

S A L U S S E C U R I T Y

D E C 2 0 2 5



CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

M E G M A F I N A N C E

Overview

Project Summary

- Name: MagmaFinanceIO - Magma token
- Platform: Sui Network
- Language: Move
- Repository:
 - https://github.com/MagmaFinanceIO/magma_token
- Audit Scope: See [Appendix - 1](#)

Project Dashboard

Application Summary

Name	MagmaFinanceIO - Magma token
Version	v2
Type	Move
Date	Dec 11 2024
Logs	Dec 11 2024; Dec 11 2024

Vulnerability Summary

Total High-Severity issues	0
Total Medium-Severity issues	0
Total Low-Severity issues	1
Total informational issues	0
Total	1

Contact

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Risk Level Description

High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth.

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Introduction

1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (<https://t.me/salusec>), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Findings

2.1 Summary of Findings

ID	Title	Severity	Category	Status
1	Centralization risk	Low	Centralization	Acknowledged

2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

1. Centralization risk

Severity: Low

Category: Centralization

Target:

- sources/magma.move

Description

The `magma_token::magma` module grants a single privileged account – the holder of the `TreasuryCap<MAGMA>` object (initially `ctx.sender()` in `init()`) – full control over minting new `MAGMA` tokens. If the deployer's private key is compromised, an attacker can arbitrarily mint an unbounded supply of `MAGMA`, dilute existing holders, and potentially disrupt any downstream protocols that integrate `MAGMA` as a utility or collateral asset. If the privileged accounts are plain EOA accounts, this can be worrisome and pose a risk to the other users.

Recommendation

It is recommended to transfer tokens to a multi-sig account and promote transparency by providing a breakdown of the intended initial token distribution in a public location.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team. The team stated that the TreasuryCap privileged address will be destroyed after the minting process is completed.

2.3 Informational Findings

No informational issues were found.

Appendix

Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following files in commit [d30e875](#):

File	SHA-1 hash
magma.move	4b49ad92ff338bc25520529223377b9196bf4726