# BLOCKHAT
## SECURITY

# MTHB

# Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by BlockHat

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# Document Properties

| Client | MTHB |
|---|---|
| Version | 0.1 |
| Classification | Public |

# Scope

The MTHB  smart contracts (Audit and Re-audit smart contracts)

| Link | Address |
|---|---|
| https://bscscan.com/token/0xbb1F4773058357C34D2EF07759f17fc55635C2Ad | 0xbb1F4773058357C34D2EF07759f17fc55635C2Ad |

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# Contents

# 1  Introduction

MTHB engaged BlockHat to conduct a security assessment on the MTHB beginning on March 19th, 2025 and ending March 21st, 2025. In this report, we detail our methodical approach to evaluate potential security issues associated with the implementation of smart contracts, by exposing possible semantic discrepancies between the smart contract code and design document, and by recommending additional ideas to optimize the existing code. Our findings indicate that the current version of smart contracts can still be enhanced further due to the presence of many security and performance concerns.

This document summarizes the findings of our audit.

## 1.1  About MTHB

-

| Issuer | MTHB |
|---|---|
| Website | `https://mthaibaht.com/` |
| Type | Solidity Smart Contract |
| Audit Method | Whitebox |

## 1.2  Approach & Methodology

BlockHat used a combination of manual and automated security testing to achieve a balance between efficiency, timeliness, practicability, and correctness within the audit's scope. While manual testing is advised for identifying problems in logic, procedure, and implementation, automated testing techniques help to expand the coverage of smart contracts and can quickly detect code that does not comply with security best practices.

## 1.2.1   Risk Methodology

Vulnerabilities or bugs identified by BlockHat are ranked using a risk assessment technique that considers both the LIKELIHOOD and IMPACT of a security incident. This framework is effective at conveying the features and consequences of technological vulnerabilities.

Its quantitative paradigm enables repeatable and precise measurement, while also revealing the underlying susceptibility characteristics that were used to calculate the Risk scores. A risk level will be assigned to each vulnerability on a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 indicating the greatest possibility or impact.

— Likelihood quantifies the probability of a certain vulnerability being discovered and exploited in the untamed.

— Impact quantifies the technical and economic costs of a successful attack.

— Severity indicates the risk's overall criticality.

Probability and impact are classified into three categories: H, M, and L, which correspond to high, medium, and low, respectively. Severity is determined by probability and impact and is categorized into four levels, namely Critical, High, Medium, and Low.

| Impact | | High | Critical | High | Medium |
|--------|--|------|----------|------|--------|
| | | Medium | High | Medium | Low |
| | | Low | Medium | Low | Low |
| | | | High | Medium | Low |

Likelihood

# 2 Findings Overview

## 2.1 Summary

The following is a synopsis of our conclusions from our analysis of the MTHB implementation. During the first part of our audit, we examine the smart contract source code and run the codebase via a static code analyzer. The objective here is to find known coding problems statically and then manually check (reject or confirm) issues highlighted by the tool. Additionally, we check business logics, system processes, and DeFi-related components manually to identify potential hazards and/or defects.

## 2.2 Key Findings

In general, these smart contracts are well-designed and constructed, but their implementation might be improved by addressing the discovered flaws, which include , 1 medium-severity, 2 low-severity, 1 informational-severity vulnerabilities.

| Vulnerabilities | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Unchecked Transfer of Tokens in rescueToken | MEDIUM | Not fixed |
| ERC-20 Approval Race Condition Vulnerability | LOW | Not fixed |
| Floating Pragma Version | LOW | Not fixed |
| Use of Outdated ERC20 Implementation | INFORMATIONAL | Not fixed |

# 3    Finding Details

## A    MTHB.sol

### A.1    Unchecked Transfer of Tokens in rescueToken [MEDIUM]

**Description:**

The rescueToken function uses the transfer function to send tokens without verifying the return value. Some ERC-20 tokens (e.g., USDT) do not adhere to the ERC-20 standard strictly and may not revert on failure, leading to potential loss of funds if the transfer fails silently.

```
Listing 1: MAKECOINGENRATOR.sol
592  function rescueToken(address tokenAddress , address receiver) public
        ↪ onlyOwner {
593      uint balance = IERC20(tokenAddress).balanceOf(address(this));
594      IERC20(tokenAddress).transfer(receiver, balance);
595  }
```

**Risk Level:**

Likelihood – 2
Impact – 2

**Recommendation:**

Use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20.safeTransfer or manually check the return value of transfer. This ensures that the transfer succeeds and mitigates the risk of funds being lost due to silent failures.

## A.2   ERC–20 Approval Race Condition Vulnerability [LOW]

### Description:

The approve function in the provided ERC–20 token contract allows the owner to set an allowance for a spender without enforcing a safe workflow to prevent a race condition. If an owner increases an existing allowance (e.g., from 100 to 200 tokens), a malicious spender could execute transferFrom with the old allowance (100 tokens) before the new approval is processed and then use the new allowance (200 tokens) afterward, effectively spending more tokens than intended (up to 300 tokens in this example). This issue is acknowledged in the IERC20 interface comments, which recommend reducing the allowance to 0 before setting a new value, but the contract does not enforce this mitigation.

Listing 2: MAKECOINGENRATOR.sol

```
242    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount)
243        public
244        virtual
245        override
246        returns (bool)
247    {
248        _approve(_msgSender(), spender, amount);
249        return true;
250    }
```

Listing 3: MAKECOINGENRATOR.sol

```
408    function _approve(
409        address owner,
410        address spender,
411        uint256 amount
412    ) internal virtual {
413        require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero
                ↪ address");
414        require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero
                ↪ address");
```

```
416          _allowances[owner][spender] = amount;
417          emit Approval(owner, spender, amount);
418      }
```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2
Impact – 2

## Recommendation:

1. Enforce a "zero–first" approval workflow by requiring the allowance to be set to 0 before a new non–zero value is approved (e.g., using a custom safeApprove function). 2. Use the increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions exclusively for adjusting allowances, as these functions are already implemented and reduce the risk by performing atomic updates. For example, add a check in approve to revert if the current allowance is non–zero and the new amount is non–zero, or document that users should rely on increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance instead of approve.

Listing 4: Proposed Safe Approve Function

```
1    function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public virtual
          ↪ override returns (bool) {
2        require(
3            _allowances[_msgSender()][spender] == 0  amount == 0,
4            "ERC20: approve race condition risk – use increaseAllowance/
                  ↪ decreaseAllowance or reset to 0 first"
5        );
6        _approve(_msgSender(), spender, amount);
7        return true;
8    }
```

Alternatively, promote the use of:

Listing 5: MAKECOINGENRATOR.sol

```
279     function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue)
          ↪ public virtual returns (bool)
```

**Listing 6: MAKECOINGENRATOR.sol**

```
298     function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue)
          ↪ public virtual returns (bool)
```

## Status – Not fixed

## A.3   Floating Pragma Version [LOW]

### Description:

The smart contract uses a floating Solidity pragma (0.8.19). This means the compiler may use any minor version within the 0.8.x range, potentially leading to unexpected behavior if a newer minor version introduces changes or deprecations. Using a fixed Solidity version enhances security by ensuring consistency in compilation.

**Listing 7: MAKECOINGENRATOR.sol**

```
11   pragma solidity ^0.8.19;
```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1
Impact – 2

### Recommendation:

Specify a fixed Solidity version (e.g., pragma solidity 0.8.19;) to ensure consistent compilation and avoid potential issues from unintended compiler updates. Always verify that the chosen version is the most suitable for security and functionality.

Status – Not fixed

## A.4 Use of Outdated ERC20 Implementation [INFORMATIONAL]

### Description:

The contract implements its own version of the ERC20 standard, which may not include the latest security practices, optimizations, and features found in widely-used libraries such as OpenZeppelin's ERC20 implementation. Using an outdated or custom implementation can introduce risks and compatibility issues with other contracts and decentralized applications (dApps).

### Recommendation:

Replace the custom ERC20 implementation with the latest version of the ERC20 token standard from a reputable library such as OpenZeppelin. This not only ensures compliance with the latest security practices but also benefits from the community's scrutiny, ongoing maintenance, and updates.

Status – Not fixed

# 4 Static Analysis (Slither)

## Description:

Block Hat expanded the coverage of the specific contract areas using automated testing methodologies. Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework, was one of the tools used. Slither was run on all-scoped contracts in both text and binary formats. This tool can be used to test mathematical relationships between Solidity instances statically and variables that allow for the detection of errors or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs throughout the entire codebase.

## Results:

```
MAKECOINGENRATOR.rescueToken(address,address) (token.sol#596-599)
    ↪ ignores return value by IERC20(tokenAddress).transfer(receiver,
    ↪ balance) (token.sol#598)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #unchecked-transfer
INFO:Detectors:
ServicePayer.constructor(address,string,address) (token.sol#562-564)
    ↪ ignores return value by IPayable(receiver).payServicesFees{value:
    ↪  msg.value}(serviceName,_refaddress) (token.sol#563)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #unused-return
INFO:Detectors:
MAKECOINGENRATOR.constructor(string,string,uint8,uint256,address,string,
    ↪ address)._name (token.sol#569) shadows:
 - ERC20._name (token.sol#131) (state variable)
MAKECOINGENRATOR.constructor(string,string,uint8,uint256,address,string,
    ↪ address)._symbol (token.sol#570) shadows:
 - ERC20._symbol (token.sol#132) (state variable)
MAKECOINGENRATOR.constructor(string,string,uint8,uint256,address,string,
    ↪ address)._decimals (token.sol#571) shadows:
 - ERC20._decimals (token.sol#133) (state variable)
```

```
MAKECOINGENRATOR.constructor(string,string,uint8,uint256,address,string,
    ↪ address)._totalSupply (token.sol#572) shadows:
 - ERC20._totalSupply (token.sol#129) (state variable)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #local-variable-shadowing
INFO:Detectors:
MAKECOINGENRATOR.rescueBalance(address).toAddr (token.sol#591) lacks a
    ↪ zero-check on :
  - (success,None) = toAddr.call{value: address(this).balance}() (token.
      ↪ sol#592)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
Context._msgData() (token.sol#18-20) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #dead-code
INFO:Detectors:
Version constraint ^0.8.19 contains known severe issues (https://
    ↪ solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)
 - VerbatimInvalidDeduplication
 - FullInlinerNonExpressionSplitArgumentEvaluationOrder
 - MissingSideEffectsOnSelectorAccess.
It is used by:
 - ^0.8.19 (token.sol#11)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #incorrect-versions-of-solidity
INFO:Detectors:
Low level call in MAKECOINGENRATOR.rescueBalance(address) (token.sol
    ↪ #591-594):
 - (success,None) = toAddr.call{value: address(this).balance}() (token.
      ↪ sol#592)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↪ #low-level-calls
INFO:Detectors:
```

```
   ERC20._decimals (token.sol#133) should be immutable
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
     ↪ #state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
 INFO:Slither:token.sol analyzed (8 contracts with 100 detectors), 11
     ↪ result(s) found
```

## Conclusion:

Most of the vulnerabilities found by the analysis have already been addressed by the smart contract code review.

# 5   Conclusion

We examined the design and implementation of MTHB  in this audit and found several issues of various severities.  We advise MTHB  team to implement the recommendations contained in all  4 of our findings to further enhance the code's security.  It is of utmost priority to start by addressing the most severe exploit discovered by the auditors then followed by the remaining exploits, and finally we will be conducting a re-audit following the implementation of the remediation plan contained in this report.

We would much appreciate any constructive feedback or suggestions regarding our methodology, audit findings, or potential scope gaps in this report.

For a Smart Contract Audit, contact us at contact@blockhat.io