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# Important Protocols

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## IpSec

### What is IpSec?

RFC 6071(IP Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap)

IPsec is a protocol that provides a secure tunnel between two computers. It is used to protect data that is transmitted over the internet.

IPsec helps mitigation against:

- eavesdropping
- theft
- replay attacks,
- Data corruption.

Ipsec operates in 2 different modes: tunnel mode and transport mode.

In **tunnel mode**, everything is encapsulated in IPsec datagram. when data is transmitted, the layer 3 devices only use IPsec header to route the packet.

This is used basically in the site-to-site VPN and remote access VPN.

in **transport mode**, all of the data is protected but the original IP header is not. Payload is protected by IPsec. This is used generally in P2P applications.

### Ipsec building Blocks:

Ipsec Suite either uses **Authentication Header(AH)** or **Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)**. One difference is that in the former, the data is encrypted.

ESP and AH both come with options of transport and tunnel.

In the AH transport mode, the payload is encrypted and the original IP header is not protected. In the tunnel mode, the payload is encrypted and the original IP header is protected. A new IP header is appointed to the packet in tunnel mode.

ESP transport and Tunnel modes can be used as it is or with AH.

ESP encapsulates the data so we have both header and trailer in the packet in Transport mode and in Tunnel mode.

in ESP header, different than AH header, there is no next header field and payload length field.

After the headers, there is **Security Association (SA)**.

Security Association in IPsec suite is a **unidirectional connection** that gives devices the capability to use AH or ESP services. for a bidirectional comms, a pair of SA is needed.

In order SA to be established, the following steps are needed:

- **SPI:** Security Parameter Index. It is a unique number that is used to identify the SA.
- **Security Protocol Identifier:** It is a number that identifies the protocol that is used in the SA. (50 for AH or 51 for ESP)
- **Destination IP Address**

For key management, it is either done manually or automated using IKEv1 or IKEv2.

**IKE** (Internet Key Exchange) is a protocol that is used to establish a key management between two computers. default one is IKEv2.

Next building block is **Crypto Algorithm**. These are used for Encryption , Authentication , Integrity and Pseudorandom Number Generation.

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for SA establishment, there are couple of different protocols that are used.

- ISAKMP (Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol) : Used for procedures and formats to establish SA. It helps us build the SA.
- OAKLEY (One-Way Authentication Key Exchange Protocol) : gives key-exchange mechanism. Used to exchange key over insecure connection using Diffie-Hellman.
- SKEME (Security Key Exchange Method) : gives anonymity and reputability through key-exchange techniques.
- IKE (Internet Key Exchange) : Uses combination of ISAKMP, OAKLEY, and SKEME

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## Ipsec in Enterprise

In enterprise level, there are 2 main uses of IPsec:

- Site-to-Site VPN

connect 2 or more sites together. One type of Site-to-Site VPN is **DMVPN** (Dynamic Multicast VPN).

**logically** connects sites, protects **entire** network, provides corporate resources to other sites.

- Remote Access VPN

**logically** connect endpoint to another network. IPsec using the OS IP stack. protects **individual** devices.

useful in wifi hotspots.

Bu mesela bir isci evden calisirken isyerinin agina ulassin diye kullanilan vpn. ticari bireysel VPNler de bu tip, hotspotshield, NordVPN gibi.

as for IPsec implementations, there are 2 main types:

- GRE over IPsec

way more common.

encapsulates entire packet. this is essentially DMVPN over IPsec.

- IPsec over GRE

much less common. only the payload is protected via IPsec. routing information stays visible in the GRE portion of the datagram.

## **IKEv2**

### **What is IKE?**

IKE is Internet Key Exchange that uses ISAKMP, OAKLEY, and SKEME for establishing SA for securing network traffic.

Although IKEv1 is still used, IKEv2 is the new standard and IKEv1 is obsolete.

V2 brought these:

- new authentication method EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) alongside PKS and PKI
- brought MOBIKE (Multicast Opportunistic Key Exchange) which allows dynamically change IP addresses without needing to re-establish the SA.
- in V1, SA lifetime was negotiated, in V2, SA lifetime is configured locally and faster negotiation.
- Flexible traffic selection per SA.

Some benefits of IKEv2 are:

- **It is more reliable:**

message flow system uses requests followed by responses. Initiator sends a request, and the responder sends a response. If the initiator does not receive a response, it will retry or drops the request. the reliability is on the initiator side.

- **It is more Mobile:**

using MOBIKE, keeps VPN connection active when changing IP addresses. thanks to **multihoming**, when interface drops, the traffic is moved to another interface.

- **it enables High Availability:**

IKEv2 comes with **redirection** feature. if one server for VPN is taken down or went down, the users can be redirected to another server.

For authentication, IKEv2 uses **Pre-Shared Key** (PSK) and **Certificate Authentication**. Apart from that uses EAP.

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## MacSec

Macsec is defined in 802.1AE as **point2point security protocol** providing **data confidentiality, integrity, and origin authenticity** (all CIA triad.) for traffic over Layer 1 or Layer 2 links and is part of larger security ecosystem.

Technically, on the transmit side of the link, Macsec adds **Mac Security Tag** (SecTag, 8 to 16 bytes) and **Integrity Check Value** (ICV, 8 to 16 bytes) to the packet and can optionally encrypt the packet. on the receive side of the link the MacSec engine can identify and decrypt the packet, check integrity, provide **replay protection** and remove SecTag and ICV. Invalid frames are discarded or monitored.

There is a need to protect data that is transmitted over the in-vehicle ethernet that is connecting **ECUs** together.

Data security protocols like MacSec are often deployed in Ethernet Local Area Networks (LAN) that support **mission critical applications**.

**Macsec per the IEEE 802.1AE standard PREVENTS LAYER 2 SECURITY THREATS SUCH AS PASSIVE WIRETAPPING, INTRUSION, MITM, AND REPLAY ATTACKS BY OFFERING LINE-RATE ENCRYPTION AND PROTECTION OF TRAFFIC PASSING OVER LAYER 1 AND/OR LAYER 2 LINKS.**

Although it is desirable, it is **not practical to secure the entire network against physical access** by determined attackers. **Macsec allows only authorized systems that attach to and interconnect LANs in a network** to maintain confidentiality and integrity of data and take measures against data theft.

- **Where does Macsec fit within OSI-layer model?**

On the layer 1, there is Automotive Ethernet Physical Layer (AEPL) which is the layer that connects the physical layer of the vehicle to the network. these are like 100baseT, 1000baseT etc.

On the next layer, which is Layer 2, there is IEEE Ethernet MAC + VLAN(802.1Q) + AVB(802.1Qav) + TSN + **MacSec**. Hence, macsec is a layer 2 protocol that is sitting on top of the bare metal.

On the layer 3, there is IPv4 and IPv6 which are protected by **IpSec**. Hence IpSec is a layer 3 protocol.

- **What are some common Security Threats?**

These are some of the common threats against Ethernet Lan:

- - Eavesdropping (compromising routers, links, DNS, or algorithms)
  - Sending arbitrary data including IP headers.
  - Replay attacks.
  - Tampering message in transit.
  - writing malicious code and deceiving people into running it.
  - exploiting bugs in software to take over machines and use them as base for future attacks.

While IPsec is encryption at Layer 3, MacSec is encryption at Layer 2 which is Ethernet layer.

Remember this : ==> **IEEE 802.1AE**

Compared to IPsec:

- MacSec provides STRONGER ENCRYPTION performance at HIGHER SPEEDS.
- Macsec can encrypt user data at UP TO 800Gig Ethernet Speeds without any hardware offloading.
- Very little latency.
- Application to any network that relies on Ethernet so can be used in many places => so Data Center, Corporate environment, Service Provider, etc.
- Allows to protect all protocols virtually, including layer 2 protocols like AVB TP (IEEE 1722)
- The smallest attack surface on Ethernet-based links for attacks with physical access to a medium

IPSEC and TLS are software based but MacSec is hardware(phy and switches) based. so it makes it more robust and secure!

Packet Structure:

A captured MacSec packet has some options and payloads.

-> **802.1AE Security Tag.**

This Tag has some option flags like VER, ES, E.

E flag is set to 1 if the packet is **encrypted**.

-> **ICV Value**

ICV is a checksum that is used to verify the integrity of the packet.

-> **Port Identifier.**

shows on what port the packet was captured on.

-> **Data**

Data is the encrypted payload. looks like a random hash value.

**MacSec Terminology:**

### 1. **MacSec Key Agreement Protocol**

Used to discover Macsec capable peers and used to negotiate encryption keys. These keys are for **data encryption** and **Security Association Key Encryption(SAK)**

### 2. **Connectivity Association (CA)**

Similar to **IPSec SA** but for MacSec. Defines a secure relationship between MacSec peers.

After authentication and key exchange are performed, a secure communication link, called **Secure Channel** is established using Macsec from one node inside CA to another. in MAcSec protected network,

each node has at least one **unidirectional secure channel**. The Secure channel does not expire and lasts for the duration of the communication between two nodes. Each secure channel is associated with an **identifier**: the **Secure Channel Identifier** SCI.

Within each secure channel(both transmit and receive), Secure Associations are defined. each Secure association has a corresponding **Secure Association Key** (SAK) and is identified by the Association Number field of the SecTag header. Secure Associations have limited duration. this is called Key Rotation.

### 3. **\*\*Connectivity Association Key(CAK)\*\***

Static or Dynamic Key exchanged by macsec speakers. This can be seen as **primary key** that is used to derive all other session keys.

So CAK is used to derive SAK keys and these SAK keys are used to encrypt the user data.

So this CAK can be statically configured or can be distributed by the server.

### 4. **\*\*Connectivity Association Key Name (CKN)\*\***

Any name that defines a CAK.

### 5. **\*\*Primary and Fallback Keys\*\***

Primary key is used to negotiate an MKA if this fails, Fallback key is used.

### 6. **\*\* Security Association Keys(SAK)\*\***

Derived from CAK used to encrypt data as mentioned earlier.

**Within each Secure Association, **replay protection** can be performed by checking the Packet Number field of SecTAG header against the packet number locally stored since each macsec packet has a unique sequential packet and each packet number can be used only once.**

A **Key Server** generates SAK. If you have if you have one switch connected to another switch on ethernet link and MacSec is enabled on this switch, one of these switches will be a Key Server. You can either configure one of these switches as higher priority to make it key server

if you enable MacSec on an interface, it drops all frames except MACsec encrypted frames. But you can configure macsec profile to allow unprotected traffic in macsec negotiation fails.

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## **What is IEEE 802.1X**

IEEE 802.1X is a network authentication protocol that opens ports for network access when a user's identity is authenticated it also authorizes them for access to the network.

IEEE 802.1X is a Port-Based Network Access Control(PNAC) standard that provides protected authentication for secure network access.

an 802.1X network is **different from home networks in one MAJOR way**: it has an authentication server called **RADIUS Server** which checks user's credentials to see if they are an active member of the organization and , depending on the network policies, grants them various access rights. This helps unique

credential creation for each user, eliminating the reliance on single network password that can be easily cracked or stolen.

the RADIUS server is able to do it in various ways, typically over LDAP or SAML protocol.

### What are possible MACsec use cases within Ethernet Network

If a hacker taps into the macsec disabled network, the flowing data can be obtained by hacker and can be used to perform attacks. Hacker can target switches, can tap into the network, or can monitor the device.

if macsec is enabled, tapping or eavesdropping, or replay attacks are not possible since packets are numbered, encrypted. **HOWEVER** hacker CAN disrupt the network using DOS attack if DOS prevention is disabled. in this case, neither hacker nor the vehicle can receive the packets. if DOS prevention is Enabled, the Video stream(i.e.) remains disturbed but DOS does not propagate through the Ethernet phy.

Macsec is cost-effective and could be used in combination with other technologies like IPsec, TLS, etc.

### ARP & ArpSec

ARP is unauthenticated, insecure and primarily broadcast protocol.

this kind of broadcasts are stopped either by routers or alike Layer 3 devices on the network.

ARP's only job is to map logical address(IP) to physical address(MAC). Just like building numbers do not help you to figure out how to go to this house, IP addresses do not help you figure out how to traverse the network to reach a destination. Hence, ARP helps this traversing.

==> ARP helps to figure out of **known** IP addresses to **unknown** physical addresses. For this end, physical address should be added into the datagram.

So once IP is resolved to MAC address, Destination MAC is added to the datagram. it is a **MUST**

First checks the memory (Arp cache) to see if the IP address is already known. if not, it dynamically resolves the mac address to the ip address.

**\*\*ARP Security \*\***

#### **\*ARP broadcast storms**

For ARP's working mentality, all the nodes in the system receive some sort of ARP messages and use them in their buffers.

Too much broadcast traffic is called **ARP broadcast storm** and can cause the network to become unstable. If storm becomes very strong, it causes Denial of Service.

This kind of problem also causes memory and processor overloads and sometimes crashing of the machines.

Why do Broadcast storms occur?

- Bad NIC or Pyhical Loop which is a hardware problem.
- **Spanning Tree Protocol**(STP) Loop or Device Misconfiguration , which is a software problem.

- Malicious Attacks.

Using HUB instead of switch is a bad idea for example because it is not programmable and not intelligent on protocols and it does not have flood avoidance.

Switches can handle this problem if **Spanning Tree Protocol** is enabled and there is no misconfiguration.

how to avoid this or DDOS type of problems?

- **Rate-limiting** the traffic. Depending on the vendor, you can limit broadcast, directly limit ARP, or rate the packet/second, bit/second, percent of bandwidth.

To successfully handle this, you need to know the baseline, **normal** traffic. There are also dangers of limiting legitimate traffics.

**IDPS systems** are also good ways to avoid this. they can help baseline setting, localize the source of the problems, can potentially help isolating network issues.

### \*CAM Table Flood

Switches dynamically associate the MAC addresses of any attached devices with the port to which they are connected on the switch based on the source MAC addresses of the packets passing into the physical interface. Hence, they **allocate memory and buffer locations** called **content addressable memory (CAM)**.

There is, of course a limit for this listing.

Maximum is 4096 entries. when an attacker connects to this switch, one of the entries is written with his mac address. What happens when the list is full?

in the older switches, whether packet was multicast, unicast, or broadcast, they would flood out all active ports with the packets which turns our switch into a **hub**. this is **MAC table flood attack**.

If switch floods, it can be seen by unauthorized people or potentially can cause Dos.

To mitigate this **Port Security** should be implemented on **per-port** basis on switches. Port Security's primary function is to authenticate and validate devices to physical ports based on MAC address. It can use whitelisting for MAC addresses (this port accepts these MAC addresses) or can check **maximum allowed list entries**. These can be persistent or non-persistent and goes away on each reboot.

Even the attacker learn the whitelisted MAC addresses and spoof it, after trying to flood the switch, Port Security can terminate the port connection and deny attacker from flooding the entire table.

### \*Arp Poisoning, Blackhole, Spoofing, MITM

**ARP Poisoning** is to manipulate the ARP table of the target device to change the MAC-IP binding of the target device to another desirable MAC address.

This is done by spoofing the default gateway. This is done by tricking the clients on the network that the IP address of the default gateway is at the attacker's MAC address. how? keep sending ARP messages to client with tricky message and fill their cache without giving them time to correct it. This way attacker becomes the gateway then the attacker attacks to the real gateway to trick it by changing the clients IP



bound to attacker's MAC. From that point on, whenever the real gateway distributes the packets, it is redirected to the attacker.

from this point on, all the client packets are sent to attacker. If attacker does not forward but keep collecting these data this is called **blackhole** because attacker never sends these packets to the intended destination.

Mitigation is through **Port Security**.

Another mitigation is **802.1X** which is a network authentication protocol that opens ports for network access when a user's identity is authenticated it also authorizes them for access to the network. This is superior to port security.

Another mitigation is **Dynamic ARP Inspection** which is a feature of switches that allows the switch to dynamically inspect the ARP table and determine if the ARP table entry is valid or not.

## **SSH**

secure shell.

Just like HTTP and HTTPS, the protocols SSH and TELNET are also operate in the OSI model's layer 5 which is **session** layer.

In the OSI model, **Application, Presentation, Session and Transport** layers are called **Host** layers while the remaining **Network, Data Link and Physical** layers are called **Media** layers.

Network Layer ==> routers, Ipv4, Ipv6, ICMP. address assignment, routing between network nodes and control of moving network traffic possible.

Data Layer ==> Once the network is connected in the layer 3, Data Link layer transmits the data. A data frame is a data that holds link layer header.

A data link layer frame has the following parts: Frame Header: It contains the source and the destination addresses of the frame and the control bytes. Payload field: It contains the message to be delivered. Trailer: It contains the error detection and error correction bits.

SSH works in one of 3 ways:

- RSA rhost authentication (rhost and shost, but a bit weakly secured)
- Private-key authentication ( cari olan islem bu.)
- Password authentication

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## CyberSecurity Notes

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NOTE: . The main function of the **gateway** is communication protocol transactions, for example, transforming FlexRay format data to CAN data, or transforming CAN data to LIN data.

## **ISO/SAE 21434**

==> Automotive Cybersecurity standards are defined by **ISO/SAE 21434**

Helped creating common terminology accross the industry.

Helped creating minimum base criteria for cybersecurity in the vehicle.

Creating security assurance level.

It is a reference that regulators point to. In order to enforce a standard, now regulators have a reference point.

The scope of ISO 21424 :

- Risk Management (Assess, monitor, evaluate potential risks.)
- Product Development (security of systems, hardware&software,
- performing TARA(Threat Analysis Risk Assessment) )
- VARA (vulnerability analysis risk assessment)
- Operation, maintenance, and processess. Starting from beginning to the end, covers all aspects.
- process overview and interdependencies.
- An **Assurance Level** is defined with ISO 21424 which is **Cybersecurity Assurance Level** this is like common security assurance level like how secure is the system or how much trust you can put onto it.

## **CanBus IDS/IPS vs Ethernet IPS/IDS**

### **Comparing Can and Ethernet**

CanBus is a Bus topology which means when a message leaves and ECU, it is guaranteed to reach any neighbir ecu on the same bus. Meaning there is no way to stop an attack using software which reside in the gateway since it is just listening to the traffic. Gateway can only stop propogation of the message from one bus to another but not on the same bus.

On the other hand, the ethernet is a star topology meaning on each port there is exactly one device is connected any device that is sent by the device can be inspected by the gateway.

Since ethernet is MUCH more speedy comparing to the Can, any IDS or IPS system needs lots of horsepower to be able to undertake full or partial analysis.

Message length in Can bus is only 8 bytes (60 for Can FD) compared to Ethernet which is 1500 bytes.

In terms of **source identification**, there is no source ID in can bus there is only Message ID. So you cannot tell who sent the message. This can be done using encapsulated protocols like **j1939** but standard does not have message origin identification. Can bus does not have any specific **message destination** as well, it only has **message id** which is a **multicast** address that anyone can listen to it.

In ethernet, on the other hand, there is **distinct unicast** that means it has source and destination mac addresses, all clear. and ethernet support both unicast and multicast hence, with ethernet it is much easier

to detect the source of a message.

Beware that **automotive ethernet** is not necessarily about ethernet, it is about all the networking. For example, on top of ethernet sits MAC, and then on top of that sits IP, on top of that sits TCP/IP or UDP/IP. To the application level, there is DoIP.

### **Can and Automotive Ethernet IDS/IPS work process**

IDS/IPS is designed to counter an attacker manipulating network traffic via a malicious application, hacked ECU or other controller.

It has 3 steps:

- It **learns** the normal.
- it **monitors** the network traffic and the **Routing** function of gateway rules
- it **Detects** anomalies based on deviation from **normal**. Prevents by discarding frames when possible.

### **Comparing CAN and Ethernet Rules Generation**

- both of them require recordings to generate rules out of it.
- Both of them use **files** where CAN uses DBC extension, ethernet uses XML.
- Both of them allow user to edit rules manually.
- Rule generation is simple in CAN Bus (but can get complicated if j1939 is used because dynamic addressing comes into play) and is complex in ethernet due to network nature (Mac addresses, DHCP, DoIP etc protocols)
- CAN is static, predictive and deterministic and uses whitelisting. But ethernet is more volatile, it uses both black and white lists simultaneously, also **signature based** detection. Signature based detection is not implemented in CAN Bus.

### **CAN and Ethernet IDS/IPS Architecture**

IDS systems are essentially sdks integrated into ecu. This ECU can be an existing ECU like gateway or a dedicated ECU attached to CAN bus.

Incoming message/frame is **routed** to IDS/IPS to be processed.

the IDS/IPS inspects the message/frame and returns its findings with the associated information.

In case of anomaly, an event is reported.

when configured as IPS, when possible, the anomalous packet is discarded.

CAN message is determined to be passing or not based on message ID, if valid, it is passed else, it is discarded. There is a possibility that a compromised ECU can send a message with a valid ID and if it is not a periodic message, it is not possible to determine it was an attack.

Ethernet Packet is filtered based on filtering rules initially. if it is not in white and blacklist, the default rule applies.

**Canbus:**

In Canbus, these IDPS will most likely be integrated into gateway, in other cases, it can be connected directly into ecus.

If we use IDS not IPS, it just taps into network so there is no need for changes in the vehicle.

**Ethernet:**

it **definitely** goes into gateway. it serves as automotive backbone.

**Message Formality****Canbus:**

Relatively easy to validate the format since the message is very short. only exception is CanBus TP(transport protocol) and SAE j1939 TP is used which adds more complexity.

**Ethernet:**

Ethernet side of the message is much harder, needs 7 layer **Deep Packet Inspection(DPI)** to determine individual message format validity. For example:

- Ethernet frame
- IP header
- UDP header
- DoIP PDU header
- UDS PDU header

**Protocol Message Flow****Canbus:**

Relatively easy to validate flow, with requests and responses, and order of messages.

Impossible to determine ECU origin. Need to add digital signature using 3rd party compression softwares or SecOC.

**Ethernet:**

To capture a packet flow, you need to follow full OSI 7 layers individually and another problem is many fields are dynamically assigned per instance.

**Diagnostics****Canbus:**

- Using UDS protocol,

- Many attack options like hacker engaging diagnostics while normal driving.
- Detection and some prevention is possible but somewhat complex since it must be based on a combination of considerations such as vehicle context and usage of transport protocols.

### Ethernet:

- based on DoIP and layered UDS protocol.
- Complex mechanism with multiple architectures and implementations (like DHCP)
- Many attack options like hacker engaging diagnostics while normal driving.
- sometimes detection is complex, especially if attacker is launched from compromised ECU from within the vehicle.

When running diagnostics in the test workshop using multiple vehicles connected to each other and the test machine, in order to prevent vehicle attacking to another vehicle, the configuration should be set to **multiplexer** not **full-mesh** so central gateway can talk to each vehicle but vehicles can talk to each other.

On media diagnostics in CAN, the MOST system will not be inspected due to it is **airgapped** and low cyber risk. Also Automotive-Ethernet AVTP (Audio-Video Transfer Protocol), which is not airgapped and very intense in traffic, will probably not be inspected but can be tested by partial sampling for protocol integrity.

### Reporting

#### Canbus:

CanBus telematics messages. CAN id will send messages to be conveyed to SOC and analyzed there

Other options are possible such as independent SMS over cellular.

#### Ethernet:

a) **SOME/IP** messages to telematics, API sending messages to microcontroller.

#### **What is SOME/IP?**

SOME/IP is a middleware where SOME stands for **Scalable service oriented middleware** which creates abstraction in automotive and used for standardization of:

- header format,
- payload serialization rules
- service discovery mechanism
- remote procedure call mechanism (RPC)

data needs to be serialized. the faster the communication, the more resource hungry the serialization. so there needs to be a fast and efficient middleware to serialize data. Due to string operations, text-based serialization and deserialization (JSON, XML these are self descriptive (structured) and text based) are very slow so a binary operation is needed. SOME/IP allows you to build the most efficient hi-speed performance system, formatting is optimized for low resources and high speed directly works on binary data. SOME/IP is

like XML and JSON, which are very slow. SOME/IP works on binary data and non-descriptive. It is fastest due to **zero-copy** and nearly as fast as Raw struct which is not serialization.

Advantages of SOME/IP Protocol SOME/IP protocol has many advantages compared to traditional automotive protocols like CAN, LIN, and MOST. Some of the worth-noting advantages of SOME/IP are the following:

1. SOME/IP is license Free.
2. SOME/IP designed automotive use cases in mind, scales very well.
3. SOME/IP provides large bandwidth for data communication in the range of 100Mbps and takes care of not wasting the bandwidth at all by providing all data communications in a client-server configuration.
4. SOME/IP is supported by **AUTOSAR**, very fast in serialization, has **built in service discovery**
5. The data from the server ECU can be communicated to client ECU via unicast, multicast, and broadcast.
6. Being a middleware, it is suitable even for CPU-intensive applications, and OS-agnostic.

b) **Syslog format for direct interface to SIEM at the SOC.**

c) **other proprietary formats over IP are possible.**

### **Some TakeAways**

- threats and risks are much more severe in automotive ethernet than in CAN bus.
- several areas are similar so some R&D effort on CAN can be used for ethernet.
- IDPS for ethernet is much more complex than for CAN.
- designing IDPS for automotive ethernet requires expertise both in automotive field and in IT networking.
- For network security, SSL/TLS, VPN, IPSec protocols are for backend connectivity, MacSec can protect all multicast, unicast, broadcast messages at line-speed. SecOC allows application layer protection for selected use cases.
- for access control, Ethernet access Control and SOME/IP is used

## **SecOC**

SecOC = Secure OnBoard Communication.

SecOC protects CAN, ethernet, Flexray etc. communications. Adds security to the onboard communication.

normally Can bus, when reached, can be tapped into and tampered or even through **SOTA**(Software Over The Air) can be used to change the firmware.

This adds integrity and authenticity to the communication by being attached to the outgoing message.

in-vehicular communication vulnerabilities can be prevented by using SecOC in the communication network. SecOC adds security to the **outgoing** message to achieve **integrity and authenticity** of the message.

It is specified to check the authenticity of a single transmitted PDU (Protocol Data Unit) in order to detect attacks such as replay attacks, message tampering, and denial of service attacks.

With SecOC implementation, **the attacker HAS TO know the sender's secret key in order to spoof a message.**

on the **sender ECU**, the SecOC module is sitting between PDURouter, CryptoService Manager and the counter.

1- PDU Router receives a PDU from an upper layer.

2- passes message to SecOC module to add authentication.

3- SecOC obtains **Freshness Value** from the counter.

4- SECOC then generates **authenticator** using services from CryptoService Manager.

This authenticator is **freshness value + secret key** using secret key

5- SecOC then attaches the freshness value and authenticator to the **PDU Frame** and returns it to the PDU router.

6- PDU router then passes it to the destination interface.

CSM module provides cryptographic services for SecOC.!

authenticator is also known as **MAC, Message Authentication Code** if keys are symmetrical, if asymmetric, then it is called as **signature**.

on the **receiver ECU**,

1- PDU router receives a secured PDU with authentication added from network interface.

2- this frame is sent to SecOC module for authentication

3- SecOC module strips authenticator and freshness value from the secure frame and freshness value is compared with the current counter value in the counter module.

4- if the received frame is not a fresh one then it is considered a **replay attack** and discarded.

5- through CSM, new authenticator is generated using the secret key and freshness value for comparison with the received authenticator value.

since the freshness value and secret key are the same, the keys are expected to be the same.

6- if auth is successful, then PDU is sent back to PDUR for further processing.

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CAN bus has the limitation. Classical CAN frames provide a payload size of only 8 bytes. The PDU along with freshness value and authenticator cannot be supported in one frame. This leaves 2 options:

1. Truncate these fields to shorten the lengths.
2. Send authenticator in another frame. (available in Autosar)

Between two, the tradeoff are the **security level** and **impact on busload**.

Networks like CAN FD, Flexray and Ethernet do not have payload limits.

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## Vehicle Key Management Systems

### Automotive CyberSecurity Threat Scenarios

- Do not forget that we have remote access to the vehicles.
- Also you have customer data collected and maybe stored.
- Now we have internal networks which means easy internal attack traversal (lateral movement.)
- Access to ECU-application means theft of intellectual properties.
- We have more software, meaning better attack surface.

### Some Ways to Mitigate these.

- **Debug Access Protection.** This may help to prevent gain access to car network. (especially JTAG and UART)
- **Reverse Engineering Protection.** (through encryption and/or obfuscation of Data-at-rest)
- Add **Secure Boot** for preventing malicious software from being flashed over ethernet. (checking signatures)
- use **SecOC**.
- Common approach should be **Distributed Trust**.
- **Code Signing**

Root of Trusts are : Symmetrical Keys, Asymmetrical Keys, Password Protection, certification.

Distributed trust boils down to Vehicle Key Management Systems. This means secure generation, storage, distribution and destruction of keys.

### The Goals of Vehicle Key Management Systems are:

- **Create** cryptographic material:
  - which can be symmetric, asymmetric, password protected, or certificate protected.
  - Cryptographic material can be platform, product, or even ECU specific (most complex but most secure).



- ○ *Good Enough* Randomness is hard to achieve. (random bit generation)
- **Distribute** cryptographic material:
  - ○ these keys should be accessible to control units.
  - ○ Keys must be stored in the control units in manufacturing.
  - ○ ECUs are mostly manufactured on-premises at the supplier-sites but they belong to OEMs so secure onboard comms is something OEM has to make sure it works.
  - ○ in the final assembly of the car, all keys distributed MUST fit together.
- **Store** cryptographic material:
  - ○ access to locked control units must be possible after shipping the car.
  - ○ cryptographic material must be stored **securely on-chip**
  - ○ Software supported hardware security.
- **Additional Requirements:**
  - ○ **Security:** the material must be protected.
  - ○ **Availability:** Manufacturer must continue development and support 24/7.
  - ○ **Scalability:** huge amount of keys/passwords/certs must be managed.

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### Architecture is divided into 3 layers:

#### 1. Backend + Middleware:

main component is the database which is used for creating and storing the cryptographic material.

It is usually set for **High Availability** in mind. Also, for the better security, **Hardware Security Modules** (HSM) are used alongside database.

Databases are used because HSM are small in memory to keep all these data.

HSM is in charge of data-at-rest encryption and randomness generation.

Key Distribution and Management is taken care by attached services/applications.

different interfaces are used like REST API, KMS-interfaces, OPENPGP for eMail, proprietary interfaces etc.

interfaces may implement server-side services like encryption and signing.

#### 2. FrontEnd:

frontend directly talks to the backend to undertake tasks like:

- ○ getting keys and flash them to ECUs in manufacturing.
- ○ Caching OEM-keys for asynchronous supplier-side manufacturing.
- ○ retrieve unit-specific passwords for root-cause analysis.

you want to store them in the backend but use it on the frontend for the key security.

depending on the use case, the frontend side application can be manual GUI, another machine ,or some library which is used by another software.

Sometimes even offline use-cases have to be supported by the VKMS like in-line flashing verification checks.

### 3. In-Vehicle(network and on-chip)

Processor/CPU + Rom/Flash + HSM.

- ◦ Every crypto material managed by the VKMS will eventually be distributed into an ECU for in-vehicle purposes like SecOC, SecureBoot, IP-Protection.
- ◦ Certain modules will always be present on chip for security and practicality reasons. these are Secure way of storing (Secure Hardware Extension(SHE), Software based HSM), A library/stack of hardware providing cryptographic services.(AUTOSAR Crypto Stack, Cryptoprocessor).

HSM on the chip is required for the protection of the keys stored on the chip so they are not extracted or extracted easily. SHE is specifically designed for this purpose.

Like if not stored on chip, how will it execute secure boot check, or signature checks.

- ◦ Depending on the VKMS implementation, on-chip software might be in or out of scope.

but in any case you need to address as holistic problem.

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## Exceprts from YouTube Videos by Technica

1.

End to End (E2E) does not mean **Application to Application** only. They all sit on a system. Thinking of the security measurements, many of them go below the application layer which are **Stack** layer and **Hardware** layer. Of these, there are MacSEc, IPSec,SecOC none of them are Application to Application.

Although TLS is an Application layer security, in AUTOSAR implementation, it is a **stack layer** security. Although in Linux, TLS can be linked to Application, when acceleration is needed for cryptography, which you need in Automotive industry, TLS is a shared resource between the application and OS levels.

2.

In automotive security, unlike IT , IP spoofing, port Spoofing etc can be prevented if the network security design works. Like hop-by-hop MACsec combined with strong filtering on Ethernet Switches causes enforcing VLANs and IPS, allows effective firewall on hosts and in the network and this allows implementing strong Access Control at many places because all these information are now trusted.

3.

Do every protocol need security build in?

for example DoIP(lives in OSI 5-7) reaches out of the vehicle so it makes sense to secure it. You can enforce security within or support it with TLS below it, or the combination of both.

But say, do we need to secure UDP Network Management(UDPNm) for network management by building security into the protocol? Technica does not think so. 😊

Main idea is, if two sides of the bridge are secure, you dont need a security for the bridge. Because if you implement MacSec, which protects everything sitting on top of it, an external attacker cannot modify anything.

for internal attacker, who is controlling a compromised ECU, say Head Unit, you can use ACL, or sort of firewalls. But you dont put them on TCP layer, but below it to protect it. So , you DONT need built in security for everything as long as you think security first and design things accordingly. **Make sure you have access control and filtering.**

4.

Are IDPS the most important security mechanism?

There is a hype in IDS and IPS systems. but instead of going through IDS, you can start with creating the path to transport **events** from vehicles to your backend and then incrementally add **events** and look at your data.

IPS on the other hand , has **actively** intervening mechanisms which can cause vehicle(especially autonomus cars) to go out of control, not-desirable.

IDS is JUST a tool in your security toolbox, and you need to create a strategy for it.

5.

Security does not allow testing.

This myth comes from the encryption of the data. However that is not correct. Think of this way:

- SecOC is authentication only and there is no encryption.
- IPSec, TLS and MACsec support authentication only modes.

How to handle **auth** does not let me change anything problem?

- add secure process to turn security on ECU on and off.
- add a secure process to share keys between test system and ECU.

As long as you know your tool chains and you design your process, testing is possible.

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