## Taguette highlights: antirequirement

We do not consider it necessary for a CBDC to offer the same degree of anonymity as cash.

**Document:** 2019 - Norges Bank Papers 22019 - Central bank dig **Tags:** anti-requirement

Techniques to achieve cash-like privacy are immature. They have limited deployments, none of which comply with know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) regulations. Their risks include hidden vulnerabilities, a lack of scalability and complicated operations.

**Document:** bankofcanada.ca-Privacy in CBDC technology.pdf **Tags:** anti-requirement

Finally, we conclude that a central bank will not issue cryptocurrencies in the sense of a truly decentralized and permissionless asset that allows users to remain anonymous.

**Document:** Berentsen and Schar - 2018 - The Case for Central **Tags:** anti-requirement

Yet full anonymity is not plausible, as central banks would design CBDC systems to meet anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism requirements (along with any other regulatory expectations or disclosure laws) (Group of central banks (2020)).

**Document:** CBDC - System design and interoperability .pdf **Tags:** anti-requirement

We make an implicit assumption that CBDCs would most likely be offered with tools to minimise criminal usage and money laundering risks ie less anonymous than cash, operating via intermediaries.

**Document:** cbdc- user needs and adoption.pdf **Tags:** anti-requirement

That said, compared with the current situation, a non-anonymous CBDC could allow for digital records and traces, which could improve the application of rules aimed at AML/CFT.

**Document:** Cœuré and Loh - Central bank digital currencies.p **Tags:** anti-requirement

Full anonymity is not plausible.

**Document:** Cœuré et al. - 2020 - Central bank digital curren **Tags:** antirequirement

While a degree of privacy is a core attribute of money, it would almost certainly be unacceptable for a CBDC to provide a cash-like degree of anonymity.

**Document:** Contingency Planning for a Central Bank Digital Cu **Tags:** anti-requirement

Cash-like anonymity would not be a policy objective because such a CBDC would be extensively used in il icit activity and would not respect antimoney laundering regulations.

**Document:** Contingency Planning for a Central Bank Digital Cu **Tags:** anti-requirement

CBDC would necessarily be less inclusive, less crisisproof and less anonymous (for better or worse) compared to physical currency (cash).

**Document:** digitalization\_mop\_ q4\_19-screen-4.pdf **Tags:** anti-requirement

However, it is difficult, if not impossible, for online transactions with a CBDC or any electronic means of payment to replicate the same level of privacy offered by a cash transaction

**Document:** Jiang - CBDC adoption and usage some insights from **Tags:** anti-requirement

However, true anonymity for any digital form of money will

be very difficult to achieve and most of the existing CBDC solutions could be regarded

"pseudo-anonymous" at best

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