The effects of malapportionment, turnout, and gerrymandering in Mexico's mixed-member system

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Background on Mexico

- Hegemonic party 1929-1997
- Three major parties:
 PRD PRI PAN and minors
 left right
- Lower chamber of Congress elected every 3 years, concurrent w presidential race every 6 years
- Mixed system: 300 SMD + 200 PR seats
- Single-term limits removed in 2018
- Autonomous regulator (IFE) organizes elections and redistricting

Questions

Did 1997 reform remove party bias in representation?

 Potential problem wherever districts are drawn to allocate seats (Tufte 1973, Johnston 2002)

If party bias remains, what factors drive it?

- Do parties use redistricting in their advantage?
- How do demographic shifts over time affect parties?
- Turnout differentials?

Answers

- Persistent bias against the right
- 2 Components of bias often cancel each other

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What is party bias

It is the excess/defect seat share that a party with half of the votes gets:

$$(s \mid v=.5) - .5$$

- Two-party system
- Constant-sum game
- Vote wasting: too-concentrated large party of too-dispersed small party suffer bias (Calvo&Rodden 2015)

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
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Obstacle 1: measure party bias

Fitting votes—seats curves: s = f(v) (Rae 1967, Tufte 1973, King&Browning 1987)

$$\frac{s}{1-s} = \lambda \left(\frac{v}{1-v}\right)^{\rho}$$



Three sources of party bias

			Raw votes		Vote shares		Seat	Seat shares		
Districts	Pop.	Turnout	left	right	total		left	right	left	right
Gerryman	dering									
1 and 2	420	.5	147	63	210		.7	.3	1	0
3, 4 and 5	420	.5	84	126	210		.4	.6	0	1
nationwide	2100	.5	546	504	1050		.52	.48	.4	.6
Turnout										
1 and 2	420	.70	200	100	300		.67	.33	1	0
3, 4 and 5	420	.35	50	100	150		.33	.67	0	1
nationwide	2100	.5	550	500	1050		.52	.48	.4	.6
Malappor	tionme	nt								
1 and 2	600	.5	200	100	300		.67	.33	1	0
3, 4 and 5	300	.5	50	100	150		.33	.67	0	1
nationwide	2100	.5	550	500	1050		.52	.48	.4	.6

Obstacle 2: measure the sources of party bias

Grofman, Koetzle & Brunell 1997:

Three additive components

raw party bias = gerrymandering (distributional)

+ malapportionment

+ turnout

- Fitting votes—seats curve with *v* yields **raw** party bias
- ② with \bar{v} yields the **gerrymandering**-based
- $oldsymbol{\emptyset}$ with $ar{w}$ yields gerrymandering + malapportionment
- \rightarrow Subtract (3) (2) = malapportionment-based
- \rightarrow Subtract (1) (3) = turnout-based

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
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Malapportionment is substantial


$$RRI = \frac{Q}{\text{district size}}$$

2006 map (drawn with 2000 census)



district relative representation index (RRI)

2015 map (drawn with 2010 census)



Obstacle 3: a multiparty system


King 1990:

$$E(s_p) = rac{\mathrm{e}^{\lambda_p} v_p^{
ho}}{\sum_{q=1}^P \mathrm{e}^{\lambda_q} v_q^{
ho}}$$

Bias is expressed relative to a baseline party (PRI in our case)


Obstacle 4: small-N

- Linzer 2012: approximates prob. distribution of national party vote returns from observed district outcomes (FMM)
- Use to simulate many elections w Monte Carlo draws




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
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Two components 2009



Results: raw party bias



	A	Actual ma	p	Hypothetical map			
party bias	pan-pri prd-pri min-pri		pan-pri prd-pri min-pri				
2003 election			(wi	th 2006 m	ap)		
raw	37 (0)	+.72 (0)	-1.01 (0)	41 (0)	+.57 (0)	-1.00 (0)	
gerrym.	09 (0)	+.69 (0)	88 (0)	13 (0)	+.62 (0)	90 (0)	
turnout	26 (0)	11 (0)	08 (0)	26 (0)	09 (0)	09 (0)	
malapp.	01 (.11)	+.14 (0)	05 (0)	02 (.12)	+.05 (0)	02 (0)	
2006 elec	tion						
raw	08 (0)	06 (0)	-1.10 (0)				
gerrym.	+.28	+.30	62 (0)				
turnout	36 (0)	41 (0)	43 (0)				
malapp.	00 (.42)	+.05 (0)	05 (0)				
2009 elec	tion						
raw	25 (0)	+.82 (0)	91 (0)				
gerrym.	11 (0)	$^{+1.01}_{(0)}$	79 (0)				
turnout	14 (0)	24 (0)	12 (0)				
malapp.	00 (.36)	+.05 (0)	00 (0)				
2012 elec	tion			(with 2015 map)			
raw	35 (0)	09 (0)	$^{+1.40}_{(0)}$	32 (0)	13 (0)	$^{+1.03}_{(0)}$	
gerrym.	28 (0)	07 (0)	+1.41 (0)	24 (0)	05 (.06)	+1.02 (0)	
turnout	07 (.02)	08 (0)	+.02	08 (.26)	09 (0)	+.01 (0)	
malapp.	+.01 (.42)	+.06 (0)	02 (0)	00 (.38)	+.01 (0)	+.00	

- Turnout always pro-PRI
- Malapp. always pro-left
- Redistricting abates malapp.
- Possibly cancelling effects

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Findings, next steps

- Rel. to the right, persistent pro-PRI, and esp. pro-left bias
- ② Though substantial malapportionent, effects are small
- Gerrymandering effects large and volatile
- Pro-PRI turnout-based bias
- O District lines can compensate for turnout disadvantage
- To-do: add PR-tier to analysis
- To-do: study inter-election volatility


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The redistricting process



The redistricting process

Redistricting by experts in 1997, 2006, 2015 (abandoned), and now 2018

- ① apportionment of 300 seats to 32 states
- ② optimization algorithm \rightarrow proposal
- parties propose amendments ("must" improve score)
- new map

$$\label{eq:score} \begin{aligned} \texttt{Score} &= .4 \times \texttt{PopBalance} + .3 \times \texttt{MunicBoundaries} \\ &+ .2 \times \texttt{TravelTime} + .1 \times \texttt{Compactness} \end{aligned}$$

IFE considers $\pm 15\%$ imbalance normal (!)


Optimization algorithm

Simulated annealing = probabilistic meta-heuristic for optimization locates a good approximation to the global optimum of the cost function in a large search space

Thousands of iterations using electoral secciones

Combinatorial optimization algorithm used to generate the first scenario in each state

Simulated Annealing



IFE claims that this is a public process, but the operation and procedures are done behind closed doors

Party amendments

