

# Airdrop Contract Audit Report

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**Updated: January 08, 2026**

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## Introduction

The purpose of this report is to document the security analysis and contract structure of the [AirdropGenKey.sol](#) contract. This audit examines airdrop mechanics, signature-based claims, reward distributions, and integration with external interfaces for secure and controlled asset airdrops.

## Disclaimer

This report is based on the information provided at the time of the audit and does not guarantee the absence of future vulnerabilities. Subsequent security reviews and on-chain monitoring are strongly recommended.

## Scope of Audit

The audit focused on the following aspects of [AirdropGenKey.sol](#):

- Security mechanisms, including signature validation, nonce management, and access controls for claims and withdrawals
- Code correctness, logical flow, and compliance with EIP-712, ERC721, and ERC20 standards
- Adherence to best practices for upgradeability, reward handling, and integration with ICOAAAuth
- Gas efficiency, error handling, and prevention of replay attacks or unauthorized claims

## Methodology

The audit process involved:

- Manual code review of inheritance, overrides, signature hashing, and claim flows
  - Automated analysis using Slither and Aderyn to detect common vulnerabilities like replay attacks or access control issues
  - Scenario-based testing using Foundry for simulating claims, reward distributions, signature verifications, and edge cases (e.g., expired signatures or insufficient balances)
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## Security Review Summary

### Review commit hash:

- [0c1fcf72ede03bf697c60f435e7a866f0312c9d3](#)

The `AirdropGenKey.sol` contract provides a secure system for signature-based airdrops and rewards, with nonce protections and role-based administration to mitigate unauthorized access and replay risks.

## Security Analysis

As an upgradeable contract, `AirdropGenKey` inherits from OpenZeppelin's `Initializable`, `AccessControlUpgradeable`, and `EIP712Upgradeable`, ensuring safe initialization, role management, and typed data hashing for signatures. The `OPERATOR_ROLE` restricts sensitive operations like setting the signer, reward tokens, or withdrawing assets, while `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` handles initial setup.

Claim functions (`claim`, `claimReward`) use EIP-712 signatures verified against a backend `signer` to authorize distributions, incorporating nonces (`userNonces`, `userRewardNonces`) and deadlines to prevent replay and expiration issues. Digests are marked as used post-verification, and user authenticity is enforced (e.g., via `coaAuth.walletToUserId`). NFT claims track token IDs incrementally (`currentAt1TokenID`), ensuring sequential distribution, while token claims (SPRLZ) use `SafeERC20` for secure transfers.

The contract integrates with `COAAuth` for user ID validation, adding an external trust layer. Withdrawal functions (`withdrawGenKey`, `withdrawGenKeys`) are operator-only, preventing arbitrary asset drains. The `onERC721Received` callback safely handles incoming NFTs with event logging.

Events (e.g., `GenesisKeyClaimed`, `RewardClaimed`) enable on-chain monitoring. Upgradeability is supported with a 40-slot `_gap` for future expansions without storage collisions. Limits like `MAX_NFT_PER_TXN` mitigate gas exhaustion in batch claims.

Automated tools (Slither/Aderyn) flagged no high-severity issues, though minor optimizations (e.g., in loops) were noted. Testing confirmed resilience against common attacks like signature malleability, replay, or front-running.

The contract prioritizes security through explicit checks, audited dependencies, and minimal attack surfaces.

## Contract Structure

The contract extends upgradeable standards with custom airdrop and reward logic:

- **State Variables:** Signer address; mappings for claims, nonces, token IDs (available, claimed), user rewards; enum for reward types; ICOAAuth interface; max NFTs per transaction.
- **Initialization:** Sets roles, signer, and EIP-712 domain.
- **Core Functions:**
  - `claim`: Signature-based claim for initial YARD NFTs with nonce and deadline checks.
  - `claimReward`: Handles NFT or token rewards based on type, with user ID validation and sequential ID assignment.
  - `setSigner` / `setCOAAuthAddress` / `setMaxClaimPerTxn`: Operator updates for configuration.
  - `withdrawGenKey` / `withdrawGenKeys`: Operator withdrawals of held NFTs.
  - `setRewardTokens` / `setRewardCurrentTokenID`: Batch setup for reward addresses and starting IDs.
  - `onERC721Received`: ERC721 callback for receiving NFTs.
- **Getters:** Functions to retrieve claimed IDs, reward amounts, token addresses, and user-specific data.

- **Helpers/Constants:** EIP-712 typehashes; events for logging; enum for reward categorization.