Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Concepts and Challenges

Shusen Wang


Settings

Settings

- 1. Fully cooperative.
- 2. Fully competitive.
- 3. Mixed Cooperative & competitive.
- 4. Self-interested.

Fully Cooperative Setting

Agents collaborate to optimize a common return.




Fully Cooperative Setting

Agents collaborate to optimize a common return.



Fully Competitive Setting

One agent's gain is the other agent's loss.



Fully Competitive Setting

One agent's gain is the other agent's loss.



Mixed Cooperative & Competitive

There are both cooperative setting and competitive setting.



Mixed Cooperative & Competitive

There are both cooperative setting and competitive setting.




Self-Interested Setting

Agents are self-interested. Their rewards may or may not conflict.



Self-Interested Setting

Agents are self-interested. Their rewards may or may not conflict.



Terminologies

State, Action, State Transition

- There are n agents.
- Let S be the state.
- Let A^i be the i-th agent's action.
- State transition:

$$p(s'|s,a^1,\cdots,a^n) = \mathbb{P}(S'=s'|S=s,A^1=a^1,\cdots,A^n=a^n).$$

• The next state, S', depends on all the agents' actions.

Rewards

- Let R^i be the reward received by the i-th agent.
- Fully cooperative: $R^1 = R^2 = \cdots = R^n$.
- Fully competitive: $R^1 \propto -R^2$.
- R^i depends on A^i as well as all the other agents' actions $\{A^j\}_{j\neq i}$.

Returns

- Let R_t^i be the **reward** received by the *i*-th agent at time *t*.
- **Return** (of the *i*-th agent):

$$U_t^i = R_t^i + R_{t+1}^i + R_{t+2}^i + R_{t+3}^i + \cdots$$

• **Discounted return** (of the *i*-th agent):

$$U_t^i = R_t^i + \gamma \cdot R_{t+1}^i + \gamma^2 \cdot R_{t+2}^i + \gamma^3 \cdot R_{t+3}^i + \cdots$$

Here, $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ is the discount rate.

Policy Network

- Each agent has its own policy network: $\pi(a^i \mid s; \theta^i)$.
- Policy networks can be exchangeable: $\theta^1 = \theta^2 = \cdots = \theta^n$.
 - Self-driving cars can have the same policy.
- Policy networks can be nonexchangeable: $\theta^i \neq \theta^j$.
 - Soccer players have different roles, e.g., striker, defender, goalkeeper.

Uncertainty in the Return

- The reward R_t^i depends on S_t and $A_t^1, A_t^2, \dots, A_t^n$.
- Uncertainty in S_t is from the state transition, p.
- Uncertainty in A_t^i is from the policy network, $\pi(\cdot \mid s_t; \theta^i)$.
- The return, $U_t^i = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \cdot R_{t+k}^i$, depends on:
 - all the future states: $\{S_t, S_{t+1}, S_{t+2}, \cdots\}$;
 - all the future actions: $\{A_t^i, A_{t+1}^i, A_{t+2}^i, \cdots\}$, for all $i = 1, \cdots, n$.

State-Value Function

• State-value of the *i*-th agent:

$$V^i(s_t; \mathbf{\Theta}^1, \cdots, \mathbf{\Theta}^n) = \mathbb{E}[U_t^i \mid S_t = s_t].$$

- The expectation is taken w.r.t. all the future actions and states except S_t .
- Randomness in actions: $A_t^j \sim \pi(\cdot \mid s_t; \mathbf{\theta}^j)$, for all $j=1,\cdots,n$. (That is why the state-value V^i depends on $\mathbf{\theta}^1,\cdots,\mathbf{\theta}^n$.)

State-Value Function

- One agent's state-value, $V^i(s; \theta^1, \dots, \theta^n)$, depends on all the agents' policies.
- If any agent changes its policy, then all of V^1, \dots, V^n can change.
- Example: soccer game.
 - A striker improves his policy, while everyone else's policies are fixed.
 - His teammates' state-values all increase.
 - The opposing players' state-values all decrease.

Convergence

Single-Agent Policy Learning

- Policy network: $\pi(a \mid s; \theta)$.
- State-value function: $V(s; \theta)$.
- $J(\mathbf{\theta}) = \mathbb{E}_{S}[V(S; \mathbf{\theta})]$ evaluates how good the policy is.
- Learn the policy network's parameter, θ , by

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}).$$


• Convergence: $J(\theta)$ stops increasing.

Multi-Agent Policy Learning

Nash Equilibrium

- While all the other agents' policy remain the same, the i-th agent cannot get better expected return by changing its own policy.
- Every agent is playing a best-response to the other agents' policies.
- Nash equilibrium indicates convergence because no one has any incentive to deviate.

Difficulty of MARL



- The *i*-th agent's policy network: $\pi(a^i \mid s; \theta^i)$.
- The *i*-th agent's state-value function: $V^i(s; \theta^1, \dots, \theta^n)$.
- Objective function: $J^i(\mathbf{\theta}^1, \dots, \mathbf{\theta}^n) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{S}}[V^i(\mathcal{S}; \mathbf{\theta}^1, \dots, \mathbf{\theta}^n)].$
- ullet Learn the policy network's parameter, $oldsymbol{ heta}^i$, by

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^i} J^i(\boldsymbol{\theta}^1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\theta}^n).$$

• The $\mathbf{1}^{st}$ agent solves: $\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta^1}} J^1(\boldsymbol{\theta^1}, \boldsymbol{\theta^2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\theta^n})$.
• The $\mathbf{2}^{nd}$ agent solves: $\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta^2}} J^2(\boldsymbol{\theta^1}, \boldsymbol{\theta^2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\theta^n})$.

: $\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta^2}} J^n(\boldsymbol{\theta^1}, \boldsymbol{\theta^2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\theta^n})$.

It may not converge...

What is wrong?

- The *i*-th agent found $\theta^i_{\star} = \underset{\theta^i}{\operatorname{argmax}} J^i(\theta^1, \dots, \theta^n)$.
- Now, another agent changes its policy.
- So Θ^i_{\star} is no longer the best policy of the *i*-th agent. The *i*-th agent has to find a new Θ^i .
- The other agents' objective functions will change, and therefore they will change their policies...

Summary

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL)

- There are n > 1 agents in the system.
- The agents are usually not independent.
 - Every agent's action can affect the next state.
 - Thus, every agent can affect all the other agents.
- Unless the agents are independent of each other, single-agent RL methods do not work well for MARL.

Settings of MARL

- 1. Fully cooperative, e.g., industrial robots.
- 2. Fully competitive, e.g., predator and prey.
- 3. Mixed cooperative & competitive, e.g., robotic soccer.
- 4. Self-interested, e.g., automated trading systems.

Convergence

- Convergence: No agent can get better expected return by improving its own policy.
- If there is only one agent, convergence means the objective function does not increase any more.
- If there are multiple agents, Nash equilibrium means convergence.

Thank you!

- Consider single-agent setting.
- Stationary environment requires state transition be fixed throughout.
 - State transition: p(s'|s,a).
 - Given s and a, the probability distribution of the next state s' is always the same.
- All the single-agent RL methods we have learned so far require stationary environment.

- Consider multi-agent setting.
- Stationary environment requires state transition be fixed throughout.
 - State transition: $p(s'|s, a^1, \dots, a^n)$.
 - Given s and a^1, \dots, a^n , the probability distribution of the next state s' is always the same.

- Consider multi-agent setting.
- Stationary environment requires state transition be fixed throughout.
- The environment is typically stationary.
- However, from any single agent's perspective, the environment is non-stationary.
 - p depends not only on s and a^i , but also on the other agents' actions.
 - If the i-th agent knows only s and a^i , then from its perspective, the state transition is not fixed.

- Consider multi-agent setting.
- Stationary environment requires state transition be fixed throughout.
- The environment is typically stationary.
- However, from any single agent's perspective, the environment is non-stationary.
- Thus, the single-agent RL method we have learned are not applicable.