

# Lesson 2021-03-11

March 21, 2021

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Problems in LFSR or Lehmer PRNG

LFSR or Lehmer PRNG are not cryptographic PRNGS. The problem is the linear property, because if you intercept the  $s_i$  you can solve an easy system.

$$\begin{cases} s_1 = as_0 + b \bmod(m) \\ s_2 = as_1 + b \bmod(m) \\ s_3 = as_2 + b \bmod(m) \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

### 1.2 KPA ATTACK

The attack is the (kpa) known plaintext attack. We assume that the enemy knows in somehow:

$$\begin{cases} \dots x_{m+j} \dots x_j \dots \\ \dots y_{m+j} \dots y_j \dots \end{cases} \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \dots s_{m+j} \dots s_j \dots \\ \dots y_{m+j} \dots y_j \dots \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

So in a LFSR with m bits and a key  $[p_{m-1} \dots p_0]$  we have :

$$s_m = s_{m-1}p_{m-1} + s_{m-2}p_{m-2} + \dots + s_1p_1 + s_0p_0 \quad (3)$$

and an enemy needs only 2m bits of key stream to solve the system.

#### 1.2.1 Example

In case of LFSR of m bits in general if you intercept a segment of 2m bits then you obtain m equations with m unknown  $p_m \dots p_0$  and you can solve the system with  $O(m^2)$

## Concrete Example

We know

Key stream:  $\dots 0 \overset{s_0}{1} \overset{s_1}{1} \overset{s_2}{1} \overset{s_3}{0} \overset{s_4}{1} \dots$

Key unknown:  $P_0, P_1, P_2$

$$\begin{cases} s_3 = s_2 P_2 + s_1 P_1 + s_0 P_0 \\ s_4 = s_3 P_2 + s_2 P_1 + s_1 P_0 \\ s_5 = s_4 P_2 + s_3 P_1 + s_2 P_0 \end{cases} \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} 1 = 1 \cdot P_2 + 0 \cdot P_1 + 1 \cdot P_0 \\ 1 = 1 P_2 + 1 P_1 + 0 P_0 \\ 0 = 1 P_2 + 1 P_1 + 1 P_0 \end{cases}$$

"Gauss-Jordan"

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & | & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & | & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$


$\mathbb{Z}_2$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & | & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & | & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & | & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & | & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & | & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & | & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$



$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & | & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & | & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & | & 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p_2 \\ p_1 \\ p_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

### 1.3 Stream Ciphers: Permutation

ORACLES. For convenience, a random oracle  $R$  is a map from  $\{0,1\}^*$  to  $\{0,1\}^\infty$  chosen by selecting each bit of  $R(x)$  uniformly and independently, for every  $x$ . Of course no actual protocol uses an infinitely long output, this just saves us from having to say how long “sufficiently long” is. We denote by  $2^\infty$  the set of all random oracles.

A random oracle is random but preserves the responses. So it has memory:

$$R : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\infty$$

$$R(x) = [b_1 \dots]$$


$$R(y) = [c_1 \dots]$$

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$$R(x) = [b_1 \dots]$$

### 1.4 Keccak-Sponge key stream



A sponge function is built from three components:


- State, containing bits,
- a function that transforms the state memory (often it is a pseudorandom permutation of the  $2^{|bits|}$  state values)
- a padding function Pad.

The State memory is divided into two sections: Bitrate( $r$ ) and the remaining part the Capacity( $c$ ).

There are two phases one of absorption in which the system uses the key and the iv to modify the current state. then there is the squeeze phase in which the system generates the key stream.

## 1.5 The Keccak-f permutations

There are 7 Keccak-f permutations of  $\{0,1\}^b$ , indicated  $\text{Keccak-f}[b]$ , where  $b = 25 \times 2^l$  and  $l$  ranges from 0 to 6. The elements of  $\{0,1\}^b$  are regarded as a 3-dimensional array



To compute  $\text{Keccak-f}[b](x)$  there are  $12 + 2l$  rounds, e.g.  $\text{Keccak-f}[25]$  has 12 rounds,  $\text{Keccak-f}[1600]$  has 24 rounds. A round consists of 5 invertible steps mappings:

