
Client
0,792
Data Tempering
0,37
Information Disclosure
0,307
Denial of Service
0,522
1.1
Man-In-The-Middle
0,37
0,74
Man On The Side
0,147
0,59
Network Sniffing
0,188
0,75
Request Flood
0,325
0,65
Damage to Client
0,23
0,46
Malware Attack
0,081
0,81
Secure Communications - SSL/TLS
0,5
Encrypt Data Communications
0,75
Encrypt Network Traffic
0,75
Rate Limiting
0,5
Physical Security Controls
0,5
Update Software Regularly
0,9


Micro-Controller
0,857
Spoofing Identity
0,133
Data Tempering
0,56
Information Disclosure
0,077
Denial of Service
0,594
Unauthorised Access
0,133
Man-In-The-Middle
0,37
0,74
SQL Injection
0,193
0,77
Connect Fake Client
0,135
0,54
Man On The Side
0,147
0,59
Network Sniffing
0,188
0,75
Encrypt Data At Rest
0,75
Network Flood
0,39
0,65
Damage to Controller
0,276
0,46
Malware Attack
0,081
0,81
Remote Application Access
0,607
Steals Phone
0,15
0,75
Multi-Factor Authentication
0,8
Secure Communication - SSL/TLS
0,5
Input Validation
0,75
Client Authentication
0,75
Encrypt Data Communications
0,75
Encrypt Network Traffic
0,75
Rate Limiting
0,4
Physical Security Measures
0,4
Update Software Regularly
0,9
Gains User Credentials
0,607
App Authentication
0,8
Social Engineering
0,482
Brute Force
0,11
0,73
Man On The Side
0,147
0,59
Phishing
0,41
0,82
Shoulder Surfing
0,122
0,49
Use Strong PassPhrase
0,85
Encrypt Communications
0,75
Education & Awareness
0,5
Privacy Screen
0,75

Design Document

IoT-based Smart Security and Home Automation System

1. INTRODUCTION

The design document provides an overview of vulnerabilities and mitigations that apply to the lighting component, controller hub, and the overall smart home system. along with the basic interpretation and functional flow diagrams of the application while adhering to security controls and architecture. potential risks with the likelihood of occurrence are listed in order to create a prototype design of value mitigating the cybersecurity threats identified.

2. SYSTEM DESIGN

The (Kodali, et al., 2016) case study provides an overview of a low-cost system that serves as a smart home security and home automation as depicted in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1

3. VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT

3.1. Vulnerability Identification

In order to understand a few of the cybersecurity challenges in creating a smart-home system, the STRIDE threat modelling framework was utilised as a baseline to build the AD tree, while aiming to identify and mitigate security threats in software systems with a structured approach to identify potential cybersecurity attacks (Tok et al, 2022). Figure 3.1 illustrates the STRIDE findings.

4.2

Threat Type	Type of Attack or Vulnerability	Mitigation Techniques
Spoofing Identity	• Control or unauthorized access (Janes et al, 2020) • Escalation of privileges (Rizvi et al, 2020)	• Implement authorized access with multi factor authentication • Enable audit trials

Tampering with Data	• Data exfiltration (Vaccari et al, 2021)
	• Data Manipulation (Bhattacharjee et al, 2017)
	• Control over database (Cooper, J and James, A. 2009)
		• Access control
		• Input validation
		• Encryption of Data
		  ◦ At rest
		  ◦ In transit
		  ◦ upon access
		• apply a defence in depth approach
		• Define security requirements

Repudiation	• Validate system owner/user (Cruz-Piris et al, 2018) • Validate input (Redini et al, 2021)	• Apply a form control list to system access • Apply Validation of output data owner • Apply Secure Socket layer (SSL) Certificate

Information disclosure	• System providing Following type of info :
	  ◦ Operation system in use (Abomhara, M and Koien, G. 2015)
	  ◦ IP address
	• SQL injection (Tweneboah et al, 2017)
	• Data breach
	• Insecure data storage (Ahmad, J and Rajan A.V. 2016)
	• insecure data transfer communication (Shin, S. and Seto, Y. 2020)
		• Limit the amount of information that the system can provide when scanned
		• Limit displaying the output where not needed to
		• Define system security requirements
		5.1

Denial of Service	• UDP ,ICMP, SYN and HTTP Flood (Gupta et al, 2022) • DDos Attack (Kolias et al, 2017) • DNS Amplification (Arthi, R. and Krishnaveni, S. 2021) • Application layer control	• Implement appropriate authentication and authorisation mechanisms in the solution • Implement proper Access Control
Elevation of privileges	• Exploiting software vulnerabilities (Cam-winget, N et all 2016) • Bypassing authentication methods (Jiang et al, 2018) • Social engineering (Ghasemi et al, 2016)	• Implement least privilege • Apply appropriate patch management practices while adhering to regular patch cycle. • Apply Logging and monitoring controls. • Utilise proper Network Segmentation • Apply proper encryption

Figure 3.1

3.2. Vulnerability Assessment

An attack-defence tree (AD Tree) is a node-labelled rooted tree describing the measures an attacker might take to attack a system and the defences that a defender can employ to protect the system (Kordy et al., 2014).

Figure 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.2 below depict AD Trees for the Client (Lighting) and a Micro-Controller hub for the smart-home automation system. The diagrams are also supplemented in this document for ease of readability.



Figure 3.2.1: AD Tree for Micro-controller (TICC3200)



Figure 3.2.2: AD Tree for Light Client

3.3. Vulnerability Analysis

Probability of Success Domain

The “Probability of Success” domain added to the ADT is used to quantify the risk towards a system (Kordy, B. and Widel, W.,2018) This domain uses the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) V3 to calculate the probability each attack within the tree has for success. The domain also quantifies how successful mitigations, shown within the countermeasures on the ADT, are on reducing the likeliness of these attacks. Both values are then used to determine how likely a vulnerability is to be exploited.

CVSS V3 is a standardized method used to assign numerical scores to vulnerabilities within computer systems and applications to determine their severity (Figueroa-Lorenzo,S. ,2020). These scores can be calculated using the CVSS V3 calculator, shown in Figure 3.3.1, which uses numerous factors to determine the CVSS base score.



Figure 3.3.1: CVSS V3 Base Score Metrics (NIST,2023)

The base score calculations for the attacks within our ADT’s are shown in Figure 3.3.2 and Figure 3.3.3.

Attack	Attack Vector	Attack Complexity	Privileges Required	User Ineraction	Scope	Confidentiality Impact	Integrity Impact	Availability Impact	CVSS Score	CVSS Score[0-1]
Phishing	Network	Low	None	Required	Changed	High	Low	None	8.2	0.82
Shoulder Surfing	Physical	Low	None	Required	Unchanged	High	Low	None	4.9	0.49
Brute Force	Network	Low	None	None	Unchanged	Low	Low	Low	7.3	0.73
Man-on-the-side	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	None	None	5.9	0.59
Theft	Physical	Low	None	None	Unchanged	High	High	Low	7.5	0.75
Man-in-the-middle	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	High	None	7.4	0.74
SQL Injection	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	High	None	7.7	0.77
Fake Client	Network	Low	Low	None	Unchanged	None	Low	Low	5.4	0.54
Network Sniffing	Network	Low	None	None	Unchanged	High	None	None	7.5	0.75
Network Flood	Adjacent Network	Low	None	None	Unchanged	None	None	High	6.5	0.65
Physical Damage	Physical	Low	None	None	Unchanged	None	None	High	4.6	0.46
Malware	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	High	High	8.1	0.81

Figure 3.3.2: CVSS V3 Base Score Calculations for Controller ADT

Attack	Attack Vector	Attack Complexity	Privileges Required	User Ineraction	Scope	Confidentiality Impact	Integrity Impact	Availability Impact	CVSS Score	CVSS Score[0-1]
Man-in-the-middle	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	High	None	7.4	0.74
Man-on-the-side	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	None	None	5.9	0.59
Network Sniffing	Network	Low	None	None	Unchanged	High	None	None	7.5	0.75
Request Flood	Adjacent Network	Low	None	None	Unchanged	None	None	High	6.5	0.65
Damage to client	Physical	Low	None	None	Unchanged	None	None	High	4.6	0.46
Malware attack	Network	High	None	None	Unchanged	High	High	High	8.1	0.81

Figure 3.3.3: CVSS V3 Base Score Calculations for Client ADT

4. MITIGATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED AS PER THE VULNERABILITIES FOUND

Figures 4.1-4.4 shows the current features of the system that makes it to be vulnerable and the mitigations that can be applied (as referenced from (Touqeer, et al., 2021), (Borgini, 2021), (Apriorit, 2022), (Anand al., 2020), (Abdullah, et al., 2019))

Features of the Current System	Risks Accompanied	Potential Vulnerabilities	Possible Mitigations
It relies solely on digits on the phone's keypad to access the security system	• Unauthorized access. • Spoofing • Man-in-the-middle Attacks • Installation of malicious software • Fines and lawsuits that could lead to damaged reputations, bankruptcy and losses	• Lack of Multi-Factor Authentication • Lack of authorization • Unencrypted communication • Not enough security enforcing features • Lack of data privacy and certified compliances like GDPR, ISO 27001, ISO 27017, ISO 27018, etc	• Multi-Factor Authentication • Implement changing of passwords • Implement complex passwords • Limit number of log-in attempts • User Access controls • Authorizations • Session management • Implement data privacy
The system's functionality is dependent on the	• Wi-Fi dependency • Network attack • Denial-of-Service	• System is down and security is compromised	• Set-up other system connectivity e.g.,

Figure 4.1

Wi-Fi connection only,	(DoS) and Denial-of -Sleep (DoSL) attacks	once Wi-Fi connection is lost or weak • Insecure network • Unencrypted communication	Local Area Connection • Firewalls like Next-generation firewall • Limit device or network bandwidth • Backup connectivity options like 4G or 3G, to ensure that the system remains operational even if the Wi-Fi connection is lost. • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems • Implementation of secure socket layer (SSL) Certificates, • Data Encryption

Figure 4.2

			• Network segmentation
Lack of security tests that make room for the system's improvements	• More prone to breaches	• Lack of security tests and scanning	• Regular security and backup testing, and scanning for threats helps in reinforcing the system
Lack of data storage security	• Injection attacks • Tampering	• Unsecure data storage	• Secure databases • Antivirus • Data encryption
Lack of Security Updates	• More prone to breaches	• Lack of Security Updates and patches	• Regular and automatic System and hardware updates
Unsecured device management	• Unauthorised factory-resetting of devices • Installation of malicious software and updates	• Malicious software updates • Device breaches • Weak firmware or software, servers, backend	• Use of secure updating mechanisms like digital signatures • Practising secure Programming

Figure 4.3

	• Software and firmware risks and attacks	application	practices • System centralization • Implementing secure device management protocols • Limiting the number of device management access points • Ensure tamper-resistant hardware
Human Error	• Breaches • Social engineering	• Human errors	• Cybersecurity training on users

12.1

Figure 4.4

5. SOLUTIONS APPROACH

Using the Agile methodology to develop a more secure system, below is a plan for Sprint 1:

- Python language will be used to implement:
    - User interface that centralizes the system
    - Multi-Factor Authorization
    - Validation of complex passwords
    - Change of password

- Access control and Authorization
- Session Management
- Cookies and certificates e.g. csrf token
- Testing

An activity diagram, in Figure 5.1, illustrates the system's authentication aspect as a solution.



Figure 5.1

6. CONCLUSION

Smart-home systems have been on the increase and widely adopted worldwide. And as such, they also pose several risks. This report demonstrates several challenges that can be anticipated in a smart-home and automation system, vulnerabilities for

the system, the micro-controller hub, and a light client. This also provides solutions for mitigating the risks associated with the system with the use of ADTrees.

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Index of comments

1.1 Before you producing the AD, you must have set the background.

2.1 A very detailed AD tree with all appropriate nodes and measures are evident

3.1 Excellent start

4.1 Excellent use of Use Case Diagram, where all the actors and actions are present

4.2 Too good idea of using STRIDE

5.1 Outstanding

6.1 Excellent design with appropriate nodes.

7.1 Inappropriate format of citation used.

7.2 Truly amazing description. The knowledge and understanding are superb

7.3 The image could have been better clear

8.1 Data and information in these two tables are unclear. A clear data table could have been produced.

8.2 Wrong format of citation used

12.1 A very detailed risk mitigation plan has been noted with clear labelling. Very well done!

13.1 Excellent

14.1 A very good conclusion is evident. Overall, a brilliant piece of work. Very well done to all of you.