CHAPTER 5

PARTY UNITY AND DISSENT IN CONGRESSIONAL VOTES

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Legislative studies have paid considerable attention to the internal unity of political parties, particularly in regards to congressional votes. Whether parties behave as a cohesive team or as a collection of disparate individuals affects political representation, and influences the extent to which voters can rely on parties to further their policy programs (Hagopian et al. 2009, Tavits 2009). Party unity also impacts the working of legislatures and the relations between presidents and congress (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997, Navia 2008). Legislative parties can behave in coherent manner, manage key congressional offices efficiently, and coordinate to further their policy goals, or they can fall prey of factionalism and internal disagreement. The extent to which presidents can rely on their parties to support executive bills and the incentives to form coalitions may both be affected by the degree of party unity in congress. The political science literature has examined the factors influencing whether parties behave in a unified manner. Comparative studies have highlighted the importance of electoral rules, and the methods parties use to nominate candidates. In general unity is lower when electoral rules promote intra-party competition than when they establish closed party lists (Ames 1995, Carey and Shugart 1995, Carey 2007), and higher in parties where the leadership controls the nomination of candidates than in parties where they do not (Coppedge 1994, Crisp et al. 2004). Disagreement persist with regards to the impact that a presidential constitution and being part of the government have on party unity.[1]

This chapter focuses on the unity of political parties in Chile. It continues the analysis of congressional votes initiated in the prior chapter, which focused on the alignment of parties and the dimensionality of the policy space. So far, I have showed that legislators' positions can be well represented in one dimension that captures ideological and coalition differences consistent with the realignment perspective presented in earlier chapters. Legislators are positioned together with their fellow party members, parties are grouped next to their coalition partners, and the two

coalitions are clearly apart from each other. In this chapter I extend the examination of congressional votes to address the unity of the different parties. The goal is two-fold. The first is to understand and measure individual defections from parties. I argue that a party' ideological stance and legislators' career concerns influence the propensity to defect from one's party. I expect defection to be more likely among legislators from centrist parties and less likely among first-time members and the electorally insecure. The second is to scrutinize the connection between party dissent and renomination. To this end, I examine the extent to which party defections affect the probability that legislators will be nominated by their party in the next election.

LEGISLATIVE VOTES AND PARTY UNITY

Chilean legislators have to cast votes on a multiplicity of policy issues. Congressional votes offer a platform for position-taking. They also allow party leaders, constituents, and interest groups to monitor legislators' behavior.

Major newspapers frequently report on congressional matters, including how legislators vote on important proposals. For example, on April 17th 2002, members of the Chamber of Deputies met to vote on a conference committee proposal that sought to abolish the death penalty. The landmark legislation, which ended this practice after 112 years, passed with the support of 68 deputies out of 120. The day before 27 senators out of 48 had also voted to support this proposal. Information about the bill and how members of congress casted their vote were published in the country's main newspapers. In the days before and after the vote, numerous legislators appeared in the news explaining their vote. Most members of the government coalition supported the bill, while most members of the opposition abstained or voted against it. Still both coalitions had some members who voted with the competing group. Given the topic at hand, parties had decided not to

"enforce" discipline (i.e., threaten to punish dissidents), but this did not detract legislators from seeking to publicly explain their actions.

In many instances legislators take a proactive stance to publicize their work in congress, including how they vote. Other times it is rival legislators who call attention to someone's vote, seeking to underline inconsistencies or positions that run contrary to relevant constituencies. There are many examples. For instance, during a televised session in November 2000, Deputy Carlos Vilches took to the floor of the chamber to call attention to a bill setting wages for public employees, which had had been voted the prior day. He then addressed the constituents of the Third Region and reminded them how deputies from the rival *Concertación* had backtracked on a presumed agreement with local public employees to reject the bill sent by the Lagos government.[2] Allies may also publicly chastise legislators for their votes. In August of 2013, after Deputy Fernando Meza, from the PRSD, voted to support a bill sent by the Piñera government seeking to increase penalties for violent protesters, Marco Antonio Núñez, the leader of the PPD and his ally in the *Concertación* coalition, publicly scorned his action and demanded that he explain his vote to his constituents and to the members of his legislative bloc.[3]

The way members of congress vote is shaped not only by their own ideological preferences but also by the preferences of their party and their constituents. Chilean legislators tend to vote with their party. One important cause of party unity is individual preferences: legislators from the same party tend to hold similar views on the policy issues they confront on the chamber. Those seeking a career in politics most often join parties that advocate polices and promote interests similar to their own. As a result, self-selection tends to sort individuals into parties according to their political views. Party leaders, activists, and committed party voters are also likely to

contribute over time to the cohesion of party delegations by their ability to punish politicians consistently advancing positions incongruent with mainstream partisan stances.

Legislators are also bound to others from the same party by their common quest for office. In Chile party labels are recognizable and convey relevant information to voters about where legislators are likely to be positioned. Individual members care about the reputation of the party and can benefit electorally from team-like behavior.

Another important reason for the level of unity exhibited in voting behavior is party discipline. Party leaders can impose discipline because generally they have the power to facilitate or hinder a legislator's career and policy goals. Chilean legislators are professional politicians who want to advance their political career. Around 88% of members of the Chamber of Deputies run again for congress at the end of their term (some for reelection and others for a Senate seat). In the two main coalitions, the decision over which two candidates will be placed on the ballot tends to be in the hands of party leaders.

Legislators who want to return to congress first need to obtain their party nomination, and then they need their national party leaders to successfully negotiate with other coalition members to secure a place in the two-member list for the given district. For a candidate that has alienated the party leadership, this tends to be an insurmountable hurdle. Moreover, under the binomial electoral system competition within lists has been crucial (since only one of the two candidates is likely to be elected),[4] which means that incumbents also want to prevent their own coalitions from nominating a list partner that could beat them. Incumbents with name recognition may choose to run as independents in their districts, but getting elected on an independent list is very difficult.[5] Thus, incumbents seeking re-nomination to congress have incentives to avoid antagonizing the party leadership.

There are, however, some noteworthy differences in regards to candidate nomination across the main Chilean parties. Inside the *Concertación,* the DC and the PS experimented with different selection mechanisms[6] that gave local organizations and militants some voice, but in the end elites exercised veto power over nominations. Elite control was more obvious inside the PPD, which gave the party's National Board ultimate power over the selection of its candidates. Inside the *Alianza*¸ both parties gave national leaders important formal authority over nominations. However, the leadership played a different role in each party. The UDI, which has a rigid, hierarchical, and well-institutionalized organizational structure (Correa Sutil 2005, Huneeus 2001), developed a very centralized candidate selection process that gave the party leadership a preponderant role in selecting nominees. But inside RN, the national leadership was much more respectful of the decisions of the local actors and incumbents (Navia 2008). Unlike UDI, RN is a party comprised primarily of local leaders with a weaker organizational structure and lower ideological coherence. It is considered to have a lower level of institutionalization vis-à-vis the other main Chilean parties (Barozaet and Aubry 2005). According to Navia (2008, p.111), RN's party structure primarily protects local leaders and "does not require them to obey the decisions and agreements reached by the national leadership."

Aside from the incentives stemming from renomination, legislators are also concerned about influencing policy, including the fate of their bills and amendments as well as the allocation of state resources to their district. To this end, party leaders are crucial. They have power over committee assignments, can fast-track uncontroversial proposals, decide over the scheduling of legislation, and facilitate opportunities for position-taking. Bills introduced by members of congress have a low probability of becoming law, as the following chapters will show, and a party leader can be an influential advocate or a significant stumbling block.

Occasionally party leaders decide to give their members "freedom" to act as they see fit, as in the case of the vote that ended of the death penalty, which I mentioned earlier. This is more likely to happen on matters of conscience. Other times the leadership sends the opposite message: members must vote with the party or face consequences.[7] For example, in July 2014, before the Chamber of Deputies voted on one proposal to change the binomial electoral system, Deputy José Auth, a member of the PPD leadership, announced that those legislators who wanted to remain in the party had to vote in favor of the proposal.[8]

Although Chilean legislators support the notion that from time to time party leaders should be able to enforce discipline, they overwhelmingly reject the idea that discipline should be demanded when voting on matters of conscience, moral, and religious issues (González Tule 2010). Likewise, most Chilean legislators reject the notion that a member should be subject to expulsion for his voting record (González Tule 2010). Expulsions are rare, but they occur from time to time. For instance, in December 2007 Senator Adolfo Zaldívar was expelled from the DC (after four decades as a member) partly as a result of his vote against a government bill funding Santiago's transport system.[9] Sometimes parties are less drastic with their punishment. For example, in December 2011 Deputy Jorge Sabag was moved out of the chamber's Family Committee by the DC leadership for his vote in favor of a government bill adjusting the salaries of public employees, which the center-left coalition to which he belongs had opposed.[10]

Legislative actors seeking to bring resources to their districts must negotiate with the government. The executive can use its power over budgetary resources and spending proposals to rally the support of potential dissidents. For example, on August 2008 during a vote on a transport bill considered crucial by the *Concertación* government, Deputy Gabriel Ascencio (from the DC) who had announced his opposition to the bill at the beginning of the session changed his position

and voted in favor it. He explained that he had come around to supporting the bill after the government offered him a substantial monetary subsidy to fund maritime projects in his district, Chiloé.[11] Of course, the executive can also use this power to convince legislators from the opposition to vote with the government. This happened, for instance, during the vote on the Education Budget, which took place in November 2011. Then Deputy René Alinco (formerly from the leftist PPD) and two independents gave the Piñera government the majority required to pass the bill. Afterwards, Deputy Alinco admitted that his support had come as the result of a government offer to increase the number and monetary value of student grants to his district.[12]

Perhaps the most important cause of internal party dissent is legislators' responsiveness to their electoral constituencies. In parliamentary surveys, Chilean legislators usually convey their willingness to put regional interests above partisan interests. They overwhelmingly state that they represent district voters rather than all voters or the party, give considerable importance to bringing resources into the district, and express a commitment to district voters in conflictive cases.[13]

Electoral incentives help to explain this connection to district constituencies. Chile's electoral rules, open list with district magnitude 2, require voters to pick an individual candidate instead of a party. Thus, candidates compete with their list partners. Electoral rules encourage candidate-identification rather than party-identification, and campaigns are financed and led by candidates seeking to establish their individual identity (Angell 2003). The comparative literature has underlined how rules that allow for intra-party competition tend to strengthen the influence of legislators' electoral constituencies relative to party leaders (Carey 2009). This is particularly true when congress is composed of career minded legislators. The reelection rate in Chile is comparatively high: two out of three incumbents usually win re-election (Alemán 2013). Incumbent legislators tend to have high name recognition and many are able to build a personal

vote base. Comparative analyses have associated a "personal vote" with lower levels of party unity in roll-call votes (Carey 2009, Depaw and Martin 2009, Tavits 2009).

Lastly, the ideological position of legislators is also likely to be associated with rates of dissent. Most often there is no conflict between legislators' preferences (personal or induced by their constituents) and the party's position. But on occasions they diverge. In those instances legislators have to consider whether to decide their vote purely on policy terms (closeness between alternatives) or to also take into account the party's position. Defecting from the party can be costly, but on occasions there may be incentives to show constituents that they can stand their ground on principle.

The dilemma between voting with the party and defecting on ideological grounds is more likely to be confronted by moderate legislators. Analyses of voting behavior in the US Congress and state legislatures show that moderate members are less likely to support their own party (Minozzi and Volden 2013, Kirkland 2014). Consider Figure 1, which presents three examples regarding a vote to change the status quo (*sq*) with a new bill (*b*). The positions of the relevant actors are shown along one dimension (e.g., left-to-right). Legislators are assumed to prefer policies more the closer they are to their own ideal point. In the three examples the status quo is located to the right of the political spectrum and the proposed bill intends to move it towards the left. The ideal point of the median member of the government coalition (C), which has a majority, appears to the left of this axis, while the ideal point of the median member of the opposition appears to the right (A) of it. In the first example the majority coalition makes a proposal seeking to win just enough votes to pass the bill, in the second example the majority coalition seeks out the support of some moderate members of the opposition, and in the third example the majority makes a consensual proposal.

In the first example the bill proposed bill is located at the position of the coalition median. While a majority of *Concertación* members prefer *b* over *sq*, some moderate members of the *Concertación* coalition may prefer *sq* over *b*. In this first example, a moderate member of the majority coalition, denoted **mC,** appears closer to *sq* than to *b*. Such a member has to decide whether to vote against the bill on ideological grounds or to submit to the choice of most members of the coalition and vote yes. In the second example, the *sq* is located further to the right, and the majority coalition makes a proposal that moves policy closer to the center-left, where their moderate members stand. Such proposal wins the support of all the members of the majority coalition, and is also preferred to the status quo by moderate members of the opposition. So, in this case the government makes a proposal that entices some members of the opposition, such as the one denoted **mA**, to vote yes. Such legislators must decide whether to join most members of their coalition in voting no, or to defect and vote for their preferred alternative. In the third example, both coalitions support a centrist bill over the *sq*, which is located in the extreme right. While most *Alianza* members prefer the bill, some furthest to the right do not. For instance, the Alianza member denoted **eA** prefers to reject the proposed bill but voting no would mean defecting from the coalition. Thus, such changes create incentives for extreme members of the opposition to defect from their coalition.

The first two examples illustrate the common scenarios in non-unanimous instances: votes that split both coalitions and cross-pressure moderate legislators. The third scenario is less likely but not farfetched. Given the composition of the Chilean Senate and the super-majority requirements to pass several important proposals, governments often sought out consensus with the opposition despite having a slim majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Over time, the scenario

illustrated in the third example could also frustrate legislators (and their constituents) positioned further to the extreme, particularly those in the opposition (e.g., **eA** in the third example).

Figure 1

Party Pressure and Party Dissent

Example 1. Minimal-Size Coalition



Example 2. Narrow Consensus



Example 3. Broad Consensus



The unity that coalitions exhibit in congressional votes may also be influenced by the types of votes that actually take place on the floor of the chamber. Allocation of power over the parliamentary agenda, described further into this book, can reduce the likelihood of certain votes. In Chile, the majority leadership controls the offices that decide which bills make it to the floor of the chamber. Such power allows it to prevent votes on bills that could divide the majority coalition, especially those that would pass. The president, however, may circumvent the gatekeeping power of majority leaders via urgency motions. But if the majority coalition is in government, then divisive votes should be significantly less likely. This is congruent with Cox and McCubbins' (2005) cartel thesis, which emphasizes how electorally motivated members of the majority party

act as a cartel, monopolizing access to the agenda and preventing bills that would roll the majority. In Chile, bills that make parties in the majority coalition worse off have a slim probability of ever being scheduled for a vote (Alemán 2006). This promotes the unity of the majority coalition. It may, however, test the unity of the opposition.

To sum up, congressional votes offer legislators an opportunity to signal constituents and other politicians their stance on particular issues. When congressional votes are systematically recorded, they facilitate the monitoring of legislative behavior. This is the case in Chile. Members of Chilean Congress are likely to vote with their party, not only because they tend to share similar ideological stances but also because the party leadership can impose discipline. Legislative leaders have tools to affect the policy objectives of incumbents. The national party leadership also has great influence over nominations, although this is less evident inside RN. The linkage with constituents, rooted in the electoral connection, is also relevant and a common motivation for individual defection. Governments may also use their resources to try to maintain a united coalition or to coopt opposition members.

Which members are more likely to defect from their party? I expect members from moderate parties to have greater incentives to defect from the party line and vote against their coalitions. As explained before, they are more likely to be cross-pressured than legislators from parties positioned further to the extreme. In addition, first time legislators, who have yet to build a strong linkage with constituents and depend more on their party for their political careers, should have fewer incentives to defect than more senior members and those who have performed better electorally. Similarly, those members that have had a better electoral performance should be less pressured to follow the party line. Overall, I expect that executive influence should make members

of the opposition more likely to dissent from the coalition position than members of the government coalition.

In the next section of this chapter I examine the congressional votes of individual legislators to test this predictions. In addition, I analyze whether defections from the party and coalition affect the chances of being renominated. Given the grip that parties have over the career of individual deputies, I expect defections to be negatively correlated with the chances of being renominated. The only likely exception should be for members of RN. As Navia (2008, p. 114) has conjectured, their defection is "not likely to be penalized by its decentralized party leadership."

PARTY UNITY, INDIVIDUAL DEFECTIONS, AND THE PROBABILITY OF BEING RENOMINATED

To investigate the unity of parties and coalitions, I focus on legislators' voting records and analyze defection rates. The data includes all non-unanimous votes taken in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies between March of 1994 and March of 2010. This includes four different legislative periods. The two different dependent variables used indicate the proportion of votes a legislator casted against a majority of members of the same party – *party dissent score* – and coalition – *coalition dissent score*. The first measure excludes independent legislators, and those that belong to the Radical Party, given the latter's small legislative membership. The second measure includes all legislators.

The independent variables include categorical variables indicating the party of the legislator. The left out variable is the one indicating that a legislator belongs to the Christian Democratic Party. Given the ideological distribution of parties, which was addressed in more detail in the prior chapter, the moderate parties are National Renewal (RN, a member of the opposition in the period analyzed) and the Christian Democratic Party (DC, a member of the government

coalition). As noted in the prior section, I expect legislators in these two parties to be more likely to face incentives to defect from the party and coalition stance than legislators from parties positioned further towards the ideological extremes (UDI in the opposition coalition, and PS and PPD in the government coalition).

In addition, the model includes a categorical variable indicating whether the legislator was in his first time in office. Such members are expected to exhibit lower levels of defection. Two other variables capture the electoral vulnerability of members. One is a continuous variable that measure the intra-list vote margin. As note before, in the two-member districts (*binominal*) competition tends to be centered within coalitions (Angell 2003). Thus, members that have a greater margin over their list partners are supposed to be more electorally secure. The other is a categorical variable that indicates whether the legislator is a member of the winning list. Lastly, the model controls for the legislative period.

The results appear in Table 1. The first two models utilize the party dissent score as the dependent variable, while the other three utilize the coalition dissent score as the dependent variable. Stars next to the coefficients indicate statistical significance (*** > .01; ** > .05; * >.10), and the number of observations appear at the bottom of the table.

The results of the first two models show that legislators from the RN are the most likely to dissent from their part position, with a predicted party dissent score of 7.4%. They are followed by DC legislators (the comparison category), with a predicted party dissent score of 6.3%.[14] Those on the left (PS and PPD) and the right (UDI) are significantly less likely to dissent than their more moderate coalition partners. The results of the models focused on coalition dissent (M3 and M4) show similar results. Inside the *Concertación* coalition, the most likely to dissent were members

of the DC, with a coalition dissent score of 8.2%. The score for members of the small Radical party, the other moderate member of the coalition, was not statistically different from those of DC members. Inside the *Alianza* coalition, those most likely to dissent were members of RN, with a coalition dissent score of 12%, and those elected as independents, with a coalition dissent score of 12.1%. Overall, members of the *Alianza* (the opposition coalition) were more likely to dissent from their coalition than members of the *Concertación* (the government coalition).

Table 1

Legislators' Dissent in Congressional Votes, 1994-2010

		party dissent		*coalition dissent*		
		M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Party	PS	-2.97 ***	-2.98 ***	-1.16 *	-1.11 *	
	PPD	-1.91 ***	-1.82 ***	-1.76 ***	-1.57 ***	
	PR			-1.40	-1.19	
	RN	0.80 *	1.11 **	3.29 ***	3.82 ***	
	UDI	-2.57 ***	-2.06 ***	-2.78 ***	-1.85 ***	
	independents (A)			3.04 **	3.98 ***	
	Government coalition					-2.21 ***
	First-time members		-0.61 *		-0.67 *	-0.78 *
	List winner		0.64 *		1.07 **	1.68 ***
	Intra-list margin		-0.01		-0.02 *	-0.04 **
Period	1998 to 2002	-1.64 ***	-1.72 ***	-2.96 ***	-3.05 ***	-3.29 ***
	2002 to 2006	-1.91 ***	-1.97 ***	-1.78 ***	-1.85 ***	-2.77 ***
	2006 to 2010	-1.18 ***	-1.24 ***	-1.94 ***	-2.04 ***	-3.00 ***
	constant	7.67 ***	7.46 ***	10.23 ***	9.81 ***	11.45 ***
	observations	*453*	*448*	*484*	*479*	*479*
	adjusted R^2	*22.83*	*23.27*	*29.20*	*29.97*	*12.76*

The results also show that first time legislators are significantly less likely to dissent from their party or coalition than legislators who have been in congress for a longer period of time,

although the difference is small (slightly over 0.6%). Members elected from a winning list are slightly more likely to dissent that those elected in a list that came second, as expected. Although the results suggests that a greater intra-coalition margin when elected to congress reduces incentives to dissent, the coefficient is almost zero, resulting in negligible differences.

To sum up, the results show that members from moderate parties tend to be more likely to dissent from their party and also from their coalition. Overall, dissent is more common among members of the opposition than among members of the government coalition. Both results fit with the expectations outlined earlier in the chapter. Members of the winning electoral list are slightly more likely to dissent, while those in congress for the first time are slightly less likely to dissent. These findings are also in line with prior expectations. However, the finding that intra-coalition margin is not positively associated with dissent is not.

Next, I examine whether legislators' dissent on congressional votes has an effect on the probability of being renominated. Given the importance of parties in the nomination process and their ability to punish rebellious legislators, dissent scores should impact the probability of running again under the party and coalition labels. The only likely exception should be for legislators from RN, who face a weaker and more decentralized organizational structure and a leadership less concerned with ideological cohesiveness.

While most deputies are renominated by their party, close to 12% are not. To evaluate the importance of roll-call vote behavior on renomination, I run a series of logistic regression. For the first set, the dependent variable equals 1 if the party did not renominate the legislator. The key independent variable is the legislator's party dissent score. In addition, the regressions include a categorical variable indicating whether the legislator has served three or more terms in office, and

a continuous variable measuring the intra-coalition share of the vote when the legislator was last elected. While legislators with a greater margin of victory are expected to be more secured, those who already served three or more terms are more likely to face pressure to give up their seat. Results appear in table 2.

The first two models present results for the entire sample of legislators. They show that a higher dissent score reduces the chances of being renominated by their party. In addition, they show that legislators that served three or more terms are less likely to be renominated, and that a greater intra-coalition vote margin increases the chances of being renominated. There are, however, important differences within parties. These are reflected in the subsequent four models.

Table 2

Party Dissent and Party Renomination, 1994-2010

				Left	*DC*	*RN*	*UDI*
		M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
	Party dissent	0.14 ***	0.14 ***	0.40 ***	0.16 ***	-0.06	0.33 **
	Senior members	1.05 ***	0.97 **	1.04	0.68	2.01 **	1.56 *
	Intra-list margin	-0.03 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.04 **	-0.01	-0.08 *	-0.11 **
Period	1998 to 2002		-0.35				
	2002 to 2006		-0.09				
	2006 to 2010		0.12				
	constant	-2.68 ***	-2.57 ***	-3.91 ***	-2.50 ***	-1.83	-2.67 ***
	observations	*444*	*444*	*126*	*119*	*95*	*104*
	Log likelihood	*-146.2*	*-145.6*	*-31.8*	*-55.5*	*-20.5*	*-25.0*
	AIC	*300.4*	*305.3*	*71.6*	*118.9*	*49.0*	*57.9*

The variable measuring the party dissent score is statistically significant in the case of the UDI, DC, and the left parties (PS and PPD). Figure 2 shows the probability of not being

renominated by the respective parties given various levels of dissent. For example, for legislators from the leftist parties a low dissent score of 2 is associated with a 3.6% probability of not being renominated, while a high dissent score of 7 is associated with a probability of 19.4%. For legislators from the UDI, similar dissent scores are in turn associated with probabilities equal to 4.5% and 17.2%. In the case of DC legislators, which tend to have higher dissent scores than those of the prior parties, the probabilities are 10.1% for a dissent score equal to 2, then 17.7% for a dissent score equal to 7, and 25.8% for a dissent score equal to 10. For RN legislators, however, the party dissent score does not affect the probability of being renominated by the party. The coefficient is close to zero, negative, and lacks statistical significance. Interestingly, legislators from RN are the ones exhibiting the highest levels of party dissent.

Figure 2

Party Dissent and Renomination by Party



Other differences are also evident between parties. The probability of not renominating senior legislators is high and statistically significant in the case of UDI and RN legislators, but not for DC legislators or for those from the PS and PPD. With regards to the variable capturing the intra-list margin at election time, it is statistically insignificant in the case of DC legislators and comparatively low (but significant) for PS and PPD legislators. The coefficient is statistically significant for both UDI and RN legislators. It is comparatively high in the case of UDI legislators, indicating that a higher margin increases the chances of being renominated.

The second set of regressions focuses on coalitions. The dependent variable equals 1 if the coalition did not renominate the legislator. Legislator's coalition dissent score is the key independent variable. As before, the regressions also include a categorical variable indicating whether the legislators served three or more terms in office, and a continuous variable indicating the legislator's intra-coalition electoral margin. The first two models include data on all legislators, while the other two use a reduced sample including only legislators from the same coalition. Results appear on table 3.

In the first two models, which use the full sample of legislators, the three main independent variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction (and again, the period dummies are not statistically significant). Coalition dissent makes legislators more likely to be excluded from the coalition list, senior legislators are more likely to be left out, and a greater intra-list margin when elected to congress reduces the chances of not being renominated. The results, however, are different when we look inside each coalition.

The effect of seniority and intra-list margin are robust whether we focus on all legislators or run the models separately for each coalition. Yet, the effect of coalition dissent differs for

Conertación and *Alianza* deputies. Defecting from one's coalition has a significant effect for members of the former coalition and no statistically significant effect for members of the latter coalition. The results are the same if we consider RN and UDI legislators separately. This means that for UDI legislators party dissent is a handicapped when seeking renomination, but coalition dissent is tolerated. This speaks to the greater disunity of the *Alianza* coalition. The impact of coalition dissent on the probability that a *Concertación* deputy will not be renominated appears in Figure 4.

Table 3

Coalition Dissent and Coalition Renomination, 1994-2010

				Concertación	*Alianza*
		M1	M2	M3	M4
	Coalition dissent	0.08 ***	0.08 **	0.17 ***	0.02
	Senior members	1.14 ***	1.12 ***	1.15 **	1.62 ***
	Intra-list margin	-0.03 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.02 **	-0.09 ***
Period	1998 to 2002		-0.24		
	2002 to 2006		-0.30		
	2006 to 2010		0.13		
	constant	-2.56 ***	-2.46 ***	-3.18 ***	-1.96 ***
	observations	*475*	*475*	*265*	*210*
	Log likelihood	*-154.7*	*-154.0*	*-98.5*	*-48.07*
	AIC	*317.4*	*322.0*	*204.9*	*104.1*

As the figure shows, coalition dissent makes it more likely that the *Concertación* will not renominate a legislator. For example, when coalition dissent equals 7.7 (average for a deputy from this coalition) the chances of not being renominated equals 12.9%. But when coalition dissent equals 12.3 (the 90th percentile) the probability of not being renominated climbs to 23.8%.

To sum up, Chilean deputies tend to be renominated when their term comes to an end, but not all of them. Dissenting from the party line in congressional votes has a significant effect on the probability that a legislator will be renominated. Higher dissent reduces the chances of returning to congress. This result is clear when we look at the entire sample of legislators. It is also significant for individual parties, with the exception of RN. In the case of legislators from RN, dissenting from the party in congressional votes has no effect on their chances of being renominated. This is consistent with anecdotal accounts that see the party as less institutionalized than others, with a decentralized organizational structure unwilling or unable to impose sanctions.

Figure 4

Coalition Dissent and Renomination of *Concertación* Legislators



CONCLUSION

This chapter continued the analysis of congressional votes initiated in the prior chapter. Together they show that legislators' voting preferences can be well represented in one dimension that aligns parties together with their fellow coalition partners; that inside each coalition parties are ordered according to their ideological stances; and that party unity is high overall but less common among moderate parties inside both coalitions. Results also note that legislators in winning lists are slightly less disciplined, while first time members are more likely to vote the party line.

The analysis also examined the effect of part unity on the probability of renomination. As expected, the results confirmed the expectation that individual behavior in congressional votes has an impact on the probability that parties will renominate a legislator. Exhibiting greater unit increases the probability of being renominated. When the analysis is conducted at the party level the expectations are confirmed, with the exception of candidacies put forward by RN. The results also show that in general a greater intra-coalition electoral margin tends to increase the probability of being renominated, and that senior members have a lower chance of being renominated, particularly in RN and UDI. When the key independent variable is coalition dissent not party dissent, results are similar for the *Concertacion* legislators but not for *Alianza* legislators. Among the latter, coalition unity appears not to be a key determinant of renomination. This finding corresponds well with the expectation of higher unity among government parties, as well as with prior accounts of coalition behavior that highlights the lower cohesion present inside the *Alianza* and the more troubled relationship among its parties (Toro 2007).

The next chapter shifts attention from congressional votes to the passage of legislation. It focuses on the institutions that influence congressional approval of presidential bills and the

influence of the partisan context. It continues the discussion of Chilean politics before and after the military dictatorship by addressing the passage of major bills, and expands on the workings of lawmaking in the contemporary period with an analysis of the president's legislative success.

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ENDNOTES

[1] While some argue that parties in government have greater incentives to behave in a unified manner than those in the opposition, others cast doubts on this relationship (Carey 2007, Sieberer 2006). Most works expect parties in presidential systems to behave in a more unified manner than parties in parliamentary systems.

[2] Chamber of Deputies, Diario de Sesiones, November 29, 2000.

[3] La Nación, Chile (lanacion.com), August 6, 2013.

[4] More than 90% of the districts were equally split between the Concertación and Alianza coalitions

[5] Fewer than 3% of all legislators have ran as independents.

[6] The DC with provincial committees, open and closed lists, and the PS with closed party primaries and selection by the party's Central Committee (Navia 2008).

[7] There is also an argument that notes how right-wing politicians are typically less committed to enforcing party discipline, partly a reflection of their history of discrediting political parties during the Pinochet administration, and their view that party discipline belongs to class-based parties and not parties that promote individual freedom and reject class warfare (Allamand 1999, Huneeus 2001, Allamand and Cubillos 2010). This argument, however, seems more pertinent to RN, and it is no clear whether it is representative of their members' views of party organization or more of a post-hoc justification.

[8] "Auth por cambio al binominal: Los que quieran seguir en el PPD, tienen que votar a favor," *La Tercera*, July 4, 2011.

[9] His public denunciation of the actions of the party leadership on this matter and other matters also contributed to his expulsion.

[10] La Tercera, December 16, 2011.

[11] "Minuto a Minuto: Duro altercado entre Dittborn y Ascencio marca debate en la Cámara," *La Tercera*, 8/13/2008.

[12] "Alinco reconoce que acordó beneficios para su región con el gobierno previo a votación del Presupuesto," *La Tercera*, 11/29/2011.

[13] However, Marenghi (2009) notes that despite what they say, Chilean legislators do not seem to translate these attitudes into district-oriented behavior; at least not in terms of the topics of the bills they initiate. Siavelis (2009) also remarks how legislators' apparent predilection for district over party does not fit well with most behavioral accounts.

[14] The predicted dissent score is based on result from Model 2.