MOHAMMAD LASHKARBOLOOKIE

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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Information Economics, Industrial Organization, Financial Economics

REFERENCES

- **Prof. Anastasios Dosis, ESSEC** **Dosis@essec.edu**
- **Prof. wilfried sand-zantman, ESSEC** **sand@essec.edu**
- **Prof. Regis Renault, CY Cergy Paris University** **regis.renault@cyu.edu**
- **Prof. Gorkem Celik, ESSEC** **celik@essec.edu**

EDUCATION

- **PhD, Economics**, ESSEC Business School and Cergy Paris University 2020 - Present
- **M.Sc., Economics**, University of Tehran 2016 - 2019
- **B.Sc., Aerospace Engineering**, Sharif University of Technology 2010 - 2016

JOB MARKET PAPER

Prosocial Disclosure and Contracts (JMP) Full Paper (PDF)

Abstract:

This paper studies prosocial disclosure (e.g., ESG reporting) and prosocial contracts (e.g., sustainability-linked loans) in a multitasking principal–agent framework with limited liability and private agent types. The agent exerts costly effort on two tasks: one yielding an unverifiable outcome and another generating an outcome that can be verifiably disclosed at a cost. The agent's private type captures their intrinsic utility over the outcomes, which affects both parties' gain from contracting on the verifiable information. The main result is the ambiguous effect of a mandatory disclosure regulation. While such a mandate can enhance prosocial effort and welfare when the voluntary regime yields non-disclosure, it can reduce welfare when full disclosure emerges voluntarily. When voluntary disclosure is partial, mandatory disclosure can either improve or undermine contracting efficiency and welfare, depending on the specification of agent types and the principal's objective.

WORKING PAPER

Welfare Effects Of Open Banking; Data Versus Collateral, (with Anastasios Dosis).

– *Abstract:*

Open banking can alter the information structure of credit markets by furnishing fintechs with more financial data on their customers and hence enhancing their screening capabilities. We investigate the welfare implications of open banking by constructing a model of a loan market with adverse selection. In this market, a fintech, reliant on information technology to assess borrowers' credibility, competes with a traditional bank that employs collateral to differentiate between various borrower types. We find that enhancing the fintech's monitoring capacity through the provision of free access to borrowers' information may not necessarily lead to improved welfare. This suggests that complete data sharing (i.e., granting the fintech full access to borrowers' data) is not always the optimal solution and could potentially reduce welfare. Specifically, when the bank is sufficiently proficient in utilizing collateral, partial data sharing might be the preferred option.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Green Portfolio Choice Under Disclosure Regulation. 2024 - Present

TEACHING

Lecturer:

- **Macroeconomics**, 2024-2026, ESSEC, Undergraduate.
- **Microeconomics**, ESSEC, 2024, 2026.

Teaching Assistant:

- **Economics Of Financial Intermediaries**, 2022-2023, ESSEC, graduate.
- **Industrial Organization**, 2022, ESSEC, graduate.
- **Industrial Organization,**, 2018-2019, University of Tehran, graduate.
- **Political Economics**, 2019, University of Tehran, graduate.
- **Microeconomics II**, University of Tehran, 2018.

CONFERENCES

- **Action and Inaction versus Climate Change, EPFL** , June 2025
- **Future of Financial Information Conference , Stockholm Business School,** May 2024
- **Cardiff Fintech Conference, Cardiff Business School,** November 2023

LANGUAGE

Persian (native), English (proficient), French (proficient)

OTHER EXPERIENCES

- **Economic Journalist, Donya-e-Eghtesad Newspaper, Iran.** **2019-2020**
- **Teacher in Mathematics, Tehran , Iran.** **2013-2018**