



Adversarial Label Flips


Matthias Dellago & Maximilian Samsinger

A short recap


Adversarial attack



+ €



=



Husky

(42.82% confidence)

Noise (PGD-40)

50x amplified

Handkerchief

(99.999988% confidence)

Source: `ctf.codes`, circa 2021

What we want

Confusion Matrix

		Categorised as		
		Dog	Cat	Plane
Adversarial Example of a	Dog	0.0	?	?
	Cat	?	0.0	?
	Plane	?	?	0.0

How many modified dogs get classified as cats vs as planes? etc.


Some simple theory

We want similar images that are classified differently.
But what is "similar"?

Quantifying Difference (ϵ)

L^0 -Norm


Number of
different pixels



Change very few
pixels maximally

L^1 -Norm


Sum of
all differences



Minimise sum

L^2 -Norm


Root of the sum
of the squares
of all differences



Minimise sum
of squares


L^∞ -Norm

Maximum of
all differences




Change all
pixels equally

Two Different Approaches




Projected Gradient Decent

- 1 Pick spot in epsilon ball around target
- 2 Iterate gradient decent
- 3 If leaving ball, project back onto surface
- 4 Repeat to convergence



Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks, Aleksander Madry et al., arXiv, 2019

Projected Gradient Decent



Know your enemy, Oscar Knagg, towardsdatascience.com, 2019

Carlini-Wagner-Attack

Original approach: minimise difference while always staying in "misclassification territory".

Problem: Non-linearity of constraint makes optimisation difficult.

Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks, Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner, IEEE, 2017

Carlini-Wagner-Attack

Solution: Pack constraint into the function that is optimised.

→ minimise: difference - "how misclassified is x?"*
i.e. minimise difference while maximising misclassification.

Apply Adam optimisation.

*loss function


Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks, Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner, IEEE, 2017

Code


Results

MNIST, L^∞ -PGD


$\epsilon = 0.01$




$\epsilon = 0.02$




$\epsilon = 0.05$




$\epsilon = 0.1$




$\epsilon = 0.2$




$\epsilon = 0.5$



$\epsilon = 1$




MNIST, L^2 -Carlini-Wagner-Attack




CIFAR-10, L^∞ -PGD


$\epsilon = 0.01$




$\epsilon = 0.02$




$\epsilon = 0.05$




$\epsilon = 0.1$




$\epsilon = 0.2$




$\epsilon = 0.5$



$\epsilon = 1$



CIFAR-10, L^0 -Brendel-Bethge-Attack



Tentative Findings

Small $\epsilon \rightarrow$ symmetric confusion matrix

Large $\epsilon \rightarrow$ strong attractor classes ("8" and "frog")

References I



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