



# CS773-2022-Autumn: Computer Architecture for Performance and Security

## Lecture 6: More on flush attacks




**ON SILENT MODE PLEASE**

Phones on  
silence, please

Thank You

# The O3 effect (See the F+R code)



Out-of-order execution ☹️  
(Multiple fetch in one cycle)

# rdtsc

---

```
uint64_t rdtsc_nofence() {  
    uint64_t a, d;  
    asm volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a" (a), "=d" (d));  
    a = (d<<32) | a;  
    return a;  
}
```

asm: To include assembly code in C/C++

rdtsc registers the clock ticks passed since the last reset, 64 bit values stored as 32-bits in EDX (upper half) and EAX (lower half)


volatile: makes sure compiler does not do anything stupid ☺

# rdtsc with fence


```
uint64_t rdtsc() {  
    uint64_t a, d;  
    asm volatile ("mfence");  
    asm volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a" (a), "=d" (d));  
    a = (d<<32) | a;  
    asm volatile ("mfence");  
    return a;  
}
```

*There are lfence, sfence too.*

# The notion of Time (an agreement in covert channel)



# Flush&Flush attack [how does it work]



Step 0: Spy *maps* the shared library, shared in the cache

Step 1: Spy *flushes* the cache block

Step 2: Victim *reloads* the cache block

Step 3: Spy *flushes* the cache block again



# Job of an attacker



CALIBRATION; FOR  
LATENCY THRESHOLD



FIND OUT ADDRESSES  
OF INTEREST



BITS OF INTEREST

CASPER



# How good is the attacker



Bandwidth  
synchronous/asynchronous



Accuracy (error rate)



Stealthy and agility

CASPER



In-class discussion  
time