



# Adversarial Label Flips

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# A short recap

## Adversarial attack



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Husky (42.82% confidence)

Noise (PGD-40) 50x amplified Handkerchief (99.999988% confidence)

Source: ctf.codes, circa 2021

### What we want to do


# Categorised as Dog Cat Plane Adversarial Example of a Cat Plane ? ? 0.0

How many modified dogs get classified as cats vs as planes? etc.

# Some simple theory

We want similar images that are classified differently.
But what is "similar"?

# Quantifying Difference ( $\epsilon$ )




# Two Different Approaches




# Projected Gradient Decent

- Pick spot in epsilon ball
- 2 Iterate gradient decent
- If leaving ball, project back onto surface
- Repeat to convergence



Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks, Aleksander Madry et al., arXiv, 2019

# Projected Gradient Decent



Know your enemy, Oscar Knagg, towardsdatascience.com, 2019

# Carlini-Wagner-Attack

Original approach: minimise difference while always staying in "misclassification territory".

Problem: Non-linearity of constraint makes optimimisation difficult.

Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks, Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner, IEEE, 2017

# Carlini-Wagner-Attack

Solution: Pack constraint into the function that is optimised.

→ minimise: difference - "how misclassified is x?"\* i.e. minimise difference while maximising misclassification.

Apply Adam optimisation.

\*loss function

Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks, Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner, IEEE, 2017

# Code

# Results

# MNIST, $L^{\infty}$ -PGD





$$\epsilon = 0.2$$



$$\epsilon = 0.02$$



$$\epsilon = 0.5$$



$$\epsilon = 0.05$$




$$\epsilon=1$$



$$\epsilon = 0.1$$




# MNIST, L<sup>2</sup>-Carlini-Wagner-Attack







# CIFAR-10, $L^{\infty}$ -PGD







 $\epsilon = 0.02$ 












# CIFAR-10, L<sup>0</sup>-Brendel-Bethge-Attack




# **Tentative Findings**

Small  $\epsilon \to \text{symmetric confusion matrix}$ 

Large  $\epsilon \to \text{strong attractor classes}$  ("8" and "frog")

### References I



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Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu.

Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.

### References II



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The mnist database of handwritten digit images for machine learning research [best of the web].

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### References III



Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. 2009.