DWF (13) PRS

COMM -> OT EFI pair: non-trivial computational indistinguishability

Def

1. Efficient generation: QPT procedure Gen: Gen(1,0) -> Po, X Gen(1,1) +P1,X

2. Statistical Farness: TD(Po,x, Pi,x) > 1-2-x.

(Holen-Helstrom) 3. Computational Indistinguishability: Po = P1

( HOPT AH (OX), 3 reglisible ~ YX: | Pr[A(OX, Pox = 1] - Pr(A(Ox, Pox = 1] | < V(X).)

1. PKE =>EFI {pk, Enc(pk,0)} vs {pk, Enc(pk,1)} 2. Stat binding commitment => EFI

Comm (b) R VS Comm (1) A  $F(\xi_0, \xi_1) \leq 1-7D(\xi_0, \xi_1)^{\frac{1}{2}}$  is negl. (Fuchs-sum de Graaf) 3. PRS

Let G: {0,1} ^ → S(≥ ) be PRS Theorem secure against teopies. Then 262 if  $\begin{pmatrix} 2^{k} + t - 1 \\ t \end{pmatrix} >> 2^{k}$ E = E[alk) ot], rank & < 2.  $\mathcal{E}_{r} = \frac{\pi s_{r}^{2^{n}, t}}{T_{r}(\pi s_{sym})} \cdot \operatorname{vank} \mathcal{E}_{r} = T_{r}(\pi s_{ym}).$ => TD > 1- Fank &, Select  $n > \lambda + 1 : t = 1$ n>logz人: t=入十 EFI => commitment. [Chailloux, Kerenidis, Rossen'll] Purify Eb -> (Eb>op Proof O is commitment output. P is reveal purification (Ebbp ) O & Eb => common. hiding open & binding to S.f. + Chlomann

P = 1867

PEMPGONF -> BOPZOMA (contrived) 2FH PRU

PRS -> BQP 7PP EFI & friends \* Sangthing? [Lombardi - Ma-

Det PRU is a pseudorandon unitary if

(1.) Yk Junitary Uz on a gobits s.t. PRU(k, 170)=1/4/6)

(2) PRV is efficient.

(3) | Pr [A (1) =1] - Pr [A (1) =1] | = negl.

Wright '24)

Non-adaptive it is) only holds & QPT A w/ query clepth 1. [Claim OWF => naPRV. [Metgler-Povemba-Sinha-Yven 24]

Doen DWF => PRU?

(Clair) n-qubit PRU => n-qubit PRS.

PRSLK) = PRU(k, 10^) => + expies can be proposed w/ Prot t queries. Dpen PRS => naPRU? (Classically PRG => PRP) Theorem [Kretichner'21] = quantum oracle U, BQP = QMin, and JPRU relative to U Haar random:  $\mathcal{U} = [\mathcal{U}_{x} : x \in \{\circ, \mid\}^*)$ Ux & Myn(IKI) P is a PSPACE-complete language. (5) that BQP = QMAP) PRU (K, 140) = Wk (47.

Hybo: A  $u, P, V_k (1^{\lambda})$ .

[Hyb I: A  $u', P, V_k (1^{\lambda})$ .  $M'_{k'} = \{M_{k'}, k' \neq k \}$   $M'_{k'} = \{M_{k'}, k' \neq k \}$ Hyb 2: A  $u, P, U' (1^{\lambda})$  identical  $BQP^{MP} = QMM^{M,P}$ : GMA u, P  $\rightarrow QMA^{M',P}$ 

Fact Let f be an L-Lipschitz real function in the Frobenius worm. Then Ya>o, double ego!  $P_r \left[ f(U) \right] \neq \left[ f \right] + \Delta \left[ \frac{(d-2)\Delta^2}{24L^2} \right]$ Vaprol Fact A makes T queries to U=> P, [A"=1] i 27-Lip. (Cor: BQP algs cannot extract classical into from u, u, ) Fact max Pr[A"(10>)=1] is 27-Lipschitz. Proof Fix U.V. Let 147, 147 be resp. maximizers. Then, [max Pr[A'=1] - max Pr[A'=1] | = [P, [A" (147)=1] - P, [A"(147)=1]) = max { Pr[A"(147)=1] - Pr[A"(147)=1], P, [A'(19>)=1]-P, [A'(17>)=1]} max { Pr[A"(147)=1] - Pr[A"(147)=1], P, [A"(19>)=1] - P, [A"(14>)=1]} < 27110-U1F.

(Cov: GMA algs cannot extraot classical into from Myach) Pf sketch O. GMA N. P makes ET queries. 1. Tomography Ux for |x| < 100-log T & replace  $\mathcal{U}_{x}$  to  $\widetilde{\mathcal{U}}_{x}$ 2. Replace Ux for IXI7 100 log T W/ M2/x1. (non QMAP). 3. BQPP compute step 2. Q: Which PRS anstructions remain secure if DWFs do not exist? Hope: existing veripe might work even if function is not DW/PR? Prop [Kzi] Binary phase PRS are insecure against BQPNP. is efficient,  $I(k) \propto \sum_{k} f(k,x) / k > 0$ flk, x) E { ±1 } is negl. Claim 2: distinguishable. (4) HATOM

1+7 | Pk 7 | + 7 -> 107 | Pk 7 | + " 7 + | 17 | + " 7 | Pk )

Ang 107 (1027 (+1)+1+1 ) 14,7) =) measure gives collision of fr. 5) find k from collisions + NP. Interlude: What can BQP solve but not BPP if P = NP? [Def (2) Forrelation problem: (f, g): [0,13) > {+1], [Aar 09] is | <+n | 9 °H of |+17 | > 0.01? Theorem [flaz-Tal'18] Forrelation is hard for PH.

Our goal is to find crypto against BQP PH => BBBV

Theorem [Aaronson-Ingram-Kretschmer 22] ORO Forclotion hard Baplit 3k: [<+" | g = o H & o f + 1+" > [ > o.o1?

2-Forvelation state for (fk, gk) is ge . Honofe (+ ).

Theorem 2-Forrelation state for random oracles are 1-copy pseudorandom against BQP PH [Kretschner-Q-Today: w/advantage 7.99. Sinha-Tal'23)

Interpretation 2-Forrelation-hardness (2FH) is plausibly strictly nealer than DWFs & PINP. (see KOST23 for a formal treatment of 2FH.) Proof sketch Ho: f, g u.a.r. A f. 9 (9 c oHenofe (+">) H.: fr, g' are Fordated fk', gk', h oure u.a.v. for k' fk. f=f', g==g'eh Vk'. Af. 9 (9 0 H on of 1+ 1) = A f, y ( hogi oH mofi /+ 1+ >) Hz: f,g,h as above A f, 9 ( holt 7) Tomolation => g'of of (1+"> ~ (+">

H<sub>3</sub>: 
$$f'_{k}$$
,  $g'_{k}$  are now u.a. Y.   
(indist for BQP PH by AIK 22)

A f,g (h 0 1 + 7)

binary phase but A has o into on h.

Openfil. Does MPSYZ4 PRU survive P=NP/BQPPH-secure?

 $\Box$ 

2. How about mondom phase states w/ higger v.o.u.?

Borns: BQP FPP
Theorem [Huang-Kung-Preskill'20] [Classical Shedow)

Let Di, ..., On be obs. Then I classical PP algorithm

that on input T samples of random Clifford measurements of P.

estimate Tr(O:p)  $\forall i$  w.p. 7, 1-S w/add. emrs.if  $T = O(\frac{max}{9.2} \cdot log \frac{m}{8})$ .

Thon [F21] Multi-opy PRS = B Gep & PP.

Open: Single-copy PRS z) multi-copy?