

Chapter 1: Varieties of Emotions in the Animal Motive Soul¹

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A desire for food and fear of a predator. Wonder at art and a longing for freedom. Some would insist on calling the latter two states “emotions,” and the former “animal appetites.” Naturally, how we parse this depends on what we say emotions are. If emotions are something more elevated, constituted by evaluative judgments, while animal appetites are just hardwired impulses towards specific objects, then such a distinction makes sense.² Avicenna—notable within classical Arabic philosophy for his optimism about what animal nature is capable of—approaches the matter differently. But this is not because he thinks there is no difference between animal and human emotional life. Rather, it’s because he thinks that states seemingly as different as the above-mentioned pairs are fundamentally actualizations of the same faculty, shared by all animals, human and non-human. That is, all these states are *inclinations* (translating *inbi’āth* or *nazzā’*), with cognitive causes of varying complexity. They are emotions insofar as they incline their subject to various acts and objects, and insofar as they are inclinations, they are basically alike.

In what follows I will argue that Avicenna’s understanding of emotion³ captures a wider range of affective states than had previously been recognized in his tradition, by showing how Avicenna deemphasizes traditional Aristotelian terminology (Gr. *orexis*, Ar. *shawq*), and instead makes use of this idea of “inclination (again, *inbi’āth* or *nazzā’*)” as that which is fundamental to being an emotion. My argument will largely be born out through a detailed contextualization and analysis of some difficult texts that have not thus far been treated in detail: Avicenna’s most comprehensive account of the motive faculty, in his *Healing: Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4.⁴ We will see Avicenna begin by discussing basic concupiscible and irascible emotions, and then slowly

1 All translations of the Arabic in this dissertation are my own, unless noted.

2 See Martha Nussbaum, developing a theory she takes to be in the Stoic tradition, in Nussbaum (2001) 131.

3 A problem facing any study of emotion in the history of philosophy is that it is difficult to locate a historical category that precisely overlaps with our modern category of emotion. But the reason for this is not that premodern philosophy did not deal with the same topic. Rather, it is that even today it is notoriously hard to agree upon what counts as an “emotion,” leading to a wide range of theories of what an emotion is. So it is no use looking for something in the history of philosophy that fills the same functional role as our modern category for emotions, since we are far from agreement on what that role is.

Yet it is clear that Avicenna and contemporaries are attempting to explain similar phenomena as modern day emotion theorists if we take our cues from particular emotions. That is, there are certain states (fear, joy, envy) that basically everyone wants to call emotions, though for different reasons, and if we look at how Avicenna deals with terms like that, we see a more clear picture emerge.

Nonetheless, once we have identified the texts where emotions are dealt with, the best way of understanding them is to follow the inner logic of Avicenna’s own system. That is, as psychological states, emotions are fundamentally explained through major divisions of psychological faculties. So in what follows I will present how Avicenna deal with things we would call emotions, according to his own schema.

4 The first scholar to draw attention to Avicenna’s usage of *inbi’āth* and *nazzā’* was Helmut Gätje, in “Zur Psychologie der Willenshandlungen in der islamischen Philosophie,” pp. 357-359. What I present here will not disagree with Gätje, but it will show that Avicenna’s picture is complex in ways Gätje’s brief treatment does not address. The only other place this topic has been discussed is in Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 218-225. Again, there is little I disagree with in his treatment of Avicenna, but much remains to be filled in.

broaden the category of emotion to include emotions that are *like* concupiscible emotions, but which have what he calls “internal” goods as their object, as opposed to “external” goods. From there, I will show how he expands the category of emotion to include affective states unique to humans, and then, finally, varieties of pleasure. These are all presented as states of the animal motive faculty, which makes the last of these especially unexpected, since pleasure is a completion-state, not a state wherein any new object is desired. But since inclination is a broader concept than desire or appetite, all these states end up able to be grouped together in a meaningful way.

1. Aristotelian Background for the Concept of "Moved-Mover"

Avicenna’s notion of “inclination” fills roughly the same role in his psychology as that of “moved-mover” for Aristotle, being an elaboration of the terrain covered by Aristotle in *De Anima* 3.9-11.⁵ At the start of 3.9 Aristotle divides animal and human psychological faculties into two kinds: those enabling cognition, and those enabling voluntary motion.⁶ Aristotle says that voluntary motion involves four things: two causes of movement, the means of movement, and the moving subject. This is seen in the following text, where Aristotle initially says there are “three factors,” but he then specifies that the first factor is in fact of of “two kinds”:

But movement involves three factors: first the moving cause, secondly the means by which it produces movement, and thirdly the thing moved. The moving cause is of two kinds: one is unmoved and the other both moves and is moved. The former is the practical good, while that which both moves and is moved is the appetite (for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement), and the thing moved is the animal.⁷

The last two factors involved in voluntary motion are the most straightforward: in the case of animal motion, the *subject* of movement is the whole animal, and the *means* of movement are the various organs and muscles that operate by pushing and pulling. Shortly after this text, Aristotle argues that there must be a central axis for all this pushing and pulling, which later commentators understood to be the heart.⁸

Prior to the means and the subject of motion is the cause of motion, which Aristotle breaks down into the practical good and appetite. Aristotle does not explain what he means by “practical good” in this context, but Themistius interprets him to simply mean a good that is relevant to and within reach of some agent, as opposed to goodness in some unqualified and universal sense.⁹ Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias understands the starting point of movement to mean some external object understood as something to be pursued or avoided.¹⁰ This would make a “practical good” any specific object, understood in such a way as to be relevant to appetite. For example, not *the* good, but *a* good, like food; and not just food, but food *grasped as* pleasant or nutritious. The reason the practical good is an “unmoved-mover” is because it is the end of

5 Aristotle’s *De Motu Animalium* is of course another key text for the motive faculty, but—despite Averroes’ later awareness of *De Motu* in broad strokes—the text itself does not seem to have ever been translated into Arabic. See Gutas (2014) 361, n. 5.

6 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.9, 432b.

7 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b.

8 Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (1996) 223.

9 Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (1996) 220.

10 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima* (1980) 98, section 2.89.

action. In a commentary attributed to John Philoponus, we read that God is called an unmoved-mover of the world for similar reasons: God is not changed, but is rather the goal towards which changeable things direct their actions.¹¹ So the practical good is an unmoved-mover because an object, when evaluated in a certain light, can be the goal for motion.¹²

The proximate cause of motion, on the other hand, is a *moved-mover*, and it is this component of Aristotle's psychological schema that has traditionally been associated with emotion. Aristotle himself explains what he means by "moved-mover" as follows: "for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement."¹³ The first half of this simply tells us that appetite is one of the causes of motion, the second half tells us that appetite causes motion by itself being a kind of motion, or change. Just like how the sense in which practical good remains *unchanged* helps us understand the sort of mover it is, so here the sense in which appetite *is* a change helps us understand why it is a mover. Again, (Pseudo) John Philoponus attempts to explain the core of what it is to be a moved-mover when he says that appetite is a change "insofar as it reaches out."¹⁴ This is an appeal to the origins of the word appetite (or *orexis*). As Martha Nussbaum relates, prior to Aristotle, the verb *orego* was fairly common outside of philosophical literature, and was used to refer to a literal reaching out (with one's hand, for example) towards some physical object (like a cup).¹⁵ Aristotle is obviously not using *orexis* in this context to refer to the literal, external reaching, since he is focused on the internal causes of motion, rather than motion itself. Nussbaum considers it a major contribution of Aristotle's to use *orexis* to refer to an inner reaching out, which is the cause for action in the more literal, prior sense of the verb. If we are talking about an appetite to avoid, rather than to pursue, then the distance of Aristotle's usage from the literal sense of *orego* is even more clear.

So the four factors involved in movement can be summarized up as follows:

- 1) unmoved-mover: a practical good, i.e., an object cognized/represented in the subject
- 2) moved-mover: an act of the motive faculty/appetite, in response to (1)
- 3) means of motion: muscles and the ligaments
- 4) that which is moved: the subject as a whole¹⁶

11 See (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (2013) 39, section 587.5ff.

12 Towards the end of the section on voluntary movement, there is a text where it might seem that Aristotle is identifying the unmoved-mover with the cognition, not the object, saying "the cognitive faculty is not moved but remains still (3.11, 434a)." But, of course, cognition is a kind of change, which means it is not the best candidate for being the unmoved-mover, precisely speaking. So what must be meant here is that the object, *as presented by some cognitive, evaluative act*, is the end which to which appetite responds, and that cognition does not have to undergo any further change in order to serve its purpose. The process of cognition is not the object of appetite, but is rather a necessary condition for the object to be relevant to appetite. In other words, one reaches out not for the thought of their object as pleasant, but rather just for the pleasant object. The thought of the object as pleasant merely occasions that reaching out.

13 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b.

14 (Pseudo) John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul* (2013) 41, section 591.10ff.

15 Nussbaum (2001) pp. 130–31.

16 Avicenna most explicitly replicates this fourfold schema in *Healing: Metaphysics*, section 6.5.3. Some of the precise terminology differs between Aristotle and Avicenna. For example, Aristotle calls *orexis* the proximate principle of motion, while Avicenna calls the means of motion the proximate principle, and differences in labeling ripple out from there. But the ordering and general point is the same.

In the *De Anima*, Aristotle further subdivides appetite into concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), irascible appetite (*thumos*), which are moved-movers in response to objects of sensation, and will or choice (*bouleisis*), which is in response to an object of thought¹⁷. But he is less concerned in this text to define and distinguish these appetites from one another than to clarify the role of appetite in general as a cause of movement.

2. Basic Emotions in Avicenna: Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite

The portions of Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* (*Al-Shifā' : Kitāb Al-Nafs*) where he treats emotions, and questions similar to those of *De Anima* 3.9-11, are his discussions of the animal motive faculty (*al-quwwa al-muḥarrika*), and the practical intellect considered as a motive principle (*mabda' muḥarrika*). But to be a motive *principle* is just to be a cognitive cause (an unmoved-mover) for acts of the animal motive faculty (moved-movers), so our discussion here will focus on the animal motive faculty.

Avicenna introduces the motive faculty in *Healing: Psychology* 1.5, in his initial enumeration of all psychological faculties, where motive faculties are distinguished at first from the apprehending (*mudrika*) faculties.¹⁸ The motive faculty, next, is divided into two types: the motive faculty as inclining (*bā' itha*)¹⁹ with respect to movement, and the motive faculty in the sense of actually moving (*fā' ila*).²⁰ The inclining (*bā' itha*) side is roughly synonymous with Aristotle's idea of moved-mover, while the actually moving side is constituted by the muscles and ligaments, which Aristotle called the means of motion. So the inclining side instigates movement, and the actually moving side carries it out.²¹ As we will see, actualizations of the inclining (*bā' itha*) side of the motive faculty constitute emotions, and so emotions on Avicenna's schema can be thought of as fundamentally inclining with respect to movement. This does not mean that emotions are always *successful* in triggering movement, just that they incline towards it.²² The terms inclination and emotion can thus be used interchangeably when discussing Avicenna's views.

Avicenna's first foray into explaining varieties of emotions in *Psychology* begins, him being a good Aristotelian, by distinguishing the concupiscible and irascible faculties. This is expected, but we need to understand *how* Avicenna goes about introducing the motive faculty here in 1.5, as it will help us see how he identifies and contrasts other varieties of inclinations beyond concupiscible and irascible appetites later in 4.4:

17 Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.9, 432b.

18 Lest this sound overly obscure, we should recall that talk of "psychological faculties" is just a way of describing the sort of abilities that living organisms have. One of the things some living organisms can do is engage in voluntary motion, and the "motive faculty" is an umbrella term for any faculty involved in voluntary motion.

19 Avicenna elsewhere further subdivides the inclining side into inclination to act *and* resolution to act (*ijmā'*). For example, Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement 25, page 435.

20 A more literal translation of *fā' ila* would be "acting" or "doing," but "moving" is appropriate because the act in question is specifically physical motion (from place to place, or in place).

21 In his *Psychology*, Avicenna is most interested in discussing motive faculty in the sense of being a motivating moved-mover. Like Aristotle, who spent more time talking about the means of movement elsewhere, for example in his *De Motu*, Avicenna discusses means of motion in his medical and biological works.

22 See footnote 19 about the distinction between inclination and resolution. \$

The motive faculty has two divisions: the motive faculty insofar as it instigates movement, and insofar as it carries out [movement]. And the motive faculty insofar as it instigates is the appetitive [*al-nazū' iyyah al-shawqiyyah*] faculty, and this is the faculty that, when a form to be sought or to be avoided [*ṣūra maṭlūbah aw mahrūb 'anhā*] is inscribed in the imagination—a faculty we'll discuss soon—it [the appetitive power] impels the other [loco]motive power—that we're about to discuss—towards movement.

And the appetitive faculty [*al-quwwa al-nazū' iyya al-shawqiyya*] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [*al-shahwāniyya*] faculty, which is a faculty that instigates motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [*al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfi'atan*], seeking pleasure [*al-ladhdha*]. And the other faculty, called the irascible [*al-ghaḍabiyya*] faculty, is the faculty which instigates motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [*al-ghalba*].²³

Two things need to be observed in this text to understand Avicenna's general approach to emotions: 1) concupiscible and irascible appetite have attractions and aversions, with their objects of attraction constituting their final object, and 2) concupiscible and irascible appetite's final objects are best construed as a kind of pleasure and dominance, respectively. By understanding the sense in which the concupiscible and irascible faculties have final objects, and what those objects are, we'll be able to better see the *further* distinctions Avicenna makes between types of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, since he appeals to distinct final objects for distinct types of emotions. (1) and (2) will be explained in more detail in sections 2.1 and 2.2 that follow presently.

2a. Innate Attractions and Aversions in All Psychological Faculties

A crucial point needed to understand Avicenna's description of concupiscible and irascible emotions in *Psychology* 1.5, and how he categorizes further types of emotions, is that voluntary motion (motion in response to cognition) and involuntary, natural motion (motion that does not involve cognition) both involve faculties that have attractions and aversions. In talking about motive faculties, he is talking about faculties most directly responsible for voluntary motion, and these faculties themselves have natural, *involuntary* attractions and aversions. In one of Avicenna's early works, *Treatise on Love*, he makes the following point about how all psychological faculties incline towards their final objects, and away from the opposites of those objects:

There is no doubt that each of the animal faculties are characterized by a type of behavior, impelled by an innate love [*'ishq gharīzī*]. If animal faculties did not possess a natural aversion [*nufūr ṭabī'ī*] whose principle is an innate hatred [*baghḍa gharīziyya*], and a natural desire [*tawaqān ṭabī'ī*] whose source is innate love [*'ishq gharīzī*], then their existence in the animal body would be superfluous. And it is apparent that that is the case for each of the divisions [of psychological faculties].²⁴

As Avicenna's examples in *Treatise on Love* go on to show, this is essentially a statement that every psychological faculty is meant for some particular final object, or end, and is in a state of completion when it attains that object. The external and internal senses are made for perceiving certain types of sensibles, and are averse to perceiving others. This is *natural* attraction and

23 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, p. 41.

24 Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 251.

aversion and, like the stone's natural attraction towards the earth, it results in natural, *involuntary* movements. The eye flinches at something that is too bright; the imagination quakes at a ghastly thought. The only objects that can naturally attract or cause aversion to some faculty are those specifically in the domain that faculty is designed for.

But animals are capable of voluntary motion, and this is due to faculties that have attraction and aversion in response to *cognized* objects. This is what Avicenna is trying to capture in Psychology 1.5 when he says that the motive faculty is the faculty that responds to things inscribed in the imagination as “to be sought or to be avoided.” If all he were saying here is that the motive faculty is attracted to its object, and averse to the opposite of its object, this would be nothing new—it would be natural attraction and aversion. What makes the motive faculties unique is that they respond to the specific objects of *any* faculty, provided they are cognized as “to be sought or to be avoided.” Rather than just being in response to objects that are naturally attractive or repugnant to some faculty, there is an added layer of processing: one person might cognize a bit of food as attractive, another might see it as repugnant. There follows from that evaluative cognition an attraction or repulsion in the motive faculty. It's the motive faculty's aversion or attraction to things *cognized* in a particular way that makes it a capacity for voluntary motion.

So when Avicenna says in the text from Psychology 1.5 that there are at least two branches of the motive faculty, he is not saying that there is one faculty for “seeking,” and one faculty for “avoiding.” Based on the fact that the concupiscible faculty is the faculty associated explicitly with pleasurable things, and the irascible with harmful things, it would be tempting to associate the former with attraction, the latter with aversion, and to assimilate all motivation related to negative objects with the irascible faculty. But we know from the more general facts just mentioned about how *all* faculties are structured that both branches have a certain function, and will lead to some emotions that constitute attractions to their final object, and some emotions that are aversions to its opposite. Clarifying that every faculty has attractions and aversions allows us to more precisely specify the objects of concupiscible and irascible emotions, as follows.

2b. The Final Objects of Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite

Knowing that both concupiscible and irascible faculties have objects to which they are attracted as *final* objects, we need to read the text from *Psychology* 1.5 with a view to characterizing what those objects are. But this requires some careful parsing, since Avicenna mentions several things about each faculty. Here is the relevant text again:

And the appetitive faculty [al-quwwa al-nazū'iyya al-shawqiyya] has two branches: a branch that is called the concupiscible [al-shahwāniyya] faculty, and it is a faculty that incites motion by which it gets closer to the things imagined to be necessary or beneficial [al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfi'atan], seeking pleasure [al-ladhdha]. And the other faculty, called the irascible [al-ghaḍabiyya] faculty, is the faculty which incites motion that defends against something imagined to be harmful or corruptive, seeking dominance [al-ghalba].²⁵

The concupiscible appetite *seeks* pleasure, in response to something “*imagined* to be necessary or beneficial,” and it aims to *acquire* that imagined thing. Likewise, the irascible appetite *seeks*

25 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 41.

dominance in response to something “*imagined to be harmful or corruptive*,” and it aims to *defend* against that imagined thing. There seems to be some goal, some cognition, and some associated action.

We can orient ourselves to determine which of these three items constitutes the faculties’ proper, final objects with a clue from, again, the *Treatise on Love*. After mentioning the attractions and aversions of the perceptive faculties, Avicenna says that the irascible faculty is attracted to revenge and dominance (*al-intiqām wa-al-taghallub*), and is averse to lowliness and submission (*al-dhull wa-al-istikāna*).²⁶ In the *Psychology* 1.5 text, dominance is that which the irascible appetite “seeks,” so the parallel for the concupiscible appetite would be its “seeking pleasure.” Avicenna does not say so in the *Treatise on Love*, but we can assume that the opposite of pleasure would be pain, so the concupiscible appetite is attracted to pleasure, and averse to pain.

The associated cognitions and actions, then, flesh out what it means to be attracted to pleasure and dominance, respectively. Attraction to the possibility of pleasure can occur when something is “imagined to be necessary or beneficial,” and the movement prompted by such attraction would be an attempt to acquire pleasure. Attraction to the possibility of dominance can occur when something is “imagined to be harmful or corruptive,” and the logical way of achieving dominance in light of such an imagination would be defensive, or retaliatory behavior. So the other aspects of the *Psychology* 1.5 text simply capture the cognition which occasions attraction from the concupiscible or irascible faculty, which we could call the faculty’s *intentional* (as opposed to final) object, and the associated *generic behavior* that would constitute acting on that emotion. For example, a puppy might see some food left on the table as delicious (an intentional object), and so try to eat it, on account of its final object, pleasure.

To be clear, these terms (final object, intentional object, and associated behavior) are my terms for clarifying what Avicenna is getting at, and are not in the text itself. By final object, I mean that towards which the act is directed (e.g., pleasure or dominance), and by “intentional” I mean how some other object is cognized so as to make it relevant to that final object (e.g., some object conceived of as pleasant or harmful).²⁷ Motive acts are not cognitive, of course, so to say they have intentional objects means they are preceded by intentional cognitions.

To summarize, concupiscible and irascible faculties give rise to emotions that are attractions to their final objects, and to aversions to the opposites of those final objects. Since these are faculties for voluntary motion, they are actualized by cognized, intentional objects that make the final object (or its opposite) clear, which leads to characteristic behaviors. Avicenna has a similar discussion of the concupiscible and irascible appetite at the start of *Psychology* 4.4, and apart

²⁶ Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 251.

²⁷ The fact that there is something like an intentional object (i.e., an object cognized in such a way as to be relevant to the motive faculty), is supported by the following text, occurring later in *Psychology*:

“For the irascible faculty is not affected by pleasures, and the concupiscible power is not affected by harmful things [*al-mu’ dhiyyāt*], and the apprehensive power is not influenced by that which influences these two, and nothing is conceptualized by these two [irascible and concupiscible faculties] insofar as these two are receptive of the apprehended form (5.7, 252).”

This text makes it clear that one and the same object can have various properties: sensible properties and evaluative properties. Insofar as some object is grasped as pleasant or harmful, it is relevant to the concupiscible and irascible faculty, respectively.

from some minor variations in terminology, he gives the same general picture.²⁸ A comparison of the two texts is as follows:

	<i>Healing: Psychology</i> 1.5	<i>Healing: Psychology</i> 4.4
Generic Name for Appetites	<i>al-shawqiyya</i>	<i>al-shawqiyya</i>
Concupiscible Name	<i>al-shahwāniyya</i>	<i>al-shahwāniyya</i>
Concupiscible Final Object	Pleasure <i>al-ladhdha</i>	That which is pleasant <i>al-ladhīdh</i>
Concupiscible Intentional Object	Imagined to be necessary or beneficial [<i>al-mutakhayyila ḍurūriyyatan aw nāfi‘atan</i>]	Imagined to be beneficial [<i>al-mutakhayyil nafi‘an</i>]
Concupiscible Associated Behavior	Getting closer/approaching [<i>yaqrab</i>]	Acquiring [<i>tajlab</i>]
Irascible Name	<i>al-ghaḍabiyya</i>	<i>al-ghaḍabiyya</i>
Irascible Final Object	Dominance [<i>al-ghalba</i>]	Dominance [<i>al-ghalba</i>]
Irascible Intentional Object	Imagined to be harmful or corruptive [<i>al-mutakhayyil ḍarran aw mufsidan</i>]	Imagined as an obstacle [<i>al-mutakhayyil munāfiyan</i>]
Irascible Associated Behavior	Defense [<i>yadfa‘</i>]	Defense [<i>tadfa‘</i>]

While the above table captures details of the concupiscible and irascible faculties related to their natural *attractions*, Avicenna is not explicit about the details concerning these faculties’ *aversions*—but we can work to fill in the blanks. We know from the *Treatise on Love* that the irascible appetite is averse to lowliness (the opposite of dominance),²⁹ and we have inferred that the concupiscible appetite is averse to pain (the opposite of pleasure).

Support for the concupiscible appetite being averse to pain is evident from prior texts in the Aristotelian tradition, since it is because of the concupiscible faculty’s aversion response that, for example, zoophytes (plant-like animals) can still have voluntary responses to pain.³⁰ Though traditionally thought of as lacking the conceptual apparatus for full defensive, retaliatory irascible behavior, zoophytes shrink away from things their meager imaginations conceive of as painful. So concupiscible behavior averse to pain would be occasioned by imagining something as painful (an intentional object), and the likely result of such an aversion would be an attempt to avoid, escape, or turn away.

28 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195, 4.4.

29 See above, footnote 26. \$

30 Aristotle discusses zoophytes in *De Anima* 2.3. Themistius, commenting on that passage, makes it clear that they only have concupiscible appetite (*epithumia*), yet are still able to voluntarily shrink away from pain. See *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima* (1996), p. 62.12-14

Avicenna’s own discussion of zoophytes proceeds along similar lines, but does not draw quite as explicit a conclusion about their lacking irascible appetite as does Themistius. In *Healing: Psychology* 2.3, the chapter on the sense of touch, Avicenna incorporates zoophytes into his wider psychological scheme by drawing a basic distinction between two types of voluntary motion: motion in place, and motion from place to place (i.e., locomotion). He says that zoophytes’ attraction and aversion responses entail that they have the sense of touch, and this explains why they are able to move in place.

The intentional object and associated behavior for the irascible faculty's aversion to lowliness are a bit more difficult to tease out. Avicenna describes the irascible faculty's intentional object on account of its attraction to dominance as "harmful," "corruptive," or "qua obstacle." But whereas the opposite of qua pleasant (i.e., qua painful) makes good sense as an intentional object for the concupiscible appetite's aversive side, the opposites of harmful, corruptive, or qua obstacle (perhaps: beneficial, salubrious, or helpful) don't make sense as probable intentional objects for the aversive side of the irascible faculty. A disposition to avoid lowliness would not be triggered by something "cognized as helpful," without further qualification. What *would* trigger a response based on someone's aversion for lowliness? Presumably something like, "imagining x as in a position of dominance over oneself," or "imagining x as impossible to overcome." But this is far too specific to be the converse for what Avicenna actually says about what the irascible faculty is attracted to (again, all he says is that it is for some object cognized "as harmful," etc.). This seems to indicate a lacuna in how Avicenna describes the intentional object of the irascible faculty, which later Latin medieval authors take up. Aquinas, for example, thinks of the irascible faculty's positive response as triggered by something conceived of as, roughly, a "surmountable obstacle," while its negative response is triggered by something conceived of as an "insurmountable obstacle."³¹ There is no reason to think Avicenna would reject this approach, but is not yet there in his sparse description of the irascible faculty's final object. Avicenna's work is, nonetheless, a major step towards clarity on these issues.³²

2c. Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite as Varieties of *Shawq*

A last thing we should notice from Avicenna's introduction of the motive faculty in T1 is his identification of concupiscible and irascible emotions as varieties of *shawq* (or more precisely, *al-quwwa al-shawqiyya* in *Psychology* 1.5), which is the Arabic translation of the Greek *orexis*/appetite. This is an important thing to notice because it paves the way for a major division between types of emotions. While Aristotle (and the Greek commentators following him) used the idea of appetite generically for all motive faculties (including *bouleisis*), Avicenna reserves *shawq* for the concupiscible and irascible faculties in *Psychology* 1.5 and 4.4. To look ahead a bit, Avicenna seems inclined to restrict the usage of *shawq* to concupiscible and irascible appetite, because he thinks of concupiscible and irascible appetites as responses to a perception of some sort of lack or vulnerability, especially to the external senses: things that would bring pleasure to the external senses signify concrete goods, and things that would bring pain to the external senses signify concrete obstacles or vulnerabilities.

31 The distinction is helpful, in part, because defensive or retaliatory behavior is not best thought of as a push away from some object. Rather, it is pull towards that which, as an obstacle, could be painful. On this distinction see Peter King (2012) 220.

32 Avicenna's careful characterization of the nature of the concupiscible and irascible appetites is a systematization of some various lines of thought in his source material. We see in the Greek commentators and Al-Farabi some reference to the idea of the irascible faculty as a faculty for retaliation, but more consistently animal movement is explained in terms of pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain (see Themistius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* (1996) 139, 112.33ff. In Farabi's *Political Regime* (1971) 33.8, the irascible faculty is narrowly associated with things like fleeing, loathing, or avoidance. In the *Virtuous City* (1985) 10.6, p. 170, the appetitive faculty (containing the concupiscible and irascible) is boiled down succinctly to that which moves us "towards [*ilā*]" or "away from [*an*]" an apprehended object. Appetites in Farabi are conceived of primarily as pulls (concupiscible) and pushes (irascible), with the ideas of defensiveness, attack, or retaliation being mostly absent.

As mentioned when discussing the Aristotelian background, the term *orexis* originally related to the idea of a literal reaching out for the sake of some concrete concern or lack. Avicenna would not have been aware of the Greek linguistic background per se, but he would be aware of the associations surrounding these two faculties and the generic idea of *shawq*.³³ For example, in the *Healing: Metaphysics* he describes God as having a will, but not *shawq*, because he is not in need of anything.³⁴ The focus on pleasures and pains of the external senses in particular is suggested by Avicenna's examples later in *Psychology* 4.4: "greed, avarice and lust" are given as examples of the "bestial concupiscible faculty," clearly in an effort to portray the concupiscible appetite as resulting in emotions oriented towards something like lower goods.³⁵

These distinctions between significantly different types of final objects have a basis in Aristotle's *Ethics*, where Aristotle distinguishes between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul.³⁶ Avicenna, as we will see, makes things more fine grained by distinguishing between three broad types of final objects faculties we can be attracted to: sensory, imaginative and intellectual goods. Avicenna's distinction between emotions in response to objects of the external senses and those whose objects are unique to the internal senses will be clarified and verified and as we examine *Psychology* 4.4 presently.

3. Emotions Oriented Towards Internal Pleasures of the Imagination

In *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna takes up the motive faculty again, but in more detail: after reviewing the distinction between the two types of *shawq* (concupiscible and irascible appetite), Avicenna immediately proceeds to describe animal emotions that *seem* related to *shawq*, but which are better described as something "belonging to the imagination." This is Avicenna's most in-depth explanation of emotions beyond concupiscible and irascible appetite, so it is worth unpacking in some detail. As we will see, what makes these emotions unique is that they are in response to final objects of a different kind: objects of the internal senses. This is contrasted explicitly with acts of the concupiscible appetite, which are attractions to objects of the external senses. His discussion of this new category of emotion spans three continuous paragraphs, but context helps clarify the obscurities, so we need to have the whole text at hand to begin the analysis:

[a] And we may [wa-qad] find in animals impulses [inbi' āthāt] not [just] for [ilā] the objects of concupiscible appetite [shahwātihā],³⁷ but also [we find] an inclination [nazzā'] of the one who begat for [their] offspring,

33 I am not arguing that the restriction of *orexis/shawq* to goods or harms of the external senses accurately reflects what is going on in Aristotle—just that this is how Avicenna seems to use and understand the terminology.

34 Avicenna, *Metaphysics of the Healing* (2005) 8.7, p. 292.

35 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 196.

36 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1117b24-1118a1. For the interpretation of Aristotle as considering *epithumia* to be primarily concerned with pleasures of the external senses, see John Philoponus, *On Aristotle On the Soul*, 2.1-6 (2005) 253.20ff.

37 Two notes on translating *shahwātihā* as "objects of the concupiscible appetite:

1) I take *hā* to refer to the concupiscible appetite, which is discussed in the sentence just prior to what is quoted here.

2) Taking *shahwa* to refer to an object requires more explanation. Sometimes this term is used to refer to lower forms of appetite (e.g., Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.3, p. 68). But if it meant that here, this first line would be saying something like, "there are inclinations for appetites," which sounds something like a second-order desire, and is obviously not what Avicenna means. Lane's *Lexicon*, however, says that this term can

and of the one who befriends for the friend, and similarly their desiring escape from bonds and chains. This, even though it is not an object [*shahwa*] belonging [*lil*] to the concupiscible faculty, it is a certain longing [*ishtiyāq mā*] for [*ilā*] an object [*shahwa*] owing to [*li*] to the imagination [*al-quwwa al-khayāliyya*].

[b] For [*fa-inna*], there is particular to the apprehending faculty—in what it apprehends, and in what it is transformed with regard to among the things that are renewed through sight, or [other] forms, for example—a pleasure that is particular to it. So when [*fa-idhā*] it [the apprehending power] suffers the loss of that pleasure, it [the animal] longs [*ishtāqat*] for it naturally, then the decisive faculty resolves that the organs should move towards it, similar to how it resolves [to act] for the sake of concupiscible and irascible appetite, and for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good also.

[c] And so to concupiscible desire there belongs the increasing of appetite towards pleasure, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and to the irascible power there belongs the increasing of appetite towards dominance, and to the inclining power the resolution to act, and likewise to the imagination [*lil-takhayyul*] there is also something [*mā*] particular to it, and to the inclining power the resolution to act.³⁸

The basic thrust of [a-c] is that there is some set of emotions, similar to concupiscible emotions, but more related to objects of the imagination. The first thing to notice about these texts is all the ways in which he signals in [a] that he is picking out something new, distinct from concupiscible and irascible appetite. Specifically, the generic vocabulary he uses to capture what he is now discussing is broader than what he has used before. Concupiscible and irascible faculties were types of *shawq*, whereas this is a new kind of inclination (*nazzā'*), distinct from concupiscible desire, under the heading of “impulses (*inbi' āthāt*).” He is careful to not call this *shawq*, though it is related (it is an *ishtiyāq mā*, or “some sort of longing,” a word derived from the same root). We do not want to hang too much on a couple of words, but in context he is clearly picking out a new category of emotions, something similar to but different concupiscible appetite. Again, towards the end of [b] Avicenna compares the way that this new type of emotion, on the one hand, and concupiscible and irascible appetites, on the other, lead to movement. In making such a comparison, he affirms the difference between the two types of emotions. Finally, [c] summarizes the preceding, emphasizing that, broadly, three things have been discussed: concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite, and “something” particular to the imagination.

Avicenna tells us, in [a], that what distinguishes this new type of emotion from what has already been discussed is that it is more attributable to the imagination. By this, he cannot mean that the imagination itself is a type of motive faculty, since in an earlier part of 4.4 Avicenna reaffirms the distinction between the apprehending and motive faculties, saying that the apprehending powers have “nothing” of appetite.³⁹ What he must mean, then, is that the imagination is involved in a distinct or more central way with these emotions than with concupiscible appetite. This does not mean that imagination is involved in these emotions, and has *nothing whatsoever* to do with concupiscible appetite, since the intentional objects of the concupiscible faculty are those “imagined” to be pleasant, and we are eventually aware of perceptibles of the external senses in various internal senses. He is focusing on a difference in the *extent* to which imagination is involved, not *whether* there is imagination involved.

sometimes be applied to “objects of desire,” citing Quran 13:4 as an example, where it speaks of “love of desires (*ḥubb al-shahwāt*),” where examples of desires include women, gold, and horses. So “desires” can also loosely refer to objects, in the sense of “objects of desire.”

38 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 195.

39 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, p. 194.

His examples of this new type of moved-mover in [a] are meant to explicate this new category of emotions. He mentions that animals have emotions towards things like distant friends and relations, and towards something as abstract as freedom when they are in captivity. One might think that what these examples have in common is that they are not oriented towards any type of pleasure at all: indeed, it might seem somewhat crass to think of seeking out a distant friend or relation just for the sake of one's own pleasure, and likewise with freedom. Seeking out friends and relations is distinctly others-oriented in a way that activities of concupiscible appetite are not. However, in [b] Avicenna elaborates, clarifying that what these examples have in common is that they are inclinations oriented at the *imagination's* pleasures, as opposed to mere sensory pleasures. This can be seen in the details of the text as follows.

The transition word at the beginning of [b], *for/fa-inna*, tells us that this paragraph is meant to be in some way an elaboration of the new sort of emotion introduced in [a]. The second half of [b] is fairly straightforward, saying that there is a pleasure, or set of pleasures, particular to the imagination, and when they are absent, the animal soul can have inclinations for them, similar to how there are inclinations for concupiscible objects, irascible objects, and intelligible objects—the last of which we will say more about later. The italicized portion of [b], towards the beginning, is somewhat enigmatic: this new category of pleasure, is found “in what [the apprehending faculty] apprehends, and in what it is transformed with regard to among the things that are renewed through sight, or [other] forms, for example.” This is a way of talking about the imagination, which is a kind of apprehending faculty. Given that perception is a kind of reception, it makes sense to talk of the apprehending faculty as “transformed” by the objects whose forms it *receives*, and its objects as “renewed,” in that they have their forms conveyed through increasing *levels of abstractness*, information moving from the external senses, to the imagination.⁴⁰ [B], then, is just a condensed way of describing what it means to grasp objects in the imagination, in contrast to grasping objects at the level of the external senses.⁴¹ So this category of emotion introduced in [a] has as its object a kind of pleasure that is available to the imagination, but not the external senses.

In [c], Avicenna's summary of the preceding paragraphs, he makes parallel claims about concupiscible emotions, irascible emotions, and these new emotions related to the imagination. Concupiscible appetite, he says, is oriented towards pleasure, irascible appetite is oriented towards dominance, and then there is “something particular to” the imagination. This last phrase on its own is concise to the point of being enigmatic, but in context he is clearly just referring to the unique class of pleasure he has picked out, towards which animals also incline. Thus, the main thrust of this passage is to distinguish emotions related to “external” pleasures (concupiscible emotions) and these new emotions more related to “internal” pleasures. This distinction between types of pleasures, which is the basis for a distinction between types of emotions, is borne out elsewhere in his works, as we will see presently.

3a. Clarifying the Nature of External, Internal and Rational Pleasure

40 For another usage of this term in the context of perception, see elsewhere in the Avicenna, *Remarks: Metaphysics* (1960) p. 256.

41 All these inclinations at the animal level can be contrasted with that which is “for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to good,” as mentioned at the end of the main text discussed in section 3. This is a reference to the unique sort of goods the human rational soul is able to appreciate, discussed more at length in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Avicenna's discussion of pleasure and pain at the beginning of book eight of *Remarks and Admonitions* provides framework that can help with understanding the types of emotions distinguished in *Psychology* 4.4. Over the course of his discussion in *Remarks*, he distinguishes between pleasures of the external senses, internal senses, and the rational soul.

He begins by pointing out that the majority of people make an incorrect judgment concerning internal and external pleasures: "It has occurred to the imaginations of the masses that the strongest and highest pleasures are those of sensation [*hiyya al-hissiyya*], while what is contrasted with that are weak pleasures, all of which are of the imagination, [which they think of as] not being real."⁴² His examples of the pleasures of sensation include drink and sex, while those of the internal senses include things like the pleasure of offering a gift to someone, or achieving victory in a game. Avicenna goes on to partially affirm, partially criticize this opinion of the masses: he affirms that there is a distinction between external and internal pleasures, but he denies that the external is more worthwhile. Proof of this is that we will often sacrifice external pleasure for the sake of an internal pleasure, as when one gives their own food to a friend. This is prioritizing the internal pleasure of friendship over the external pleasure of food.

The superiority of internal and rational pleasures to external pleasures is further clarified towards the same section, *Remarks* 8.1. The overlap with *Psychology* 4.4 is especially evident in the examples he uses to describe animals having internal pleasures:

It has been made clear that internal pleasures [*al-ladhdhāt al-bāṭina*] are more lofty than sensible pleasures. And this is the case not only in rational beings, but also in speechless animals. For among hunting dogs there is the fact that they hunt, regardless of hunger, then grasp [the prey] for their master, and sometimes carry it to him. And the nursing animal prefers its offspring to itself, and sometimes takes risks [for the sake of] protecting [the offspring], greater than the risk-taking they take with regard to themselves.⁴³

One of the examples Avicenna provided of the new type of emotion he introduced at in *Psychology* 4.4 (beyond concupiscible and irascible appetite) was the emotion of the "the one who begat for [their] offspring." Here there is a parallel in *Remarks*, since a nursing animal gets internal pleasure from taking great risks for their offspring, regardless of whether this means they lose out on some external pleasure. At the end of this section in *Remarks*, Avicenna briefly mentions that just as internal pleasures are higher than external, so intellectual pleasures [*al-ʿaqliyya*] are higher than both.⁴⁴ This aligns with Avicenna's offhand comment in *Psychology* 4.4 that the animal motive faculty also moves "for the sake of the intelligibles pertaining to the good."⁴⁵ So the types of pleasures distinguished in *Remarks* correspond to the final objects of the varieties of emotions discussed in *Psychology* 4.4. In other words, Avicenna's distinctions between types of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4 parallels his distinctions between types of pleasures in *Remarks*.

What makes some pleasures external, internal, or rational, is whether they are the perfection of an external sense faculty, an internal sense, or the rational soul, respectively. Shortly after distinguishing the three types of pleasures in *Remarks*, Avicenna goes on to define pleasure as follows:

42 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 7.

43 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 9.

44 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.1, p. 9.

45 See above, footnote 38. §

Pleasure is the perception and reaching of the attainment of that which, according to the perceiver [*‘ind al-mudrik*], is a perfection and good, insofar as it is such [*min haythu huwa ka-dhālika*]. And pain is the apprehension and reaching of attainment of what is, according to the perceiver [*‘ind al-mudrik*], a defect and evil. [...] Every pleasure is related to [*tata‘allaq bi-*] two things, a good perfection, and the perception of that [perfection], insofar as it is like that [*min haythu huwa ka-dhālika*].⁴⁶

As mentioned above,⁴⁷ every faculty tends towards some final object. According to Avicenna, when that object is achieved, and we are aware of it having been achieved, we experience pleasure. This is clearly building upon Aristotle’s definition of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.12 as something that supervenes on the “unimpeded activity of a natural process.” The key difference between the two definitions is between whether the pleasure and pain consist simply in *undergoing* some activity (shared by both Avicenna and Aristotle’s definitions), or awareness of and judgment *about* the activity (only in Avicenna’s).

The pleasures of food are external pleasures, because they amount to doing what the faculty of taste is designed for. The pleasures of giving someone a gift, or winning a game (to use Avicenna’s examples from above) are internal pleasures because they fulfill some capacity we have at a level of the animal soul, higher than the level of the external sense.⁴⁸ The faculty of estimation and memory also have objects that can be desired for, and when those forms are acquired, or take shape (*takayyuf*) in the respective faculty, there is an internal pleasure particular to those faculties. Avicenna says that we could make similar descriptions of unique pleasures for the rest of the internal senses.⁴⁹ The pleasures of the rational soul include the attainment of truth, for the theoretical intellect, and the good, for the practical intellect. Avicenna also says that rational goods can include "receiving gratitude, and an abundance of praise, respect, and honor."⁵⁰ It is not totally clear whether those are meant to be goods particular to the theoretical or practical intellect, or if they are just obviously goods of some capacity in the rational soul that fall outside of the standard two faculty distinction.

One thing worth making clear is that the difference between external, internal and rational pleasures has to do with which faculties’ perfection constitutes the *experience* of something as pleasant, not which faculty is involved in knowing *that* something would be pleasant. On the animal level, the judgmental faculty “estimation [*wahm*]” is involved in awareness *that* various things would provide pleasant experiences, even if those pleasant experiences are as different from one another as external and internal pleasures. Through estimation, a dog naturally judges that food would be pleasant to eat,⁵¹ and estimation would similarly explain how an animal

46 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.3, p. 11 & 15.

47 Section 2a.

48 It might seem odd to think of imagination as having a capacity that is fulfilled in some way when we play a game, or give a gift. One might think we were veering precariously close to something like Franz Gall’s phrenology, where the fact that some people are good at chess means that they have a chess-playing faculty, while others do not. A major problem with Gall’s view is that it posits faculties that are not common to all members of a species, and so ceases to be explanatory (see Fodor (1983) section I.3, p. 14 ff.). Avicenna does not go into detail about what all the sub-faculties in the imagination are whose activity amounts to internal pleasure, but whatever he would say about this, they would be common to anything with a sensitive soul. We are not in the habit of distinguishing such faculties, and they are not as obvious as the external sense faculties which have obviously distinct organs, but that does not mean they are not there to be actualized.

49 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9, 21.

50 Avicenna, *Remarks: Mysticism* (1960) 8.9, 25

51 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 184.

identifies its offspring as something worth caring for. Doing the latter would bring with it a type of internal pleasure, while the former is a pleasure of the external senses. To put the point conversely, the sense of taste doesn't judge *that* something would be pleasant, but when something appropriate is tasted, this constitutes a pleasurable experience. The external senses perceive objects according to their material, sensible properties (shapes, colors, sounds, and so on), while all properties like something's being good, beneficial or pleasant, and their opposites, amount to aspects that are perceived by estimation.⁵² Estimation can judge that food is good (an external pleasure), and that friendship is good (an internal pleasure), which can in turn lead to emotions related to both sorts of objects. The same faculty—estimation—is involved in judging *that* two things would be pleasant, even if they would be pleasant experiences of generically different varieties, owing to the fact that they would be completions of different types of faculties.

In the *Psychology* 4.4 text from the prior section, Avicenna referred to internal pleasures as pleasures of the imagination, using the term imagination loosely. That being the case, it is worth clarifying this category of "internal pleasure" that is relevant to the discussion of emotions from another sense in which pleasure is sometimes talked about in relation to the imagination. As a reminder, in *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna mentions a pleasure "particular to" the imagination, which is longed for when imagination "suffers its loss." This is his way of saying that internal sense faculties have particular perfections which they naturally tend towards, and which give pleasure to the subject when they are achieved. This is different than the sort of pleasure of the imagination Avicenna discusses in his *Healing: Rhetoric*, where he says we can long for an object of sense perception, based on the pleasurable vestige of its image in the imagination, retained and recalled after the actual object is no longer directly perceived. That is, regardless of what sort of pleasure we are talking about (external, internal or rational), there is some pleasure involved in remembering the experience of that pleasure, which Avicenna describes as follows:

As for the imagination, it has a type of pleasure [i.e., it experiences pleasure in a way], except that imagination is a weak sensation, like a vestige from sensation, and it delights in recalling or in hoping. Most of what is hoped for coincides with what is remembered, especially hoping for structures/arrangements from prior sensed particulars, for there is pleasure in memory or hope following sensible pleasure [initially] observed/experienced, then recalled, then hoped for. For sensation pertains to the present, memory to the past, hope to the future.⁵³

Just as we can experience some sensible particular as pleasant when in contact with it, we can recall the form of that same sense object, and our awareness of its form in the imagination conveys a similar, but weaker, kind of pleasure than the initial experience, which might lead us to long for the direct experience once again. Remembering a delicious meal can be pleasant, and make you want to have the same meal again. But this is not what is meant by a pleasure "particular to" the imagination in *Psychology* 4.4. It is one thing to long for and then experience an internal pleasure, it is another thing to fondly recall an internal pleasure, and then long for it. The vestigial pleasures of imaginative memory are not equivalent to the present experience of an external, internal or rational pleasure.

⁵² Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.2, 60 and 4.3, 182-3.

⁵³ Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.6, p. 100.

A sub-variety of animal emotions towards internal pleasures of the imagination that Avicenna treats elsewhere are those towards aesthetic pleasure, especially musical pleasure. As Luis Xavier López-Farjeat has shown, there is a clear strand of thought in Avicenna's *Healing: Book of Music* which discusses how animals perceive, incline towards, and take pleasure in aesthetic beauty, even though they cannot label it as such, or produce it.⁵⁴ Emotions related to music would be different than emotions related to external, concupiscible pleasures, because aesthetic experience is not the perfection of any particular external sense: neither the ear nor the eye have any capacity to perceive aesthetic pleasure on their own. Only once particular sensibles are arranged in the imagination is it possible for aesthetic properties, like harmony, to be appreciated. So while it might seem strange to think of brute animals as being moved to seek out aesthetic pleasure, we should remember that this is still something short of the full engagement with aesthetic beauty of which humans are capable. Moreover, it does not need to be a terribly complicated sort of aesthetic pleasure. We can easily imagine an animal being affected by a potential mate's colorful feather arrangement, and this is beyond the ability of any particular external sense to appreciate.

3b. Varieties of Pleasures and Varieties of Emotions

To bring this discussion of pleasures back to emotions, we can now see how the distinctions Avicenna makes in *Psychology* 4.4 are grounded in these prior distinctions between types of pleasures. There are three major types of emotions: those towards the goods of the external senses, those towards goods of the internal senses, and those towards rational goods.

Despite the neatness of this organization, one might wonder why the organization matters. Avicenna does not provide an answer to this in his emotion texts, but we can make some inferences. On the one hand, it is likely that the impetus for making these distinctions is the same as the impetus for distinguishing faculties in the first place: trying to come up with a more orderly body of scientific explanations for common phenomena. Beyond this, it is also clear that emotions involving objects of the external senses would result in very different behavior from those that have internal and rational objects. You would not necessarily want to "acquire" your friend or relative, just because you long for them. Upon being told that there is a beautiful landscape around the bend, you might be moved to go appreciate it, but not consume it. On the other hand, inclinations towards pleasures of the external senses require direct contact for their satisfaction.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Luis Xavier López Farjeat (2013) esp. p. 103ff.

⁵⁵ One might wonder, still, why it is necessary to distinguish different *faculties* for these emotions, rather than just noting that there is a difference between types of pleasures, and supposing that the concupiscible faculty responds to both. Avicenna does not explain why he chooses to make this distinction, but it is likely because these higher emotions are not found in all animals. That is, we have already discussed how some animals, namely zoophytes, have the concupiscible faculty but not the irascible (see section 2b). Presumably zoophytes also lack these higher emotions, for the same reason (i.e., their diminished cognitive capacities). Where there are significantly distinct final objects, and separability in terms of existence, there is a good reason to insist on a distinction of faculties

Avicenna's principle of distinguishing faculties based on objects occurs in *Healing: Psychology* 1.4. The separability in existence argument is normally used to distinguish types of souls, or groupings of faculties, but it is also used to distinguish individual faculties at the beginning of section 4 of Avicenna, *Compendium on the Soul* (1875).

One might wonder, still, why it is necessary to distinguish these emotions related to internal and rational pleasures from emotions of the concupiscible faculty, rather than just noting that there is a difference between types of pleasures, and asserting that the concupiscible faculty responds to all of them. Again, Avicenna does not answer a question like this directly, but it is likely because these higher emotions are not found in all animals. That is, we have already discussed know that some animals, namely zoophytes, have the concupiscible faculty but not the irascible.⁵⁶ Presumably they also lack these higher emotions, for the same reason (their diminished cognitive capacities). Where there are significantly distinct final objects, and separability in terms of existence, there is a good reason to insist on a distinction of faculties.⁵⁷

To summarize, there are certain classes of objects that individuate major groupings of capacities of the animal soul. Some are objects of the external senses, some are objects of the imagination and intellect, broadly construed. Emotions towards pleasures of the first sort are acts of the concupiscible appetite. Emotions towards pleasures of the second and third sort are acts of higher capacities for emotion—more elevated than concupiscible appetite, and more related to the imagination and intellect, respectively.⁵⁸ The key thing to notice is that there are distinct classes of emotions, based on major differences in final objects, but still treated as similar in *Psychology* 4.4 insofar as they are inclinations.

3c. Ruling Out an Alternative Interpretation

Having looked at the *Rhetoric* text about pleasures remembered in the imagination in section 3.1, one might object to my interpretation of the texts in *Psychology* 4.4, arguing that in *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna actually saying is something more along the lines of what he says in the *Rhetoric*. That is, one might think concupiscible and irascible appetite are appetites in response to objects one is aware of as *present and nearby*, whereas it is also possible to recall *distant objects* in the imaginative memory and be motivated towards them. On this interpretation, Avicenna's examples in *Psychology* 4.4 would actually just be referring to remembered objects (e.g., a desire for a friend or child *when they are not present*, or for *what life was like* outside of the bonds of captivity). When Avicenna refers to the idea of the apprehending faculty "suffer[ing] the loss of that pleasure," he could be taken to be emphasizing the fact that the object is no longer present, but is recalled in the imagination.

Despite its simplicity, the major problem with this alternative interpretation is that Avicenna never suggests that concupiscible and irascible appetite are only for things the animal is aware of as present and nearby. There is, no doubt, a line of thought in the tradition, going back to Aristotle, which distinguishes animal from human appetites on the grounds that animal appetites are only concerned with what seems pleasurable *in the present*, but this is a different distinction.⁵⁹ Avicenna deals with this latter distinction in *Psychology* 5.1, and the idea is basically that humans can evaluate whether something is worth pursuing all-things-considered,

⁵⁶ See section 2b.

⁵⁷ Avicenna's principle of distinguishing faculties based on objects occurs in *Psychology* 1.4. The separability in existence argument is normally used to distinguish types of souls, or groupings of faculties, but it is also used to distinguish individual faculties at the beginning of section 4 of *Compendium on the Soul* (1875).

⁵⁸ Such a distinction between different types of pleasures at the level of the animal soul is seen later in Al-Ghazali's distinction between biological, social/political, and intellectual pleasure. See Fakhry (1994) p. 203.

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *On the Soul* (1986) 3.10, 433b5-10.

whereas animals simply see a pleasure and go towards it, without consideration for how it fits into their larger goals. For this reason humans can decline present pleasure for the sake of the future. Concupiscible appetite is for anything that seems good to the animal soul in that moment, but this does not mean that object of appetite needs to be something the animal is aware of as present and nearby, and it would be odd if it did: most appetites involve things that are not present or nearby, as opposed to what is, which is the very reason why one is in a state of desire, rather than satisfaction.

4. Deepening the Category of Emotion: More on the Irascible Faculty

In the final part of his overview of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, Avicenna lists concrete examples of various types of emotions, which not only add to our understanding of previously distinguished types of emotions, but also introduce new types. We can view what this section does as *deepening* our understanding of previously distinguished irascible emotions, and then *widening* the category of emotion to include some pleasurable completion-states as types of emotions. This section follows directly upon the key text from *Psychology* 4.4, quoted at length at the beginning of section 3 above:

Fear [*al-khawf*] and distress [*al-ghamm*] and sadness [*al-ḥuzn*]⁶⁰ are actualizations [*‘awāriḍ*] of the irascible faculty with the participation [*bil-mushārīka*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. And the irascible faculty, if it is opposed, following upon intellectual or imaginative conceptualization, there is fear. And if it does not fear, it becomes strong. Distress occurs to the irascible faculty on account of that which [at other times] causes anger, when something is prevented from defending against something else, or when one fears something else’s occurrence. And joy [*al-farah*] which belongs in the category of subduing, is the end/final cause [*ghāya*] for this faculty also.⁶¹ Greediness [*al-ḥirṣ*], gluttony [*al-naham*], and lust [*al-shabq*], and what is similar to them, they belong to the bestial concupiscible faculty.

Enjoyment of people [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*‘awāriḍ*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we’ll talk about soon.⁶²

60 The fact that distress and sadness are states of the irascible faculty is something that will be discussed in chapter five, the chapter on pain and pleasure. This text makes it seem like pain-like states have the irascible faculty as their subject, while in Avicenna’s *Rhetoric* pain-like states show up as component parts of definitions of irascible emotions. So the precise relationship between the irascible faculty and pain needs more analysis, but must wait until we can focus on pleasure and pain on their own.

61 The statement that the irascible faculty seeks “joy in the category of subduing” coheres with the points we made in sections 2a-b about the final objects of motive faculties. Just as reaching an object of the concupiscible appetite brings a kind of pleasure, so a certain kind of pleasure attends any instance of overcoming an obstacle. The difference is that while concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure qua pleasure, the irascible appetite seeks overcoming qua overcoming, and when this goal is achieved, one experiences pleasure. The state of the person fighting for the love of fighting is different than the state of the person fighting out of self-defense, even though both might lead to pleasure. They both seek overcoming, but under different aspects: one qua overcoming, one as a pleasure. In fact, the person fighting for the love of fighting would best be classified as seeking a kind of internal pleasure of the imagination, as opposed to a concupiscible object. So “joy in the category of subduing” is just another way of saying that “subduing” is the final object of the irascible faculty, and by definition, achieving a final object brings satisfaction.

62 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

In the first paragraph of this final section Avicenna deepens our understanding of what he has already discussed, showing how the irascible faculty's tendency to achieve dominance results in different particular emotions, depending on how exactly some intentional object is conceived.⁶³ Our general inclination to achieve dominance takes on the specific character of fear when it is in response to a conception of some obstacle as especially imposing (and hence unlikely to be successfully opposed), anger or courage if in response to an obstacle we think we can overcome, or distress if we simply know it cannot be overcome.⁶⁴ These different inclinations all fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these are states that occur on account of our being oriented towards dominance.

One thing to notice is that, whereas Avicenna spent the lengthy prior section distinguishing different types of emotions that are similar to, but more complex than, concupiscible appetite (e.g., concupiscible emotions and emotions more related to the imagination), he does not do anything similar here. One might think it worthwhile to distinguish emotions associated with dominance over threats that would pain the external senses, from dominance over obstacles that would pain one inwardly. Indeed, in Avicenna's *Healing: Rhetoric*, following Aristotle, he provides examples of states we would think of as irascible, like anger, but which are associated with dominance over obstacles that would cause *inward* pain. For example, anger can be directed at a verbal slight or scorn.⁶⁵ Further, we can imagine obstacles to the internal pleasures Avicenna mentioned in *Remarks* 8, such as an obstacle to achieving victory in a game. This is clearly a different type of obstacle in comparison to actual physical threats.

Avicenna does not discuss why he focuses on the external/internal distinction when it comes to pleasure, but does not do the same for dominance over external/internal threats. But it seems likely that the reason behind this lack of distinction is that irascible faculty, even when it is seeking dominance over physical threats, *already* involves a higher level of cognition than concupiscible appetite. That is, while paradigmatic cases of irascible acts involve responding to physical threats, recognizing something as an obstacle already requires a more abstract type of judgment than just knowing whether something is pleasant or painful. This is why, as discussed earlier,⁶⁶ some animals with lesser cognitive capacities are taken to only have concupiscible appetite. External, internal and rational pleasures correspond to different clusters of faculties, and their perfections. But achieving dominance is the perfection, simply, of the irascible faculty. So while it seemed worthwhile to Avicenna to make a distinction between types of pleasures, there is apparently no reason to make a similar distinction between types of obstacles.

A second thing to notice from the first paragraph above is the idea that evaluations are necessary but not sufficient causes for emotion. This is implied by the fact that fear, distress and sadness are said to be acts of the irascible faculty "with the participation" of the perceptive faculties, and presumably what is true of these acts is true for defining other particular emotions in general. To specify what fear is, you cannot just say, "it is a variety of irascible appetite." Instead, you need to reference the associated intentional object, i.e., the way in which the pleasure or obstacle is cognized. This idea is just an extension of Avicenna's general descriptions of the motivating side of the motive faculty (from *Psychology* 1.5, discussed in section 2 above),

63 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

64 These different inclinations nonetheless fall under the heading of the irascible faculty because Avicenna has described dominance as its final object, and these states that occur on account of being oriented towards dominance.

65 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 3.1, p. 130.

66 Section 2b.

where he has already stated that the motive faculty is dependent on evaluative acts of a particular sort. The point here is related to Martha Nussbaum's argument for the centrality of evaluation to emotion, where she claims that anything but the cognitive component of an emotion is too underspecified to be the essence of an emotion. Emotions just aren't the sort of thing it is easy to put into words.⁶⁷ Avicenna would not agree with her view entirely, since he clearly thinks that the most central thing that makes anger what it is, for example, is that it is a type of moved-mover (an "actualizations of" the motive faculty, in the words of the text above). Since it is possible to have the very same evaluative act with or without an emotion, the two things are distinct. But what allows us to *describe* a specific type of emotion is the cognition that causes it.

So in the first paragraph of the above text, Avicenna deepens our understanding of emotion, by showing how the single irascible faculty is posited to account for our tendency to seek dominance over a variety of threats, and by showing how cognitive evaluations are necessary, but not sufficient, causes of emotions.

5. Widening the Category of Emotion: Uniquely Human Emotions and Pleasurable Completion-States as Types of Emotions

In the final part of Avicenna's overview of emotions in *Psychology* 4.4, he briefly mentions two varieties of emotions: pleasure-states particular to the perceptive faculties, and states dependent on the rational soul. It is important to remember that this text comes directly after Avicenna lists his further examples of irascible emotions, as this shows that we are still in the middle of a discussion of types of emotions:

Enjoyment of people [*al-istīnās*] and gladness [*al-surūr*] are among the actualizations [*min al-'awāriḍ*] of the perceptive faculties [*al-qiwā al-dirāka*]. As for the human faculties, there occurs to them other states [*aḥwāl*], particular to them, which we'll talk about soon.⁶⁸

In the second half of this text, Avicenna refers to emotions of the rational soul, indicating that he will discuss them later. Indeed, in the very next section of *Psychology*, 5.1, he identifies some uniquely human emotions, such as shame and wonder, that are caused by cognitions of which only humans are capable. Nonetheless, his mentioning them here indicates that he wants us to think of uniquely human emotions as acts of the animal motive faculty, despite their being caused by uniquely human types of evaluations. This idea is reflected by Avicenna's argument in the *Treatise on Love*, that the rational soul "partners with" and "makes use of" the animal motive faculty for its particular emotions.⁶⁹ This is a significant conclusion in that it suggests that all emotion is fundamentally animal, in that all emotions are acts of the common animal motive faculty, regardless of how complex the judgments causing them are. These points, and human emotions more generally, will be discussed in chapter two of this dissertation.

In the first half of this text, Avicenna mentions two emotions, "enjoyment of people and gladness," calling them actualizations of the perceptive faculties, and in doing so indicates that the category of emotion can be widened to include pleasurable-completion states. Given that Avicenna is in the midst of explaining and listing various types of emotions that involve the

⁶⁷ Nussbaum (2001) 29.

⁶⁸ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 196.

⁶⁹ Avicenna, *Treatise on Love* (1983) 256.

animal soul, there is no reason not to take these actualizations of the perceptive powers under that general heading, as well.

To better understand the significance of these two emotions, we should first better understand them on their own. “*Surūr*/gladness,” is used elsewhere as a generic term for pleasure, contrasted with pain.⁷⁰ Nothing too specific beyond the general idea of pleasure seems intended. The definition of “*istīnās*/enjoyment of people” is less straightforward. Given the linguistic form of the Arabic word (form 10), which often carries with it the idea of “seeking,” and the root in that form (‘*alif-nūn-sīn*), which refers to the idea of persons, one might think that it means something like “desire to be around people.” This would make sense of its place in the chapter on emotions, but no classical sources attest to such a definition. Instead, one of the main classical definitions is “enjoyment of people”—not *seeking* out people, but *enjoyment* once their presence is attained. The 12th century Latin edition of Avicenna's *Psychology* translates *istīnās* as “*solatium*/relief from distress,” which might feel like a different notion altogether. But it makes sense as a translation if one considers that a primary way of finding consolation is to be around people. So *solatium* is a bit of a loose translation, but it supports taking Avicenna to be talking about enjoyment of people as a completion-state, alongside gladness. Both of these emotions, then signify pleasurable-completion states.

Pleasurable-completion states make sense as a new type of emotion, but they are importantly different than any other type of emotion Avicenna has mentioned. At the start of *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna has said that perceptive faculties “have nothing” of appetite/*shawq*.⁷¹ Cognitions cause appetite, but the two are acts of fundamentally distinct types of faculties. Moreover, the emotions we have been discussing thus far involve seeking things, like pleasure and dominance, whereas in a pleasurable completion-state some object or perfection is acquired, not sought.⁷²

This might seem to put Avicenna in a bind, but if we recall that throughout *Psychology* 4.4 we have seen Avicenna gradually *widening* our understanding of what can count as an emotion, this can be seen just as an extension of that project. Perceptive emotions do not involve *shawq*/appetite, because they are inclinations that do not involve any kind of lack, or reaching out: they are emotions of completion, where the object is already attained. But we could see completion-states as emotions in a wider sense, in that they directly affect behavior by orienting us towards some object (i.e., the thing being enjoyed). They incline us, in the words of some contemporary emotion theorists, to “keep going” in whatever it is we are doing.⁷³ Indeed, in *Remarks*, Avicenna says that experiences with the spiritual realm in this life bring with them a kind of pleasure that motivates one to pursue truth more fully.⁷⁴ Likewise, bodily pleasures affect behavior in that they *distract* us from such pure pursuits.⁷⁵ Apparently, appetite and pleasure-states can both be emotions, in a broad sense, even if pleasure states are not *appetitive*.⁷⁶ That is,

70 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.3, 31-32.

71 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 194.

72 See above, section 3a.

73 See, for example, Matthen (2015) p. 179.

74 Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) 8.15-16. In this text he uses the term *bā' ith* for “motivate,” a term we have seen in *Healing: Psychology* 4.4.

75 Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) 8.15-16.

76 In this we can notice a contrast with how pleasure states are handled by, for example, Aquinas, who considers pleasure to have the concupiscible appetite as its subject. What he means by this is that pleasure is a state of the concupiscible appetite, when it achieves its object King (1999) pp. 18-19. For Avicenna, pleasure is not necessarily tied to the completion of an appetite, though completing appetites (concupiscible, irascible, or otherwise) does bring

the broader category for all these states is “emotion/inclination,” not appetite, so it is consistent for Avicenna to think of them all as emotions, while also affirming that appetite and perception are distinct.

Insofar as Avicenna is committed to a fundamental division between motive and cognitive faculties, including these pleasurable completion-states (which are “actualizations of the perceptive faculties”) as types of emotions does create a kind of tension. An alternate way of reading the above text would be to say that Avicenna’s mentioning enjoyment of people and gladness as acts of the perceptive faculty here is a way of reminding us that they are *distinct* from the sort of thing he has been discussing in *Psychology* 4.4. In other words, he could just be choosing to mention some states that we *might* think of as emotions, in order to clarify that they are not. It would be as if Avicenna were saying, “as for states like these, they might seem to be emotions, but they’re really just acts of the perceptive faculties.”

Of course, such a reading would involve a tension of its own, since it would be a break from common sense to consider something like “gladness” to not be an emotion. Avicenna’s predecessors in the field of psychology, like Al-Balkhī and A.B. Al-Rāzī, included states like gladness and pain in their discussions of emotions,⁷⁷ and Avicenna himself groups joy (another pleasurable completion-state) and pain with other emotions in his medical texts.⁷⁸ Indeed, part of why it makes sense to group pleasure and pain with appetitive and irascible emotions is because of the felt, bodily aspect to all such states. So it may indeed be that pleasurable-completion states (and their opposites, pain states) do not fit neatly into the sort of explanatory schema offered by *Healing: Psychology*, centered around divisions of faculties. This is perhaps why Avicenna’s more in depth treatment of pleasure and pain occurs in *Remarks*, as has already been discussed. But insofar as they could fit into the schema offered by *Psychology*, it makes sense to think of them as emotions.⁷⁹

6. The Variety of Emotions Involving the Animal Motive Soul According to Avicenna

Now that we have seen the varieties of emotions Avicenna attributes to the animal, sensitive soul in *Healing: Psychology*—his most comprehensive overview of such matters—we can step back and consider his overall contribution. The preceding texts from *Psychology* 4.4 are somewhat meandering, but this befits the messy task of wrestling with the nature of emotion, and what emerges is an innovative, wide array of animal affective states, unified under a carefully honed central concept. To review, Avicenna has discussed the following as types of emotions:

pleasure, since pleasure occurs whenever *any* faculty achieves its object.

⁷⁷ Al-Balkhī discusses pleasure and pain as emotions in the beginning of chapter 4 of his *Sustenance of the Soul* (2005). A.B. Al-Rāzī likewise discusses pleasure in chapter five of his *AB Razi* also discusses pleasure in chapter 5 of his *Spiritual Physick* (1950).

⁷⁸ Avicenna concurs with prior thinkers on this point at *Cardiac Drugs* (1984) 226.

⁷⁹ Still yet another way of reading the text would be to argue that when Avicenna says that gladness and enjoyment of people are “min al-‘awāriḍ” of the perceptive faculties, the “min” does not mean “among,” but “on account of.” In other words, enjoyment of people and gladness are emotions (acts of the motive faculty) that have perceptive faculties as a prior cause. This reading, however, leaves the status of these emotions even more ambiguous. It is unclear why Avicenna would need to mention this mundane fact, since all emotions have prior cognitive causes, and it does not give any new insight into the sort of state these emotions are.

- Acts of the concupiscible appetite, ordered towards pleasures of the external senses
- Acts similar to those of the concupiscible appetite, but ordered towards pleasures of the imagination (i.e., internal pleasures)
- Acts of the irascible appetite (higher and lower varieties)
- Pleasurable completion-states (and conversely, pain-states)
- Uniquely human emotions (i.e., affective states of the animal motive faculty, caused by cognitions of the rational soul)

The terms in *Psychology* 4.4 that are used generically to capture all of these states are *inbi' āthāt* and *nazzā' āt*, both of which convey the idea that these emotional states are, at their core, something like impulses, inclinations, or motivations. Avicenna uses these terms early on in the key text we looked at from *Psychology* 4.4, when he says that “we find in animals impulses [*inbi' āthāt*] not [just] for their concupiscible pleasures, but also an inclination [*nazzā'*] towards” internal pleasures.⁸⁰ These two Arabic terms, *inbi' āth* and *nazzā'*, and words related to their Arabic roots, are used elsewhere by Avicenna and others in the tradition to connote something related to but broader than concupiscible or irascible appetite.⁸¹ For example, when introducing the motive faculty in *Psychology* 1.5, Avicenna says that “the motive power insofar as it motivates is the *inclining* [*al-nazū' iyyah*], appetitive faculty.”⁸² Al-Farabi and Averroes likewise use *nazzā'* in a generic sense.⁸³ In 1.5, Avicenna uses a word related to *inbi' āth* to distinguish the motive faculty qua motivating (*bā' itha*) from the motive power in the muscles that actually moves (*fā' ila*). Of course, Avicenna also uses appetite/*shawq* to convey something generic, capturing both concupiscible or irascible appetite, but we have seen that this has a more narrow scope for him, and was not as useful as *inbi' āth* or *nazzā'* for referring to all of the affective states listed above.

While it would be correct to call the above affective states *inbi' āthāt* or *nazzā' āt*, it is *nazzā' āt* that seems to more precisely pick out the phenomena that belongs exclusively to the discussion in *Psychology* 4.4. This is because sometimes *inbi' āth* has an even broader sense in Avicenna's writings than *nazzā'*, used to mean “something instinctive,” as when he uses the term to refer to the evaluative judgments made by the faculty of estimation in animals.⁸⁴ But in any case, both of these terms point to the fact that Avicenna thinks of emotions as states wherein animals (human and non-) are disposed to act in a certain way, without yet actually acting.⁸⁵

80 See section 3.

81 Helmut Gätje has suggested that *inbi' āthāt* and *nazzā' āt* in Avicenna's philosophy have roughly the same scope as the Greek *hormē* (impulse), used by some of Aristotle's commentators and the Stoics in the context of emotions, which seems correct. See Gätje (1974) p. 359.

82 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 41.

83 See Al-Farabi, *Virtuous City* (1985) 10.6, p. 170; also Averroes, *Epitome of the De Anima* (1950), pp. 96-100.

84 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 182.

85 What finally pushes us towards actual motion is a motive state called resolution, discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation.