

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF
COMPUTER ENGINEERING
BBM 456 HOMEWORK 1




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Subject: Why Not Double Des? Explain

1) Double Des

Double DES is an encryption technique which uses two instances of DES on the same plain text. In both instances it uses different keys to encrypt the plain text. Both keys are required at the time of decryption. The 64 bit plain text goes into the first DES instance which then converts it into a 64 bit middle text using the first key and then it goes to the second DES instance which gives 64 bit cipher text by using the second key.



However, double DES uses a 112 bit key but gives a security level of 2^{56} not 2^{112} and this is because of the meet-in-the-middle attack, which can be used to break through double DES.

2) Meet in the middle Attack

The meet-in-the-middle attack is one of the types of known plaintext attacks. The intruder has to know some parts of plaintext and their ciphertexts. Using meet-in-the-middle attacks, it is possible to break ciphers, which have two or more secret keys for multiple encryption using the same algorithm. For example, the 2DES cipher works in this way. The meet-in-the-middle attack was first presented by Diffie and Hellman for cryptanalysis of the DES algorithm.

A cipher, which is to be broken using meet-in-the-middle attack, can be defined as two algorithms, one for encryption and one for decryption. Each of them contains two simpler algorithms:

$$C = E_b(k_b, E_a(k_a, P))$$

$$P = D_a(k_a, D_b(k_b, C))$$

where:

- C is a ciphertext,
- P is a plaintext,
- E is an algorithm for encryption,
- D is an algorithm for decryption,
- k_a and k_b are two secret keys

A following equation can be written for the cipher defined above:

$$D_b(k_b, C) = E_a(k_a, P)$$

Where C is the ciphertext, known to the intruder, which corresponds to the message P, also known to the intruder.

The first step of the attack is to create a table with all possible values for one side of the equation. One should calculate all possible ciphertexts of the known plaintext P created using the first secret key, so $E_a(k_a, P)$. A number of rows in the table is equal to a number of possible secret keys. It is good idea to sort the received table based on received ciphertexts $E_a(k_a, P)$, in order to simplify its further searching.

The second step of the attack is to calculate values of $D_b(k_b, C)$ for the second side of the equation. One should compare them with the values of the first side of the equation, computed earlier and stored in the table. The intruder searches a pair of secret keys k_a and k_b , for which the value $E_a(k_a, P)$ found in the table and the just calculated value $D_b(k_b, C)$ are the same.

