
Complete Final Draft

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On Mon, Oct 05, 2020 at 10:13:27AM -0400, Michael Fatigati wrote:

- > So if you were going to have any major concerns, it would be really
- > helpful to factor that into the revisions I'm working on right now, in
- > the next month and a half.

~~Here are some notes on Chapter One:~~

~~General: You have a tendency toward exposition rather than explanation, and you sometimes exhibit texts as though they have a clear meaning and prove a claim you make, where they don't always do so. I personally would like more context, but perhaps that will be provided by the Introduction (?).~~

~~I assume what I have is still rough, so there is no point in commenting on, say, formatting, spelling, etc.~~

~~On p.2 you take Themistius and Alexander to be saying pretty much the same thing. Perhaps they are, but it takes some work to establish that; I read Themistius as saying that "practical good" = particular good, which need not be the same as *a* particular good. Here, and elsewhere, you are quick to move on.~~

~~I suppose we are to take Aristotle's framework as given and philosophically important. I hope the Introduction will give us some reason to think so.~~

~~On p.6 you make a big deal that the motive faculty depends on cognition. Well, it does, but I don't quite see what you're driving at, and certainly not why that "makes it a capacity for voluntary motion."~~

On pp.6-7 you seem to conflate two senses of "imagined" -- a neutral sense of "being in/through the [faculty of] imagination" and the loaded sense of "seen as". They are not the same, but your interpretation depends on them being taken as the same.

On p.7, the last few paragraphs set you up for the rest of the chapter by talking about the role of pleasure. What you say seems wrong to me, but then again, I don't understand your sentence beginning "By final object..." The problem here seems to me to be riding roughshod over Aristotle's theory of concomitant pleasures -- we are not motivated by the pleasure in X, but by doing X, which has as a by-product some type of pleasure. This is absolutely central to Aristotle, and if Avicenna doesn't have it, then it would be good to say why we should go along with him. This issue runs through the rest of the chapter.

On p.11, I do not understand the phrase "and in what ... through sight" that is part of (b) in your translation. What you say in the middle of p.12 doesn't help and in any event isn't really an explanation (more of an exposition or paraphrase).

From p.12 forward you assume something in dire need of proof, namely, that faculties directed at different objects have different pleasures. This is particularly evident in your discussion on p.15. Well, suppose that one faculty is directed at internal goods and another at external goods. Why

is it the case that the *pleasure* the satisfaction/fulfilment/perfection of the two faculties must differ? As Bentham said, qua pleasure, pushpin is as good as poetry. You *need* an argument, or at least a reason, to make this rather substantive and controversial assumption. The claims about aesthetic pleasure at the top of p.16 are a particularly clear case of making the assumption.

On the top of p.15 you say, in essence, that estimation etc. doesn't really issue judgments but responds to objects in ways that offer an experience that is pleasant or unpleasant. Point taken, but then at the bottom of p.17 you offer as a defence of your interpretation that Avicenna never says that appetite deals with things presently at hand. But restricting the function of estimation etc. to appropriate responsiveness to objects (rather than to prior judgments of their value) restricts them to what is presently at hand. It just goes without saying, which is why Avicenna goes without saying it. There is a dog searching for a bone problem here but that's a problem everywhere (is it a pleasure of the imagination? of the particular object, the bone? and so on).

~~At the bottom of p.15: the pleasure of remembering some past pleasure is not the same as the present experience of that pleasure ... so you say: Why not? This is actually quite a difficult problem. Here you offer more exposition when analysis is called for.~~

~~Bottom of p.16 you implicitly distinguish appreciation from consumption. I would have said: "appreciation" is said in many ways.~~

~~Middle of p.19: Why would it be worthwhile to distinguish dominance over internal vs. external objects?~~

~~Top of p.20: Nussbaum's argument is for the necessity of the cognitive component of an emotion. But it isn't uncontroversial. There are lots of philosophers who are pure "feelings-theorists" about emotions etc.~~

[Quoted text hidden]

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