




# Voting system

**NETWORKS INFO 2040 / CS 2850 / ECON 2040 / SOC 2090**



**Cornell Bowers C-IS**  
College of Computing  
and Information Science

- Reading Chapter 23 / Winter handout (Canvas)
- PS 9 out (due on Thur): answers typed, assign numbers
- Final Exam: Dec 12th afternoon
- Review session (Dec 6th / 8th)




# Voting





Voting





# Voting





# Voting







## Finding Your Upvotes on Reddit



# Voting





# Individual preferences


**A finite set of alternatives  $A, B, C, \dots$**



# Individual preferences

A finite set of alternatives  $X, Y, Z, \dots$

**Preference:**  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$  between any pair of alternatives  $X$  and  $Y$





# Individual preferences

**A finite set of alternatives**  $X, Y, Z, \dots$

**Preference:**  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$  **between any pair of alternatives**  $X$  and  $Y$

**Completeness** Either  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$ , but not both

**Transitivity** If  $X \succ_i Y$  and  $Y \succ_i Z$ , then  $X \succ_i Z$



# Individual preferences

Does the following relationship satisfy completeness and transitivity?

X

X



FIFA World Cup (round-robin tournament)

4 teams, each scheduled for 3 matches against others

If I: prefer  $X \succ_i Y$  if X “defeats” Y in their match



# Individual preferences

Does the following relationship satisfy completeness and transitivity?

?

✓



Comparing the “heights”

If I: prefer  $X \succ_i Y$  if  $X$  is higher than  $Y$


# Group preferences

**Preference:**  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$  **between any pair of alternatives**  $X$  and  $Y$

**Completeness** Either  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$ , but not both

**Transitivity** If  $X \succ_i Y$  and  $Y \succ_i Z$ , then  $X \succ_i Z$

A complete and transitive relation arises from some ranked list of the alternatives.





# Group preferences

**Preference:**  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$  between any pair of alternatives  $X$  and  $Y$

**Completeness** Either  $X \succ_i Y$  or  $Y \succ_i X$ , but not both

**Transitivity** If  $X \succ_i Y$  and  $Y \succ_i Z$ , then  $X \succ_i Z$

A complete and transitive relation arises from some ranked list of the alternatives.

Alternatives  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$

Select  $x^*$  which "beats" the most number of others

We can show  $x^*$  beats everyone

$x^*$

$\prec_i y$

Contradiction!



$A$ : options beaten by  $x^*$

$\Rightarrow y$  beats  $x^*$ ,  $y$  also beats everyone in  $A \Rightarrow y$  beats more options than  $x^*$

- ① Set  $x^*$  as No. 1
- ② Repeat this for all options except  $x^*$   
 $\Rightarrow$  New " $x^{**}$ " as No. 2

# Individual preferences

**How do we aggregate individual preferences?**

**If there are only 2 alternatives: Majority rule**



## Group preferences

**How do we aggregate individual preferences?**

**If there are  $> 2$  alternatives: *Very hard***

# Group preferences

How do we aggregate individual preferences?

**Person 1:**  $X \succ_1 Y \succ_1 Z$

**Person 2:**  $Y \succ_2 Z \succ_2 X$

**Person 3:**  $Z \succ_3 X \succ_3 Y$

Compare  $X$  vs  $Y$  ( $X \succ Y$ )  
 $Y$  vs  $Z$  ( $Y \succ Z$ )  
 $X$  vs  $Z$  ( $Z \succ X$ )



# Group preferences

**How do we aggregate individual preferences?**

**Person 1:**  $X \succ_1 Y \succ_1 Z$

**Person 2:**  $Y \succ_2 Z \succ_2 X$

**Person 3:**  $Z \succ_3 X \succ_3 Y$

**Condorcet Paradox:**

**Nontransitive group preferences arising from transitive individual preferences**

# Group preferences

How do we aggregate individual preferences?

Group i (40%) :  $X \succ_i Y \succ_i Z$

Group j (30%):  $Y \succ_j Z \succ_j X$

Group k (30%):  $Z \succ_k X \succ_k Y$

Compare  $X$  vs  $Y$   $X \succ Y$   
Compare  $\left( \text{Winner between } X \text{ and } Y \right)$  vs  $Z \Rightarrow \text{Winner} : Z$   
 $X \prec Z$



# Group preferences

**How do we aggregate individual preferences?**

**Group i (40%) :**  $X \succ_i Y \succ_i Z$

**Group j (30%):**  $Y \succ_j Z \succ_j X$

**Group k (30%):**  $Z \succ_k X \succ_k Y$

# Group preferences

(100 people in total)

How do we aggregate individual preferences?

Group i (40%) :  $X \overset{2}{>}_i Y \overset{1}{>}_i Z \overset{0}{}$

Group j (30%) :  $Y >_j Z >_j X$

Group k (30%) :  $Z >_k X >_k Y$

$$X: 40 \times 2 + 30 \times 1 =$$

$$Y: 30 \times 2 + 40 \times 1 =$$

$$Z: 30 \times 2 + 30 \times 1 =$$

110

100

90

In each person's choice

No. 1 gets 2 points

No. 2 gets 1 point

No. 3 gets 0 points

Get total # points for each option  $\Rightarrow$  Group-level ranking.