Computational Modeling and Human Language

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LING 581 and 506 guest lecture. April 19th and 21st 2022.

Two Lectures

- Part 1: Background (*Today*)
- Part 2: Combinatorics (*Thursday*)

Why Computation?

- Recent work by Chomsky has highlighted the role of computational efficiency in UG, a theory of I-Language.
- References:
 - 2021: *Minimalism*: Where Are We Now, and Where Can We Hope to Go. Gengo Kenkyu)**160**: 1–41.
 - https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/gengo/160/0/160 1/ article/-char/en
 - 2022: *Genuine Explanation* and the *Strong Minimalist Thesis*. MIT Linguistics Colloquium video.
 - https://www.dropbox.com/s/npoxkqezudbeh9i/Chomsky Lecture 20220401.mp4

Why Computation?


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Background

- **FL**: Faculty of Language
 - Biological organ: part of the brain, part of our innate endowment, enables acquisition and use.
 - Inner workings inaccessible to consciousness.
- I-Language
 - Internal language of thought, optionally externalized.
- **UG**: Universal Grammar
 - A generative theory of I-Language
- Genuine Explanation:
 - UG must be (A) descriptively adequate, (B) explain how language is learnable (given **POS**), and (C) plausibly evolved.
- **SMT**: Strong Minimalist Thesis
 - Nature came up with an optimal solution (to I-Language)
- Computational efficiency:
- - the human brain is slow
 - · UG makes efficient use of limited resources

Brain is slow

- Computational efficiency (and bandwidth) are important considerations for all organic systems:
 - our sensory apparatus can generate vast amounts of data
 - a slow (*chemical*) brain limits what can be analyzed
 - we (selectively) throw out/ignore almost all of the signal



source: Reuters

Human Eye

- Sensor performance is incredibly good:
 - **sensitivity** down to the single photon level (Tinsley *et al.*, 2016)
 - resolution (77 cycles/degree) (Curcio et al. 1990)
 - within a factor of 3 of an eagle's
 - we don't need it for scene analysis
- Other sensors:
 - olfactory thresholds at parts per billion (ppb) (Wackermannová et al., 2016)
 - eardrums can detect tiny vibrations: hydrogen atom size (Fletcher & Munson, 1933)
 - · brain doesn't need this either

90% of the area is peripheral vision: 50% of the nerve fibers fovea pit (0.2mm diameter) 20/20 vision, color: 50%





Fig. 1.1. A drawing of a section through the human eye with a schematic enlargement of the retina.



A Formal Model of I-Language

- Phrases in UG are represented as sets.
- Sets are the simplest formal objects for representing **unordered** hierarchical phrase structure.
 - a set can contain sets as members.



Set representation:

{EA, {v*, {R, IA}}}

• v* and R, heads, come from LEX

Minimalist representation:

- Inclusiveness
- no labels (and no room for labels)
- no room for syntactic features (too strong?)

- Limited use of set theory for representation:
 - no {}
 - no infinite sets
 - no union, intersection, difference, powerset operations
 - no equality
 - not a set, perhaps a multi-set
 - naïve set theory paradoxes seem not to apply
 - $\{x: P(x)\}$, P some property
 - Russell's Paradox: suppose P(x) is $x \notin x$
 - Barber Paradox

UG: sub-phrases are unordered

- However, set theory allows for the construction of ordered elements too
- Define x < y iff $x \in y$

• Example:

```
• <a, b> = {a, {a, b}}
```

• = > =
$$\{a, \{a, \{b, \{b, c\}\}\}\}\$$

• Example:

- ordinals {}, {{}}, {{}}}, and so on ...
- more readably as \emptyset , $\{\emptyset\}$, $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$ $(\emptyset = \text{empty set})$
- generally, $successor(x) = x \cup \{x\}$

Question:

does anything block the formation of ordered elements in this model?

• Note 1:

- ordinal operation x ∪ {x} not formulable under **Simplest Merge**
- e.g. {Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}}, {Ø, {Ø}}, {Ø, {Ø}}}} cannot be constructed
- the above expression maps to 4 in \mathbb{N} .

Why?

- $\emptyset = 0$
- $\{\emptyset\} = 1$
- $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\} = 2$
- $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}, \{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}\}\} = 3$

Question:

does anything block the formation of ordered elements in this model?

• Note 2:

- the sequence <a, b, c> is represented by the set {a, {a, {b, {b, c}}}}}
- 1) this set can be formed by iterated External Merge (EM) from WS:

b
$$c \Rightarrow_{EM} \{b, c\} \Rightarrow_{EM} \{b, \{b, c\}\} \Rightarrow_{EM} \{a, \{b, \{b, c\}\}\} \Rightarrow_{EM} \{a, \{a, \{b, \{b, c\}\}\}\}$$

or

2) this set can also be formed from a minimal WS:

```
a b c
```

b
$$c \Rightarrow_{EM} \{b, c\} \Rightarrow_{IM} \{b, \{b, c\}\} \Rightarrow_{EM} \{a, \{b, \{b, c\}\}\} \Rightarrow_{IM} \{a, \{a, \{b, \{b, c\}\}\}\}$$

- do these violate SMT?
- I-language builds thoughts only (theta configurations + other projections)

wrt. phrases as sets,

- we use ∈, immediate dominance
- we also employ a special constructor, Binary Merge, takes two sets x and y from a Workspace (WS) and creates {x, y}
 - reminiscent of the ZF Axiom of the Unordered Pair: given sets x, y, form {x, y}
- also have another operation, Minimal Search (MS), on sets
- Binary Merge is recursive, i.e. Merge feeds Merge.

Binary Merge gives us the **Basic Property** (BP) of language

- capable of forming an infinite number of structured thought objects (from LEX) Research Question:
- what else will we need?


- Workspace (WS): a collection of sets
 - we use ∈, member of the WS
 - each set represents a phrase or item (LI) from LEX
 - Note: WS itself is set-like, like a phrase, but not a phrase
 - WS can contain repetitions of identical inscriptions
 - formally, a LI x can be treated as singleton set {x}, or the collection could be expanded to include ur-elements/atoms LI

Binary Merge (BM) has two selection steps:

- 1st step: select any **WS** item *x* that's eligible
- 2nd step: select y, a proper sub-term of x (Internal Merge), or
- select a **WS** item *y*, distinct from *x* (**External Merge**)
- add {x, y} to the WS

Some assumptions:

- 1. distinctness requirement for *x* and *y*
- 2. non-selected WS items carry over (WS Preservation)
- 3. selected WS items vanish (Markovian assumption perhaps)
- 4. involves only the current WS (Markovian assumption)
- 5. and nothing more is permitted (Simplest Merge) and no other operations



or

WS':a {d, {b, c}}

• Markovian assumption

- no access to history of the WS
- Consequences
 - can't tell (or make use of) what kind of Merge (IM or EM) has applied
 - SMT Enabling Function (M-gaps, see Chomsky ref.)
 - can't compare previous with current state

Operation	Previous WS	Current WS
Internal Merge (IM)	{a, b}	{a, {a, b}}
External Merge (EM)	a {a, b}	{a, {a, b}}

Binary Merge

- BM(x,y) *only* add {x, y}
 - nothing more is permitted
- Consequences
 - can't annotate/label the new set
 - No Tampering Condition (NTC)
 - can't annotate or modify constituents X or y
 - IM does not form copies
 - no relation between the two a's in
 - {a, b} \Rightarrow_{M} {a, {a, b}}
 - at INT, **FormCopy** optionally establishes a relation (a, a) between the two identical inscriptions

cf.

- move-α
- copy theory of movement

Axiomatic Set Theory

- e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) Set Theory
 - axioms expressed in 1^{st} order logic $+ \in (set membership)$
 - Axiom of Extension: same set if same members
 - $x \in y$ iff $x \in z$ implies y = z
 - doesn't necessarily hold for language
 - we have "occurrences", possibly repetitions/copies
 - Example (Chomsky, p.c.):
 - the man who saw many people didn't see many people
 - can't be derived using just one occurrence of many people
 - See also: identity of inscriptions

Binary Merge (BM) has two selection steps:


- 1st step: select any WS item x that's eligible
- 2^{nd} step: select y, a proper sub-term of x (IM), or
- select a WS item y, distinct from x (EM)


Note:

• IM is less computationally complex

Why do we have both then?

- I-Language generates thought expressions
 - EM: introduces theta-position content into structure
 - IM: displacement: wh-movement, raising, passivization, etc.





- Modern humans emerged in Africa (200,000–300,000 years ago)
 - genetic change: mutation
 - rich evidence of symbolic behavior
- Simplest Merge meets evolutionary plausibility
 - a criterion of Genuine Explanation
 - simplest mechanism for construction of thought
 - its appearance could coincide with that small evolutionary step
- Question:
 - might IM be an optimization of EM?

Theta theory

Duality of Semantics

- strict separation of tasks between EM and IM
- Theta positions populated by EM exclusively
- IM cannot move something into a theta position
- a Language-specific Condition (LSC)

Consequence

- Theta theory must be built into Merge
- Theta positions must be detectable throughout the Merge derivation

Question

does this violate the Markovian assumption or the NTC?

WS: R IA
$$\Rightarrow_{EM} \{R, IA_{\theta}\}$$
WS: EA $\{v*, \{R, IA_{\theta}\}\} \Rightarrow_{EM} \{EA_{\theta}, \{v*, \{R, IA_{\theta}\}\}\}$
WS: $\{v*, \{R, IA_{\theta}\}\} \Rightarrow_{IM} \{IA_{\theta}, \{v*, \{R, IA_{\theta}\}\}\}$

Non-simplest Merge

SMT Condition

- Minimal Yield (MY):
 - no operation can increase the number of selectable items by more than the bare minimum, one.
- Sideways Merge variant (Nunes & Hornstein):

•
$$\{X, Y\}, Z, ... \Rightarrow \{X, Y\}, \{X, Z\}, ...$$
 (out: +2)

• Parallel Merge variant (Citko):

• X, Y,
$$Z \Rightarrow \{X, Y\}, \{X, Z\}, ...$$
 (out: +2)

Merge + Deletion:

```
• {A, B}, C, D, ... \Rightarrow {A, B}, {A, C}, ... (still out: +1)
```

Non-simplest Merge

- Simplest Binary Merge imposes the least burden on computational resources. Other variants are non-optimal.
- Actually, Parallel Merge

• X, Y, Z
$$\Rightarrow$$
 {X, Y}, {X, Z}, ...


can be simulated using **Sideways Merge** (SiM):


- WS: X, Y, Z, ...
- EM: {X, Y}, Z, ...
- SiM: {X, Y}, {X, Z}, ...

So, if we rule out SiM, we rule out Parallel Merge too.

- Example (*Chomsky refs.*): an adverb has to find a VP to modify
 - the man who fixed the car carefully packed his tools

Parses #3 and #1 from kbest standalone Stanford Parser





- Example (*Chomsky refs.*):
 - the man who fixed the car carefully packed his tools
- WS computation:
 - WS: {v*, {fix, the car}} {v*, {packed, his tools}} carefully
 - WS: {{v*, {fix, the car}}, carefully} WS:{{v*, {packed, his tools}}, carefully}
 - {carefully, {... {v*, {packed his tools}}, carefully}...}}

the man who carefully fixed the car ...
the man who fixed the car carefully ...


the man who fixed the car carefully packed ...

the man who fixed the car packed his tools carefully

Carefully, the man who fixed the car packed ...

Example:

- He saw him
- WS: he, see, *v**, he, INFL, C



Example:

- He saw him
- WS: he, see, *v**, he, INFL, C
- Form Copy (FC) applies @ INT (Phase level):
 - via c-command (Minimal Search)
 - {he, {v*, {see, he}}}
 - {C, {he, {INFL, {he, {v*, {see, he}}}}}}
 - construct relation (he, he)
 - Ruled out by Theta Theory
 - would be pronounced as *he saw
- Form Copy (FC) doesn't apply:
 - no relation between the two he's
 - pronounced as he saw him

Appendix

Russell's Paradox

Axiom

• there exists a set y, for all $x, x \in y$ iff P(x)

Paradox

- suppose P(x) is $x \notin x$
- then there's w st. $w \in w$ iff $w \notin w$, a contradiction

Why?

- there exists a set y, for all $x, x \in y$ iff $x \notin x$
- by existential instantiation, let that set be w
- for all $x, x \in w$ iff $x \notin x$
- by universal instantiation, $w \in w$ iff $w \notin w$
- contradiction

Avoid Russell's Paradox assume a set A $\{x \in A \text{ st. } P(x)\}$

Barber Paradox

- **First**, some background:
 - assume all men must shave, and
 - barber is a man

Define

• barber = one who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves

Derivation

- barber can't shave himself as he only shaves those who don't shave themselves.
- but if he doesn't shave himself, he must be shaved by the barber.

Saved if

- barber does not need to shave (e.g. recently mentioned medical condition alopecia)
- no such barber exists

Axiomatic Set Theory

- Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) Axioms:
 - Axiom of Extensionality: same if same members not valid for language
 - identity of inscription is the relevant notion
 - Axiom of the Unordered Pair: reminiscent of **Binary Merge** (see later slides)
 - Axiom of Separation: avoids paradox
 - Axiom of Union
 - Axiom of Powerset
 - Axiom of Infinity
 - Axiom of Replacement

• ...