the Sovereign Individual

主权个人: 掌握信息时代的变革

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Lord William Rees-Mogg

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序言

中世纪的人对意志没有信心,认为人类是容易受伤的、极其脆弱的,但他们尊重智力。他们认为只要认真思考,即使是人,也有能力回答关于上帝和宇宙的最深奥的问题。现代人崇拜意志,但他们对智力感到绝望。乌合之众,随机粒子的偏转,无意识偏见的影响:所有这些当代的陈词滥调,都在谈论智力的弱点,或者说也在谈论我们自己。

威廉·里斯·莫格勋爵和詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森,并没有承诺也没有给出任何关于上帝和宇宙的答案。但是,他们对"大政治"的研究,对历史上各种力量的剖析,以及对不久的将来的一系列预测,是非比寻常的,甚至是反文化的,因为他们运用人类的理性,去思索那些我们被教导为"机遇"或"命运"的事情。在《主权个人》首次出版近四分之一个世纪之后,回顾过去,最容易做、也是我们周围的文化最喜欢做的事,就是挑剔他们的错误,这也算是一种自我安慰:那么费心去思考未来有什么意义呢?

当然,有一些事情他们没有想到:首先就是中国的崛起。在共产党的领导下,21世纪的中国创造了自己的信息时代,具有明显的民族主义、种族同化和深刻的国家主义特征。这可能是该书出版以来最大的"大政治"现象。仅举一个关键的例子,共产中国已经粉碎了香港这个城邦(城市国家),而里斯·莫格和戴维森曾将香港描述为"一种心智模式,一种会在信息时代繁荣昌盛的管辖区模式"。

从某个角度看,这是作者的一个盲点。从另一个角度看,中国的政治局委员一定是《主权个人》的 热心读者。在不断重温列宁斯大林主义的同时,也积极地展望信息时代,只有这种特有的长期的警惕意识,才使得党的领导人能在本书分析的趋势中获得胜利。

这些趋势在今天依然适用:赢家通吃的经济、管辖权的竞争、大规模生产的转移,以及国家间的战争可能会过时。中国的崛起,与其说是对里斯·莫格和戴维森的反驳,倒更像是对他们所描述的利害关系的剧烈提升。

事实上,未来大政治的巨大冲突才刚刚开始。在技术层面上,**这场冲突的两极是:人工智能和加密技术**。人工智能展现出一种前景,能够最终解决经济学家所说"计算问题"(计划经济的关键)。理论上,它使集中控制整个经济成为可能。CCP 最喜欢的技术,就是人工智能,这绝不是巧合。强加密技术在另外一极,它带来的远景是一个去中心化和个性化的世界。如果说人工智能是共产主义的,那么加密技术就是自由主义的。

未来可能就落在这两极之间。而要知道,我们今天采取的行动,会决定日后全局性的结果。在 2020 年,阅读《主权个人》,有助你认真思考,自己的行动将塑造什么样的未来;这是一次不容浪费的学习机会。

> 彼得·蒂尔 2020年1月6日, 洛杉矶

译者推荐

今天,我们生活在一个民族国家的世界里,联合国承认 195 个"国家",地球上除南极洲以外的几乎所有陆地领土都属于其中一个国家。我们认为这很正常。但实际上,我们现在的时代是一个历史上的异类:在过去 2000 年的大部分时间里,世界上的大部分领土都是完全不受统治的。为什么今天不一样了?因为在过去 500 年的大部分时间里,现有的技术创造了一套激励机制,让民族国家是有意义的。用《主权个人》的作者詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森¹的话来说,暴力的逻辑倾向于民族国家,政府通过征服尽可能多的领土会获得很多好处,而且他们这么做很容易,他们确实这么做了。

但事实并非总是如此。一个典型的例子是,在"黑暗时代"欧洲在地理上极为分散,很少有中央政府掌权。这部分是因为盔甲的发明。如果你有一套盔甲,一把剑和一匹马,那时候没有任何武器能真正阻止你。这意味着大国家很难形成,因为国家的运作依赖于隐性的暴力威胁。但当火药在欧洲盛行时,暴力的逻辑被颠覆了。在一个有枪的世界里,集结大量军队和征服大量领土要便宜得多。詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森认为,互联网是另一项改变世界的发明,最终它会让民族国家过时,这是因为互联网能在本质上能使资本流动。

民族国家依赖富人的掠夺性税收(远远超过政府提供的商品和服务价值的税收),以支持大型军队和福利项目。但是戴维森说,互联网使掠夺性税收变得不可能,因为当资本流动时,人们可以选择生活在世界上的任何地方。他们不会被自己的工作、拥有的土地或工厂的位置所束缚。他们可以去待遇最好的地方。

所以戴维森说,在未来的一百年左右,民族国家将开始崩溃,因为他们根本没有足够的钱来维持今天的运作方式。相反,他想象的是一个由小城邦组成的世界,类似于 19 世纪前的意大利,或今天的新加坡。我不知道这一切是否会成真,或者何时会成真,但我们已经看到了一些趋势。疫情证明大规模远程工作是可行的,这意味着工人们可以不再被自己的位置所束缚。许多城市和国家正在为远程工作者提供激励措施,让他们回到自己的境内生活。此外,越来越多的人以高税收为由放弃了他们的美国公民身份,许多西方商人现在住在避税天堂。纳西姆·塔勒布让我相信未来的世界可能会有不确定性,而《主权个人》让我相信,未来的世界会有所不同。在未来的几十年里,像美国这样的大国的影响力可能会下降,而像葡萄牙、新加坡和土耳其这样的小国的影响力会变得更重要。人们可能会集体逃离西方,特别是如果目前这种低自由度的趋势继续下去的话。

因此,指望过一种"传统"的生活(上大学、在大公司找工作、努力工作、在公司里步步高升)可能没有意义。相反,现在的年轻人应该尽可能多地学习,培养一套灵活的技能,这样他们才可以重新适应未来的任何情况。

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2000 年转折: 人类社会的第四阶段

1.1 **PREMONITIONS** 预言

The coming of the year 2000 has haunted the Western imagination for the past thousand years. Ever since the world 到来一直困扰着西方人的想象力。 failed to end at the turn of the first millennium after Christ, theologians, evangelists, poets, seers, and now, even computer programmers have looked to the end of this decade with an expectation that it would bring something momentous. No less an authority than Isaac Newton speculated that the world would end with the year 2000. Michel de Nostradamus, whose prophecies have been read by every generation since they were first published in 1568, forecast the coming of the Third Antichrist in July 1999. Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, connoisseur of the "collective unconscious," envisioned the birth of a New Age in 1997. Such forecasts may easily be ridiculed. And so can the sober forecasts of economists, such as Dr. Edward Yardeni of Deutsche Bank Securities, who expects computer malfunctions on the millennial midnight to "disrupt the entire global economy." But whether you view the Y2K computer problem as groundless hysteria ginned up by computer programmers and In-

在过去的一千年里,2000年的 自从世界在基督之后的第一个千年 之交未能结束以来,神学家、传道 者、诗人、先知,甚至现在,甚至计算 机程序员也期待着这个十年的结束, 期望它会带来一些重大的东西。不 亚于艾萨克·牛顿 (Isaac Newton) 推测世界将在2000年结束的权威。 米歇尔·德·诺查丹玛斯(Michel de Nostradamus)的预言自1568年 首次出版以来,每一代人都在阅读, 他预言了 1999 年 7 月第三敌基 督者的到来。瑞士心理学家卡尔· 荣格(Carl Jung)是"集体无意 识"的鉴赏家,他在1997年设想 了新时代的诞生。这样的预测可能 很容易被嘲笑。经济学家的清醒预 测也是如此, 例如德意志银行证券

formation Technology consultants to stir up business, or as a mysterious instance of technology unfolding in concert with the prophetic imagination, there is no denying that circumstances at the eve of the millennium excite more than the usual morbid doubt about where the world is tending.

A sense of disquiet about the future has begun to color the optimism so characteristic of Western societies for the past 250 years. People everywhere are hesitant and worried. You see it in their faces. Hear it in their conversation. See it reflected in polls and registered in the ballot box. Just as an invisible, physical change of ions in the atmosphere signals that a thunderstorm is imminent even before the clouds darken and lightning strikes, so now, in the twilight of the millennium, premonitions of change are in the air. One person after another, each in his own way, senses that time is running out on a dying way of life. As the decade expires, a murderous century expires with it, and also a glorious millennium of human accomplishment. All draw to a close with the year 2000.

For there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, neither hid that shall not be known.

——MATTHEW 10.26

We believe that the modern phase of Western civilization will end with it. This book tells why. Like many earlier works, it is an attempt to see into a glass darkly, to sketch (Deutsche Bank Securities)的 爱德华·亚德尼(Edward Yardeni)博士,他预计千禧年午夜的计算机故障将"扰乱整个全球经济"。但是,无论你是否将 Y2K 计算机问题视为计算机程序员和信息技术顾问为搅动业务而制造的毫无根据的歇斯底里,或者作为技术与预言想象力一起展开的一个神秘例子,不可否认的是,千禧年前夕的情况比通常对世界走向何方的病态怀疑更令人兴奋。

对未来的不安感已经开始为过 去 250 年来西方社会特有的乐观 情绪着色。世界各地的人们都在犹 豫和担心。你可以在他们的脸上看 到它。在他们的谈话中听到它。看到 它反映在民意调查中并在投票箱中 登记。正如大气中无形的物理变化 甚至在云层变暗和闪电袭击之前就 预示着雷暴即将来临,所以现在,在 千年的黄昏, 空气中弥漫着变化的 预感。一个又一个人,每个人都以 自己的方式,感觉到时间在垂死的 生活方式上已经不多了。随着十年 的过去,一个杀戮的世纪也随之结 束, 也是人类成就的光荣千年。所 有这些都在2000年结束。

> 因为没有什么是不能透露 的,也没有隐藏的,是不应 该知道的。

> > ——马太福音 10.26

我们相信, 西方文明的现代阶段将随之结束。这本书讲述了原因。 像许多早期的作品一样, 它试图黑

out the vague shapes and dimensions of a future that is still to be. In that sense, we mean our work to be apocalyptic —in the original meaning of the word. Apokalypsis means "unveiling" in Greek. We believe that a new stage in history —the Information Age—is about to be "unveiled."

暗地看到玻璃, 勾勒出未来仍然存 在的模糊形状和维度。从这个意义 上说, 我们的意思是我们的工作是 世界末日的——在这个词的原始含 义中。Apokalypsis 在希腊语中的 意思是"揭幕"。我们相信, 历史的 新阶段——信息时代——即将"揭 开面纱"。

We are watching the beginnings of a new logical space, an instantaneous electronic everywhereness, which we may all access, enter into, and experience. We have, in short, the beginnings of a new kind of community. The virtual community becomes the model for a secular Kingdom of Heaven; as Jesus said there were many mansions in his Father's Kingdom, so there are many virtual communities, each reflecting their own needs and desires.

-MICHAEL GRASSO

我们正在观察一个新的逻 辑空间的开始,一个瞬间的 电子无处不在, 我们都可以 访问, 进入和体验。简而言 之, 我们已经有了一种新的 社区的开端。虚拟社区成为 世俗天国的典范; 正如耶稣 所说, 在他父的王国里有许 多豪宅, 所以有许多虚拟社 区,每个社区都反映了他们 自己的需要和愿望。

——迈克尔·格拉索

1.2 THE FOURTH STAGE OF HUMAN SOCIETY 人类社会的第四阶段

The theme of this book is the new revolution of power which is liberating individuals at the expense of the twentieth- 它以牺牲二十世纪的民族国家为代 century nation-state. Innovations that alter the logic of violence in unprecedented ways are transforming the boundaries within which the future must lie. If our deductions are correct, you stand at the threshold of the most sweeping revolution in history. Faster than all but a few now imagine, microprocessing will subvert and destroy the nation-state, creating new forms of social organization in the process. This will be far from an easy transformation.

本书的主题是权力的新革命, 价解放个人。以前所未有的方式改 变暴力逻辑的创新正在改变未来必 须存在的界限。如果我们的推论是 正确的, 那么你就站在了历史上最 彻底的革命的门槛上。微处理的速 度比现在除了少数人想象的要快, 它将颠覆和摧毁民族国家, 在此过 程中创造新的社会组织形式。这远

The challenge it will pose will be all the greater because it will happen with incredible speed compared with anything seen in the past. Through all of human history from its earliest beginnings until now, there have been only three basic stages of economic life: (1) hunting-and-gathering societies; (2) agricultural societies; and (3) industrial societies. Now, looming over the horizon, is something entirely new, the fourth stage of social organization: information societies.

Each of the previous stages of society has corresponded with distinctly different phases in the evolution and control of violence. As we explain in detail, information societies promise to dramatically reduce the returns to violence, in part because they transcend locality. The virtual reality of cyberspace, what novelist William Gibson characterized as a "consensual hallucination," will be as far beyond the reach of bullies as imagination can take it. In the new millennium, the advantage of controlling violence on a large scale will be far lower than it has been at any time since before the French Revolution. This will have profound consequences. One of these will be rising crime. When 中之一将是犯罪率上升。当大规模 the payoff for organizing violence at a large scale tumbles, the payoff from violence at a smaller scale is likely to jump. Violence will become more random and localized. Organized crime will grow in scope. We explain why.

Another logical implication of falling returns to violence is the eclipse of politics, which is the stage for crime on the largest scale. There is much evidence that adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth-century nation-state is rapidly eroding. The death of Communism is merely the most striking example. As we explore in detail, the collapse of morality and growing corruption among leaders of Western governments are not random developments. They are evidence that the potential of the nation-state is exhausted. Even many of its leaders no longer believe the platitudes they mouth. Nor are they believed by others.

非易事的转变。

它将带来的挑战将更大, 因为 与过去看到的任何东西相比, 它将 以令人难以置信的速度发生。纵观 人类历史,从最早的开始到现在,经 济生活只有三个基本阶段: (1) 狩 猎和采集社会;(2)农业社会;(3)工 业社会。现在, 迫在眉睫的是某种 全新的社会组织阶段:信息社会。

社会以前的每个阶段都与暴力 演变和控制的明显不同阶段相对应。 正如我们详细解释的那样, 信息社 会有望大幅减少暴力的回归, 部分 原因是它们超越了地方性。小说家 威廉·吉布森(William Gibson)称 之为"自愿幻觉"的网络空间的虚 拟现实将远远超出欺凌者的想象范 围。在新的千年里,大规模控制暴力 的优势将远远低于法国大革命前的 任何时候。这将产生深远的影响。其 组织暴力的回报下降时, 小规模暴 力的回报可能会增加。暴力将变得 更加随机和局部化。有组织犯罪的 范围将会扩大。我们解释原因。

暴力回归下降的另一个逻辑含 义是政治的黯然失色, 这是最大规 模犯罪的舞台。有很多证据表明,对 二十世纪民族国家的公民神话的坚 持正在迅速侵蚀。共产主义的死亡 只是最引人注目的例子。正如我们 详细探讨的那样, 西方政府领导人 道德的崩溃和日益严重的腐败并不 是随机的发展。它们证明民族国家 的潜力已经耗尽。甚至许多领导人 也不再相信他们所说的陈词滥调。

1.2.1 History Repeats Itself 历史重演

This is a situation with striking parallels in the past. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion often comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. So it was in the late fifteenth century, when the medieval Church was the predominant institution of feudalism. Notwithstanding popular belief in "the sacredness of the sacerdotal office," both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt—not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today.

We believe that much can be learned by analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and the situation today, when the world has become saturated with politics. The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting government have reached a senile extreme today.

We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution. Technological developments created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. A similar technological revolution is destined to downsize radically the nation-state early in the new millennium.

这种情况在过去有着惊人的相似之处。每当技术变革将旧形式与新的经济动力分离时,道德标准就会发生变化,人们开始越来越蔑视那些控制旧机构的人。这种普遍的厌恶往往在人们形成一种新的连贯的变革意识形态之前就已经显现出来了。因此,在十五世纪后期,中世纪教会是封建主义的主要机构。尽管人们普遍相信"神圣职位的神圣性",但神职人员的上级和下级都受到了极大的蔑视——这与今天对政治家和官僚的普遍态度没有什么不同。

我们认为,通过类比15世纪末的生活被有组织的宗教彻底浸透的情况与今天世界政治饱和的情况,可以学到很多东西。十五世纪末支持制度化宗教的成本已经达到了历史的极端,就像支持政府的成本今天达到了衰老的极端一样。

我们知道在火药革命之后,有 组织的宗教发生了什么。技术发展 为缩小宗教机构规模和降低成本创 造了强烈的动力。类似的技术革命 注定要在新千年初期从根本上缩小 民族国家的规模。 Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned

—MARSHALL McLUHAN, 1964

今天,经过一个多世纪的电 气技术,我们已经在全球范 围内扩展了我们的中枢神 经系统本身,就我们的星球 而言,废除了空间和时间

> ——马歇尔·麦克卢汉, 1964

1.2.2 The Information Revolution 信息革命

As the breakdown of large systems accelerates, systematic compulsion will recede as a factor shaping economic life and the distribution of income. Efficiency will become more important than the dictates of power in the organization of social institutions. This means that provinces and even cities that can effectively uphold property rights and provide for the administration of justice, while consuming few resources, will be viable sovereignties in the Information Age, as they generally have not been during the last five centuries. An entirely new realm of economic activity that is not hostage to physical violence will emerge in cyberspace. The most obvious benefits will flow to the "cognitive elite," who will increasingly operate outside political boundaries. They are already equally at home in Frankfurt, London, New York, Buenos Aires, Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Incomes will become more unequal within jurisdictions and more equal between them.

The Sovereign Individual explores the social and financial consequences of this revolutionary change. Our desire is to help you to take advantage of the opportunities of the new age and avoid being destroyed by its impact. If only half of what we expect to see happens, you face change of a magnitude with few precedents in history.

随着大型系统的加速崩溃,系 统性强迫作为影响经济生活和收入 分配的一个因素将会消退。在社会 机构的组织中, 效率将变得比权力 的要求更重要。这意味着,能够有效 维护财产权和提供司法行政的省份 甚至城市,同时消耗的资源很少,在 信息时代将是可行的主权, 就像过 去五个世纪以来通常没有的那样。 一个不受身体暴力影响的经济活动 全新领域将在网络空间出现。最明 显的好处将流向"认知精英", 他们 将越来越多地在政治边界之外运作。 他们已经在法兰克福、伦敦、纽约、 布宜诺斯艾利斯、洛杉矶、东京和 香港同样自在。辖区内的收入将变 得更加不平等,它们之间的收入将 变得更加平等。

《主权个人》探讨了这一革命性变化的社会和财务后果。我们的愿望是帮助您利用新时代的机遇,避免被其影响所摧毁。如果我们期望看到的只有一半发生,你将面临历史上很少有先例的巨大变化。

The transformation of the year 2000 will not only revolutionize the character of the world economy, it will do so more rapidly than any previous phase change. Unlike the Agricultural Revolution, the Information Revolution will not take millennia to do its work. Unlike the Industrial Revolution, its impact will not be spread over centuries. The Information Revolution will happen within a lifetime.

What is more, it will happen almost everywhere at once. Technical and economic innovations will no longer be confined to small portions of the globe. The transformation will be all but universal. And it will involve a break with the past so profound that it will almost bring to life the magical domain of the gods as imagined by the early agricultural peoples like the ancient Greeks. To a greater degree than most would now be willing to concede, it will prove difficult or impossible to preserve many contemporary institutions in the new millennium. When information societies take shape they will be as different from industrial societies as the Greece of Aeschylus was from the world of the cave dwellers.

2000 年的转变不仅将彻底改变世界经济的性质,而且将比以往任何阶段性变化都快。与农业革命不同,信息革命不需要几千年才能完成其工作。与工业革命不同,它的影响不会延续几个世纪。信息革命将在有生之年发生。

更重要的是,它几乎会同时发生在任何地方。技术和经济创新将不再局限于全球的一小部分。这种转变几乎是普遍的。它将涉及与如此深刻的过去决裂,以至于它几乎将像古希腊人这样的早期农业民族所想象的那样,使神的神奇领域栩栩如生。在比大多数人现在愿意承认的更大程度上,在新千年中保留许多当代机构将证明是困难或不可能的。当信息社会形成时,它们将与工业社会不同,就像埃斯库罗斯的希腊与穴居者的世界一样。

1.3 PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: THE RISE OF THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL

普罗米修斯不受束缚: 主权个体的崛起

I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man to elevate his life by conscious endeavor.

—HENRY DAVID THOREAU

The coming transformation is both good news and bad. The good news is that the Information Revolution will liberate individuals as never before. For the first time, those who can educate and motivate themselves will be almost entirely free to invent their own work and realize the full benefits

我知道没有比人类通过有 意识的努力来提升自己生 活的能力更令人鼓舞的事 实了。

——亨利·大卫·梭罗

即将到来的转变既有好消息也 有坏消息。好消息是信息革命将像 从未有过的那样解放个人。首次,那 些能够自我教育和激励自己的人将 of their own productivity. Genius will be unleashed, freed from both the oppression of government and the drags of racial and ethnic prejudice. In the Information Society, no one who is truly able will be detained by the ill-formed opinions of others. It will not matter what most of the people on earth might think of your race, your looks, your age, your sexual proclivities, or the way you wear your hair. In the cybereconomy, they will never see you. The ugly, the fat, the old, the disabled will vie with the young and beautiful on equal terms in utterly color-blind anonymity on the new frontiers of cyberspace.

几乎完全自由地发明自己的工作, 并实现自己生产力的全部好处。天 才将被释放,摆脱了政府的压迫和 种族和民族偏见的限制。在信息社 会中,没有真正有才华的人会被他 人没见过的肤浅见解所阻拦。你的 种族、外貌、年龄、性取向或发型方 式将无关紧要。在网络经济中,别 人永远看不见你。在新的网络空间 上,丑陋、肥胖、老年和残疾的人 将与年轻和美丽的人平等竞争,实 现完全无色觉偏见的匿名。

1.3.1 思想成为财富

Merit, wherever it arises, will be rewarded as never before. In an environment where the greatest source of wealth will be the ideas you have in your head rather than physical capital alone, anyone who thinks clearly will potentially be rich. The Information Age will be the age of upward mobility. It will afford far more equal opportunity for the billions of humans in parts of the world that never shared fully in the prosperity of industrial society. The brightest, most successful and ambitious of these will emerge as truly Sovereign Individuals.

At first, only a handful will achieve full financial sovereignty. But this does not negate the advantages of financial independence. The fact that not everyone attains an equally vast fortune does not mean that it is futile or meaningless to become rich. There are 25,000 millionaires for every billionaire. If you are a millionaire and not a billionaire, that does not make you poor. Equally, in the future, one of the milestones by which you measure your financial success will be not just now many zeroes you can add to your net worth, but whether you can structure your affairs in a way that enables you to realize full individual autonomy and independence. The more clever you are, the less propulsion you \$\frac{1}{2}\$?

无论何时何地,凡是有卓越思想的人都将得到前所未有的奖励。 在一个最大的财富资源是你脑中的思想而不仅仅是物质资本的环境中,任何能够清晰思考的人都可能富有。信息时代将是流动性的年代。它将为数十亿生活在未曾共享工业社会繁荣的地区的人提供更多平等机会。这些人中最聪明、最成功和最有抱负的人将成为真正的独立个体。

ty. 一开始,只有少数人能实现完全的财务主权。但这并不否定财务独立的优势。并不是每个人都能获得同样巨大的财富,这并不意味着成为富有是毫无意义的。每个亿万富翁都有25000个百万富翁。如果你是百万富翁而不是亿万富翁,那也不代表你是穷人。同样,在未来,衡量你的财务成功的一个里程碑不仅仅是你的净值上有多少个零,而是你能否以一种可以实现个人完全自治和独立的方式来构建你的事

will require to achieve financial escape velocity. Persons of even quite modest means will soar as the gravitational pull of politics on the global economy weakens. Unprecedented financial independence will be a reachable goal in your lifetime or that of your children.

At the highest plateau of productivity, these Sovereign Individuals will compete and interact on terms that echo the relations among the gods in Greek myth. The elusive Mount Olympus of the next millennium will be in cyberspace - a realm without physical existence that will nonetheless develop what promises to be the world's largest economy by the second decade of the new millennium. By 2025, the cybereconomy will have many millions of participants. Some 拟经济将有很多百万参与者。其中 of them will be as rich as Bill Gates, worth tens of billions of dollars each. The cyberpoor may be those with an income of less than \$200,000 a year. There will be no cyberwelfare. No cybertaxes and no cybergovernment. The cybereconomy, rather than China, could well be the greatest economic phenomenon of the next thirty years.

The good news is that politicians will no more be able to dominate, suppress, and regulate the greater part of commerce in this new realm than the legislators of the ancient Greek city-states could have trimmed the beard of Zeus. That is good news for the rich. And even better news for the not so rich. The obstacles and burdens that politics imposes are more obstacles to becoming rich than to being rich. The benefits of declining returns to violence and devolving jurisdictions will create scope for every energetic and ambitious person to benefit from the death of politics. Even the consumers of government services will benefit as entrepreneurs extend the benefits of competition. Heretofore, competition between jurisdictions has usually meant competition by means of violence to enforce the rule of a predominant group. Consequently, much of the ingenuity of interjurisdictional competition was channeled into military endeavor. But the advent of the cybereconomy will

务。越聪明的你,就越不需要推动力 来实现财务逃逸速度。即使是非常 普通的人也可以在全球政治重力对 全球经济的影响减弱之际腾飞。在 你或你的子孙一生中, 无先例的财 务独立将成为一个可以实现的目标。

在生产力的最高高原上,这些 主权个体将在类似于希腊神话中神 之间的关系的条件下竞争和互动。 下一个千禧年的神山将是虚拟空间 ——一个没有实体存在的领域,但 它发展成为新千年二十年代世界上 最大的经济体之一。到2025年,虚 一些人将像比尔·盖茨一样富有,价 值数百亿美元。虚拟贫穷可能是年 收入不到 20 万美元的人。没有虚 拟福利。没有虚拟税收, 也没有虚 拟政府。虚拟经济可能成为未来30 年最伟大的经济现象,而不是中国。

好消息是政治家将不再能够在 这个新领域中支配、压制和规范大 部分商业活动,就像古希腊城邦的 立法者不能修剪宙斯的胡须一样。 这对富人来说是好消息。对于不那 么富裕的人来说更是好消息。政治 施加的障碍和负担对于成为富人来 说是更多的障碍, 而对于已经富足 的人来说则更少。暴力收益递减和 权力下放的益处将为每个有活力和 雄心壮志的人创造发挥,从而从政 治的消亡中受益。即使是政府服务 的消费者也会受益, 因为企业家会 扩大竞争的好处。迄今为止,司法管 辖区之间的竞争通常意味着通过暴 力竞争来强制执行主导群体的规则。 因此, 许多跨领土竞争的独创性都

bring competition on new terms to provision of sovereignty services. A proliferation of jurisdictions will mean proliferating experimentation in new ways of enforcing contracts and otherwise securing the safety of persons and property. The liberation of a large part of the global economy from political control will oblige whatever remains of government as we have known it to operate on more nearly market terms. Governments will ultimately have little choice but to treat populations in territories they serve more like customers, and less in the way that organized criminals treat the victims of a shakedown racket.

集中在军事事业上。但是,网络经济 的出现将为主权服务的供给带来新 的竞争条件。司法管辖区的繁殖将 意味着在新的执行合同和保障人身 和财产安全的方式方面的多种多样 的实验。全球经济的大部分解放出 了政治控制,这将迫使我们所知道 的政府在更接近市场原则的条件下 运作。政府最终将别无选择,只能把 他们服务的地区人口视为顾客,而 不是像有组织的犯罪分子对待勒索 诈骗受害者一样。

1.3.2 超越政治

What mythology described as the province of the gods will become a viable option for the individual – a life outside the reach of kings and councils. First in scores, then in hundreds, and ultimately in the millions, individuals will escape the shackles of politics. As they do, they will transform the character of governments, shrinking the realm of compulsion and widening the scope of private control over resources.

The emergence of the sovereign individual will demonstrate yet again the strange prophetic power of myth. Conceiving little of the laws of nature, the early agricultural peoples imagined that "powers we should call supernatural" were widely distributed. These powers were sometimes employed by men, sometimes by "incarnate human gods" who looked like men and interacted with them in what Sir James George Frazer described in The Golden Bough as "a great democracy."

When the ancients imagined the children of Zeus living among them they were inspired by a deep belief in magic. They shared with other primitive agricultural peoples an awe of nature, and a superstitious conviction that nature's

神话描述的神的领域将成为个人的可行选项-生活在国王和议会无法触及的生活之外。从成百上千开始,最终达到数百万,个人将逃脱政治的枷锁。他们这样做,将改变政府的性质,缩小强制的范围,扩大对资源的私人控制范围。

个人主权的出现将再次证明神话的奇异预言能力。早期的农业民族很少了解自然法则,他们认为"我们应该称之为超自然的力量"是广泛分布的。这些力量有时被人类利用,有时由"人格化的人类神"利用,他们看起来像人类,并与他们互动在詹姆斯·乔治·弗雷泽在《金枝》中所描述的"一个伟大的民主制"中。

当古人想象宙斯的子女与他们 一起生活时,他们受到了对魔法的 深刻信仰的启发。他们与其他原始 农业民族分享对自然的敬畏,以及

works were set in motion by individual volition, by magic. In that sense, there was nothing self-consciously prophetic about their view of nature and their gods. They were far from anticipating microtechnology. They could not have imagined its impact in altering the marginal productivity of individuals thousands of years later. They certainly could not have foreseen how it would shift the balance between power and efficiency and thus revolutionize the way that assets are created and protected. Yet what they imagined as they spun their myths has a strange resonance with the world you are likely to see.

通过个体意志的魔法来控制自然力 量的迷信信念。从这个意义上说,他 们对自然和他们的神并没有什么自 觉的预言性。他们远未预见到微技 术的到来。数千年后,他们也无法想 象它对个人边际生产力的改变会对 生产资产和保护方式的变革带来多 大的影响。然而, 当他们编织神话 时所想象的, 却与你可能看到的世 界有着奇怪的共鸣。

Abracadabra 咒语 1.3.3

The "abracadabra" of the magic invocation, for example, bears a curious similarity to the password employed to access a computer. In some respects, high-speed computation has already made it possible to mimic the magic of the genie. Early generations of "digital servants" already obey the commands of those who control the computers in which they are sealed much as genies were sealed in magic lamps. The virtual reality of information technology will widen the realm of human wishes to make almost anything that can be imagined seem real. Telepresence will give living individuals the same capacity to span distance at supernatural speed and monitor events from afar that the Greeks supposed was enjoyed by Hermes and Apollo. The Sovereign Individuals of the Information Age, like the gods of ancient and primitive myths, will in due course enjoy a kind of "diplomatic immunity" from most of the political woes that have beset mortal human beings in most times and places.

The new Sovereign Individual will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically. Commanding vastly greater resources and beyond the reach of many forms of compulsion, the Sovereign Individual will redesign governments and reconfigure economies in the new 入新的千年。这种变化的全部影响

魔法咒语中的"阿布拉卡达布 拉"与访问电脑的密码惊人地相似。 高速计算在某些方面已经让模仿神 灵魔法成为可能。早期的"数字仆 人"就像法器中被封印的神灵一样 服从主人的命令。信息技术的虚拟 现实将扩大人类的愿望范围, 使几 乎任何想象得到的事情都变得真实。 远程存在将赋予生命体在超自然速 度下跨越距离和远程监控事件的能 力,就像希腊神话中的赫尔墨斯和 阿波罗一样。信息时代的主权个体, 像古代和原始神话中的神灵一样, 最终将享有一种"外交豁免权", 使 其免于大多数时代和地方困扰凡人 的政治问题。

新的主权个体将在同一物理环 境中与普通公民生活, 但在政治上 处于单独的领域。拥有非常庞大的 资源,超出多种形式约束的范围,主 权个体将重新设计政府和经济, 进

1.3.4 天才与天惩

For anyone who loves human aspiration and success, the Information Age will provide a bounty. That is surely the best news in many generations. But it is bad news as well. The new organization of society implied by the triumph of individual autonomy and the true equalization of opportunity based upon merit will lead to very great rewards for merit and great individual autonomy. This will leave individuals far more responsible for themselves than they have been accustomed to being during the industrial period. It will also precipitate transition crises, including a possibly severe economic depression that will reduce the unearned advantage in living standards that has been enjoyed by residents of advanced industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. As we write, the top 15 percent of the world's population have an average per-capita income of \$21,000 annually. The remaining 85 percent of the world have an average income of just \$1,000. That huge, hoarded advantage from the past is bound to dissipate under the new conditions of the Information Age.

As it does, the capacity of nation-states to redistribute income on a large scale will collapse. Information technology facilitates dramatically increased competition between jurisdictions. When technology is mobile, and transactions occur in cyberspace, as they increasingly will do, governments will no longer be able to charge more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. Anyone with a portable computer and a satellite link will be able to conduct almost any information business anywhere, and that includes almost the whole of the world's multitrillion-dollar financial transactions.

This means that you will no longer be obliged to live in a high-tax jurisdiction in order to earn high income. In

对于任何一个追逐理想和成功 的人来说, 信息时代的回报将无与 伦比。这无疑是几代人以来最好的 消息, 但也是一个坏消息。基于个 人自治的新型社会组织, 以及建立 在能力之上的、真正的机会均等,会 使才能出众者,得到超级的回报和 个人自主性。但是,个人要对自己担 负的责任, 也会远远超过他们在工 业时期所习惯的。此外, 在整个20 世纪,先进工业社会的居民,享受了 不劳而获的优越生活, 这种优势也 将被削弱。在我们写这本书的时候 (1997年之前), 世界上前 15%的 人口,人均年收入为21000美元; 其余85%的人,平均年收入只有 1000 美元。在信息时代的新环境 下, 过去囤积起来的巨大优势, 必 将烟消云散。

随着它的消散,民族国家大规模重新分配收入的能力将崩溃。信息技术极大地促进了辖区之间的竞争。信息技术加剧了各管辖区之间的竞争。信息技术加剧了各管辖区之间的竞争。技术是流动的,交易是在网络空间进行的。任何人只要有一台便携式电脑,和一条卫星网络,就可以在任何地方,从事几乎任何信息业务,包括世界上数以万亿美元的金融交易。

这意味着, 你不再需要为了高 收入, 而不得不生活在高税率的国

the future, when most wealth can be earned anywhere, and even spent anywhere, governments that attempt to charge too much as the price of domicile will merely drive away their best customers. If our reasoning is correct, and we believe it is, the nation-state as we know it will not endure in anything like its present form.

家和地区。在未来,大多数财富可 以在任何地方赚取, 甚至可以在任 何地方消费。到那时,政府试图对它 的永久居民收取高额的服务费, 只 会丢掉它们最好的客户。如果我们 的推理是正确的, 我们相信它是正 确的, 那么, 大家所知道的民族国 家,将不会再以任何类似现在的形 式而存在。

THE END OF NATIONS 1.4 国家末日

Changes that diminish the power of predominant institutions are both unsettling and dangerous. Just as monarchs, lords, popes, and potentates fought ruthlessly to preserve their accustomed privileges in the early stages of the modem period, so today's governments will employ violence, 行的残酷斗争一样, 今天的政府也 often of a covert and arbitrary kind, in the attempt to hold back the clock. Weakened by the challenge from technology, the state will treat increasingly autonomous individuals, its former citizens, with the same range of ruthlessness and diplomacy it has heretofore displayed in its dealing with other governments. The advent of this new stage in history was punctuated with a bang on August 20, 1998, when the United States fired about \$200 million worth of Tomahawk BGM-109 sea-launched cruise missiles at targets allegedly associated with an exiled Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden became the first person in history to have his satellite phone targeted for attack by cruise missiles. Simultaneously, the United States destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, in Bin Laden's honor. The emergence of Bin Laden as the enemy-in-chief of the United States reflects a momentous change in the nature of warfare. A single individual, albeit one with hundreds of millions of dollars, can now be depicted as a plausible

削弱了主导机构权力的变化既 令人不安, 又危险。正如君主、贵 族、教皇和有权势的人在现代时期 的早期阶段为了维护惯有特权而进 会用暴力,通常是隐蔽和任意的,试 图阻止时钟倒转。受技术挑战削弱 的国家将像以前对待其他政府一样, 用同样的无情和外交手段处理日益 自治的个人——它的前公民。这个 历史新阶段的出现在1998年8月 20 日响起; 当时, 美国向据称与被 流放的沙特亿万富翁奥萨马·本·拉 登有关的目标发射了价值约 2 亿 美元的海基巡航导弹。本·拉登成为 历史上第一个被巡航导弹攻击卫星 电话的人。与此同时,美国在苏丹的 喀土穆摧毁了一家制药厂, 以表彰 本·拉登。本·拉登成为美国最大军 事力量的可信威胁。单个人,虽然拥 有数百万美元, 现在也可以被描绘 为对工业时代最大的军事力量构成 可信威胁的人。美国总统和他的国

threat to the greatest military power of the Industrial era. In statements reminiscent of propaganda employed during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, the United States president and his national security aides portrayed Bin Laden, a private individual, as a transnational terrorist and leading enemy of the United States.

The same military logic that has seen Osama bin Laden elevated to a position as the chief enemy of the United States will assert itself in governments' internal relations with their subjects. Increasingly harsh techniques of exaction will be a logical corollary of the emergence of a new type of bargaining between governments and individuals. Technology will make individuals more nearly sovereign than ever before. And they will be treated that way. Sometimes violently, as enemies, sometimes as equal parties in negotiation, sometimes as allies. But however ruthlessly governments behave, particularly in the transition period, wedding the IRS with the CIA will avail them little. They will be increasingly required by the press of necessity to bargain with autonomous individuals whose resources will no longer be so easily controlled.

The changes implied by the Information Revolution will not only create a fiscal crisis for governments, they will tend to disintegrate all large structures. Fourteen empires have disappeared already in the twentieth century. The breakdown of empires is part of a process that will dissolve the nation-state itself. Government will have to adapt to the growing autonomy of the individual. Taxing capacity will plunge by 50-70 percent. This will tend to make smaller jurisdictions more successful. The challenge of setting competitive terms to attract able individuals and their capital will be more easily undertaken in enclaves than across continents.

We believe that as the modern nation-state decomposes, latter-day barbarians will increasingly come to exercise power 的解体, 后期野蛮人将越来越多地 behind the scenes. Groups like the Russian mafiya, which

家安全助手发表的声明, 类似于冷 战期间有关苏联的宣传,将本·拉登 描述为跨国恐怖分子和美国的头号 敌人。

相同的军事逻辑已将奥萨马: 本·拉登提升为美国的首要敌人,这 种逻辑也将在政府与国民的内部关 系中得到体现。越来越严厉的敛财 手段将成为政府与个人谈判出现的 逻辑必然结果。技术将让个人比以 往任何时候都更接近主权。他们也 将被当作如此对待, 有时会被视作 敌人,有时会被视作平等的谈判方, 有时会被视作盟友。然而, 无论政 府的行为多么无情, 尤其是在过渡 期间,将联邦税务局与中央情报局 (CIA)捆绑在一起是没有什么用处 的。由于自主个体的资源不再轻易 被控制, 政府将越来越需要与自主 个体进行谈判来适应这种变化。

信息革命所带来的变化不仅会 为政府创造财政危机, 还将倾向于 分解所有的大型结构。20世纪已经 有 14 个帝国消失了。帝国的崩溃 是一个过程的一部分, 该过程将消 解民族国家本身。政府将不得不适 应个人日益增长的自治。税收收入 能力将下降 50-70%。这将倾向于 使较小的司法管辖区更为成功。面 对吸引有才华的个体和他们的资本 的竞争性条款的挑战,将更容易在 飞地中而不是跨越大陆进行。

我们相信,随着现代民族国家 在幕后行使权力。像俄罗斯黑手党、

picks the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas, drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will be laws unto themselves. They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modern barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nation-state without greatly changing its appearances. They are micropar-家的形象的情况下,渗透到国家形 asites feeding on a dying system. As violent and unscrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power are part of the downsizing of politics. Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power.

在前苏联领土上乱捡残羹剩饭的其 他族裔犯罪团伙、官僚特权阶层、毒 品贩子和叛逆的秘密机构这样的团 体将成为自己的法律。他们已经是 了。现代野蛮人已经在不大改变国 式之中, 远比人们所理解的要多得 多。他们是在死亡的系统上寄生的 微小寄生虫。这些团体和处于战争 状态下的政治机构一样具有暴力和 不择手段, 他们运用国家的技术进 行小规模的实施和控制。他们日益 增长的影响力和权力是政治下降的 一部分。微处理降低了团体必须达 到的规模才能在使用和控制暴力方 面发挥有效作用的规模。随着这一 技术革命的展开, 掠夺性暴力将越 来越多地组织在中央控制之外。遏 制暴力的努力也将以效率而不是权 力大小的方式演化。

1.4.1 倒退的历史

The process by which the nation-state grew over the past five centuries will be put into reverse by the new logic of the Information Age. Local centers of power will reassert themselves as the state devolves into fragmented, overlapping sovereignties. The growing power of organized crime is merely one reflection of this tendency. Multinational companies are already having to subcontract all but essential work. Some conglomerates, such as AT&T, Unisys, and ITT, have split themselves into several firms in order to function more profitably. The nation-state will devolve like an unwieldy conglomerate, but probably not before it is forced to do so by financial crises.

Not only is power in the world changing, but the work of

过去五个世纪民族国家成长的 过程将被信息时代的新逻辑逆转。 当国家分化成交叉重叠的主权时, 地方权力中心将重新确立自己的地 位。有组织犯罪的不断壮大仅仅是 这种趋势的一个反映。跨国公司已 经不得不外包除了必要的工作之外 的所有工作。一些企业集团,如AT&T、 Unisys 和 ITT,已经分裂成几个公 司,以更赚钱的方式运作。民族国家 将像一个难以管理的企业集团一样 分化, 但可能不会在金融危机迫使 它这样做之前。

不仅世界权力在改变, 世界工

the world is changing as well. This means that the way business operates will inevitably change. The "virtual corporation" is evidence of a sweeping transformation in the nature of the firm, facilitated by the drop in information and transaction costs. We explore the implications of the Information Revolution for dissolving corporations and doing away with the "good job". In the Information Age, a "job" will be a task to do, not a position you "have". Microprocessing has created entirely new horizons of economic activity that transcend territorial boundaries. This transcendence of frontiers and territories is perhaps the most revolutionary development since Adam and Eve straggled out of paradise under the sentence of their Maker: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." As technology revolutionizes the tools we use, it also antiquates our laws, reshapes our morals, and alters our perceptions. This book explains how.

Microprocessing and rapidly improving communications already make it possible for the individual to choose where to work. Transactions on the Internet or the World Wide Web can be encrypted and will soon be almost impossible for tax collectors to capture. Tax-free money already compounds far faster offshore than onshore funds still subject to the high tax burden imposed by the twentieth-century nation-state. After the tum of the millennium, much of the world's commerce will migrate into the new realm of cyberspace, a region where governments will have no more dominion than they exercise over the bottom of the sea or the outer planets. In cyberspace, the threats of physical violence that have been the alpha and omega of politics since time immemorial will vanish. In cyberspace, the meek and the mighty will meet on equal terms. Cyberspace is the ultimate offshore jurisdiction. An economy with no taxes. Bermuda是终极的离岸司法管辖区。一个 in the sky with diamonds.

When this greatest tax haven of them all is fully open for business, all funds will essentially be offshore funds at 作也在改变。这意味着商业运作的 方式不可避免地会发生变化。"虚 拟企业"是企业性质发生巨变的证 据,这一变化得益于信息和交易成 本的降低。我们探讨了信息革命对 于溶解公司和消除"好工作"的影 响。在信息时代,"工作"将是一项 任务, 而不是一个你"拥有"的职 位。微处理技术已经创造了超越领 土界限的全新经济活动领域。这种 超越国界和领土的能力或许是自亚 当和夏娃受造之后最具革命性的进 展: "你必须流着汗水才能吃到面 包。"随着技术革新所带来的工具 倒退了我们的法律, 重塑了我们的 道德, 改变了我们的感知。本书解 释了这一点。

微处理技术和迅速改进的通信 技术已经使个人有选择工作地点的 可能性。在互联网或万维网上进行 的交易可以进行加密,并且很快就 几乎不可能被税务部门发现。免税 的资金已经在海外比在岸上完全受 到二十世纪民族国家高税负重担的 资金更快地复利增长。在千禧年之 后,世界上的大部分商业将迁移到 新的网络空间, 这是一个政府不再 能够支配的领域, 就像他们对待海 底和外层行星一样。在网络空间,一 直是政治的尧舜大禹的物理暴力威 胁将消失。在网络空间, 弱者和强 者将在平等的条件下相遇。网络空 没有税收的经济。天空中的百慕大 岛和钻石。

当这个最大的避税天堂完全开 放营业时, 所有资金实际上将成为

the discretion of their owner. This will have cascading consequences. The state has grown used to treating its taxpayers as a farmer treats his cows, keeping them in a field to be milked. Soon, the cows will have wings.

业主自行决定的离岸基金。这将产 生连锁反应。国家已经习惯了像农 民对待奶牛一样对待纳税人,将他 们留在田地里挤奶。很快, 奶牛将 有翅膀。

1.4.2 国家的复仇

Like an angry farmer, the state will no doubt take desperate measures at first to tether and hobble its escaping herd. It will employ covert and even violent means to restrict access to liberating technologies. Such expedients will work only temporarily, if at all. The twentieth-century nation- 术的接触。这些方法只能在短时间 state, with all its pretensions, will starve to death as its tax revenues decline.

When the state finds itself unable to meet its committed expenditure by raising tax revenues, it will resort to other, more desperate measures. Among them is printing money. Governments have grown used to enjoying a monopoly over currency that they could depreciate at will. This arbitrary inflation has been a prominent feature of the monetary policy of all twentieth-century states. Even the best national currency of the postwar period, the German mark, lost 71 percent of its value from January 1, 1949, through the end of June 1995. In the same period, the U.S. dollar lost 84 percent of its value. This inflation had the same effect as a tax on all who hold the currency. As we explore later, inflation as revenue option will be largely foreclosed by the emergence of cybermoney. New technologies will. allow the holders of wealth to bypass the national monopolies that have issued and regulated money in the modern period. Indeed, the credit crises that swept through Asia, Russia, and other emerging economies in 1997 and 1998 attest to the fact that national currencies and national credit ratings are anachronisms inimical to the smooth operation of the global economy. It is precisely the fact that the demands of sovereignty

像一位愤怒的农民一样, 国家 无疑会首先采取绝望的措施来束缚 和牵制其逃离的群体。它将采用隐 秘甚至暴力手段来限制对解放性技 内起作用,如果有的话。二十世纪的 民族国家,带着所有的自负,将因为 税收下降而面临资金不足的困境。

当国家发现自己无法通过增加 税收来满足支出时, 就会采取其他 更绝望的措施。其中之一是印钞票。 政府已经习惯了享有货币垄断权, 可以随意贬值,这种任意通胀一直 是所有二十世纪国家的货币政策的 一个突出特征。甚至二战后期最好 的国家货币德国马克在 1949 年 1 月1日至1995年6月底期间的价 值下降了71%。在同一时期,美元 贬值了84%。这种通胀对持有货币 的人的影响与税收类似。随着我们 之后的探讨, 通货膨胀作为一种收 入选择在信息时代将被广泛淘汰。 新技术将允许财富的持有者绕过现 代时期发行和管理货币的国家垄断。 事实上, 1997年和1998年席卷亚 洲、俄罗斯和其他新兴经济体的信 贷危机表明, 国家货币和国家信用 评级是不利于全球经济运作的陈旧 思维。正是主权要求在一个管辖范

require all transactions within a jurisdiction to be denominated in a national currency that creates the vulnerability to mistakes by central bankers and attacks by speculators which precipitated deflationary crises in one jurisdiction after another. In the Information Age, individuals will be able to use cybercurrencies and thus declare their monetary independence. When individuals can conduct their own monetary policies over the World Wide Web it will matter less or not at all that the state continues to control the industrial-era printing presses. Their importance for controlling the world's wealth will be transcended by mathematical algorithms that have no physical existence. In the new millennium, cybermoney controlled by private markets will supersede fiat money issued by governments. Only the poor will be victims of inflation and ensuing collapses into deflation that are consequences of the artificial leverage which fiat money injects into the economy.

Lacking their accustomed scope to tax and inflate, governments, even in traditionally civil countries, will turn nasty. 的情况下,即使在传统上文明的国 As income tax becomes uncollectible, older and more arbitrary methods of exaction will resurface. The ultimate form of withholding tax -de facto or even overt hostage-taking - will be introduced by governments desperate to prevent wealth from escaping beyond their reach. Unlucky individuals will find themselves singled out and held to ransom in an almost medieval fashion. Businesses that offer services that facilitate the realization of autonomy by individuals will be subject to infiltration, sabotage, and disruption. Arbitrary forfeiture of property, already commonplace in the United States, where it occurs five thousand times a week, will become even more pervasive. Governments will violate human rights, censor the free flow of information, sabotage useful technologies, and worse. For the same reasons that the late, departed Soviet Union tried in vain to suppress access to personal computers and Xerox machines, Western governments will seek to suppress the cybereconomy by totalitarian means.

围内的所有交易必须以国家货币计 价的事实, 才造成了银行家错误和 投机者攻击的漏洞, 从而引发了一 个又一个的通货紧缩危机。 在信息 时代,个人将能够使用网络货币,因 此宣布他们的货币独立。当个人能 够通过万维网进行自己的货币政策 时,国家继续控制工业时代的印刷 机就会变得不那么重要, 甚至不重 要。它们为掌控世界财富的重要性, 将被没有物理存在的数学算法所超 越。在新千年,由私人市场控制的网 络货币将取代政府发行的法定货币。 只有穷人将成为通货膨胀和随后崩 溃的受害者, 这是法定货币注入经 济的人工杠杆的后果。

在没有了习惯性的征收所得税 家, 政府也将变得残忍。 更老、更武 断的征税方式将重新出现。政府迫 切希望阻止财富逃离其管辖范围, 将引入最终形式的代扣税——实际 上甚至是公开的劫持人质。不幸的 个人将发现自己被单独挑选并以几 乎中世纪的方式被绑架和赎金。为 个人实现自治的服务的企业将受到 渗透、破坏和破坏。在美国,已经普 遍存在的任意没收财产行为, 每周 发生五千次的情况将变得更为普遍。 政府将侵犯人权, 审查信息的自由 流动,破坏有用的技术等等。由于晚 已逝去的苏联试图无效地压制个人 电脑和施乐复印机的使用, 西方政 府也将通过极权主义手段试图抑制 网络经济。

1.5 RETURN OF THE LUDDITES 卢德派的回归

Such methods may prove popular among some population segments. The good news about individual liberation and autonomy will seem to be bad news to many who are frightened by the transition crisis and do not expect to be winners in the new configuration of society. The apparent popularity of the draconian capital controls imposed in 1998 by Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in the wake of the Asian meltdown testifies to residual enthusiasm among many for the old-fashioned closed economy dominated by the nation-state. This nostalgia for the past will be fed by resentments inflamed by the inevitable transition crisis. The greatest resentment is likely to be centered among those of middle talent in currently rich countries. They particularly may come to feel that information technology poses a threat to their way of life. The beneficiaries of organized compulsion, including millions receiving income redistributed by governments, may resent the new freedom realized by the Sovereign Individuals. Their upset will illustrate the truism that "where you stand is determined by where you sit."

It would be misleading, however, to attribute all the bad feelings that will be generated in the coming transition crisis to the bald desire to live at someone else's expense. More will be involved. The very character of human society suggests that there is bound to be a misguided moral dimension to the coming Luddite reaction. Think of it as a bald desire fitted with a moral toupee. We explore the moral and moralistic dimensions of the transition crisis. Self-interested grasping of a conscious kind has far less power to motivate actions than does self-righteous fury. While adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth century is rapidly falling away, they are not without their true believers. Many humans, as the passage quoted from Craig Lambert attests, are belongers, who place importance on

这些方法可能会在某些人群中 流行。个人解放和自治的好消息可 能会给许多人带来打击, 他们对转 型危机感到恐惧, 并且不期望在社 会新形态的赢家中。马来西亚总理 马哈蒂尔·莫哈末于 1998 年在亚 洲经济危机后实施的严厉的资本管 制政策表明,仍有很多人倾向于传 统的以国家为主导的封闭经济。这 种对过去的怀旧情结将因转型危机 必然带来的愤怒而得到滋养。最大 的憎恨可能集中在目前富裕国家中 的中等才能人群上。他们特别可能 会感到信息技术对他们的生活方式 构成威胁。有组织强制的受益者,包 括数百万接受政府收入再分配的人, 可能会对主权个人实现的新自由感 到不满。他们的不满将说明"你所 站的位置取决于你的处境"的真理。

然而,将即将到来的过渡危机中将产生的所有不良情绪归咎于光秃秃地想生活在别人的代价之下是具有误导性的。它将涉及更多方面。人类社会的性质表明,即将到来的勒德派反应必然会有一个错误的道德维度。把它想象成一个带有道德假发的光秃秃的愿望。我们探讨了过渡期的道德和道德主义维度。有意识的自我利益追求远不如自以为是的愤怒来推动行为。虽然对于20世纪公民传统的遵循正在迅速减少,但它们并不是没有真正的信徒。正如从 Craig Lambert 引用的文章

being members of a group. The same need to identify that motivates fans of organized sports makes some partisans of nations. Everyone who came of age in the twentieth century has been inculcated in the duties and obligations of the twentieth-century citizen. The residual moral imperatives from industrial society will stimulate at least some neo-Luddite attacks on information technologies.

In this sense, this violence to come will be at least partially an expression of what we call "moral anachronism," the application of moral strictures drawn from one stage of economic life to the circumstances of another. Every stage of society requires its own moral rules to help individuals overcome incentive traps peculiar to the choices they face in that particular way of life. Just as a farming society could not live by the moral rules of a migratory Eskimo band, so the Information Society cannot satisfy moral imperatives that emerged to facilitate the success of a militant 20th century industrial state. We explain why.

In the next few years, moral anachronism will be in evidence at the core countries of the West in much the way that it has been witnessed at the periphery over the past five centuries. Western colonists and military expeditions stimulated such crises when they encountered indigenous hunting-and-gathering bands, as well as peoples whose societies were still organized for farming. The introduction of new technologies into anachronistic settings caused confusion and moral crises. The success of Christian missionaries in converting millions of indigenous peoples can be laid in large measure to the local crises caused by the sudden introduction of new power arrangements from the outside. Such encounters recurred over and over, from the sixteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century. We expect similar clashes early in the new millennium as Information Societies supplant those organized along industrial lines.

所证明的那样,许多人是"属于者",他们认为成为团队成员很重要。同样的认同需求使一些国家倾向于某些主义。在 20 世纪成年的每个人都受到 20 世纪公民责任和义务的熏陶。工业社会的残留道德义务将激发至少一些基于信息技术的新勒德派攻击。

在这个意义上,未来的暴力至少部分上将是我们所谓的"道德时代落后"的表达,即将道德准则应用于另一种经济生活方式的情况。每个社会阶段都需要其自身的道德准则来帮助个人克服该特定生活方式下他们面临的激励陷阱。正如一个农业社会不能按照一个流浪爱斯基摩人团队的道德规则生活一样,信息社会也无法满足于对二十世纪激进的工业国家成功所产生的道德要求。我们会解释原因。

在接下来的几年中,这种道德 时代落后将在西方核心国家的许多 领域中得到体现, 就像在过去的五 个世纪里在边缘地区所见到的一样。 当西方殖民者和军事远征队遭遇土 著狩猎采集部落以及那些仍以耕种 种植为生的人时, 就会出现这样的 危机。新技术的引入到这些时代落 后的环境中会导致混乱和道德危机。 基督教传教士成功地转化了数百万 土著民族, 这在很大程度上归功于 由外部引入的新能源系统带来的本 地危机。从16世纪到20世纪初,这 样的冲突一再发生。我们预计,在信 息社会取代沿工业线组织的社会时 期早期、将会有类似的冲突出现。

1.5.1 对强制的怀旧情感

The rise of the Information Society will not be wholly welcomed as a promising new phase of history, even among those who benefit from it most. Everyone will feel some misgivings. And many will despise innovations that undermine the territorial nation-state. It is a fact of human nature that radical change of any kind is almost always seen as a dramatic turn for the worse. Five hundred years ago, the courtiers gathered around the duke of Burgundy would have said that unfolding innovations that undermined feudalism were evil. They thought the world was rapidly spiraling downhill at the very time that later historians saw an explosion of human potential in the Renaissance. Likewise, what may someday be seen as a new Renaissance from the perspective of the next millennium will look frightening to tired twentieth-century eyes.

There is a high probability that some who are offended by the new ways, as well as many who are disadvantaged by them, will react unpleasantly. Their nostalgia for compulsion will probably turn violent. Encounters with these new "Luddites" will make the transition to radical new forms of social organization at least a measure of bad news for everyone. Get ready to duck. With the speed of change outracing the moral and economic capacity of many in living generations to adapt, you can expect to see a fierce and indignant resistance to the Information Revolution, notwithstanding its great promise to liberate the future.

You must understand and prepare for such unpleasantness. A series of transition crises lies ahead. Deflationary tribulations, such as the Asian contagion that swept through the Far East to Russia and other emerging economies in 1997 and 1998, will erupt sporadically as the dated national and international institutions left over from the Industrial Era

信息社会的崛起并不是所有人 都欣然接受的一段有前途的历史阶 段,即使是那些从中受益最多的人 也会感到一些疑虑。每个人都会感 到某些不安。许多人会鄙视破坏领 土民族国家的创新。这是人性的一 个事实, 任何一种激进的变革几乎 总被视为一个戏剧性的倒退。五百 年前, 围绕勃艮第公爵的宫廷人士 会说, 破坏封建制度的展开中的创 新是邪恶的。他们认为世界正在迅 速地走下坡路, 而后来的历史学家 则在文艺复兴时期看到了人类潜力 的爆发。同样,从下一个千年的角 度来看,有一天可能会被看作是新 文艺复兴, 但它会让疲惫的二十世 纪眼睛感到恐惧。

有很大可能会有一些被新方式冒犯的人,以及许多受其不利影响的人,会做出令人不愉快的反应。他们对强迫的怀旧情结可能会变得暴力。与这些新的"卢德派"相遇将使向激进的新社会组织形式的转变对每个人都至少有一些不好的消息。准备好躲避吧。随着变化的速度超过生活中许多人适应的道德和经济能力,你可以预料到对信息革命的凶猛反抗,尽管它有解放未来的巨大承诺。

你必须理解并为这样的不愉快情况做好准备。一系列的转型危机将接踵而至。通货紧缩的磨难,例如1997年和1998年席卷远东到俄罗斯和其他新兴经济体的亚洲瘟疫,将会间歇性地爆发,因为那些过时

prove inadequate to the challenges of the new, dispersed, transnational economy. The new information and communication technologies are more subversive of the modern state than any political threat to its predominance since Colum何政治威胁都要更具颠覆性,对于 bus sailed. This is important because those in power have seldom reacted peacefully to developments that undermined their authority. They are not likely to now.

The clash between the new and the old will shape the early years of the new millennium. We expect it to be a time of great danger and great reward, and a time of much diminished civility in some realms and unprecedented scope in others. Increasingly autonomous individuals and bankrupt, desperate governments will confront one another across a new divide. We expect to see a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty and the virtual death of politics before the transition is over. Instead of state domination and control of resources, you are destined to see the privatization of almost all services governments now provide. For inescapable reasons that we explore in this book, information technology will destroy the capacity of the state to charge more for its services than they are worth to you and other people who pay for them.

的国内外机构已经证明无法应对新 的、分散的跨国经济的挑战。新的信 息和通讯技术比哥伦布航海后的任 现代国家的主导地位更加具有威胁 性。这一点很重要,因为那些在权力 中的人很少会对破坏他们权威的发 展做出和平反应。他们现在也不太 可能这么做。

新旧之间的冲突将塑造新千年 的早期年份。我们预计这将是一个 充满危险和奖励的时代, 在某些领 域中,文明的减弱将是空前的,而在 其他领域中,范围将是前所未有的。 越来越自主的个人和破产、绝望的 政府将在新的分界线上相互对抗。 我们预计, 在过渡结束之前, 主权 的性质将发生根本性的重组, 政治 几乎完全死亡。与其主导和控制资 源, 你注定会看到几乎所有政府现 在提供的服务的私有化。出于我们 在本书中探讨的无法逃避的原因, 信息技术将摧毁国家为其服务所收 费比其价值和其他为其支付的人们 的贡献更高的状态的能力。

1.5.2 市场赋予的主权

To an extent that few would have imagined only a decade ago, individuals will achieve increasing autonomy over territorial nation-states through market mechanisms. All nation-领土国家越来越多的自治权。所有 states face bankruptcy and the rapid erosion of their authority. Mighty as they are, the power they retain is the power to obliterate, not to command. Their intercontinental missiles and aircraft carriers are already artifacts, as imposing and useless as the last warhorse of feudalism.

仅仅十年前,大多数人都无法 想象,通过市场机制,个人将获得对 国家都面临破产和权威的迅速侵蚀。 尽管它们强大, 但它们所保留的权 力只是毁灭而非统治的权力。它们 的洲际导弹和航空母舰已经成为历 史, 就像封建主义时代的最后一匹 战马一样具有威严和无用。

Information technology makes possible a dramatic extension of markets by altering the way that assets are created and protected. This is revolutionary. Indeed, it promises 扩展。这是一场革命。实际上, 对于 to be more revolutionary for industrial society than the advent of gunpowder proved to be for feudal agriculture. The transformation of the year 2000 implies the commercialization of sovereignty and the death of politics, no less than guns implied the demise of oath-based feudalism. Citizenship will go the way of chivalry.

We believe that the age of individual economic sovereignty is coming. Just as steel mills, telephone companies, mines, and railways that were once "nationalized" have been rapidly 厂、电话公司、矿山和铁路在全球 privatized throughout the world, you will soon see the ultimate form of privatization -the sweeping denationalization of the individual. The Sovereign Individual of the new millennium will no longer be an asset of the state, a de facto item on the treasury's balance sheet. After the transition of the year 2000, denationalized citizens will no longer be citizens as we know them, but customers.

信息技术通过改变资产的创造 和保护方式, 使得市场得以大幅度 工业社会而言,它的革命性可能比 火药对封建农业的影响还要深远。 2000 年的转型意味着主权的商业 化和政治的消亡, 正如火器对宣誓 效忠的封建制度的终结一样。公民 身份将逐渐成为历史。

我们相信,个人经济主权时代 即将到来。正如曾被国有化的钢铁 范围内被迅速私有化一样, 你将很 快见证终极私有化的形式——个人 的彻底非国有化。新千年的主权个 体将不再是国家资产, 不再是国库 资产负债表上的一个实际项目。在 2000年过渡后,非国有化公民将 不再是我们所知道的公民, 而是顾 客。

BANDWIDTH TRUMPS BORDERS 1.6 带宽胜过边界

The commercialization of sovereignty will make the terms and conditions of citizenship in the nation-state as dated as chivalric oaths seemed after the collapse of feudalism. Instead of relating to a powerful state as citizens to be taxed, the Sovereign Individuals of the twenty-first century will be customers of governments operating from a "new logical space." They will bargain for whatever minimal government they need and pay for it according to contract. The governments of the Information Age will be organized along different principles than those which the world has come to expect over the past several centuries. Some jurisdictions and sovereignty services will be formed through "assortive

主权商业化将使国家公民身份 的条款和条件显得像封建主义崩溃 后的骑士誓言一样过时。21世纪的 主权个人将作为政府的客户从"新 的逻辑空间"运营, 而不是像纳税 的公民那样与强大的国家有关。他 们将按照合同谈判并付款以获得他 们需要的最小政府。信息时代的政 府将按照不同的原则组织, 这些原 则不同于过去几个世纪世界所期望 的原则。一些司法管辖区和主权服 务将通过"交配匹配"形成,这是一

matching", a system by which affinities, including commercial affinities, are the basis upon which virtual jurisdictions earn allegiance. In rare cases, the new sovereignties may be holdovers of medieval organizations, like the 900year-old Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta. More commonly known as the Knights of Malta, the order is an affinity group for rich Catholics, with 10,000 current members and an annual income of several billions. The Knights of Malta issues its own passports, stamps, and money, and carries on full diplomatic relations with seventy countries. As we write it is negotiating with the Republic of Malta to reassume possession of Fort St. Angelo. Taking possession of the castle would give the Knights the missing ingredient of territoriality that will enable it to be recognized as a sovereignty. The Knights of Malta could once again become a sovereign microstate, instantly legitimized by a long history. It was from Fort St. Angelo that the Knights of Malta turned back the Turks in the Great Siege of 1565. Indeed, they ruled Malta for many years thereafter, until they were expelled by Napoleon in 1798. If the Knights of Malta were to return in the next few years, there could be no clearer evidence that the modern nation-state system, ushered in after the French Revolution, was merely an interlude in the longer sweep of history in which it has been the norm for many kinds of sovereignties to exist at the same time.

Still another and very different model for a postmodern sovereignty based on assortive matching is the Iridium satellite telephone network. At first glance, you may think it odd to treat a cellular telephone service as a kind of sovereignty窝电话服务视为一种主权奇怪。然 Yet Iridium has already received recognition as a virtual sovereign 恢星已经被国际当局承认为虚 by international authorities. As you may know, Iridium is a global cellular phone service that allows subscribers to receive calls on a single number, wherever they find themselves on the planet, from Featherston, New Zealand, to the Bolivian Chaco. To allow calls to be routed to Iridium sub-

种基于亲和力(包括商业亲和力) 而非地理位置的虚拟管辖权挣得忠 诚的基础。在罕见情况下, 新的主 权可能仍然是中世纪组织(如有着 900年历史的圣约翰医院长,罗得 和马耳他的邦联)。这个亲密团体是 一个富有的天主教徒的可以拥有自 己护照, 邮票和货币的组织, 年收 入几十亿。圣约翰骑士团发行自己 的护照, 邮票和货币, 并与 70 个国 家保持着完整的外交关系。就在我 们写作的时候, 它正在与马耳他共 和国进行谈判, 以重新占据安琪洛 堡。占领城堡将成为这个组织具有 领土性的缺失要素, 并使其能够被 认可为主权。圣约翰骑士团可能再 次成为一个主权微型国家, 并因悠 久的历史而被立即合法化。正是从 安琪洛堡,圣约翰骑士团在1565 年的大围攻中击退了土耳其人。他 们统治了马耳他多年,直到1798 年被拿破仑驱逐。如果圣约翰骑士 团在未来几年内返回, 那么现代国 家体系, 即法国革命后出现的国家 体系,只是历史长河中的一个片段, 历史长河中许多种类的主权同时存 在是正常的。

基于匹配交配的后现代主权的 另一个非常不同的模型是铱星手机 网络。乍一看,你可能认为将一个蜂 拟主权国家。正如您所知,铱星是一 种全球蜂窝电话服务, 允许用户在 全球任何一个地方接收来电, 从新 西兰的菲瑟斯顿到玻利维亚查科。 为了允许呼叫路由到全球任何地方

scribers anywhere on the globe, given the architecture of global telecoms, international telecom authorities had to agree to recognize Iridium as a virtual country, with its own country code: 8816. It is a short step logically from a virtual country comprising satellite telephone subscribers to sovereignty for more coherent virtual communities on the World Wide Web that span borders. Bandwidth, or the carrying capacity of a communications medium, has been expanding faster than computational capacity multiplied after the invention of transistors. If this trend to greater bandwidth continues, as we believe likely, it is only a matter of a few years, soon after the turn of the millennium, until bandwidth becomes sufficiently capacious to make technically possible the "metaverse," the alternative, cyberspace world imagined by the science fiction novelist Neal Stephenson. Stephenson's "metaverse" is a dense virtual community with its own laws. We believe it is inevitable that, as the cybereconomy becomes richer, its participants will seek and obtain exemption from the anachronistic laws of nation-states. The new cybercommunities will be at least as wealthy and competent at advancing their interests as the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta. Indeed, they will be more capable of asserting themselves because of far-reaching communications and information warfare capabilities. We explore still other models of fragmented sovereignty in which small groups can effectively lease the sovereignty of weak nation-states, and operate their own economic havens much as free ports and free trade zones are licensed to do today.

A new moral vocabulary will be required to describe the relations of Sovereign Individuals with one another and what remains of government. We suspect that as the terms of these new relations come into focus, they will offend many people who came of age as "citizens" of twentieth-century nation-states. The end of nations and the "denationalization of the individual" will deflate some warmly held notions, such as "equal protection under the law", that pre-

的铱星用户, 考虑到全球电信的架 构, 国际电信当局不得不同意将铱 星作为一个虚拟国家来承认, 其拥 有自己的国家代码: 8816。从卫星 电话订户组成的虚拟国家到跨越边 界的更一致的虚拟社区的主权, 这 仅是逻辑上的简短步骤。带宽,即通 信媒介的承载能力, 正在以晶体管 发明后计算能力的增长速度加快。 如果这种向更大带宽的趋势继续下 去,正如我们所相信的那样,那么仅 仅几年,在新千年之后不久,带宽就 会变得足够宽敞,以使"元宇宙"成 为可能,即科幻小说家尼尔·斯蒂芬 森想象的另一种虚拟社区。斯蒂芬 森的"元宇宙"是一个拥有自己的 法律的密集虚拟社区。我们相信,随 着网络经济变得更加富裕, 其参与 者将寻求并获得豁免过时的国家法 律的豁免权。由于具有广泛的通信 和信息战争能力,新的网络社区将 至少与圣约翰马耳他医院长的邦联 一样富裕和有能力推进自己的利益。 实际上,他们将更有能力表现自己。 因为我们认为越来越多的小组可以 有效地租用虚弱国家的主权, 并运 营自己的经济避风港, 就像自由港 和自由贸易区今天被许可做一样, 我们探索了其他碎片化主权的模型。

需要新的道德词汇来描述主权 个体之间以及政府剩余部分的关系。 我们怀疑随着这些新关系的术语逐 渐清晰,许多成长于二十世纪民族 国家的"公民"会受到冒犯。国家 的终结和"个体非国籍化"将破坏 一些温暖的理念,如"法律平等保 护",这些理念预设的权力关系很快 suppose power relations that are soon to be obsolete. As virtual communities gain coherence, they will insist that their members be held accountable according to their own laws, rather than those of the former nation-states in which they happen to reside. Multiple systems of law will again coexist over the same geographic area, as they did in ancient and medieval times.

Just as attempts to preserve the power of knights in armor were doomed to fail in the face of gunpowder weapons, so the modern notions of nationalism and citizenship are destined to be short-circuited by microtechnology. Indeed, they will eventually become comic in much the way that the sacred principles of fifteenth-century feudalism fell to ridicule in the sixteenth century. The cherished civic notions of the 20th century will be comic anachronisms to new generations after the transformation of the year 2000. The Don Quixote of the twenty-first century will not be a knighterrant struggling to revive the glories o f feudalism but a bureaucrat in a brown suit, a tax collector yearning for a citizen to audit.

将过时。随着虚拟社区的凝聚,他们 将坚持按照自己的法律来追究成员 的责任, 而不是根据他们恰巧居住 的前民族国家的法律。在同一地理 区域中,多个法律系统将再次并存, 就像古代和中世纪时期那样。

正如试图保留穿甲骑士的权力 注定要失败一样, 现代民族主义和 公民身份的概念注定会在微技术面 前被短路。事实上,它们最终将变得 滑稽可笑, 就像十五世纪封建主义 的神圣原则在十六世纪的嘲笑中失 败一样。二十世纪所珍视的公民观 念将成为二千年后的新一代的滑稽 时代语汇。21世纪的唐吉柯德将不 是一个挣扎恢复封建主义辉煌的骑 士,而是一名穿着棕色衣服的官僚, 一名渴望审计公民的税务员。

REVIVING LAWS OF THE MARCH 1.7 复兴游行的法律

We seldom think of governments as competitive entitles, except in the broadest sense, so the modern intuition about the range and possibilities of sovereignty has atrophied. In the past, when the power equation made it more difficult for groups to assert a stable monopoly of coercion, power was frequently fragmented, jurisdictions overlapped, and entities of many different kinds exercised one or more of the attributes of sovereignty. Not infrequently, the nominal overlord actually enjoyed scant power on the ground. Governments weaker than the nation-states are now faced with sustained competition in their ability to impose a monopo现在,比民族国家弱小的政府,它们 of coercion over a local territory. This competition gave

我们很少将政府视为竞争实体, 除了在最广泛的意义上, 因而现代 人对主权的范围及其可能性的直觉 已经萎缩了。在过去,权力往往是分 散的,管辖是重叠的,不同类型的实 体行使着主权的一种或多种属性; 在这种权力等式中, 很难有某个集 团能稳定地保持垄断地位。名誉上 的最高统治者, 在下面并没有多少 权力,这种情况在历史上并不少见。 在地方施加权力的垄断地位, 就面

rise to adaptations in controlling violence and attracting allegiance that will soon be new again. When the reach of lords and kings was weak, and the claims of one or more groups overlapped at a frontier, it frequently happened that neither could decisively dominate the other. In the Middle Ages, there were numerous frontier or "march" regions where sovereignties blended together. These violent frontiers persisted for decades or even centuries in the border areas of Europe. There were marches between areas of Celtic and English control in Ireland; between Wales and England, Scotland and England, Italy and France, France and Spain, Germany and the Slav frontiers of Central Europe, and between the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the Islamic kingdom of Granada. Such march regions developed distinct institutional and legal forms of a kind that we are likely to see again in the next millennium. Because of the competitive position of the two authorities, residents of march regions seldom paid tax. What is more, they usually had a choice in deciding whose laws they were to obey, a choice that was exercised through such legal concepts as "avowal" and "distraint" that have now all but vanished. We expect such concepts to become a prominent feature of the law of Information Societies.

临着持续的竞争。这些竞争,曾经改 变了控制暴力和吸引效忠的形式, 而新的改变很快就会出现。当领主 和国王们的势力单薄, 往往就会出 现一种现象:对同一块边境地区, 有一个或多个团体主张权力, 而任 何一方都无法占据决定性的支配地 位。在中世纪,有很多的边疆或"边 区"(March)。在这些地方, 主权重 叠,暴力丛生。边区在欧洲存在了几 十年甚至几个世纪, 广泛存在于凯 尔特人和英特兰人控制的爱尔兰地 区之间,在威尔士和英格兰、苏格兰 和英格兰、意大利和法国、法国和西 班牙、德国和中欧的斯拉夫人边境 之间, 以及在西班牙的基督教王国 和格拉纳达的伊斯兰王国之间。边 区形成了独特的制度和法律,在下 一个千年,我们很可能会重温它们。 在边区, 由于存在两个相互竞争的 当局,住在这里的人很少交税。更重 要的是, 他们往往可以选择遵循谁 的法律,通过"宣誓"或"封租"等法 律方式。这些法律概念和方式现在 都不复存在了;我们认为,它们将 会成为信息社会法律的明显特征。

1.7.1 超越国籍

Before the nation-state, it was difficult to enumerate precisely the number of sovereignties that existed in the world because they overlapped in complex ways and many varied forms of organization exercised power. They will do so again. The dividing lines between territories tended to become clearly demarcated and fixed as borders in the nation-state system. They will become hazy again in the Information Age. In the new millennium, sovereignty will be frag-

在国民国家之前,很难准确地 列举出世界上存在的主权数量,因 为它们以复杂的方式重叠,许多不 同形式的组织行使权力。它们将再 次这样做。在国家体系中,领土之间 的分界线倾向于变得清晰明确并固 定为边界。在信息时代中,它们将再 次变得模糊。在新千年中,主权将再 mented once more. New entities will emerge exercising some 次分裂。新实体将出现,行使我们已 but not all of the characteristics we have come to associate with governments.

Some of these new entities, like the Knights Templar and other religious military orders of the Middle Ages, may control considerable wealth and military power without controlling any fixed territory. They will be organized on principles that bear no relation to nationality at all. Members and leaders of religious corporations that exercised sovereign 在中世纪欧洲某些地区行使主权权 authority in parts of Europe in the Middle Ages in no sense derived their authority from national identity. They were of all ethnic backgrounds and professed to owe their allegiance to God, and not to any affinities that members of a nationality are supposed to share in common.

经习惯了与政府相关的某些特征, 但并非全部。

这些新实体中, 像圣殿骑士团 和其他中世纪的宗教军团一样, 可 能会控制相当大的财富和军事力量, 而不控制任何固定的领土。它们将 按照与国籍无关的原则组织起来。 力的宗教公司的成员和领导者, 绝 不是从国家身份中获得他们的权威。 他们来自不同的族裔背景, 并自称 效忠于上帝, 而不是效忠于成员国 之间被认为有共同利益的亲缘关系。

赛博空间的商业共和国 1.7.2

You will also see the re-emergence of associations of merchants and wealthy individuals with semisovereign powers, like the Hanse (confederation of merchants) in the Middle Ages. The Hanse that operated in the French and Flemish fairs grew to encompass the merchants of sixty cities. The "Hanseatic League," as it is redundantly known in English (the literal translation is "Leaguely League"), was an organization of Germanic merchant guilds that provided protection to members and negotiated trade treaties. It came to exercise

semisovereign powers in a number of Northern European and Baltic cities. Such entities will re-emerge in place of the dying nation-state in the new millennium, providing protection and helping to enforce contracts in an unsafe world.

In short, the future is likely to confound the expectations of those who have absorbed the civic myths of twentieth- 些吸收了 20 世纪工业社会公民神 century industrial society. Among them are the illusions of social democracy that once thrilled and motivated the most gifted minds. They presuppose that societies evolve in whatever way governments wish them to-preferably in

您还将看到一些富有的商人和 个人组成的半主权团体重新出现, 例如中世纪的汉萨(商人联盟)。在 法国和佛兰德的博览会上运作的汉 萨发展到包括六十个城市的商人。 被冗余地称为"汉萨同盟"的它是 德语商业协会的组织, 为成员提供 保护,并谈判贸易协议。在一些北 欧和波罗的海城市, 它开始行使半 主权的力量。在新千年代, 这样的 实体将出现,取代正在衰亡的民族 国家,在一个不安全的世界中提供 保护, 并帮助执行合同。

简而言之, 未来很可能会使那 话的人感到困惑。其中包括曾经激 发并激励最有才华的人的社会民主 主义幻想。它们预设社会会以政府 所希望的方式演进, 最好是响应民

response to opinion polls and scrupulously counted votes. This was never as true as it seemed fifty years ago. Now it is an anachronism, as much an artifact of industrialism as a rusting smokestack. The civic myths reflect not only a mindset that sees society's problems as susceptible to engineering solutions; they also reflect a false confidence that resources and individuals will remain as vulnerable to political compulsion in the future as they have been in the twentieth century. We doubt it. Market forces, not political majorities, will compel societies to reconfigure themselves in ways that public opinion will neither comprehend nor welcome. As they do, the naive view that history is what people wish it to be will prove wildly misleading.

It will therefore be crucial that you see the world anew. That means looking from the outside in to reanalyze much that you have probably taken for granted. This will enable you to come to a new understanding. If you fail to transcend conventional thinking at a time when conventional thinking is losing touch with reality, then you will be more likely to fall prey to an epidemic of disorientation that lies ahead. Disorientation breeds mistakes that could threaten your business, your investments, and your way of life.

1.7.3 Seeing Anew 看到

To prepare yourself for the world that is coming you must understand why it will be different from what most experts tell you. That involves looking closely at the hidden causes of change. We have attempted to do this with an unorthodox analysis we call the study of mega politics. In two previous volumes, Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, we argued that the most important causes of change are not to be found in political manifestos or in the pronouncements of dead economists, but in the hidden factors that alter the boundaries where power is exercised. Often,

意调查和严格计数的选票。这在 50 年前就不如它看起来那么正确。现 在,它已经过时了,就像生锈的烟囱 一样是工业主义的产物。这些公民 神话不仅反映了一种认为社会问题 容易被工程解决的心态,它们还反 映了一种错误的信心,即资源和个 人在将来仍将像在 20 世纪一样容 易受到政治压迫。我们对此表示怀 疑。市场力量而不是政治多数将迫 使社会以公众意见既无法理解也无 法欢迎的方式进行重构。随着这种 重构,天真地认为历史是人们希望 它成为的观念将被证明是极其误导 的。

因此, 关键是你需要重新审视 世界。这意味着从外部重新分析你 可能认为理所当然的许多事情。这 将使你能够得出新的理解。如果你 在传统思维失去与现实接触的时候 不能超越传统思维, 那么你更有可 能陷入即将到来的失序病毒的困扰 中。失序会导致错误, 可能会威胁 到你的业务、投资和生活方式。

为了为即将到来的世界做好准备,您必须理解为什么它会与大多数专家告诉您的不同。这涉及密切关注变化的隐藏原因。我们尝试用一种非正统的分析,称为"大政治"的研究来做到这一点。在两个之前的卷册中,《街头流血》和《大清算》中,我们认为,变化的最重要的原因不在于政治宣言或死亡经济学家的声明,而是在于改变行使权力的边

subtle changes in climate, topography, microbes, and technology alter the logic of violence. They transform the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves.

Notice that our approach to understanding how the world changes is very different from that of most forecasters. We are not experts in anything, in the sense that we pretend to know a great deal more about certain "subjects" than those who have spent their entire careers cultivating highly specialized knowledge. To the contrary, we look from the outside in. We are knowledgeable around the subjects about which we make forecasts. Most of all, this involves seeing where the boundaries of necessity are drawn. When they change, society necessarily changes, no matter what people may wish to the contrary.

In our view, the key to understanding how societies evolve is to understand factors that determine the costs and rewards of employing violence. Every human society, from the hunting band to the empire, has been informed by the interactions of megapolitical factors that set the prevailing version of the "laws of nature." Life is always and everywhere complex. The lamb and the lion keep a delicate balance, interacting at the margin. If lions were suddenly more swift, they would catch prey that now escape. If lambs suddenly grew wings, lions would starve. The capacity to utilize and defend against violence is the crucial variable that alters life at the margin.

We put violence at the center of our theory of megapolitics for good reason. The control of violence is the most important dilemma every society faces. As we wrote in The Great Reckoning:

The reason that people resort to violence is that it often pays. In some ways, the simplest thing a man can do if he wants money is to take it. That is no less true for an army of men seizing an oil field than it is for a single thug taking a wallet. Power, as William Playfair wrote, "has always 界的隐藏因素。通常,气候、地形、微生物和技术上的微妙变化都会改变暴力的逻辑。它们改变了人们组织生计和自我防卫的方式。

请注意,我们理解世界变化的方法与大多数预测者所采用的方法非常不同。我们不是某个领域的专家,也不是假装比那些一生都在培养高度专业知识的人了解更多关于某些"主题"的人。相反,我们从外部看。我们在我们预测的主题领域有知识。最重要的是,这涉及到看到必要性的边界在哪里被画出。当它们改变时,社会必然改变,无论人们想不想改变。

在我们看来,理解社会如何演变的关键在于理解决定使用暴力的成本和回报的因素。从狩猎队到帝国,每个人类社会都受到"大政治"因素相互作用的影响,这些因素确定了"自然法则"的普遍版本。生活始终是复杂的。羊和狮子在边缘相互作用,保持着微妙的平衡。如果狮子突然更敏捷,他们会捕捉到现在逃脱的猎物。如果羊突然长出翅膀,狮子会挨饿。利用和防御暴力的能力是改变生命边缘的关键变量。

我们把暴力放在我们的"大都市政治"理论的中心,这是有充分理由的。控制暴力是每个社会面临的最重要的问题。正如我们在《大清算》中所写的那样:

人们诉诸暴力的原因在于它往往有利可图。在某些方面,如果一个人想要钱,他最简单的做法就是拿走它。这同样适用于抢夺油田的一支军队和抢夺钱包的单个恶棍。威

sought the readiest road to wealth, by attacking those who were in possession of it."

The challenge to prosperity is precisely that predatory violence does pay well in some circumstances. War does change things. It changes the rules. It changes the distribution of assets and income. It even determines who lives and who dies. It is precisely the fact that violence does pay that makes it hard to control.

Thinking in these terms has helped us foresee a number of developments that better-informed experts insisted could never happen. For example, Blood in the Streets, published in early 1987, was our attempt to survey the first stages of the great megapolitical revolution now under way. We argued then that technological change was destabilizing the power equation in the world. Among our principal points:

- We said that American predominance was in decline, which would lead to economic imbalances and distress, including another 1929-style stock market crash. Experts were all but unanimous in dfnying that such a thing could happen. Yet within six months, in October 1987, world markets were convulsed by the most violent sell-off of the century.
- · We told readers to expect the collapse of Communism. Again, experts laughed. Yet 1989 brought the events that "no one could have predicted." The Berlin Wall fell, as revolutions swept away Communist regimes from the Baltic to Bucharest.
- · We explained why the multiethnic empire the Bolshevik nomenklatura inherited from the tsars would "inevitably crack apart." At the end of December 1991, the hammer-and-sickle banner was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time as the Soviet Union ceased to exist.
- · During the height of the Reagan arms buildup, we argued that the world stood at the threshold of sweeping

廉·普雷费尔写道,权力"总是通过 攻击那些拥有财富的人来寻求最便 捷的致富之路"。

繁荣的挑战恰恰在于掠夺性暴力在某些情况下确实有好处。战争改变了一切,改变了规则,改变了 资产和收入的分配,甚至决定了谁生谁死。正是暴力有利可图的事实使其难以控制。

从这些方面思考有助于我们预见到一些明眼人认为永远不可能发生的事情。例如,早在1987年初发表的《街头流血》是我们试图调查当前正在进行的巨型政治革命的最初阶段。我们当时认为,技术变革正在动摇世界上的权力平衡。我们的主要观点之一是:

- · 我们曾说过,美国的主导地位 正在衰落,这将导致经济失衡 和困境,包括另一次1929年 式的股市崩盘。专家们几乎一 致地否认这种事情可能发生。 然而,在六个月内,即1987 年10月,世界市场被20世 纪最激烈的抛售所动摇。
- · 我们告诉读者要预期共产主 义的崩溃。同样,专家们嗤之 以鼻。然而,在1989年,一些 "不可预测"的事件发生了。柏 林墙倒塌,革命席卷了从波罗

disarmament. This, too, was considered unlikely, if not preposterous. Yet the following seven years brought the most sweeping disarmament since the close of World War I.

- At a time when experts in North America and Europe were pointing to Japan for support of the view that governments can successfully rig markets, we said otherwise. We forecast that the Japanese financial assets boom would end in a bust. Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Japanese stock market crashed, losing almost half its value. We continue to believe that its ultimate low could match or exceed the 89 percent loss that Wall Street suffered at the bottom after 1929.
- At a point when almost everyone, from the middle-class family to the world's largest real estate investors, appeared to believe that property markets could only rise and not fall, we warned that a real estate bust was in the offing. Within four years, real estate investors throughout the world lost more than \$1 trillion as property values dropped.
- Long before it was obvious to the experts, we explained in Blood in the Streets that the income of blue-collar workers had decreased and was destined to continue falling on a long-term basis. As we write today, almost a decade later, it has at last begun to dawn on a sleepy world that this is true. Average hourly wages in the United States have fallen below those achieved in the second Eisenhower administration. In 1993, average annualized hourly wages in constant dollars were \$18,808. In 1957, when Eisenhower was sworn in for his second term, U.S. annualized average hourly wages were \$18,903.

- 的海到布加勒斯特的共产主 义政权。
- · 我们解释了为什么来自沙皇的多民族帝国会"不可避免地解体"。1991年12月底,苏联停止存在,镇魂曲被最后一次放下。
- · 在里根军备竞赛的高峰期,我 们认为世界处于全面裁军的 门槛。这也被认为是不可能 的,如果不是荒谬的话。然而, 接下来的七年带来了自第一 次世界大战结束以来最全面 的裁军。
- 在北美和欧洲的专家指向日本支持政府可以成功操纵市场的观点的时候,我们持有不同的态度。我们预测,日本的金融资产繁荣将以失败告终。在柏林墙倒塌后不久,日本股市崩盘,几乎损失了一半的价值。我们继续认为,它的最终低点可能会匹配或超过1929年后华尔街跌至底部的89%的损失。
- · 在几乎每个人,从中产阶级 家庭到全球最大的房地产投 资者,似乎都相信房地产市 场只能上涨而不能下跌的时 候,我们警告道,房地产危机 即将来临。在四年内,全球房 地产投资者因房价下跌而损 失了1万亿美元以上。
- · 长期以来,早在专家们看得出 来之前,我们就在《血腥街头》

一书中解释,蓝领工人的收入已经下降,并且将在长期基础上继续下降。如今几乎过了十年,这一点终于开始对瞌睡世界有所意识。美国平均小时工资已经下降至艾森豪威尔政府的第二个任期所实现的水平以下。在1993年,美国的年平均工时工资是18808美元。在1957年艾森豪威尔宣誓就职第二个任期时,美国年平均工时工资为18903美元。

While the main themes of Blood in the Streets have proven remarkably accurate with the benefit of hindsight, only a few years ago they were considered rank nonsense by the guardians of conventional thinking. A reviewer in Newsweek in 1987 reflected the closed mental climate of late industrial society when he dismissed our analysis as "an unthinking attack on reason."

You might imagine that Newsweek and similar publications would have recognized with the passage of time that our line of analysis had revealed something useful about the way the world was changing. Not a bit. The first edition of The Great Reckoning was greeted with the same sniggering hostility that welcomed Blood in the Streets. No less an authority than the Wall Street Journal categorically dismissed our analysis as the nattering of "your dopey aunt."

This chuckling aside, the themes of The Great Reckoning proved less ludicrous than the guardians of orthodoxy pretended.

· We extended our forecast of the death of the Soviet Union, exploring why Russia and the other former Soviet republics faced a future of growing civil disorder, hyper-

尽管《血腥街头》的主要主题 在回顾中表现出了惊人的准确性, 但仅仅几年前,它们被传统思维的 守护者认为是无稽之谈。1987年 《新闻周刊》的一位评论家反映了 后期工业社会的封闭思维气氛,当 他把我们的分析视为"对理性的无 思考攻击"时。

你可能会想象,《新闻周刊》和 类似的出版物随着时间的推移应该 已经认识到,我们的分析线路揭示 了关于世界正在发生变化的有用信 息。可惜并没有。《大清算》的第一版 受到了与《血腥街头》相同的嘲笑 和敌视。华尔街日报等权威机构也 毫不客气地将我们的分析称为"你 迟钝的姑妄言"之类的话语。

然而,这些调笑话并没有能够 掩盖《大清算》所阐述的主题,它们 仍然被坚守正统的守护者所忽视。

> 我们扩大了我们对苏联解体 的预测,并探讨了为什么俄罗 斯和其他前苏联共和国面临

- inflation, and falling living standards.
- · We explained why the 1990s would be a decade of downsizing, including for the first time a worldwide downsizing of governments as well as business entities.
- We also forecast that there would be a major redefinition of terms of income redistribution, with sharp cutbacks in the level of benefits. Hints of fiscal crisis appeared from Canada to Sweden, and American politicians began to talk of "ending welfare as we know it."
- We anticipated and explained why the "new world order" would prove to be a "new world disorder." Well before the atrocities in Bosnia engrossed the headlines, we warned that Yugoslavia would collapse into civil war.
- · Before Somalia slid into anarchy, we explained why the pending collapse of governments in Africa would lead some countries there to be effectively placed into receivership.
- We forecast and explained why militant Islam would displace Marxism as the principal ideology of confrontation with the West.
- · Years before the Oklahoma bombing and the attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, we explained why the United States faced an upsurge in terrorism.
- Before the headlines that told of the rioting that swept Los Angeles, Toronto, and other cities, we explained why the emergence of criminal subcultures among urban minorities was setting the stage for widespread criminal violence.
- · We also anticipated "the final depression of the twentieth century," which began in Asia in 1989 and has been spreading back from the periphery toward the center of the global system. We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street's path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression.

- 着日益增长的内部冲突、高 通货膨胀和生活水平下降的 未来。
- · 我们解释了为什么 20 世纪 90 年代将是一个裁员的十年,包括首次全球范围内的政府和企业实体裁员。
- · 我们还预测,将会有一个重大的收入再分配条款重新定义,福利水平将大幅削减。从加拿大到瑞典,财政危机的迹象开始显现,美国政客开始谈论"改变我們熟知的福利制度"。
- · 我们预见并解释了为什么"新 秩序"将证明是"新混乱"。早 在波斯尼亚的暴行引起头条 新闻之前,我们就警告说南 斯拉夫将陷入内战。
- · 在索马里陷入无政府状态之前,我们解释了为什么非洲政府的垮台将导致一些国家被有效地接管。
- · 我们预测并解释了为什么激 进伊斯兰教会取代马克思主 义成为与西方对抗的主要意 识形态。
- · 在奥克拉荷马城爆炸和企图 炸毁世贸中心之前多年,我 们就已经解释了为什么美国 面临恐怖主义激增。
- · 在洛杉矶、多伦多和其他城市 爆发骚乱之前,我们就已经解 释了为什么城市少数族裔中 的犯罪亚文化的出现为广泛 的犯罪暴力局势铺平了道路。

Although massive government intervention in Japan and elsewhere temporarily prevented markets from fully reflecting the deterioration of credit conditions, this only displaced and compounded economic distress, building pressures for competitive devaluations and a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s.

我们还预见到了"二十世纪最终的萧条",它始于1989年的亚洲,并从边缘向全球体系中心扩散。我们说日本股市将沿着1929年华尔街的轨迹走向,这将导致信贷崩溃和经济衰退。尽管日本和其他地方的大规模政府干预暂时阻止了市场充分反映信贷条件恶化的情况,但这只是转移和加剧了经济困境,建立了竞争性货币贬值和类似于20世纪30年代全球性信贷崩溃的系统性信贷崩溃的压力。

The Great Reckoning also spelled out a number of controversial theses that have not yet been confirmed, or have not reached the level of development that we forecast:

《大清算》也提出了许多有争 议的论点,这些观点尚未得到证实, 或者没有达到我们预测的水平:

- We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street's path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression. Although unemployment rates in Spain, Finland, and a few other countries exceeded those of the 1930s, and a number of countries, including Japan, did experience local depressions, there has not yet been a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s.
- · We argued that the breakdown of the command-and-control system in the former Soviet Union would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of ministates, terrorists, and criminal gangs. To the world's good fortune, this has not come to pass, at least not to the degree that we feared. Press reports indicate that Iran purchased several tactical nuclear weapons on the black market; more worryingly, the Times of London reported on October 7, 1998, that "Osama bin Laden, the exiled millionaire Saudi terrorist leader, has acquired tactical nuclear weapons from the former So-
- 我们曾说过,日本股市将在 1929年后追随华尔街的道路, 这将导致信贷崩溃和经济萧 条。尽管西班牙、芬兰和其他 一些国家的失业率超过了 20 世纪 30 年代的水平,并且包 括日本在内的一些国家的确 经历了局部经济萧条,但还 没有像 20 世纪 30 年代那样 导致全球经济崩溃的系统性 信贷崩溃。
- · 我们认为,前苏联指挥与控制系统的崩溃将导致核武器传播到小国、恐怖分子和犯罪团伙手中。对于全球幸运的是,至少没有达到我们担心的程度。媒体报道表明,伊朗在黑市上购买了几个战术核武器;更令人担忧的是,《泰晤

viet Central Asian states, according to a leading Arab newspaper." That said, there has been no officially confirmed deployment or use of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union.

• We explained why the "War on Drugs" was a recipe for subverting the police and judicial systems of countries where drug use is widespread, particularly the United States. With tens of billions of dollars in hidden monopoly profits piling up each year, drug dealers have the means as well as the incentive to corrupt even apparently stable countries. While the world media have carried occasional stories hinting at high-level penetration of the U.S. political system by drug money, the full story has not yet been told. 士报》于 1998年 10月7日 报道称,"流亡的千万富翁沙 特恐怖分子领袖本·拉登已从 前苏联中亚国家购买了战术 核武器,据一家领先的阿拉 伯报纸报道。"尽管如此,前 苏联的军火库还没有正式确 认部署或使用过核武器。

我们解释了为什么"毒品战争"是破坏警察和司法系统的谋略,特别是在毒品泛滥的国家,尤其是美国。由于每年隐蔽的垄断利润累积数十亿美元,毒品贩子具有腐败甚至是看似稳定国家的手段和动机。尽管全球媒体偶尔报道高层渗透美国政治体系的毒品资金,但完整的故事尚未被揭示。

1.7.4 看得比别人更远

Notwithstanding the points where our forecasts were mistaken or seem mistaken in light of what is now known, the record stands to scrutiny. Much of what is likely to figure in future economic histories of the 1990s was forecast or anticipated and explained in The Great Reckoning. Many of our predictions were not simple extrapolations or extensions of trends, but forecasts of major departures from what has been considered normal since World War II. We warned that the 1990s would be dramatically different from the previous five decades. Reading the news of 1991 through 1998, we see that the themes of The Great Reckoning were borne out almost daily.

We see these developments not as examples of isolated difficulties, trouble here, trouble there, but as shocks and 尽管我们的预测在已知信息的 光下似乎是错误的,但记录经得起 审查。在《大清算》一书中,许多将会 成为未来经济史的内容都被预测或 预见,并加以解释。我们的许多预测 不是趋势的简单推展或延伸,而是 对自第二次世界大战以来被认为是 常态的重大变革的预测。我们警告 说,1990年代将与前五十年截然 不同。阅读1991年至1998年的 新闻,我们发现《大清算》的主题 几乎每天都在得到证实。

我们认为这些发展不是孤立的 困难例子,这里有麻烦,那里也有麻 tremors that run along the same fault line. The old order is being toppled by a megapolitical earthquake that will revolutionize institutions and alter the way thinking people see the world.

In spite of the central role of violence in determining the way the world works, it attracts surprisingly little serious attention. Most political analysts and economists write as if violence were a minor irritant, like a fly buzzing around a cake, and not the chef who baked it. 烦,而是沿着同一断层线发生的震荡和颤动。旧秩序正在被一个巨大的政治地震所推翻,这将彻底改变制度并改变思考人士看待世界的方式。

尽管暴力在确定世界运作方式 中发挥着核心作用,但它吸引的严 肃关注却出奇的少。大多数政治分 析家和经济学家的写作都表现得好 像暴力只是一个小烦恼,就像苍蝇 围绕着蛋糕,而不是制作它的厨师。

1.7.5 另一个超级政治先驱

In fact, there has been so little clear thinking about the role of violence in history that a bibliography of mega political analysis could be written on a single sheet of paper. In The Great Reckoning, we drew upon and elaborated arguments of an almost entirely forgotten classic of mega political analysis, William Playfair's An enquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations, published in 1805. Here one of our departure points is the work of Frederic C. Lane. Lane was a medieval historian who wrote several penetrating essays on the role of violence in history during the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these was "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 1958. Few people other than professional economists and historians have read it, and most of them seem not to have recognized its significance. Like Playfair, Lane wrote for an audience that did not yet exist.

实际上, 历史上暴力的角色所 涉及的清晰思考如此之少, 以至于 关于巨型政治分析的书目可以写在 一张纸上。在《大清算》中, 我们借 鉴了并详细阐述了威廉·普莱费尔 的巨型政治分析经典作品《对富国 强兵的永久性原因的探讨》(1805 年出版)的论点,该作品几乎已被 人遗忘。其中之一的出发点是弗雷 德里克·C·莱恩的工作。莱恩是一位 中世纪历史学家,在 1940 年代和 1950 年代写了几篇关于历史中暴 力角色的深入研究论文。其中最全 面的是《有组织暴力的经济后果》, 发表于1958年的《经济史学杂志》 上。除了专业经济学家和历史学家 外,很少有其他人读过它,而且大多 数人似乎没有意识到其重要性。像 普莱费尔一样, 莱恩为一个尚未存 在的观众写作。眼下,对我们最有用 的莱恩和普莱费尔的主题是暴力与 经济增长之间的关系, 这是我们将 要探讨的。

1.7.6 信息时代的洞见

Lane published his work on violence and the economic meaning of war well before the advent of the Information Age. He certainly was not writing in anticipation of microprocessing or the other technological revolutions now unfolding. Yet his insights into violence established a framework for understanding how society will be reconfigured in the Information Revolution.

The window Lane opened into the future was one through which he peered into the past. He was a medieval historian, and particularly a historian of a trading city, Venice, whose fortunes surged and sagged in a violent world. In thinking about how Venice rose and fell, his attention was attracted to issues that can help you understand the future. He saw the fact that how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining "what uses are made of scarce resources."

We believe that Lane's analyses of the competitive uses of violence has much to tell us about how life is likely to change in the Information Age. But don't expect most people to notice, much less follow, so unfashionably abstract an argument. While the attention of the world is riveted on dishonest debates and wayward personalities, the meanderings of mega politics continue almost unnoted. The average North American has probably lavished one hundred times more attention on O.J.Simpson and Monica Lewinsky than he has on the new micro technologies that are poised to antiquate his job and subvert the political system he depends on for unemployment compensation.

莱恩在信息时代出现之前就发表了关于暴力和战争经济意义的研究工作。他的著述并不是在预测微处理或其他科技革命的到来。然而,他对暴力的洞察建立了一个框架,可以理解信息革命时期,社会将如何重新构建。

莱恩打开的未来之窗是一个窥视过去的窗口。他是一名中世纪历史学家,特别是威尼斯这座交易城市的历史学家。在思考威尼斯的兴衰时,他的注意力被吸引到一些可以帮助我们理解未来的问题上。他认为,暴力的组织和控制方式在决定"稀缺资源的使用方式"方面发挥了重要作用。

我们认为, 莱恩关于暴力竞争使用的分析可以告诉我们, 在信息时代生活将如何改变。但是不要期望大多数人会注意这么不太流行的抽象论证, 更不要期望他们会跟随这个论证。当全世界的注意力都被卡戴珊和莫妮卡·莱温斯基之类的有争议的人物所吸引时, 超级政治的波折几乎没有引起注意。普通北美人可能在 O·J·辛普森和莫妮卡·莱温斯基方面花费的关注度是他们在新的微技术上花费关注度的百倍,而后者正准备使他们的工作过时, 颠覆他们依赖于失业赔偿的政治系统。

1.8 THE VANITY OF WISHES

愿望的虚荣

The tendency to overlook what is fundamentally important is not confined solely to the couch dweller watching television. Conventional thinkers of all shapes and sizes observe one of the pretenses of the democratic nation-state -that the views people hold determine the way the world changes. Apparently sophisticated analysts lapse into explanations and forecasts that interpret major historical developments as if they were determined in a wishful way. A striking example of this type of reasoning appeared on the editorial page of the New York Times just as we were writing: "Goodbye, Nation-State, Hello...What?," by Nicholas Colch族国家, 你好……什么?", 由尼古拉 ester. Not only was the topic, the death of the nation-state, the very topic we are addressing, but its author presents himself as an excellent marker to illustrate how far removed our way of thinking is from the norm. Colchester is no simpleton. He wrote as editorial director of the Economist Intelligence Unit. If anyone should form a realistic view of the world it should be he. Yet his article clearly indicates in several places that "the coming of international government" is "now logically unstoppable."

Why? Because the nation-state is faltering and can no longer control economic forces. In our view, this assumption verges on the absurd. To suppose that some specific new form of governance will emerge simply because another has failed is a fallacy. By that reasoning, Haiti and the Congo would long ago have had better government simply because what they had was so luminously inadequate.

Colchester's point of view, widely shared among the few who think about such things in North America and Europe, utterly fails to take into account the larger mega po-

忽视根本重要的事情的倾向并 不仅限于躺在沙发上看电视的人。 各种形状和大小的传统思想家观察 到民主国家的伪装之一 - 人们持 有的观点决定了世界变化的方式。 明显高级的分析师们陷入解释和预 测之中,将主要历史发展解释为如 愿以偿的方式。刚好在我们写作的 时候,在《纽约时报》的编辑专栏上 出现了一个醒目的例子: "再见, 民 斯·科尔切斯特 (Nicholas Colchester) 撰写。不仅是话题, 民族国 家的死亡, 就是我们正在处理的话 题, 而且作者表现出自己是一个很 好的标志, 用以说明我们的思维方 式与常规思维方式有多么不同。科 尔切斯特不是傻瓜。他是《经济学 家》情报部门的编辑总监。如果应 该有人形成现实的世界观, 那应该 是他。然而, 他的文章在若干地方 明确指出,"国际政府的到来"现 在是"逻辑上不可阻挡的"。

为什么? 因为民族国家正在衰 败,无法再控制经济力量。在我们看 来,这种假设接近荒谬。假设仅仅因 为另一种形式的治理失败了, 某种 特定的新治理形式就会出现, 这是 一种谬论。按照这种推理,海地和刚 果早就应该有更好的政府了, 仅仅 因为它们原有的那种政府是如此的 不足。

考尔切斯特的观点在北美和欧 洲这样的思考之人中间广泛共享, 但它完全没有考虑到决定政治体制 litical forces that determine what types of political systems are actually viable. That is the focus of this book. When the technologies that are shaping the new millennium are considered, it is far more likely that we will see not one world government, but micro-government, or even conditions approaching anarchy.

For every serious analysis of the role of violence in determining the rules by which everyone operates, dozens of books have been written about the intricacies of wheat subsidies, and hundreds more about arcane aspects of monetary policy. Much of this shortfall in thinking about the crucial issues that actually determine the course of history probably reflects the relative stability of the power configuration over the past several centuries. The bird that falls asleep on the back of a hippopotamus does not think about losing its perch until the hippo actually moves. Dreams, myths, and fantasies play a much larger role in informing the supposed social sciences than we commonly think.

This is particularly evident in the abundant literature of economic justice. Millions of words have been uttered and written about economic justice and injustice for each page devoted to careful analysis of how violence shapes society, and thus sets the boundaries within which economies must function. Yet formulations of economic justice in the modem context presuppose that society is dominated by an instrument of compulsion so powerful that it can take away and redistribute life's good things. Such power has existed for only a few generations of the modem period. Now it is fading away.

实际上是可行的更大的超级政治力量。这本书的重点就是这个问题。当考虑到塑造新千年的技术时,我们更有可能看到的不是一个世界政府,而是微型政府,甚至接近无政府状态。

这在经济正义的丰富文献中特别明显。对经济正义和不正义的数百万言论和文字述说,与认真分析暴力如何塑造社会并因此为经济体制设定界限的书页相比,数量要多得多。然而在现代情境下,经济正义的表述预设社会被一种力量所统治,这种力量非常强大,可以夺取和重新分配生活的好东西。这种权力仅在现代时期的短暂几代人存在。现在它正在消逝。

对于决定每个人运作规则的暴力角色的严肃分析,有数十本书被写成关于小麦补贴的错综复杂事宜的数倍,还有几百本有关货币政策的深奥方面的书籍。关于实际上决定历史进程的关键问题思考的缺少大部分可能反映了过去几个世纪权力配置的相对稳定。在河马背上睡着的鸟类直到河马真正移动起来才会考虑失去它的栖息地。梦想、神话和幻想在通知所谓社会科学方面所起的作用比我们通常想象的要大得多。

1.8.1 社会保障的大哥

Industrial technology gave governments greater instruments of control in the twentieth century than ever before. For a time, it seemed inevitable that governments would be-

工业技术在 20 世纪为政府提供了比以往任何时候都更大的控制工具。曾经有一段时间,政府似乎注

come so effective at monopolizing violence as to leave little room for individual autonomy. Nobody at mid-century was looking forward to the triumph of the Sovereign Individual.

Some of the shrewdest observers of the mid-twentieth century became convinced on the evidence of the day that the tendency of the nation-state to centralize power would lead to totalitarian domination over all aspects of life. In George Orwell's 1984 (1949), Big Brother was watching the individual vainly struggle to maintain a margin of autonomy and self-respect. It appeared to be a losing cause. Friedric 治权和自尊心。这似乎是一场失败 von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) took a more scholarly view in arguing that freedom was being lost to a new form of economic control that left the state as the master of everything. These works were written before the advent of microprocessing, which has incubated a whole range of technologies that enhance the capacity of small groups and even individuals to function independently of central authority.

As shrewd as observers like Hayek and Orwell were, they were unduly pessimistic. History has unfolded its surprises. Totalitarian Communism barely outlasted the year 1984. A new form of serfdom may yet emerge in the next millennium if governments succeed in suppressing the liberating aspects of microtechnology. But it is far more likely that we will see unprecedented opportunity and autonomy for the individual. What our parents worried about may prove to be no problem at all. What they took for granted as fixed and permanent features of social life now seem destined to disappear. Wherever necessity sets boundaries to human choice, we adjust, and reorganize our lives accordingly.

定会在垄断暴力方面变得如此有效, 以至于个体自治的空间很小。半个 世纪以来,没有人期待主权个体的 胜利。

二十世纪中期最精明的观察家 之一通过当时的证据确信, 民族国 家集中权力的趋势将导致对生活各 个方面的极权主义控制。在乔治·奥 威尔的《1984》(1949)中,大兄弟一 直在注视着个体徒劳地努力保持自 的事业。弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克(Friedrich von Hayek)的《通往奴役之路》(1944) 则采取了更加学术的视角, 认为自 由正在失去,被一种新形式的经济 控制所取代, 这让国家成为了一切 的主宰。这些作品均在微处理器的 出现之前编写, 而微处理器孕育了 一系列增强小团体甚至个人独立于 中央权威运作的技术。

正如哈耶克和奥威尔等观察家 一样精明,他们过于悲观了。历史已 经揭示了它的惊喜。极权主义共产 主义仅在 1984 年之后未能幸存。 如果政府成功地压制了微技术的解 放方面,未来的新奴隶制形式可能 会出现。但更有可能的是,我们将看 到个人前所未有的机遇和自治权。 我们父母所担心的问题可能根本不 是问题, 他们认为是社会生活的固 定和永久特征的事情现在注定会消 失。无论什么时候, 当必要性给人 类的选择设置边界时, 我们都会进 行调整并重新组织我们的生活。

1.8.2 预测有风险

No doubt we put our small measure of dignity at risk in attempting to foresee and explain profound changes in the organization of life and the culture that binds it together. Most forecasts are doomed to make silly reading in the fullness of time. And the more dramatic the change they envision, the more embarrassingly wrong they tend to be. The world doesn't end. The ozone doesn't vanish. The coming Ice Age dissolves into global warming. Notwithstanding all the alarms to the contrary, there is still oil in the tank. Mr. Antrobus, the everyman of The Skin of Our Teeth, avoids freezing, survives wars and threatened economic calamities, and grows old ignoring the studied alarms of experts.

Most attempts to "unveil" the future soon tum out to be comic. Even where self-interest provides a strong incentive to clear thinking, forward vision is often myopic. In 1903, the Mercedes company said that "there would never be as many as 1 million automobiles worldwide. The reason was that it was implausible that as many as 1 million artisans worldwide would be trainable as chauffeurs."

Recognizing this should stop our mouths. It doesn't. We are not afraid to stand in line for a due share of ridicule. If we mistake matters greatly, future generations may laugh as heartily as they please, presuming anyone remembers what we said. To dare a thought is to risk being wrong. We are hardly so stiff and useless that we are afraid to err. Far from it. We would rather venture thoughts that might prove useful to you than suppress them out of apprehension that they might prove overblown or embarrassing in retrospect.

As Arthur C. Clarke shrewdly noted, the two overriding reasons why attempts to anticipate the future usually fall flat are "Failure of Nerve and Failure of Imagination." Of the two, he wrote, "Failure of Nerve seems to be the more common; it occurs when even given all the relevant facts 毫无疑问,在试图预见和解释 生活组织和文化变革方面,我们将 冒险失去一些尊严。大多数预测注 定在时间的推移中变得愚蠢。而且, 它们设想的变化越剧烈,它们就越 容易出错。世界不会终结,臭氧不 会消失。即使有所有相反的警报,油 箱里还是有油。《我们的牙齿的皮 肤》中的平民先生安特罗布斯避免 冻结,幸存于战争和潜在的经济灾 难中,老化时忽略专家的警报。

大多数揭示未来的尝试很快就变成了喜剧。即使自身利益提供了强烈的清晰思考的动力,前瞻性的愿景也经常是短视的。1903年,梅赛德斯公司说:"全世界永远不会超过100万辆汽车。原因是全球最多只有100万个工匠可供培训为司机。"

认识到这一点应该让我们闭嘴。 但事实并非如此。我们不怕被取笑, 也会排队领取应得的嘲笑。虽然我 们可能会大错特错,但后代可能会 为我们的言论大笑,如果有人记得 我们所说的话的话。敢于思考就冒 着被错的风险。我们并非这么僵硬 和无用,以至于害怕犯错。恰恰相 反,我们宁愿尝试提出可能对您有 用的想法,而不会因为担心它们可 能被夸大或在回顾中尴尬而压抑它 们。

正如亚瑟·克拉克所说, 预测未 来通常失败的两个主要原因是"胆 怯的失败"和"想象的失败"。在这 两者中, 他写道, "胆怯的失败似乎 更为常见; 即使在提供了所有相关 the would-be prophet cannot see that they point to an inescapable conclusion. Some of these failures are so ludicrous as to be almost unbelievable."

Where our exploration of the Information Revolution falls short, as it inevitably will, the cause will be due more to a lack of imagination than to a lack of nerve. Forecasting the future has always been a bold enterprise, one which properly excites skepticism. Perhaps time will prove that our deductions are wildly off the mark. Unlike Nostradamus, we do not pretend to be prophetic personalities. We do not foretell the future by stirring a wand in a bowl of water or by casting horoscopes. Nor do we write in cryptic verse. Our purpose is to provide you with a sober, detached analysis of issues that could prove to be of great importance to you.

We feel an obligation to set out our views, even where they seem heretical, precisely because they may not otherwise be heard. In the closed mental atmosphere of late industrial society, ideas do not traffic as freely as they should through the established media.

This book is written in a constructive spirit. It is the third we have written together, analyzing various stages of the great change now under way. Like Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, it is a thought exercise. It explores the death of industrial society and its reconfiguration in new forms. We expect to see amazing paradoxes in the years to come. On the one hand, you will witness the realization of a new form of freedom, with the emergence of the Sovereign Individual. You can expect to see almost the complete liberation of productivity. At the same time, we expect to see the death of the modern nation-state. Many of the assurances of equality that Western people have grown to take for granted in the twentieth century are destined to die with it. We expect that representative democracy as it is now known will fade away, to be replaced by the new democracy of choice in the cybermarketplace. If our de事实的情况下,那些想预言未来的 人也看不到它们指向不可避免的结 论。其中一些失败是如此荒谬,以 至于几乎难以置信。"

当我们对信息革命的探索受阻时,这必然更多地是由于缺乏想象力而不是缺乏勇气。预测未来一直是一项大胆的企业,这正是激起怀疑心理的原因。也许时间会证明我们的推断完全错了。与诺斯特拉达姆斯不同,我们不假装有预言性的个性。我们不通过在水的碗里搅拌魔杖或占星术来预测未来。我们也不写含义深奥的诗歌。我们的目的是为您提供一种冷静、客观的对重要问题进行分析的方法。

即使看似异端邪说,我们也有义务阐述我们的观点,因为它们可能不会被他人听到。在后期工业社会的封闭思维氛围中,思想不像它们应该在传统媒体中那样自由。

这本书是以建设性的精神编写 的。这是我们合作编写的第三本书, 分析正在发生的重大变革的不同阶 段。像《街头大屠杀》和《大清算》一 样,它是一种思想锻炼。它探讨了工 业社会的死亡以及它在新形式中的 重组。我们预计未来几年会出现惊 人的悖论。一方面,你将见证一种新 形式的自由实现, 即主权个人的出 现。你可以期待看到生产力的几乎 完全解放。同时,我们预计现代主权 国家将会消亡。许多西方人在二十 世纪习惯于接受的平等保证也将随 之消失。我们预计现有的代议制民 主将逐渐式微,被网络市场的新民 主所取代。如果我们的推论正确,未

ductions are correct, the politics of the next century will be much more varied and less important than that to which we have become accustomed.

We are confident that our argument will be easy to follow, notwithstanding the fact that it leads through some territory that is the intellectual equivalent of the backwoods and bad neighborhoods. If our meaning is not entirely intelligible in places, that is not because we are being cute, or using the time-honored equivocation of those who pretend to foretell the future by making cryptic pronouncements. We are not equivocators. If our arguments are unclear, it is because we have failed the task of writing in a way that makes compelling ideas accessible. Unlike many forecasters, we want you to understand and even duplicate our line of thinking. It is based not upon psychic reveries or the gyrations of planets, but upon old-fashioned, ugly logic. For quite logical reasons, we believe that microprocessing will inevitably subvert and destroy the nation-state, creating new forms of social organization in the process. It is both necessary and possible for you to foresee at least some details of the new way of life that may be here sooner than you think.

来世纪的政治将比我们习惯的要更 多样化,也更不重要。

我们有信心说服您接受我们的 论点,尽管有时候会经过某些思维 混乱的地方。如果有些地方不太容 易理解,那并不是因为我们想卖弄, 或者使用掐头去尾的说法来预言未 来。我们不是隐晦不明的人。如果我 们的论点不清晰, 那是因为我们在 书写中没有成功地表达好我们的理 念。与许多预言家不同的是,我们希 望您能够理解并且复制我们的思维 方式。我们的论点是根据老派、丑陋 的逻辑推导而成, 而非凭借心理幻 觉或行星运转。由于一些十分合乎 逻辑的原因, 我们相信微处理将不 可避免地颠覆和摧毁民族国家, 在 此过程中产生新的社会组织形式。 至少可以预见到生活的某些新细节 即将到来,这一点是必要的和可能 的。

1.8.3 讽刺的未来预言

For centuries, the end of this millennium has been seen as a pregnant moment in history. More than 850 years ago, St. Malachy fixed 2000 as the date of the Last Judgment. American psychic Edgar Cayce said in 1934 that the earth would shift on its axis in the year 2000, causing California to split in two and inundating New York City and Japan. A Japanese rocket scientist, Hideo Itokawa, announced in 1980 that the alignment of the planets in a "Grand Cross" on August 18, 1999, would cause widespread environmental devastation, leading to the end of human life on earth.

数百年来,千禧年末日被视为历史上一个充满可能性的时刻。850多年前,圣马拉基预言 2000年是世界末日的日期。1934年,美国通灵者埃德加·凯西称地球会在 2000年转移其轴心,导致加利福尼亚州分裂成两半,淹没纽约市和日本。1980年,日本火箭科学家板川英雄宣布,1999年8月18日行星的"宏伟十字"将引起广泛的环境破坏,导致地球上的人类生命的终结。

Such visions of apocalypse make a plump target for ridicule. After all, the year 2000, while an imposing round number, would appear to be only an arbitrary artifact of the Christian calendar as adopted in the West. Other calendars and dating systems calculate centuries and millennia from different starting points. By the reckoning of the Islamic calendar, for example, A.D. 2000 will be the year 1378. As ordinary按照伊斯兰教历,公元 2000 年将 sounding as a year can be. According to the Chinese calendar, which repeats itself every sixty years, A.D. 2000 is just another year of the dragon. It is part of a continuous cycle that extends millennia into the past. Yet there is more than theological investment in the year 2000. Its importance is undergirded not only by Christian tradition, but by the limitations of mid-century information technology. The so-called Y2K or year 2000 computer problem, a potentially devastating logic flaw in billions of lines of computer code, could approximate apocalyptic conditions by closing down essential elements of industrial society on the millennial midnight. Many computers and microprocessors use software preserved and recycled from the earliest days of computers, when memory space, at \$600,000 per megabyte, was more valuable than gold. To save expensive space, the early programmers tracked dates with only the last two numbers of the year. This convention of employing two-digit date fields was carried over into most software employed in mainframe computers, and even found wide use in personal computers and so-called embedded chips, microprocessors that are used to control almost everything, from VCRs to car ignition systems, security systems, telephones, the switching systems that control the telephone network, process and control systems in factories, power plants, oil refineries, chemical plants, pipelines and much more. Thus, abbreviated into a two-digit field, the year 1999 would be "99." The trouble is what happens when 00 comes up for the year 2000. Many computers will read this as 1900. This may make it impossible for many unremediated computers and other digital devices to recognize the year 2000

这样的末日预言成为嘲笑的目 标。毕竟, 2000年虽然是一个庞大 的圆整数, 但在西方采用的基督教 日历中似乎只是牵强附会的结果。 其他日历和日期计算系统从不同的 起始点计算世纪和千禧年。例如, 是1378年。根据中国的农历,每 60 年重复一次的公元 2000 年只 是龙年的又一年。它是一个延续了 几千年的持续循环的一部分。然而, 2000 年的重要性不仅在于基督教 传统,还在于20世纪信息技术的局 限性。所谓的Y2K或2000年计算 机问题是数十亿行电脑代码中可能 严重的逻辑漏洞, 可以通过关闭千 禧时刻的主要元素来近似末日条件。 许多计算机和微处理器使用了早期 计算机保存和回收的软件, 当时每 兆字节的存储空间价格高达 60 万 美元,比黄金更贵。为了节省昂贵的 空间,早期的程序员只使用年份的 最后两个数字跟踪日期。这个使用 两位数日期字段的约定传承到大型 计算机中使用的大多数软件中, 甚 至在个人计算机和嵌入式芯片中也 得到广泛应用, 微处理器用于控制 几乎所有东西, 从录像机到汽车点 火系统、安全系统、电话、控制电话 网络的交换系统, 在工厂、发电厂、 炼油厂、化工厂、管道和其它众多 设施的处理和控制系统中使用。因 此,缩写成两位数字的1999年将 是"99"年。问题在于00年出现后 会发生什么。许多计算机将把这个 读作 1900 年。这可能使得许多未 进行修复的计算机和其它数字设备

in date fields.

The result will be a massive problem of data corruption that will provide an accidental illustration of a new potential for information warfare. In the Information Age, potential adversaries will be able to wreak havoc by detonating "logic bombs" that sabotage the functions of essential systems by corrupting the data upon which their functioning depends. As a military exercise, for example, you would not need to shoot down an airplane, if you could corrupt data crucial to its safe operation. Data corruption can do almost as much as physical weapons can to thwart the function of a modern society. That this has potentially far-reaching consequences should be obvious on reflection. For example, the Mail of London reported on December 14, 1997, that airlines around the globe were planning to cancel hundreds of flights on January 1, 2000 out of fear that air traffic control systems could fail.19 Potential problems include not only the air traffic systems, but also date-sensitive functions built into the airplanes themselves. According to Boeing, many airplanes will require Y2K remediation. Many devices may have a problem if they try to log an event on an invalid date. The fly-by-wire computer-controlled systems that operate airplanes may malfunction if they are programme在 1900 年进行的,则控制飞机的 to conclude that crucial maintenance was last performed in the year 1900. They many even go into an error loop and shut down.

The potentially lethal feedback effects of a logic time bomb that closes down noncompliant control systems could make the turn of the millennium a memorable date for unpleasant reasons. Remember, you can be affected by many devices that go into an error loop and shut down even if you are lucky enough not to find yourself in midair when the new millennium begins.

You would be well advised to avoid an accident arising from non-Y2K-compliant pacemakers, or simply inebriated millennial revelers, because if the pacemakers shut down, the phone system might also, so the ambulance might never

无法识别日期字段中的2000年。

结果将是大规模的数据损坏问 题, 将提供一个关于信息战新潜力 的意外说明。在信息时代,潜在的对 手将能够通过炸毁破坏其功能的必 须数据的"逻辑炸弹"来制造混乱。 例如,作为一个军事演习,如果你能 破坏关键维护的数据, 就不需要击 落一架飞机了。数据损坏几乎可以 像物理武器一样阻扰现代社会的功 能。这个潜在的影响应该毋庸置疑。 例如,《伦敦邮报》在 1997 年 12 月 14 日报道,全球航空公司计划 取消 2000 年 1 月 1 日的数百个航 班, 因为他们担心空中交通管制系 统可能会失效。潜在的问题不仅包 括空中交通系统, 还包括内置在飞 机本身中的日期敏感功能。据波音 公司称, 许多飞机将需要进行 Y2K 修复。如果设备试图记录无效日期 上的事件可能会出现问题。如果计 算机程序被编程为认为关键维护是 电脑化飞控系统可能会出现故障。 它们可能甚至会进入错误循环并关 闭。

潜在致命的反馈效应可能会关 闭不符合规定的控制系统, 使千年 之交成为一个不愉快的纪念日。要 记住,即使你在新千年开始时没有 置身于空中, 你也可能会受到许多 设备进入错误循环并关闭的影响。

你最好避免因非 Y2K 兼容的 起搏器或醉酒的千禧年狂欢者而发 生事故,因为如果起搏器关闭,电话 系统可能也会关闭, 那么救护车可

come. Unless you live in Brazil or Ukraine, you are used to picking up the telephone or turning on the car phone and automatically getting a dial tone. Happily, you seldom have to concern yourself with the technical details of how the telephone system operates. But it turns out that phone network switches and routers are highly date dependent. All connections are logged to a date and time, which is crucial to calculating call duration for billing. If you happen to make a one-minute call at 11:59:30 on December 31, 1999, and at 12:00:00 the system reads your call as having had a negative duration of more than 99 years, error loops and shutdown are possible. While long-distance companies are spending great sums to upgrade their switches to make them year 2000 compliant, and local service providers presumably are too, if even a few smaller companies fail to comply and go down, the whole network could be affected. You will be lucky to get a dial tone on January 1,2000.

In the words of the Y2K expert Peter de Jager, "If we lose the ability to make a phone call, then we lose everything. We lose electronic fund transfers, we lose trading, we lose branch banking." And the follow-on consequences of Y2K failures could come to more than that.

Today, no one knows how pervasively crucial systems will crash because of the year 2000 problem. Embedded systems that cannot be reprogrammed but must be replaced if nonfunctional on a date-sensitive basis are found in cars, trucks, and buses built after 1976. (Perhaps you won't be in an accident with vehicles driven by persons with noncompliant pacemakers, because their vehicles might not start.) Embedded systems are also widespread in all types of power plants, water and sewage systems, medical devices, military equipment, aircraft, offshore oil platforms, oil tankers, alarm systems, and elevators. While many assemblies of microprocessors perform no date sensitive functions, they

能永远不会来。除非你住在巴西或 乌克兰, 否则你习惯于拿起电话或 打开车载电话自动获得拨号音。令 人高兴的是, 你很少需要关注电话 系统的技术细节。但事实证明,电话 网络交换机和路由器高度依赖日期。 所有连接都记录在日期和时间上, 这对于计算通话持续时间很关键。 如果你在 1999 年 12 月 31 日的 11:59:30 打了一个一分钟电话, 而 在 12:00:00 系统读取你的通话时, 认为它持续时间为负99年以上,那 么错误循环和关闭是可能的。虽然 长途公司正在花费大量资金升级其 交换机以使其符合2000年标准,地 方服务提供商也可能在这样做,但 如果即使有一些较小的公司未能遵 守规定而垮掉,整个网络都可能受 到影响。你很幸运在 2000 年 1 月 1日能听到拨号音。

正如 Y2K 专家彼得·德贾格所说:"如果我们失去打电话的能力,那么我们就失去了一切。我们失去了电子资金转移,失去了交易,失去了分支银行。"

由于 Y2K 问题的后续影响可能更多, 因此目前没有人知道关键系统由于 Y2K 问题会崩溃到什么程度。不能重新编程但必须在日期敏感的基础上更换的嵌入式系统可以在 1976 年之后建造的汽车、卡车和公共汽车中找到。(也许你不会与搭载非符合性心脏起搏器的人开的车辆发生交通事故, 因为他们的车可能无法启动。) 嵌入式系统在各种发电厂、水和污水系统、医疗设备、军用设备、飞机、海上石油

may nonetheless depend upon a clock, which may be Y2K 平台、油轮、报警系统和电梯中也 sensitive, for their internal operations. 很常见。虽然许多微处理器组件不

平台、油轮、报警系统和电梯中也 很常见。虽然许多微处理器组件不 执行日期敏感功能,但它们可能仍 然依赖一个时钟,该时钟可能对其 内部运行敏感于 Y2K 问题。

1.9 MAINFRAMES AND THE Y2K TIME BOMB 大型机和 Y2K 定时炸弹

1.10 Y2K AND THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL Y2K 与核武库