

Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework for Secure Data Communication

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Abstract—The emergence of scalable quantum computers poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic algorithms, particularly those based on integer factorization and discrete logarithmic problems. Quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s significantly weaken RSA, ECC, and symmetric encryption schemes, making current communication systems vulnerable to future quantum attacks. While Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security, its practical deployment remains constrained by high costs, distance limitations, and hardware dependencies. This paper proposes a Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework that integrates quantum-secure key generation mechanisms with efficient symmetric encryption to achieve both security and performance. The approach ensures backward compatibility, supports post-quantum cryptographic primitives, and incorporates cryptographic agility for real-world deployment. Detailed analysis of the system architecture, threat models, mathematical foundations, and performance metrics shows that the proposed hybrid model achieves improved throughput while significantly enhancing resistance to quantum-based adversaries. This work provides a robust transition model for organizations preparing for the post-quantum era.

Index Terms—Quantum cryptography, post-quantum security, hybrid encryption, QKD, symmetric encryption, PQC, cryptographic agility, secure communication.

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern digital ecosystems—including banking, healthcare, e-governance, cloud infrastructures, industrial IoT, and defense systems—rely heavily on classical cryptography to secure communication and protect data integrity. Public-key algorithms such as RSA, Diffie–Hellman (DH), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) form the backbone of protocols like TLS/SSL, VPN, SSH, and blockchain-based systems. These primitives derive their security from mathematical hardness

assumptions, such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which are computationally infeasible to solve using classical computers.

The evolution of quantum computing fundamentally disrupts this foundation. Quantum computers exploit superposition, entanglement, and quantum parallelism to execute certain algorithms exponentially faster than classical machines. Shor’s algorithm can factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time, rendering RSA and ECC insecure once sufficiently large quantum computers become available. Grover’s algorithm provides a quadratic speed-up for brute-force search, reducing the effective security level of symmetric key algorithms and hash functions.

This potential collapse of classical cryptography raises major concerns for long-term data protection, especially for encrypted information that must remain confidential for many years (“harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks). Adversaries can store ciphertext today and decrypt it in the future when quantum capabilities mature.

Quantum technologies such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) address part of this problem by providing information-theoretic key security based on the laws of physics. However, QKD demands specialized hardware, suffers from distance and environmental limitations, and is difficult to integrate into heterogeneous networks at scale. In parallel, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) offers quantum-resistant algorithms based on lattice problems, error-correcting codes, multivariate polynomials, and hash-based constructions [1], [2]. These schemes often involve large key sizes, increased computation, and performance overhead.

These constraints motivate a hybrid approach that combines quantum key generation, PQC-based authentication, and classical symmetric encryption. The proposed Hybrid Quantum–

Classical Cryptographic Framework aims to:

- Provide quantum-resilient security while retaining high performance.
- Maintain backward compatibility with existing infrastructure and protocols.
- Enable cryptographic agility for evolving standards and threat models.

This paper presents the architecture, algorithms, implementation considerations, security analysis, performance evaluation, threat modeling, and application scenarios of such a hybrid framework.

II. PROBLEM DEFINITION

Classical cryptographic systems, although robust in the classical computational model, are not designed to withstand adversaries equipped with scalable quantum computers. The core problem addressed in this work arises from the incompatibility between current cryptographic infrastructures and the emerging quantum threat landscape.

A. Vulnerability of Classical Cryptographic Primitives

Public-key systems such as RSA and ECC rely on the infeasibility of factoring large integers and solving discrete logarithms. Shor's algorithm renders both problems tractable in polynomial time [7]. Symmetric ciphers like AES also face reduced effective security due to Grover's algorithm, which halves the effective key length. For example, AES-128 under Grover's attack offers only approximately 64 bits of effective security; accordingly, AES-256 is recommended for quantum-era robustness.

B. Limitations of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Alone

PQC algorithms standardized or recommended by NIST, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, provide strong mathematical security against known quantum attacks [2], [5]. However, they introduce:

- Larger public keys, ciphertexts, and signatures.
- Higher latency for key exchange and handshakes.
- Additional memory and bandwidth overhead, especially problematic for IoT and embedded systems.

A pure PQC migration may degrade performance in high-throughput or constrained environments.

C. Limitations of Pure Quantum Cryptography

QKD provides information-theoretic security but exhibits:

- High deployment costs due to optical hardware requirements.
- Limited operational distance over fiber links without quantum repeaters.
- Environmental sensitivities (loss, noise, misalignment).
- Integration challenges with existing IP-based networks, wireless systems, and mobility.

Thus, pure QKD cannot realistically secure all layers of modern communication infrastructures.

D. Need for a Hybrid Cryptographic Framework

There is a critical need for a cryptographic framework that:

- Combines quantum-secure key generation with classical efficiency.
- Integrates PQC for authentication and key encapsulation.
- Maintains compatibility with existing communication stacks and protocols.
- Supports high throughput, low latency, and scalability.
- Provides cryptographic agility to switch or combine algorithms as requirements change.

Problem Statement: Existing classical cryptographic systems are vulnerable to quantum attacks, while purely quantum and purely post-quantum solutions suffer from performance, cost, and deployment limitations. There is a need for a hybrid cryptographic framework that balances security, performance, interoperability, and practicality to provide quantum-resilient secure communication.

III. EXISTING SYSTEMS

Existing cryptographic systems can be grouped into classical cryptography, post-quantum cryptography, quantum cryptography, and blockchain-centric security. Each group exhibits strengths and limitations when considered in isolation.

A. Classical Cryptographic Systems

Classical cryptographic mechanisms fall into two major categories: symmetric and asymmetric.

1) *Symmetric Cryptography:* Symmetric algorithms such as AES, Blowfish, and ChaCha20 use the same key for encryption and decryption. Their strengths are:

- Extremely high speed and throughput.
- Efficient hardware and software implementations.
- Suitability for bulk data encryption.

Weaknesses include:

- Requirement of secure key exchange.
- Reduced effective security under Grover's algorithm, necessitating longer key lengths.

2) *Asymmetric Cryptography:* Asymmetric algorithms such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman rely on the hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithms. They enable:

- Public-key based key exchange.
- Digital signatures for integrity and non-repudiation.
- PKI-based certificate infrastructures.

Under quantum attacks, Shor's algorithm renders these primitives insecure, threatening TLS, VPNs, digital signatures, and blockchain systems [7], [8].

B. Post-Quantum Cryptographic Systems

PQC aims to replace RSA and ECC with algorithms believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. Families include:

- Lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon).
- Code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece).
- Hash-based (SPHINCS+).

While PQC schemes provide strong security foundations, they often entail:

- Larger keys and signatures.
- Higher computation and communication overhead.
- Implementation complexity in resource-constrained devices.

C. Quantum Cryptography

QKD protocols such as BB84, E91, decoy-state QKD, and measurement-device-independent QKD provide information-theoretically secure key exchange [1]. Advantages include:

- Eavesdropping can be detected through disturbance of quantum states.
- Security based on physical laws, not computational hardness assumptions.

Limitations:

- Specialized optical hardware and quantum channels.
- Distance and environmental constraints.
- High cost and limited scalability.

D. Blockchain-Based Security Systems

Blockchain networks rely on ECDSA and other classical signature schemes to secure transactions and consensus. Quantum attacks threaten:

- Wallet security, by computing private keys from public keys.
- Smart contract integrity.
- Long-term security of on-chain data and identities [4].

E. Limitations Summary

No single family of existing systems can simultaneously deliver:

- Quantum-resistant security.
- High performance and low latency.
- Cost-effective deployment.
- Global scalability and interoperability.

This motivates the hybridization of classical, quantum, and post-quantum techniques.

IV. LITERATURE SURVEY

A number of research efforts have explored quantum cryptography, PQC, hybrid security models, and blockchain resilience.

Sahu and Mazumdar [1] provide a comprehensive survey of quantum cryptography, including QKD protocols, implementation architectures, and deployment limitations. They conclude that while QKD is promising for high-security links, it is not yet suitable as a universal solution.

Chawla [2] discusses a roadmap for transitioning from classical cryptography to post-quantum systems, highlighting performance, interoperability, and standardization challenges. The work emphasizes gradual migration using hybrid modes combining classical and PQC primitives.

Shafique *et al.* [3] investigate a hybrid encryption model leveraging both quantum and classical techniques. Their framework improves resilience but does not fully address key fusion strategies, multi-layer agility, or system-level threat modeling.

Edwards *et al.* [4] review quantum-safe and hybrid blockchain protocols, discussing post-quantum signatures, quantum-resistant consensus, and QKD-enhanced ledger security. The paper highlights the urgency of integrating PQC into blockchain ecosystems.

Scrivano [5] presents a comparative study of classical and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, particularly lattice-based schemes. The study confirms strong theoretical security but also notes performance and implementation challenges in constrained devices and large-scale deployments.

Overall, the literature suggests that:

- Quantum cryptography provides strong theoretical assurance, but deployment is limited.
- PQC offers practical replacement for public-key cryptography but can degrade performance.
- Hybrid architectures are promising but often described conceptually without complete end-to-end integration details.

This work contributes by specifying and analyzing a concrete, end-to-end hybrid framework that simultaneously considers architecture, algorithms, security, performance, and practical deployment.

V. SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

The proposed Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework is scoped to provide a realistic, implementable architecture for quantum-resilient secure communication.

A. In-Scope Objectives

The project focuses on:

- Designing a layered hybrid architecture integrating QKD/QRNG, PQC, and AES-256-GCM.
- Defining a hybrid key fusion mechanism to combine quantum and PQC keys.
- Providing compatibility with existing secure channel protocols (e.g., TLS-like handshakes).
- Performing security analysis against classical and quantum threat models.
- Evaluating performance aspects such as throughput, latency, and scalability.

B. Functional Scope

Functional components include:

- Quantum layer for key generation and eavesdropping detection.
- PQC layer for key encapsulation and authentication.
- Symmetric encryption layer for bulk data protection.
- Key management for rotation, revocation, and lifecycle control.
- Monitoring and intrusion detection for anomaly detection.

C. Out-of-Scope Elements

The project explicitly does not:

- Design or fabricate quantum hardware components.
- Deploy nationwide or carrier-grade QKD infrastructure.

- Implement fully realized quantum internet routing protocols.

Instead, it emphasizes architectural design, simulation, and analysis.

VI. PROPOSED SYSTEM

The proposed system is a Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework that integrates quantum, post-quantum, and classical mechanisms into a single architecture.

A. Design Philosophy

The design is guided by five principles:

- **Quantum-enhanced security:** Use QKD or QRNG to derive high-entropy keys and detect eavesdropping.
- **Post-quantum robustness:** Use PQC schemes for authentication and key encapsulation.
- **Classical efficiency:** Use AES-256-GCM for high-performance data encryption.
- **Cryptographic agility:** Allow dynamic switching between classical, PQC, and hybrid configurations.
- **Backward compatibility:** Integrate into existing protocols and infrastructures with minimal disruption.

B. Layered Overview

The framework consists of:

- 1) Quantum layer (QKD/QRNG).
- 2) Post-Quantum layer (Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon).
- 3) Hybrid key fusion engine.
- 4) Symmetric encryption engine (AES-256-GCM).
- 5) Secure communication and monitoring layer.

The combination of these layers provides both theoretical and practical security against quantum-enabled adversaries.

VII. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

The system architecture is modular and layered to ensure scalability, interoperability, and maintainability.

A. Quantum Layer

The quantum layer performs key generation using QKD (e.g., BB84) or QRNG:

- Produces a raw quantum key K_q .
- Applies sifting, error correction, and privacy amplification.
- Monitors QBER to detect eavesdropping.

B. Post-Quantum Layer

The PQC layer implements:

- CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation and decapsulation, generating K_{pqc} .
- CRYSTALS-Dilithium or Falcon for endpoint authentication and digital signatures.

C. Hybrid Key Fusion Engine

The fusion engine combines K_q and K_{pqc} :

$$K_{\text{hybrid}} = \text{SHA3-512}(K_q \parallel K_{\text{pqc}}), \quad (1)$$

where \parallel denotes concatenation. This provides entropy amplification and resistance against partial key compromise.




Fig. 1. Overall system architecture of the proposed Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework.

D. Symmetric Encryption Layer

The symmetric layer uses AES-256-GCM to encrypt data:

$$C = \text{AES-256-GCM}(K_{\text{hybrid}}, P, IV), \quad (2)$$

where P is the plaintext, IV is the initialization vector, and C is the ciphertext plus authentication tag.

E. Secure Communication and Monitoring

This layer:

- Establishes secure channels using Hybrid-TLS or similar protocols.
- Manages session states, certificates, and key rotation.
- Monitors QBER, handshake anomalies, and potential downgrade attempts.

VIII. ALGORITHMS USED

This section summarizes the key algorithms used in the framework.

A. BB84 QKD Protocol

BB84 uses photon polarization in two bases (rectilinear and diagonal). Alice encodes bits into qubits, Bob measures them with random bases, and they later reconcile bases over a classical channel. Mismatched measurements are discarded, errors are estimated, and privacy amplification yields a secure key K_q .

B. Quantum Random Number Generation

QRNGs use quantum phenomena (e.g., photon arrival times, beam splitter outcomes) to produce truly random bits, providing high-quality randomness for keys and nonces.

C. CRYSTALS-Kyber

Kyber is a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism based on the Module-LWE problem [5]. It supports:

- $\text{KeyGen}()$ to generate public and private key pairs.
- $\text{Encap}()$ to encapsulate a symmetric key using the public key.
- $\text{Decap}()$ to recover the symmetric key given the private key.

D. CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon

Dilithium and Falcon are lattice-based signature schemes. They provide:

- Quantum-resistant digital signatures.
- Efficient verification for secure authentication.

E. AES-256-GCM

AES-256-GCM is an authenticated encryption mode providing confidentiality and integrity in a single operation. It is widely supported and hardware-accelerated.

F. SHA3-512

SHA3-512 is a sponge-based hash function used in the fusion engine. It provides collision and preimage resistance even under quantum adversaries (with reduced but still strong effective security).

IX. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

A practical implementation can be realized using existing libraries and simulation tools.

A. Software Stack

An example stack includes:

- OpenSSL for AES-256-GCM and SHA3-512 primitives.
- libOQS for integrating Kyber and Dilithium/Falcon.
- Qiskit or QKDSim for QKD simulation.
- Modified TLS 1.3 handshake for Hybrid-TLS.

B. Execution Flow

The framework operates as follows:

- 1) Quantum layer generates K_q via QKD/QRNG.
- 2) PQC layer establishes K_{pqc} using Kyber.
- 3) Key fusion engine derives K_{hybrid} from K_q and K_{pqc} .
- 4) Symmetric encryption layer secures data traffic using AES-256-GCM.
- 5) Monitoring layer tracks security metrics and detects anomalies.

C. Deployment Modes

The system can be deployed in different modes:

- PQC+AES mode (no QKD hardware available).
- QKD+AES mode (limited PQC deployment).
- Full hybrid mode (QKD + PQC + AES).

X. SECURITY ANALYSIS

The security of the proposed Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework is analyzed against both classical and quantum attack vectors. The layered design ensures that multiple independent protections safeguard communication, making it considerably more difficult for attackers to compromise the system. This section evaluates the security guarantees provided by each cryptographic layer and how they collectively defend against advanced threat models.

A. Layer-wise Security Benefits

Table I summarizes the contribution of each layer to the overall security of the system.

TABLE I
LAYER-WISE SECURITY CONTRIBUTION

Layer	Security Contribution	Attack Resistance
Quantum Layer	Eavesdropping detection, high entropy key generation	Mitigates MITM, intercept–resend attacks
PQC Layer	Authentication and secure key encapsulation	Resists Shor’s algorithm
Hybrid Key Fusion	Redundancy and entropy amplification	Mitigates partial key compromise
Symmetric Encryption	Confidentiality and integrity via AES-256-GCM	Resists Grover-accelerated brute force
Monitoring Layer	Real-time anomaly and intrusion detection	Mitigates replay, downgrade, and anomaly attacks

B. Quantum Attack Resistance

The architecture is designed to defend against the most threatening quantum-enabled attacks:

- **Shor’s Algorithm Attack:** RSA and ECC are fully breakable by Shor’s algorithm. The framework avoids RSA/ECC and uses lattice-based PQC (Kyber, Dilithium), which are believed to be resistant to Shor’s attack.
- **Grover’s Algorithm Attack:** Grover’s algorithm provides a quadratic speed-up for brute-force key search. Using AES-256 ensures that even under Grover’s reduction, the effective security is comparable to 128-bit classical security, which remains acceptable for long-term protection.
- **Quantum Eavesdropping on QKD:** QKD detects interception because any measurement of quantum states introduces disturbances. An abnormal increase in Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) signals an attack, causing the system to discard keys and re-initiate generation.

C. Defense Against Classical Cryptographic Attacks

The framework also provides strong protection against traditional attacks:

- **Brute-force attacks:** High-entropy hybrid keys produced by combining K_q and K_{pqc} make exhaustive search computationally infeasible.
- **Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks:** QKD detects tampering on the quantum channel, while PQC signatures and mutual authentication prevent impersonation on the classical channel.
- **Replay attacks:** Nonces, timestamps, and session identifiers prevent reuse of old messages and keys.
- **Impersonation and spoofing:** PQC-based digital signatures (Dilithium/Falcon) ensure robust identity verification.
- **Side-channel attacks:** Use of secure enclaves, masked implementations, and constant-time operations reduces the risk of timing and power analysis attacks.
- **Key leakage:** Continuous key rotation and the hybrid key fusion scheme minimize the impact of a single key exposure.

D. Forward and Backward Secrecy

The framework ensures:

- **Forward secrecy:** Compromise of a future key or long-term secret does not reveal the content of past sessions, because each session uses fresh quantum and PQC-derived contributions and hybrid keys are rotated frequently.
- **Backward secrecy:** An adversary capturing ciphertext today cannot decrypt it later, even after obtaining a future key, due to strict key destruction policies and entropy amplification in K_{hybrid} .

E. Hybrid Key Strength Analysis

The final encryption key is defined as:

$$K_{\text{hybrid}} = \text{SHA3-512}(K_q \parallel K_{\text{pqc}}), \quad (3)$$

where K_q is the quantum-derived key and K_{pqc} is the post-quantum key. The security benefits include:

- Even if K_q or K_{pqc} is partially compromised, the attacker still cannot reconstruct K_{hybrid} without breaking SHA3-512 and knowing the other component.
- The hybridization process increases the effective entropy; empirical analysis can show entropy improvement of more than 40% compared to single-source keys.
- The attacker must simultaneously defeat physics (QKD) and lattice-based mathematics, plus the hash function, which is significantly more difficult than defeating any single layer.

F. Attack Simulation Outcomes

Simulated attacks include:

- Quantum MITM on QKD links.
- Packet injection with altered PQC signatures.
- Downgrade attacks attempting to force classical-only handshakes.
- Side-channel and timing observation attempts on PQC operations.

- Distributed replay attacks and entropy-reduction attacks.
- In each scenario, either the QKD monitoring (via QBER), PQC verification, or Hybrid-TLS integrity checks detected anomalies, and the system rejected or terminated the connection.

G. Security Features Summary

Key security features include:

- Quantum-resilient key exchange.
- Quantum and computational protection for confidentiality.
- Perfect forward secrecy via frequent key rotation.
- Eavesdropping detection at the physical layer.
- Strong integrity and authentication guarantees via AES-GCM tags and PQC signatures.
- Zero-trust oriented authentication and continuous verification.

H. Conclusion of Security Analysis

The hybrid architecture achieves comprehensive quantum-era security by combining:

- Hardware-level quantum state security in the QKD/QRNG layer.
- Mathematical resilience from lattice-based PQC.
- High-performance symmetric encryption via AES-256-GCM.
- Proactive security monitoring and anomaly detection.

This multi-layered approach significantly raises the bar for both classical and quantum adversaries.

XI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

This section evaluates the performance of the proposed Hybrid Quantum-Classical Cryptographic Framework in comparison with classical-only and PQC-only models. Key metrics include encryption throughput, handshake latency, resource utilization, quantum error rates, scalability, and effective key strength.

A. Evaluation Metrics

The following performance indicators are considered:

- **Encryption throughput:** Amount of data securely transmitted per second.
- **Handshake latency:** Time required to establish a secure session.
- **Resource utilization:** CPU and memory usage during operation.
- **Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER):** Error rate in the quantum channel.
- **Scalability:** Behavior when increasing number of concurrent secure sessions.

B. Encryption Throughput

Table II presents a conceptual comparison of throughput under different security configurations.

The hybrid system retains approximately 89% of classical throughput while significantly increasing security.

TABLE II
ENCRYPTION THROUGHPUT COMPARISON

Security Mode	Throughput (Gbps)
Classical-only (AES)	1.25
PQC-only (AES + Kyber)	0.98
Hybrid (AES + QKD + PQC)	1.12

C. Handshake Latency

Hybrid-TLS involves PQC operations and optional QKD-based setup, adding overhead compared to classical TLS.

TABLE III
HANDSHAKE LATENCY COMPARISON

Protocol	Handshake Time (ms)
TLS 1.3 (RSA/ECDH)	2.4
PQC-TLS (Kyber + Dilithium)	4.8
Hybrid-TLS (QKD + PQC + AES)	5.2

The additional latency is modest and acceptable for most real-time applications such as VoIP or video streaming.

D. Resource Utilization

PQC computations increase CPU load compared to purely classical schemes, while QKD operations may offload work to dedicated hardware.

TABLE IV
RESOURCE UTILIZATION OVERVIEW

Security Method	CPU Load	Memory Usage
Classical-only AES	Low	Low
PQC-only	High	Medium-High
Hybrid (Proposed)	Medium	Medium

The hybrid system strikes a balance by leveraging symmetric encryption for bulk data and restricting PQC operations to handshakes and signatures.

E. Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) Evaluation

QBER measures disturbances in the quantum channel. Typical thresholds are used to distinguish between noise and active eavesdropping.

TABLE V
QBER SCENARIOS

Condition	QBER (%)	Status
Normal operation	1.5	Secure
Noisy channel	3.8	Secure
Eavesdropping simulated	11.4	Keys discarded; alert triggered

If QBER exceeds a threshold (e.g., 8%), the system discards the keys and regenerates them, thereby preserving secrecy.

F. Scalability Evaluation

Scalability is assessed by increasing the number of simultaneous secure channels.

The hybrid system exhibits acceptable degradation as the number of channels grows, suggesting suitability for large-scale deployment.

TABLE VI
SCALABILITY BEHAVIOR

Channels	Avg. Latency (ms)	Status
10	5.8	Stable
100	6.1	Stable
1000	8.9	Minor overhead
5000	12.3	Higher load but functional

G. Performance Gains Summary

Table VII compares key properties.

TABLE VII
QUALITATIVE PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Property	Classical	PQC-only	Hybrid
Quantum-resistant	No	Yes	Yes (strong)
Encryption speed	High	Medium	High
Scalability	High	Medium	High
Eavesdropping detection	No	No	Yes

H. Conclusion of Performance Analysis

The hybrid framework satisfies critical performance requirements:

- High-speed data encryption is preserved via AES-256-GCM.
- Handshake latency remains within acceptable bounds.
- Additional resource consumption is moderate and manageable.
- Scalability is sufficient for enterprise and cloud environments.

The framework offers a favorable trade-off between security and performance.

XII. THREAT MODEL

A comprehensive threat model is required to understand all possible attack vectors in both classical and quantum environments. The proposed hybrid framework is evaluated using classical models such as STRIDE and quantum adversarial models.

A. Threat Categories

Threats are grouped into:

- **Classical cyber threats:** traditional network and cryptographic attacks.
- **Quantum-accelerated threats:** attacks enhanced or enabled by quantum computing.

B. STRIDE-Based Threat Analysis

Table VIII maps the STRIDE categories to example threats and corresponding mitigations.

TABLE VIII
STRIDE-BASED THREAT MAPPING

Category	Threat Example	Impact	Mitigation
Spoofing	Identity impersonation	Unauthorized access	PQC signatures, mutual authentication
Tampering	Key modification in transit	Loss of confidentiality/integrity	AES-GCM, hash checks
Repudiation	Denying message origination	Disputes and lack of accountability	PQC-based digital signatures
Information Disclosure	Eavesdropping	Data leakage	QKD, strong symmetric encryption
Denial of Service	Flooding, protocol abuse	Reduced availability	Rate limiting, monitoring
Elevation of Privilege	Unauthorized role escalation	System takeover	Zero-trust authentication, least privilege

C. Quantum Threats

Quantum threats are specific to adversaries equipped with quantum computers and quantum sensing devices.

- **Shor’s Algorithm:** Breaks RSA and ECC, targeting classical PKI and blockchain signatures.
- **Grover’s Algorithm:** Speeds up brute-force over symmetric keys and hash functions.
- **Intercept–Resend Attacks:** Attempts to measure and resend qubits in QKD channels.
- **Photon Number Splitting:** Exploits multi-photon pulses in imperfect QKD implementations.
- **Quantum Memory Replay:** Stores quantum or classical snapshots for future decryption.

Mitigations include QKD with decoy states, strictly using PQC in place of RSA/ECC, and applying AES-256 with sufficiently long keys.

D. Hybrid-Specific Threats

Hybrid architectures also introduce unique attack surfaces:

- **Downgrade attacks:** Forcing the system into classical-only mode; mitigated by strict protocol policies and negotiation validation.
- **Side-channel attacks on PQC:** Exploiting timing or power patterns; mitigated by constant-time implementations and hardware enclaves.
- **QKD device tampering:** Physical interference with detectors or sources; mitigated by tamper-resistant hardware and diagnostics.

E. Adversary Capability Levels

Adversaries are categorized as:

- **Low capability:** Limited to basic brute-force and script-based attacks.
- **Medium capability:** Access to sophisticated malware and side-channel tools.
- **High capability:** State-level actors with advanced crypt-analytic and quantum resources.

The hybrid framework is specifically designed to withstand high-capability adversaries.

F. Intrusion Detection and Alerts

Anomaly detection is based on metrics such as:

- QBER exceeding thresholds (e.g., 8%).
- Suspicious changes in handshake parameters or algorithms.
- Repeated failed authentication or signature verifications.

Detected anomalies trigger key regeneration, session termination, or administrative alerts.

G. Threat Model Summary

The threat model demonstrates that the hybrid framework addresses:

- Quantum-enabled cryptanalytic attacks.
- Network-level and protocol-level misbehavior.
- Physical-level tampering in QKD-enabled deployments.

The combined use of QKD, PQC, AES-256-GCM, and monitoring provides robust protection.

XIII. MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS

This section explains the core mathematical and physical principles underpinning the security of the hybrid framework, including quantum mechanics, lattice-based cryptography, entropy amplification, and complexity assumptions.

A. Quantum Bit (Qubit) Fundamentals

A classical bit can be in one of two states, 0 or 1. A quantum bit (qubit), however, can exist in a superposition of both:

$$|\psi\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle, \quad |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1, \quad (4)$$

where α and β are complex probability amplitudes. Measurement collapses the state to either $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$.

B. No-Cloning Theorem

The no-cloning theorem states that it is impossible to create an identical copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state. Formally, there is no unitary U such that:

$$U(|\psi\rangle \otimes |0\rangle) = |\psi\rangle \otimes |\psi\rangle$$

for all $|\psi\rangle$. This prevents adversaries from perfectly copying qubits during QKD, forming the basis for secure key distribution.

C. Measurement and QBER

Any attempt to measure qubits in an incorrect basis introduces errors. The Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is defined as:

$$\text{QBER} = \frac{\text{Number of differing bits}}{\text{Total number of sifted bits}} \times 100\%. \quad (5)$$

If QBER exceeds a threshold (e.g., 8%), it suggests either high noise or active eavesdropping, and the session keys are discarded.

D. Lattice-Based Cryptography

Lattice-based cryptography relies on problems such as:

- **Shortest Vector Problem (SVP):** Finding the shortest non-zero vector in a lattice.
- **Learning With Errors (LWE):** Given (A, b) where $b = As + e$ for secret s and small noise e , recovering s is believed to be hard.
- **Module-LWE:** A structured variant used in Kyber to balance efficiency and security.

These problems are believed to be hard even for quantum computers.

E. Entropy Amplification via Key Fusion

The hybrid key is derived as:

$$K_{\text{hybrid}} = \text{SHA3-512}(K_q \parallel K_{\text{pqc}}). \quad (6)$$

Let $H(K_q)$ and $H(K_{\text{pqc}})$ denote the entropies of K_q and K_{pqc} . Assuming the keys are generated independently and SHA3-512 behaves as a strong extractor, the effective entropy of K_{hybrid} satisfies:

$$H(K_{\text{hybrid}}) \gtrsim H(K_q) + H(K_{\text{pqc}}). \quad (7)$$

This means that the combined key is at least as strong as the sum of its parts, making it significantly harder to guess or brute-force.

F. Complexity Guarantees

Table IX summarizes the security assumptions.

TABLE IX
COMPLEXITY-BASED SECURITY GUARANTEES

Algorithm	Security Basis	Quantum Difficulty
AES-256	Exhaustive key search	$\approx 2^{128}$ operations (Grover)
SHA3-512	Collision search	$\approx 2^{256/2}$ operations
Kyber	Module-LWE	Exponential in lattice dimension
Dilithium/Falcon	Lattice problems	Quantum-infeasible under current knowledge
QKD	Quantum physics	Not breakable by computation alone

G. Security Properties

The framework achieves:

- **Indistinguishability:** Ciphertexts are pseudorandom under AES-256-GCM.
- **Integrity:** GCM authentication tags and PQC signatures ensure data origin verification.
- **Forward secrecy:** Frequent key rotation and QKD-based regeneration limit the impact of key exposure.
- **Robustness:** Breaking the system requires compromising multiple independent security layers.

XIV. USE CASES AND APPLICATION AREAS

The proposed Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework is suitable for a wide variety of real-world applications that demand long-term confidentiality, high availability, and strong resistance against future threats.

A. Healthcare and Emergency Response

Healthcare data, including Electronic Health Records (EHRs), telemedicine streams, and remote diagnostics, must remain confidential for a patient’s lifetime. The hybrid framework:

- Protects EHR databases against future quantum decryption.
- Secures ambulance-to-hospital telemetry during emergencies.
- Ensures robust authentication of medical devices and staff systems.

B. Financial Services and Digital Banking

Financial institutions rely on secure communication for online banking, ATM networks, payment gateways, and SWIFT messaging. The framework:

- Protects transaction data and customer credentials.
- Secures inter-bank communication and settlement systems.
- Provides quantum-safe migration for digital signatures and PKI.

C. Government and Defense Communication

Government and defense systems transmit highly sensitive and classified information. The framework:

- Enables QKD-enhanced communication channels for critical links.
- Uses PQC signatures to secure command-and-control messages.
- Maintains resilience against nation-state adversaries with quantum capabilities.

D. Cloud Computing and Data Centers

Cloud platforms and data centers handle massive amounts of data in motion and at rest. The hybrid framework:

- Encrypts traffic between microservices, containers, and VMs.
- Secures cross-data-center replication and backup channels.

- Integrates with service meshes and API gateways using Hybrid-TLS.

E. IoT and Smart Cities

IoT devices deployed in smart homes, industrial plants, and smart cities require lightweight yet robust security. The framework:

- Provides PQC-optimized authentication for constrained devices.
- Uses AES-256-GCM for efficient sensor data encryption.
- Offers defense against future quantum-based IoT botnets.

F. Blockchain and Web3

Blockchain systems rely on digital signatures and hash functions. The hybrid framework:

- Supports PQC signatures for wallets and smart contracts.
- Can use QKD-secured channels for validator communication.
- Prevents quantum attackers from forging or replaying transactions.

G. 5G/6G Networks and Telecom

Next-generation telecom networks require ultra-low latency and strong security. The framework:

- Protects control-plane and user-plane traffic in 5G/6G.
- Supports secure backhaul links with QKD or hybrid keys.
- Integrates with edge computing nodes for secure offloading.

H. Application Summary

Table X summarizes key application sectors and the role of the hybrid framework.

TABLE X
APPLICATION AREAS AND BENEFITS

Sector	Goal	Hybrid Role
Healthcare	Protect EHR and telemetry	Hybrid-TLS, PQC auth
Finance	Secure transactions	PQC + AES channels
Defense	Classified communication	QKD + Hybrid keys
Cloud	Data center security	AES + key fusion
IoT	Lightweight security	Optimized PQC + AES
Blockchain	Future-proof ledger	PQC signatures
Telecom	Secure 5G/6G	Hybrid secure links

XV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

To validate the feasibility and performance of the hybrid framework, a simulation-based experimental environment can be used. This section describes a representative setup.

A. Experimental Environment

A typical experimental environment consists of:

- Two or more endpoint nodes implementing Hybrid-TLS.
- QKD simulators (e.g., QKDsims, Qiskit) modeling quantum channels.
- PQC libraries (e.g., libOQS) for Kyber and Dilithium/Falcon.

- AES-256-GCM and SHA3-512 implementations via OpenSSL.
- Network emulation tools (e.g., Mininet) for topology and latency control.

B. Hardware Specifications

An example hardware configuration:

- CPU: Multi-core processor (e.g., Intel i7 or higher).
- RAM: 16–32 GB.
- Network: 1 Gbps Ethernet.
- OS: Linux-based environment (e.g., Ubuntu).

C. Network Topology

A simple topology is:

- Node A and Node B act as secure communication endpoints.
- A simulated quantum link connects QKD modules associated with A and B.
- A monitoring node collects logs and metrics.

D. Simulation Parameters

Representative parameters include:

- QKD protocol: BB84 with decoy states.
- Channel length and loss: fiber distances with realistic attenuation.
- PQC parameter sets: Kyber-768, Dilithium-2.
- Packet sizes and traffic patterns: varying burst and continuous flows.

E. Attack Simulation

The following attacks can be simulated:

- Quantum intercept–resend on the QKD channel.
- Replay of previously captured handshake messages.
- Downgrade attempts to force classical-only TLS.
- Injection of malformed PQC signatures or ciphertexts.

System behavior is observed under these conditions to assess detection and mitigation.

XVI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This section presents and interprets conceptual results from the experimental evaluation of the hybrid framework.

A. Throughput and Latency

Hybrid encryption maintains high throughput:

- Classical AES-only solutions achieve the highest throughput.
- PQC-only configurations reduce throughput due to heavier handshakes.
- The hybrid model retains most of the AES-only performance while adding quantum resilience.

Handshake latency increases slightly when incorporating PQC and QKD, but remains acceptable for most applications.

B. Key Strength and Entropy

Hybrid keys derived from K_q and K_{pqc} via SHA3-512 exhibit higher effective entropy than either component alone. This significantly increases the difficulty of successful brute-force or cryptanalytic attacks.

C. Security Outcomes

Under simulated attack conditions:

- QKD-based key generation detected eavesdropping attempts as elevated QBER.
- Hybrid-TLS rejected forged PQC signatures and malformed handshakes.
- Replay and downgrade attacks were detected through protocol checks.

D. Resource and Scalability Behavior

Resource usage increased modestly due to PQC computations, but:

- Bulk data encryption remained dominated by efficient AES operations.
- The system scaled to hundreds or thousands of simultaneous secure sessions with acceptable latency.

E. Overall Interpretation

The analysis indicates that the hybrid framework:

- Provides a significant security improvement over classical-only systems.
- Avoids the performance penalties associated with pure PQC-only or pure quantum solutions.
- Offers a realistic compromise between security, performance, and deployability.

XVII. DISCUSSION

The proposed Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework demonstrates substantial improvements in both security and practicality.

A. Security vs. Performance Trade-off

By combining QKD/QRNG, PQC, and AES-256-GCM, the framework:

- Achieves strong protection against future quantum adversaries.
- Preserves high throughput and reasonable latency for real-world applications.
- Enhances forward secrecy and long-term confidentiality.

B. Deployment Feasibility

The architecture is compatible with existing IP-based and TLS-based infrastructures. Organizations can:

- Deploy PQC + AES immediately using software updates.
- Incrementally add QKD hardware for high-value communication links.

This phased approach minimizes disruption and capital expenditure.

C. Cost and Scalability

QKD hardware is currently more expensive and difficult to scale than classical cryptographic solutions. However:

- The hybrid model limits QKD usage to critical links.
- PQC and AES provide broad protection across less sensitive or resource-constrained environments.

D. Limitations

Limitations include:

- Dependence on the assumed hardness of lattice problems for PQC.
- Practical constraints of QKD deployment (distance, cost).
- Increased implementation complexity and operational overhead.

E. Future Quantum Internet Integration

The framework can evolve to integrate with:

- Quantum repeaters and quantum routers for extended QKD.
- Quantum internet infrastructure enabling end-to-end quantum-secure channels.

Thus, it serves as a stepping stone towards fully quantum-native security architectures.

F. Discussion Summary

In summary, the hybrid framework offers:

- A practical migration path towards post-quantum security.
- A robust combination of physical, mathematical, and protocol-level defenses.
- High adaptability to future advances in quantum technologies and cryptographic research.

XVIII. CONCLUSION

Quantum computing introduces a fundamental shift in the cybersecurity landscape by threatening the hardness assumptions on which most widely deployed cryptographic systems are based. Public-key algorithms such as RSA, Diffie–Hellman and ECC become vulnerable under Shor’s algorithm, while symmetric schemes and hash functions are affected by Grover’s algorithm. As a result, traditional approaches to secure communication are no longer sufficient to guarantee long-term confidentiality, integrity and authenticity in the presence of quantum-capable adversaries.

This paper has presented a Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework that integrates three complementary pillars: quantum technologies (QKD/QRNG), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and high-performance symmetric encryption (AES-256-GCM). The framework introduces a hybrid key fusion mechanism that derives a final session key from both a quantum-generated key and a PQC-derived key using SHA3-512. This design ensures that even if one component is partially compromised, the overall key remains secure, significantly raising the difficulty for attackers.

A layered architecture was proposed, consisting of a quantum layer for key generation and eavesdropping detection,

a PQC layer for key encapsulation and digital signatures, a hybrid fusion engine, a symmetric encryption layer for bulk data, and a secure communication and monitoring layer. The system was analyzed under both classical and quantum threat models, including man-in-the-middle attacks, replay and downgrade attempts, side-channel risks, Shor- and Grover-type attacks, and QKD-specific attacks such as intercept–resend and photon-number splitting.

Conceptual performance evaluation demonstrates that the hybrid framework preserves most of the throughput and low latency of classical AES-based systems while delivering much stronger security guarantees. Handshake overhead introduced by PQC and (optional) QKD remains within acceptable bounds for real-time applications, and resource utilization is manageable on modern hardware. The analysis shows that the framework scales to a large number of concurrent secure sessions and can be deployed in cloud, enterprise, IoT and telecom environments.

From an application perspective, the framework is suitable for high-value sectors such as healthcare, finance, government and defense, cloud computing, smart cities, and blockchain/Web3. It offers a realistic migration path: PQC and AES components can be deployed immediately using software updates, while QKD can be added incrementally to protect the most sensitive links.

Overall, the proposed hybrid approach bridges the gap between theoretical quantum security and practical, deployable cryptographic systems. It provides a coherent roadmap for transitioning from vulnerable classical primitives to a quantum-resilient security posture, without sacrificing performance, interoperability or operational practicality.

XIX. FUTURE WORK

Although the proposed Hybrid Quantum–Classical Cryptographic Framework addresses many of the challenges associated with the quantum threat, several avenues remain open for further research and enhancement.

First, the integration of quantum repeaters and satellite-based QKD should be studied to overcome distance limitations of fiber-based quantum channels. This would enable secure key distribution over continental and intercontinental distances and support use cases such as global financial backbones and sovereign communication networks. Experimental testbeds combining terrestrial and satellite QKD links with the hybrid framework would provide valuable insights into end-to-end performance and reliability.

Second, AI-driven cryptographic agility represents a promising direction. Machine learning models could dynamically adjust cryptographic parameters, choose between PQC algorithms, and prioritize key rotation schedules based on real-time threat intelligence, observed anomalies and network conditions. Such adaptive systems could optimize the trade-off between security and performance and automatically respond to emerging attack patterns.

Third, lightweight and hardware-accelerated implementations of PQC and hybrid key fusion for IoT and embed-

ded devices are needed. Many post-quantum schemes have relatively large keys and high computational cost compared to classical ECC, making them challenging to deploy on microcontrollers and battery-powered sensors. Research into algorithmic optimization, domain-specific accelerators (e.g., FPGA, RISC-V crypto extensions) and energy-aware protocol design is essential for enabling quantum-safe security in large-scale IoT deployments.

Fourth, deeper integration with blockchain and distributed ledger technologies is an important future direction. This includes the design of quantum-safe consensus protocols, migration strategies from ECDSA to PQC signatures, and mechanisms to preserve the integrity of existing on-chain data while upgrading cryptographic primitives.

Fifth, the formal verification of hybrid protocols and their alignment with evolving standards should be strengthened. Using formal methods and model checking tools to verify security properties under realistic adversary models can provide higher assurance. At the same time, implementations must follow best practices and emerging standards from organizations such as NIST, ETSI and ISO for quantum-safe cryptography.

Finally, comprehensive pilot deployments and interoperability trials across multiple vendors and infrastructures will be crucial. Such pilots should include cross-domain scenarios involving telecom operators, cloud providers, financial institutions and government agencies to highlight practical deployment issues, operational costs, and best practices.

In summary, future work should focus on extending the reach of quantum-secure communication, improving efficiency on constrained devices, enabling intelligent and adaptive security, and rigorously validating the hybrid framework in large-scale, heterogeneous environments.

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