irascible faculty "with the participation" of the perceptive faculties, and presumably what is true of these acts is true for defining particular moved-movers in general. To specify what fear is, you cannot just say, "it is a variety of irascible appetite." Instead, you need to reference the associated intentional object, that is, the way in which the pleasure or obstacle is cognized. In one way, this

49 The fact that distress and sadness are states of the irascible faculty is something that will be discussed in chapter five, the chapter on on pain and pleasure. This text makes it seem like pain-like states have the irascible faculty as their subject, while in Avicenna's *Rhetoric* pain-like states show up as component parts of definitions of irascible emotions. So the precise relationship between the irascible faculty and pain needs more analysis, but must wait until we can focus on pleasure and pain on their own.

is nothing new, since Avicenna's general descriptions of the motive faculty qua inclining already stated that it is dependent on cognition. But (2) is a distinct point because a *specific* irascible act, like distress, cannot be understood merely with the general knowledge that the irascible faculty is dependent on cognition. Rather, the specific cognition seems to be essential to understanding what the particular variety of irascible act is. In Martha Nussbaum's argument for the centrality of evaluation to emotion, she claims that anything but the cognitive component of an emotion is too underspecified to be the essence of an emotion.[50] Avicenna would not agree with this view entirely, since he clearly thinks that the most central thing that makes anger what it is, for example, is that it is a type of moved-mover (an "actualization of" the motive faculty, in the words of T2e), but what allows us to identify a specific type of moved-mover is the cognition that causes it. Avicenna's cursory mention of examples of the concupiscible faculty at the end of T2e suggests that we would need to take a similar approach to fully flesh out their definitions.

One final point that needs to be clarified from T2e is Avicenna's statement that "joy in the category of subduing" is in some sense the end, or final cause, of the irascible faculty. Read one way, this would stand in tension with Avicenna's way of distinguishing the concupiscible and irascible appetite in Psychology 1.5 and text T2a from 4.4. In those texts, the concupiscible faculty aims at pleasure, and the irascible faculty aims at dominance. So it would be odd if Avicenna meant the final object of the irascible faculty were also a type of pleasure qua pleasure. Yet there is no denying that just as reaching an object of the concupiscible appetite brings a kind of pleasure, so a certain kind of pleasure attends any instance of overcoming an obstacle. The difference is that while concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure qua pleasure, the irascible appetite seeks overcoming qua overcoming, and when this goal is achieved, one experiences pleasure.

50 Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, 29.

The state of the person fighting for the love of fighting is different than the state of the person fighting out of self-defense, even though both might lead to pleasure. They both seek overcoming, but under different aspects: one qua overcoming, one as a pleasure. In fact, the person fighting for the love of fighting would best be classified as seeking a kind of internal pleasure of the imagination, as opposed to a concupiscible object. So "joy in the category of subduing" is just another way of saying that "subduing" is the final object of the irascible faculty, and by definition, achieving a final object brings satisfaction.

but why is satisfaction any less ambiguous than joy?

VI. Pleasure-States as Types of Moved-Movers

After these elaborations on the acts of concupiscible and irascible appetite, Avicenna distinguishes two final types of states: pleasures-states, particular to the perceptive faculties, and states particular to the rational soul:

?? accidents; occurrences? this is just inaccurate?

> [T2f] Enjoyment of people [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*ʿawāriḍ*] of the perceptive powers [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human powers, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we'll talk about soon.[51]

The second half of T2f is easier to make sense of than the first. Avicenna has nothing else to say in 4.4 about the states particular to the human soul, because he is about to discuss them in 5.1. In 5.1, according to his chapter heading, Avicenna discusses the various acts and affections (*al-afʿāl wal-infiʿālāt*) that are made possible by the intellect. Not every action and affection made possible by the intellect 5.1 are what Avicenna is referring to here in 4.4, so the question arises as to which of the acts and affections described in 5.1 count as moved-movers. We will turn to 5.1 shortly and clarify this issue.

51 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 4.4, 196.

Enjoyment of people and gladness, the two examples of acts of the perceptive powers, are more difficult to make sense of, because they are varieties of pleasures. And we will see more fully in chapter five, Avicenna thinks of pleasures as completion states, where an object or perfection is acquired, not sought. Thus, their occurence in a chapter on the motive faculties needs some explanation. The definitions of these words are important for making sense of them, so it is worth explaining why they mean what they mean. This is straightforward in the case of "*surūr*/gladness," since it is used elsewhere as generic variety of a pleasurable state, contrasted with pain.[52] The definition of "*istīnās*/enjoyment of people" is less straightforward. Given the linguistic form of the Arabic word (form 10), which often carries with it the idea of "seeking," and the root in that form, which refers to the idea of persons, one might think that it means something like "desire to be around people." This would make sense of its place in the chapter on moved-movers, but not its being grouped alongside gladness, with the perceptive faculty alone. Fortunately, no dictionaries attest to such a definition. Instead, one of the main classical definitions is something like "enjoyment of people"—not seeking out people, but enjoyment once their presence is attained. The Latins translated this word as "*solatium*/relief from distress," which might feel like a different notion altogether, but it makes sense it one considers that a primary way of finding consolation is to be around people. So *solatium* is a bit of a loose translation, but it does not problematize taking Avicenna to be talking about enjoyment of people as a completion state, alongside gladness.

?istinas has that appearance, but only on your translation

I think you are overdoing this

Given that Avicenna is in the midst of explaining and listing various types of moved-movers, there is no reason not to take these actualizations of the perceptive powers under that general heading, as well. At first glance, this feels strange, because 4.4 is about inclinations, of which

52 Ibid., 1.3, 31-32.

appetite [*shawq*] is the primary example, and he states at the beginning of 4.4 that acts of the perceptive faculties are in no way appetitive, and vice versa.[53] However, throughout 4.4 we have seen him gradually widening our understanding of what can count as a moved-mover, and this seems to be an extension of that project. It remains true that perceptive moved-movers do not involve *appetite*, because they are motivations that do not involve any kind of lack, or reaching out: they are emotions of completion, where the object is already attained. But we could see completion states as moved-movers in a wider sense, in that they directly affect behavior by disposing us towards some object (i.e., the thing being enjoyed). They incline us, in the words of some contemporary emotion theorists, to "keep going" in whatever it is we are doing.[54] Indeed, in his *Remarks*, Avicenna says that experiences with the spiritual realm in this life bring with them a kind of pleasure that motivates one to pursue truth more fully.[55] Likewise, bodily pleasures affect behavior in that they *distract* us from such pure pursuits.[56] Appetite and pleasure-states can both be moved-movers, apparently, even if pleasure states are not appetitive.

this isn't keeping going

Avicenna may not be explicit that this is the way he wants us to understand the acts of the perceptive faculties in T2f, but it fits with a common way of talking about how pleasure states affect behavior, and there is no other more straightforward reading of the text. We often think of pleasure-states as in the same conceptual territory as emotions, feelings, and appetites, and presumably this was also true in Avicenna's milieu. If we do not want to read the text along these lines, it seems there are only two other options:

53 Ibid., 4.4, 194.
54 For example: Matthen, "Play, Skill, and the Origins of Perceptual Art," 179.
55 Using the term *bāʿith* for "motivate," a term we have seen in 4.4. Avicenna, *Al-Ishārāt Wa-Al-Tanbīhāt [Pointers and Reminders]*, Vol. 4 *al-Taṣawwuf*: 8.15-16.
56 Ibid., 8.15-16.

> **Alternate Reading 1)** enjoyment of people and gladness are understood as acts of the concupiscible faculty, with the participation of the perceptive powers.
> **Alternate Reading 2)** enjoyment of people and gladness are understood as acts of the perceptive faculty, and do not involve the motive faculty.

Alternate reading 1 is possible if we take T2f to be more directly a continuation of T2e. In that case, after describing acts of the the irascible faculty "with the participation of the perceptive faculties," he would be going on to distinguish two types of concupiscible acts: those that do not involve perception (the acts of the "bestial concupiscible faculty," mentioned at the end of T2e), and then those that do involve perception (enjoyment of people and gladness). This interpretati fits somewhat with the flow of the text, but it would be odd for Avicenna to distinguish acts of the concupiscible faculty that do and do not involve perception. For as we know, all appetite follows cognition, and he did not make this sort of division between varieties of irascible appetites.

Alternate reading 2 would make sense if it were implausible for Avicenna to extend the idea of "moved-mover" to perceptive faculties. In that case, he would just be mentioning pleasurable completion states as a way of reminding us that these are *distinct* from the sort of thing he has been discussing in 4.4. But, far from being a break in the flow of thought, these are presented as fitting with the subject under discussion, and we have seen that a wider notion of moved-mover could be used to capture the idea of pleasurable, behavior-affecting completion states.

So, for Avicenna, pleasure-states are in the came conceptual territory as acts of the concupiscible and irascible faculty, in that they are all moved-movers, but pleasure-states do not have the concupiscible or irascible faculty as their subject in any way. In this we can notice a contrast with how pleasure states are handled by, for example, Aquinas, who considers pleasure most fundamentally to be a completion state of the concupiscible appetite, when it achieves its

object.[57] For Avicenna, pleasure is not necessarily tied to the completion of an appetite, though completing appetites (concupiscible, irascible, or otherwise) does bring pleasure, since pleasure occurs whenever any faculty achieves its object.

VII. Avicennian Terminology for Moved-Movers

Now that we have seen the varieties of moved-movers Avicenna discusses in Psychology 4.4, we can see that "inclination" is a more Avicennian, and less cumbersome, way of referring to these states. To review, he has mentioned the following states:

- Acts of the irascible appetite
- Acts of the concupiscible appetite, ordered towards pleasures of the external senses
- Acts similar to the concupiscible appetite, but ordered towards pleasures of the imagination (i.e., internal pleasures)
- Pleasurable completion-states
- Acts uniquely dependent on the rational soul

The terms in Psychology 4.4 that best capture all of theses states are *inbiʿāthāt* and *nazzāʿāt*, both of which could be translated as a impulse, or inclinations, or motivations. Avicenna uses these terms in T2b, when he says that "we find in animals impulses [*inbiʿāthāt*] not [just] for their concupiscible pleasures, but also an inclination [*nazzāʿ*] towards," followed by a description of the "something" towards internal pleasures. These two Arabic terms, *inbiʿāth* and *nazzāʿ*, and other words related to their Arabic roots, are used elsewhere by Avicenna and others in the tradition when wanting to connote something related to but broader than concupiscible or irascible appetite.

For example, when first introducing the motive faculty in I.5, Avicenna says that "the motive power insofar as it is motivates is the *inclining*, appetitive faculty [*al-nazūʿiyyah al-*

57 King, "Aquinas on the Passions," 19.

shawqiyyah]."[58] Al-Farabi and Averroes likewise use *nazzāʿ* in a generic sense.[59] In 1.5, Avicenna uses a word related to *inbiʿāth* to distinguish the motivate faculty qua motivating (*baʿith*) from the motive power in the muscles that actually moves (*fāʿil*). Of course, Avicenna also uses appetite/*shawq* to convey something generic, capturing both concupiscible or irascible appetite, but we have seen that this had some specific connotations at the time, and was apparently not seen as useful for referring to all the states listed above. However, sometimes *inbiʿāth* has an even more broad sense in Avicenna's writings than *nazzāʿ*, used to mean "something instinctive," as when he uses the term to refer to the evaluative judgments made by the faculty of estimation in animals.[60] So while it would be correct to call the states in 4.4 *inbiʿāthāt* or *nazzāʿāt*, *nazzāʿāt* seems to more precisely pick out the phenomena that belongs exclusively to the discussion in 4.4.

Given the role we know moved-movers play in Avicenna's psychology, it would be best to translate *nazzāʿ* as "inclination," rather than "motivation" or "impulse." *Nazzāʿāt* are in response to cognition, and "impulses" as an English translation seems like it could equally well refer to a movement of the vegetative faculties that do not respond to cognition. Motivation, on the other hand, is too easily confused in English with the idea of a cognitive reason, and that is of course what causes the states under discussion, so it would be best not to adopt it as a way of referring to the states themselves. Inclination, on the other hand, connotes the idea of being disposed to act in a certain way, without actually acting, and that is precisely what all these states pick out. The only trouble with this translation is that inclination is also a good English translation of the Arabic *mayl*, which Avicenna often uses to refer to something's naturally tendency in virtue of its

58 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 1.5, 41.
59 See Al-Fārābī, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*, 10.6, 170.; also Averroes, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb Al-Nafs [Epitome of De Anima]*, 96–100.
60 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 4.3, 182.

nature (like a stone's tendency to fall), or even someone being on the verge of believing something[61], and these are obviously different phenomena that what is discussed in 4.4. So provided we are mindful of when Avicenna is using *mayl*, and when he is using *nazzāʿ*, inclination is a good way of referring to moved-movers. Gatje has suggested that *inbiʿāthāt* and *nazzāʿāt* in Avicenna's philosophy have roughly the same scope as the Greek *hormē*, which seems right,[62] although Aristotle never uses *hormē* as a way of referring to moved-movers (doing so is more of a practice among the Stoics, and it is not clear whether Avicenna is influenced in his psychology by the Stoics).[63] Aristotle uses *orexis* to capture the idea of moved-movers in a more limited sense, so Avicenna's use of a broader term seems to be a helpful innovation.

VIII. Uniquely Human Inclinations in Psychology 5.1

We have already seen in Avicenna's overview of the faculties in I.5 that the practical intellect makes general evaluative judgments, which it then cooperates with the animal cognitive faculties to apply to particular situations, and in V.1 Avicenna reemphasizes that it is in this sense that the practical intellect is relevant to inclinations. The dual role of the practical intellect is obvious in the following summary statement from V.1, which comes after he finishes distinguishing the practical and theoretical intellect:

syntax?

> For there is in a person a sensible judge, and an estimative judge in the realm of imagination, and an intellectual and practical judge. And the motive/inclining principles [*al-mabadī al-bāʿitha*] relevant to faculty that resolves on the movement of the organs, are the estimative imagination, and the practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Other animals have three of these.[64]

61 For inclining to belief, see Ibid., 5.1, 208. For inclining on account of one's nature, see Ibid., 3.8, 157.
62 Gätje, "Zur Psychologie der Willenshandlungen in der islamischen Philosophie," 359.
63 Ibid., 361.
64 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 5.1, 208.

The practical intellect is primarily a cognitive faculty, like sensation, estimation, and the theoretical intellect. But it is also relevant to inclinations, in the same way that "estimative imagination" is relevant to inclinations among the strictly animal faculties. The practical intellect is, on its own, the subject of an inclination, but it accounts for different types of judgments that result in different actualizations of the animal motive faculties.

As mentioned before, the heading of *Psychology* 5.1 refers to "actions and affections" that are unique to humans, and many of these depend on the practical intellect, but only some would constitute the "states unique to the rational soul" that Avicenna alludes to in 4.4. This is because there is a difference between the practical intellect making possible more complex behavior to act on inclinations we share in common with animals, and the practical intellect making possible different types of inclinations altogether.

In a very general sense, anytime a judgment of the practical intellect leads to an actualization of the animal motive faculties, this would be "unique" in that it was caused by a more general sort of judgment than that of which animals are capable. The general phenomena of directing the motive faculty by means of human reason is what Avicenna and the tradition refer to as "choice [Ar: *iktiyār*, Gr: *bouleisis*]." He begins 5.1 by discussing activities unique to humans, such as engaging in trade and linguistic communication. These are obviously activities unique to humans, but they do not necessarily involve unique inclinations. Trade can be a way of acting on concupiscible appetite, and linguistic communication could help fulfill an inclination towards the internal pleasure of familial relations.

but why say this? there is no reason to assume all phenomena discussed in 5.1 are emotions!

But when Avicenna switches to talking about "affections [*infiʿālāt*]" unique to humans, he is interested not just in behavior unique to humans, but in unique inclinations. *Infiʿāl* is another generic term Avicenna sometimes uses to circumscribe similar phenomena that fall under the

heading of *inbiʿāth* and *nazzāʿ*. *Infiʿāl* does not as precisely pick out the functional role that these phenomena serve in his psychology as does the idea of "inclination," meaning more generally "passion," or "that which one undergoes." But since it was in use to refer to emotions/inclinations prior to Avicenna, it makes sense that he would slip into using it.

but here I don't see any reason to think Avicenna takes this term to be improper; why is it a slip?

Avicenna's discussion of inclinations unique to humans in 5.1 can be broken in roughly three sections, based on how we know these inclinations are unique to humans: 1) inclinations known to be unique through their physical manifestations, 2) inclinations in response to behavior grasped as bad according to social norms, and 3) inclinations in response to objects judged as worthy of pursuit or fleeing in the future.

VIIIa. Inclinations Known as Uniquely Human Through Their Physical Manifestations

Inclinations of the first sort, which I am describing as inclinations known to be unique through their physical manifestations, are caused by uniquely human cognitions, but they are also accompanied by noteworthy, uniquely human physical manifestations. Avicenna has two phenomena in particular in mind, wonder and anxiety, which he describes as follows:

yes, that is how we know they are unique!

> [T3a] One of the distinguishing characteristics of humans is that there follows upon his apprehension of rare/witty [*nādira*] things an affection [*infiʿāl*] which is called wonder [*al-taʿajjub*], and laughter follows [wonder]. And following his apprehension of harmful things there is an affection [*infiʿāl*] called anxiety/distress [*ḍajar*], which is followed by crying.[65]

What causes wonder and this variety of anxiety/distress in humans are uniquely human cognitions, but the reason Avicenna groups these two inclinations together is because they are also known by their uniquely human physical manifestations.

65 Avicenna, 5.1, 204.

Laughter—the physical manifestation of wonder—holds a notable place within Aristotelian works on psychology, because of Aristotle's statement in *Parts of Animals* that humans are the only animal that laugh.[66] *Parts of Animals* was translated in the 8th century, along with *History of Animals* and *Generation of Animals*, by Yahya Ibn al-Batriq, so Avicenna would have been aware of this specification. In *Parts of Animals*, Aristotle mentions laughter as unique to humans due to the physical makeup of their diaphragm. Here Avicenna places the explanatory emphasis on the unique cognition and emotion leading to laughter, rather than on the uniqueness of human diaphragms: recognizing something as rare or witty is what gives rise to laughter. This coheres with the commonplace modern idea that what constitutes humor is the thwarting of expectations, and it makes sense why only humans would subject to this inclination. As we will see when we look at emotions related to humans' ability to mark time, below in this same section, Avicenna thinks that having cognitive expectations (as opposed to mere instinct or intuition) is, in fact, uniquely human. Since Avicenna does not emphasize humans' unique diaphragms as the reason for their ability to laugh, presumably he thinks animals would laugh, too, *if* they experienced the relevant inclination, which would require having the relevant cognition. So wonder is caused by a distinctly human cognition, and it manifests itself in a way that is particular to humans.

This raises the issue of just what is the relation between the emotion—wonder—and the physical manifestation—laughter. Here Avicenna clearly thinks of an emotion as distinct from its closely related physical manifestation, something he had already emphasized in a prior section of Psychology.[67] The relation between an emotion and its closely related physical manifestation is something we will examine in more detail in chapter four, on the physiology of emotion. Nonetheless, it is obvious there is a stronger connection between, say, wonder and laughter, and,

66 Aristotle, *Aristotle*, 3.10, 673a.

67 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 4.4, 198.

fear and sweating, than wonder and applause, or fear and the act of running away. The physical manifestation of an inclination is different than the physical behavior or course of action by which one acts on that inclination.

Avicenna has little to say here about the nature of wonder itself, ~~since~~ but it is something he takes up elsewhere, in the context of poetics and aesthetics.[68] He is focused here on examining the range of uniquely human inclinations, and how we can classify them, not on examining the inclinations themselves.

The other uniquely human manifestation of an emotion Avicenna discusses here is crying. Humans' propensity to cry is common throughout ancient discussions of emotions, but Avicenna seems to be the first to group it with laughter as manifesting a uniquely human inclination. Galen is the first to discuss the tear duct in detail, and he notes that one of its functions is to release moisture from the lacrimal glands.[69] His discussion makes no mention of this being unique to humans, since of course it is not. Animals moistening their eyes out of physical necessity is different from what it is like to cry, and Avicenna seems to pick up on the difference. Today there is debate about whether humans are, in fact, the only animals that cry or laugh, and after many more years of animal observation it is by no means clear that these physical manifestations do signify uniquely human inclinations. But the fact that there is lively debate about these phenomena shows that it was astute for Avicenna to have pointed it out.

Unlike wonder, which Avicenna discusses elsewhere at length, this seems to be the only time he uses this particular word, *ḍajar* (anxiety/distress), so it is difficult to know just how it differs from other varieties of negative psychological inclinations. But it is possible to speculate: the entry on *ḍajar* in Lane's Lexicon does not restrict *ḍajar* to humans, and it is used for a range of

68 For a thorough discussion see chaper one in Harb, "Poetic Marvels."
69 Galen, *Galen on the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body*, 489–90.

states from the mental distress from the loss of a loved one, to the sort of mental distress animals can experience when being milked. Even if *ḍajar* was sometimes used in the later sense, Avicenna is obviously trying to pick out something more specific here, and uniquely human. What both types of examples in Lane have in common is that they are states of mental distress where there is not much that can be done about the distressing event in question, except, in the case of humans, to cry. The Latins translated *ḍajar* as *anxietas*, which is of course an emotion that pervades human life.[70] Human life is full of stress, sometimes leading to tear-filled breakdowns that are not focused on any sort of action, but just involve ruminating over something harmful and sad. The fact that humans experience mental distress of such a type that it leads to crying, when other animals have tear ducts that do not get engaged in the same way, shows that this type of mental distress is uniquely human. Obviously animals can grasp things as harmful, so what Avicenna must mean here is that humans grasp things as harmful in a particular kind of way—the sort of way that leads to *ḍajar*/anxiety and crying. no evidence in text!

In sum, wonder and anxiety are uniquely human inclinations, known to be so because of their uniquely human physical manifestations. Animals have the relevant body parts to laugh and cry, and presumably would laugh and cry if they had the appropriate inclinations. But they do not, and this is how we can be certain that wonder and anxiety are only experienced by humans.

VIIIb. Inclinations in Response to Uniquely Humans Social Orders

Avicenna's overview of uniquely human emotions continues with shame, which Avicenna builds to by discussing the way that humans set up moral standards for communal benefit in a way that animals do not. Avicenna describes shame as follows:

70 Avicenna, *Liber de Anima Seu Sextus de Naturalibus*, 5.1, vol. 2, page 74.

> [T3b] […] And there follows from a human's awareness that someone else is aware that he did something which it is agreed upon that one should not do a psychological affection [*infi'āl nafsānī*] called shame [*khajl*]. And this is also one of the distinguishing characteristics of humans.[71]

The reason humans can experience shame, and brute animals cannot, is that animals do not set up moral standards for communal benefit. In a section that comes between [3a] and [3b], Avicenna explains how humans develop complex moral standards and raise people to abide by them, such that the belief that certain things are wrong, and behavior in keeping with those principles, becomes "like that which is instinctual [*kal-gharīzī*]." In other words, it becomes habit.[72] Animals, on the other hand, merely do what is or is not appropriate for the sake of their survival, like not killing the human who is the source of their food, or caring for their offspring. Rather than being due to habit, an animal's communal survival behavior is merely due to natural instinct [*al-ilhām*].[73]

Aside from being rooted in a uniquely human social order, it makes sense that Avicenna would single out shame here, since shame's phenomenology does not obviously fit with any of the inclinations covered in *Psychology* 4.4. It is not an inclination towards a good, either of the senses or imagination, and it is not a response to a concrete obstacle. Shame is a kind of sadness that occurs specifically when you evaluate something you have done as bad in the eyes of the group, according to agreed upon moral standards, and since animals cannot have agreed upon moral standards, they do not feel shame.

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71 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 5.1, 205.

72 The way Avicenna discusses human moral development here is reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of virtue, acquired as a second nature, in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1.

73 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 5.1, 205.. A discussion related to this is in Avicenna's *Remarks and Admonitions*, where he says that some moral standards would not arise were it not for the social context of humans. See: Avicenna, *Al-Ishārāt Wa-Al-Tanbīhāt [Pointers and Reminders]*, Vol. 1, *Al-Manṭiq*: 351–52.

no? Avicenna doesn't think that any moral standards are innate.

VIIIc. Inclinations in Response to Uniquely Human Awareness of Time

Avicenna concludes his discussion of uniquely human emotions by describing those that are in response to objects that might cause harm or pleasure in the future. The two names he uses for inclinations that can be about future objects, fear [*al-khawf*] and hope [*al-rajāʾ*], are sometimes also used for animal inclination. However, Avicenna explains that certain types of fear and hope are unique to humans:

> [T3c] And there could occur to a person a psychological affection [*infiʿāl nafsānī*] because of his believing something in the future is among those things which will harm him, and this is called fear [*al-khawf*]. Other animals only have that affection in relation to what they think of as regular in the now, and connected to the now.
>
> And a human has, in contrast with fear, hope [*al-rajāʾ*], which animals [again] do not have, except in relation to the now, and [the hope animals have] is not for that which is far off from the now of that time. That which animals do is rote, and not because they are aware of time and that which pertains to it. Indeed, that also is a kind of instinct [*ḍarb min al-ilhām*]; for example, that which ants do in terms of moving provisions to their burrow, signaling rain [it is because] they imagine that that is something which is happening in that time, just like when an animal flees an opponent when he imagines that the other one is going to strike him at that time.[74]

Aristotl noticed the relevance of time to psychology in *De Anima* 3.10, saying that it is humans' ability to perceive time that allows them to resist now-oriented animal appetite for the sake of future goods.[75] Avicenna is less interested here in conflicting inclinations, than in the fact that perception of time makes certain uniquely human emotions possible. It is one thing to attempt to restrain a present concupiscible appetite out of considerations for the future, and this is what Aristotle was focused on in *De Anima* 3.10. It is another thing to be aware of a possible pleasure or harm that does not yet exist, and to hope or fear, respectively, that it might.

74 Avicenna, *Al-Shifāʾ, Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 5.1, 205-206.
75 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.10, 433b5-10

Avicenna explains elsewhere what he means by time, and human perception of it,[76] but it is uncontroversial in this tradition that humans have the ability to perceive time, and other animals in general do not.[77] Admittedly, some animals exhibit behavior where it looks like they are aware of time, and even seem to prepare for the future. Themistius, commenting on *De Anima* 3.10, speculates that this may be because select animals, like ants and bees, do in fact perceive time.[78] But in the above text Avicenna has a different explanation for that behavior: some sort of instinct prompts them to imagine that it is raining in the present, which provokes behavior that amounts to preparation.

Rather than using new emotion terms for these future oriented emotions, Avicenna prefers to contrast hope-for-something-in-the-present with hope-for-something-in-the-future, and fear-for-something-in-the-present with fear-for-something-in-the-future. There is clearly a relation between these uniquely human inclinations, and the inclinations also shared with animals. But just as how shame did not did neatly into any of the categories outlined in *Psychology* 4.4, neither do these future-oriented emotions. Animals are capable of inclinations in response to pleasures or harms that they think they could acquire or avoid in the present, whereas humans can take the long view, for better or worse. Fearing or hoping for something in the future does not necessarily lead to any action in the present. Like shame and wonder, they are inclinations that could result in little concrete action, but are strongly felt nonetheless.

To summarize, the three new types of emotions Avicenna points out here, unique to humans, are distinguished as follows: those that we know to be uniquely human because of their uniquely human physical manifestations (inclinations like wonder and anxiety), those that are rooted in

76 Avicenna, *The Physics of The Healing*, 2.10-11.
77 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 3.10, 433b5ff.
78 Themistius, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's* De Anima, 2:221, 120.10ff.

uniquely human social and moral orders (shame), and those that are rooted in the uniquely human ability to perceive time (future-oriented hope and fear). These are all uniquely human inclinations in the sense that they are varieties of actualizations of the animal motive faculty that only occur in humans, caused by judgments of the rational soul.

IX. Other Cases of Uniquely Human Inclinations

Before drawing any general conclusions about the view of inclination that holds together 5.1 and 4.4, there are three cases of what we might also call uniquely human inclinations that do not get mentioned in 5.1, but which are important for our consideration of Avicenna's overall view: 1) humans' use of reason to guide animal inclination, 2) humans' inclination towards the good, and 3) completion states of the theoretical intellect.

Avicenna discusses how humans use reason to guide the concupiscible and irascible appetites in his *Treatise on Love*. *Treatise on Love* is an early work, but Avicenna's point here is a fairly standard one, and it is likely that his lack of discussion of the topic in later works was due to the fact that he took it for granted, rather than that he gave it up. The concupiscible appetite is actualized when we are thinking about some pleasure to the external senses, the irascible when we are thinking about some obstacle that would cause pain to the external senses. In non-human animals objects are presented in the imagination more or less at random ("*min ghayr qaṣd.*")[79] Humans, however, can attempt to rouse our appetites for physical pleasure or dominance for more noble reasons, such as preservation of the species, or defending a city. Insofar as these are inclinations, they are not uniquely human. They are actualizations of the specifically same sort of

79 Avicenna, *Risāla Fi-Al-ʿishq [Treatise on Love]*, 256.

inclinations that animals can have, just stirred up intentionally.[80] But insofar as animals are not able to govern inclinations in this way, the phenomena is uniquely human.

As for the second point, the animal motive faculty can sometimes be roused by objects or concerns that only occur to the intellect. This is different than the intellect governing animal appetites, it is the motive faculty in response to a different sort of object altogether. Recall that in *Psychology* 4.4, text T2c, Avicenna briefly mentioned that the animal motive faculty can be actualized "for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good." No further explanation is given in 4.4, or anywhere else in Avicenna's later works, about what this means. But in the *Treatise on Love*, after describing the way that the intellect can guide the concupiscible and irascible faculties, he mentions something similar:

> And acts could proceed from a person, from the core of their rational faculty, such as the conceiving of intelligibles, inclination [*nazzāʿ*] towards important matters, love of the next life and [love of] being close to the noble one.[81]

These activities, which we could summarize as seeking intelligibles and seeking the divine, are objects that non-human animals simply do not have access to, and therefore cannot experience inclinations towards. We can see the connection of this passage to 4.4 because, summarizing still further, these things are objects which it would be appropriate to call good.

The good, as Avicenna defines it in his *Rhetoric*, is that which is sought for its own sake.[82] We can understand this in two ways. Firstly, in this context, the good is that which is not sought merely for the sake of pleasure. While there is a broad sense of "good" which Avicenna will sometimes use to refer to sensible objects, and activities which are done well, he does not use the term "good" when discussing the final objects of strictly animal inclinations. Rather, as we have

80 As we will see in the next chapter, objects can be evaluated in a natural, instinctual way, or a rational/deliberative way.
81 Avicenna, *Risāla Fi-Al-ʿishq [Treatise on Love]*, 256.
82 Avicenna, *Al-Shifaʾ, Al-Khaṭāba [Rhetoric]*, 2.3, 80.

seen, they are for the sake of external and internal pleasure. Humans, on the other hand, have the capacity to seek out that which is good in and of itself. Of course, experiences of the good (intelligibles and the divine) are pleasant, but they are not sought for that reason. The second way of understanding the good is as that whose goodness is not dependent on anything else. In this sense, God is the true good.[83] It is not always clear which sense of good Avicenna is using when he refers to uniquely human objects of inclination, but what is clear is that he thinks such uniquely human objects of inclination exist. We have inclination towards the good insofar it is presented to the animal motive faculty as something "to be sought after," in the language of *Psychology* 1.5.

Finally, to the third point, there is a kind of pleasure in completion states of the theoretical intellect, when the theoretical intellect performs its function of grasping intelligibles. In *Psychology* 1.3 Avicenna briefly mentions this sort of phenomena as an example of how the intellect is obviously connected to the body, as intellectual pleasure is not without physical arousal.[84] Further, in *Remarks and Admonitions* Avicenna discusses intellectual pleasures of the theoretical intellect as the highest sort of pleasure, and from his visceral descriptions it is difficult to imagine those pleasures being attained in this life without any manifestation in the body.[85] As we know from *Psychology* 4.4, Avicenna considers completion states types of inclinations, so these would be cases where it is the theoretical intellect's activity, apparently without the practical intellect, that brings about inclination states.

83 Avicenna, *Risāla Fi-Al-ʿishq [Treatise on Love]*, 263.
84 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', Kitāb Al-Nafs [Psychology]*, 1.3, 31-32.
85 Avicenna, *Al-Ishārāt Wa-Al-Tanbīhāt [Pointers and Reminders]*, Vol. 4 al-Taṣawwuf: 8.16, 34

X. Concluding Summary and the Role of the Practical Intellect

We can conclude by stepping back and reflecting on the unity of Avicenna's discussions of inclination in general. We started by looking at how Avicenna enters the stage set by the Aristotelian schema prior to him. On that schema, the proximate cause of voluntary motion is some sort of moved-mover, which was broadly captured by Avicenna's concept of the motive faculty. Moved-movers are moved by unmoved-movers, which are behaviorally relevant objects cognized as to be sought, or to be avoided.

?perhaps Aristotle says this, but there is no need for a moved mover to have an unmoved mover, except in the first instance. Why is the cognized object unmoved?

As we examined the various types of moved-movers in *Psychology* 4.4, distinguished by the sort of objects they are directed towards, we saw that Avicenna groups a wide range of phenomena under this heading, and uses terms that can be translated as "inclination" to describe them. Animal inclinations include those towards and away from pleasures and harms appreciable by the external senses, towards internal pleasures, and completion-states. These are all presented as actualizations of the motive faculty, broadly speaking.

When Avicenna turns to uniquely human inclinations in 5.1, it is not to distinguish a new motive faculty, but rather to distinguish different types of cognitions that actualize the animal motive faculty. Nowhere does Avicenna say that the intellect is in any way the *subject* of uniquely human emotion. Rather the intellect is the cause of more complex, behaviorally-relevant cognitions that affect the animal motive faculty. As we have seen, Avicenna's writings include a number of phenomena that would fit under this heading:

is this a new point? does he say that the appetites are subjects of emotions? I am not sure what the significance of this is, and I'm not sure how to evaluate it as an interpretation of Avicenna. Do you want to claim that all these emotions are physically localized in the animal motive faculty? I am not sure your discussion here has really shown that, except negatively.

- Particular inclinations that have no analogues in animals (wonder, anxiety, shame)
- Inclinations oriented at future pleasures or obstacles
- Animal inclinations that are guided by reason
- Completion states of the theoretical intellect
- Inclinations towards the good

On Avicenna's broad understanding of inclination, these are all ways that humans can actualize the motive faculty in unique ways. The animal motive faculty's most basic function is to respond to anything conceived of in the imagination as to-be-sought or to-be-avoided. Since all cognition involves imagination, uniquely intellectual cognitions or judgments can affect the animal motive faculty in all the above ways.

One might wonder in all of this what has happened to the importance of the practical intellect. In Avicenna's general remarks about animal motive principles that we looked at, the practical intellect was highlighted as was especially important. But not all of the above uniquely human inclinations involve the practical intellect: one explicitly involves the theoretical intellect, others (like wonder, anxiety and shame) are unspecific about whether the practical or theoretical intellect is more relevant.

The practical intellect does not show up in every one of Avicenna's discussions of uniquely human inclination because, as we saw in T2a-d, the practical intellect is posited specifically for explaining how we evaluate objects and construct practical syllogisms to decide on courses of action (locomotion), and not every inclination above is obviously oriented towards concrete action. The ideas of theoretical and practical intellect are ways of referring to the two main functions of the rational soul, but they are not intended to capture everything that happens on account of our rationality. So when Avicenna talks about the "motive principles" for the soul, and includes practical intellect rather than theoretical intellect, it is because he is focused on principles specifically leading to action. But it turns out, as we have seen here, that there are other ways for the animal motive faculty to be actualized by the intellect. These would still deserve to be called inclinations, but they are not necessarily a part of the process for which the practical intellect is specifically posited to account. In the next chapter, we will distinguish those

inclinations that are specifically geared towards action, from the resolution-to-act (both states of the motive faculty), and see more how Avicenna understands the practical intellect's function in both.

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