

# Introduction Causal Inference

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August 5, 2021

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## 1 Introduction to Causal Graphs

Before introduction of the do-operator, it is necessary to introduce the graphical terminology that lie underneath the probabilistic models. These give rise to the Bayesian networks, which form the basics of causal models. Also, this will help provide intuition to understanding the rules of do-calculus. The assumptions that combine probability theory and graph theory are stated explicitly. Many have been extracted from the Causal Textbook of Brady Neal [3].

### 1.1 Graph Terminology

A graph  $G = (V, E)$  where  $V$  is the set of vertices and  $E$  the set of edges. A graph can be *directed* when every edge has a direction, *undirected* when no edge has a direction or *partially directed* when some edge have a direction. A graph can contain a *cycle* when there exists a directed path from a node to itself. When there is no such path and the graph is directed, we call this a *directed acyclic graph* or DAG. Finally we distinguish a couple of different directed graph

structure: We call the structure  $X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y$  a *chain*,  $X \leftarrow Z \rightarrow Y$  a *fork* and  $X \rightarrow Z \leftarrow Y$  a *v-structure*. In the last case  $Z$  is called the *collider*.

## 1.2 Bayesian Network

We now extend this graph knowledge to introduce probabilistic models. According to chain rule of probability, we can write the distribution  $P(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  in terms of its factors:

$$P(x_1, \dots, x_n) = P(x_1) \prod_i P(x_i \mid x_{i-1} \dots x_1) \quad \text{none}$$

but we can simplify this if we assume the following:

**Assumption 1 *Local Markov Assumption*.** *Given a DAG  $G$ , a node  $X$  is conditionally independent from all variables except its parents  $\text{pa}_i(G)$  and children.*

This assumption allows us to write the joint probability in a much more tractable way:

$$P(x_1, \dots, x_n) = P(x_1) \prod_i P(x_i \mid \text{pa}_i(G)). \quad \text{none}$$

This is called the *Bayesian Network Factorization* and we call  $P$  and  $G$  *Markov compatible*. Now in order to completely connect graphs to the probability distribution, we need one more assumption that incorporates dependencies:

**Assumption 2 *Adjacency-Faithfulness Assumption*.** *Given a DAG  $G$  and suppose that two variables are adjacent in the  $G$ . Then they are not independent conditional on any subset of other variables.*

Both assumptions can be combined to obtain the minimality assumption:

**Assumption 3 *Minimality Assumption*.** *Given a DAG  $G$  and suppose that distribution  $P$  is Markov to  $G$ . Then no proper subgraph of  $G$  is also Markov to  $P$ .*

In other words, the remaining edges imply dependency between variables. Because we are dealing with directed edges, these dependencies do not have to be bilateral with can be one-sided:

**Assumption 4 *Causal Edges Assumption*.** *Given a DAG  $G$ , every directed edge from  $X$  to  $Y$  in  $G$  implies that  $X$  has a causal effect on  $Y$ .*

## 1.3 Dependencies in Graph Structures

We create distributions according to a graph that contains a chain, fork and v-structure. In each of these cases we will derive the dependencies and the conditional dependencies of the variables. We include the python code to illustrate the true distribution in this Colab Notebook, but first we share the graph that lie underneath the distributions in Figure 1.

Based on this graph we create distribution where  $T$  depends on  $S$  and  $U$ ,  $U$  depends on  $V$  and  $Y$  depends on  $V$ :




Figure 1: DAG

Listing 1: Distributions

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```

N = 5000
s = np.random.uniform(size=N)
v = np.random.normal(size=N)
u = 2. * v + 0.1 * np.random.normal(size=N)
t = 2. * s + u + 0.1 * np.random.normal(size=N)
y = np.random.binomial(1., p=1./(1. + np.exp(-5. * v)))
df = pd.DataFrame({'S': s, 'T': t, 'U': u, 'V': v, 'Y': y})

```

---

When can check dependence by simple Pearson Correlation test to obtain the following results shown in Figure 3. As we expect according to our distributions:  $S$  and  $T$  are dependent, but  $S$  is independent from all other variables since the collider  $T$  blocks all association. The variable  $Y$  is dependent on all other variables except  $S$  since association goes through the fork structure  $U \leftarrow V \rightarrow Y$ .

Note that all that we have checked so far is unconditional dependence. We are also interested in dependencies when we condition on variables. The various structures; chain, fork and v-structure behave different under conditional dependence. First the dependence under the chain structure  $V \rightarrow U \rightarrow T$  when we do not condition (we know we have dependency, but we check again to show the difference in results) and then we check again when we condition on the mediator node  $U$ . We do the same exercise for the fork and the v-structure to obtain the following:




Figure 2: Correlation Plot

Listing 2: p-values Chain Dependence (rounded to 6 decimals)

---

V and T are unconditionally dependent cause p-value < 0,05:	0.0
V and T conditional U are independent cause p-value > 0,05:	0.664282

---

Listing 3: p-values Fork Dependence (rounded to 6 decimals)

---

U and Y are unconditionally dependent cause p-value < 0,05:	0.0
U and Y conditional V are independent cause p-value > 0,05:	0.42431

---

Listing 4: p-values v-structure Dependence (rounded to 6 decimals)

---

S and U are unconditionally independent cause p-value > 0,05:	0.312844
S and U conditional T are dependent cause p-value < 0,05:	1.5e-05

---

The conclusion of this exercise is the following: in chain and forks we have unconditional dependence between the distant variables, but independence conditional on the middle variable. In v-structure we have unconditional independence between the distant variables, but conditional dependence on the middle, collider variable (or any descendent of the collider variable). This concept gives rise to the definition of *d-separation*.

**Definition 1 *d-separation*** A path  $p$  is blocked by a set of nodes  $Z$  if and only if

1.  $p$  contains a chain  $T \rightarrow U \rightarrow V$  or fork  $T \leftarrow U \rightarrow V$  where  $U$  is contained in  $Z$ .
2.  $p$  contains a v-structure  $T \rightarrow U \leftarrow V$  and the collider node  $U$  or any of the descendants of the collider is in  $Z$ .

If  $Z$  blocks every path  $p$  between two nodes  $X$  and  $Y$ , then  $X$  and  $Y$  are *d-separated* by  $Z$ :  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y \mid Z$ .

Given the graph in Figure 1,  $S$  and  $U$  are d-separated given the empty set, but  $S$  and  $U$  are not d-separated given  $T$ . The formally state the connection between probability independence and graph independence we have the following Theorem.

**Theorem 1 *Global Markov Assumption*** Given that  $P$  is Markov with respect to  $G$ , if  $X$  and  $Y$  are d-separated in  $G$  conditioned on  $Z$ , Then  $X$  and  $Y$  are independent in distribution  $P$  conditioned on  $Z$ .

$$X \perp\!\!\!\perp_G Y \mid Z \Rightarrow X \perp\!\!\!\perp_P Y \mid Z.$$

Even though this is framed as a theorem, this can also be framed as an assumption since it is derived from the local Markov assumption.

## 2 Introduction to do-operator

In order to say something about causal effects, we should first say something about intervention and introduce the do-operator and do-calculus that goes along with that created by Judea Pearl. When we condition on a certain variable, say  $T = t$ , we are saying we are restricting ourselves to look at the subset of observations where  $T = t$ . However when we say we intervene on variable  $T = t$ , we say we enforce  $t$  to the entire population. See Figure from Brady Neil's textbook for a clear distinction.

The intervention is specified by the do-operator and is written as  $do(T = t)$ . We call the distribution following from the intervention the *intervention distribution*:  $P(Y \mid do(T = t))$  or simply  $P(Y \mid do(t))$ . Similarly we call a distribution *observable* when there is no do-operator in the distribution. The relation between these two observable is described in the following definition:

**Definition 2** Suppose  $Q$  is an expression containing a do-operator. Then  $Q$  is *identifiable* if we can replace the expression containing the do-operator with an expression without a do operator.

We will get back at how to rewrite the expression containing a do-operator in an expression without do-operator when we introduce the do-calculus. We first have to introduce an additional assumption describing the locality of the intervention:

**Assumption 5** *Modularity Assumption.* Suppose we intervene on a subset of nodes  $S$ , then for all nodes  $i$  we have

1. If  $i \notin S$ , then  $P(x_i \mid pa_i)$  remains unchanged
2. If  $i \in S$ , then  $P(x_i \mid pa_i) = 1$  with  $x_i$  being the value set by the intervention and 0 otherwise.




Figure 3: Difference Intervention and Conditioning

Note that the modularity assumptions encodes that the intervention is local in the sense that only the conditional distribution of  $X_i$  given its causes (parents) is affected by the intervention on  $X_i$ . Note that the modularity assumptions and bayesian network factorization allows us to rewrite an intervention distribution in the following way:

**Theorem 2** *Assume that  $P$  is Markov to  $G$  and satisfies modularity. Given a set of intervention nodes  $S$  and  $x$  being consistent with  $S$ , we can write*

$$P(x_1, \dots, x_n \mid do(S = s)) = \prod_i P(x_i \mid pa_i)$$

and of course  $P(x_1, \dots, x_n \mid do(S = s)) = 0$  if  $x$  is not consistent.

Using this new way of writing interventional distributions, we can bolster the intuition behind Figure 3 by formalizing the difference between intervening and conditioning on a variable. For this consider the causal graph in Figure 4. Assume that  $P$  is Markov to this graph, then according to the bayesian network assumption we can write the joint distribution.

$$P(y, t, x) = P(x)P(t \mid x)P(y \mid t, x)$$

We we start intervening, we can use Theorem 2 to rewrite the distribution as follows:

$$P(y, x \mid do(t)) = P(x)P(y \mid t, x)$$

and by marginalizing  $x$  out we receive

$$P(y \mid do(t)) = \sum_x P(x)P(y \mid t, x)$$

While the conditional probability  $P(y \mid t)$  can be reframed as

$$P(y \mid t) = \sum_x P(y, x \mid t) = \sum_x P(x \mid t)P(y \mid t, x).$$

Hence the difference between interventional distribution and conditional distribution is the difference between  $P(x)$  and  $P(x \mid t)$  as is illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 4: Simple Causal Graph

## 2.1 Intuition do-calculus

Now we can combine the concept of d-separation together with Markov assumption to arrive at the rules of do-calculus intuitively. For a proof of the rules see [1] Consider a graph depicted in Figure 5. When we condition on  $Z$ , this means that  $X$  and  $Y$  become d-separated. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this implies that  $X$  and  $Y$  become independent in distribution when  $P$  is Markov to graph  $G$ . This means:

$$P(y \mid x, w) = P(y \mid w) \text{ if } Y \perp\!\!\!\perp X \mid Z.$$

This can then be generalized to form the first rule of do-calculus.

**Rule 1:**  $P(y \mid do(x), z, w) = P(y \mid do(x), w)$  if  $(Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid X, W)_{G_{\overline{X}}}$ .

Now we are going back to Figure 4. Note that when we condition on  $X$ , the only relation there is between  $T$  and  $Y$  is a direct path or in other words:  $T$  become d-separated from  $Y$  when we remove all the arrows going from  $T$ , the last directed path. In this way intervening is the same as conditioning hence:

$$P(y \mid do(t), x) = P(y \mid t, x) \text{ if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid X)_{G_{\underline{T}}}.$$

which can again be generalized to the second rule

**Rule 2:**  $P(y \mid do(z), do(t), x) = P(y \mid do(z), t, x)$  if  $(Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid X, Z)_{G_{\overline{X}\underline{T}}}$ .

Rule 3 can also be intuitively derived, but can be a little harder. Suppose the graph of Figure 6. In this graph  $T$  and  $Y$  are d-separated when we intervene on  $T$  because this would break the arrow from  $V$  to  $T$ . This d-separation would suggest that intervening on  $T$  does not have affect on  $Y$ . Also, in this example conditioning on  $W$  does still keep this d-separation intact, which would suggest the following:

$$P(y \mid do(t), w) = P(y \mid w) \text{ if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid W)_{G_{\overline{T}}}.$$

However, this is **NOT** true! This can be understood by taking a look at the modification of the graph in Figure 7. In this graph conditioning on  $W$  would




Figure 5: Graph




Figure 6: Causal Graph 1 for intuition rule 3

imply that  $U$  and  $Y$  become dependent variables because  $W$  is the descendent of a collider. Consequently, intervening on  $T$  would break that dependence and therefore we cannot just remove the do-operator in this equation. Instead we can check if we can remove the do-operator by checking those nodes in  $T$  that are not ancestors of the  $W$  we are conditioning on. In this way, we make sure that conditioning on  $W$  does not create additional dependencies that we consequently break with the intervention. Hence the correct way of formulating this is:

$$P(y \mid do(t), w) = P(y \mid w) \text{ if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid W)_{G_{\overline{T(W)}}}.$$

where  $T(W)$  are the nodes of  $T$  that are not ancestors of  $W$ . Again, generalizing this yields the last rule:

**Rule 3:**  $P(y \mid do(z), do(t), w) = P(y \mid do(z), w) \text{ if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid W, Z)_{G_{\overline{T(W)Z}}}.$

The rules of do-calculus shed a new light on Definition 2, meaning the rules are the toolkit needed to rewrite an expression containing a do-operator to an expression not containing a do-operator. In fact, Pearl [?] proved that the rules of do-calculus are complete. This means that there is no identifiable expression containing a do-operator who cannot be rewritten to an expression without a do-operator using the three rules of do-calculus




Figure 7: Causal Graph 2 for intuition rule 3



### 3 Application of the do-calculus and estimation

Now consider the example of Figure 4 again. This time we are going to use the do-calculus to calculate the causal effect of treatment  $T$  on outcome  $Y$ . Therefore we first have to define the average causal treatment effect ATE for binary treatment  $T$ :

$$\mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(T = 1)) - \mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(T = 0)).$$

Suppose now we have the following observations: we have  $N$  datapoints with covariates  $X$  where  $X$  is uniformly distributed between  $[0, 1]$ :  $x \sim U(0, 1)$ . Treatment  $T$  has binomial distribution  $t \sim B(1, \frac{1}{1+e^{-5x}})$ . Also suppose we have outcome based on covariate  $X$  and treatment  $T$ :  $y \sim 2x + t + 0.1\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ .

#### 3.1 Application do-calculus for identifiability

We can now prove that in our causal graph,  $Y$  is identifiable by treatment  $T$ . First we marginalize out  $x$  by rules of probability:

$$P(Y \mid do(T = t)) = \sum_z P(y \mid x, do(t)) P(x \mid do(t)) \quad (1)$$

Now we observe that  $((Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T) \mid X)_{G_{\underline{T}}}$  and we apply the second rule of do-calculus to rewrite the first term:

$$P(y \mid x, do(t)) = P(y \mid x, t). \quad (2)$$

Similarly, we observe that  $(X \perp\!\!\!\perp T)_{G_{\overline{T}}}$  to apply the third rule of do-calculus to obtain

$$P(x \mid do(t)) = P(x). \quad (3)$$

We can rewrite our first expression than to:

$$P(Y \mid do(T = t)) = \sum_x P(y \mid x, t) P(x). \quad (4)$$

Since the last expression is 'do-operator free', this is now an application of the do-calculus to prove identifiability. In this case the identifiability is called the **back-door theorem**.

#### 3.2 Application IPW algorithm for estimation

Note that we want to know

$$P(y \mid do(T = t)) = \sum_z P(y \mid t, z) P(z) = \sum_z \frac{P(y \mid t, z) P(t \mid z) P(z)}{P(t \mid z)} = \sum_z \frac{P(y, t, z)}{P(t \mid z)}$$

where the first identity follows from the do-calculus as shown above. This means we can obtain the intervention distribution  $P(y|do(T = t))$  by accounting for the propensity score  $P(t|z)$ . So now we need to train a model  $\hat{e}$  to predict  $T$  from  $Z$ . This is done by logistic regression. We apply this models to obtain weights for each data point:  $w_i = \frac{1}{P(T_i=t|z_i)}$ .

Using this weights we will now sample from the intervention distribution  $P(y|do(T = t))$  by sampling from our data given the weights we created to adjust for the covariate  $Z$ . Data points with higher weights  $w_i$  are more likely to get picked from the data than datapoints with lower weights. Note that there will be duplicates in our new data when we create datasamples of equal length to the original data. Since we had more observations of  $T = 1$  in our original dataset, observations of  $T = 0$  received higher weights and therefore the new dataset will be balanced.

Now given the causal relation is not confounded anymore, we can calculate the causal effect. Note for the expectation first that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}(Y | do(T)) &= \sum_y \sum_z \frac{Y P(y, t, z)}{P(t|z)} = \sum_y \sum_z \frac{y P(y) \mathbb{1}_{T=t, Z=z}}{P(t|z)} \\ &= \mathbb{E}\left(\sum_z \frac{Y \mathbb{1}_{T=t, Z=z}}{P(t|z)}\right) = \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{Y \mathbb{1}_{T=t}}{P(t|Z)}\right).\end{aligned}$$

So we we implement that to calculate the causal effect we have

$$\mathbb{E}(Y | do(T = 1)) - \mathbb{E}(Y | do(T = 0)) = \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{Y \mathbb{1}_{T=1}}{P(t|Z)}\right) - \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{Y \mathbb{1}_{T=0}}{1 - P(t|Z)}\right)$$

We can then estimate the causal effect by the following estimand:

$$\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \left( \frac{y_i \mathbb{1}_{T=1}}{\hat{e}(z_i)} - \frac{y_i \mathbb{1}_{T=0}}{1 - \hat{e}(z_i)} \right)$$

where  $\hat{e}$  is the model used to estimate  $P(t|Z)$ . Since we have already applied that estimate in our python function, this reduces to

$$\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i (y_i \mathbb{1}_{T=1} - y_i \mathbb{1}_{T=0}).$$

## 4 Optimization problem

Having introduced the do-calculus and a simple application, we can start how generalizing this idea brings us to the optimization exercise that lies ahead: consider the following graph in Figure 8 were the treatment and outcome variables have already been specified. The causal effect of the treatment variable can be defined as the causal effect

$$\mathbb{E}(Y | do(T = 1)) - \mathbb{E}(Y | do(T = 0))$$




Figure 8: Difference Intervention and Conditioning

for treatment variable  $T$  and outcome variable  $Y$  if  $T$  is binary. And we define the (marginal) causal effect of treatment  $T$  on outcome variable  $Y$  when  $T$  continuous as:

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(t)) - \mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(t - \Delta t))}{\Delta t}.$$

Thanks to the do-calculus, if the outcome is identifiable given the treatment, we can rewrite this expression containing a do-operator to an expression not containing a do-operator. Once we have such an expression, we can use statistical techniques to approximate this expression. In the example of the previous chapter, the objective was obvious, because we have one treatment variable and it was binary. But considering the graph in Figure 8, we are not merely interested in the causal effect of one binary variable on the outcome, but we are interested in knowing what variables to intervene on and what to set as the intervention

value in order to yields the most desirable outcome given a maximal number of variables to intervene on. Mathematically, this means we are interested in:

$$\max_{S, t_i} \mathbb{E}(Y \mid \bigcup_{T_i \in S} do(T_i = t_i))$$

where  $|S| \leq n$ .

Let for simplicity first consider the case were we are interested in finding the intervention value that maximizes the expected outcome given a certain intervention  $T$ :

$$\max_t \mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(T = t))$$

Then we can consider multiple interventions and find the intervention values that maximize the expected outcome:

$$\max_{t_1, \dots, t_n} \mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(T_1 = t_1, \dots, T_n = t_n))$$

Now we consider the case were we do not only have to find the intervention value, but also the variable to intervene on, considering at most one variable to intervene on:

$$\max_{i, t_i} \mathbb{E}(Y \mid do(T_i = t_i))$$

Of course, the goal is to find multiple intervention variables and the intervention values that maximizes our objective with the constraint of only  $n$  interventions:

$$\max_{S, t_i} \mathbb{E}(Y \mid \bigcup_{T_i \in S} do(T_i = t_i))$$

where  $|S| \leq n$ .

## References

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