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the Sovereign Individual

主权个人: 掌握信息时代的变革

James Dale Davidson

Lord William Rees-Mogg

1997年初版 2020年再版

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序言

中世纪的人对意志没有信心,认为人类是容易受伤的、极其脆弱的,但他们尊重智力。他们认为只要认真思考,即使是人,也有能力回答关于上帝和宇宙的最深奥的问题。现代人崇拜意志,但他们对智力感到绝望。乌合之众,随机粒子的偏转,无意识偏见的影响:所有这些当代的陈词滥调,都在谈论智力的弱点,或者说也在谈论我们自己。

威廉·里斯·莫格勋爵和詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森,并没有承诺也没有给出任何关于上帝和宇宙的答案。但是,他们对"大政治"的研究,对历史上各种力量的剖析,以及对不久的将来的一系列预测,是非比寻常的,甚至是反文化的,因为他们运用人类的理性,去思索那些我们被教导为"机遇"或"命运"的事情。在《主权个人》首次出版近四分之一个世纪之后,回顾过去,最容易做、也是我们周围的文化最喜欢做的事,就是挑剔他们的错误,这也算是一种自我安慰:那么费心去思考未来有什么意义呢?

当然,有一些事情他们没有想到:首先就是中国的崛起。在共产党的领导下,21世纪的中国创造了自己的信息时代,具有明显的民族主义、种族同化和深刻的国家主义特征。这可能是该书出版以来最大的"大政治"现象。仅举一个关键的例子,共产中国已经粉碎了香港这个城邦(城市国家),而里斯·莫格和戴维森曾将香港描述为"一种心智模式,一种会在信息时代繁荣昌盛的管辖区模式"。

从某个角度看,这是作者的一个盲点。从另一个角度看,中国的政治局委员一定是《主权个人》的热心读者。在不断重温列宁斯大林主义的同时,也积极地展望信息时代,只有这种特有的长期的警惕意识,才使得党的领导人能在本书分析的趋势中获得胜利。

这些趋势在今天依然适用: 赢家通吃的经济、管辖权的竞争、大规模生产的转移,以及国家间的战争可能会过时。中国的崛起,与其说是对里斯·莫格和戴维森的反驳,倒更像是对他们所描述的利害关系的剧烈提升。

事实上,未来大政治的巨大冲突才刚刚开始。在技术层面上,**这场冲突的两极是:人工智能和加密技术**。人工智能展现出一种前景,能够最终解决经济学家所说"计算问题"(计划经济的关键)。理论上,它使集中控制整个经济成为可能。CCP最喜欢的技术,就是人工智能,这绝不是巧合。强加密技术在另外一极,它带来的远景是一个去中心化和个性化的世界。如果说人工智能是共产主义的,那么加密技术就是自由主义的。

未来可能就落在这两极之间。而要知道,我们今天采取的行动,会决定日后全局性的结果。在2020年,阅读《主权个人》,有助你认真思考,自己的行动将塑造什么样的未来;这是一次不容浪费的学习机会。

彼得·蒂尔 2020年1月6日,洛杉矶

译者推荐

今天,我们生活在一个民族国家的世界里,联合国承认195个"国家",地球上除南极洲以外的几乎所有陆地领土都属于其中一个国家。我们认为这很正常。但实际上,我们现在的时代是一个历史上的异类:在过去2000年的大部分时间里,世界上的大部分领土都是完全不受统治的。为什么今天不一样了?因为在过去500年的大部分时间里,现有的技术创造了一套激励机制,让民族国家是有意义的。用《主权个人》的作者詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森¹的话来说,暴力的逻辑倾向于民族国家,政府通过征服尽可能多的领土会获得很多好处,而且他们这么做很容易,他们确实这么做了。

但事实并非总是如此。一个典型的例子是,在"黑暗时代"欧洲在地理上极为分散,很少有中央政府掌权。这部分是因为盔甲的发明。如果你有一套盔甲,一把剑和一匹马,那时候没有任何武器能真正阻止你。这意味着大国家很难形成,因为国家的运作依赖于隐性的暴力威胁。但当火药在欧洲盛行时,暴力的逻辑被颠覆了。在一个有枪的世界里,集结大量军队和征服大量领土要便宜得多。詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森认为,互联网是另一项改变世界的发明,最终它会让民族国家过时,这是因为互联网能在本质上能使资本流动。

民族国家依赖富人的掠夺性税收(远远超过政府提供的商品和服务价值的税收),以支持大型军队和福利项目。但是戴维森说,互联网使掠夺性税收变得不可能,因为当资本流动时,人们可以选择生活在世界上的任何地方。他们不会被自己的工作、拥有的土地或工厂的位置所束缚。他们可以去待遇最好的地方。

所以戴维森说,在未来的一百年左右,民族国家将开始崩溃,因为他们根本没有足够的钱来维持今天的运作方式。相反,他想象的是一个由小城邦组成的世界,类似于19世纪前的意大利,或今天的新加坡。我不知道这一切是否会成真,或者何时会成真,但我们已经看到了一些趋势。疫情证明大规模远程工作是可行的,这意味着工人们可以不再被自己的位置所束缚。许多城市和国家正在为远程工作者提供激励措施,让他们回到自己的境内生活。此外,越来越多的人以高税收为由放弃了他们的美国公民身份,许多西方商人现在住在避税天堂。纳西姆·塔勒布让我相信未来的世界可能会有不确定性,而《主权个人》让我相信,未来的世界会有所不同。在未来的几十年里,像美国这样的大国的影响力可能会下降,而像葡萄牙、新加坡和土耳其这样的小国的影响力会变得更重要。人们可能会集体逃离西方,特别是如果目前这种低自由度的趋势继续下去的话。

因此,指望过一种"传统"的生活(上大学、在大公司找工作、努力工作、在公司里步步高升)可能没有意义。相反,现在的年轻人应该尽可能多地学习,培养一套灵活的技能,这样他们才可以重新适应未来的任何情况。

2023年5月

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第1章

2000年转折:

人类社会的第四阶段

1.1 PREMONITIONS

预言

The coming of the year 2000 has haunted the Western imagination for the past thousand years. Ever since the world failed to end at the turn of the first millennium after Christ, theologians, evangelists, poets, seers, and now, even computer programmers have looked to the end of this decade with an expectation that it would bring something momentous. No less an authority than Isaac Newton speculated that the world would end with the year 2000. Michel de Nostradamus, whose prophecies have been read by every generation since they were first published in 1568, forecast the coming of the Third Antichrist in July 1999. Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, connoisseur of the "collective unconscious," envisioned the birth of a New Age in 1997. Such forecasts may easily be ridiculed. And so can the sober forecasts of economists, such as Dr. Edward Yardeni of Deutsche Bank Securities, who expects computer malfunctions on the millennial midnight to "disrupt the entire global economy." But whether you view the Y2K computer problem as groundless hysteria ginned up by computer programmers and Information Technology consultants to stir up business, or as a mysterious instance of technology unfolding in concert with the prophetic imagination, there is no denying that circumstances at the eve of the millennium excite more than the usual morbid doubt about where the world is tending.

在过去的一千年里,2000年的 到来一直困扰着西方人的想象力。 自从世界在基督之后的第一个千年 之交未能结束以来,神学家、传道 者、诗人、先知,甚至现在,甚至 计算机程序员也期待着这个十年的 结束,期望它会带来一些重大的东 西。不亚于艾萨克·牛顿(Isaac Newton)推测世界将在2000年结束的 权威。米歇尔·德·诺查丹玛斯 (Michel de Nostradamus)的预言自1568年 首次出版以来,每一代人都在阅读, 他预言了1999年7月第三敌基督者 的到来。瑞士心理学家卡尔·荣格 (Carl Jung) 是"集体无意识"的 鉴赏家,他在1997年设想了新时代 的诞生。这样的预测可能很容易被 嘲笑。经济学家的清醒预测也是如 此,例如德意志银行证券(Deutsche Bank Securities)的爱德华亚德尼 (Edward Yardeni) 博士,他预计 千禧年午夜的计算机故障将"扰乱

A sense of disquiet about the future has begun to color the optimism so characteristic of Western societies for the past 250 years. People everywhere are hesitant and worried. You see it in their faces. Hear it in their conversation. See it reflected in polls and registered in the ballot box. Just as an invisible, physical change of ions in the atmosphere signals that a thunderstorm is imminent even before the clouds darken and lightning strikes, so now, in the twilight of the millennium, premonitions of change are in the air. One person after another, each in his own way, senses that time is running out on a dying way of life. As the decade expires, a murderous century expires with it, and also a glorious millennium of human accomplishment. All draw to a close with the year 2000.

For there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, neither hid that shall not be known.

——MATTHEW 10.26

We believe that the modern phase of Western civilization will end with it. This book tells why. Like many earlier works, it is an attempt to see into a glass darkly, to sketch out the vague shapes and dimensions of a future that is still to be. In that sense, we mean our work to be apocalyptic—in the original meaning of the word. Apokalypsis means "unveiling" in Greek. We believe that a new stage in history—the Information Age—is about to be

整个全球经济"。但是,无论你是 否将Y2K计算机问题视为计算机程 序员和信息技术顾问为搅动业务而 制造的毫无根据的歇斯底里,或者 作为技术与预言想象力一起展开的 一个神秘例子,不可否认的是,千 禧年前夕的情况比通常对世界走向 何方的病态怀疑更令人兴奋。

对未来的不安感已经开始为过 去250年来西方社会特有的乐观情 绪着色。世界各地的人们都在犹豫 和担心。你可以在他们的脸上看到 它。在他们的谈话中听到它。看到 它反映在民意调查中并在投票箱中 登记。正如大气中无形的物理变化 甚至在云层变暗和闪电袭击之前就 预示着雷暴即将来临, 所以现在, 在千年的黄昏,空气中弥漫着变化 的预感。一个又一个人,每个人都 以自己的方式,感觉到时间在垂死 的生活方式上已经不多了。随着十 年的过去,一个杀戮的世纪也随之 结束,也是人类成就的光荣千年。 所有这些都在2000年结束。

> 因为没有什么是不能透露 的,也没有隐藏的,是不 应该知道的。

> > ---- 马太福音10.26

我们相信,西方文明的现代阶段将随之结束。这本书讲述了原因。像许多早期的作品一样,它试图黑暗地看到玻璃,勾勒出未来仍然存在的模糊形状和维度。从这个意义上说,我们的意思是我们的工作是世界末日的——在这个词的原始含

"unveiled."

We are watching the beginnings of a new logical space, an instantaneous electronic everywhereness, which we may all access, enter into, and experience. We have, in short, the beginnings of a new kind of community. The virtual community becomes the model for a secular Kingdom of Heaven; as Jesus said there were many mansions in his Father's Kingdom, so there are many virtual communities, each reflecting their own needs and desires.

----MICHAEL GRASSO

义中。Apokalypsis在希腊语中的意思是"揭幕"。我们相信,历史的新阶段——信息时代——即将"揭开面纱"。

我们正在观察一个新的逻辑空间的开始,一个瞬间的开始,一个瞬间的电子无处不在,我们都可以访问,进入和体验。可以访问,我们已经有。也不能以为世俗天国的开端的开始。而一种新的社区成为世俗天国性俗天国里有许多。由此交流,在他们的不够是,他们自己的不会。

—— 迈克尔 格拉索

1.2 THE FOURTH STAGE OF HUMAN SOCIETY 人类社会的第四阶段

The theme of this book is the new revolution of power which is liberating individuals at the expense of the twentieth-century nation-state. Innovations that alter the logic of violence in unprecedented ways are transforming the boundaries within which the future must lie. If our deductions are correct, you stand at the threshold of the most sweeping revolution in history. Faster than all but a few now imagine, microprocessing will subvert and destroy the nation-state, creating new forms of social organization in the process. This will be far from an easy transformation.

The challenge it will pose will be all the greater because it will happen with incredible speed compared with anything seen in the 本书的主题是权力的新革命,它以牺牲二十世纪的民族国家为代价解放个人。以前所未有的方式改变暴力逻辑的创新正在改变未来必须存在的界限。如果我们的推论是正确的,那么你就站在了历史上最彻底的革命的门槛上。微处理的速度比现在除了少数人想象的要快,它将颠覆和摧毁民族国家,在此过程中创造新的社会组织形式。这远非易事的转变。

它将带来的挑战将更大,因为 与过去看到的任何东西相比,它将 past. Through all of human history from its earliest beginnings until now, there have been only three basic stages of economic life: (1) hunting-and-gathering societies; (2) agricultural societies; and (3) industrial societies. Now, looming over the horizon, is something entirely new, the fourth stage of social organization: information societies.

Each of the previous stages of society has corresponded with distinctly different phases in the evolution and control of violence. As we explain in detail, information societies promise to dramatically reduce the returns to violence, in part because they transcend locality. The virtual reality of cyberspace, what novelist William Gibson characterized as a "consensual hallucination," will be as far beyond the reach of bullies as imagination can take it. In the new millennium, the advantage of controlling violence on a large scale will be far lower than it has been at any time since before the French Revolution. This will have profound consequences. One of these will be rising crime. When the payoff for organizing violence at a large scale tumbles, the payoff from violence at a smaller scale is likely to jump. Violence will become more random and localized. Organized crime will grow in scope. We explain why.

Another logical implication of falling returns to violence is the eclipse of politics, which is the stage for crime on the largest scale. There is much evidence that adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth-century nation-state is rapidly eroding. The death of Communism is merely the most striking example. As we explore in detail, the collapse of morality and growing corruption among leaders of Western governments are not random developments. They are evidence that the potential of the nation-state is exhausted. Even many of its leaders no longer believe the platitudes they mouth. Nor are they believed by others.

以令人难以置信的速度发生。纵观 人类历史,从最早的开始到现在, 经济生活只有三个基本阶段:(1) 狩猎和采集社会;(2)农业社会;(3) 工业社会。现在,迫在眉睫的是某 种全新的社会组织阶段:信息社会。

社会以前的每个阶段都与暴力 演变和控制的明显不同阶段相对应。 正如我们详细解释的那样,信息社 会有望大幅减少暴力的回归,部分 原因是它们超越了地方性。小说家 威廉·吉布森(William Gibson)称 之为"自愿幻觉"的网络空间的虚 拟现实将远远超出欺凌者的想象范 围。在新的千年里,大规模控制暴 力的优势将远远低于法国大革命前 的任何时候。这将产生深远的影响。 其中之一将是犯罪率上升。当大规 模组织暴力的回报下降时, 小规模 暴力的回报可能会增加。暴力将变 得更加随机和局部化。有组织犯罪 的范围将会扩大。我们解释原因。

暴力回归下降的另一个逻辑含义是政治的黯然失色,这是最大规模犯罪的舞台。有很多证据表明,对二十世纪民族国家的公民神话的坚持正在迅速侵蚀。共产主义的死亡只是最引人注目的例子。正如我们详细探讨的那样,西方政府领导人道德的崩溃和日益严重的腐败并不是随机的发展。它们证明民族国家的潜力已经耗尽。甚至许多领导人也不再相信他们所说的陈词滥调。他们也不被其他人相信。

1.2.1 History Repeats Itself 历史重演

This is a situation with striking parallels in the past. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion often comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. So it was in the late fifteenth century, when the medieval Church was the predominant institution of feudalism. Notwithstanding popular belief in "the sacredness of the sacerdotal office," both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt—not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today.

We believe that much can be learned by analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and the situation to-day, when the world has become saturated with politics. The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting government have reached a senile extreme today.

We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution. Technological developments created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. A similar technological revolution is destined to downsize radically the nation-state early in the new millennium.

Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned

——MARSHALL McLUHAN, 1964

这种情况在过去有着惊人的相似之处。每当技术变革将旧形式与新的经济动力分离时,道德标准就会发生变化,人们开始越来越蔑视那些控制旧机构的人。这种普遍的厌恶往往在人们形成一种新的连贯的变革意识形态之前就已经显现出来了。因此,在十五世纪后期,中世纪教会是封建主义的主要机构。尽管人们普遍相信"神圣职位的神圣性",但神职人员的上级和下级都受到了极大的蔑视——这与今天对政治家和官僚的普遍态度没有什么不同。

我们认为,通过类比15世纪末 的生活被有组织的宗教彻底浸透的 情况与今天世界政治饱和的情况, 可以学到很多东西。十五世纪末支 持制度化宗教的成本已经达到了历 史的极端,就像支持政府的成本今 天达到了衰老的极端一样。

我们知道在火药革命之后,有 组织的宗教发生了什么。技术发展 为缩小宗教机构规模和降低成本创 造了强烈的动力。类似的技术革命 注定要在新千年初期从根本上缩小 民族国家的规模。

今天,经过一个多世纪的 电气技术,我们已经在全 球范围内扩展了我们的中 枢神经系统本身,就我们 的星球而言,废除了空间 和时间

> ——马歇尔·麦克卢汉, 1964

1.2.2 The Information Revolution 信息革命

As the breakdown of large systems accelerates, systematic compulsion will recede as a factor shaping economic life and the distribution of income. Efficiency will become more important than the dictates of power in the organization of social institutions. This means that provinces and even cities that can effectively uphold property rights and provide for the administration of justice, while consuming few resources, will be viable sovereignties in the Information Age, as they generally have not been during the last five centuries. An entirely new realm of economic activity that is not hostage to physical violence will emerge in cyberspace. The most obvious benefits will flow to the "cognitive elite," who will increasingly operate outside political boundaries. They are already equally at home in Frankfurt, London, New York, Buenos Aires, Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Incomes will become more unequal within jurisdictions and more equal between them.

The Sovereign Individual explores the social and financial consequences of this revolutionary change. Our desire is to help you to take advantage of the opportunities of the new age and avoid being destroyed by its impact. If only half of what we expect to see happens, you face change of a magnitude with few precedents in history.

随着大型系统的加速崩溃,系 统性强迫作为影响经济生活和收入 分配的一个因素将会消退。在社会 机构的组织中,效率将变得比权力 的要求更重要。这意味着,能够有 效维护财产权和提供司法行政的省 份甚至城市,同时消耗的资源很少, 在信息时代将是可行的主权,就像 过去五个世纪以来通常没有的那样。 一个不受身体暴力影响的经济活动 全新领域将在网络空间出现。最明 显的好处将流向"认知精英",他 们将越来越多地在政治边界之外运 作。他们已经在法兰克福、伦敦、 纽约、布宜诺斯艾利斯、洛杉矶、 东京和香港同样自在。辖区内的收 入将变得更加不平等,它们之间的 收入将变得更加平等。

《主权个人》探讨了这一革命 性变化的社会和财务后果。我们的 愿望是帮助您利用新时代的机遇, 避免被其影响所摧毁。如果我们期 望看到的只有一半发生,你将面临 历史上很少有先例的巨大变化。 The transformation of the year 2000 will not only revolutionize the character of the world economy, it will do so more rapidly than any previous phase change. Unlike the Agricultural Revolution, the Information Revolution will not take millennia to do its work. Unlike the Industrial Revolution, its impact will not be spread over centuries. The Information Revolution will happen within a lifetime.

What is more, it will happen almost everywhere at once. Technical and economic innovations will no longer be confined to small portions of the globe. The transformation will be all but universal. And it will involve a break with the past so profound that it will almost bring to life the magical domain of the gods as imagined by the early agricultural peoples like the ancient Greeks. To a greater degree than most would now be willing to concede, it will prove difficult or impossible to preserve many contemporary institutions in the new millennium. When information societies take shape they will be as different from industrial societies as the Greece of Aeschylus was from the world of the cave dwellers.

2000年的转变不仅将彻底改变 世界经济的性质,而且将比以往任 何阶段性变化都快。与农业革命不 同,信息革命不需要几千年才能完 成其工作。与工业革命不同,它的 影响不会延续几个世纪。信息革命 将在有生之年发生。

更重要的是,它几乎会同时发生在任何地方。技术和经济创新将不再局限于全球的一小部分。这种转变几乎是普遍的。它将涉及与如此深刻的过去决裂,以至于它几乎将像古希腊人这样的早期农业民族所想象的那样,使神的神奇领域栩栩如生。在比大多数人现在愿意承认的更大程度上,在新千年中保留许多当代机构将证明是困难或不可能的。当信息社会形成时,它们将与工业社会不同,就像埃斯库罗斯的希腊与穴居者的世界一样。

1.3 PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: THE RISE OF THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL

普罗米修斯不受束缚: 主权个体的崛起

I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man to elevate his life by conscious endeavor.

— HENRY DAVID THOREAU

The coming transformation is both good news and bad. The good news is that the Information Revolution will liberate individuals as never before. For the first time, those who can educate and motivate themselves will be almost entirely free to invent their own work and realize the full benefits of their own productivity. Genius will be unleashed, freed from both the oppression of government

我知道没有比人类通过有 意识的努力来提升自己生 活的能力更令人鼓舞的事 实了。

一 亨利 大卫 梭罗

即将到来的转变既有好消息也 有坏消息。好消息是信息革命将像 从未有过的那样解放个人。首次, 那些能够自我教育和激励自己的人 and the drags of racial and ethnic prejudice. In the Information Society, no one who is truly able will be detained by the ill-formed opinions of others. It will not matter what most of the people on earth might think of your race, your looks, your age, your sexual proclivities, or the way you wear your hair. In the cybereconomy, they will never see you. The ugly, the fat, the old, the disabled will vie with the young and beautiful on equal terms in utterly color-blind anonymity on the new frontiers of cyberspace.

将几乎完全自由地发明自己的工作, 并实现自己生产力的全部好处。天 才将被释放,摆脱了政府的压迫和 种族和民族偏见的限制。在信息社 会中,没有真正有才华的人会被他 人没见过的肤浅见解所阻拦。你的 种族、外貌、年龄、性取向或发型 方式将无关紧要。在网络经济中, 别人永远看不见你。在新的网络空 间上,丑陋、肥胖、老年和残疾的 人将与年轻和美丽的人平等竞争, 实现完全无色觉偏见的匿名。

1.3.1 思想成为财富

Merit, wherever it arises, will be rewarded as never before. In an environment where the greatest source of wealth will be the ideas you have in your head rather than physical capital alone, anyone who thinks clearly will potentially be rich. The Information Age will be the age of upward mobility. It will afford far more equal opportunity for the billions of humans in parts of the world that never shared fully in the prosperity of industrial society. The brightest, most successful and ambitious of these will emerge as truly Sovereign Individuals.

At first, only a handful will achieve full financial sovereignty. But this does not negate the advantages of financial independence. The fact that not everyone attains an equally vast fortune does not mean that it is futile or meaningless to become rich. There are 25,000 millionaires for every billionaire. If you are a millionaire and not a billionaire, that does not make you poor. Equally, in the future, one of the milestones by which you measure your financial success will be not just now many zeroes you can add to your net worth, but whether you can structure your affairs in a way that enables you to realize full individual autonomy and independence. The more clever you are, the less propulsion you will require to achieve financial escape velocity. Persons of even quite modest

无论何时何地,凡是有卓越思想的人都将得到前所未有的奖励。 在一个最大的财富资源是你脑中的思想而不仅仅是物质资本的环境中,任何能够清晰思考的人都可能富有。信息时代将是流动性的年代。它将为数十亿生活在未曾共享工业社会繁荣的地区的人提供更多平等机会。这些人中最聪明、最成功和最有抱负的人将成为真正的独立个体。

一开始,只有少数人能实现完全的财务主权。但这并不否定财务独立的优势。并不是每个人都能获得同样巨大的财富,这并不意味着成为富有是毫无意义的。每个亿万富翁都有25000个百万富翁。如果你是百万富翁而不是亿万富翁,那也不代表你是穷人。同样,在未来,衡量你的财务成功的一个里程碑不仅仅是你的净值上有多少个零,而是你能否以一种可以实现个人完全自治和独立的方式来构建你的事务。

means will soar as the gravitational pull of politics on the global economy weakens. Unprecedented financial independence will be a reachable goal in your lifetime or that of your children. 越聪明的你,就越不需要推动力来 实现财务逃逸速度。即使是非常普 通的人也可以在全球政治重力对全 球经济的影响减弱之际腾飞。在你 或你的子孙一生中,无先例的财务 独立将成为一个可以实现的目标。

At the highest plateau of productivity, these Sovereign Individuals will compete and interact on terms that echo the relations among the gods in Greek myth. The elusive Mount Olympus of the next millennium will be in cyberspace – a realm without physical existence that will nonetheless develop what promises to be the world's largest economy by the second decade of the new millennium. By 2025, the cybereconomy will have many millions of participants. Some of them will be as rich as Bill Gates, worth tens of billions of dollars each. The cyberpoor may be those with an income of less than \$200,000 a year. There will be no cyberwelfare. No cybertaxes and no cybergovernment. The cybereconomy, rather than China, could well be the greatest economic phenomenon of the next thirty years.

在生产力的最高高原上,这些主权个体将在类似于希腊神话中神之间的关系的条件下竞争和互动。下一个千禧年的神山将是虚拟空间一个没有实体存在的领域,但它发展成为新千年二十年代世界上最大的经济体之一。到2025年,虚拟经济将有很多百万参与者。其中一些人将像比尔·盖茨一样富有,价值数百亿美元。虚拟贫穷可能是年收入不到20万美元的人。没有虚拟福利。没有虚拟税收,也没有虚拟政府。虚拟经济可能成为未来30年最伟大的经济现象,而不是中国。

The good news is that politicians will no more be able to dominate, suppress, and regulate the greater part of commerce in this new realm than the legislators of the ancient Greek city-states could have trimmed the beard of Zeus. That is good news for the rich. And even better news for the not so rich. The obstacles and burdens that politics imposes are more obstacles to becoming rich than to being rich. The benefits of declining returns to violence and devolving jurisdictions will create scope for every energetic and ambitious person to benefit from the death of politics. Even the consumers of government services will benefit as entrepreneurs extend the benefits of competition. Heretofore, competition between jurisdictions has usually meant competition by means of violence to enforce the rule of a predominant group. Consequently, much of the ingenuity of interjurisdictional competition was channeled into military endeavor. But the advent of the

好消息是政治家将不再能够在 这个新领域中支配、压制和规范大 部分商业活动,就像古希腊城邦的 立法者不能修剪宙斯的胡须一样。 这对富人来说是好消息。对于不那 么富裕的人来说更是好消息。对于不那 么富裕的人来说更是好消息。政治 施加的障碍和负担对于成为富人来 说是更多的障碍,而对于已经富足 的人来说则更少。暴力收益递减和 权力下放的益处将为每个有活力和 雄心壮志的人创造发挥,从而从政 治的消亡中受益。即使是政府服务 的消费者也会受益,因为企业家会 扩大竞争的好处。迄今为止,司法 管辖区之间的竞争通常意味着通过 cybereconomy will bring competition on new terms to provision of sovereignty services. A proliferation of jurisdictions will mean proliferating experimentation in new ways of enforcing contracts and otherwise securing the safety of persons and property. The liberation of a large part of the global economy from political control will oblige whatever remains of government as we have known it to operate on more nearly market terms. Governments will ultimately have little choice but to treat populations in territories they serve more like customers, and less in the way that organized criminals treat the victims of a shakedown racket.

暴力竞争来强制执行主导群体的规则。因此,许多跨领土竞争的独创性都集中在军事事业上。但是,网络经济的出现将为主权服务的供给带来新的竞争条件。司法管辖区的繁殖将意味着在新的执行合同和保障人身和财产安全的方式方面的多种多样的实验。全球经济的大部分解放出了政治控制,这将迫使我们所知道的政府在更接近市场原则的条件下运作。政府最终将别无选择,只能把他们服务的地区人口视为顾客,而不是像有组织的犯罪分子对待勒索诈骗受害者一样。

1.3.2 超越政治

What mythology described as the province of the gods will become a viable option for the individual – a life outside the reach of kings and councils. First in scores, then in hundreds, and ultimately in the millions, individuals will escape the shackles of politics. As they do, they will transform the character of governments, shrinking the realm of compulsion and widening the scope of private control over resources.

The emergence of the sovereign individual will demonstrate yet again the strange prophetic power of myth. Conceiving little of the laws of nature, the early agricultural peoples imagined that "powers we should call supernatural" were widely distributed. These powers were sometimes employed by men, sometimes by "incarnate human gods" who looked like men and interacted with them in what Sir James George Frazer described in *The Golden Bough* as "a great democracy."

When the ancients imagined the children of Zeus living among them they were inspired by a deep belief in magic. They shared with other primitive agricultural peoples an awe of nature, and a 神话描述的神的领域将成为个人的可行选项 - 生活在国王和议会无法触及的生活之外。从成百上千开始,最终达到数百万,个人将逃脱政治的枷锁。他们这样做,将改变政府的性质,缩小强制的范围,扩大对资源的私人控制范围。

个人主权的出现将再次证明神话的奇异预言能力。早期的农业民族很少了解自然法则,他们认为"我们应该称之为超自然的力量"是广泛分布的。这些力量有时被人类利用,有时由"人格化的人类神"利用,他们看起来像人类,并与他们互动在詹姆斯·乔治·弗雷泽在《金枝》中所描述的"一个伟大的民主制"中。

当古人想象宙斯的子女与他们 一起生活时,他们受到了对魔法的 深刻信仰的启发。他们与其他原始 superstitious conviction that nature's works were set in motion by individual volition, by magic. In that sense, there was nothing self-consciously prophetic about their view of nature and their gods. They were far from anticipating microtechnology. They could not have imagined its impact in altering the marginal productivity of individuals thousands of years later. They certainly could not have foreseen how it would shift the balance between power and efficiency and thus revolutionize the way that assets are created and protected. Yet what they imagined as they spun their myths has a strange resonance with the world you are likely to see.

农业民族分享对自然的敬畏,以及 通过个体意志的魔法来控制自然力 量的迷信信念。从这个意义上说, 他们对自然和他们的神并没有什么 自觉的预言性。他们远未预见到微 技术的到来。数千年后,他们也无 法想象它对个人边际生产力的改变 会对生产资产和保护方式的变革带 来多大的影响。然而,当他们编织 神话时所想象的,却与你可能看到 的世界有着奇怪的共鸣。

1.3.3 Abracadabra咒语

The "abracadabra" of the magic invocation, for example, bears a curious similarity to the password employed to access a computer. In some respects, high-speed computation has already made it possible to mimic the magic of the genie. Early generations of "digital servants" already obey the commands of those who control the computers in which they are sealed much as genies were sealed in magic lamps. The virtual reality of information technology will widen the realm of human wishes to make almost anything that can be imagined seem real. Telepresence will give living individuals the same capacity to span distance at supernatural speed and monitor events from afar that the Greeks supposed was enjoyed by Hermes and Apollo. The Sovereign Individuals of the Information Age, like the gods of ancient and primitive myths, will in due course enjoy a kind of "diplomatic immunity" from most of the political woes that have beset mortal human beings in most times and places.

The new Sovereign Individual will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically. Commanding vastly greater resources and beyond the reach of many forms of compulsion, the Sovereign Individual will redesign governments and reconfigure economies in the new millennium. The full implications of this change are all but unimaginable.

魔法咒语中的"阿布拉卡达布 拉"与访问电脑的密码惊人地相似。 高速计算在某些方面已经让模仿神 灵魔法成为可能。早期的"数字仆 人"就像法器中被封印的神灵一样 服从主人的命令。信息技术的虚拟 现实将扩大人类的愿望范围, 使几 乎任何想象得到的事情都变得真实。 远程存在将赋予生命体在超自然速 度下跨越距离和远程监控事件的能 力,就像希腊神话中的赫尔墨斯和 阿波罗一样。信息时代的主权个体, 像古代和原始神话中的神灵一样, 最终将享有一种"外交豁免权",使 其免于大多数时代和地方困扰凡人 的政治问题。

新的主权个体将在同一物理环境中与普通公民生活,但在政治上处于单独的领域。拥有非常庞大的资源,超出多种形式约束的范围,主权个体将重新设计政府和经济,进入新的千年。这种变化的全部影响几乎无法想象。

1.3.4 天才与天惩

For anyone who loves human aspiration and success, the Information Age will provide a bounty. That is surely the best news in many generations. But it is bad news as well. The new organization of society implied by the triumph of individual autonomy and the true equalization of opportunity based upon merit will lead to very great rewards for merit and great individual autonomy. This will leave individuals far more responsible for themselves than they have been accustomed to being during the industrial period. It will also precipitate transition crises, including a possibly severe economic depression that will reduce the unearned advantage in living standards that has been enjoyed by residents of advanced industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. As we write, the top 15 percent of the world's population have an average per-capita income of \$21,000 annually. The remaining 85 percent of the world have an average income of just \$1,000. That huge, hoarded advantage from the past is bound to dissipate under the new conditions of the Information Age.

As it does, the capacity of nation-states to redistribute income on a large scale will collapse. Information technology facilitates dramatically increased competition between jurisdictions. When technology is mobile, and transactions occur in cyberspace, as they increasingly will do, governments will no longer be able to charge more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. Anyone with a portable computer and a satellite link will be able to conduct almost any information business anywhere, and that includes almost the whole of the world's multitrillion-dollar financial transactions.

This means that you will no longer be obliged to live in a high-tax jurisdiction in order to earn high income. In the future, when most wealth can be earned anywhere, and even spent anywhere, governments that attempt to charge too much as the price of domicile will merely drive away their best customers. If our reasoning is correct, and we believe it is, the nation-state as we

对于任何一个追逐理想和成功 的人来说,信息时代的回报将无与 伦比。这无疑是几代人以来最好的 消息,但也是一个坏消息。基于个 人自治的新型社会组织,以及建立 在能力之上的、真正的机会均等, 会使才能出众者,得到超级的回报 和个人自主性。但是,个人要对自 己担负的责任,也会远远超过他们 在工业时期所习惯的。此外,在整 个20世纪, 先进工业社会的居民, 享受了不劳而获的优越生活,这种 优势也将被削弱。在我们写这本书 的时候(1997年之前),世界上前15%的 人口,人均年收入为21000美元;其 余85%的人,平均年收入只有1000美 元。在信息时代的新环境下,过去 囤积起来的巨大优势, 必将烟消云 散。

随着它的消散,民族国家大规模重新分配收入的能力将崩溃。信息技术极大地促进了辖区之间的竞争。信息技术加剧了各管辖区之间的竞争。信息技术加剧了各管辖区之间的竞争。技术是流动的,交易是在网络空间进行的。任何人只要有一台便携式电脑,和一条卫星网络,就可以在任何地方,从事几乎任何信息业务,包括世界上数以万亿美元的金融交易。

这意味着,你不再需要为了高收入,而不得不生活在高税率的国家和地区。在未来,大多数财富可以在任何地方赚取,甚至可以在任何地方消费。到那时,政府试图对它的永久居民收取高额的服务费,

know it will not endure in anything like its present form.

只会丢掉它们最好的客户。如果我们的推理是正确的,我们相信它是正确的,那么,大家所知道的民族国家,将不会再以任何类似现在的形式而存在。

1.4 THE END OF NATIONS 国家末日

Changes that diminish the power of predominant institutions are both unsettling and dangerous. Just as monarchs, lords, popes, and potentates fought ruthlessly to preserve their accustomed privileges in the early stages of the modem period, so today's governments will employ violence, often of a covert and arbitrary kind, in the attempt to hold back the clock. Weakened by the challenge from technology, the state will treat increasingly autonomous individuals, its former citizens, with the same range of ruthlessness and diplomacy it has heretofore displayed in its dealing with other governments. The advent of this new stage in history was punctuated with a bang on August 20, 1998, when the United States fired about \$200 million worth of Tomahawk BGM-109 sea-launched cruise missiles at targets allegedly associated with an exiled Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden became the first person in history to have his satellite phone targeted for attack by cruise missiles. Simultaneously, the United States destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, in Bin Laden's honor. The emergence of Bin Laden as the enemy-in-chief of the United States reflects a momentous change in the nature of warfare. A single individual, albeit one with hundreds of millions of dollars, can now be depicted as a plausible threat to the greatest military power of the Industrial era. In statements reminiscent of propaganda employed during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, the United States president and his national security aides portrayed Bin Laden, a private individual, as a transnational terrorist and leading enemy of the United States.

削弱了主导机构权力的变化既 令人不安,又危险。正如君主、贵 族、教皇和有权势的人在现代时期 的早期阶段为了维护惯有特权而进 行的残酷斗争一样, 今天的政府也 会用暴力,通常是隐蔽和任意的, 试图阻止时钟倒转。受技术挑战削 弱的国家将像以前对待其他政府一 样,用同样的无情和外交手段处理 日益自治的个人——它的前公民。 这个历史新阶段的出现在1998年8月20日 响起;当时,美国向据称与被流放 的沙特亿万富翁奥萨马 本 拉登有 关的目标发射了价值约2亿美元的 海基巡航导弹。本拉登成为历史 上第一个被巡航导弹攻击卫星电话 的人。与此同时,美国在苏丹的喀 土穆摧毁了一家制药厂,以表彰本拉 登。本 拉登成为美国最大军事力 量的可信威胁。单个人, 虽然拥有 数百万美元,现在也可以被描绘为 对工业时代最大的军事力量构成可 信威胁的人。美国总统和他的国家 安全助手发表的声明, 类似于冷战 期间有关苏联的宣传,将本拉登 描述为跨国恐怖分子和美国的头号 敌人。

The same military logic that has seen Osama bin Laden elevated to a position as the chief enemy of the United States will assert itself in governments' internal relations with their subjects. Increasingly harsh techniques of exaction will be a logical corollary of the emergence of a new type of bargaining between governments and individuals. Technology will make individuals more nearly sovereign than ever before. And they will be treated that way. Sometimes violently, as enemies, sometimes as equal parties in negotiation, sometimes as allies. But however ruthlessly governments behave, particularly in the transition period, wedding the IRS with the CIA will avail them little. They will be increasingly required by the press of necessity to bargain with autonomous individuals whose resources will no longer be so easily controlled.

The changes implied by the Information Revolution will not only create a fiscal crisis for governments, they will tend to disintegrate all large structures. Fourteen empires have disappeared already in the twentieth century. The breakdown of empires is part of a process that will dissolve the nation-state itself. Government will have to adapt to the growing autonomy of the individual. Taxing capacity will plunge by 50-70 percent. This will tend to make smaller jurisdictions more successful. The challenge of setting competitive terms to attract able individuals and their capital will be more easily undertaken in enclaves than across continents.

We believe that as the modern nation-state decomposes, latterday barbarians will increasingly come to exercise power behind the scenes. Groups like the Russian mafiya, which picks the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas, drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will be laws unto themselves. They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modern barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nation-state without greatly changing its appearances. They are microparasites feeding on a dying system. As violent and un-

相同的军事逻辑已将奥萨马本拉 登提升为美国的首要敌人,这种逻 辑也将在政府与国民的内部关系中 得到体现。越来越严厉的敛财手段 将成为政府与个人谈判出现的逻辑 必然结果。技术将让个人比以往任 何时候都更接近主权。他们也将被 当作如此对待,有时会被视作敌人, 有时会被视作平等的谈判方,有时 会被视作盟友。然而,无论政府的 行为多么无情,尤其是在过渡期间, 将联邦税务局与中央情报局(CIA) 捆绑在一起是没有什么用处的。由 于自主个体的资源不再轻易被控制, 政府将越来越需要与自主个体进行 谈判来适应这种变化。

信息革命所带来的变化不仅会为政府创造财政危机,还将倾向于分解所有的大型结构。20世纪已经有14个帝国消失了。帝国的崩溃是一个过程的一部分,该过程将消解民族国家本身。政府将不得不适应个人日益增长的自治。税收收入能力将下降50-70%。这将倾向于使较小的司法管辖区更为成功。面对吸引有才华的个体和他们的资本的竞争性条款的挑战,将更容易在飞地中而不是跨越大陆进行。

我们相信,随着现代民族国家的解体,后期野蛮人将越来越多地在幕后行使权力。像俄罗斯黑手党、在前苏联领土上乱捡残羹剩饭的其他族裔犯罪团伙、官僚特权阶层、毒品贩子和叛逆的秘密机构这样的团体将成为自己的法律。他们已经是了。现代野蛮人已经在不大改变国家的形象的情况下,渗透到国家

scrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power are part of the downsizing of politics. Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power.

形式之中,远比人们所理解的要多得多。他们是在死亡的系统上寄生的微小寄生虫。这些团体和处于战争状态下的政治机构一样具有暴力和不择手段,他们运用国家的技术进行小规模的实施和控制。他们日益增长的影响力和权力是政治下降的一部分。微处理降低了团体必须达到的规模才能在使用和控制暴力方面发挥有效作用的规模。随着这一技术革命的展开,掠夺性暴力将越来越多地组织在中央控制之外。遏制暴力的努力也将以效率而不是权力大小的方式演化。

1.4.1 倒退的历史

The process by which the nation-state grew over the past five centuries will be put into reverse by the new logic of the Information Age. Local centers of power will reassert themselves as the state devolves into fragmented, overlapping sovereignties. The growing power of organized crime is merely one reflection of this tendency. Multinational companies are already having to subcontract all but essential work. Some conglomerates, such as AT&T, Unisys, and ITT, have split themselves into several firms in order to function more profitably. The nation-state will devolve like an unwieldy conglomerate, but probably not before it is forced to do so by financial crises.

Not only is power in the world changing, but the work of the world is changing as well. This means that the way business operates will inevitably change. The "virtual corporation" is evidence of a sweeping transformation in the nature of the firm, facilitated by the drop in information and transaction costs. We explore the implications of the Information Revolution for dissolving corporations and doing away with the "good job". In the Information Age,

过去五个世纪民族国家成长的 过程将被信息时代的新逻辑逆转。 当国家分化成交叉重叠的主权时, 地方权力中心将重新确立自己的地 位。有组织犯罪的不断壮大仅仅是 这种趋势的一个反映。跨国公司已 经不得不外包除了必要的工作之外 的所有工作。一些企业集团,如AT&T、 Unisys和ITT,已经分裂成几个公 司,以更赚钱的方式运作。民族国 家将像一个难以管理的企业集团一 样分化,但可能不会在金融危机迫 使它这样做之前。

不仅世界权力在改变,世界工作也在改变。这意味着商业运作的方式不可避免地会发生变化。"虚拟企业"是企业性质发生巨变的证据,这一变化得益于信息和交易成本的降低。我们探讨了信息革命对于溶解公司和消除"好工作"的影

a "job" will be a task to do, not a position you "have". Microprocessing has created entirely new horizons of economic activity that transcend territorial boundaries. This transcendence of frontiers and territories is perhaps the most revolutionary development since Adam and Eve straggled out of paradise under the sentence of their Maker: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." As technology revolutionizes the tools we use, it also antiquates our laws, reshapes our morals, and alters our perceptions. This book explains how.

Microprocessing and rapidly improving communications already make it possible for the individual to choose where to work. Transactions on the Internet or the World Wide Web can be encrypted and will soon be almost impossible for tax collectors to capture. Tax-free money already compounds far faster offshore than onshore funds still subject to the high tax burden imposed by the twentieth-century nation-state. After the tum of the millennium, much of the world's commerce will migrate into the new realm of cyberspace, a region where governments will have no more dominion than they exercise over the bottom of the sea or the outer planets. In cyberspace, the threats of physical violence that have been the alpha and omega of politics since time immemorial will vanish. In cyberspace, the meek and the mighty will meet on equal terms. Cyberspace is the ultimate offshore jurisdiction. An economy with no taxes. Bermuda in the sky with diamonds.

When this greatest tax haven of them all is fully open for business, all funds will essentially be offshore funds at the discretion of their owner. This will have cascading consequences. The state has grown used to treating its taxpayers as a farmer treats his cows, keeping them in a field to be milked. Soon, the cows will have wings. 响。在信息时代,"工作"将是一项任务,而不是一个你"拥有"的职位。微处理技术已经创造了超越领土界限的全新经济活动领域。这种超越国界和领土的能力或许是自亚当和夏娃受造之后最具革命性的进展:"你必须流着汗水才能吃到面包。"随着技术革新所带来的工具倒退了我们的法律,重塑了我们的道德,改变了我们的感知。本书解释了这一点。

微处理技术和迅速改进的通信 技术已经使个人有选择工作地点的 可能性。在互联网或万维网上进行 的交易可以进行加密,并且很快就 几乎不可能被税务部门发现。免税 的资金已经在海外比在岸上完全受 到二十世纪民族国家高税负重担的 资金更快地复利增长。在千禧年之 后,世界上的大部分商业将迁移到 新的网络空间,这是一个政府不再 能够支配的领域,就像他们对待海 底和外层行星一样。在网络空间, 一直是政治的尧舜大禹的物理暴力 威胁将消失。在网络空间,弱者和 强者将在平等的条件下相遇。网络 空间是终极的离岸司法管辖区。一 个没有税收的经济。天空中的百慕 大岛和钻石。

当这个最大的避税天堂完全开放营业时,所有资金实际上将成为业主自行决定的离岸基金。这将产生连锁反应。国家已经习惯了像农民对待奶牛一样对待纳税人,将他们留在田地里挤奶。很快,奶牛将有翅膀。

1.4.2 国家的复仇

Like an angry farmer, the state will no doubt take desperate measures at first to tether and hobble its escaping herd. It will employ covert and even violent means to restrict access to liberating technologies. Such expedients will work only temporarily, if at all. The twentieth-century nation-state, with all its pretensions, will starve to death as its tax revenues decline.

When the state finds itself unable to meet its committed expenditure by raising tax revenues, it will resort to other, more desperate measures. Among them is printing money. Governments have grown used to enjoying a monopoly over currency that they could depreciate at will. This arbitrary inflation has been a prominent feature of the monetary policy of all twentieth-century states. Even the best national currency of the postwar period, the German mark, lost 71 percent of its value from January 1, 1949, through the end of June 1995. In the same period, the U.S. dollar lost 84 percent of its value. This inflation had the same effect as a tax on all who hold the currency. As we explore later, inflation as revenue option will be largely foreclosed by the emergence of cybermoney. New technologies will. allow the holders of wealth to bypass the national monopolies that have issued and regulated money in the modern period. Indeed, the credit crises that swept through Asia, Russia, and other emerging economies in 1997 and 1998 attest to the fact that national currencies and national credit ratings are anachronisms inimical to the smooth operation of the global economy. It is precisely the fact that the demands of sovereignty require all transactions within a jurisdiction to be denominated in a national currency that creates the vulnerability to mistakes by central bankers and attacks by speculators which precipitated deflationary crises in one jurisdiction after another. In the Information Age, individuals will be able to use cybercurrencies and thus declare their monetary independence. When individuals can conduct their own monetary policies over the World Wide Web it will matter less or not at all that the

像一位愤怒的农民一样,国家 无疑会首先采取绝望的措施来束缚 和牵制其逃离的群体。它将采用隐 秘甚至暴力手段来限制对解放性技 术的接触。这些方法只能在短时间 内起作用,如果有的话。二十世纪 的民族国家,带着所有的自负,将 因为税收下降而面临资金不足的困 境。

当国家发现自己无法通过增加 税收来满足支出时,就会采取其他 更绝望的措施。其中之一是印钞票。 政府已经习惯了享有货币垄断权, 可以随意贬值,这种任意通胀一直 是所有二十世纪国家的货币政策的 一个突出特征。甚至二战后期最好 的国家货币德国马克在1949年1月1日 至1995年6月底期间的价值下降了71%。 在同一时期,美元贬值了84%。这 种通胀对持有货币的人的影响与税 收类似。随着我们之后的探讨,通 货膨胀作为一种收入选择在信息时 代将被广泛淘汰。新技术将允许财 富的持有者绕过现代时期发行和管 理货币的国家垄断。事实上,1997年 和1998年席卷亚洲、俄罗斯和其他 新兴经济体的信贷危机表明,国家 货币和国家信用评级是不利于全球 经济运作的陈旧思维。正是主权要 求在一个管辖范围内的所有交易必 须以国家货币计价的事实, 才造成 了银行家错误和投机者攻击的漏洞, 从而引发了一个又一个的通货紧缩 危机。在信息时代,个人将能够使 用网络货币,因此宣布他们的货币 独立。当个人能够通过万维网进行

state continues to control the industrial-era printing presses. Their importance for controlling the world's wealth will be transcended by mathematical algorithms that have no physical existence. In the new millennium, cybermoney controlled by private markets will supersede fiat money issued by governments. Only the poor will be victims of inflation and ensuing collapses into deflation that are consequences of the artificial leverage which fiat money injects into the economy.

Lacking their accustomed scope to tax and inflate, governments, even in traditionally civil countries, will turn nasty. As income tax becomes uncollectible, older and more arbitrary methods of exaction will resurface. The ultimate form of withholding tax -de facto or even overt hostage-taking - will be introduced by governments desperate to prevent wealth from escaping beyond their reach. Unlucky individuals will find themselves singled out and held to ransom in an almost medieval fashion. Businesses that offer services that facilitate the realization of autonomy by individuals will be subject to infiltration, sabotage, and disruption. Arbitrary forfeiture of property, already commonplace in the United States, where it occurs five thousand times a week, will become even more pervasive. Governments will violate human rights, censor the free flow of information, sabotage useful technologies, and worse. For the same reasons that the late, departed Soviet Union tried in vain to suppress access to personal computers and Xerox machines, Western governments will seek to suppress the cybereconomy by totalitarian means.

自己的货币政策时,国家继续控制 工业时代的印刷机就会变得不那么 重要,甚至不重要。它们为掌控世 界财富的重要性,将被没有物理存 在的数学算法所超越。在新千年, 由私人市场控制的网络货币将取代 政府发行的法定货币。只有穷人将 成为通货膨胀和随后崩溃的受害者。 这是法定货币注入经济的人工杠杆 的后果。

在没有了习惯性的征收所得税 的情况下,即使在传统上文明的国 家,政府也将变得残忍。更老、更 武断的征税方式将重新出现。政府 迫切希望阻止财富逃离其管辖范围, 将引入最终形式的代扣税——实际 上甚至是公开的劫持人质。不幸的 个人将发现自己被单独挑选并以几 乎中世纪的方式被绑架和赎金。为 个人实现自治的服务的企业将受到 渗透、破坏和破坏。在美国,已经 普遍存在的任意没收财产行为,每 周发生五千次的情况将变得更为普 遍。政府将侵犯人权,审查信息的 自由流动,破坏有用的技术等等。 由于晚已逝去的苏联试图无效地压 制个人电脑和施乐复印机的使用, 西方政府也将通过极权主义手段试 图抑制网络经济。

1.5 RETURN OF THE LUDDITES

卢德派的回归

Such methods may prove popular among some population segments. The good news about individual liberation and autonomy will seem to be bad news to many who are frightened by the tran这些方法可能会在某些人群中 流行。个人解放和自治的好消息可 能会给许多人带来打击,他们对转 sition crisis and do not expect to be winners in the new configuration of society. The apparent popularity of the draconian capital controls imposed in 1998 by Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in the wake of the Asian meltdown testifies to residual enthusiasm among many for the old-fashioned closed economy dominated by the nation-state. This nostalgia for the past will be fed by resentments inflamed by the inevitable transition crisis. The greatest resentment is likely to be centered among those of middle talent in currently rich countries. They particularly may come to feel that information technology poses a threat to their way of life. The beneficiaries of organized compulsion, including millions receiving income redistributed by governments, may resent the new freedom realized by the Sovereign Individuals. Their upset will illustrate the truism that "where you stand is determined by where you sit."

It would be misleading, however, to attribute all the bad feelings that will be generated in the coming transition crisis to the bald desire to live at someone else's expense. More will be involved. The very character of human society suggests that there is bound to be a misguided moral dimension to the coming Luddite reaction. Think of it as a bald desire fitted with a moral toupee. We explore the moral and moralistic dimensions of the transition crisis. Self-interested grasping of a conscious kind has far less power to motivate actions than does self-righteous fury. While adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth century is rapidly falling away. they are not without their true believers. Many humans, as the passage quoted from Craig Lambert attests, are belongers, who place importance on being members of a group. The same need to identify that motivates fans of organized sports makes some partisans of nations. Everyone who came of age in the twentieth century has been inculcated in the duties and obligations of the twentieth-century citizen. The residual moral imperatives from industrial society will stimulate at least some neo-Luddite attacks on information technologies.

型危机感到恐惧,并且不期望在社 会新形态的赢家中。马来西亚总理 马哈蒂尔 莫哈末于1998年在亚洲经 济危机后实施的严厉的资本管制政 策表明,仍有很多人倾向于传统的 以国家为主导的封闭经济。这种对 过去的怀旧情结将因转型危机必然 带来的愤怒而得到滋养。最大的憎 恨可能集中在目前富裕国家中的中 等才能人群上。他们特别可能会感 到信息技术对他们的生活方式构成 威胁。有组织强制的受益者,包括 数百万接受政府收入再分配的人, 可能会对主权个人实现的新自由感 到不满。他们的不满将说明"你所 站的位置取决于你的处境"的真理。

然而,将即将到来的过渡危机 中将产生的所有不良情绪归咎于光 秃秃地想生活在别人的代价之下是 具有误导性的。它将涉及更多方面。 人类社会的性质表明,即将到来的 勒德派反应必然会有一个错误的道 德维度。把它想象成一个带有道德 假发的光秃秃的愿望。我们探讨了 过渡期的道德和道德主义维度。有 意识的自我利益追求远不如自以为 是的愤怒来推动行为。虽然对于20世 纪公民传统的遵循正在迅速减少, 但它们并不是没有真正的信徒。正 如从Craig Lambert引用的文章所 证明的那样,许多人是"属于者", 他们认为成为团队成员很重要。同 样的认同需求使一些国家倾向于某 些主义。在20世纪成年的每个人都 受到20世纪公民责任和义务的熏陶。 工业社会的残留道德义务将激发至

In this sense, this violence to come will be at least partially an expression of what we call "moral anachronism," the application of moral strictures drawn from one stage of economic life to the circumstances of another. Every stage of society requires its own moral rules to help individuals overcome incentive traps peculiar to the choices they face in that particular way of life. Just as a farming society could not live by the moral rules of a migratory Eskimo band, so the Information Society cannot satisfy moral imperatives that emerged to facilitate the success of a militant 20th century industrial state. We explain why.

In the next few years, moral anachronism will be in evidence at the core countries of the West in much the way that it has been witnessed at the periphery over the past five centuries. West-ern colonists and military expeditions stimulated such crises when they encountered indigenous hunting-and-gathering bands, as well as peoples whose societies were still organized for farming. The introduction of new technologies into anachronistic settings caused confusion and moral crises. The success of Christian missionaries in converting millions of indigenous peoples can be laid in large measure to the local crises caused by the sudden introduction of new power arrangements from the outside. Such encounters recurred over and over, from the sixteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century. We expect similar clashes early in the new millennium as Information Societies supplant those organized along industrial lines.

少一些基于信息技术的新勒德派攻击。

在这个意义上,未来的暴力至少部分上将是我们所谓的"道德时代落后"的表达,即将道德准则应用于另一种经济生活方式的情况。每个社会阶段都需要其自身的道德准则来帮助个人克服该特定生活方式下他们面临的激励陷阱。正如一个农业社会不能按照一个流浪爱斯基摩人团队的道德规则生活一样,信息社会也无法满足于对二十世纪激进的工业国家成功所产生的道德要求。我们会解释原因。

在接下来的几年中,这种道德 时代落后将在西方核心国家的许多 领域中得到体现,就像在过去的五 个世纪里在边缘地区所见到的一样。 当西方殖民者和军事远征队遭遇土 著狩猎采集部落以及那些仍以耕种 种植为生的人时,就会出现这样的 危机。新技术的引入到这些时代落 后的环境中会导致混乱和道德危机。 基督教传教士成功地转化了数百万 土著民族,这在很大程度上归功于 由外部引入的新能源系统带来的本 地危机。从16世纪到20世纪初,这 样的冲突一再发生。我们预计,在 信息社会取代沿工业线组织的社会 时期早期,将会有类似的冲突出现。

1.5.1 对强制的怀旧情感

The rise of the Information Society will not be wholly welcomed as a promising new phase of history, even among those who benefit from it most. Everyone will feel some misgivings.

信息社会的崛起并不是所有人 都欣然接受的一段有前途的历史阶 段,即使是那些从中受益最多的人 And many will despise innovations that undermine the territorial nation-state. It is a fact of human nature that radical change of any kind is almost always seen as a dramatic turn for the worse. Five hundred years ago, the courtiers gathered around the duke of Burgundy would have said that unfolding innovations that undermined feudalism were evil. They thought the world was rapidly spiraling downhill at the very time that later historians saw an explosion of human potential in the Renaissance. Likewise, what may someday be seen as a new Renaissance from the perspective of the next millennium will look frightening to tired twentieth-century eyes.

There is a high probability that some who are offended by the new ways, as well as many who are disadvantaged by them, will react unpleasantly. Their nostalgia for compulsion will probably turn violent. Encounters with these new "Luddites" will make the transition to radical new forms of social organization at least a measure of bad news for everyone. Get ready to duck. With the speed of change outracing the moral and economic capacity of many in living generations to adapt, you can expect to see a fierce and indignant resistance to the Information Revolution, notwithstanding its great promise to liberate the future.

You must understand and prepare for such unpleasantness. A series of transition crises lies ahead. Deflationary tribulations, such as the Asian contagion that swept through the Far East to Russia and other emerging economies in 1997 and 1998, will erupt sporadically as the dated national and international institutions left over from the Industrial Era prove inadequate to the challenges of the new, dispersed, transnational economy. The new information and communication technologies are more subversive of the modern state than any political threat to its predominance since Columbus sailed. This is important because those in power have seldom reacted peacefully to developments that undermined

也会感到一些疑虑。每个人都会感到某些不安。许多人会鄙视破坏领土民族国家的创新。这是人性的一个事实,任何一种激进的变革几乎总被视为一个戏剧性的倒退。五百年前,围绕勃艮第公爵的宫廷人士会说,破坏封建制度的展开中的创新是邪恶的。他们认为世界正在迅速地走下坡路,而后来的历史学家则在文艺复兴时期看到了人类潜力的爆发。同样,从下一个千年的角度来看,有一天可能会被看作是新文艺复兴,但它会让疲惫的二十世纪眼睛感到恐惧。

有很大可能会有一些被新方式冒犯的人,以及许多受其不利影响的人,会做出令人不愉快的反应。他们对强迫的怀旧情结可能会变得暴力。与这些新的"卢德派"相遇将使向激进的新社会组织形式的转变对每个人都至少有一些不好的消息。准备好躲避吧。随着变化的速度超过生活中许多人适应的道德和经济能力,你可以预料到对信息革命的凶猛反抗,尽管它有解放未来的巨大承诺。

你必须理解并为这样的不愉快情况做好准备。一系列的转型危机将接踵而至。通货紧缩的磨难,例如 1997 年和 1998 年席卷远东到俄罗斯和其他新兴经济体的亚洲瘟疫,将会间歇性地爆发,因为那些过时的国内外机构已经证明无法应对新的、分散的跨国经济的挑战。新的信息和通讯技术比哥伦布航海后的任何政治威胁都要更具颠覆性,对于现代国家的主导地位更加具有

their authority. They are not likely to now.

The clash between the new and the old will shape the early years of the new millennium. We expect it to be a time of great danger and great reward, and a time of much diminished civility in some realms and unprecedented scope in others. Increasingly autonomous individuals and bankrupt, desperate governments will confront one another across a new divide. We expect to see a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty and the virtual death of politics before the transition is over. Instead of state domination and control of resources, you are destined to see the privatization of almost all services governments now provide. For inescapable reasons that we explore in this book, information technology will destroy the capacity of the state to charge more for its services than they are worth to you and other people who pay for them.

威胁性。这一点很重要,因为那些 在权力中的人很少会对破坏他们权 威的发展做出和平反应。他们现在 也不太可能这么做。

新旧之间的冲突将塑造新千年 的早期年份。我们预计这将是一个 充满危险和奖励的时代, 在某些领 域中,文明的减弱将是空前的,而 在其他领域中,范围将是前所未有 的。越来越自主的个人和破产、绝 望的政府将在新的分界线上相互对 抗。我们预计,在过渡结束之前, 主权的性质将发生根本性的重组, 政治几乎完全死亡。与其主导和控 制资源,你注定会看到几乎所有政 府现在提供的服务的私有化。出于 我们在本书中探讨的无法逃避的原 因,信息技术将摧毁国家为其服务 所收费比其价值和其他为其支付的 人们的贡献更高的状态的能力。

1.5.2 市场赋予的主权

To an extent that few would have imagined only a decade ago, individuals will achieve increasing autonomy over territorial nation-states through market mechanisms. All nation-states face bankruptcy and the rapid erosion of their authority. Mighty as they are, the power they retain is the power to obliterate, not to command. Their intercontinental missiles and aircraft carriers are already artifacts, as imposing and useless as the last warhorse of feudalism.

Information technology makes possible a dramatic extension of markets by altering the way that assets are created and protected. This is revolutionary. Indeed, it promises to be more revolutionary for industrial society than the advent of gunpowder proved to be for feudal agriculture. The transformation of the year 仅仅十年前,大多数人都无法想象,通过市场机制,个人将获得对领土国家越来越多的自治权。所有国家都面临破产和权威的迅速侵蚀。尽管它们强大,但它们所保留的权力只是毁灭而非统治的权力。它们的洲际导弹和航空母舰已经成为历史,就像封建主义时代的最后一匹战马一样具有威严和无用。

信息技术通过改变资产的创造和保护方式,使得市场得以大幅度扩展。这是一场革命。实际上,对于工业社会而言,它的革命性可能比火药对封建农业的影响还要深远。

2000 implies the commercialization of sovereignty and the death of politics, no less than guns implied the demise of oath-based feudalism. Citizenship will go the way of chivalry.

We believe that the age of individual economic sovereignty is coming. Just as steel mills, telephone companies, mines, and railways that were once "nationalized" have been rapidly privatized throughout the world, you will soon see the ultimate form of privatization—the sweeping denationalization of the individual. The Sovereign Individual of the new millennium will no longer be an asset of the state, a de facto item on the treasury's balance sheet. After the transition of the year 2000, denationalized citizens will no longer be citizens as we know them, but customers.

2000年的转型意味着主权的商业化 和政治的消亡,正如火器对宣誓效 忠的封建制度的终结一样。公民身 份将逐渐成为历史。

我们相信,个人经济主权时代即将到来。正如曾被国有化的钢铁厂、电话公司、矿山和铁路在全球范围内被迅速私有化一样,你将很快见证终极私有化的形式——个人的彻底非国有化。新千年的主权个体将不再是国家资产,不再是国库资产负债表上的一个实际项目。在2000年过渡后,非国有化公民将不再是我们所知道的公民,而是顾客。

1.6 BANDWIDTH TRUMPS BORDERS 带宽胜过边界

The commercialization of sovereignty will make the terms and conditions of citizenship in the nation-state as dated as chivalric oaths seemed after the collapse of feudalism. Instead of relating to a powerful state as citizens to be taxed, the Sovereign Individuals of the twenty-first century will be customers of governments operating from a "new logical space." They will bargain for whatever minimal government they need and pay for it according to contract. The governments of the Information Age will be organized along different principles than those which the world has come to expect over the past several centuries. Some jurisdictions and sovereignty services will be formed through "assortive matching", a system by which affinities, including commercial affinities, are the basis upon which virtual jurisdictions earn allegiance. In rare cases, the new sovereignties may be holdovers of medieval organizations, like the 900-year-old Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta. More commonly known as the Knights of Malta, the order is an affinity group for rich Catholics, with 10,000 current members and an

主权商业化将使国家公民身份 的条款和条件显得像封建主义崩溃 后的骑士誓言一样过时。21世纪的 主权个人将作为政府的客户从"新 的逻辑空间"运营,而不是像纳税 的公民那样与强大的国家有关。他 们将按照合同谈判并付款以获得他 们需要的最小政府。信息时代的政 府将按照不同的原则组织,这些原 则不同于过去几个世纪世界所期望 的原则。一些司法管辖区和主权服 务将通过"交配匹配"形成,这是 一种基于亲和力(包括商业亲和力) 而非地理位置的虚拟管辖权挣得忠 诚的基础。在罕见情况下,新的主 权可能仍然是中世纪组织(如有着900年 历史的圣约翰医院长, 罗得和马耳 他的邦联)。这个亲密团体是一个

annual income of several billions. The Knights of Malta issues its own passports, stamps, and money, and carries on full diplomatic relations with seventy countries. As we write it is negotiating with the Republic of Malta to reassume possession of Fort St. Angelo. Taking possession of the castle would give the Knights the missing ingredient of territoriality that will enable it to be recognized as a sovereignty. The Knights of Malta could once again become a sovereign microstate, instantly legitimized by a long history. It was from Fort St. Angelo that the Knights of Malta turned back the Turks in the Great Siege of 1565. Indeed, they ruled Malta for many years thereafter, until they were expelled by Napoleon in 1798. If the Knights of Malta were to return in the next few vears, there could be no clearer evidence that the modern nationstate system, ushered in after the French Revolution, was merely an interlude in the longer sweep of history in which it has been the norm for many kinds of sovereignties to exist at the same time.

富有的天主教徒的可以拥有自己护 照,邮票和货币的组织,年收入几 十亿。圣约翰骑士团发行自己的护 照,邮票和货币,并与70个国家保 持着完整的外交关系。就在我们写 作的时候,它正在与马耳他共和国 进行谈判,以重新占据安琪洛堡。 占领城堡将成为这个组织具有领土 性的缺失要素,并使其能够被认可 为主权。圣约翰骑士团可能再次成 为一个主权微型国家,并因悠久的 历史而被立即合法化。正是从安琪 洛堡,圣约翰骑士团在1565年的大 围攻中击退了土耳其人。他们统治 了马耳他多年,直到1798年被拿破 仑驱逐。如果圣约翰骑士团在未来 几年内返回,那么现代国家体系, 即法国革命后出现的国家体系,只 是历史长河中的一个片段,历史长 河中许多种类的主权同时存在是正 常的。

Still another and very different model for a postmodern sovereignty based on assortive matching is the Iridium satellite telephone network. At first glance, you may think it odd to treat a cellular telephone service as a kind of sovereignty. Yet Iridium has already received recognition as a virtual sovereignty by international authorities. As you may know, Iridium is a global cellular phone service that allows subscribers to receive calls on a single number, wherever they find themselves on the planet, from Featherston, New Zealand, to the Bolivian Chaco. To allow calls to be routed to Iridium subscribers anywhere on the globe, given the architecture of global telecoms, international telecom authorities had to agree to recognize Iridium as a virtual country, with its own country code: 8816. It is a short step logically from a virtual country comprising satellite telephone subscribers to sovereignty for more coherent virtual communities on the World Wide Web that span borders. Bandwidth, or the carrying capacity of a communica-

基于匹配交配的后现代主权的 另一个非常不同的模型是铱星手机 网络。乍一看,你可能认为将一个 蜂窝电话服务视为一种主权奇怪。 然而, 铱星已经被国际当局承认为 虚拟主权国家。正如您所知,铱星 是一种全球蜂窝电话服务,允许用 户在全球任何一个地方接收来电, 从新西兰的菲瑟斯顿到玻利维亚查 科。为了允许呼叫路由到全球任何 地方的铱星用户,考虑到全球电信 的架构,国际电信当局不得不同意 将铱星作为一个虚拟国家来承认, 其拥有自己的国家代码:8816。从 卫星电话订户组成的虚拟国家到跨 越边界的更一致的虚拟社区的主权, tions medium, has been expanding faster than computational capacity multiplied after the invention of transistors. If this trend to greater bandwidth continues, as we believe likely, it is only a matter of a few years, soon after the turn of the millennium, until bandwidth becomes sufficiently capacious to make technically possible the "metaverse," the alternative, cyberspace world imagined by the science fiction novelist Neal Stephenson. Stephenson's "metaverse" is a dense virtual community with its own laws. We believe it is inevitable that, as the cybereconomy becomes richer, its participants will seek and obtain exemption from the anachronistic laws of nation-states. The new cybercommunities will be at least as wealthy and competent at advancing their interests as the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem. of Rhodes and of Malta. Indeed, they will be more capable of asserting themselves because of far-reaching communications and information warfare capabilities. We explore still other models of fragmented sovereignty in which small groups can effectively lease the sovereignty of weak nation-states, and operate their own economic havens much as free ports and free trade zones are licensed to do today.

A new moral vocabulary will be required to describe the relations of Sovereign Individuals with one another and what remains of government. We suspect that as the terms of these new relations come into focus, they will offend many people who came of age as "citizens" of twentieth-century nation-states. The end of nations and the "denationalization of the individual" will deflate some warmly held notions, such as "equal protection under the law", that presuppose power relations that are soon to be obsolete. As virtual communities gain coherence, they will insist that their members be held accountable according to their own laws, rather than those of the former nation-states in which they happen to reside. Multiple systems of law will again coexist over the same geographic area, as they did in ancient and medieval times.

这仅是逻辑上的简短步骤。带宽, 即通信媒介的承载能力, 正在以晶 体管发明后计算能力的增长速度加 快。如果这种向更大带宽的趋势继 续下去,正如我们所相信的那样, 那么仅仅几年,在新千年之后不久, 带宽就会变得足够宽敞,以使"元 宇宙"成为可能,即科幻小说家尼 尔斯蒂芬森想象的另一种虚拟社 区。斯蒂芬森的"元宇宙"是一个 拥有自己的法律的密集虚拟社区。 我们相信,随着网络经济变得更加 富裕, 其参与者将寻求并获得豁免 过时的国家法律的豁免权。由于具 有广泛的通信和信息战争能力,新 的网络社区将至少与圣约翰马耳他 医院长的邦联一样富裕和有能力推 进自己的利益。实际上,他们将更 有能力表现自己。因为我们认为越 来越多的小组可以有效地租用虚弱 国家的主权,并运营自己的经济避 风港,就像自由港和自由贸易区今 天被许可做一样,我们探索了其他 碎片化主权的模型。

需要新的道德词汇来描述主权 个体之间以及政府剩余部分的关系。 我们怀疑随着这些新关系的术语逐 渐清晰,许多成长于二十世纪民族 国家的"公民"会受到冒犯。国家 的终结和"个体非国籍化"将破坏 一些温暖的理念,如"法律平等保 护",这些理念预设的权力关系很 快将过时。随着虚拟社区的凝聚, 他们将坚持按照自己的法律来追究 成员的责任,而不是根据他们恰巧 居住的前民族国家的法律。在同一 地理区域中,多个法律系统将再次 Just as attempts to preserve the power of knights in armor were doomed to fail in the face of gunpowder weapons, so the modern notions of nationalism and citizenship are destined to be short-circuited by microtechnology. Indeed, they will eventually become comic in much the way that the sacred principles of fifteenth-century feudalism fell to ridicule in the sixteenth century. The cherished civic notions of the 20th century will be comic anachronisms to new generations after the transformation of the year 2000. The Don Quixote of the twenty-first century will not be a knight-errant struggling to revive the glories of feudalism but a bureaucrat in a brown suit, a tax collector yearning for a citizen to audit.

正如试图保留穿甲骑士的权力 注定要失败一样,现代民族主义和 公民身份的概念注定会在微技术面 前被短路。事实上,它们最终将变 得滑稽可笑,就像十五世纪封建主 义的神圣原则在十六世纪的嘲笑中 失败一样。二十世纪所珍视的公民 观念将成为二千年后的新一代的滑 稽时代语汇。21世纪的唐吉柯德将 不是一个挣扎恢复封建主义辉煌的 骑士,而是一名穿着棕色衣服的官 僚,一名渴望审计公民的税务员。

1.7 REVIVING LAWS OF THE MARCH 复兴游行的法律

We seldom think of governments as competitive entitles, except in the broadest sense, so the modern intuition about the range and possibilities of sovereignty has atrophied. In the past, when the power equation made it more difficult for groups to assert a stable monopoly of coercion, power was frequently fragmented, jurisdictions overlapped, and entities of many different kinds exercised one or more of the attributes of sovereignty. Not infrequently, the nominal overlord actually enjoyed scant power on the ground. Governments weaker than the nation-states are now faced with sustained competition in their ability to impose a monopoly of coercion over a local territory. This competition gave rise to adaptations in controlling violence and attracting allegiance that will soon be new again. When the reach of lords and kings was weak, and the claims of one or more groups overlapped at a frontier, it frequently happened that neither could decisively dominate the other. In the Middle Ages, there were numerous frontier or "march" regions where sovereignties blended together. These vio-

我们很少将政府视为竞争实体, 除了在最广泛的意义上,因而现代 人对主权的范围及其可能性的直觉 已经萎缩了。在过去,权力往往是 分散的,管辖是重叠的,不同类型 的实体行使着主权的一种或多种属 性: 在这种权力等式中, 很难有某 个集团能稳定地保持垄断地位。名 誉上的最高统治者,在下面并没有 多少权力,这种情况在历史上并不 少见。现在, 比民族国家弱小的政 府,它们在地方施加权力的垄断地 位,就面临着持续的竞争。这些竞 争,曾经改变了控制暴力和吸引效 忠的形式,而新的改变很快就会出 现。当领主和国王们的势力单薄, 往往就会出现一种现象:对同一块

lent frontiers persisted for decades or even centuries in the border areas of Europe. There were marches between areas of Celtic and English control in Ireland; between Wales and England, Scotland and England, Italy and France, France and Spain, Germany and the Slav frontiers of Central Europe, and between the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the Islamic kingdom of Granada. Such march regions developed distinct institutional and legal forms of a kind that we are likely to see again in the next millennium. Because of the competitive position of the two authorities, residents of march regions seldom paid tax. What is more, they usually had a choice in deciding whose laws they were to obey, a choice that was exercised through such legal concepts as "avowal" and "distraint" that have now all but vanished. We expect such concepts to become a prominent feature of the law of Information Societies.

边境地区,有一个或多个团体主张 权力,而任何一方都无法占据决定 性的支配地位。在中世纪,有很多 的边疆或"边区"(March)。在这 些地方, 主权重叠, 暴力丛生。边 区在欧洲存在了几十年甚至几个世 纪,广泛存在于凯尔特人和英特兰 人控制的爱尔兰地区之间,在威尔 士和英格兰、苏格兰和英格兰、意 大利和法国、法国和西班牙、德国 和中欧的斯拉夫人边境之间,以及 在西班牙的基督教王国和格拉纳达 的伊斯兰王国之间。边区形成了独 特的制度和法律,在下一个千年, 我们很可能会重温它们。在边区, 由于存在两个相互竞争的当局,住 在这里的人很少交税。更重要的是, 他们往往可以选择遵循谁的法律, 通过"宣誓"或"封租"等法律方 式。这些法律概念和方式现在都不 复存在了;我们认为,它们将会成 为信息社会法律的明显特征。

1.7.1 超越国籍

Before the nation-state, it was difficult to enumerate precisely the number of sovereignties that existed in the world because they overlapped in complex ways and many varied forms of organization exercised power. They will do so again. The dividing lines between territories tended to become clearly demarcated and fixed as borders in the nation-state system. They will become hazy again in the Information Age. In the new millennium, sovereignty will be fragmented once more. New entities will emerge exercising some but not all of the characteristics we have come to associate with governments.

Some of these new entities, like the Knights Templar and

在国民国家之前,很难准确地 列举出世界上存在的主权数量,因 为它们以复杂的方式重叠,许多不 同形式的组织行使权力。它们将再 次这样做。在国家体系中,领土之 间的分界线倾向于变得清晰明确并 固定为边界。在信息时代中,它们 将再次变得模糊。在新千年中,主 权将再次分裂。新实体将出现,行 使我们已经习惯了与政府相关的某 些特征,但并非全部。

这些新实体中,像圣殿骑士团

other religious military orders of the Middle Ages, may control considerable wealth and military power without controlling any fixed territory. They will be organized on principles that bear no relation to nationality at all. Members and leaders of religious corporations that exercised sovereign authority in parts of Europe in the Middle Ages in no sense derived their authority from national identity. They were of all ethnic backgrounds and professed to owe their allegiance to God, and not to any affinities that members of a nationality are supposed to share in common.

和其他中世纪的宗教军团一样,可能会控制相当大的财富和军事力量,而不控制任何固定的领土。它们将按照与国籍无关的原则组织起来。在中世纪欧洲某些地区行使主权权力的宗教公司的成员和领导者,绝不是从国家身份中获得他们的权威。他们来自不同的族裔背景,并自称效忠于上帝,而不是效忠于成员国之间被认为有共同利益的亲缘关系。

1.7.2 赛博空间的商业共和国

You will also see the re-emergence of associations of merchants and wealthy individuals with semisovereign powers, like the Hanse (confederation of merchants) in the Middle Ages. The Hanse that operated in the French and Flemish fairs grew to encompass the merchants of sixty cities. The "Hanseatic League," as it is redundantly known in English (the literal translation is "Leaguely League"), was an organization of Germanic merchant guilds that provided protection to members and negotiated trade treaties. It came to exercise

semisovereign powers in a number of Northern European and Baltic cities. Such entities will re-emerge in place of the dying nation-state in the new millennium, providing protection and helping to enforce contracts in an unsafe world.

In short, the future is likely to confound the expectations of those who have absorbed the civic myths of twentieth-century industrial society. Among them are the illusions of social democracy that once thrilled and motivated the most gifted minds. They presuppose that societies evolve in whatever way governments wish them to-preferably in response to opinion polls and scrupulously counted votes. This was never as true as it seemed fifty years ago. Now it is an anachronism, as much an artifact of industrialism as a rusting smokestack. The civic myths reflect not only a mindset that sees society's problems as susceptible to engineering solutions;

您还将看到一些富有的商人和 个人组成的半主权团体重新出现, 例如中世纪的汉萨(商人联盟)。在 法国和佛兰德的博览会上运作的汉 萨发展到包括六十个城市的商人。 被冗余地称为"汉萨同盟"的它是 德语商业协会的组织,为成员提供 保护,并谈判贸易协议。在一些北 欧和波罗的海城市,它开始行使半 主权的力量。在新千年代,这样的 实体将出现,取代正在衰亡的民族 国家,在一个不安全的世界中提供 保护,并帮助执行合同。

简而言之,未来很可能会使那些吸收了20世纪工业社会公民神话的人感到困惑。其中包括曾经激发并激励最有才华的人的社会民主主义幻想。它们预设社会会以政府所希望的方式演进,最好是响应民意调查和严格计数的选票。这在50年前就不如它看起来那么正确。现在,它已经过时了,就像生锈的烟囱一样是工业主义的产物。这些公民神

they also reflect a false confidence that resources and individuals will remain as vulnerable to political compulsion in the future as they have been in the twentieth century. We doubt it. Market forces, not political majorities, will compel societies to reconfigure themselves in ways that public opinion will neither comprehend nor welcome. As they do, the naive view that history is what people wish it to be will prove wildly misleading.

It will therefore be crucial that you see the world anew. That means looking from the outside in to reanalyze much that you have probably taken for granted. This will enable you to come to a new understanding. If you fail to transcend conventional thinking at a time when conventional thinking is losing touch with reality, then you will be more likely to fall prey to an epidemic of disorientation that lies ahead. Disorientation breeds mistakes that could threaten your business, your investments, and your way of life.

1.7.3 Seeing Anew 看到

To prepare yourself for the world that is coming you must understand why it will be different from what most experts tell you. That involves looking closely at the hidden causes of change. We have attempted to do this with an unorthodox analysis we call the study of mega politics. In two previous volumes, *Blood in the Streets* and *The Great Reckoning*, we argued that the most important causes of change are not to be found in political manifestos or in the pronouncements of dead economists, but in the hidden factors that alter the boundaries where power is exercised. Often, subtle changes in climate, topography, microbes, and technology alter the logic of violence. They transform the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves.

话不仅反映了一种认为社会问题容易被工程解决的心态,它们还反映了一种错误的信心,即资源和个人在将来仍将像在20世纪一样容易受到政治压迫。我们对此表示怀疑。市场力量而不是政治多数将迫使社会以公众意见既无法理解也无法欢迎的方式进行重构。随着这种重构,天真地认为历史是人们希望它成为的观念将被证明是极其误导的。

因此,关键是你需要重新审视 世界。这意味着从外部重新分析你 可能认为理所当然的许多事情。这 将使你能够得出新的理解。如果你 在传统思维失去与现实接触的时候 不能超越传统思维,那么你更有可 能陷入即将到来的失序病毒的困扰 中。失序会导致错误,可能会威胁 到你的业务、投资和生活方式。

为了为即将到来的世界做好准备,您必须理解为什么它会与大多数专家告诉您的不同。这涉及密切关注变化的隐藏原因。我们尝试用一种非正统的分析,称为"大政治"的研究来做到这一点。在两个之前的卷册中,《街头流血》和《大清算》中,我们认为,变化的最重要的原因不在于政治宣言或死亡经济学家的声明,而是在于改变行使权力的边界的隐藏因素。通常,气候、地形、微生物和技术上的微妙变化都会改变暴力的逻辑。它们改变了人们组织生计和自我防卫的方式。

Notice that our approach to understanding how the world changes is very different from that of most forecasters. We are not experts in anything, in the sense that we pretend to know a great deal more about certain "subjects" than those who have spent their entire careers cultivating highly specialized knowledge. To the contrary, we look from the outside in. We are knowledgeable around the subjects about which we make forecasts. Most of all, this involves seeing where the boundaries of necessity are drawn. When they change, society necessarily changes, no matter what people may wish to the contrary.

In our view, the key to understanding how societies evolve is to understand factors that determine the costs and rewards of employing violence. Every human society, from the hunting band to the empire, has been informed by the interactions of megapolitical factors that set the prevailing version of the "laws of nature." Life is always and everywhere complex. The lamb and the lion keep a delicate balance, interacting at the margin. If lions were suddenly more swift, they would catch prey that now escape. If lambs suddenly grew wings, lions would starve. The capacity to utilize and defend against violence is the crucial variable that alters life at the margin.

We put violence at the center of our theory of megapolitics for good reason. The control of violence is the most important dilemma every society faces. As we wrote in *The Great Reckoning*:

The reason that people resort to violence is that it often pays. In some ways, the simplest thing a man can do if he wants money is to take it. That is no less true for an army of men seizing an oil field than it is for a single thug taking a wallet. Power, as William Playfair wrote, "has always sought the readiest road to wealth, by attacking those who were in possession of it."

The challenge to prosperity is precisely that predatory violence does pay well in some circumstances. War does change things. It 请注意,我们理解世界变化的方法与大多数预测者所采用的方法非常不同。我们不是某个领域的专家,也不是假装比那些一生都在培养高度专业知识的人了解更多关于某些"主题"的人。相反,我们从外部看。我们在我们预测的主题领域有知识。最重要的是,这涉及到看到必要性的边界在哪里被画出。当它们改变时,社会必然改变,无论人们想不想改变。

在我们看来,理解社会如何演变的关键在于理解决定使用暴力的成本和回报的因素。从狩猎队到帝国,每个人类社会都受到"大政治"因素相互作用的影响,这些因素确定了"自然法则"的普遍版本。生活始终是复杂的。羊和狮子在边缘相互作用,保持着微妙的平衡。如果狮子突然更敏捷,他们会捕捉到现在逃脱的猎物。如果羊突然长出翅膀,狮子会挨饿。利用和防御暴力的能力是改变生命边缘的关键变量。

我们把暴力放在我们的"大都市政治"理论的中心,这是有充分理由的。控制暴力是每个社会面临的最重要的问题。正如我们在《大清算》中所写的那样:

人们诉诸暴力的原因在于它往往有利可图。在某些方面,如果一个人想要钱,他最简单的做法就是拿走它。这同样适用于抢夺油田的一支军队和抢夺钱包的单个恶棍。威廉·普雷费尔写道,权力"总是通过攻击那些拥有财富的人来寻求最便捷的致富之路"。

changes the rules. It changes the distribution of assets and income. It even determines who lives and who dies. It is precisely the fact that violence does pay that makes it hard to control.

Thinking in these terms has helped us foresee a number of developments that better-informed experts insisted could never happen. For example, *Blood in the Streets*, published in early 1987, was our attempt to survey the first stages of the great megapolitical revolution now under way. We argued then that technological change was destabilizing the power equation in the world. Among our principal points:

- We said that American predominance was in decline, which would lead to economic imbalances and distress, including another 1929-style stock market crash. Experts were all but unanimous in dfnying that such a thing could happen. Yet within six months, in October 1987, world markets were convulsed by the most violent sell-off of the century.
- We told readers to expect the collapse of Communism. Again, experts laughed. Yet 1989 brought the events that "no one could have predicted." The Berlin Wall fell, as revolutions swept away Communist regimes from the Baltic to Bucharest.
- We explained why the multiethnic empire the Bolshevik nomenklatura inherited from the tsars would "inevitably crack apart." At the end of December 1991, the hammer-and-sickle banner was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time as the Soviet Union ceased to exist.
- During the height of the Reagan arms buildup, we argued that the world stood at the threshold of sweeping disarmament. This, too, was considered unlikely, if not preposterous. Yet the following seven years brought the most sweeping disarmament since the close of World War I.
- At a time when experts in North America and Europe were pointing to Japan for support of the view that governments can successfully rig markets, we said otherwise. We forecast that the Japanese financial assets boom would end in a bust.
 Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Japanese stock

繁荣的挑战恰恰在于掠夺性暴力在某些情况下确实有好处。战争改变了一切,改变了规则,改变了 资产和收入的分配,甚至决定了谁 生谁死。正是暴力有利可图的事实 使其难以控制。

从这些方面思考有助于我们预见到一些明眼人认为永远不可能发生的事情。例如,早在1987年初发表的《街头流血》是我们试图调查当前正在进行的巨型政治革命的最初阶段。我们当时认为,技术变革正在动摇世界上的权力平衡。我们的主要观点之一是:

- 我们曾说过,美国的主导地 位正在衰落,这将导致经济 失衡和困境,包括另一次1929年 式的股市崩盘。专家们几乎 一致地否认这种事情可能发 生。然而,在六个月内,即1987年10月, 世界市场被20世纪最激烈的 抛售所动摇。
- 我们告诉读者要预期共产主义的崩溃。同样,专家们嗤之以鼻。然而,在1989年,一些"不可预测"的事件发生了。柏林墙倒塌,革命席卷了从波罗的海到布加勒斯特的共产主义政权。
- 我们解释了为什么来自沙皇的多民族帝国会"不可避免地解体"。1991年12月底,苏

market crashed, losing almost half its value. We continue to believe that its ultimate low could match or exceed the 89 percent loss that Wall Street suffered at the bottom after 1929.

- At a point when almost everyone, from the middle-class family to the world's largest real estate investors, appeared to believe that property markets could only rise and not fall, we warned that a real estate bust was in the offing. Within four years, real estate investors throughout the world lost more than \$1 trillion as property values dropped.
- Long before it was obvious to the experts, we explained in *Blood in the Streets* that the income of blue-collar workers had decreased and was destined to continue falling on a long-term basis. As we write today, almost a decade later, it has at last begun to dawn on a sleepy world that this is true. Average hourly wages in the United States have fallen below those achieved in the second Eisenhower administration. In 1993, average annualized hourly wages in constant dollars were \$18,808. In 1957, when Eisenhower was sworn in for his second term, U.S. annualized average hourly wages were \$18,903.

- 联停止存在,镇魂曲被最后 一次放下。
- 在里根军备竞赛的高峰期,我 们认为世界处于全面裁军的 门槛。这也被认为是不可能 的,如果不是荒谬的话。然 而,接下来的七年带来了自 第一次世界大战结束以来最 全面的裁军。
- 在北美和欧洲的专家指向日本支持政府可以成功操纵市场的观点的时候,我们持有不同的态度。我们预测,日本的金融资产繁荣将以失败告终。在柏林墙倒塌后不久,日本股市崩盘,几乎损失了一半的价值。我们继续认为,它的最终低点可能会匹配或超过1929年后华尔街跌至底部的89%的损失。
- 在几乎每个人,从中产阶级 家庭到全球最大的房地产投资者,似乎都相信房地产市场只能上涨而不能下跌的时候,我们警告道,房地产危机即将来临。在四年内,全球房地产投资者因房价下跌而损失了1万亿美元以上。
- 长期以来,早在专家们看得出来之前,我们就在《血腥街头》一书中解释,蓝领工人的收入已经下降,并且将在长期基础上继续下降。如今几乎过了十年,这一点终于开始对瞌睡世界有所意识。美国平均小时工资已经下降

至艾森豪威尔政府的第二个 任期所实现的水平以下。在1993年, 美国的年平均工时工资是18808美 元。在1957年艾森豪威尔宣 誓就职第二个任期时,美国 年平均工时工资为18903美元。

While the main themes of *Blood in the Streets* have proven remarkably accurate with the benefit of hindsight, only a few years ago they were considered rank nonsense by the guardians of conventional thinking. A reviewer in *Newsweek* in 1987 reflected the closed mental climate of late industrial society when he dismissed our analysis as "an unthinking attack on reason."

You might imagine that Newsweek and similar publications would have recognized with the passage of time that our line of analysis had revealed something useful about the way the world was changing. Not a bit. The first edition of The Great Reckoning was greeted with the same sniggering hostility that welcomed Blood in the Streets. No less an authority than the Wall Street Journal categorically dismissed our analysis as the nattering of "your dopey aunt."

This chuckling aside, the themes of *The Great Reckoning* proved less ludicrous than the guardians of orthodoxy pretended.

- We extended our forecast of the death of the Soviet Union, exploring why Russia and the other former Soviet republics faced a future of growing civil disorder, hyperinflation, and falling living standards.
- We explained why the 1990s would be a decade of downsizing, including for the first time a worldwide downsizing of governments as well as business entities.

尽管《血腥街头》的主要主题 在回顾中表现出了惊人的准确性, 但仅仅几年前,它们被传统思维的 守护者认为是无稽之谈。1987年《新 闻周刊》的一位评论家反映了后期 工业社会的封闭思维气氛,当他把 我们的分析视为"对理性的无思考 攻击"时。

你可能会想象,《新闻周刊》和 类似的出版物随着时间的推移应该 已经认识到,我们的分析线路揭示 了关于世界正在发生变化的有用信 息。可惜并没有。《大清算》的第 一版受到了与《血腥街头》相同的 嘲笑和敌视。华尔街日报等权威机 构也毫不客气地将我们的分析称为 "你迟钝的姑妄言"之类的话语。

然而,这些调笑话并没有能够 掩盖《大清算》所阐述的主题,它 们仍然被坚守正统的守护者所忽视。

- 我们扩大了我们对苏联解体的预测,并探讨了为什么俄罗斯和其他前苏联共和国面临着日益增长的内部冲突、高通货膨胀和生活水平下降的未来。
- 我们解释了为什么20世纪90年

- We also forecast that there would be a major redefinition of terms of income redistribution, with sharp cutbacks in the level of benefits. Hints of fiscal crisis appeared from Canada to Sweden, and American politicians began to talk of "ending welfare as we know it."
- We anticipated and explained why the "new world order" would prove to be a "new world disorder." Well before the atrocities in Bosnia engrossed the headlines, we warned that Yugoslavia would collapse into civil war.
- Before Somalia slid into anarchy, we explained why the pending collapse of governments in Africa would lead some countries there to be effectively placed into receivership.
- We forecast and explained why militant Islam would displace Marxism as the principal ideology of confrontation with the West.
- Years before the Oklahoma bombing and the attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, we explained why the United States faced an upsurge in terrorism.
- Before the headlines that told of the rioting that swept Los Angeles, Toronto, and other cities, we explained why the emergence of criminal subcultures among urban minorities was setting the stage for widespread criminal violence.
- We also anticipated "the final depression of the twentieth century," which began in Asia in 1989 and has been spreading back from the periphery toward the center of the global system. We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street's path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression. Although massive government intervention in Japan and elsewhere temporarily prevented markets from fully reflecting the deterioration of credit conditions, this only displaced and compounded economic distress, building pressures for competitive devaluations and a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s.

- 代将是一个裁员的十年,包 括首次全球范围内的政府和 企业实体裁员。
- 我们还预测,将会有一个重大的收入再分配条款重新定义,福利水平将大幅削减。从加拿大到瑞典,财政危机的迹象开始显现,美国政客开始谈论"改变我們熟知的福利制度"。
- 我们预见并解释了为什么"新秩序"将证明是"新混乱"。 早在波斯尼亚的暴行引起头 条新闻之前,我们就警告说 南斯拉夫将陷入内战。
- 在索马里陷入无政府状态之前,我们解释了为什么非洲政府的垮台将导致一些国家被有效地接管。
- 我们预测并解释了为什么激进伊斯兰教会取代马克思主义成为与西方对抗的主要意识形态。
- 在奥克拉荷马城爆炸和企图 炸毁世贸中心之前多年,我 们就已经解释了为什么美国 面临恐怖主义激增。
- 在洛杉矶、多伦多和其他城市爆发骚乱之前,我们就已经解释了为什么城市少数族裔中的犯罪亚文化的出现为广泛的犯罪暴力局势铺平了道路。
- 我们还预见到了"二十世纪 最终的萧条",它始于1989年

的亚洲,并从边缘向全球体系中心扩散。我们说日本股市将沿着1929年华尔街的轨迹走向,这将导致信贷崩溃和经济衰退。尽管日本和其他地方的大规模政府干预暂时阻止了市场充分反映信贷条件恶化的情况,但这只是转移和加剧了经济困境,建立了竞争性货币贬值和类似于20世纪30年代全球性信贷崩溃的压力。

The Great Reckoning also spelled out a number of controversial theses that have not yet been confirmed, or have not reached the level of development that we forecast:

- We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall
 Street's path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit
 collapse and depression. Although unemployment rates in
 Spain, Finland, and a few other countries exceeded those
 of the 1930s, and a number of countries, including Japan,
 did experience local depressions, there has not yet been a
 systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies
 worldwide in the 1930s.
- We argued that the breakdown of the command-and-control system in the former Soviet Union would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of ministates, terrorists, and criminal gangs. To the world's good fortune, this has not come to pass, at least not to the degree that we feared. Press reports indicate that Iran purchased several tactical nuclear weapons on the black market; more worryingly, the *Times* of London reported on October 7, 1998, that "Osama bin Laden, the exiled millionaire Saudi terrorist leader, has acquired tactical nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Central Asian states, according to a leading Arab newspaper." That said, there has been no officially confirmed deployment

《大清算》也提出了许多有争 议的论点,这些观点尚未得到证实, 或者没有达到我们预测的水平:

- 我们曾说过,日本股市将在1929年 后追随华尔街的道路,这将 导致信贷崩溃和经济萧条。尽 管西班牙、芬兰和其他一些 国家的失业率超过了20世纪30年 代的水平,并且包括日本在 内的一些国家的确经历了局 部经济萧条,但还没有像20世 纪30年代那样导致全球经济 崩溃的系统性信贷崩溃。
- 我们认为,前苏联指挥与控制系统的崩溃将导致核武器传播到小国、恐怖分子和犯罪团伙手中。对于全球幸运的是,至少没有达到我们担心的程度。媒体报道表明,伊朗在黑市上购买了几个战术核武器;更令人担忧的是,《泰晤士报》于1998年10月7日报道称,"流亡的千万富翁沙特

or use of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union.

• We explained why the "War on Drugs" was a recipe for subverting the police and judicial systems of countries where drug use is widespread, particularly the United States. With tens of billions of dollars in hidden monopoly profits piling up each year, drug dealers have the means as well as the incentive to corrupt even apparently stable countries. While the world media have carried occasional stories hinting at high-level penetration of the U.S. political system by drug money, the full story has not yet been told.

- 恐怖分子领袖本·拉登已从前 苏联中亚国家购买了战术核 武器,据一家领先的阿拉伯 报纸报道。"尽管如此,前苏 联的军火库还没有正式确认 部署或使用过核武器。
- 我们解释了为什么"毒品战争"是破坏警察和司法系统的谋略,特别是在毒品泛滥的国家,尤其是美国。由于每年隐蔽的垄断利润累积数十亿美元,毒品贩子具有腐败甚至是看似稳定国家的手段和动机。尽管全球媒体偶尔报道高层渗透美国政治体系的毒品资金,但完整的故事尚未被揭示。

1.7.4 看得比别人更远

Notwithstanding the points where our forecasts were mistaken or seem mistaken in light of what is now known, the record stands to scrutiny. Much of what is likely to figure in future economic histories of the 1990s was forecast or anticipated and explained in *The Great Reckoning*. Many of our predictions were not simple extrapolations or extensions of trends, but forecasts of major departures from what has been considered normal since World War II. We warned that the 1990s would be dramatically different from the previous five decades. Reading the news of 1991 through 1998, we see that the themes of *The Great Reckoning* were borne out almost daily.

We see these developments not as examples of isolated difficulties, trouble here, trouble there, but as shocks and tremors that run along the same fault line. The old order is being toppled by a megapolitical earthquake that will revolutionize institutions and 尽管我们的预测在已知信息的 光下似乎是错误的,但记录经得起 审查。在《大清算》一书中,许多 将会成为未来经济史的内容都被预 测或预见,并加以解释。我们的许 多预测不是趋势的简单推展或延伸, 而是对自第二次世界大战以来被认 为是常态的重大变革的预测。我们 警告说,1990年代将与前五十年截 然不同。阅读1991年至1998年的新 闻,我们发现《大清算》的主题几 乎每天都在得到证实。

我们认为这些发展不是孤立的 困难例子,这里有麻烦,那里也有 麻烦,而是沿着同一断层线发生的 震荡和颤动。旧秩序正在被一个巨 alter the way thinking people see the world.

In spite of the central role of violence in determining the way the world works, it attracts surprisingly little serious attention. Most political analysts and economists write as if violence were a minor irritant, like a fly buzzing around a cake, and not the chef who baked it. 大的政治地震所推翻,这将彻底改 变制度并改变思考人士看待世界的 方式。

尽管暴力在确定世界运作方式 中发挥着核心作用,但它吸引的严 肃关注却出奇的少。大多数政治分 析家和经济学家的写作都表现得好 像暴力只是一个小烦恼,就像苍蝇 围绕着蛋糕,而不是制作它的厨师。

1.7.5 另一个超级政治先驱

In fact, there has been so little clear thinking about the role of violence in history that a bibliography of mega political analysis could be written on a single sheet of paper. In The Great Reckoning, we drew upon and elaborated arguments of an almost entirely forgotten classic of mega political analysis, William Playfair's An enquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations, published in 1805. Here one of our departure points is the work of Frederic C. Lane. Lane was a medieval historian who wrote several penetrating essays on the role of violence in history during the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these was "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 1958. Few people other than professional economists and historians have read it, and most of them seem not to have recognized its significance. Like Playfair, Lane wrote for an audience that did not yet exist.

实际上,历史上暴力的角色所 涉及的清晰思考如此之少, 以至于 关于巨型政治分析的书目可以写在 一张纸上。在《大清算》中,我们 借鉴了并详细阐述了威廉普莱费 尔的巨型政治分析经典作品《对富 国强兵的永久性原因的探讨》(1805年 出版)的论点,该作品几乎已被人 遗忘。其中之一的出发点是弗雷德 里克C莱恩的工作。莱恩是一位 中世纪历史学家,在1940年代和1950年 代写了几篇关于历史中暴力角色的 深入研究论文。其中最全面的是《有 组织暴力的经济后果》,发表于1958年 的《经济史学杂志》上。除了专业 经济学家和历史学家外,很少有其 他人读过它,而且大多数人似乎没 有意识到其重要性。像普莱费尔一 样,莱恩为一个尚未存在的观众写 作。眼下,对我们最有用的莱恩和 普莱费尔的主题是暴力与经济增长 之间的关系,这是我们将要探讨的。

1.7.6 信息时代的洞见

Lane published his work on violence and the economic meaning of war well before the advent of the Information Age. He certainly was not writing in anticipation of microprocessing or the other technological revolutions now unfolding. Yet his insights into violence established a framework for understanding how society will be reconfigured in the Information Revolution.

The window Lane opened into the future was one through which he peered into the past. He was a medieval historian, and particularly a historian of a trading city, Venice, whose fortunes surged and sagged in a violent world. In thinking about how Venice rose and fell, his attention was attracted to issues that can help you understand the future. He saw the fact that how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining "what uses are made of scarce resources."

We believe that Lane's analyses of the competitive uses of violence has much to tell us about how life is likely to change in the Information Age. But don't expect most people to notice, much less follow, so unfashionably abstract an argument. While the attention of the world is riveted on dishonest debates and wayward personalities, the meanderings of mega politics continue almost unnoted. The average North American has probably lavished one hundred times more attention on O.J.Simpson and Monica Lewinsky than he has on the new micro technologies that are poised to antiquate his job and subvert the political system he depends on for unemployment compensation.

莱恩在信息时代出现之前就发表了关于暴力和战争经济意义的研究工作。他的著述并不是在预测微处理或其他科技革命的到来。然而,他对暴力的洞察建立了一个框架,可以理解信息革命时期,社会将如何重新构建。

莱恩打开的未来之窗是一个窥视过去的窗口。他是一名中世纪历史学家,特别是威尼斯这座交易城市的历史学家。在思考威尼斯的兴衰时,他的注意力被吸引到一些可以帮助我们理解未来的问题上。他认为,暴力的组织和控制方式在决定"稀缺资源的使用方式"方面发挥了重要作用。

我们认为,莱恩关于暴力竞争 使用的分析可以告诉我们,在信息 时代生活将如何改变。但是不要期 望大多数人会注意这么不太流行的 抽象论证,更不要期望他们会跟随 这个论证。当全世界的注意力都被 卡戴珊和莫妮卡·莱温斯基之类的 有争议的人物所吸引时,超级政治 的波折几乎没有引起注意。普通北 美人可能在O·J·辛普森和莫妮卡·莱 温斯基方面花费的关注度是他们在 新的微技术上花费关注度的百倍, 而后者正准备使他们的工作过时, 颠覆他们依赖于失业赔偿的政治系 统。

1.8 THE VANITY OF WISHES

愿望的虚荣

1.9 MAINFRAMES AND THE Y2K TIME BOMB 大型机和Y2K定时炸弹

1.10 Y2K AND THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL Y2K与核武库