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Motivation

Our Objective is

- verifying an **account** that you claim to possess,
- not verifying the **identity** that you claim to be,
- using in-air-handwriting and hand geometry,
- through the gesture interface.

It has **features like a password**:


- Created by the user, changeable and revocable;
- The personal identity is not linked to the account.

It also has **features like a biometric**:

- Can not be given to someone else;
- Can not be easily spoofed.


However, there are several technical challenges [6]:

- Hand movement tracking is difficult;
- Minor variations of writing the same content;
- Lack of understanding of the features.




Proposed Approach

Multifactor user authentication system with in-air-handwriting and hand geometry.



Signal Matching Algorithm

input : R, T, C



T and C are generated at registration:
 $T_{ij} = \text{mean}(S_{ij}^1, S_{ij}^2, \dots, S_{ij}^k)$,
 $C_{ij} = \text{var}(S_{ij}^1, S_{ij}^2, \dots, S_{ij}^k)$.

parameter: p, q, th_1, th_2




preparation $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} R' \leftarrow \text{preprocess}(R). \\ S \leftarrow \text{align}(T, R'). \end{array} \right.$

element-wise distance $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} D \leftarrow \text{abs}(T - S). \\ P \leftarrow \text{inverse}(1 + p \times T) \\ Q \leftarrow \text{inverse}(1 + q \times C) \\ D \leftarrow \text{multiply}(D, P). \\ D \leftarrow \text{multiply}(D, Q). \end{array} \right.$

scaling [10] $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } l \text{ do} \\ \quad \text{for } j = 1 \text{ to } d \text{ do} \\ \quad \quad \text{if } D_{ij} < th_1 \text{ then} \\ \quad \quad \quad | \quad D_{ij} \leftarrow 0 \\ \quad \quad \text{else if } D_{ij} > th_2 \text{ then} \\ \quad \quad \quad | \quad D_{ij} \leftarrow 1 \\ \quad \quad \text{else} \\ \quad \quad \quad | \quad D_{ij} \leftarrow 0.5 \\ \quad \quad \text{end} \\ \quad \text{end} \end{array} \right.$


Threshold-Then-Vote (TTV)

output : $\text{dist}(S, T) \leftarrow \frac{1}{l \times d} \sum_i^l \sum_j^d D_{ij}$




Signal Feature Analysis


true-user: S and T are from the same account; **false-user**: different accounts; **spoof**: S is from the impostors



Distribution of element-wise distance in time (rows of D), i.e., $p(\frac{1}{d} \sum_j^d D_{ij} | c)$



Distribution of element-wise distance in sensor axes (cols of D), i.e., $p(\frac{1}{l} \sum_i^l D_{ij} | c)$




Distribution of signal distance, i.e., $p(\text{dist}(S, T) | c)$

- Signals generated by the same user writing the same content are similar, and hence, they have small distances.
- Human users are better at maintaining speed and force (i.e., acceleration) than position, in y and z axes.

Hand Geometry Matching and Analysis


22 Hand Geometry Features:

$\mathbf{h} = (M_T, P_T, D_T, M_{IF}, P_{IF}, \dots, w_1, w_2, w_3)$



Template: $\mathbf{t} = \text{mean}(\mathbf{h}^1, \mathbf{h}^2, \dots, \mathbf{h}^k)$


Distance: $\text{dist}(\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{t}) = \frac{1}{22} \sum_i \frac{h_i - t_i}{t_i}$





Score Fusion and Decision Making

$\text{score} = \text{dist}(S, T) + w_1 \text{dist}(\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{t}) + w_2 |l_T - l_R| / l_T$

- if **score** < **decision_threshold** : **accept**.
- else : **reject**.
- **decision_threshold** can be adjusted to trade off security and convenience.
- w_1 and w_2 are parameters. ($w_1 = 0.4, w_2 = 0.05$)



Empirical Results



Observations on performance improvement and performance limitation:

- Preprocess provides robustness against poor signal quality and minor variation in writing behavior.
- Threshold-Then-Vote (TTV) prevents locally mismatched signal segments for legitimate users.
- Score fusion further prevents some false matches with additional hand geometry information.
- A few signals at registration may not be enough for the inherent complexity of the writing behavior.

Dataset and Preprocessing

200 passcodes created and written by 100 users, 5 + 5 repetitions to simulate sign-up and sign-in.
 7 impostors write the same content (all 200 passcodes) as legitimate users write, 5 repetitions each.
 44 passcodes by 22 users are tracked for 4 weeks, on average twice a week, 5 repetitions each time.


Preprocessing Steps:

- Step 1) Interpolate missing samples;
- Step 2) Derive velocity and acceleration;
- Step 3) low-pass filtering (< 10 Hz);

- Step 4) Trim the start and the end when hand stays still;
- Step 5) Hand posture normalization (pointing to x-axis);
- Step 6) Down-sample the signal to 50 Hz;
- Step 7) Amplitude normalization (individually on each axis).

Signal Alignment Steps:

- First, run dynamic time warping on R and T to obtain a warping path, with a window constraint of ± 50 samples.
- Then each sample of the aligned signal S is calculated by taking the average of a range of samples in the original signal mapped to T on the warping path.



Conclusions and Future Work

Conclusions: Multifactor authentication with in-air-handwriting and hand geometry has **good potentials**.

- Limitations:**
- Constraints on user behavior, e.g., user must write within the field of view of the camera.
 - Parameter tweaking and template protection on the server.
 - User needs to remember the content of the in-air-handwriting (same as password).

- Future Work:**
- An in-depth study on the influence of passcode content, length, and strength.
 - Larger dataset, more users, longer tracking time (several weeks).
 - Advanced score fusion mechanism (beyond weighted sum).