

Chapter 5: Translation of the sections on emotions in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric and Compilation: Rhetoric*

Word Count: 15,265

From Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*

3.1 On persuasive/manipulative rhetorical speeches

[129]¹ Let us now discuss the types of rhetorical speech by which judges and listeners are persuaded [yastadriju bi-hā].

The [the type of rhetoric used] might differ according to the level of those judging, according to their minds and the sophistication of their beliefs, or the lack thereof, and that is especially the case in [legal] deliberations [mashwarāt]. As for lawsuits/trials [khaṣūmāt], it seems that in them there is more of a dependence on preserved laws than on distinct traits [of the speaker]. So if the rhetorician is acquainted [129.5] with the state of the judge, and the state of the opposing party [khaṣm], he benefits from that. For those judging are not all the same in their disposition towards those they like, and those they dislike.

And their judgment about one they bear ill will towards is fixed, in other words, they don't work to bring him a peaceful resolution. Likewise, if the judge of the defendant [lit: the judge of person who is the subject of the address] is manipulated towards thinking [of the defendant] with hatred, he believes the prosecutor [khaṣm], and he hates [the defendant], and if he thinks of the defendant with love, he believes the rhetorician and the respect [he proclaims] about [the defendant]. And suchlike are the things which incline [the judge] towards [the defendant] and harden him against the prosecutor. Or [another thing which affects judgment is] when [the judge] has a good opinion about the rhetorician, trusting him [129.10], on account of what he imagines in terms of his virtue and refinement, or something like that, thinking it likely [the rhetorician] would do good, just like it is probable that he would have scruples with doing something suspicious and harsh. For gentle natures easily do what is gentle, and harsh natures do what is harsh.

And the speaker could make someone believe him on account of confidence in his practical wisdom, [130] or [confidence] in his virtue, or [confidence] in his good will and friendship. And [arousing] disbelief is on account of the opposite of these. Similarly, telling a falsehood could happen in the deliberations among deliberators, either because of: their ignorance, their wickedness and their love of doing evil to people, or because of they do not care about what is being discussed, so they do not sincerely look into the matter, and they do evil through failure of knowledge.

As for scrutinizing a person and getting to know a person [130.5] in terms of the strength of their practical wisdom and the integrity of their nature, grasping this is only facilitated through a consideration of the types [of people] given in the chapter on praise and dispraise.²

¹ Page and line numbers in brackets accord with Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954).

² See section 2.4 of this same text, corresponding to 1.9 of Aristotle *Rhetoric*.

As for the state of good-will and friendship, and their relation, we will deal with their types in such a way as will get rid of the cause for the need to know about them [any further] when we mention the emotions. And [emotions] are states wherein which one's judgment differ, through a difference [consisting of] the transformation of the judger [when they are in that emotional state].³

So let's begin discussing these states with anger [ghaḍb], and the one who is angry, and the one toward whom anger is directed. As for [130.10] anger, it is a psychological pain [adhā nafsāniyyah] owing to [li] a desire [shawq] on the part of the person for bringing about a punishment that they see as appropriate because of the thought of a slight or scorn to him, from the one toward whom he is angry. On account of this, anger does not deal with universal humanity, for scorn does not issue from universal humanity, and revenge is not hoped for on account of it, but rather the object⁴ of anger is an individual person or a group of people. And you have learned about what pertains to anger in terms of pleasure⁵ [al-ladhdhah], [and you have learned that pleasure] draws out an increase in the anger.⁶

And as for scorn/disregard [istiḥqār], it is that which rears its head [130.15] on account of something said or done [indicating] to someone that someone else does not consider them deserving of concern, or have regard for their honor, or worry about their meeting some evil, or hope that they meet some good.

And scorn/disregard can be divided into three divisions: disdain [istihāna], [131] abuse [ʿanat], and insult [shatīma].

Disdain is the doing of that which indicates the worthlessness of the one disdained.

Abuse is dealing with someone in such a way that [the abuser] tries, by intentionally doing or not doing something, to get in the way of the other person for no other reason than the fact that they take pleasure in the other's discontent and helplessness. And [abuse] is not done except to someone who is considered not worth one's concern or respect, or who is not revered or feared.

3 Avicenna's most schematic definition of emotions in this text differs from that offered by Aristotle. Aristotle says: "Emotions [al-'ālam] are things that, when the one judging is changed because of them, their judgments differ; and they may be accompanied by pleasure and pain (83.10-11 in the Arabic version, cf. 1378a in the Greek)."

Aristotle follows this by mentioning the he will deal with individual emotions, and their opposites, and he provides a description of how he will treat each emotion: "It is necessary that we proceed and examine each [emotion] in the threefold manner. As for how this will be done, I say that it will follow the pattern of what we do concerning anger, when we show [1] the state--which one and what it is like [kayf wa bi-ayya ḥāl]—such that, if someone [is in it] they are disposed towards anger, and [2] on account of what [mimmā] it is typical for [a particular occurrence of anger] anger to occur, and [3] towards whom/what [ʿlā man] [anger is directed] (83.13-17 in the Arabic, cf. 1378a in the Greek)."

Avicenna does not include the references to pleasure and pain, or opposites, or the three aspects of emotions, in this initial overview. His analysis of individual emotions that follows, however, does proceed along these same lines.

4 This would correspond to the "towards whom" aspect of an emotion mentioned above, in fn. 3.

5 It is worth noting that anger involves both pleasure and pain.

6 Unclear to what prior section this is a reference, but it is illustrated in later in 131.15, where it is said that someone may get is angered when a pleasure gets taken away from them.

[131.5] And as for the manner of being harmed by insult, and the fact that it comes about through disregard, these are two clear phenomena which do not require elucidation. And insulting is also something which pleases the one insulting, on account of the dominance he imagines when he insults, and [on account of] conceiving in himself that he is superior to the one insulted, in terms of virtue, on account of his being free of that disgrace which he hurls at the other. The young and the rich are excessive insulters for this reason.

And mockery is a combination of abuse and belittlement, or abuse and insult, understood as will be explained in their proper place.

[131.10] And the person who has the least ability to bear⁷ external annoyances or the sharpness of anger-inducing things, is the one who considers himself better intrinsically, or due to his power, or some virtue in himself, or [his] authority, as well as those who live in luxury, and those who expect to be honored or given favors and are then disappointed in this, or [the one who has trouble bearing such things is he who] encounters intentional belittlement and disregard towards himself or his kinfolk, from the one from whom he expects [honor].

And the one focused on a pain in his body, or suffering harm from someone else, or being afflicted by some disaster or mishaps that burdens him, [such a one] is disposed towards anger on account of the least annoyance. So, one who suffers some trial, or fails to reach one of their desired goals, [if] he does not detach himself from the appetite and the [missed] pleasure [131.15], he is struck by and occurrence of anger. Anger comes quickly to the one who [132] is made light of with regard to some physical or psychological harm, or with regard to some [bad] news, or the occurrence of a death, or [due to some person] paying little mind to his duty in terms of friendship. Similarly, when one fails to achieve that which they hope for, their burning anger falls upon that which denied him his hope, and even on other things.

And from the [same] genus of insult [shatīma] and scorn [istihāna] is disdain [taḥqīr] for that which is declared by those who make official judgements about religious obligations and virtue, or [for the] teaching [132.5] and learning of some judgement from those who make official judgments. And [disdain also applies to those who] cast someone out as a sinner.⁸

And the general population frequently mocks these [jurists] on account of the failure of their imaginations to realize the use in what [the jurists] are working on. So they suppose that [the jurists] are floundering in useless things, and in that which has no benefit. And if the judge or the scholar becomes aware of what the masses are doing, they become angry and grieved.

[Nonetheless], at the end of the day, the general population is compelled by their condition to please the trustworthy and virtuous [jurists], because they count on their skill at managing trusts, and their good ability to mediate in conflicts, [and] because of what [132.10] the general population understands of [the jurists'] devotion to generosity and the need for [the jurists'] justice in contracts, without which trade cannot occur. So they endear themselves to and seek the

⁷ This is a discussion of the sort of “states” that dispose someone towards anger.

⁸ No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this discussion of religious judgments.

sympathy of [the noble jurists] hearts, and if they get the cold-shoulder from [a noble jurist], they see this as a great loss and a trade loss.

And those things which make a person angry include: the breaking of custom in generosity, and refraining from repaying the gracious with something gracious. And this can happen in various ways: if the repayment is done poorly, and the acceptance of a great amount of kindness [is met with] with evil or ungratefulness, [132.15] or with if the charitable offering is considered vile and placed in a position less than what is deserved. And one of these ways of being [a bad repayer] is vile, namely, the breaking of custom, and one is even more vile, and that is failing to repay, and for [yet another] one there is no way to speak of its repugnance, and this is repaying [good] with bad.⁹

And someone might get angry at his friend ¹⁰[133] if [the friend] considers it fine to pass over in silence the lovely gift, and especially if he is struck by some misery and it is ignored by [the friend], and [the friend] does not get frustrated about it, and does not try to do good by sharing with him in [the misery]. Or if need afflicts him, and he is in the midst of its trial, and [the friend] does not say a word to him [then he would get angry]. And similarly [he would get angry] if he is part of the people [that the friend is supposed to, but is not] taking care of, and if [such people] matter and concern to him. And [anger is caused by all these things] because all of this signifies disdain.

[133.5] And the types of disdain [istihāna] leading to anger/annoyance include: disdain for a person himself, disdain for someone that someone respects, disdain someone that someone marvels at,¹¹ and disdain for that which brings humiliation on a friend. Examples [of things that cause disdain] include: a father who gets angry at his children, and a woman who domineers over her husband.

And cheating a deserving [person] is a type of disdain, as is responding to something serious with a joke, along with [arbitrarily] singling-out someone for deprivation from among many others. And being neglectful of a friend to the point where his name or [133.10] tale is blotted out of memory [is a type of disdain]. Thus has the explanation of that which is related to anger been laid out fully.

So let us move onto explaining the nature of [anger's] opposite,¹² and that is the slackening of anger [futūr al-ghaḍb]. For example, anger slackens towards one who did not intend to disdain an act of kindness, but [who was simply] absent-minded or made an error; and towards one who passes from doing something that provokes anger to torturing, such that the pain diverts from the thing that caused anger;¹³ and [anger slackens] towards the one who is treated as he treats the other; and towards the one who acknowledges [their wrong] and seeks forgiveness via

9 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this focus on repayment of gifts and debts.

10 cf. 1379b in Greek Aristotle (at various points where there is a clear parallel in language or focus between Avicenna and Aristotle's text, this will be noted).

11 No parallel in Aristotle's text for these specific examples of objects of disdain.

12 cf. 1380a in Greek Aristotle.

13 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this example of how being tortured by someone can cause anger to abate, because you are distracted by the pain of being tortured.

repentance. On the other hand, someone who persists in denying and disavowing some insolence or slight brings about more [133.15] anger in addition to what was already directed towards him.

And [anger slackens] towards someone who is submissive, humble, yielding, and quiet, [134] who does not take recourse to obstinance or argument. An ashamed acknowledgment [from the other of their wrongdoing] solidifies the abating of anger. And [for example] you might find quarrelsome dogs¹⁴ who are on the verge of attacking some [people]. If some of [the people] sit down, and some of them hasten as if to fight the dogs, [the dogs] refrain from the ones who sit down submissively, and they attack the ones who are making to fight.¹⁵

And anger slackens a lot towards someone who is very cheerful. For the generosity that is perceived in someone on account of their joyousness, [134.5] it moves the soul towards something similar, as if cheerfulness were a gift that requires repayment.¹⁶

And similarly [anger slackens towards] the poor, who are in distress, and ones dressed as ascetics seeking forgiveness [from God]. And those who are well known for refraining from harm, and avoiding the extreme, and not talking too much, their fits of passion and their eccentricities are tolerated. And similarly the revered and the ones who make you feel bashful [do not make you angry], for anger does not join to reverence or embarrassment.¹⁷

And disdain, if it comes from a revered person, it is thought to be a result of their just displeasure [sukht], which is not [134.10] considered not to be pure disdain, but rather it is thought to be [an attempt o] educate or instill culture, and [the revered one's] assessment that [the other] deserves his anger is considered the opposite of scorn.

As for one who has reached a high degree of depravity, reprimand does not even reach down to their level, and one does not feel grief on account of him, and there is no pain felt with the awareness of [your being an object of] his disdain.¹⁸

And likewise [one does not get angry over] the apparent disdain in the case of making fun of someone, for it signifies that the one who is doing the disdaining [via jokes] takes pleasure in the one who is disdained and in mingling with him. And this is on account of [the joker's thinking that the other person has] strength of character, not on account of his scorn.

The one who is made fun of might not get angry if they are hoping for some good from the one who slights them.¹⁹ [134.15] For example, someone might do something that [would normally] cause anger, [but] mixed with meeting a need or providing an obvious service [in which case it would not cause anger].

14 cf. 1380a in Greek Aristotle.

15 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the in depth explanation of the example of quarrelsome dogs. The dogs are Aristotelian example, but Avicenna seems to take more interest in unpacking it.

16 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this example of how perceiving a positive trait in someone else (joyousness, in this case) can shift your emotional state positively towards them.

17 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this explanation that certain emotions are incompatible with one another.

18 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the idea that being disdained by someone might not cause any pain if we think little of the one by whom we are disdained.

19 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the idea that someone could do something that would normally cause anger, but because you are hoping for some good from them, you don't become angry.

And time elapses after the thing that caused anger, its impact abates, so that one is no longer angry, or anger lessens.²⁰

[135] And those things which lessen anger include: triumph, taking revenge, and the pouring out of agonies—as if from heaven—on the person who is the cause of anger. And the acknowledgement of a mistake and crime [slackens anger], [as well as] admission of a mistake. And [anger is lessened by] someone who admits that they deserve shame, and who does not take recourse to denial in the midst of their chastisement, and especially when there are first verbal punishments, and they agree to the badness of their [135.5] deed, and are chastised about it. And [the kind of person who] gets angry in this sort of case in one who is plunged into testiness.

And that which lessens the feeling of anger at the wrong-doer is the wrong-doer's being ignorant of their offense, and their not being aware of the difference between good and evil.²¹ And the death of the one who causes anger, and their reaching the final house [that lessens anger also], indeed that is among the things which removes resentment from the heart, to say nothing of anger.

3.2 [135.10] On the types of friendship, and hope and fear, and courage and cowardice

Friendliness [al-ṣadāqa] is the state [ḥālah] of a person insofar as they wish the good for another person, for the sake of that other person, and not for their own sake. For he has some disposition [malakah] motivating him to do the good for that other. The friend is one who both loves and is loved, and who shares in happiness and adversity, for the sake of his friend [136], not for his own sake.

The true sign of friendship is apparent when there is elation [al-irtiyāḥ] at what makes [yasirr] the friend happy, and sadness [al-ighitmām] and what is bad for him [yasū'uhu]. The enemy [does] the opposite of that. Those people who love you are those who do good either to you, or to one of yours, for some reason, and especially when they do some big thing in terms out of charity, without hesitation, without finding it burdensome. And similarly those to whom one looks for something similar [i.e., you think they will be friendly toward you]. [136.5] Similarly, the beloved of the beloved [is one that you feel friendship towards], and [one feels friendship for] the enemy of [your enemy] who hates [your] enemy, or who [your] enemy [likewise] hates.

Those who covet are different from those who do not covet, like the generous and the courageous and the upright. And those who are content with that which they gain by their own work of themselves [are different from those] who strip away the objects of greed from others, like those who live off the plunder of their enemies. Likewise those with sincere hearts are loved on account of the fact that they curb others' pains and protect others from harms. And similarly people of virtue [are loved], who do without [136.10] others, and with whom no one initiates the giving of a gift without permission [i.e., because it is an honor to give a gift to a respectable

²⁰ cf. 1380b in Greek Aristotle.

²¹ No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in this paragraph of the sort of things which can reduce anger.

person]. [With respect to these people, the gift-giver] is conscious of [the recipients'] bestowing on them a great kindness when they agree to accept [the gift].²²

And similarly [we feel friendship towards] those who are pleasant to be around, and those who are delightful to have as companions one account of the fact that they can be counted on to be forbearing and helpful, and to help repair disorderly states of affairs, and to not scold when there is a failure,²³ [or] it is believed by the friend that their scolding is light. And the opposite of this is those who are quarrelsome, hostile, and critical. And [this is true] even if each [of the above-mentioned unpleasant tendencies] is not on account of being bad-tempered, but on account of pity. And among them [who we feel friendship toward] are the hardy, those who bear well [136.15] under various types of punishment, and those who suffer with fortitude, for they only do that [i.e., suffer well] on account of the hardness of their character.

[137] Among those who are loved [as friends] are those who praise and flatter, and those who are well adorned, who have beautiful clothes, and those who are not reproachful, and not critical, and those who do not nurture anger in their hearts, and those who try hard not to be an obstinate nuisance. And when word is spread about someone's whose manner is like this, everyone hopes for someone similar to that [sort of friend] for themselves.

And similarly those who have control over their tongues,²⁴ for they do not talk nonsense nor do they abound in mentioning evil. In this way [137.5] the knot of anger loosed, that is, when [anger] is met with with tranquility and subservience. And the one who is a partner in trade and in what you do with your time [is one who is loved].²⁵

And one who thinks a person to be virtuous or admirable, and who is friendly to him, he is loved by the one he is thinking about. Similarly the one giving respect and honor [is lovable].

And similarly someone's jealousy of you [can cause you to feel friendly towards them], so long as they do not reach the point of lying in wait to betray you. Were you not prepared for [their jealousy], you would not like their jealousy towards you. But the one who is prepared, if he is safe from evil befalling him, he is open to loving [the one who is jealous]. Similarly [you love someone when] you love that they love you.²⁶

And among those who you love [as friends] [137.10] also is one who offers his resources to those near and far without flattering or affectation. And [those who are loved as friends] include one who is trusted because he is well able keep quiet about bad traits discovered in [some other] person. Therefore the shameless love the chaste/modest because they feels safe around them.

And there are three kinds of friendship: the first is companionship, and it is a state that takes root between two people on account of the length of time they spend seeing one another; the second is sociability/intimacy, and it is when meeting [the other person] brings delight at meeting, and

22 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in this paragraph. The focus on hospitality in the second part is especially noteworthy.

23 cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

24 cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

25 Still cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

26 Still cf. 1381b in Greek Aristotle.

the third is a bond or [137.15] partnership, either in kinship, as in a relationship by marriage, or in benefaction, as in the exchanging of gifts.

And as for enmity [al-‘adāwa], its states [aḥwāliḥā] are known from the states [aḥwāl] of friendship, insofar as they are contraries. And one of the causes of enmity and hatred is anger.²⁷ But anger is only for a individual, [138] and hatred might be for a species/group, or what is like to a species, like your hatred for a thief in an unrestricted sense. And from these types it is possible that we would distinguish someone as friend, and someone else an enemy, and in this way we could place enmity and hatred for an adversary in the mind of the judge or the hearer, or love for the speaker and an inclination towards him. This is the manner in which [rhetorical] persuasion [istidrāj] proceeds.

[138.5] And as for fear [al-khawf], it is a pain [ḥuẓn] and agitation [ikhtilāl] of the soul, on account of [li] imagining an expected, debilitating evil, either [an evil] that reaches [the level of] full-on corruption, or not. Now, not every evil is feared. For envy or a person’s being licentious are among the sort of things that are not feared [despite their being evil]. Among evil things, that which is feared is that which will harm that one to whom it occurs with [either] corruption or pain, and it [the object of fear] must be something in the future. For fear dissipates with respect to that which has passed, or that which has occurred. And the object of fear—despite its being in the future—is expected, that is, close to happening. For that which is far off is not feared. [138.10] For that reason not everyone fears death, but rather one only fears it if he is on the brink of it. So objects of fear, then, are those things which have the ability to inflict this sort of harm. [As an aside], to venture some dangerous thing is an action which either gets rid of the proximity of the harm, or intensifies its closeness.

And among the things that cause fear,²⁸ there is when one takes heed from something else, and that is when one witnesses some sort of harm, happening to someone else. And someone from whom came something feared [is thereafter a cause of fear], and one who has frequently carried out harm is also feared. [And someone will be feared] when they are so powerful they could only be defended against via prayer, [138.15] even if they have not taken any step toward doing any harm. This is especially so when they are also [known to be] unjust.

And that which suddenly comes out of nowhere causes fear, [139] unlike those things which are anticipated [beforehand], [and] they feared on account of their being surprising. The sudden thing, if it was not previously anticipated, is feared by the person who is startled.²⁹

And the one who is a powerful opponent in the sphere of those things that cannot be shared, such as the king, he is also feared. And the high of hand are feared, especially if one is aware of some sort of [malicious] purpose/intent from them.

And among those whom one fears is the one who is better, for he is feared by the inferior. And the friends of the unjustly treated, and enemies, [139.5] and those who are quick to cause harm to you [are feared]. And those who think carefully, the sly ones, for they are more harmful than

27 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy emotions in some sense causes of other emotions.

28 cf. 1382a in Greek Aristotle.

29 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this whole paragraph about unanticipated things causing fear.

those who are quick to anger. They are those whose intentions are not known very quickly, and who do not weary of a long struggle in carrying out their enmity.³⁰

And things which are feared include those which it is not easy to prevent, or to exchange with its opposite, and that for which there is no hero to defend against.

And as for the one who is disposed to fear,³¹ he is the one in whom there is one of these states [aḥwāl], for he is expecting a looming evil, with no one to triumph over it, and no way of changing it.

And those who do not fear [139.10] are the rich, those who have mastery over many, and [those who have] powerful supporters. Therefore you see them being habitual vilifiers and hecklers, putting people down, and lording themselves over others; especially in the age of youth, and [in the] health of the body and its strength. And those who have a lot of followers and a big group of friends [have no fear].

Taking refuge in counsel is something that signifies fear fear.

[A rhetorician] who wants to deepen fear, or fix it in [someone else's] soul or the imagination, let him consider each thing we have said, and let him make use of it in the [proper] place.

[139.15] As for courage [al-shajā'a]: it is a state [malakah] by which a person is good at hoping for deliverance,³² and seeks to ward off the occurrence of that which is hateful. In the view of the courageous person, it is as if the hateful thing does not exist, or is far off.

And every [courageous person] [140] has courage because of his belief that the causes of his deliverance are near; and because they are optimistic about being able to overcome the expected evil, and their strong awareness of their ability to unravel the difficulty with the competition.

A great amount of supporters [makes someone courageous], and their cumulative strength, [or] also freedom from injustice along with a paucity of suffering [i.e., if one hasn't gone through too much suffering to be discouraged]. If these things occur together, they make the person courageous. For insofar as one has not been wronged he is optimistic, and insofar as [140.5] one has not suffered injustice he is daring in competition. For he would not be able to undertake struggle, and that by which there is suffering of body or soul, [were he not courageous].

And whenever there is [one who has] strength, and another person has become to him a friend, and [the weaker] is free from facing harm from [the powerful], and indeed, on the contrary, [the weaker] continues to be favored by the [strong] person, either in actively or passively—actively, insofar as they might help him with money, or passively, like undergoing trials in which some benefit redounds to the [weaker]—this [weaker] person is [140.10] very courageous towards one who harms him on account of his friends, whose relation to him is as we have described.

30 cf. 1382b in Greek Aristotle.

31 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy that (among other things) belief-states can constitute dispositions for emotions.

32 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, courage is framed as a virtue, a disposition towards an emotion.

Then the one who is supported by means of nobility in rank, or excellence in reputation, or the two of them together, [he is] daring [and] bold, on account of the fact that he scorns those [he views as] beneath him.

And the things towards which one is courageous are things that do not reach the point of causing death, and for which one expects some sort of remedy. And [as for] when there is repeated suffering for the sake of deliverance, the one experienced in fearful matters that cause suffering might venture [such repeated suffering] for the sake of his people, and sometimes might avoid them for the sake of his people. [140.15] And that which has not been experienced is something about which one can be courageous, when its end/result is not conceived of.

And the experienced person is courageous towards that which is feared, if he happens to have some sort of support that supports him sufficiently, like one who is courageous about sailing the sea, [141] having confidence in the wise captain.

And one might be courageous towards a fearful thing on account of their knowing that some other group that had been suffering from it was delivered, though the person did not wade through the experience himself.

And when a ruler [of lesser authority] is under the rule of another [who has wider domain], thinking that he is better and higher in age and standing than the other, he is courageous towards him. And likewise [even] if he sees himself as a peer to him.

And as for when the more elevated one is more virtuous and greater in the abundance of money, or [in] the strength of his brutality, [141.5] or [in] the density of his supporters and the dense throng of his country and the greatness of its numbers, or in something potent of this sort, then he is at that point a feared, awe-inspiring person.³³ And when the person who is ruled is of good conduct, someone who has himself well in order in terms of that which is between him and God, he also is little concerned about the one dominating him. Similarly, if those who are considered wise, and the jurists, and the orators present good opinions about him, and give a good account about him, then [the weaker] does not worry about [the one dominating].

Among the things that give courage is the burning of anger; for [141.10] when one is heated, it emboldens the cowardly, strengthens the weak, and such a person is moved towards bravery.³⁴ And among the things that bring about this sort of anger is injustice happening to the innocent, for [the one burning with such anger] is optimistic about God's giving him victory.³⁵

Likewise [the sort of things that make one courageous include] the trust wherein one feels safe from the [possibility of] calamity or the [need to] go on the offensive, or [trust that] the benefit [of some hardship] will outweigh the harm, or [trust that] the harm is susceptible to remedy.

33 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in the first part of this paragraph.

34 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the explanation of how anger leads to courage via a physiological mechanism.

35 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the way that Avicenna brings God into the explanation in the second half of this sentence.

[142] 3.3 On the types of shame [al-istiḥyā’], and its opposite, and kindness [al-minna]

Let us discuss embarrassment [al-khajal] and disgrace [al-iftidāḥ] and their causes.

Embarrassment and shame are a pain [ḥuzn]³⁶ and an agitation [ikhtilāṭ] because of some evil deed by which the person becomes blameworthy, whether [142.5] its occurrence preceded, or is present, or is expected. And shamelessness is a trait [khalq] by which a person doesn’t care about a loss of honor, and makes light of the spreading of disrepute [about themselves].

Things which cause disgrace are evil things like the following: running away from the an army, taking out your weapon in cowardice, interfering with a deposit by breaking a contract, committing injustice, mingling with of an adulterer, frequenting places of suspicion, a greedy desire for shameful things, the pursuing of lowly things (as in plundering the down and out and exhuming [142.10] the shrouds of the dead), irrational frugality despite having wealth, asking the poor [for money], borrowing when it is unacceptable, refusing someone who asks and entreats for a favor, responding to a supplicant with a demand for debt (as in making a claim when asked for a gift), and asking for a gift when one has been paid.

And [disgraceful things] include: extolling greediness, criticizing the unsuccessful, [when] one is a flatterer who is excessive in spreading word about the virtues of a person beyond beyond what is necessary, and [when] one is a pretender by being sad for what saddens another over and above that which is hidden in [the pretender’s] soul.

And [again] disgraceful things include: anxiety/regret about trivial [143] pains or a harms, [as we see in] the anxiety of the old, or the lazy, or foul mouthed people, or the weak. And [disgraceful things include] reproaching those who do well for their actions or feelings, for that is bad and [a signifier of trying to act with] excess, for these things are a sign of smallness of soul.

And likewise [disgraceful things include] falsely praising oneself boasting, and claiming the good traits which someone else displays, for that is among the signs of vainglory.

And those who are considered disgraceful include are those who follow the course of [i.e., hang out with] those [disgraceful ones], even if they don’t do the [exact same] deeds. “Those who follow their course” include one who are satisfied with [disgraceful peoples’] approval [143.5], and who enter into their advice, and incline to their companionship.

And shameful things include: emotions of submissiveness that a person has in his soul and inner self, a person’s being okay with being ridiculed by imitation for foul things, someone’s exposing his limbs to sinful acts, and someone’s enduring evil happening to him (willingly or unwillingly) on account of his keenness and greediness and his expecting something good in return for it. And a lot of endurance is cowardice [143.10], not courage, such as failing to retaliate, and suchlike. So, disgrace or shame, in general, can be conceived of as happening when honor passes away, blame descends, tongues are loosened about [the disgraced person], and there is blame in the the eyes of someone who [the disgraced person] cares about.

36 Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

As for when honor is lost in the eyes of jokers and boys, that is something that one does not feel shame about. For one feels shame before those that they admire, or before those by whom one is admired, and or before those who they prefer [143.15] to be respected or revered by. For one counts on what they get from [such people] in terms of praise, because [144] they prefer their praise, or they need it, or they glory in it, or [such people] are peers. Or maybe one aspires [to look good] to the peer as long as he does not strive [to impress] another [more distinguished person]. And one is embarrassed someone known as having sound judgment, known for the strength of their belief, or an older person, or an educated person.³⁷

And dishonor seen before [another's] eyes is more severe than dishonor that was been reported, and dishonor made public is more severe than dishonor kept secret. And dishonor in front of those who are relatives [144.5] and friends is greater than dishonor before those who are far away and left behind.

And dishonor before those who do not hold the place of evaluator and educator for him [who is dishonored] is greater than dishonor before those standing in the position of the evaluator and educator. For people tend to open up to those who do not hold the place of educator/evaluator, and [people up to those] with whom one can act chummy; and people tend to shrink from one who holds the place [of educator/evaluator], and do not disclose to them the core aspects of their mind, or the hidden things of his inner self, and he hates when [the one holding the place of educator/evaluator] is aware of his mistakes, whether [the educator/evaluator] is honest or not, [144.10] whether he is right or wrong, after there is some judgment. [However] not everyone who has knowledge [i.e., not all the non-evaluators to whom one opens up] are chummy [back] towards him, for many who [seem] lovingly aware are waiting for mistakes, monitoring, and [are ones] charged with investigating the wrongdoers [even though they are not technically evaluators]. And dishonor before those sorts of people is the greatest kind of dishonor. And as for those sorts, one is not shamed before them because they themselves are the community [wherein one most feels] shame, but rather [one is ashamed of] their broadcasting that which one is ashamed of, so that it reaches those before whom one is ashamed. And they are those who mock friendships [144.15] and who are quarrelsome with acquaintances.

And one might be embarrassed before one who by whom one remains honored [despite the shameful deed], and who has not despised him with scorn, just as like how one is embarrassed before the one who is infatuated with the person [who did the shameful thing], and before the one with whom the renewal of friendship is desired, and the continuance of friendly exchange, and before the one with whom one will eventually meet, and before old acquaintances who [145] did not exposed the person in prior [shameful] things.

And one is not merely embarrassed by a shameful deed and the corrupt profit, but also from the evidence of it and its signs, and when it is heard about.

As for one who one is not ashamed in front of, that is the sincere friend, and the riffraff one looks down on, i.e., those who act like beasts and children, and strangers who have no education.

37 cf. 1384a in Greek Aristotle.

Shame [145.5] before those who know you is true shame, while before foreigners it is like mere opinion.³⁸

And it is not necessary to reiterate that about which one feels intense shame.

And since we have spoken about proper shame and shamelessness, let us discuss being thankful for kindness, [shukr al-minna] and ungrateful for it [kufrānihā], for this is connected with [shame].

Kindness is something by which someone is called kind.³⁹ And it is something beneficial which, if one person does it to another, it necessitates that other person be thankful towards him, or compliant [to him], or even more thankful, or even more obedient of spirit.

And the types of kindness [are as follows]: either a service, [145.10] that is, any bodily, beneficial deed; or a boon, like the giving of a jewel from which one can benefit; in both of these cases, were the thing not given, the benefit [thereby acquired] would not possibly be grasped [by the beneficiary].

And this sort of service or boon is only kindness if one does not want with it anything other than the the very person to whom it is being given. And great kindness is that which meets a severe need, or [comes] at a time in which the aid is difficult to replicate, [145.15] or when the giver is singled out by his giving it, [i.e.] no one else took action, or [the giver] is the first one who bestowed [a kindness], [and] then he spurred others to action, so that [the initial giver] is [considered] even more giving.

And need, it is either constituted by an object of desire which one longs to obtain, or an object of desire whose loss one is sad about, like a lover. Especially what is longed for in misery [is felt to be a need], either because it [would] dispel misery, or because the desire is for the thing in such a way that the depression and sadness of the misery do not diminish the desire.

And the impact [146] of kindness among poor recipients, and among those driven to poverty, is greater. And similarly [the impact is greater] among the afflicted, and the forgotten, and those hiding from enemies and adversaries, and those who are in similar positions, and among those who are in a worse state. And the most kind person is one who does not seek acknowledgement through giving, nor do they intend in their concealing the good deed [that the recipient] spread [it], for the hidden good deed is [in fact their] reward, just as broadcasting it is loathsome to them.

And these things [146.5] are what can be used in rhetorical arguments to emphasize kindness.

And that which one can put forth in order to argue that someone is not actually kind, and to diminish their status as kind, is to say: you intended by your good deed merely a display from which you benefited, and or you didn't see the act of kindness through to completion, or you

38 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this last line, which is interesting in that it suggests that are more or less justified versions of emotions.

39 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, kindness is discussed neither as a virtue nor an emotion, but an action.

failed in some duty incumbent upon you in something similar,⁴⁰ or since you did not meet the superior need, or you compelled acceptance [of the kindness] in view of an acquisition [of something else], or you did not do the thing intentionally, but rather by coincidence or necessity, or on account of a desire for repayment, or without knowing [146.10] or without will. For all of that is the sort of thing that together weakens [the sense in which someone is] kind. And if [some deed] were on account of necessity, kindness is thereby lessened. And [a good deed] could be voluntary [but also] by necessity, as when the will is compelled, and that is like when someone seeks recourse [from some harm] by choosing to do some kindness. And a kind deed could be without any will, and that is when someone is compelled, and has their money taken from them, and the other person squanders it, and likewise that can happen with knowledge [of what is being done], or without knowledge.⁴¹

[146.15] And these characterizations of types are beneficial for mounting a legal complaint or defense. And the things known to indicate that there is in fact good will of kindness,⁴² or [known to] strengthen [the fact that it is a kindness], is when the coming forth of [the kindness/benefit] is on account of will and love, and that there is no slighting in it, and nothing similar has been given to the enemies of the one being benefited. For if two enemies share in a kindness [147], it indicates that necessity caused that kindness. And similarly if the [supposedly] kind person does a similar [kindness] to his own enemy [this would have been on account of necessity]. And likewise [it will appear to be by necessity] if he did not give to someone a similarly or more deserving; for [when it is not given to someone more deserving] that suggests that the kindness did not come forth on account of generosity. For were one's charity a charity intended for the sake of kindness and as a sacrifice [pleasing to God], then [the giver] would not take their enemy into consideration, nor would [the giver] fail in to be kind towards someone similarly deserving.

And likewise if the kindness is tarnished with evil, [147.5] that diminishes it. For in that case the kindness does not seek to meet some corresponding need. That is because, for something to be considered kindness, there must be something that can be considered a need [to be met], and evil is not considered to be a need to be met.

3.4 On having concern [al-ihtimām] and pity [al-shafqa] for others, and on envy, revenge, [147.10] jealousy, zeal and scorn

Let us mention concern for others, which is close in meaning to pity, or heartfelt concern involving care, and [let us mention] the one who is cared about.

Pity is a pain⁴³ [adhā] that strikes a person on account of [li] something [148] corrupting or saddening that happened to another person without the other person deserving it, and without it being expected. The person feeling concern is the one who has this pain on account of what happened to the other person, or some fallout of that occurrence.

40 cf. 1385b in Greek Aristotle.

41 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the discussion of will, compulsion and intention in this paragraph.

42 No parallel in Aristotle's text for these indicators of kindness.

43 Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

As for those who are passing away [i.e., dying], one does not have concern/pity for what happens to them, because it is not reasonable to say that what happens to them is unexpected.

Likewise those who are very lucky, one does not have concern/pity for them, because one does not associate anything bad with them, [nor does one expect them to] encounter of evil.

And those who do not have concern/pity, or who do not care [about things], they are those who are accustomed to enduring evils on account of age, [148.5] or on account of a plethora of experience. And those abiding in good fortune, and whose souls are good, they do not feel distress in any situation.

And [others who do not feel pity include]: those famous for [their] ascension to office and advancement; the well-mannered who are of good repute; those upon whose beloved ancestors befell evils; those moved by courage, like the angry and the hard-hearted. And those who despise and those who revile do not [148.10] have concern/pity, nor for their counterparts, namely, fearful slaves and miserable, downtrodden folks, for they have concerns that divert them from caring for/pitying others. On the other hand, the moderate person between [very high and very low states] is the one who feels concern/pity.

And one is not concerned for the unknown [and] despised, for they [merely exist] in the mass of the unknown. And the powerful ones/tyrants do not care about individuals, because they do not consider one to be different from any other.

As for the reasons why one has concern/pity, one may infer them from the definition of concern/pity. And these [148.15] causes of pity include someone's perishing from torture, and starvation, and strenuous effort, and old age, and illness, and destitution, and bad luck, and lack of supporters, and especially when evil strikes someone expecting good instead of that evil,⁴⁴ [149] and when the evil [being experienced] is completely unmixed with any good, or if the time wherein there was some good mixed in [with the evil] has passed away.

And one has concern for those who are acquaintances, partners, and fellow-workers.

And as for someone who is of one's very self, such as a child, it is not said that the person "has concern" for a pain that afflicts them, just as it is not said that one "has concern" for what happens to oneself. For it is not said that a person pities oneself,⁴⁵ or is preoccupied with himself, but rather great fear [is what one has for one's self], not "care" or "pity." It is on account of this that there is the story of the one whose eye did not shed a tear [149.5] at his son being on the brink of destruction, whereas when he saw a friend shamed by poverty, he cried for him. The intensity [of the fear] rids the mind of pity, and causes one to forget about care for the other.⁴⁶

44 Expectation, and thwarted expectation, is a key part of the cognition behind some of these emotions, which shows how they are tied up with belief.

45 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the way that pity is distinguished from fear in that you cannot have the pity towards yourself, while you can have fear towards yourself.

46 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy emotions in some sense causes of other emotions.

And among the ones that one has concern for [there are those] who are like [oneself] in age, including peers, and those who are like oneself in terms of character traits, and interests and ranks, and in the choosing of the good.

And every sort of thing that might occur that is feared by a person, if it befalls his brothers, it is a cause for concern.

Therefore one does not have concern for those living in opulence or old age.

And among those whom one has concern for are those who are unjustly treated, and those who are tormented, those who are sorely tried [149.10] and tested, even when one does not directly witness what afflicts them [inwardly] nor fully ascertain their [inward] trial. For the [outer] appearance represents the [inner state], and seeing the [external] appearance is like seeing the [inner] state.

Also, signs of the harms can cause concern/pity, if they indicate the occurrence of harm, even if it has not happened yet. For this reason a trial/tribulation that it not deserved can cause concern. And it seems like this pain [that we call pity] is the analog or counterpart in some way to the sort of pain [ḥuzn] that [149.15] strikes [a person] on account of [someone else's] undeserved success, and this is what is called in this book indignation [jazaʿ], even though [150] it is not a true contrary. For the source of each one [pity and indignation] is an honorable disposition [khalq karīm].⁴⁷ And the general idea that captures both of them [is that] something of good or evil comes in each case to one to one not deserving it.

And the occurrence of what one does not deserve causes sadness [yaghamm]⁴⁸ justifiably. However if, if there is no known cause for the [thing that befalls], but rather it happens along the lines of of providence and divine decree, then the sadness [ḥuzn] towards it is less intense. For someone might reasonably say, [150.5] “that sudden good that came to him would not be decreed for him unless he deserved it, and the sudden evil which is decreed for him likewise would only occur if he were deserving.” The sadness [ḥuzn] thereby diminishes, even if [the evil] does not go away quickly or completely. However, [this way of thinking is dubious because] decree and fate are not limited only to what is deserving, although they are imagined as such, but it is well known that the matter of decree and fate is a murky matter entrusted to God.⁴⁹

And it is stated in the primary teaching:⁵⁰ “as for those who arrive at that without inevitability or providence.” [150.10] It seems that the expression “without” is extraneous, owing to negligence on the part of the translators or others, or that its meaning is “without inevitability from the ones acquiring [it], and without a determination on their part,” so it is as if it said: “without expectation and determination on the part of people.”

47 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, but stated more clearly, emotions are true contraries if they stem from opposite dispositions.

48 Unclear why Avicenna switches to a more generic verb for sadness here.

49 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the discussion of providence and decree in this paragraph.

50 Reference unclear. Not obviously a reference to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

And that which is opposite of concern [i.e., pity] and indignation, which have been mentioned, is envy [al-ḥasd]. For concern is a pain [adhā]⁵¹ that strikes a person on account of an evil that befalls [some other] person, and [the pain] strikes because the [other] person is undeserving [of the pain], and is focused on [150.15] that person. Envy is a pain [adhā]⁵² that strikes one on account of a good befalling someone who deserves it, and on account of the fact that it befell him. And as for indignation which has been mentioned, it is like a mean between the two, [though] indignation is closer to concern/pity, and since it is closer to concern it is like a contrary to jealousy.⁵³

And it is not necessary [151] to get into a [further] discussion also about contraries, seeking to elucidate those truths, not [just] opinions. For what has been said about this already is sufficient for this section.

Envy is only envy, when the sadness [ghamm] about something is because of a good that befell another. And if the sadness [ghamm] is not because [of someone else having a good], but rather you are sad that you yourself lack a similar [good], this is not jealousy. [Rather] this is something very close to being necessary [151.5], [for different] dispositions cannot escape feeling it. For each person is sad [yaghtamm] for the gifts and blessings that pass him by which are wont to exist for another.

Similarly, [it is not envy] if the sadness is because of a fear that strikes a person on account of the success of an enemy. For one understands that that success makes the enemy even more powerful, and gives the enemy more ability to perpetrate acts of hostility.

And along these lines, there is a joy⁵⁴ that arises when evil happens to those who deserve it, like to those who kill people and obliterate monuments and live in some land attempting to corrupt it. And another type of joy is at the failure [151.10] of one who deserves [it] and evil [happening] to one who does well; and these two are contraries: one comes from a virtuous state, the other from vice.

And here are two kinds of sadness [ḥuzn]: a sadness which occurs on account of the good state of one who deserves it, with respect to the goodness of the state, and this is called envy. And there is a sadness that occurs on account of the good state of one who does not deserve it, because he does not deserve it, and this is vengeance or wrath. And these two are contraries. One of the stems from vice, the other from virtue.

And these [emotions] different compositions [tarkībāt] of sadness [ḥuzn] and joy [farah], and good and bad, and merit and non-merit.⁵⁵

[151.15] And the envious person [can be] envious toward any good thing, even charity and beauty and suchlike. As for the wrathful [nāqim] one, he cannot be envious about virtues, because there is no meaning to the idea of “one’s awareness of the existence of undeserved

51 Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

52 Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

53 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for the technical language of “means” and “contraries” in this context.

54 cf. 1387b in Greek Aristotle.

55 No parallel in Aristotle’s text that emotions are compositions of these different sort of psychological ingredients.

virtue.” [152] For it is not as though the non-virtuous person is simply gifted virtue⁵⁶ [undeservedly]. Rather, wrath can be directed towards external goods [received without deserving]. For the non-virtuous person does not deserve [external goods], and yet is granted them, while only the best sort of people truly do deserve them.

Likewise vengefulness is not directed at good things occurring by nature such as loveliness or beauty, nor about inherited goods that are not acquired recently, for these things are seen as a fixed right. And similarly when the one does acquire something recently, [152.5] [but] he is an authority or [the authority’s] follower. For even though [such a] one might not deserve such good things on account of [his] virtue, it is as though they were merited to him from of old, and it seems this way on account of power and status. And some [people who recently acquire undeserved things] do not inspire vengeful feelings because they are the sort of people who possess things from of old, although this particular thing is acquired recently, and some of them because [they possess something] that is not acquired recently, but rather belongs to the person as by right.

And the amount of merit in every person is not the same,⁵⁷ and each person is not deserving of every good, but rather each person is suited to a particular good, and he is wrathful if it flits away. For an ascetic is not deserving [152.10]—according to common opinion—of loveliness or goodness in terms of the ornaments of clothing or armament. Likewise, overdoing it in one’s furnishings and the like is not fitting to the one who is newly rich. For the newly rich, it is appropriate to him to seem still like the poor until he is accustomed to his wealth.

Likewise those who are base do not deserve victory over the highborn, especially if they are both involved in the same mode of life.⁵⁸ For this reason there are examples of these states which are reckoned among the effects of divine decree, and [there are also examples] that are not [reckoned] among the effects of divine decree. And were that not the case [i.e., that divine decree acts in various ways] the impotent would not rule over [152.15] the powerful, and the rich would not despise the poor. And the issues discussed in this section related [153] to divine decree are two:⁵⁹ one of them is when one who does not deserve victory obtains victory over a great danger, and the second is when a deserving, virtuous person fails in the thing he deserves.⁶⁰

And the wrath of the wrathful one intensifies towards examples of both cases if he himself is a lover of honor. For the lover of honor is more attentive to merit, or lack thereof.

For this reason the one content with vileness, and relying on deception, on which he bases his life, [153.5] who does not pay attention to blame, he is not [properly called] “wrathful,” because such people do not pay attention to what someone deserves. Rather, the objects of their jealousy

56 i.e., it would be unjust were the non-virtuous person simply gifted virtue, but since that could never occur, there is not way for someone to feel wrathful on account of undeserved virtue. Wrath is directed at that which is undeserved, but true virtue cannot be undeserved.

57 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this whole discussion of merit.

58 i.e., it is excusable if for some reason someone in another field outdoes you in your own field in an unexpected, unlikely happening, but it is more shameful if your inferior in your field does so.

59 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this talk about divine decree and its relation to our emotions.

60 Avicenna’s point seems to be that we can see that divine decree acts in unusual ways, and this impacts our emotions.

are those on whom befall some good, and it is due to that that [those content with vileness] are in [the same] category as the people who are jealous.

As for someone who is of an altogether different sort of status, they are not [able to be] an object of jealousy; and likewise with those who are different in terms of property, or age, or profession, or rank, or wealth. If the distinction between statuses is very great, envy abates. For it is when they are not equal, but are comparable, that there will be envy.

[153.10] And the jealous person is the one who fails in a goal, even though he got close to it.

Therefore jealousy proliferates among those who are competent.⁶¹ For one who has knowledge is more jealous towards a fellow knower than will be one who has no knowledge.⁶² And one who does great things is more jealous toward the one who surpasses him will be one who does not even try. For in such cases [noticing] likeness or comparison is inescapable. And the most jealous one is the lover of respect, and, in short, the one who loves honor, on account of what we have said, and likewise those who dress up with finery and riches. For dressing up is a feature of those who put on airs about their respectability.

And likewise for everything [153.15] deemed good [there will be] an observer who is jealous, especially if the good thing is among those things that the jealous person seeks.

And you can tell from this what the objects of envy are; there is no need to repeat mention of it, on account of what has been said.

[154] As for those whom people do not envy, they include: those who are dying an early death, those who are perishing in a miserable way, those who are in a far away place from whom one is cut off from, like those living at the Pillars of Heracles (for no one from these [i.e., Eastern] countries envies them). And the severely punished [are not envied], nor the insignificant, nor those with whom there is no comparison. But rather one envies someone who it is appropriate to consider a rival,⁶³ and about whom it could be said that they have some shared love or [154.5] desire.

And the envied good is something which the jealous person expects, or that he had at one time. For this reason the older of two youths envies the younger of them if [the younger] prospers, since [the old thinks] he was entitled to that prosperity. Likewise one who squandered something envies the one who does things properly, and the one who only obtains the good with effort envies the one for whom obtaining the good was easy. And in general [there will be envy] if one sees himself worthy of something which has come sooner to someone else. However when [people] are in different stations, then there is not jealousy.

[154.10] So with these characterizations, the rhetorician is able to arouse vengeance, jealousy, sadness, concern/pity, entertainment, and suchlike.

61 cf. 1387b in Greek Aristotle.

62 Avicenna develops this idea that competent people more easily experience jealousy more thoroughly than what we see in Aristotle's text.

63 cf. 1387b in Greek Aristotle.

And there is something related to vengeance, and that is zeal [ḥamīya]. [Zeal] is also from the set of good [emotions]. And zeal is a pain [idhā]⁶⁴ that strikes [a person] when someone loses goods that they deserve, while others attain them, and there is in an attainment of the others an indication of the possibility of attaining it. For the possibility of attaining it is in the manner of deserving.⁶⁵

[154.15] This kind of zeal only strikes one who loves the good, and is grieved at its passing, and sees that [the good] is something honored, [155] and [zeal] does not occur except to the great of soul, and to those who are concerned with higher matters.

The most zealous are those whose predecessors, or companions, or peers, had an easy time with such a good, especially when the good is among those things which is respected, and by which honor is obtained—like money or beauty (though not like health, for health does not always expose a person to honor). One is zealous⁶⁶ of things like courage, and wisdom, [155.5] and leadership; for these are things which make possible the virtues, like generosity and the acquisition of various praiseworthy things.

So zeal⁶⁷ then only is directed towards those who have these virtues and similar things, and towards all whose friendship is desired on account of virtue, and towards the ones impressed by [the virtuous], and towards the one praising [the virtuous].⁶⁸

And the ones who are scorned [by a zealous person] are those who are not as good as the ones they are zealous towards, and who are opposed to [the ones they are zealous towards] and who fight against them. For scorn is opposed to zeal.

So zeal [ḥamīya] comes from zeal [ghayra] [towards the one to-be-emulated],⁶⁹ and scorn comes from a lack of zeal [towards the underwhelming person]. And if scorn is opposed [155.10] to zeal [ḥamīya], then the contrary movement stirs it up and [the contrary] pain increases it. [For example,] the one scorning the possessor of zeal stirs up zeal in the [possessor of zeal] on account of [the other's] scorning the zealous one.

As for the one whom zeal strikes, he is the one who lacks the good that he is zealous towards. As for the one who is scorned⁷⁰ and whom one does not feel zealous towards, he is the one to whom good luck gives something without deserving it, and without its coming about on account of firmness [of character] and stern effort. Such a person is scorned, and one can trust in the imminent collapse of the foundation of his affair.

64 Again, noteworthy that pain is in the definition of an emotion.

65 i.e., someone feels like they deserve something if it is possible for them to deserve it.

66 yaghāru: Avicenna appears to use this verb interchangeably with ḥamīya and its derivatives in this section.

67 ghayrahy: Avicenna appears to use this verb interchangeably with ḥamīya and its derivatives in this section.

68 cf. 1388b in Greek Aristotle.

69 ḥamīya and ghayra seem to have been used interchangeably in the preceding paragraphs, so it is unclear what the difference here is supposed to be.

70 cf. 1388b in Greek Aristotle.

[156] 3.5 On the roots of the differences of people with respect to character traits

It is appropriate now to discuss the states that incline [al-aḥwāl al-muḥarrikah], by way of [discussing] each disposition [khalq khalq] with respect to occurrences [al-‘wāriḍ] [of the just discussed emotions] and concerns, according to ages, according to strengths [ḥudūd], and according to souls.

As for occurrences [of emotion], [156.5] these are like anger and desire. As for concerns, this is like the preference of a soul for one kind among many things, such as ruling, or politics, or asceticism; and religions and the practical arts enter into this [concept]. As for ages there is adolescence, youth, and the graybeard. As for strengths there is the noble, the easygoing, and the long-suffering. As for the types of souls there is the Arabic and the foreign, and the great and the small.

Let us begin with ages. The movement of concupiscible appetite is more prevalent among the young [al-ghalmān], and it is stronger among them. Their appetite is limited to matters encompassing the body, and related to beauty, such as women and clothes and perfume. And they are quick to transform and change, [for] boredom has power over them, and they desire immoderately and [then] they grow bored quickly, on account of the keenness of their passions and [their passions’] restlessness and their lack of firm beliefs. [157] And their beliefs are like a deceptive thirst that is satisfied by a cold wind.

And anger comes upon [the young] quickly, and it is strong in them, especially on account of their love for honor [al-karāma],⁷¹ such that they do not bear injury well. And their love for honor is immoderate in them, and their love for dominance inclines them towards renown and status. And their love for [dominance] is stronger than their love for money. Indeed their desire for money is fairly moderate, for they have not [yet] suffered from need, nor have they [had to] endure [157.5] poverty.

And their natures are prone to believing quickly whatever falls at their feet on account of their optimism [ḥasn al-ẓann], and their lack of suspicion, and their abundance of hope. And all of that follows on account of their hot temperament,⁷² which resembles the intoxicated, [and their temperament] strengthens the soul very much.⁷³

Therefore they do not go far astray, and they are not beaten down, and they seek the best in life on account of hope. For the future is in their power, while the past is in the power of the old. For since there is not much of the past belonging to them, their experience is small, and on account of their optimism, tricking them is easy.

71 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this explicit mention of something like the object for anger. This is probably due to Avicenna’s generally more specific discussion of the irascible faculty in general.

72 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, but stated more clearly, emotions partially depend on physiological dispositions.

73 cf. 1389a in Greek Aristotle.

[157.10] The bold [shuj‘ān] are like this, too. Therefore both of these types [the young and the bold] have quickness towards anger in common. So they are optimistic, and quick to anger. Optimism does away with anxiety. And intense anger emboldens natural disposition, so that a lack of fear follows;⁷⁴ [so this happens] not only on account of optimism, but also because of strength of heart. So fear and anger do not coexist. And it seems that optimism is a part of [what causes] courage.

And shame is pervasive among the young, for they have not yet plunged into shameful obscenities, and they remain according to nature.⁷⁵ And they are hard on [157.15] themselves due to their lack of experience and knowledge.

And their magnanimity is a consequence of their optimism. They do not think that they will be deprived, since they have not yet experienced harms. Therefore their concerns are turned [158] towards great things, and beliefs abound in their souls.

And their desire towards the beneficial [al-nafi‘] thing that they know is stronger than their desire toward the lovely thing [al-jamīl] with which they are not yet acquainted.⁷⁶ And indeed their thought and the ideas in their souls and held fixedly on the most beneficial thing. For in the category of “good,” they only know the beneficial that is before them on account of their age, that is, pleasure and what goes along with it, and [their] thought [is] based upon nature [fiṭrah]. And this thought [158.5] is attracted to the beneficial, which is [beneficial] in relation to the thinker and present to him. As for that which pulls towards the lovely, it is virtue, and not nature.⁷⁷

It is in this way that this type of character needs to be understood.

As for youth [al-aḥdāth],⁷⁸ [again], they have a strong love for their family and brothers and relatives, because they are spirited, and they love gaiety. And gaiety only occurs when there is health and friendship together.

And their goal in what they choose is not true benefit, but rather benefit leading to pleasure. [158.10] Therefore they make friendships for pleasure, not for a benefit in intellectual interests.⁷⁹ So they love friends, in order that they might make merry with them.

And in seeking to reach some benefit—and in everything for that matter—they make more mistakes than the old, because they are excessive and they are not moderate. For excess causes

74 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, it is noteworthy emotions in some sense causes of other emotions.

75 i.e., they are not hardened against shame.

76 cf. 1389a-b in Greek Aristotle.

77 This is one of the clearest statements in Avicenna that pleasure/benefit is that towards which nature tends, whereas the good is only pursued by virtue.

78 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for this secondary discussion of the young.

79 No parallel in Aristotle’s text for the use of the term “benefit” as a genus that includes pleasurable benefit and intellectual benefit [true benefit].

error.⁸⁰ And due to the severity of their immoderation, they think of themselves as comprehending all things..

And due to their natures they will commit injustice in public, even though they are given shameful disgrace in return [for such acts], because they tend by nature towards bad actions, on account of their being by nature [158.15] very angry, and low on fear.

Nevertheless pity abounds in them, on account of their believing the one known to be wronged to be good. And they are hostile to evil deception, on account of their own lack of guiltiness and deceptive tendencies.

And they are lovers of jest and joking, on account of [their] love of joy and gaiety, and on account of the weakness of their deliberative faculty. The care [of their deliberative faculty], if it were strong, [would rather] fall upon serious matters.

[159] As for the old, most of their dispositions [akhlāq] are opposite of [the young]. Their dispositions are passionless and grumpy, and they do not give into any [trickery] on account of all that they have experienced, and all that has happened to them in terms of deception and error, and all the evils they have fallen into, and [even] those they have intended [to commit]—thus they are on high alert for such things.

It is on account of their dispositions that they don't ever speak about anything with decisive speech. And if they judge, they judge [159.5] on the basis of what they have experienced. Everything in their view is [judged] according to a prior judgement, or they don't make any judgment about it. And it is as if, owing to the abundance of their experience, they never try anything [new], because they are skeptical about anything that has no precedent in their eyes, and in that which they are like the unlearned. And they are little concerned about praise and blame. And when they talk about something in the future, they speak about it with misgivings, attaching the expressions, "possibly," and "perhaps."

And their dispositions are bad,⁸¹ on account of their pessimism [sū' ẓunihim]. And it is not typical of them to go very far in the way of good will or hatred, except [159.10] about things in which there is compulsion. And you can observe them in their love to be like those who hate, and in their hate to be like those who love.

And they are not magnanimous] and they belittle [others]. They don't act in the manner of those who are resolute and determined, [but they act] as though they might do badly.

Therefore their appetite for things is weak, except for what is connected with their livelihood, for they are intent on that, fearing the perception of death. And on account of that [fear] their souls do not rise up to generosity and chivalry, because they are stingy with respect to worldly goods. And experience has made them conscious of the difficulty of acquiring [goods], and the bad that comes from losing them or having them [159.15] destroyed.

⁸⁰ No parallel in Aristotle's text for the discussion of how excess causes error, and the preference for moderation. Seems that Avicenna may be channeling the spirit of *Nicomachean Ethics*, which he otherwise does not write about.

⁸¹ cf. 1389b in Greek Aristotle.

And cowardice rules over them. And they are good at cautioning about what could happen, on account of all the experiences they have benefited from. And they are opposite of youth in terms of how they are motivated [fī al-maʿānī al-muḥarrikah], indeed they incline towards rest on account of the coldness of their temperament.⁸² Therefore they are cowardly and fearful.

And because of cowardice and fear their greed is stronger. And also [they are greedy] because they cling excessively to their love of life, realizing that it is close to vanishing.

And their desire has ceased [160] for women and spectacles, on account of the fact that they no longer need them. And [this occurs] despite the fact that they do indeed [continue to] desire [other things], especially food.

And they incline towards justice, and they love just imams, and this is on account of their cowardice and weakness. For the inclination towards justice is on account of love of peace. And love of peace is either on account of excellence, or smallness of soul. For virtue is impelled towards it, and smallness [160.5] of soul also brings about [love of peace]⁸³. So in whoever it isn't virtue that is impelling him towards [love of peace], there is nothing else impelling him except smallness of soul.

[The old] prefer the beneficial good, and they do not prefer the ⁸⁴noble good, because of their love of themselves. For love of self inclines one towards the beneficial, rather than the noble. For the beneficial has to do with the person himself, while the noble has to do with others. And they are shameless, not being embarrassed, for they do not have any inclination towards the noble, rather their disposition focuses on the beneficial. Therefore they little esteem the noble.

[160.10] And on account of their dispositions [they have] a paucity of hope, since they have found failure in the world more often than success. And [what we call] experience is that which happens most often, and their beliefs accord with experience⁸⁵.

And rather than taking pleasure in hoping, they take pleasure in remembering. And on account of the paucity of their hope, their cowardice grows.

And their anger is sharp [ḥadīd]⁸⁶ [yet] weak.⁸⁷ The sharpness is due to quickness of feeling, as if they are sick, and as for the weakness [of the anger], it is due to the weakness of their natural disposition.⁸⁸

82 Similar to what we see in Aristotle, but stated more clearly, emotions partially depend on physiological dispositions.

83 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the examples in this paragraph.

84 No parallel in Aristotle's text for the distinction between the beneficial and the noble good at this juncture. Benefit is relative to the person, whereas the good does not just concern personal interests.

85 Noteworthy that some dispositions are beliefs, or habits of mind, caused by repeated experiences.

86 This appears to be an explication of the idea of different "intensities [ḥudūd]" from the first paragraph of 3.5.

87 cf. 1390a in Greek Aristotle.

88 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this explication of why their anger is sharp yet weak. Aristotle asserts the same thing, but does not explain.

Their appetitive power is dwindling, or abating, and their appetite is towards the beneficial, not the [160.15] pleasurable, therefore they are thought to be self-controlled. Yet they are self-controlled by necessity, not one account of virtue. And their desire for seeking the virtuous and the beneficial is in decline, on account of the fact that their time of life is waning.

And they associate [161] with people who are adherents to what they prefer, on account of their [having] settled dispositions for the sake of which they do what they do.⁸⁹ They do not [associate with people] insofar as [the others] are adherents to thoughts that are in accord with what is beneficial.⁹⁰

Their wont is to feign the dispositions of the pure of heart, even though what they do is for certain ends and contrivances. For when they feign as pure of heart, they seek some benefit, but they do not acknowledge it. They are dead set on acquiring benefits, [161.5] but by means of skill and deceit and cunning, not by means of things done out in the open, which one might be embarrassed by. [In this they are] contrary to the tendency of the young.

And they may have compassion [but for reasons] contrary to [the reasons behind] the compassion of the young. For the young are compassionate on account of their love for people, or the fact that they believe [the other's] complaints. [The old] are compassionate on account of their own weakness, and on account of the fact that they imagine the evil complained about or witnessed as if it were happening to them.

Along with all that they are patient in the face of harms, not worried. And they are not jokers, for [161.10] joking is incompatible with seriousness, and different than patience.

As for those in the prime of life, they are those who have reached their strongest, and have not passed over [it]. Their dispositions are a mean between the two previously mentioned dispositions: between destructive courage and cowardice, and between believing everything and considering everything to be false.

Rather, they are courageous insofar as it is appropriate, and they believe things insofar as it is appropriate. And their concerns are a mixture of [being concerned with] the beneficial and the noble, and of seriousness and jesting. For they are [161.15] self-controlled as well as courageous. As for the young, they have courage along with voraciousness. Likewise, the old have cowardice along with continence.

The beginning of these years is from thirty to thirty five, and their completion is at fifty.⁹¹

[162] As for those people of noble descent who possess a [good] lineage, they greatly desire honor, striving to resemble their ancestors. And it is thought [by them] that everyone who is older is more illustrious and greater, and therefore they desire rank and honor. Therefore they tend towards pride and presumptuousness and self-control.

89 No parallel in Aristotle's text at this juncture for the specific notion that dispositions [akhlāq] settle as you get older.

90 i.e., even though old people only seek the beneficial, they do not seek to associate with people who might push them towards new types of benefits. Rather, in their relations they just look for people like themselves.

91 Aristotle distinguishes between the prime of the body and the prime of the mind. Avicenna does not.

Nevertheless, their honor compels them towards justice, and that is the case at least as long as honor still remains in them, and the passage of time has not dispelled [162.5] the habits they have inherited from their predecessors. Eventually [their inherited habits] break down with the passage of time, on account of their lack of humility for [submitting to] education.

And their seeking high office [is] on account of decline owing to deviance, and [their being involved in] industry and making base profits. And when time encroaches upon them, [their inherited habits] continue breaking down, and provisions and competencies fall away from them, and they go on as idiots, or the worst of the lazy.

As for the dispositions of the rich: [they are characterized by] domineering, scorning people, engaging audaciously in [162.10] insults, and puffed-up thoughts about themselves, as if they are victorious in all good things, and they never take note of [those in] slavery or servitude. For they are luxuriously equipped with the good life, swaggering about in a good state. And they love praise and opulence, owing to the amount of both [praise and opulence] that they are accustomed to. And their wont is to be jealous of everyone, as if everyone were jealous of them for their lot.

Therefore some attribute to them the virtues of wisdom, since [the wise] need the wealthy, suffering poverty, such that [they consider the rich] to be wise, aware of all things,⁹² [162.15] not thinking badly about people, not doing badly through domineering judgement. [But this is backwards, because] the bad deeds of the wealthy increases in them weakness of judgement, for they belittle the need for it.

And the good qualities [of the rich] resemble the good qualities of women.

Moreover, the one who has a history of wealth is more high minded than one who has newly acquired it, who may have suffered ignominy prior to his wealth, and in whom smallness of soul may have crept in.

[163] And the wealthy resemble the young in [their] committing manifest acts of injustice without a care, as if money protects them from blemish.

And in [the rich] there are strong dispositions that incline [them] towards the power. The dispositions inclining one towards the direction of power include: [a disposition] which is more base, which exchanges the good of power for more acquisitions, and [a disposition] which is more sagacious, such as love of seeking excellence. For he who is [163.5] concerned with higher things uses his power for excellence. And these are the ones who love honor. And they are superior in terms of dispositions, and better equipped in terms of thought, and they are more capable than those inclining towards the acquisition of goods, because their activities of power are those that are in accordance with superiority and honor and augustness.

92 cf. 1391a in Greek Aristotle.

Avicenna's text is difficult to make sense of here, but it seems meant to convey spirit of Aristotle's original discussion. That is, some think the rich are better than the wise because the wise beg from the rich.

As for acquisitiveness and seeking plenty (in terms of [mere] quantity), this are due to weakness. For whenever the soul is stronger, it is more inclined towards living well and pride. Such ones acquire, by the power of their soul, excellence of mind, and they refrain from laboriously seeking the highest place, [163.10] and therefore they see no need for haughtiness—on account of their [strength of] soul—for they are moderate, [and they are] of good character in society. They do not strive for vile injustice, rather, if they do injustice, they do it on a great scale.

As for the ones made recently [in terms of their wealth], their dispositions are as follows: comfort-seeking, pleasure-enjoying, presumptuous, [and] having little concern [for others], owing to a great amount of self-sufficiency. And they are serious lovers of God, trusting in him, trusting in providence, because they are used to benefiting from luck, without hard work.⁹³

[163.15] And the states contrary to these [of the poor] can be known from the states of those [just mentioned].

Hence, the benefit [sought] in persuasive speech is the attainment of persuasion.⁹⁴ And persuasion will not occur [164] except when a response is brought to an end, and speech is completed. It is difficult to silence an individual or to prevent their speaking out, especially if they are being persuasive. So it is important—in order to have sound governance over legal deliberations—that a judge is appointed who can reprove the one committing [some act] from his committing it, and [reprove] the one doing badly from his doing badly, along with [the rhetorician] having total self-control over his speech, not being hindered or proceeding on to idle prattle. And it is necessary that [164.5] [the judge] restrain the audience from participating in the prattling of the speaker. And [it is important for the judge to also restrain] the testimony of the listeners from the outset so that [one] does not bring a particular slant [to the table].⁹⁵

So it is necessary that there is there a speaker, and a judge, and an audience. And if that is the case, then it is necessary that the rhetorician knows about these characterizations that are distinct in terms of emotions and dispositions.

93 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this somewhat scathing remark that the apparent noble religiosity of the wealthy is just due to their being lucky. In other words, in poorer circumstances, they would likely not be so virtuous, which suggests that their virtue is superficial.

94 cf. 1391b in Greek Aristotle.

95 No parallel in Aristotle's text for this for this way of describing what conditions are needed for persuasion.

From Avicenna's *Compilation: Rhetoric*

Truly, the most powerful means for obtaining assent, and the most fitting for rhetoric, is syllogistic speech, followed by the inducing of these passions:

Anger is a psychological injury, accompanied by a desire in the angered one to inflict punishment, because of some contempt [23.5]⁹⁶ or indifference that is perceived by him, or by someone who is connected to him. Anger is directed at a person or a particular group of people, it is not directed towards a general concept. The kinds of contempt are, firstly, indifference, especially when something is happening to the angered-party in a certain circumstance, and that circumstance consists in the person being seen, that is, the person by whom the angered-person is disregarded. Mocking and insult are also kinds of contempt. A lack of something hoped for, or a lack of being treated well, are also things that cause anger. A sad person is quick to anger. Similar, there is the one who has some cause of anger befall him, and thus he [further] becomes angry at the least thing connected to him. And anger afflicts [someone] on account of their friends, [23.10] if some of their friends do not stand up for their other friends, or if they do not say nice things about them, or if they are not pained by those who oppose them, or if they do not offer support for the doing of a good deed, or if they laugh when they are serious, or if they do not repay them. [24] Anger also occurs on account of someone being forgetful.

The opposite of anger is repose of the soul, and its causes are opposite the causes of anger. Confession, contrition, and rest all alleviate anger. Anger is not abundant in the joyful, the poor, the virtuous, nor in the gentle. Finally, revenge puts anger to rest, along with the length of time [that has passed since the offense], and the extent of the affliction reaching the object of anger.

[24.5] Friendship is a state between two people, wherein each of the two wants the good for the other—for the sake of the other—not for themselves, and wherein each of the two loves and is loved. The causes of friendship: one of the causes of friendship is doing good cheerfully, or in a time of need. [Also, among the causes of friendship, there is the fact of someone having] friendship with one's friends, enmity towards one's enemies, soundness of thoughts and virtues, goodness, skill in social intercourse, an effortless disposition to virtue, excellent manners in speech, a lack of tendency to reproach and reprimand, and a shared desire or interest in the affairs of one's friends and relatives or [in the affairs of] the relatives of one's friends—these causes, if they are in a person, they open that person up to being loved. And the kinds of [24.10] friendship are: familiar relations, intimate relations, companionship, and kinship. The causes of enmity are opposite of all these causes [of friendship].

Fear is a sadness or a disorder caused by imagining an evil which is expected to do damage or harm. People who are feared are those who are able to bring about these evils, those who are known to carry out such evils, the friends of the unjustly-treated, the enemies [of the unjustly-treated], those who are sharp in their anger, in cunning, or in trickery, possessing patience [to carry out their evils]. Things that are feared include failure and the occurrence of shameful acts, especially when there is no escape from the feared thing, and when there is no help to deal with it.

96 Page and line numbers correspond to Avicenna, *Natural Affections* (1954).

Security is the opposite of fear, [24.15] and its causes are opposite the causes of fear.

[25] Concerning courage and its causes, it could either be caused by habit, or natural boldness, or the aggravation induced by anger, or the hope of being saved soon, or the existence of helpers, or an increase of virtue, or having a claim to help, or an abundance of money and provisions.

Embarrassment and shame are a kind of disorder or sadness caused by the occurrence of some evil wherein the person is made blameworthy, whether [25.5] in the present or the past or the future. Brazenness is the indifference of a soul in light of the occurrence of such evils. [With respect to either of these,] it is caused by the exposure of shyness or timidity, or of deeds of injustice or harm, or of wicked companionship and its evil in terms of vile deeds. [It is also caused by the exposure of] injustice done to the weak, and vanity, and deceit, and weakness of will, and other moral abominations. If these evils are manifest to [one's] friends—[friends that a shy person] wants to impress—and to other decent folk, [the shyness] becomes even more poignant.

[25.10] Concern [or pity] is a grief for a corrupting and damaging evil that happened or is happening, undeservedly, to the one worrying or to one connected to the one worrying. A man is unconcerned if he has encountered many things, or is courageous, or is sound in thought, or is brazen and indifferent. [The concerned person, on the other hand, is] very fearful.

And as for the vile things [which one might be concerned about], there is suffering, misfortunes, the loss or death of brothers, the vanishing of beneficial resources, and failure. The worrier worries for those who are relatives, acquaintances, those able to benefit him, the virtuous, and the weak.

Joy in its causes is different, neutralizing concern such that it does not occur, or changing [25.15] the mind so that it does not grasp [the concerns].

The vengeful person is one who is upset at the goodness of [someone's] condition who does not deserve [that goodness], while the jealous person is one [26] who is upset at the goodness of a state belonging to someone, because of the goodness of the state, whether that someone is deserving or not deserving [of the goodness]. Rather than [being upset at some kind of injustice, the jealous person] is spiteful because of the goodness of a state like nobility, beauty, power and wealth. Moreover, the great are spiteful if the weak dominate them, and the keen-witted are spiteful if the ignorant cause them to error. And as for those whose manner is to be jealous, [they are those who] love honor, they are possessors of money, and they are those who are equal in year and age and status and praise and glory.

And thus we have said enough concerning [26.5] virtues and emotions.