

Integrity

I'd swear my life on it

Secrecy Is Not Enough

- Encryption protects someone from reading plaintext
- An adversary can still modify messages
 - ▶ Flip a bit in the plaintext
 - ▶ Lead you to accept garbage data
- Integrity: protecting messages from tampering and modification
 - ▶ Node actually advertised that routing vector
 - ▶ Person actually made that bid
 - ▶ Endpoint actually sent that message to terminate the connection
- Confidentiality without integrity is rare (and a sign of a poor design), while integrity without confidentiality is common
 - ▶ Exception: encrypted storage (not on a network, no MitM)

Two Integrity Examples

- Cryptographic hashes
 - ▶ Way to verify that data has not been modified
 - ▶ Requires no secrets: anyone can generate one
 - ▶ Useful in data storage
- Message authentication codes (MACs)
 - ▶ Way to verify that data has not been modified
 - ▶ Also verifies generator has secret key: authenticity
 - ▶ Useful in networks

Cryptographic Hash

- Hash: computed fixed length output from arbitrary length input
 - ▶ Typical sizes 160-412 bits
 - ▶ Very cheap to compute, faster than network
- *Cryptographic* hash: also collision-resistant
 - ▶ Intractable to find $x \neq y$ such that $H(x) = H(y)$
 - ▶ Of course, many such collisions exist: ($2^{30} - 2^{256}$) GB blocks have same 256-bit hash)
 - ▶ But no-one has been able to find one, even after analyzing the algorithm for years
- Use SHA-256 or SHA-512 today (SHA-2)
 - ▶ Historically, most popular hash was SHA-1, but it's nearly broken
 - ▶ October 2, 2012: Keccak algorithm chosen by NIST for SHA-3
 - Goal: alternative, dissimilar hash function to SHA-2

Cryptographic Hash


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Designed by NSA

Designed by Bertoni et al.

Using a Cryptographic Hash

- Small hash uniquely describes large data
 - ▶ Hash a file, remember hash value h_1
 - ▶ Compute hash h_2 later on same file: if $h_1 = h_2$, file hasn't been tampered with
 - ▶ Hashes often published with a software distribution
- Hash tree (Merkle hash tree) lets you check small piece of huge data with a logarithmic number of steps



HMAC


- Anyone can generate a cryptographic hash: MACs want to also provide assurance generator has shared secret
- Simple approach: generate MAC from hash and secret,
 - ▶ $\text{HMAC}(K, M) = \text{SHA-2}(K, M)$
 - ▶ Send $\{M, \text{HMAC}(K, M)\}$
- Simple: we have a cryptographically strong MAC!

WRONG

- Anyone can provide assurance
 - Simple
 - ▶ HMAC
 - ▶ Send
 - Simple: we have a cryptographically strong MAC!
- If I have $\{M, \text{HMAC}(K, M)\}$,
I can generate $\{M', \text{HMAC}(K, M')\}$,
where M' has data appended to M

HMAC, Revisited

- $\text{HMAC}(K, M) = H(K \oplus \text{opad}, H(K \oplus \text{ipad}, M))$
 - H is a cryptographic hash such as SHA-3
 - ipad is 0x36 repeated 64 times, opad 0x5c repeated 64 times
- Why does previous attack not work?




Encryption and MACs

- Should I encrypt the MAC, or MAC the encrypted data?



or



- Encrypting the MAC is not always secure
- MACing encrypted data is always secure