

Chapter 3: Emotions and Resolution-to-act

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Introduction: emotion is not sufficient for action

A major theme we saw from the texts discussed in chapters one and two is that all emotions—animal or human—are called emotions insofar as they are acts of the animal motive faculty qua inclining (i.e., emotions are inclinations, or impulses, towards objects). This raises the issue for Avicenna of how we get from inclination to actually carrying out an act. After all, at the start of *Psychology* 4.4 Avicenna makes it clear that his primary purpose in this text is to explain actual voluntary motion,¹ and to incline towards some object or course of action is not the same thing as to actually move. Unpacking Avicenna's way of dealing with the relation between inclination and actual motion involves seeing how the various parts of his overall schema for voluntary action fit together, and helps clarify emotions' role as inclinations.

What this chapter will show is that emotions tend towards, but are not sufficient to cause, voluntary motion. Emotions are caused by one sort of cognition, an evaluation, but there needs to be a further, practical judgment in order to bring about what Avicenna calls the "resolution-to-act." The term "resolution (*ijmā'*)" is how Avicenna refers to the motive faculty when it reaches a stage where it necessarily causes motion, provided there are no external impediments. There are uniquely human ways of *evaluating* something (which lead to uniquely human emotions) and ways of evaluating things that all animals share (which lead to standard emotions). Then, there are uniquely human ways of making a *practical judgment* (which leads to resolution), and there is an analogue to this on the animal level (which also leads to resolution). In such a schema, emotions play an important role in setting goals and focusing attention, but they do not ultimately determine what we do.

Although Avicenna uses this schema consistently, there is no one place where he attempts to unpack it directly, in all its detail. Moreover, there are some places where he elides certain components, especially when it is not the main subject under discussion. So, the analysis here will rely on several key discussions, each of which individually only gives part of the picture, but which nonetheless fit together. Avicenna is clear enough in the separate texts that it seems reasonable to assume we are describing a schema he has in mind, rather than imposing something from the outside.

In discussing resolution alongside emotion, we are following Avicenna's lead, who most often discusses the two topics alongside one another. Presumably one reason for this is that getting clear on both aspects of the motive faculty together (emotion and resolution) helps clarify each aspect individually. Since emotion and resolution are both closely related acts of the motive faculty, it would be easy to erroneously map the role of one onto the other. So while some of this discussion will focus on resolution, and the cognitions behind resolution and emotion, Avicenna nonetheless thinks this is relevant to clarifying the role of emotion.

¹ "Since we have spoken of the apprehensive animal powers, it is appropriate for us to discuss the animal motive [*muḥarrikah*] powers. We say that the animal, unless it has an appetite for [*yashtaq*] something with an appetite that it is aware of, or that it imagines, or [even] that it is not aware of, it is not impelled towards seeking that thing through movement." Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.4, 194.

1. Inclination is distinct from resolution

The distinction between two branches of the motive faculty—inclination and, as we will see shortly, resolution—shows that, for Avicenna, there is more nuance to the four factors involved in voluntary motion than just what we looked at in chapter one. As a reminder, the four factors required for voluntary movement in the Aristotelian schema, to which Avicenna generally subscribes, are as follows:

- 1) unmoved-mover: the cognized object, a practical good represented to the subject in some way
- 2) moved-mover: an act of the motive faculty, in response to (1)
- 3) means of motion: muscles and the ligaments
- 4) that which is moved: the subject as a whole.²

As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out in reference to Aristotle, this four-element schema, found in Aristotle's *De Anima*, leaves some things unspecified³. In particular, it does not specify in what way exactly a practical good is represented to the subject, and how we account for all the cases where we seem to want something, but don't actually *do* anything about it. In the *De Motu* Aristotle goes into more detail, distinguishing various ways in which the object can be cognized relevant to action, and explaining how we get from inclination to actual motion. Avicenna would not have had access to the *De Motu*,⁴ but we nonetheless find him nuancing parts of the four-element schema of voluntary motion in a similar way. What Avicenna ends up affirming, in brief, is that there are two of types ways in which the unmoved-mover (the practical good) is grasped, which lead to two distinct types of moved-movers (inclination, then resolution). That is, there are two types of cognitions related to practical goods, which lead to two different acts of the motive faculty, before the means of motion are actually engaged.

The two types of moved-movers are distinguished in the following text, which occurs towards the beginning of Avicenna's *Healing: Psychology* 4.4, just before Avicenna explains the various types of emotions that we looked at in chapter one:

And appetite [*shawq*] may vary.⁵ For among [different kinds of appetite] there is that which remains weak, and there is that which strengthens to the point where it brings about [*yūjib*] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]—*though resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] is not the same as appetite*. Appetite might strengthen towards something yet there be no resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] towards movement at all, analogous to when the imagination grows strong while there is no appetite for what is in the imagination.

2 Some of their precise terminology differs. Aristotle calls *orexis* the proximate principle of motion, while Avicenna calls the means of motion the proximate principle, and differences ripple out from there. But the ordering and general point is the same.

3 Nussbaum (1983) 136-137.

4 Gutas notes this at (2014) 361, n. 5. While the Latin *Book of Animals* did have *De Motu* folded into it, and was made using some Arabic intermediaries, Burnett notes that the intermediaries only included *Hist.*, *De part.*, *De gener.* (see Burnett (2014) 795). We know from Averroes that there was a summary of Aristotle's works on animals by Nicolaus Damascenus, including the *De Motu*, that was translated into Arabic. On that, see Steel (1999) 74. But whether this made it to Avicenna, we do not know.

5 Not yet having made careful distinctions between types of animal emotions, Avicenna is using the term appetite [*shawq*] here loosely, simply with the goal of sketching how emotion can lead to action. As we saw in chapter one, his more technical way of referring to emotions is with the terms *inbi' āthāt* and *nazzā'āt*.

And when the resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*] happens properly, the locomotive powers (whose function is simply to contract and expand the muscles) obey—though this is not the same thing as appetite, nor [is it the same as] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]. For someone prevented from movement is not prevented from having a strong appetite, nor from resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā'*]—but [when constrained] he will not find obedience from the other powers, whose only function is locomotion, and which are in the muscles.⁶

Here Avicenna is making the point that there are three distinct capacities of the motive soul: an appetitive/inclining/emotion capacity, a resolving capacity, and a locomotive capacity. He shows that these are distinct by showing how it is possible to have a full actualization of one, without the others. For example, it is possible to have an emotion, even a very strong emotion, yet still not have the resolve to do anything about it. Again, one could be resolved to take some sort of action, yet be physically prevent from doing so (e.g., because they are in captivity).

Avicenna is not always clear about how we should categorize *al-ijmā'*, in terms of its being merely an activity of an existing faculty, or a distinct faculty/capacity, but it seems the available evidence suggests the latter. He does not mention *al-ijmā'* in his initial enumeration of faculties in *Psychology* 1.5, but in 4.4 and elsewhere he does use the term faculty (*quwwa*) to refer to the *al-ijmā'*: "The decisive faculty follows the previously mentioned [emotional] faculties, so that when their inclination grows strong, it resolves to act."⁷ Moreover, in a previous section of *Psychology*, 1.4, he specifies that some things which make actions different do not thereby necessitate positing of new faculties, such as: differences in movements of the will (you can will to move to point A or point B, but you do not need two locomotive faculties to do so), states of the organs used (someone with an impaired memory does not have a different kind of memory, just an impaired one), external impediments (if you put on tinted glasses, this does not change the basic structure of the visual faculty), strong/weak or positive/negative manifestations of the same activity (we can believe, be certain, and doubt, from the same faculty).⁸ His concern to show in the above text that *al-ijmā'* is *not* merely the same as strong inclination suggests that he has the last of these points in mind: if *al-ijmā'* were equivalent to a strong appetite, we would not need to posit two distinct faculties—but it is something more than strong appetite. So while Avicenna does not single out *al-ijmā'* in his overview of psychological faculties, there is evidence that he thinks it is worth considering a distinct faculty.

Granted, there are cases where Avicenna is not careful with this distinction, and sometimes refers to the appetitive faculty itself as resolving, but these should not be taken to override his more focused discussion in *Psychology* 4.4. For example, the following text from his *Marginal Glosses on Aristotle's De Anima* blurs the lines between inclination and resolution:

And he [Aristotle] says that by appetite, there is not meant the trivial appetite that increases and diminishes and goes away and differs, but rather decisive, resolving appetite [*al-shawq al-'azmī al-ijmā'ī*]; for it moves necessarily if there is no impediment. This is not like the appetite of the ascetic, for that is merely concupiscible desire, along with which there is not the decisive resolution [*al-'azim al-ijmā'ī*] whose course of action is from the mind [*allādhī huwwa min al-'aql mashīhu*]⁹.

6 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 195. Emphasis mine.

7 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 4.4, 196.

8 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959), 1.4, 33-34.

9 Avicenna, *Marginal Glosses* (1947) 113.19.

Here Avicenna is commenting on *De Anima* 3.9, 433a9, where Aristotle discusses how some people are especially good at controlling their desires. These are the self-controlled, the *egkrateis* in Greek, which is here discussed under the heading of those who are ascetics, or pious devotees (*nāsik/nussāk*). Since Aristotle does not make a clear distinction between his faculties of appetite and resolution, Avicenna follows suit, calling the difference between the ascetic's inclination and one who acts on their inclination the difference between "mere" appetite and "decisive, resolving" appetite. So this blurring of lines here makes sense, given that Avicenna is glossing Aristotle, who himself did not make this distinction. Moreover, there certainly is a sense in which both inclining appetite and *al-ijmā'* are sub-faculties of the more generic animal motive faculty. So depending on how finely we want to slice faculties, inclination and resolution could be more or less identified.

In the secondary literature and translations of scattered texts, *al-ijmā'*, or *al-quwwa al-ijmā' iyya*, is sometimes referred to as the "decisive faculty," sometimes the "resolving faculty."¹⁰ Here I will prefer translating *al-ijmā'* as "resolution," because "decision" has cognitive overtones, and Avicenna is clear that *al-ijmā'* is not a cognitive function. Taking the background of this term into account, one might be tempted to think otherwise: Al-Farabi's single use of the term *al-ijmā'* is at the beginning of *Conditions of Certitude*, as a synonym for knowledge (*ra'ī*), under the genus of certainty (*yaqīn*).¹¹ However, the term does not show up in Avicenna's own logical section of the *Healing*, instead consistently being brought up under the heading of the motive faculty, which shows that he is not following Al-Farabi's usage, instead wanting us to think of resolution on the motive side of the motive-cognitive division.¹² *Al-ijmā'* is also an important term in Islamic law, signifying the unanimous agreement of a group of authorities on some moral or doctrinal issue.¹³ Yet this cognitive, juridical use is a technical usage of a term with a broader meaning, and Avicenna gives no indication that he means to evoke that particular legal meaning in his discussion of *al-ijmā'*. Rather, he refers to *al-ijmā'* as part of (*min*),¹⁴ or belonging to (*li*),¹⁵ the motive faculty. Taken together with the fact that he introduces *al-ijmā'* in his discussion of motive faculties, there is little doubt he intends us to think of resolution as something distinct from, but following, cognition.

One particularly striking text that distinguishes the notion of resolution from the cognitive faculties occurs at the beginning of Avicenna's section on the animal motive faculties in his *Remarks and Admonitions*:

As for voluntary motion, it is more lively [*ashadd nafsaniyyatan*], and it has a determining, resolving [*‘āzim mujammi'*] principle, [which is] acquiescent and passive to [*mudha'inan wa munfa'ilan 'an*] imagination, or estimation, or intellect [*khayāl aw wahm aw 'aql*], from which proceeds the irascible power, which pushes away from harm, or the concupiscible, which attracts to that which is necessary or the beneficial for animals. That which stretches out in the muscles obeys it, the locomotive faculty, is subservient to those commands.¹⁶

10 See, for example, Marmura usage of the translation "decisive" in 4.2 of *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005).

11 Al-Fārābī, *Conditions of Certitude* (1987), 98.5.

12 See prior discussion of Avicenna's *Psychology* 1.5 in chapter 1, section 2.

13 Bernand (2012).

14 Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.3.

15 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195.

16 Avicenna, *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement, 25, page 435.

What is noteworthy about this text is that the resolving faculty is clearly linked with appetite and inclination as an “acquiescent and passive” counterpart to cognitive principles of imagination, estimation and intellect. So even though resolution is active in the sense of directly activating the means of motion in the muscles, it is nonetheless responsive to cognition, just like inclination. This coheres with what we saw in the previously quoted text from *Marginal Glosses*, that decisive resolution gets its “course of action” from the mind, but it is motive, rather than cognitive.¹⁷

So it seems appropriate to render *al-ijmāʿ* as resolution, keeping in mind that this is non-cognitive, and always a resolution-*to-act*, not simply resolution *that* some action would be good to do. That is, it is not a mere thought, but an embodied resolution towards action caused by a thought. This leads directly to the next issue that is central to clarifying how inclination and resolution fit into the schema for voluntary motion: the differing cognitions that trigger each of them.

Looking at the differing cognitions that trigger inclination and resolution in Avicenna’s psychology will show him to have a coherent picture of how they fit together. This coherent picture has not always been recognized, as prior comments by Gätje and Van Riet on the term *al-ijmāʿ* in Avicenna have shown. Both point out that the Latin tradition had a difficult time translating *al-ijmāʿ*, variously using *desiderium*, *voluntas*, *effectus*, or *optare*,¹⁸ blurring the lines between inclination and resolution, and sometimes even using *consensus communis*,¹⁹ suggesting a conflation of Avicenna’s use of *al-ijmāʿ* with the Islamic legal use. Gätje reports that in the 20th century some scholars have tried to understand *al-ijmāʿ* as related to the Stoic notion of *synkatathesis*—a kind of cognitive assent—which Avicenna might have absorbed in some manner through Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Stoic-inspired writings.²⁰ A close look at the cognitive causes behind both inclination and resolution will show that Avicenna is consistent in distinguishing inclination from resolution, and in holding that both are states of the motive faculty, rather than themselves types of cognitions.

2. Different cognitions for different motive faculties

Though emotion and resolution are not cognitive, the cognitions that trigger them constitute an important part of understanding their place in Avicenna’s schema for explaining voluntary motion. In other words, emotions and resolution are acts of the motive faculty, each caused by a different type of cognition that is distinct from the motive act, and precedes the motive act. Moreover, there is an order to all these acts, with resolution occurring last, preceded by a practical judgment, which practical judgment in turn must be preceded by a relevant emotion, caused by some evaluation.

Avicenna’s clearest explanation *that* there are cognitions that trigger inclination and resolution, and that they differ, is in *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2. It is part of Avicenna’s explanation of the concepts potency and actuality, specifically natural potencies versus powers over a thing and its opposite, paralleling Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Theta. Avicenna’s way of framing the issue and figuring out what to focus on seems to be a true development unique to

¹⁷ See above, footnote 9. §

¹⁸ Gätje (1975) 360.

¹⁹ Van Riet (1967) 646.

²⁰ Gätje (1975) 356.

him, as there was little in the way of source material other than Aristotle's text itself. The only Greek commentaries translated into Arabic on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* were the Book Delta portions of the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius.²¹ And while Al-Farabi's *Aims of Aristotle's Metaphysics* was helpful in orienting Avicenna towards the work as a whole, it does not contain analysis of this specific section.

What is at issue, according to Avicenna, is how to best conceive of the distinction between capacities for motion that act automatically upon encountering a suitable object (natural faculties), and those that do not. That is, some capacities, like fire's ability to heat, operate automatically when put in proximity with something capable of being heated. Other capacities, like a doctor's ability to heal, do not. If we conceive of the doctor's ability to heal as a kind of knowledge, there must be something else, beyond the mere ability to heal, that explains whether the doctor actually heals or not in a particular situation. That "something else" that makes the difference between whether these non-automatic faculties actualize or not is what Aristotle calls "appetite" or "choice," which, to use Avicenna's language, are various states of the motive faculty. We will unpack the core Avicennian text that deals with these issues by breaking it into three parts.

Avicenna begins by circumscribing the particular type of powers he plans to discuss. In the text Avicenna bases his discussion on, Aristotle distinguishes between rational and non-rational faculties that cause motion, while Avicenna broadens the focus to any cognitive and non-cognitive faculties that lead to motion:

[a] [To turn to] those powers that are principles for motions and actions,²² some are associated with reason and imagination, while some are not associated with these. Those associated with reason and imagination are of the same genus as reason and imagination. For it is almost the case that man and not-man are known by one power and that it belongs to one power to imagine pleasure and pain and, in general, to imagine a thing and its opposite. Likewise, these powers themselves are, in their individual instances, each a power over a thing and its opposite.²³

Here Avicenna first makes a distinction between powers that are principles for motion which are "associated with" reason and imagination, and those which are not. He immediately clarifies this locution, "associated with," saying that he just means faculties that could be considered rational or imaginative in some generic sense, and those that are not. In other words, he is making a distinction between cognitive faculties at the level of the animal and human soul, on the one hand, and non-cognitive faculties, on the other.

The reason for the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive faculties is that cognitive faculties, insofar as they are principles of motion, are "a power over a thing and its opposite." Powers over a thing and its opposite can be principles of motion, or not, and Avicenna's first example of being a power over a thing and its opposite is just the ability to know and not know someone. These two acts are opposite, and they can both be performed by the same cognitive faculty. The idea at this point is just that a power is a power over a thing and its opposite if it has different types of act with respect to one and the same object. Cognitive faculties related to

21 Bertolacci (2006) 73.

22 As we saw in chapter two, section one, something can be a principle of motion, but not necessarily a motive faculty.

23 [T4a-c] are a continuous text taken from Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005), 4.2.10-11. The translation used here is Marmura's, slightly modified.

motion are “likewise” a power over a thing and its opposite, as Avicenna says in the final line of the text. A doctor’s medical knowledge can be used to heal or not heal, to heal or to harm. Upon seeing some raw materials, a builder with the knowledge of how to build can build, or not.

Given that cognitive principles of motion do not just have one sort of action upon encountering their object, it cannot be that they actualize on their own when the subject encounters their object, at least insofar as they are principles for motion. Avicenna continues in *Metaphysics* 4.2 as follows:

[b] In reality, however, it would not be a complete power—that is, a principle of change, complete and in actuality, of one thing in another (inasmuch as [the latter] is another)—unless the will [*al-irāda*] conjoins it, impelled either by an estimative belief [*i’ atiqād wahmī*] that follows an appetitive or irascible imaginative act [*takhayyul shahwānī aw ghadabī*] or by a rational belief²⁴ [*ra’ī ‘aqlī*] following a cogitative idea [*fikra ‘aqliyya*] or the conceptualization of an intellectual form [*taṣawwur ṣūra ‘aqliyya*]. Then, if that will, still not being a will that [only] inclines [*irāda mumīla*], but a decisive will [*irāda jazima*] (namely, the one which constitutes the resolution [*al-ijmā’*] that necessitates the movement of the organs), conjoins [the power, then the latter] becomes necessarily the principle of necessitating action.

Aristotle made it clear in the original discussion of these ideas that powers over a thing and its opposite need something else to actualize when encountering their object, in order to avoid the absurd conclusion of automatically doing x and not-x at the same time.²⁵ The doctor’s knowledge of the healing arts equips them to be able to heal and not heal, but without some additional factor, it would seem that they would do both upon encountering a patient, which of course they do not. Avicenna does not repeat this line of reasoning, but he clearly endorses the need for an additional factor, as seen in this text.

In unpacking the additional factor needed for a cognitive principle for motion to actually enact motion in this text, Avicenna orders some of the factors involved in voluntary motion in a way that is consonant with the psychological literature, and more explicit. In general, Avicenna is stringing together an array of psychological functions in text [b] in order to show the relationship between different types of cognitive and motive faculties. When Avicenna says that “will [*irāda*]” must join to the cognitive faculties in order for motion to actually occur, “will” is being used generically for any species of motive faculty associated with voluntary motion, in the same way that “power associated with reason and imagination” was used generically earlier for various cognitive faculties. What we see in text [b], then, are basically two processes, two ways for cognitive principles of motion to lead to actual motion:

Process leading to action	Cognition 1 (evaluation) —>	Motive Act 1 —>	Cognition 2 (practical judgment) —>	Motive Act 2
Animal	Imaginative act	Inclining will	Estimative belief	Resolved will
Rational	Conceptual act	Inclining will	Rational belief	Resolved will

24 Marmura had “opinion” for *ra’ī*, but the following text from Psychology suggests “belief” or “knowledge” would be better: “Knowledge [*ra’ī*] is belief that is settled, while opinion [*ṭann*] is belief one is inclined towards, along with the admission that the alternative might be true. And not everyone who opines believes, just like not everyone who senses thinks, or everyone who imagines opines or believes or knows.” *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207-208.

25 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006) 1048a.

The two processes are how voluntary motion takes place at the level of the animal and rational soul, respectively. The column “Cognition 1” contains the two cognitive principles of motion at issue, and what follows are the factors Avicenna says need to follow them, respectively, in order for actual motion to occur. Midway through text [b] Avicenna makes a clear distinction between two processes, one where an estimative belief follows an imaginative act, and another where a rational belief follows a conceptual act. What the second cognitive act (the estimative or rational belief, respectively) leads to in both processes, according to [b], is a *resolved* will, as opposed to a merely inclining will. Prior to the second cognitive act, the first cognitive act (the imaginative or conceptual act) merely leads to an *inclined* will, which corresponds to inclination, or emotion. Avicenna does not describe these components in more detail, because, individually, they are all discussed at more length in the psychological texts. His main point in this section is just to show what the “something else” is that enables a cognitive principle of motion to actually enact motion. That additional faculty is the resolved will, *al-ijmāʿ*.

Distinguishing *al-ijmāʿ* as a “something else” necessary for a cognitive principle to enact motion is a development on Avicenna’s part, though that may not be obvious at first. Some recent work on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Theta renders the Greek of Aristotle’s way of referring to desire and choice as “that which is decisive [*kurios*].”²⁶ Since one of the translations of *al-ijmāʿ* in the literature is “decisive faculty,” as mentioned before, this could make it seem like Avicenna is in some way getting the core of his idea for *al-ijmāʿ* from the Aristotle text, even if Aristotle did not present it so explicitly. However, the Arabic text of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that Avicenna would have had access to, at least as it is preserved in Averroes’s *Long Commentary on the De Anima*, makes no mention of *al-ijmāʿ*. Rather, the phrase (in Greek) that describes the additional motive component as “that which is decisive [*kurios*]” is rendered (in Arabic) as the “true ruler [*al-masūd al-ḥaqqī*].”²⁷ That is, Avicenna would have read that the motive faculty (in particular appetite/*shawq* and choice/*ikhtiyār*) is the true ruler when it comes to whether powers associated with reason act or do not act. There is no mention of *al-ijmāʿ* in the Arabic of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, nor even a clear distinction between inclination and resolution. Rather, in Aristotle’s text, we just have the equivalent of inclination, and this alone somehow makes the difference between whether a doctor would choose to heal or not. If Avicenna were speaking loosely, he would broadly agree with something like that. But in texts [a] and [b] above he is careful to distinguish inclination from resolution, since it is not merely having an emotion that makes the difference in whether the doctor heals or not, it is having a resolution to act.

One phrase in text [b] that needs explanation is how this additional motive component renders the cognitive principle of motion a “complete power.” Avicenna goes on to unpack this idea in the remainder of his discussion of cognitive principles for motion in *Metaphysics* 4.2. There are several paragraphs which follow, but their first two sentences sum up the idea:

[c] For we have shown that, so long as a cause does not become a cause in terms of necessitation whereby a thing is necessitated by it, the effect would not come into existence through it. Before this state, the will [*al-irāda*] would have been weak, [resolution] [*al-ijmāʿ*] not having taken place.

26 See the translation at Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (2006) 1048a and Nussbaum’s discussion of the term at (1983) 139, 146, and 150.

27 Averroes, *Long Commentary on the De Anima* (1967) 5.2, Book Theta, p. 1149.

For Avicenna, a power is called a complete power when an effect is necessitated by the power, given the appropriate circumstances.²⁸ He says he has already argued for this, likely referring to an earlier section in the same book, *Metaphysics* 4.1.10, where he argues that if a cause, *x*, were a “complete cause” of *y*, yet *x* did not necessitate *y* when *x* and *y* coexist, then the only thing that would make the difference in terms of whether *x* is a cause of *y* is whether *y* exists or not. Since that is absurd, *x* is a complete cause for *y* only when *y* is necessitated by *x*.

A cognitive principle for motion, like the doctor’s knowledge of how to heal, does not on its own necessarily cause motion, so it is not a complete cause for motion. It is only with something additional, namely, *al-ijmāʿ*, that the motion follows necessarily, assuming there are no impediments. When the will is “weak”—when it is mere “inclination,” as described in text [b]—action will not take place, even when the appropriate object is at hand. Of course, cognitive faculties are not always thought of as principles of motion. It is possible to just imagine or conceptualize something, with no relation at all to motion. But insofar as cognitive faculties imagine or deliberate *about* action, they are principles for motion, and only complete when accompanied by a resolution.

Avicenna’s concluding analysis in [c] shows that the idea of some act being necessary is not opposed to the idea of it being voluntary. Avicenna concludes his discussion of cognitive principles for motion in 4.2 by saying that when resolution accompanies a cognitive principle for motion, the subject would “then act by necessity.”²⁹ What precisely is necessitated was mentioned earlier, in text [b] when Avicenna says that the resolution-to-act [*irāda jazima*, translated by Marmura as “decisive will”] “necessitates the movement of the organs.” A doctor is not bound to conclude that healing some patient is the right thing to do, but once they do so conclude, and then have resolution to heal, they will act to heal the patient when in proximity to the patient. Of course, the cognitive faculties and the resolving faculty are themselves complete capacities in their own domains, and so certain cognitions or resolutions are necessary in appropriate circumstances. It is not random that a doctor with a certain web of beliefs would determine that healing is the best course of action. And there is no indication that the resolving faculty is self-determining or self-moving—it is responsive to cognition under normal circumstances. So necessity seems to run straight through the process. This highlights the fact that the key difference between voluntary and involuntary motion for Avicenna is not that one involves necessary actualization of faculties, and the other does not. Rather, one involves cognitive and motive faculties, while the other does not.³⁰

The preceding analysis of *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 has shown that cognitive powers are principles for motion only insofar as they work through the motive faculties. In clarifying what he means by this, Avicenna shows that there are two levels as which cognitive powers can trigger motive faculties: first by making the motive faculty *incline* towards some object, and then by making the motive faculty resolved towards some course of action. When there is resolution, this

28 McGinnis, & Ruffus (2015) 161, 174.

29 Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 4.2.11.

30 You could argue that, on this view, if we had a detailed enough understanding of someone’s web of beliefs, we would be able to predict what they will conclude is good for themselves or not in a given situation, in the same way that we could predict what type of nuts an oak tree will produce. Even if this is true, a key difference would remain between the two cases, in that the later is entirely predictable based on the nature of thing (oak trees always produce acorns), whereas nothing about the nature of a human being tells you how a particular human being will actualize their powers over opposites. For an interpretation of Avicenna’s texts that relate to the issue of human freedom, see McGinnis, & Ruffus (2015).

is when there is a complete principle of motion, necessitating movement of the muscles and organs.

In order to get a more detailed better grasp on the distinction between inclination and resolution, and how one leads to the other, we need to better understand the cognitive causes by which each occur. Since Avicenna is not focused on clarifying the cognitions themselves in *Metaphysics* 4.2, in what follows I want to show that other Avicennian texts fill in the picture, and that Avicenna endorses the following schema:

[Stage 1] First, some practical good (the object, unmoved-mover), imagined as having some sort of value, can lead to an inclination (e.g., food is seen as beneficial, then desired).

[Stage 2] Then, some practical judgment about a course of action can lead to a resolution-to-act (e.g., someone decides to open the cupboard to get a snack, and the motive faculty actually attempts to instigate action).

To be clear, the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text mere shows *that* there is a progression of cognitions and motive states, but I think other texts fill in the picture in this way. Some cognitions of unmoved-movers lead to inclinations, others lead to resolutions-to-act. The evaluation in [Stage 1] and the practical judgment in [Stage 2] are supposed to correspond to what is mentioned under Cognition 1 and Cognition 2, respectively, in the above table. In other words, two types of evaluations (one at the animal level, one human) lead to inclination, and two types of practical judgments (one at the animal level, one human) lead to resolution. In the following sections, I will explain the components of [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] in more detail, showing that these distinctions are ones Avicenna is interested in making, and what they amount to.

3. Emotions for means, resolution for ends

The distinctions made in [Stage 1] and [Stage 2] are made more plausible when seen as a development of Aristotle's distinction between ends of motion versus means of motion. In *Nicomachean Ethics*—a text Avicenna would have had access to, despite not writing a text of similar scope—Aristotle says that “[virtue] determines the end and [practical intellect] makes us do the things that lead to the end.”³¹ The general idea here is relevant to the discussion of emotions because virtues determine ends to the extent that some of them govern appetites and emotions, and therefore what we are inclined to pursue or not pursue.³² The practical intellect, on the other hand, decides how to pursue that which emotions incline towards. If someone is disposed to feel merciful to another person (i.e., they have the virtue of being merciful), helping that person in need of mercy becomes an object towards which they incline. Exactly what emotions we have is governed by the sort of dispositions or virtues we have, but it is because of the emotion that we are actually oriented towards some end in a given situation. Then a practical judgment of the sort, “I ought to help them in such and such a way” could lead to action. This determines the means. The practical judgment shifts the focus from the value of the object (in this case, helping someone), to how the subject ought to carry out the act. Avicenna's schema, as

31 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 6.13, 1145a.

32 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (1984) 2.5, 1106a.

summarized by [Stage 1] and [Stage 2], likewise has a place for judgments that determine ends as well as judgments that determine means.

One text where we see Avicenna using means and ends language in the context of voluntary motion is, again, in *Healing: Metaphysics*. In 6.5.4-6. Avicenna's main goal is to show that all voluntary motion has an end. Say there are two points, A and B. In some cases the end is identical with what the motion itself achieves, as in simply having the desire to move from point A to point B. Here, the end is to move, and the end is achieved through that very motion. In other cases, the motion is in the service to some other goal, like meeting up with a friend at point B. In order to meet with a friend at point B, you still need to move from point A to point B, so the motion (the means) *looks* the same as in the previous case, but the *end* differs. Avicenna's main point is that in both cases there is a goal, and a means to serve that goal, even in cases where the goal and the means to the goal are difficult to distinguish, as in the first case.

What this shows for our purposes is that the idea of an end, the object of inclination, is not the same as the means of movement towards that object. It is one thing to desire to meet up with a friend, it is another to resolve on concrete steps to get to them. Even the case of desiring to get from point A to point B requires actually resolving on doing those actions. The two steps—desiring an end and resolving on a practical course of action—are distinct.

4. Evaluations lead to inclination

What triggers emotions is just an evaluation of some object, without any decision about a particular course of action. That is, emotions are triggered when we judge some object to have a certain value. The main place we see evidence of emotions being caused by evaluations is in the opening to Avicenna's descriptions of the inclining motive faculty. He tends to describe emotions as caused by things "imagined to be" beneficial or harmful, not by decisions that something ought to be pursued or avoided through a particular course of action. This can be made most clear by referring back to the table in chapter one where we broke down Avicenna's descriptions of the inclining motive faculty³³ There we see that, in *Psychology* 1.5, concupiscible appetite responds to that which is "imagined to be necessary or beneficial," and again, "imagined to be beneficial" in 4.4. The irascible appetite actualizes in response to that which is "imagined to be harmful or corruptive," in 1.5, and "imagined as an obstacle" in 4.4. The word for "imagined" in all these cases is *mutakhayyil* and his purpose in using it will be clarified shortly. But the consistency with which the locution "imagined as" is chosen to discuss the cause of inclinations, and *not* used to discuss the cause of resolution (as we will see), strongly suggests that he intends to contrast merely imagining something as harmful or beneficial with making a practical, imperative judgment.

This close association between emotions and evaluations is not unique to the *Healing*, but recurs in his other texts, for example in the later psychological part of his *Salvation*:

The motive faculty insofar as it is motivating, it is the inclining, appetitive faculty, and it is the faculty which, when there is inscribed in the imagination [*irtasima fī al-takhayyul*] [...] an image of something to be sought or avoided, it incites [*hamalat*] to motion.³⁴

³³ See chapter 1, section 2b.

³⁴ Avicenna, *Salvation: Psychology* (1985) p. 197.

Avicenna is again specifically discussing inclination, as opposed to resolution, and the cause is described solely in terms of something being imagined in a particular way. This text is especially vivid, talking about the harmful or beneficial object as “inscribed” in the imagination. It appears that certain objects, when conceived in the imagination with some value, simply have the ability to trigger inclinations. But, as was said, the turn of phrase “imagined as having some sort of value” is in need of explanation.

Avicenna’s writings provide two ways of better understanding this locution, which require keeping straight two usages of words related “imagination.” On the one hand, for something to be “imagined as having some sort of value,” is for it to be an evaluation that is undergirded by images in the imagination, and affects appetite via those images. On the other hand, something can be evaluated in various ways, the two main divisions being “imaginatively” or arrived at through discursive, reasoned thought. So the phrase “imagined” in “imagined as having some sort of value” picks out that this evaluative process is *undergirded by images*, but the evaluative process itself comes in *various modes* (all undergirded by images), one of which modes is called “imaginative,” and another which is called “discursive” or “reason-based.” The next two sections will examine the key texts where these distinctions arise, so as to get a better understanding of [Stage 1], where evaluations trigger emotions.

4a. Evaluations are about particulars

All evaluations that lead to emotion are undergirded by images in the imagination because they are in response to particulars, and the sensitive faculties required to perceive particulars are loosely referred to as “imagination.” Avicenna makes clear that imagination is necessary for any particular inclination in a text from his *Remarks an Admonitions*. The text comes from a supplement he added to the psychological part of the *Remarks*, addressing issues that are not normally treated so explicitly in his psychological texts. A main issue he takes up in the supplement is that of distinguishing the different types of volitions belonging to celestial beings and humans. In making these distinctions, human voluntary motion is described in ways that emphasize the role of imagination. The distinctions he makes about the volitions of celestial beings are necessary for understanding the discussion of human volition.

The motion of celestial bodies, moving in their circular orbits, is identified as voluntary rather than natural because it has more than one sort of movement with respect to its object. In keeping with the description of voluntary motion from *Healing: Metaphysics* 4.2 as stemming from a power over a thing and its opposites,³⁵ Avicenna says that because the motion of the celestial bodies is circular, it by definition goes away from *and* towards its object—he does not specify exactly what the object is—and this is enough to be sure that it is voluntary, not natural. Natural motion would only go either towards some object, or away from it, but celestial bodies repeatedly switch between the two, owing to some sort of volition.³⁶

Avicenna next clarifies that the movement belonging to the “first body,” or the outermost sphere, is also voluntary—even though it does not move in terms of position. To make that claim he first needs to make a distinction between types of voluntary motion: sensible and

³⁵ See section 2 above.

³⁶ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Supplement 26, p. 438.

intellectual.³⁷ Sensible volitions are directed at sensible intentions, and intellectual volitions are directed at intellectual intentions. Intellectual intentions are defined as those which “are predicated of many, being unrestricted.”³⁸ As examples he provides “son of Adam,” or “human being.” He does not define sensible intentions, but we know from other similar discussions in *Psychology* that sensible intentions are particular,³⁹ in that what is being conceived cannot be predicated of a whole species (Adam himself, as opposed to human being in general).

Avicenna then makes use of this distinction to show that the volition of the first body is “intellectual,” being directed at a general intention, contrasting this with the volitions of humans and animals, which are sensible, in that they are directed at particulars. That the first mover’s volition is directed at a general intention is manifested in that it seeks position in general, rather than specific positions. The notion of position “in general” makes sense if we remember that the first body, the outermost sphere, is beyond even the sphere of the fixed stars, and does not have any planets or particular bodies inside it that move from place to place.⁴⁰ Rather, its motion is just the rotation of its entire area, which therefore would amount to no particular motion. Avicenna admits that this is difficult to conceive of, but the next section, on particular volitions, is more familiar, and directly bears on the nature of the evaluations that can trigger inclination in animals and humans.

Animal and human motion, in contrast with volitions of the first body, but *similar to* volitions of the other celestial bodies, involves particular movements, and is due to cognition of particulars. Avicenna initially bases this claim on what he takes as an axiom:

No particular, determined thing proceeds from universal knowledge. For [universal knowledge] is, of course, only determined to this particular rather than on account of some determination joined to it. This [the proceeding of some particular thing from the universal] does not happen through [universal knowledge] alone.⁴¹

Before any concrete action can be taken, universal knowledge must first be related to some particular object. As Avicenna goes on to illustrate, the cause of an animal seeking food is not simply its considering food in general to be nourishing, but considering this particular thing nourishing. In his words, “the desiring animal [...] desires and imagines particular nourishment, and there proceeds from that [desire and imagination] a particular animal volition.”⁴² There first needs to be imagination and appetite towards a particular, and only then is it possible for concrete action to be conceived of and resolved upon.

But, of course, there is a sense in which it seems that we *do* incline towards general objects, and Avicenna immediately faces this objection. Playing devil’s advocate, he notes that animals, when hungry, can be satisfied by multiple specific instances of nourishment, suggesting that they

³⁷ This distinction is of course compatible with other divisions Avicenna makes, such as dividing voluntary motion in terms of in place or from place to place. For the later distinction, Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) beginning of 2.3.

³⁸ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 27, p. 438.

³⁹ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 2.2, 60. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁰ Discussion of the “first body” at Davidson (1992) 45, 74.

⁴¹ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 442-443.

⁴² *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 443-444: “[443...] The desiring animal, [who desires] nourishment through its animal faculty, desires and imagines particular nourishment, and there proceeds from that [desire and imagination] a particular animal volition. [444] And then it seeks nourishment through its movement.”

do not have one particular type in mind to begin with, but rather something general. For example, if a dog is hungry, it will not care which of two bowls of dog food it is offered. Continuing to play devil's advocate, he adds a related worry: when desiring to cross some distance, it seems that we want something quite general (that is, crossing the entire field), which is then carried out by crossing bits and pieces of it. In both cases, it seems that the initial object is general, not particular.

Avicenna's response to both of these worries is to argue that specific objects can be pursued via related actions and related objects, without this meaning that there was some first, more general object of desire, of which the objects of these related actions are species. This core of this response, which he makes explicit at the end of his discussion, is as follows:

We say also that we might draw a universal conclusion from universal premises [...] ⁴³ then we follow that with a particular conclusion from which proceed appetite and volition, determined by a kind of estimative determination [*al-ta'ayyun al-wahmī*]. Then from there the motive power proceeds towards particular movements, which [movements] become the object of volition [*murāda*], for the sake of the initial object of volition. ⁴⁴

In this text, Avicenna is focused on the distinction between cognitions that orient us towards some initial object of pursuit, and the particular cognitions and movements that actually constitute the pursuit of that object. As such, there is some overlap between [Stage 1], evaluations that set goals (which are now discussing), and [Stage 2], practical judgments that set means to goals (which we will discuss shortly). But the general idea seems to be that once there is an inclination towards the “initial object of volition,” then practical judgments—according to the process described in section III—settle on a course of actions, which become objects that are then sought for the sake of that initial object of inclination. Object-evaluations are oriented at particulars, and they are sought through particular actions, determined by practical judgments.

With this in mind, we can understand his responses to the above worries about seeking nourishment and crossing a distance. To the worry about multiple instances of nourishment being acceptable to an animal, he simply says this “does not mean that that [universal knowledge] is represented to it [as the object of desire].” ⁴⁵ Presumably what he means is that the animal initially desired some particular instance of nourishment. Towards the end of a series of actions of nourishment-seeking it will finally encounter some object it knows to be nourishment. Though slightly different than what it had initially imagined, it will nonetheless make something akin to the practical judgment, “I ought to eat this thing to satisfy my initial appetite.” We can notice similarities between the actual objects we encounter, and the particular objects we initially desire, and so fulfill the initial inclination. Even if this reasoning process requires noticing similarities that rely to an extent on a more general concept, this does not show that the initial object of desire is general.

His response to the worry about crossing a distance is more extended:

And similar to [the prior worry], in crossing a distance particular limits are represented to someone, which they intend, and perhaps that representation [of the distance] would be cut off, and perhaps its existence [i.e.,

⁴³ A universal conclusion is different than a universal volition. A universal conclusion is a precursor to particulars volition in humans. A universal volition is something that only the first body is capable of, as described above.

⁴⁴ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 445-448.

⁴⁵ *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 444.

the existence of the representation] would be renewed in some manner, by a renewal of continual, connected motion. And that does not prevent individuality and particularity in the representation, just as it does not prevent motion.⁴⁶

His point here is that an initial volition—to cross some distance—is carried out by a series of more discrete, but equally particular volitions, based on successive representations. Once you get started crossing a distance, the initial representation and desire to cross it is inevitably “cut off” as your focus is turned to navigating the new particulars of the path. In navigating these particulars, the initial representation is renewed “in some manner,” in that your more specific goals bear some relation to the initial goal. For example, first you desire crossing the distance as a whole (which is itself a particular), then you desire getting to the tree that is a third of the way across the distance, then you desire getting to the rock that is two thirds of the way across the distance, and so on. In any case, the fact that an initial desire is carried out by a series of smaller actions does not show that the object which actualized inclination in the first place was a universal. The broader view of the distance was still a view of a particular distance.

To summarize, Avicenna’s discussion in *Remarks* shows that emotions occur in response to particular cognitions by diffusing the worry that having an initial goal—to which successive actions are related—somehow means that the initial object was a universal. This way of moving voluntarily is similar to that of the celestial bodies, insofar as it is based on particulars, but different than that of the first body, which moves simply on the basis of general knowledge. Actions in animals and humans can be related to an initial particular object, whose representation either persists or is replaced, while nonetheless allowing a connected, coherent series of actions for the sake of that initial particular object.

The passage therefore shows that particular representations in the imagination undergird the evaluations that cause emotion. A similar point is articulated, though not defended, in a brief passage from Avicenna’s *Discussions* [*al-Mubāḥithāt*], when Avicenna’s interlocutor asks, “How do we understand the idea that the appetitive and resolving faculties are corporeal?” Avicenna’s answer is as follows:

Estimative resolution is the faculty arrived at by the influence of the particular, such that [the particular] moves it [estimative resolution] towards causing motion insofar as it is affected/moved by the particular. And this is on account of corporeality. And the appetitive faculty enters into this, for there is conveyed to it [the appetitive faculty] a taste, or smell, or an imaginative memory of suchlike, and it is affected/moved towards seeking.

Again, there is overlap here between emotion and resolution, because the point being made here about the evaluations that trigger emotions also applies to resolution: emotion and resolution are rooted in the corporeal, in the sense that the cognitions that cause them are about particulars, known via the internal senses that make use of bodily organs. This is true whether emotion and resolution are about things currently being sensed, or simply recollections. In the sense of being based on particulars, emotion is based on corporeal imagination. That this is also asserted for the cognitions that undergird resolution shows that it is not something that makes the evaluations undergirding emotions particularly unique. But the point nonetheless helps us between understand what Avicenna means when he says that inclinations are in response to something “imagined with some value.”

46 *Remarks: Physics* (1960) Section 3, Section 3, Supplement 29, p. 444.

4b. Object-evaluations can be imaginative or reason-based

All evaluations that lead to emotions are undergirded by particular imagination, but not all such evaluations are “imaginative,” since “imaginative” is merely one of the modes in which evaluations can take place, alongside “cogitative.” The distinction between imaginative and cogitative evaluation is the distinction between an evaluation that proceeds with the aid of reason (cogitative), and that which proceeds via the internal senses alone (imaginative). Cogitative evaluations are not always correct, but they involve a discursive process that imaginative evaluations simply do not.

Avicenna’s division between imaginative and cogitative evaluations is most clear in two texts from his *Healing: Rhetoric*. The first comes in the midst of his distinguishing various sources of human action, as part of an attempt to describe acts that constitute wrongdoing from those that do not, in order to help rhetoricians paint their subjects in a positive or negative light⁴⁷: some acts are unintentional and involuntary [*bi-ghayr qasd wa-irāda*], and thus not blameworthy, such as those due to chance, nature, or compulsion. The category of intentional, voluntary acts, on the other hand, includes acts due to habit (since we have control over which habits we develop) and those due to appetite. Under the category of intentional, voluntary action, he makes two further distinctions: between acts in response to objects evaluated *imaginatively*, and objects evaluated *rationally*. This division is most evident in the second of the following two paragraphs, since Avicenna initially uses some language from the text on which he is basing the discussion (Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*), and then clarifies the matter in his own terminology:

As for the acts that are from the will, they include [*min-hā*] those [...] that follow upon animal appetite [*shawqan ḥayawāniyyan*], either desire for pleasure, and this is the concupiscible power, or desire for repelling and overcoming, and this is the irascible power. And among them [appetite-based acts]⁴⁸ there are those that follow upon cogitative desire [*shawqan fikriyyan*], or those that follow upon rational desire [*shawqan manṭiqiyyan*].

And it seems that what is meant by “cogitative [*al-fikrī*]” is what proceeds from cogitation [*al-fikr*] towards any goal whatsoever, even though the goal is not rational or good [*ghayr ‘aqlī aw ghayr jamīl*], and [what is meant by] “rational [*al-manṭiqī*]” is what proceeds towards the good and the rational. And it seems that what is meant by “cogitative” is “imaginative,” and by “rational,” “cogitative in the proper sense.”⁴⁹

Avicenna encounters some difficulty here in his effort to clearly articulate the distinction between types of evaluative bases for emotions, while remaining faithful to the distinctions in Aristotle’s text as it appears in Arabic. Thus we see him, in the second paragraph, modify a way of speaking from the first paragraph that he finds imprecise. Prying apart why Avicenna shifts his vocabulary over the course of these two paragraphs will help us see exactly what his core point is.

In Aristotle’s original *Rhetoric*, the distinction is simply made between rational and non-rational appetites, identifying concupiscible and irascible appetite with non-rational. In the

47 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96ff.

48 Here Avicenna, less careful than in *Psychology* 4.4, seems to be using the term appetite [*shawq*] to refer to inclination in general.

49 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96.

Arabic translation, however, two distinctions are made: first, between *cogitative* desire and rational desire, and then between *non-rational* and rational desire, with concupiscible and irascible appetite being given as example of the non-rational. So the Arabic text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* text makes it seem as though "cogitative" and "non-rational" are different ways of talking about the same category of emotion, to be contrasted with what is rational. What follows is a translation of the problematic Arabic rendering of Aristotle's text:

[Among acts involving appetite] there is that which is for the sake of *cogitative* desire [*al-shahwa al-fikriyya*], and what is for the sake of rational [*al-mantiqiyya*] [desire]. Volition is thought-based and rational [when] the agent only wills that which they think to be good. As for *irrational* appetites, they are irascible and concupiscible appetite.⁵⁰

Since cogitative and non-rational are parallels in this text, they seem to be different ways of talking about the same sort of phenomena. But for Avicenna cogitation is the process wherein reason has control over the internal senses, so it just does not seem right to lump cogitation together with the non-rational. Thus, the first paragraph of Avicenna's text from *Healing: Rhetoric*, above, follows the terminology of the Arabic Aristotle more closely, but he corrects this in the second paragraph, saying that "imaginative" is what should replace "cogitative" as that which is "irrational," in opposition to the "rational." Aristotle's original text merely distinguishes between rational and irrational desires, so Avicenna's clarification has the advantage of being closer to what the original text intended. In other words, Avicenna must have noticed that the Arabic text he was looking at infelicitously seemed to use the term "cogitative [*fikriyya*]" to describe a process that does not involve reason. Of course, this raises the issue of just what is the distinction between the cognitions underlying imaginative/non-rational desires, on the one hand, and cogitative/rational desires, on the other, and this is something he clarifies shortly in a second text from *Healing: Rhetoric*.

In the section of his *Rhetoric* immediately following the distinction between different types of acts, Avicenna describes what pleasure is, again for the sake of improving the rhetorician's understanding of the motivations of their audience. Avicenna distinguishes pleasures as rational or non-rational, the difference corresponding to the way in which something is evaluated as worth pursuing or not. A non-rational pleasure is defined negatively, as having been evaluated as worth pursuing *without* any kind of discursive thought:

And what is longed for [*al-mushtahā*] has a pleasurable quality, whether [it is] a rational [*naṭqiyya*] pleasure or a non-rational pleasure. The non-rational [object of desire] is what desire [*shawq*] is directed towards without being due to cogitation [*fikra*] or knowledge [*ra'ī*] or analogy [*tamthīl*] that has clarified whether it is necessary that one pursue or not pursue it. And this [desire towards non-rational objects] is what pertains to nature and sensation.⁵¹

If non-rational pleasures are those things longed for on the basis of object-evaluations that *do not* involve deliberation, knowledge, or analogy, then, by implication, rational pleasures are longed for on the basis of object-evaluations that *do* involve deliberation, knowledge, or analogy. The terminology here is not fleshed out, but he clearly means to contrast, on the one hand, any kind

50 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.5, 96. Emphasis mine.

51 Avicenna, *Healing: Rhetoric* (1954) 2.6, 100. Emphasis mine.

of process where one uses some sort of discursive thought (analysis and synthesis)⁵² to arrive at an evaluation, as opposed to the evaluation just naturally arising due to the natural operations of the internal senses.

“Nature and sensation” are provided as examples of how non-rational evaluations of pleasures are arrived at, meaning that animal faculties are hardwired to evaluate certain objects as pleasant or painful, without any need for discursive thought. When an animal sees food, that image is joined to the intention of pleasure in their memory or instinct, and they want to pursue it. Since this might be based on prior experience, it is based on a reason in a sense, but it is not discursive—it is automatic.⁵³ In contemporary terms, we could think of merely imagining something to be beneficial or harmful as “construing” it to be so, or “entertaining the thought that” it is so, without making a considered judgment that this is the case.⁵⁴

It is worth making two clarifications about the initial *Rhetoric* text quoted above, related to what imaginative and cogitative desire are not, respectively. First of all, cogitative desire is always towards that which is determined to be “good and rational,” but this does not mean that the agent will necessarily be correct that their goal is good. Avicenna’s emphasis has been on the discursive process behind cogitative desires, not their validity. Secondly, although non-rational, imaginative desire can proceed towards “any goal whatsoever,”⁵⁵ this does not mean that the agent could pursue something that it has evaluated as *not* good, all things considered. It is a truism in Avicenna’s tradition that no one pursues any object unless they think it is worth pursuing, in some way. Again, by saying that imaginative desire proceeds towards “any goal whatsoever,” the emphasis seems to be on the unguided nature of the process leading to the evaluation. So to call a desire cogitative/rational, or imaginative/non-rational, relates more to the way in which an evaluation is arrived at.

Avicenna makes use of the distinction between imaginative and cogitative evaluative bases for emotion in at least two other texts. First, there is Avicenna’s discussion in *Metaphysics* 6.5 about how no voluntary action is pointless, because voluntary action is always in response to some emotion, and that emotion is always for some object. Key for our purposes is where Avicenna says that this object is grasped either imaginatively or cogitatively:

Hence, the proximate principle of every psychological movement is a motive power in the muscle of the organ, and the principle that comes after it is desire—desire, as you have learned in the *Psychology*, being necessarily consequent on some [act of] imagination or cogitation [*takhayyul aw fikr*], so that the most remote principle would be either imaginative or cogitative [*takhayyulan aw fikran*].⁵⁶

He goes on to classify actions that proceed from imagination or deliberation, respectively, with special attention to how we should think about acts that proceed from imagination. If imagination alone is involved, and no discursive, we call the end towards which an act is directed “trivial” and the act itself “haphazard.”⁵⁷ There is still an end, or an object, but it would merely be due to “nature and sensation.”

⁵² Black (2013) 70.

⁵³ In contemporary terms, these would not be reasons on a reason internalist view. See Tappolet (2016) 164.

⁵⁴ Deonna & Teroni (2012) 55.

⁵⁵ This is the way he describes what he initially calls deliberative desire, but which he corrects as imaginative in the last sentence. So this descriptor more truly applies to imaginative desire. See text above at fn. 49. \$

⁵⁶ Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.7.

⁵⁷ Avicenna, *Healing: Metaphysics* (2005) 6.5.10, 12.

Finally, the distinction between imaginative and deliberative is evident in a text from Avicenna's *Notes* [*al-Ta'liqāt*] titled "Explaining [the Necessary Existent's] Volition [*bayān irādatihi*]." The main purpose of this particular "note" is to clarify the sense in which the Necessary Existent has volition, but along the way voluntary action in general is explained in such a way as sheds light on imaginative versus cogitative evaluation, especially in the following passage:

[E]very action that proceeds from a will, the principle of that will is either knowledge [*ilm*] or opinion [*ẓann*] or imagination [*takhayyul*]. An example of what proceeds from understanding is the action of the geometer or physician. An example of what proceeds from opinion is being cautious of that in which there is risk, while an example of what proceeds from imagination is seeking something that appears to be either noble or excellent in order that a likeness to the noble or excellent thing is obtained.⁵⁸

For our purposes this text can be seen as augmenting the merely twofold distinction between imagination and cogitative thought, subdividing cogitation into processes that lead to understanding or opinion. Avicenna does not explicitly say that understanding and opinion are meant to be grouped together, in contrast to imagination, but they fit well with the description of discursive/reason-based evaluations that we have seen in this section. Consider Avicenna's examples: to *know* something as good is to have a deep grasp of why it is the way it is, such as a geometer or physician have of their objects. One's reasons are firm and have been made explicit. To believe something as good *according to opinion* is to have a reason for preferring one thing over another, but to admit that the other option is possible. This is not as firmly grasped of a reason, but it is still explicit.⁵⁹ On the other hand, when something is construed as good according to the imagination, there is no mention of reasons—something simply "appears [or seems: *yushbih*]" worth pursuing, and that is that. Appearances are not necessarily wrong, they are just not based on discursive thought.

So in the last two sections we have seen two senses in which imagination relates to emotion. On the one hand, all emotions are triggered by evaluations, insofar as those evaluations are based on particulars, conceived in the imagination (even if higher faculties are also involved in the evaluative process). On the other hand, some emotions are based on imaginative evaluations (not involving discursive thought), while others are based on cogitative evaluations (which do involve discursive thought). Both these senses in which imagination is involved are important for an overall understanding of Avicenna's views on emotion. But in Avicenna's initial definition of the inclining motive faculty, when he says that emotions are due to "imagining" some object as worth pursuing or not, it seems most likely that he has the former sense of imagination in mind. That is, he is simply pointing out that inclinations/emotions are caused by evaluations of particulars.

58 Avicenna, *Notes* (1973) p. 16. Avicenna goes on to show that while most voluntary actions are passive, in the sense that the agent is acted upon in forming an evaluation of it as worth pursuing, it is possible for understanding-based volition to not be passive, this being characteristic of the Necessary Existent. So voluntary action can be rooted in a cognition that is active or passive, which McGinnis and Ruffus takes to correspond to the difference between the act being free or determined. For more on the later point, see McGinnis & Ruffus (2015).

59 A related distinction is between knowledge and opinion: "Knowledge [*ra'ī*] is belief that is settled, while opinion [*tann*] is belief one is inclined towards, along with the admission that the alternative might be true. And not everyone who opines believes, just like not everyone who senses thinks, or everyone who imagines opines or believes or knows." Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207-208.

For the purposes of this chapter, this confirms that Avicenna indeed has the view expressed in [Stage 1]: some practical good (the object, unmoved-mover), imagined as having some sort of value, can lead to an inclination/emotion. In the next section, we will see how different cognitions are involved in Stage 2, leading to the resolution-to-act.

5. Practical judgments lead to resolution

Once a subject has an emotion/inclination (*nazʿa/inbiʿāth*) towards or away from some object, triggered by an evaluative judgment ([Stage 1]), they are in a position to determine what to do about that object. With respect to what I have called [Stage 2], Avicenna describes how we form a practical judgment about what to do or not do, which leads to the motive state called resolution (*al-ijmāʿ*). Avicenna describes practical judgments, particularly with reference to the rational soul, in *Healing: Psychology* 5.1. This section off of the general sketch of the practical intellect in 1.5 that we looked at in chapter two, on human emotion, but in it he more fully unpacks the nature of practical judgments and their relation to the resolution-to-act is more fully unpacked. The main thing that we need to see in this text is that not just any judgment leads to a resolution-to-act, but only the conclusion of a practical syllogism, or the analogue to a the conclusion of a practical syllogism at the animal level.⁶⁰ In the language of Aristotle looked at earlier, it is this cognition which determines the *means* to achieve some end.

Avicenna introduces his discussion of practical judgments with a contrast, clarifying that judgments of theoretical intellect are *not* essentially related to action:

[a]⁶¹ Humans have governance in particular matters and in universal matters. In universal matters there is only belief, even if it is about action. For one type of belief is the universal belief about how a house should be built. From this [universal] belief alone and primarily, however, there will not issue the enacting of a particular house. For actions deal with particular matters, and issue from particular judgments, and that is because the universal, insofar as it is universal, is not related to this rather than that. Let us postpone explanation of this, relying on what will come to you in the metaphysical art, in the last part.⁶²

Here, human thought about universal matters is contrasted with deliberation about particular matters. Beliefs on a universal level can be about action in general, and could theoretically apply to many particulars and situations. But enacting motion requires selecting and interacting with one set of particulars, with “this rather than that,” so universal beliefs are too general to have immediate implications for what one ought to do. You can have a general belief about the best way of building houses, but without deciding to build a particular house nothing will get done. You can believe that apples are nutritious and worth eating, but without deciding to eat this particular nutritious apple, you will never eat any apple at all.

60 The animal equivalent to a practical judgment is not the same thing as the conclusion of a practical syllogism, since animals cannot reason discursively. Non-human animals do, however, have cognitions that settle on courses of action. Avicenna says this in an aside at the end of the a text discussed below: If this [the practical intellect] judges, there follows a movement of the faculty that resolves on [*al-quwwa al-ijmāʿiyya ilā*] movement of the body, just as [movement of the body] follows judgments of other faculties in animals. (*Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207).

61 The texts labeled [a-e] are a mostly continuous section from *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 206-207.

62 The “postponement” Avicenna mentions refers to further discussion of universals qua universals, which he returns to in the *Healing: Metaphysics* 5.2, but this is his primary explanation of the difference between universal and practical judgments.

With the universal judgments of the theoretical intellect determined to be insufficient for prompting action, Avicenna contrasts this with the sort of judgments that *can* lead to action, these being the particular judgments of the practical intellect:

[b] Humans have, then, a faculty concerned with universal matters and another concerned with deliberation [*al-rawiyya*] in particular matters, about what should be done and not done, about what is beneficial and harmful, beautiful and ugly, good and bad. And that [is done] through a type of syllogism and thought process, [which can be] correct or faulty, whose goal is to produce a knowledge [*ra'ī*] about some particular, future thing from among that which is possible. For one does not deliberate about whether or not to do things that are necessary or non-existent, nor [does one deliberate about whether or not to do things] pertaining to what is past [because] the past cannot be enacted. If this faculty judges, there follows a movement of the faculty that resolves on [*al-quwwa al-ijmā' iyya ilā*] movement of the body, just as [movement of the body] follows judgments of other faculties in animals.⁶³

In this last sentence Avicenna says that the judgments described in this paragraph lead, directly, to an actualization of the resolving faculty, not mere inclination. He does not specifically say that judgments of the practical intellect lead to acts of the resolving faculty, *as opposed to* inclination, but the distinctions from the immediately preceding book 4.4 (examined in section 1 above), are supposed to be fresh in our minds. So he has just finished describing emotion and its causes in 4.4, and now in 5.1 is describing how to get from emotion to resolution, via practical judgments. At the end of this section (text [e] below), he again connects practical judgments to the resolution-to-act, with no mention of emotion, showing that he is indeed meaning to talk about the cognitions leading to *al-ijmā'* here.

The thought process leading to practical judgments, at the human level, is described in text [b] as syllogistic, but involving syllogisms of a different sort than lead to universal judgments. Avicenna says that the syllogisms constructed by the practical intellect have two features: 1) they are about what should and shouldn't be done, and 2) they are about the particular, future, and possible. Avicenna is not saying that the practical intellect is the only human faculty that can think about what should and shouldn't be done, or that can think about particular, future, or possible things. As we have seen, the theoretical intellect can indeed make judgments about good or evil in a general sense, such as that all apples are nutritious. With the aid of estimation and imagination, we identify particulars as this or that (i.e., this is an apple, that is not), and then the practical intellect is posited specifically to account for identifying particular things or courses of action as good or bad. In order for this to be done with any coherency, Avicenna specifies above that the things identified as good or bad need to be in the future, and possible. Since the conclusions drawn by the practical intellect involve action, it wouldn't make sense to draw those conclusions about things in the past ("I will spend more time studying for that last exam"), or courses of action that are impossible ("I will give out lots of square circles as party gifts"). We can have such thoughts, but presumably these would be the "faulty" acts of the practical intellect, which he mentions in [b]. What Avicenna describes in this text is, as he says, the "goal," or the ideal operation of the practical intellect.

From here, Avicenna goes on to describe the relationship between the theoretical and practical intellect in light of the practical intellect's goal of arriving at conclusions about what ought and ought not be done. He begins by emphasizing that the practical intellect does not do this entirely on its own:

63 Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 5.1, 207.

[c] And this faculty [the practical intellect] is supplied by the faculty that deals with universals, and from there it [the practical intellect] takes major premises concerning what it deliberates about, and draws conclusions in the realm of particulars.

Avicenna does not provide examples of how this works, but we could take for example the following simple practical syllogism: apples are healthy, this is an apple, eat this apple. Avicenna says that the major premise of such syllogisms (in this case, “apples are healthy”) would be “taken from” the theoretical intellect, which deals with universals. Even though this major premise is here used in a practical syllogism, the aim of this premise, considered on its own, is truth. On the other hand, the conclusion, “eat this carrot,” aims at action. Avicenna consistently relates notions of benefit and harm, and their synonyms, to the practical intellect, even though the theoretical intellect can make general judgments about benefits and harms, because the practical intellect is concerned with commanding the pursuit of benefits and avoiding harms, while the theoretical intellect is concerned with affirming truth, and rejecting falsehood. The concepts Avicenna repeatedly associates with both faculties have to do with their *goals* as faculties (truth vs. action), not the *content* of the premises they make use of.

In the penultimate section of Avicenna’s discussion of the practical intellect, he elaborates on the structure of the practical syllogism, in comparison to the sort of syllogisms the theoretical intellect constructs. The first few sentences are a review of what has already been said, but about halfway through he provides new details by distinguishing the “principles” of both faculties:

[d] The first power belonging to the human soul is a power related to intellection, and so it is called the theoretical intellect. And the second is a power related to action, and it is called the practical intellect. The former pertains to truth and falsehood, the latter to good and evil in particular matters. The former pertains to the necessary, the possible and the impossible, the latter to the evil, the good and the morally permitted. The principles of the former are the primary premises, and the principles of the later are well known, accepted, opined, weak experiential [premises]—the ones that are not among the strong experiential [premises] [...]

When Avicenna says that the principles of the theoretical intellect are “primary premises,” he is referring, as defined in *Remarks and Admonitions*, to propositions “that are necessitated by the essence and instinct of a clear intellect, and not by any cause external to it.”⁶⁴ In other words, propositions like “the whole is greater than its parts,” are axiomatic in the sense that their truth is automatically assented to, once they are understood.⁶⁵ Assent to them is given because they appear to be necessarily true in themselves, on the basis of the essences under consideration, not on the basis of any external evidence.

On the other hand, Avicenna says that the principles of the practical intellect include those that are “well known, accepted, opined, weak experiential [premises].” Each of the descriptors in this sentence refer to a different type of premise, or a different way of knowing a premise.⁶⁶ Avicenna elsewhere discusses each of these types of premises in more detail, but his point here seems to simply be that the sort of premises involved in practical syllogisms are not known with axiomatic certainty. When discussing “well known” premises in *Remarks*, such as that “stealing the wealth of others is an ugly act and that lying is an ugly act which must not be pursued,”

⁶⁴ Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 119.

⁶⁵ “Axiomatic” is Inati’s word. See Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 119, fn. 5.

⁶⁶ Black (2013a) 124.

Avicenna says that these are premises that we typically accept merely thanks to our social and moral upbringing.⁶⁷

These weaker premises are still “taken from” the theoretical intellect, in the language of [c], above, in that they are general premises initially accepted by the theoretical intellect, and then made use of in a practical syllogism. The practical intellect is not posited for every aspect of a practical syllogism, but rather for the unique ability to draw a conclusion that makes some general value judgment into an imperative for an individual in a particular situation. These non-axiomatic premises are “principles” of the practical intellect in the sense that they are the premises the practical intellect needs in order to perform its unique function of drawing practical judgments.

Though Avicenna thinks that the practical intellect *typically* relies on a weaker sorts of premises, a text we looked at earlier in chapter two from Avicenna’s *Psychology* 1.5 shows that practical judgments can also be verified in a more certain way.⁶⁸ As we saw, in 1.5 Avicenna briefly indicates that the premises the practical intellect uses, like “lying and injustice are bad” are “well known” and “not demonstrated,” which coheres well enough with what we have seen in 5.1. However he also adds in 1.5 that “were [the beliefs of the practical intellect] logically considered, they would come from the intelligibles in accordance with what is in the books of logic.”⁶⁹ It is difficult to read this as saying anything other than that premises like “lying and injustice are bad” could also be demonstrated by way of “primary premises,” which is much stronger than being based merely on social and moral upbringing. What this suggests is that the distinctions Avicenna makes in 5.1 refer simply to the *typical* way in which we arrive at practical conclusions. Even though it would be possible to demonstrate that lying is bad from primary premises, most people take this to be a premise simply on the basis of moral upbringing. Avicenna is not a subjectivist about ethical judgments, he just thinks that most of the time action is guided by less than axiomatic premises.

In the conclusion to 5.1’s discussion of the practical intellect, Avicenna reaffirms that he has been discussing the sort of cognition undergirding the transition to, specifically, resolution. At the same time, he reaffirms the point that this same sort of function exists, albeit via a different mechanism, in animals:

[e] For there is in humans a sensible judge, and an estimative judge in the realm of imagination, and an intellectual and practical judge. And the motivating principles that belong to [*al-mabadī al-bā’itha li-*] humans’ power that resolves upon [*quwwatihi al-ijmā’iyya ‘alā*] the movement of the organs are imaginative estimation [*wahm khayālī*], the practical intellect, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties. Other animals have three of these.

Of the four main types of cognitive faculties, two of them (estimation and the practical intellect) make judgments oriented especially towards causing an act of the resolving faculty. Sensitive judgments and theoretical judgments may provide data or premises to estimation and the practical intellect, but on their own they do not trigger resolution. When Avicenna says that other animals “have three of these,” he means that estimation alone, without the practical intellect, is responsible for the analogous sort of practical judgments in animals that lead to resolution.

67 Avicenna, *Remarks: Logic* (1984, trans. Inati) 122.

68 See discussion in chapter 2, section 2.

69 Avicenna *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 1.5, 46.

Again, this analogous judgment is not the conclusion of a practical syllogism, but it nonetheless settles on a course of action. This coheres with the *Metaphysics* 4.2 text we looked at earlier (text [b], section 2) which said that the judgment prior to a resolved will can just be a kind of “estimative belief [*i’atiqād wahmī*],” when resolution is reached without the involvement of rational faculties.⁷⁰ These texts are not linked in a straightforward way, but the general picture is the same in both, with analogous practical judgments on the animal and human level able to lead to resolution.

Avicenna is not explicit in any text in his corpus about the precise role estimation plays in non-human animals for the sake of bringing about resolution. Of course he has plenty to say in *Psychology* 4.4 about how animals make general value judgments: some knowledge of harms and benefits is built into animals as instinct, some is learned through experience.⁷¹ But it is not clear whether these are meant to be merely evaluations, such as can lead to emotion, or whether they are the animal analogue to practical judgments. He seems to leave the matter at assuming estimation somehow produces something analogous to the intellect’s practical judgments, despite not sharing in the human ability to construct syllogisms.

In text [e], the conclusion, Avicenna has emphasized the importance of both emotion and practical judgment as causes of resolution-to-act, because if either of these things are missing, there can be no resolution. Judging something to be worth doing, but having no initial inclination to do it, provides no motive state for the practical judgment to help push into a resolution, while having an emotion without a practical judgment is bound to remain mere inclination. Sometimes Avicenna will talk about the practical judgment alone as a proximate cause of resolution-to-act, and sometimes he does a similar thing with emotion, as in a text from 4.4 we looked at earlier, where inclination “strengthens to the point where it brings about [*yūjīb*] resolution-to-act [*al-ijmā*].”⁷² The different emphases in each makes sense, since both inclination and practical judgment need to come together if there is going to be resolution.

The preceding analysis of the text on the practical intellect in 5.1 has confirmed the general picture summarized in [Stage 2]: some practical good (the object, unmover-mover), represented as part of a practical judgment, can lead to a resolution-to-act (e.g., someone decides to open the cupboard to get a snack, and the motive faculty actually attempts to instigate action).⁷³

6. Conclusion: reviewing the distinctions

We can summarize the distinctions that have been made as follows. Inclination and resolution are two separate acts of the motive faculty (or two separate faculties, depending on how finely

⁷⁰ See chart in section 2 of this chapter.

⁷¹ Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 4.3, 183-184.

⁷² Avicenna, *Healing: Psychology* (1959) 195. Discussed at the beginning of the section 1, above.

⁷³ Avicenna is aware that any illustration of the factors involved in voluntary movement is going to seem overly simplistic, as this one may have. In his *Healing: Physics* (2009, trans. McGinnis) 1.15.5, he says concerning volition that “it is difficult to produce the cause completely, for the will is incited to act [only] after a number of factors are fulfilled, the enumeration of which is not easy. Also, one might not even be conscious of many of them so as to include them in the account.” A single decision of the practical intellect, such as that planting a garden would be good, does not lead to actual planting without a number of further judgments, influenced by numerous factors, conscious and unconscious. But the general schema could be applied to any of these intermediary judgments and actions, as well.

faculties are being parsed), and they are triggered by different cognitive processes. Those two cognitive processes are as follows:

- Evaluations: cognitions that ascribe value to objects/ends in some way
- Practical judgments: cognitions about the course of action to take regarding some evaluated object/end

Evaluations lead to emotions, practical judgments lead to a resolution. Avicenna's standard way of describing the evaluation that leads to inclination involves the phrase that something is "imagined as having some sort of value." We have understood the sense in which imagination is relevant to the evaluations that cause emotion along two lines:

- Evaluations are cognitions that involve particular imagination.
- Evaluations can ascribe value to their objects via imaginative or cogitative processes.

When Avicenna says that emotions are triggered when something is "imagined as having some sort of value," he probably does *not* have the second sense sense of "imaginative" involvement in mind. That is, the evaluations leading to emotions can be imaginative or cogitative, where imaginative means "lacking discursive thought." But this does not apply to all evaluations (cogitative evaluations *do* involve discursive thought), so it wouldn't make sense to interpret this as what Avicenna means in the phrase "imagined as having some value." On the other hand, all emotions (animal and human) are in fact based on cognitions that engage the imagination for the sake of particularity. So when Avicenna says that emotions are caused when something is "imagined as having some sort of value," he is merely emphasizing the particularity of the evaluation leading to emotion. This is not unique to the evaluations behind emotions, since practical judgments engage the imagination as well,⁷⁴ but he nonetheless seems to think it worth emphasizing.

Going back to some of the previously mentioned earlier understandings of *al-ijmā'*, it should be clear that the Latin tendency of sometimes translating *al-ijmā'* with terms that capture inclination was a mistake, since inclination and resolution are distinct. Moreover, *al-ijmā'* in Avicenna does not have any particular association with *al-ijmā'* in Islamic legal theory. It describes a state of the motive faculty, not the coming together of various faculties in any way that resembles a number of legal judges coming together. We could think of motion in fact occurring at the point where cognition and motive faculties finally "come together" to cause movement, but this is not precisely what Avicenna picks out by the term *al-ijmā'*. Finally, there is no obvious Stoic influence on Avicenna's concept of *al-ijmā'*. On the contrary, given that it is motive, rather than cognitive, it seems uniquely unsuited to be a successor to the Stoic concept of *synkatathesis*. It might be that the *practical judgment* leading to *al-ijmā'* fulfills a similar role in Avicenna's psychology as *synkatathesis* does in the Stoic tradition, but the practical judgment is, of course, something distinct from *al-ijmā'* itself.

Avicenna's formulation can be seen as a development of Aristotle's ends-means distinction, in that emotions focus us on some evaluated end, while resolution enacts motion according to the means clarified by a practical judgment. Avicenna is not always careful about making these

⁷⁴ See section 5, above.

distinctions, which is understandable, since he is really just talking about two different branches, or functions, that follow from the one animal motive faculty, and he is introducing a new concept (resolution) alongside older terms (e.g., appetite) that previously were used to capture everything in this conceptual terrain. But despite the fact that in some places he glosses over the careful distinctions he makes elsewhere, we should take seriously his careful distinctions when considering his overall schema. Emotions, then, according to Avicenna, are best thought of as varieties of inclination, which orient us towards objects or goals, but are not in themselves directly action-guiding.