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Adversarial Label Flips

Related work presentation

Matthias Dellago & Maximilian Samsinger

Adversarial examples [1]

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations!

- [1] Intriguing properties of neural networks, 2013
- [2] Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, 2014



Adversarial examples [1]

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations!

Fast gradient sign method [2]

Even worse: Adversarial examples generalize over multiple datasets and architectures. Even cheap attacks like FGSM can work.

- [1] Intriguing properties of neural networks, 2013
- [2] Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, 2014

Adversarial examples [1]

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Fast gradient sign method [2]

Even worse: Adversarial examples generalize over multiple datasets and architectures. Even cheap attacks like FGSM can work.

Fast gradient sign method

Modify an input image x, with respective label y,

$$x + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y)).$$

using the loss function J.

- [1] Intriguing properties of neural networks, 2013
- [2] Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, 2014

Adversarial examples [1]

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations!

Projected gradient descent [3]

Strong and cheap attacks therefore exist: Projected gradient descent (PGD) iteratively computes FGSM.

Fast gradient sign method

Modify an input image x, with respective label y,


$$x + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y)).$$

using the loss function J.

^[1] Intriguing properties of neural networks, 2014

^[3] Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks, 2018

Fast gradient sign method



[2] Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, 2014

What we want to do

Confusion Matrix Categorised as Dog Cat Plane Dog 0.0 ? ? Adversarial Example of a Cat Plane Plane ? ? 0.0 ?

How many modified dogs get classified as cats vs as planes? etc.

Case study

A suit of attacks is available with FoolBox! [4]

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Foolbox

- Over 40 different attacks.
- Available in PyTorch, TensorFlow and JAX.
- Easy to work with.




Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack for different epsilons.

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack for different epsilons.

```
import foolbox as fb
model = ...
fmodel = fb.PvTorchModel(model, bounds=(0, 1))
attack = fb.attacks.LinfPGD()
epsilons = [0.0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 1.0]
. advs. success = attack(fmodel, images, labels, epsilons=epsilons)
```

Datasets

MNIST [5]




The MNIST database of handwritten digit images for machine learning research, 2012

Fashion-MNIST [6]




Fashion-MNIST: A novel image dataset for benchmarking machine learning algorithms, 2017

CIFAR-10 [7]



Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images, 2009

References I



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Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks

Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.

References II



Jonas Rauber, Wieland Brendel, and Matthias Bethge. Foolbox: A python toolbox to benchmark the robustness of machine learning models.

arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.04131, 2017.



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The mnist database of handwritten digit images for machine learning research [best of the web].

IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 29(6):141–142, 2012.



Han Xiao, Kashif Rasul, and Roland Vollgraf.

Fashion-mnist: a novel image dataset for benchmarking machine learning algorithms.

arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.07747, 2017.

References III



Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. 2009.