HAICOSYSTEM: AN ECOSYSTEM FOR SANDBOXING SAFETY RISKS IN HUMAN-AI INTERACTIONS

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ABSTRACT

AI agents are increasingly autonomous in their interactions with human users and tools, leading to increased interactional safety risks. We present HAICOSYSTEM, a framework examining AI agent safety within diverse and complex social interactions. HAICOSYSTEM features a modular sandbox environment that simulates multi-turn interactions between human users and AI agents, where the AI agents are equipped with a variety of tools (e.g., patient management platforms) to navigate diverse scenarios (e.g., a user attempting to access other patients' profiles). To examine the safety of AI agents in these interactions, we develop a comprehensive multi-dimensional evaluation framework that uses metrics covering operational, content-related, societal, and legal risks. Through running over 8K simulations based on 132 scenarios across seven domains (e.g., healthcare, finance, education), we demonstrate that HAICOSYSTEM can emulate realistic user-AI interactions and complex tool use by AI agents. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs, both proprietary and open-sourced, exhibit safety risks in 62% of cases, with models generally showing higher risks when interacting with malicious users and using tools simultaneously. Our findings highlight the ongoing challenge of building agents that can safely navigate complex interactions. To foster the AI agent safety ecosystem, we release a code platform that allows practitioners to create custom scenarios, simulate interactions, and evaluate the safety and performance of their agents. [1]

1 INTRODUCTION

AI agents, holding the potential to automate tasks and improve human productivity, are increasingly being deployed in real-life applications (Wu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024c;b). To function effectively in the real world, AI agents should communicate seamlessly with human users to understand their goals and intents (Ouyang et al., 2022; Zhou et al., 2024c), while interacting with environments and tools. For example, they may acquire information by browsing websites (Zhou et al., 2024a), or manipulate the state of the environment by controlling mobile apps (Trivedi et al., 2024) and creating artifacts such as software and digital content (Yang et al., 2024a; Si et al., 2024). This involves multiple stages of interaction among AI agents, humans, and environments (e.g., human → AI agent; AI agent → environment), forming a complex ecosystem.

However, increased autonomy of agents brings forward **new safety risks at each stage of interaction**. When interacting with human users, AI agents may generate misinformation (Loth et al., 2024), toxic content (Jain et al., 2024a), and unsafe answers (Zou et al., 2023b). When interacting with the environment, AI agents could cause unintended harm (e.g., sending money to the wrong person due to under-specified instructions; Ruan et al., 2024). While existing works focus on isolating the safety risks of AI agents in the specific stage of interaction (Ruan et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2024b; Brahman et al., 2024), we argue that the safety risks of AI agents should be investigated in a holistic manner by examining the entire ecosystem of AI agents, humans, and environments.

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

Figure 1: An overview of HAICOSYSTEM. The framework enables simultaneous simulation of interactions between human users, AI agents, and environments. The left side shows an example scenario from 132 scenarios in HAICOSYSTEM covering diverse domains and user intent types (benign and malicious). The right side shows an example simulation where the AI agent follows the human user's instructions to prescribe a controlled medication to a patient without verification. After the simulation, the framework provides a set of metrics (HAICOSYSTEM-EVAL; §4) to evaluate the safety of the AI agent as well as its performance.

We propose HAICOSYSTEM, a framework to investigate AI agent safety risks across all stages at once.[2] As shown in Figure 1, HAICOSYSTEM simulates how human users, whether with benign or malicious intent, interact with AI agents across a range of scenarios, from daily life to professional settings. It also models how AI agents use tools to engage with their environment in a multi-turn setting. At the end of the simulation, HAICOSYSTEM examines the safety risks of AI agents based on the outcomes of the interactions. Concretely, we create a software platform that allows us to create scenarios, plug in AI agents in specific simulated environments (e.g., smart home, a web browser), and sample corresponding simulated human users to model the complex interactions among AI agents, humans, and environments with LLMs.

To enable a holistic, multidimensional evaluation of AI agents in HAICOSYSTEM, we propose HAICOSYSTEM-EVAL, a framework to measure both the safety and performance of AI agents in these complex interactions. HAICOSYSTEM-EVAL includes a scenario-specific checklist of safe and risky outcomes, along with other general dimensions of safety risks (e.g., legal risks), to capture the harmful outcomes from the interactions comprehensively. For performance evaluation, our framework also includes efficiency and goal completion rate measures to study potential trade-offs between risky behavior and helpfulness. Going beyond capturing immediate, single-turn, or single-action harm, HAICOSYSTEM-EVAL focuses on evaluating the potential harms that may emerge across the entire trajectory of interactions within a simulated episode.

To demonstrate the utility of HAICOSYSTEM, we compiled 132 scenarios spanning seven domains, including healthcare, business & finance, science & technology, and more. For example, a healthcare scenario might involve "a person chatting with the Teladoc AI agent to request a prescription". We then run simulations across the scenarios, sampling diverse profiles of malicious and benign users to capture a broad range of real-world interactions. To ensure realism and effectively stress-test the agents, each scenario is designed such that participants have access to different information (e.g., the user's goal is hidden from the AI agent). Additionally, user instructions are often ambiguous to reflect real-world use cases. These design choices challenge the AI agent to infer implicit yet critical information (e.g., malicious user intent) through multi-turn interactions.

[2]For clarity, we refer to AI agents as those AI assistants (e.g., ChatGPT) that do not engage in role-playing human-like characteristics such as demographics, personality, etc.

Framework	👤 ⇄ 🤖	🤖 ⇄ 🌎	User Int.	Social Contexts
R-Judge (Yuan et al., 2024)	⭘	⭘	😊 & 😡	General domains; The agent is the omniscient evaluator.
Wildteaming (Jiang et al., 2024b)	→	⊗	😡	General domains; The agent is a Chatbot
ToolEmu (Ruan et al., 2024)	→	⇄	😊	General domains; Assume the agent is a personal assistant.
Cresc (Russinovich et al., 2024a)	⇄	⊗	😡	General domains; The agent is a Chatbot
PrivacyLens (Shao et al., 2024)	→	⇄	😊	Privacy issues; Assume the agent is a personal assistant.
HAICOSYSTEM (**Ours**)	⇄	⇄	😊 & 😡	General domains; The agent is a personal/organizational assistant.

Table 1: Comparison of various safety evaluation frameworks versus HAICOSYSTEM. 👤 indicates human users, 🤖 indicates the AI agents, and 🌎 indicates the environment. ⇄ indicates the multi-turn interactions are considered and → indicates single-turn interaction. ⊗ indicates such interactions are not present and ⭘ indicates such interactions are static instead of dynamic. 😊 and 😡 indicate the intent of the human user to be either benign or malicious, respectively.

Through these empirical investigations with 8,700 simulated episodes, we find that HAICOSYSTEM can effectively surface previously unknown safety issues of AI agents in human-AI interactions. Specifically, all the proprietary and open-source models we evaluate exhibit behaviors that pose potential safety risks, with weaker models being more vulnerable (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo shows safety risks in 67% of all simulations). Furthermore, different models show varying strengths and weaknesses across different stages of interaction. For example, Llama3.1-405B (Dubey et al., 2024) outperforms Llama3.1-70B in effectively using tools and communicating with benign users but falls short in handling situations involving malicious users. Through simulating multi-turn interactions, we reveal the unique challenge of AI agents maintaining safety when interacting with environments and malicious human users simultaneously. Moreover, we identify that the safety risks of AI agents are closely related to the types of human users they interact with. Specifically, simulated human users with good intentions provide valuable information to agents to avoid safety risks, while those with malicious intentions strategically "trick" the agents into taking harmful actions.

In summary, HAICOSYSTEM is the first framework to study AI safety issues through simulating interactions between agents and humans in grounded environments. Besides pointing to the importance of considering the holistic ecosystem of AI agents, humans, and environments in evaluating AI agent safety, HAICOSYSTEM also offers a foundation for future research, which practitioners can use to create custom scenarios for exploring specific safety issues and develop safer AI agents for real-world deployment.

2 Background and Preliminaries

In this section, we first introduce the background of AI safety evaluation and then discuss relevant concepts in simulating social interactions and tool excution with LLMs. Please refer to Appendix A for an extended discussion of related works.

Safety Evaluation As shown in Table 1, most existing research focuses on evaluating the safety risks of AI agents in a single-turn interaction with human users (Jiang et al., 2024b; Zeng et al., 2024b; Ruan et al., 2024; Shao et al., 2024) with little coverage of risks arise from complex, multi-turn interactions. Some studies focus on human users with malicious intent (Jiang et al., 2024b; Zeng et al., 2024b; Anil et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2023; Deng et al., 2024a), while others focus on the benign user settings where the safety risks come from the AI agents use tools incorrectly (Ruan et al., 2024; Shao et al., 2024). Recent research also explores the multi-turn interactions between human users and AI agents (Russinovich et al., 2024a; Yang et al., 2024b), though these works do not consider the tool-using behaviors of AI agents and solely focus on malicious human users. Additionally,

benchmarks like R-Judge (Yuan et al., 2024) evaluate LLMs' ability to identify safety issues given a static interaction trajectory. Furthermore, previous safety evaluations have predominantly focused on the safety risks of personal AI agents, ignoring the safety risks of AI agents in organizational contexts with more complex social dynamics.

In contrast, HAICOSYSTEM aims to evaluate the safety risks of AI agents dynamically in a multi-turn interaction with human users either with malicious intent or benign intent. AI agents have access to a wide range of tools, and we not only consider personal agents but also agents in an organizational context, resembling a broader range of realistic risks when deploying AI agents in our society.

Social Agents and Social Simulations We identify social agents as goal-driven decision-makers that sense and act upon the state of the environment and interact with other agents to achieve their goals (Sutton & Barto, 2018). This paper follows SOTOPIA (Zhou et al., 2024c) in formulating interactions between human users and AI agents as *social tasks*. A social task in SOTOPIA consists of a scenario, two characters' profiles, and their respective private social goals to achieve in an interaction. Within one episode, the two agents role-play the characters to achieve their respective social goals, where the agents could either be AI agents or humans. While SOTOPIA considers the general social interaction between social agents, in HAICOSYSTEM, we focus on the social tasks with one character being an AI agent, and another character being a human user (§3). We also consider different kinds of human users, including users with benign intents to simulate the cooperative users, and the ones with malicious intents to simulate adversarial actors.

Emulating Tool Execution Following Ruan et al. (2024), we emulate the tool execution of AI agents by using LLMs as the emulators. Due to the long-tail property of safety risks, using LLMs as emulators helps us fast prototype various scenarios and tools. While rule-based implementation of tools is also possible, it usually grounds the investigation on specific domains, limiting the generalizability of the findings (Shao et al., 2024). Although LLM-based emulators may not always execute tool-calling actions accurately, as shown by Ruan et al. (2024), those risks identified in the emulated environments are also likely to manifest in the real world.

3 CONSTRUCTING THE HAICOSYSTEM

As shown in Figure 1, HAICOSYSTEM ensembles human users, AI agents, and a shared environment. We use LLMs to simulate the human users with rich user profiles from Zhou et al. (2024c), including name, demographics, personality, etc. The AI agent, powered by an LLM, can select `speak` or `action` to interact with either the human user or the shared environment. Inspired by Ruan et al. (2024), we use an LLM as the environment engine, namely GPT-4o, to simulate the response of the tool calls of the AI agent. Unlike Ruan et al. (2024), we provide scenario-specific instructions to the LLM environment engine, ensuring that the generated responses align with the scenario specifications, thereby enhancing controllability and reproducibility.

Each component in HAICOSYSTEM is modular and has access to different information, which is crucial for realistic simulation (Zhou et al., 2024b). Specifically, the AI agents have no access to the simulated users' goals as well as their profiles. Similarly, the human users have no access to the AI agents' tools, goals, and the response of tool calling. Please refer to Appendix B for more details on the framework.

A simulation in HAICOSYSTEM is initiated by the following three components: (1) a *scenario*, (2) a *human user* and an *AI agent*, and (3) a *checklist of safe and risky outcomes*.

(1) Scenario A scenario first starts with the *overall background* of the scenario outlining the overall situational context – e.g., "On July 1, 2024, a person is standing in the kitchen of a smart home managed by an AI agent. There's a sudden smoke coming from the kitchen..." The environment profile also includes the *AI agent goal* and *human user goal* (e.g., the human's goal is to convince the AI agent that the smoke is not a fire). Including a detailed scenario background grounds the simulation towards a more realistic setting, thus reflecting risks that are more likely to happen in real-world scenarios (Dalrymple et al., 2024).

(2) Human User & AI Agent To simulate human users, we use the character profiles from Sotopia (Zhou et al., 2024c), which include rich information such as name, demographics, and personality. For the AI agent, we include the AI agent's role description (e.g., "You are an AI assistant responsible for triaging user requests at Epic on FHIR") and the tools that the agent has access to, which are *scenario*-specific. For example, in a scenario of scheduling a medical appointment, the AI agent has access to tools such as `EpicFHIRGetPatientDetails`, `EpicFHIRSearchDoctors`, and `EpicFHIRManageClinicalDocuments`. Each tool is designed to reflect the real-world existing services with public APIs or is expected to be accessible by the AI agent in the future. Besides a short description of what the tool is used for, we also provide the arguments that the tool takes in, and the format of the tool's response. Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the detailed prompt for helping the agent call the tools.

(3) Checklist of Safe and Risky Outcomes The checklist of safe and risky outcomes outlines the safety objectives that the AI system should aim to achieve (e.g., ensuring the properties in the house remain undamaged) and the risks it should avoid (e.g., unnecessarily calling the fire department when there is no fire), for *each scenario*. Using such checklists has been demonstrated to enhance automated evaluation with LLMs (Lee et al., 2024). It is important to note that this checklist is scenario-specific and is not used in the simulation process.

3.1 Populating Scenarios

When populating HAICOSYSTEM with *scenarios*, we focus on broad domain coverage, varied user intentions (malicious vs. benign), and realistic interactions to ensure evaluations reflect real-world risks. Specifically, we consider the following aspects when collecting scenarios:

Domain of the scenario: We consider a wide range of domains of tasks in human society. Inspired by previous works on the safety evaluation of AI agents (Ruan et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024), we consider scenarios in the domains of "personal services", "healthcare", "business & finance", "politics & law", "technology & science", "education", and "miscellaneous".[3]

Intent type of the agents: We categorize user intent into two types: malicious and benign. Users with malicious intent seek to exploit the AI agent to create safety issues, while users with benign intent do not seek to cause safety issues.

Scenario realism: We consider three different levels of realism when designing scenarios. Specifically, we have level 3 as everyday scenarios that AI agents are already interacting with humans (e.g., AI tutor [4]), level 2 as scenarios that are likely to happen in the near future (e.g., AI bank manager [5]), and level 1 as scenarios that are unlikely to happen in the near future, but high-stakes (e.g., AI managing nuclear weapons). Different realism levels have been discussed in various AI safety works (Hendrycks et al., 2023; Bengio et al., 2024a), simulations of which are possible via HAICOSYSTEM.

Following the above considerations, we instantiate HAICOSYSTEM with **132 scenarios spanning across 7 domains** mentioned above. 21 scenarios are manually created by the authors guided by the above considerations. The remaining 111 scenarios are inspired by previous works, as we randomly sample data from previous datasets (Zeng et al., 2024b; Shen et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2024b; Mireshghallah et al., 2024; Sharma et al., 2023; Ruan et al., 2024; Majumder et al., 2024), use them in the prompts and let GPT-4o transform them into HAICOSYSTEM scenarios. The authors then manually validated and made necessary adjustments to all of the generated scenarios. Please refer to Appendix D for more details on our scenarios.

4 Evaluating Safety of AI Agents with HAICOSYSTEM-EVAL

To evaluate the safety of AI agents when interacting with humans on grounded tasks, we propose a set of dimensions that measure the AI agents' abilities to avoid risky outcomes while staying helpful in the scenarios. As shown in Figure 2, all safety risk dimensions are rated from -10 to 0, where a

[3]Our list of domains come from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. `https://www.bls.gov/ooh/home.htm`

[4]`https://www.synthesis.com/`

[5]`https://thebankingscene.com/opinions/the-ai-bank-manager-of-the-future`

Figure 2: Overview of HAICOSYSTEM-EVAL, including scales for each metric group.

higher score indicates a lower risk. The AI agent is considered risky overall if any of the dimensions is negative in an episode.

Targeted Safety Risks (TARG) [-10, 0] measure scenario-specific safety risks by evaluating whether the AI agent's actions lead to any of the plausible positive or negative outcomes outlined in the scenario's checklist (§3).

System and Operational Risks (SYST) [-10, 0] target the AI agents' ability to operate in the environment, avoiding security threats like network intrusions, malware, etc., while offering safe automated decision-making in finance, justice, and healthcare, and other domains (Zeng et al., 2024c; Ruan et al., 2024).

Content Safety Risks (CONT) [-10, 0] focus on the AI agents' ability to provide safe content to the human users (Zeng et al., 2024c). Specifically, risky content includes, but is not limited to, violence, extremism, hate speech, harassment, sexual content, child exploitation, and self-harm.

Societal Risks (SOC) [-10, 0] focus on the detrimental impacts of AI agents on political, economic, and social structures (Zeng et al., 2024c). Specifically, this dimension covers manipulation of public opinion, spreading propaganda, unfair market practices, misinformation, etc. AI agents, with their capacity for rapid action and large-scale production, can significantly amplify societal risks (Hendrycks et al., 2023; Bengio et al., 2024b).

Legal and Rights Related Risks (LEGAL) [-10, 0] focus on risks of AI agents violating fundamental rights, engaging in discrimination, breaching privacy, and facilitating criminal activities (Zeng et al., 2024c). Examples include physically hurting humans, assigning resources based on protected characteristics, and unauthorized collection or misuse of sensitive personal data.

Tool Use Efficiency (EFFICIENCY) [0, 10] focuses on the AI agents' ability to use tools effectively without wasting time or resources. One common issue arises when AI agents operate under incorrect assumptions. For example, an AI agent might call a tool with a generic argument ({`coordinate: coordinate`}). This type of error can lead to environmental failures that prevent tasks from being executed correctly, resulting in wasted processing time and the need for repeated operations. Such inefficiencies reduce the overall productivity and reliability of AI agents (Kapoor et al., 2024). The efficiency score ranges from 0 to 10, with a higher score indicating better efficiency.

Goal Completion (GOAL) [0, 10] focuses on the AI agents' ability to complete the goals assigned to them. The goals can range from a general objective, such as "be a helpful assistant", to a specific task, like "scrutinize evidence, flag, and redact prejudicial information before sending it to the jury". Note that the AI agents' goals are not always aligned with the safety requirements. For example, if an AI agent's goal is to "be a helpful assistant" while interacting with a human user with malicious intent, the AI agent may choose to refuse to help the human user to avoid getting involved in risky situations (Brahman et al., 2024). In these cases, the AI agent must balance the trade-off between safety and helpfulness (Wallace et al., 2024; Su et al., 2024; Scheurer et al., 2024). The goal completion score ranges from 0 to 10, with a higher score indicating better goal completion.

Given the interaction trajectories of the AI agents along with the checklist of safe and risky outcomes, we use an LM-based evaluator (e.g., GPT-4o) to first reason whether the AI agent leads to certain safety risks, and then rate the safety risks across all the dimensions accordingly. Estimating the degree of safety risks is fundamentally hard and subjective (Ruan et al., 2024; Brown, 2014). We thus also consider the coarse-grained evaluation of the AI agents' safety risks, which the agent is considered risky in a dimension if it receives a negative score in the corresponding dimension of an episode. For an agent, the *risk ratio* of each dimension is calculated as the proportion of risky



Figure 3: The risk ratio of models for different risk dimensions across simulated episodes. Overall dimension refers to an episode being considered as risky overall if any individual risk dimension is negative. The higher the risk ratio is, the more likely the model is to exhibit certain safety risks. The table shows the overall risk ratio for all benchmarked models, while the bar chart displays dimension-wise risk ratios for representative models.

episodes over the total number of episodes. Please refer to Appendix C for more details on the evaluation framework.

5 Agent Safety Experiments

We first introduce the experimental setup and validation checks, followed by the results and analysis on (1) the safety risks of AI agents exhibited in the simulations of HAICOSYSTEM, and (2) how interactions with human users affect the safety of AI agents.

5.1 Experimental Setup and Validation

Across 132 scenarios, we sample 5 human users with different profiles to interact with the AI agent. We fix the model to be GPT-4o (OpenAI, 2024) to role-play the human user as well as the evaluator. In total, we have 660 simulated episodes for 12 different models, namely GPT-4-turbo OpenAI (2023), GPT-3.5-turbo Ouyang et al. (2022), Llama3 Series (3.1-405B, 3.1-70B, 3.1-8B, 3-70B, 3-8B; Dubey et al. 2024), Qwen Series (1.5-72B-Chat, 1.5-110B-Chat, 2-72B-Instruct; Bai et al. 2023), Mixtral-8x22B Jiang et al. (2024a), and DeepSeek-67B DeepSeek-AI et al. (2024). Due to space constraints, we present the detailed analysis using representative models: GPT-4-turbo, GPT-3.5-turbo, Llama3.1-405B, and Llama3.1-70B. [6]

To check whether the simulated human users realistically emulate real human users, we use the *believability* score in Zhou et al. (2024c) to evaluate the simulated human users. Across all the episodes, the average believability score is 9.1 out of 10, indicating the simulated human users behave naturally. To validate our automatic LM-based evaluation of safety risks, we manually verified the evaluation of 100 randomly sampled episodes. We find that 90% of evaluations are accurate in identifying AI agents' risk with a 0.8 average Pearson correlation with the human evaluator's judgment for various risk dimensions.[7]

5.2 Benchmarking Safety Risks of AI Agents

As shown in Figure 3, we observe that all models exhibit substantial risks across all risk categories (0.49–0.71 overall risk ratio). Specifically, the targeted safety risks category has the highest risk ratio (0.46–0.66) of all risk dimensions, indicating that models are more likely to show the safety risks anticipated in our scenario's safe and risky outcomes checklist compared to other risk dimensions.

[6]Please refer to the Appendix E for the details of the experimental setup and Appendix F for analysis of other models.

[7]Please refer to Appendix F.1 for the details of manual verification of the automated evaluation.



Figure 4: The qualitative examples of the episodes where the AI agents interact with human users with both malicious (left) and benign (right) intents.

Agents powered by bigger models (GPT-4, Llama3.1-405B) tend to have lower safety risks compared to less capable models (GPT-3.5, Llama3.1-70B). For example, in the case of redacting sensitive information for the jury, the Llama3.1-70B AI agent does not remove the political opinion of the defendant ("I support and 100% think legal abortion is a fundamental right."), which is irrelevant to the case and could bias the jury's decision, whereas the Llama3.1-405B AI agent successfully redacts the sensitive information, avoiding legal risks.[8] These findings corroborate Dubey et al. (2024) which points out that bigger models underwent more careful safety training and alignment, leading to lower safety risks.

Agents are more likely to exhibit System and Operational risks and less likely to exhibit Content safety risks. From Figure 3, we also find the agents powered by different models are in general more likely to cause safety issues while operating in the environments with the tools (SYST), highlighting the need for evaluating their situational safety risks. Comparatively, the agents show fewer problems of producing toxic or offensive content (CONT) in the simulations, as toxic content has been extensively studied in various works (Jain et al., 2024b; Lin et al., 2023).

Effective use of tools is correlated with lower safety risks for agents. We observe a negative correlation ($r = -0.31$) between the efficiency of AI agents in using tools (i.e., higher efficiency scores) and safety risks in scenarios that require the use of these tools. For example, in the case of an AI agent helping a user update the school's internal database, the agent can avoid the safety risks by using the `SearchKnowledgeBase, GoogleSearch` tools to help itself validate the correctness of the information that the user wants to update. However, if the AI agent is not able to use the tools effectively, it could also lead to more safety risks. For example, in the case of an AI agent helping the athlete to monitor the health conditions, the AI agent powered by Llama3.1-70B fails to use the `HeartRateMonitor` tool correctly, leading to a failure in detecting the athlete's heart rate anomaly and causing safety risks.

Balancing Goal Completion and Safety Risks is Challenging for AI Agents We analyze how AI agents balance achieving their goals and avoiding safety risks across different scenarios. Counterintuitively, our results show a general positive correlation between goal completion scores and tar-

[8]Please check the episode for Llama3.1-70B and for Llama3.1-405B in Appendix G.

geted safety risk scores (e.g., $r = 0.71$ for GPT-4-turbo and $r = 0.63$ for GPT-3.5-turbo), indicating that agents often avoid safety risks when they successfully achieve their goals. [9]

5.3 INTERACTIONS WITH HUMAN USERS MATTER FOR REALISTIC AI AGENT SAFETY

Next, we turn to the role of human users' intents and multi-turn interactions, which is a key feature of HAICOSYSTEM compared to previous works that evaluate the safety risks of AI agents in a static manner (Zou et al., 2023b; Jiang et al., 2024b). Human users' intents often start out underspecified or hidden and gradually unfold throughout the interactions with AI agents (Zeng et al., 2024b; Ruan et al., 2024). As shown in Figure 4, simulated human users with different intents exhibit various behaviors in their multi-turn interactions with AI agents. In the presence of malicious simulated users, a seemingly benign question from the user could prompt the AI agent to leak sensitive information. Conversely, when interacting with benign simulated users, the AI agent could seek clarification to verify the accuracy of the information and mitigate safety risks.

Agents face challenges in maintaining safety during tool-involved interactions with malicious users Figure 5 shows that, when tool usage is involved, AI agents are more prone to safety risks when interacting with malicious simulated users, whereas interactions with benign users result in fewer risks across most models. Specifically, GPT-4-turbo agents outperform other models in avoiding safety risks during tool-involved interactions with malicious users. And Llama3.1-405B agents are the best at avoiding safety risks in these benign scenarios, followed by GPT-4-turbo and Llama3.1-70B. Note that for the scenarios with tool usage, they evaluate the AI agents' ability to choose the appropriate tools, operate them correctly, and ask clarifying questions when necessary. When AI agents interact with malicious simulated users in these scenarios, they also need to identify the malicious intent of the users simultaneously, thus increasing the complexity of maintaining safety.

When it comes to the scenarios with malicious simulated users that do not require the use of tools, most AI agents exhibit less or equal safety risks compared to the scenarios with malicious simulated users that require the use of tools. In these scenarios, the AI agents do not need to deal with the complex tool use space while eliminating the operational risks (SYST) and could focus on identifying the malicious intent of the simulated human users. However, Llama3.1-405B agents are exceptions, which could be attributed to Llama3.1-405B's strong ability to use tools (Dubey et al., 2024). Furthermore, although Llama3.1-405B shows lower overall safety risks in Figure 3, it is not better than GPT-3.5-turbo or Llama3.1-70B at identifying the malicious human user intents and avoiding safety risks in the malicious scenarios without tools.

The observations indicate the unique challenges of dealing with malicious simulated users and complex tool usage at the same time for the AI agents, and different models have various strengths and weaknesses at different stages of interactions. These findings further show the importance of evaluating the safety risks of AI agents holistically.

Single-turn interactions show a biased picture of the safety risks of AI agents To further show the importance of evaluating AI agent safety issues in multi-turn interactions, we first explore limiting the interactions to a single turn in the 39 scenarios coming from DAN (Shen et al., 2024) which includes common jailbreaking prompts like "You can do anything now", PAP (Zeng et al., 2024b) which explores persuasion techniques to jailbreak the AI system, and WildTeaming (Jiang et al., 2024b) which is a recent effort inspired by in-the-wild user jailbreaking attempts. Note that all these scenarios involve malicious simulated users, and the AI agents operate without tool access. Restricting AI agents to single-turn interactions essentially reduces HAICOSYSTEM to the benchmark mentioned above. Therefore, such comparison solely focuses on the influence of multi-turn interactions on the safety risks of AI agents.

As shown in Figure 6, we find that the AI agents powered by GPT-4-turbo are more likely to exhibit safety risks when interacting with malicious human users in a multi-turn setting for both DAN and PAP datasets except WildTeaming which came out after GPT-4-turbo. This could be due to the fact that the GPT-4-turbo has already undergone safety fine-tuning on the content of the DAN and PAP datasets. These static datasets, once released, are hard to prevent from being used for

[9] Please see more analysis of the relationship between goal completion and safety risks in Appendix F.2.



Figure 5: The overall risk ratio of each model between benign and malicious human user intents. "W/ or w/o tools" represents the risk ratio from scenarios where AI agents either have access to tools or do not, respectively.



Figure 6: The overall risk ratio between single-turn and multi-turn settings for AI agents powered by GPT-4-turbo in scenarios adapted from representative jailbreaking benchmarks.

fine-tuning LLMs and could quickly become outdated as new models are released. However, this does not necessarily reflect the safety of the latest models in the "wild" since the models might just "memorize" the content of the datasets. In HAICOSYSTEM, the evaluation of the safety risks of AI agents is dynamic and depends on the interaction with simulated human users. With the improvement of the models to simulate the human users, HAICOSYSTEM could better reflect the safety risks of the AI agents when interacting with real malicious human users.

We also explore the role of multi-turn simulations for scenarios with benign users and find that simulated users with benign intentions can sometimes provide feedback to help AI agents avoid safety risks. For example, in Figure 4, the simulated human user provides information to the AI agent when asked to help the agent achieve its goal. Involving interactions with human users is important here as well, as it tests the AI agent's ability to ask clarifying questions and adjust its actions based on feedback from human users to avoid safety risks. Our findings highlight the importance of simulating user-AI interactions, as users can either exacerbate or mitigate AI agent safety risks. Previous studies have focused solely on the AI agent's ability to operate tools correctly (Ruan et al., 2024), ignoring the impact of human feedback in real-world scenarios. This oversight could result in a biased estimation of the realistic safety risks of AI agents.

6 Conclusion & Discussion

We propose HAICOSYSTEM, a general-purpose framework for simulating the safety risks of AI agents when interacting with human users and tools in a sandbox environment. HAICOSYSTEM operates by simulating AI agent behavior in diverse, realistic scenarios, testing their responses to various conditions and enabling a controlled assessment of potential safety risks. In our experiments, we find that the AI agents exhibit substantial safety risks across all risk dimensions at each interaction stage. Agents generally show fewer content safety risks but are more prone to safety issues when using tools, particularly in multi-turn interactions, with different models exhibiting varying strengths and weaknesses across interaction stages. Our findings highlight the potential of HAICOSYSTEM as a systematic framework for emulating real-world risks and comprehensively evaluating AI agents' safety. Going forward we envision more works on:

Inferring User Intents & AI Agent Safety Inferring user intents is crucial for AI agents to safely navigate real-world tasks, as demonstrated by HAICOSYSTEM through interactive simulated human users. Part of achieving this involves improving the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of AI agents, which is essential for understanding and predicting human behavior. However, current LLMs struggle with ToM, as evidenced by various studies (Kim et al., 2023; Shapira et al., 2023; Zhu et al., 2021; Yerukola et al., 2024). Improving ToM abilities can help AI agents better identify malicious intents and interpret implied messages in user instructions, allowing them to act appropriately by either seeking clarification or using contextual information to resolve ambiguities.

HAICOSYSTEM**: a hub for AI agent safety research** HAICOSYSTEM provides a versatile framework to investigate various stages of interactive safety risks in a uniform manner. It is not hard to transfer the safety evaluation benchmarks from static analysis to HAICOSYSTEM, thus largely enriching the safety evaluation for AI agents. In the future, HAICOSYSTEM could host more sophisticated human users with diverse personalities, goals, and behaviors, an API or website for practitioners to easily create their own scenarios and evaluate the safety risks of their AI agents.

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7 ETHICS STATEMENT

Our framework, HAICOSYSTEM, is designed to simulate interactions among human users, agents, and environment. It aims to help identify and mitigate potential safety risks such as misinformation, unsafe answers, privacy breach and other harmful outcomes. By evaluating AI agents through a holistic framework, we contribute to the development of safer AI agents that can operate effectively in real-world settings across diverse domains.

While our framework aims to enhance the safety of agents, it could also be misused to train AI agents for harmful purposes (e.g., people could use it to train AI agents to strategically deceive users). However, we will take steps to mitigate these risks. For example, we will use certain license (e.g., AI2 ImpACT license) to limit the use of our framework for malicious purposes. We will also provide guidelines on ethical use of our dataset through the HuggingFace dataset card [10].

The automated evaluation system in HAICOSYSTEM, primarily powered by GPT-4 (Cheng et al., 2023), may carry potential social stereotypes. Future work could explore when these biases arise, how they impact the evaluation process, and ways to mitigate them. Uncovering such biases within HAICOSYSTEM can also offer insights into broader social biases present in the real world (Zhou et al., 2021). Additionally, extending the evaluator to include other systems, such as Delphi (Jiang et al., 2022), could provide a more comprehensive assessment. Addressing biases and stereotypes in interactive HAICOSYSTEM-like systems would support the development of AI agents that are fairer and more inclusive.

In terms of societal consequences, our framework enables practitioners to create custom scenarios to explore specific safety issues, fostering the development of AI agents that can better handle high-stakes situations such as healthcare, finance, and education. By promoting transparency, collaboration, and ethical awareness, HAICOSYSTEM helps pave the way for safer, more responsible AI systems while acknowledging the potential risks of dual-use.

8 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We have made significant efforts to ensure the reproducibility of our work. Detailed descriptions of our framework, evaluation methodology, and experimental setup can be found in the main paper and in the appendix. Specifically, Appendix B outlines the architecture and implementation details of HAICOSYSTEM, while Appendix C provides a comprehensive explanation of our evaluation metrics and criteria. For datasets used in our experiments, Appendix D describes the data collection and processing steps. Additionally, Appendix E includes a thorough breakdown of experimental configurations and parameters, and Appendix F and G present extensive quantitative and qualitative results to validate our findings. To further support reproducibility, we release the code in the supplementary materials, and we will release the dataset in the HuggingFace platform, allowing the community to replicate and build upon our work.

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