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Browser-specific scripts
brutexor.py
brxor.py
Burp
Network Sniffer and Web Proxy
Byte 8bits
${f C}$
CALL E8 Instruction
Calling convention cdecl Args passed to function pushed onto stack right to left. Return value is in EAX register, code block calls function to clean up ie printf()
Args stored in registers, extra Args placed in stack, callee responsible cleaning stack, return value is EAX.  ECX and EDX pass args
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Compiler
Executable File2-
Linker
Loader
Object Code
Command and control (C2)
Compiler
Compound (complex) Expressions multiple conditions
Concatenate join cells together
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Qiling
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Emulate HTTPS, SMTP,FTP,POP3,TFTP,IRC
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Entry Point
Original
Environment variable appdata users profile directory
Equation Editor 3.0
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eval deobfuscation process
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exceptions error conditions code usually handle
Executable File
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How many Arguments and Local Variables
How many Locations
Knowledge of Functions
Locations of functions, number of args, number of local vars, instructions comprise pro/epi, calling convention used
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oledump Concealed, obfuscated URL inside Dim array1(12) 12 lines
oledump grep
Extracts lines that start with a keyword in "
oledump Macro decoded using strings Function DU(yI) array1 = Xf book3
oledump $nh = Split(Replace(pn(array1), Fw, "), zM)book3$



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Common CloudFlare Websites minimize risk of misused SSL certificates	
HTTP Intercept, capture HTTPS, Decrypt HTTPS, AutoResponder, Enable rules	
Network Sniffer and Web Proxy	
Request	
Response raw tab	



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file
grouping of code and data, .text .data .rsrc .reloc
file see format of files
FindRes, LoadRes, SizeRes, LockRes, WriteFil, CreateProcess - Dropper
FindWindow function
FLOSS
-no-static-strings parameter regular non-obf strings
FLOSS emulate execution deobf strings decode stack strings $\dots \dots \dots$
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