

Smartphone as a security token







Group 18


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


System architecture





System architecture - VMs





- Password strength, XSS, SQLI
- > 2FA
- Custom Secure Channel
- > Proximity



Password strength, XSS, SQLI


- ➤ Not the focus of our project, but still:
 - > we use use PHP's password_hash which uses bcrypt.
 - > we require a minimum of 10 characters with lowercase, uppercase, digit and symbol.
 - > we escape HTML characters directly or indirectly provided by a user when output to the screen.
 - we use SQL prepared statements.



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Two-factor authentication





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Private is large and random

16/12/20

Diffie-Hellman



Private = 5

(6⁵) MOD 13 (7776) MOD 13 Public = 2 Agree upon two numbers:

P Prime Number 13
G Generator of P 6

P is large, e.g. 2048 bits

Randomly generate a Private Key

G is a primitive root modulo P

Calculate Public Key:

(G^Private) MOD P

Exchange Public Keys



Private = 4

(6⁴) MOD 13 (1296) MOD 13 Public = 9



(9⁵) MOD 13 (59049) MOD 13 Shared Secret = 3

Calculate the Shared Secret

(Shared Public^{Private}) MOD P



(2⁴) MOD 13 (16) MOD 13 Shared Secret = 3



Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE)

- ➤ Grants **perfect forward secrecy** by computing new private and public values for each session
 - ➤ If a session key is discovered only that session is compromised.
 - ➤ If a long-term private key is compromised, past sessions are not compromised.



Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman with RSA (DHE-RSA)





* clicks Register button *

Client acts as middle man due to the lack of JS crypto and smartphone proximity



- 1. Smartphone verifies if RSA pub.'s certificate is signed by a CA. (not implemented)
- Verifies DH pub. key signature
 Smartphone
- 2. Smartphone computes its own DH pub. and shared secret.

- login to smartphone
- P, G, nº bits of P, server DH pub. key
- (plain and signed), RSA pub. key
 - Smartphone's DH pub. key (plain and signed)
 - Request encrypt [username, password]

Ek[username, password]

P, G, nº bits of P, server DH pub. key (plain and signed), RSA pub. key

request DH

Smartphone's DH pub. key (plain and signed)

Ek[username, password]

verifies DH pub. key signature except on registration 2. Server computes shared secret.

1. Server


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AES Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM)

- > DH only finds a shared secret that can be used as a symmetric key, it is not an encryption algorithm.
- ➤ GCM is an authentication encryption mode of operation, it is composed by two separate functions: one for encryption (AES-CTR) and one for integrity and authentication (GMAC).







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Proximity

- > The client can only communicate with the server with the smartphone close by.
 - Smartphone contains RSA private key and all cryptographic methods.
- Client application logs out as soon as connection with the smartphone is lost.
- Encrypted .txt files are decrypted to volatile memory only (garbage collected as soon as smartphone connection is lost). (not implemented)
- > Decrypted binary files are encrypted again as soon as smartphone connection is lost. (not implemented)



Conclusion

Aside from:

- 1. Not verifying if the server's RSA public key is inside a certificate signed by a Certification Authority;
- 2. Not having implemented file encryption / decryption in time;
- 3. Not associating the user's account with Duo at registration;

We have also not encrypted the HTTP headers including the session cookie! But otherwise we consider our implementation to be a start and our design logic robust.

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