MOHAMMAD LASHKARBOLOOKIE

+33 67 381 4788 ⋄ Cergy, France

mohammad.lashkarbolookie@esssec.edu

mlashkarbolookie.github.io

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Information Economics, Industrial Organization, Financial Economics

REFERENCES

- **Prof. Anastasios Dosis, ESSEC**   Dosis@essec.edu
- **Prof. wilfried sand-zantman, ESSEC**   sand@essec.edu
- **Prof. Regis Renault, CY Cergy Paris University**   regis.renault@cyu.edu
- **Prof. Gorkem Celik, ESSEC**   celik@essec.edu

EDUCATION

- **PhD, Economics**, ESSEC Business School and Cergy Paris University   2020 - Present
- **M.Sc., Economics**, University of Tehran   2016 - 2019
- **B.Sc., Aerospace Engineering**, Sharif University of Technology   2010 - 2016

JOB MARKET PAPER

Prosocial Disclosure and Contracts; Value and Values (JMP)   2024 - Present

Abstract:

This paper studies the disclosure of prosocial performance (e.g., ESG) in a multitasking principal-agent framework with limited liability and private agent types. The agent derives utility from exerting costly effort on two tasks that benefit the principal: one yielding an unverifiable outcome, and another producing an outcome that becomes verifiable through costly disclosure. The agent's private type, reflected in their utility and cost structure, influences the principal's incentive to contract on the verifiable outcome. The resulting equilibrium offers a theoretical explanation for the observations regarding heterogeneities in prosocial contracts (e.g., sustainability linked loans), and helps explain empirical patterns consistent with social or green washing. The main result is the ambiguous impact of mandatory disclosure regulations. When voluntary costly disclosure serves as a screening device for the principal, resulting in a partial disclosure equilibrium, mandatory disclosure regulation can reduce prosocial effort and overall welfare. Conversely, mandating disclosure can enhance prosocial incentives and outcomes when the voluntary regime admits a non-disclosure equilibrium.

WORKING PAPER

Welfare Effects Of Open Banking; Data Versus Collateral, (with Anastasios Dosis).   2022 - Present

– *Abstract:*

Open banking can alter the information structure of credit markets by furnishing fintechs with more financial data on their customers and hence enhancing their screening capabilities. We investigate the welfare implications of open banking by constructing a model of a loan market with adverse selection. In this market, a fintech, reliant on information technology to assess borrowers' credibility, competes with a traditional bank that employs collateral to differentiate between various borrower types. We find that enhancing the fintech's monitoring capacity through the provision of free access to borrowers' information may not necessarily lead to improved welfare. This suggests that complete data sharing (i.e., granting the fintech full access to borrowers' data) is not always the optimal solution and could potentially reduce welfare. Specifically, when the bank is sufficiently proficient in utilizing collateral, partial data sharing might be the preferred option.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Green Tecnology Choice Under Disclosure Regulation.   2024 - Present

TEACHING

Essec:

- **Macroeconomics**, 2024-2025, Undergraduate, Lecturer.
- **Microeconomics**, 2024, graduate, Lecturer.
- **Economics Of Financial Intermediaries**, 2022-2023, graduate, Teaching Assistant.
- **Industrial Organization**, 2022, graduate, Teaching Assistant.

University of Tehran:

- **Industrial Organization,**, 2018-2019, MS.c., Teaching Assistant.
- **Political Economics**, 2019, graduate, Teaching Assistant.
- **Microeconomics II**, 2018, graduate, Teaching Assistant.

CONFERENCES

- **Action and Inaction versus Climate Change, EPFL** , June 2025
- **Future of Financial Information Conference , Stockholm Business School,** May 2024
- **Cardiff Fintech Conference, Cardiff Business School,** November 2023

LANGUAGE

Persian (native), English (proficient), French (proficient)

OTHER EXPERIENCES

- **Economic Journalist, Donya-e-Eghtesad Newspaper, Iran.**   **2019-2020**
- **Teacher in Mathematics, Tehran , Iran.**   **2013-2018**