# CSC 525: Computer Networks

## **Resilient Overlay Networks**

David G. Andersen


Hari Balakrishnan, M. Frans Kaashoek, Robert Morris

## MIT Laboratory for Computer Science

October 2001


http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/ron/

#### The Internet Abstraction



• Any-to-any communication

#### The Internet Abstraction



 Any-to-any communication transparently routing around failures

## **How Robust is Internet Routing?**

Pax	kson
95-	97

• 3.3% of routes had "serious problems"

#### • 10% of routes available < 95% of time

# Labovitz 97,00

- 65% of routes available < 99.9% of time
- 3-min minimum detect+recover time; often 15 minutes
- 40% of outages took 30+ mins to repair


#### Chandra

01

• 5% of faults > 2.75 hours

## The Internet has Redundancy

Traceroute between 12 hosts,
 showing Autonomous Systems (AS's)



## **How Robust is Internet Routing?**

- Scales well
- X Suffers slow outage detection and recovery

Internet backbone routing also cannot:

- Detect badly performing paths
- Efficiently leverage redundant paths
- Multi-home small customers
- Express sophisticated routing policy / metrics
- → We'd like to fix these shortcomings


#### Goal

Improve communication availability for small (3-50 node) communities:

- Collaboration and conferencing
- Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
- 5 friends who want better service...


Interest in improving communication between *any* members of the community

## **RON: Routing around Internet Failures**



The Internet takes a while to re-route

## **RON: Routing around Internet Failures**




The Internet takes a while to re-route

... Cooperating hosts in different routing domains can do better by re-routing through a peer node

## **Overlays**


- Old idea in networks
- Easily deployed
- Lets Internet focus on scalability
- Keep functionality between active peers

## The Approach




- Frequently measure *all* inter-node paths
- Exchange routing information
- Route along app-specific best path consistent with routing policy

## **Architecture: Probing**




- → Probe between nodes, determine path qualities
  - $-O(N^2)$  probe traffic with active probes
  - Passive measurements

## **Probing and Outage Detection**




- Probe every random(14) seconds
- 3 packets, both sides get RTT and reachability
- If "lost probe," send next immediately
  Timeout based on RTT and RTT variance
- If N lost probes, notify outage

## **Architecture: Performance Database**



- Probe between nodes, determine path qualities
- → Store probe results in performance database

## **Architecture: Routing Protocol**



- Probe between nodes, determine path qualities
- Store probe results in performance database
- → Link-state routing protocol between nodes
  Disseminates info using the overlay

## **Routing: Announcements**

- Link-state announcements from perf. db
- Announce every 10-20 seconds
- Latency: EWMA with parameter .9:

$$lat_{avg} = 0.9 \times lat_{avg} + .1 \times new\_sample$$

- Loss: Average of last 100 samples
- Outage: Any success in last 4 probes

## **Routing: Predicting paths**

Combine link metrics into a path estimate.

- Latency:  $\sum L_1, L_2, ..., L_N$
- Loss:  $\prod \rho_1, \rho_2, ..., \rho_N$
- Throughput: (TCP Throughput Equation)

$$score = \frac{\sqrt{1.5}}{rtt \cdot \sqrt{\rho}}$$

• Outage: Any outage anywhere?


## Routing: Building Forwarding Tables

### Policy routing


- Classify by policy
- Generate table per policy
- E.g. Internet2 Clique

#### Metric optimization

- App tags packets(e.g. "low latency")
- Generate one table per metric



## **Architecture: Forwarding**




- Probe between nodes, determine path qualities
- Store probe results in performance database
- Link-state routing protocol between nodes
- → Data handled by application-specific conduit Forwarded in UDP

## **Scaling**

Routing and probing add packets:

Responsiveness vs. overhead vs. size




- × 50 nodes is pushing the limit
- ✓ But is enough for many community apps

## **RON Clients and Applications**

RON is a set of *libraries*...

... you have to build something with them.

#### Resilient IP Forwarder Client




→ Transparent RON of any traffic

#### **Evaluation**

- Two datasets from Internet deployment (running for several months now)
- $RON_1$ : 12 nodes, 64 hours, Mar 2001
- $RON_2$ : 16 nodes, 85 hours, May 2001
- Compared RON-chosen paths to the Internet

## **Deployment**



- 16 hosts in the US, Europe, and Asia.
   (A few more online now. Want a RON?)
- Variety of network types / bandwidths
- $N^2$  scaling of paths seen

## **Evaluation Methodology**

- Loss & latency. Each node repeats:
  - 1. Pick random node j
  - 2. Pick a probe type (direct, latency, loss) round-robin. Send to j
  - 3. Delay for random interval
- Throughput: As above, but do 1M TCP bulk transfer to random host
- Record traceroutes for post-processing

## **Evaluation Details: Policy**

- *Never, ever* use the Internet2 to improve life for a host not already connected to the Internet2
- ➤ Internet2 is high-speed, research-only net: atypically fast, uncongested, and reliable
- → Implemented via RON's policy routing component

## **Major Results**


- ✓ Probe-based outage detection effective
  - RON takes ~10s to route around failure
     Compared to BGP's several minutes
  - Many Internet outages are avoidable
  - RON often improves latency / loss / throughput [paper]
- Single-hop indirect routing works well
- Scaling is explicitly not our forte but big enough

## $RON_1$ vs Internet 30 minute loss rates


[90,100]	12								
[80,90)	2								
Internet Loss Rate	1								
	3	1							
	1								
	3								
	8	1							
[20,30)	87	8	4						
[10,20)	362	32	12						
(0,10)	2188	44	3						
	(0,10) [20,30) [10,20)			RON loss rate					

• 6,825 "path hours" (13,650 samples)

## $RON_1$ 30 minute loss rate changes




## **Outage Detection: Flooding Attack**



BGP can't handle this kind of problem...


## **Performance: Latency**



## Performance: Throughput

- 1% were 50% worse with RON
- 5% doubled throughput with RON
- Median unchanged: RON's throughput optimizer looks only for big wins.

## Performance: Throughput in $RON_2$



## Single-hop Indirect Routing

$$P[ ext{path good}] = p$$
 $P[ ext{indirect good}] = p^2$ 
 $P[ ext{indirect bad}] = 1 - p^2$ 
 $P[ ext{At least one good}] = 1 - (1 - p^2)^{R+1}$ 

Latency shortest paths from routing table dump:

- 48.8% direct paths best
- 99% best paths had 0 or 1 intermediate nodes

## **Policy**

- RON supports flexible policies
  - Exclusive cliques (e.g. Internet2)
  - General policies (classifier + link set)
- RONs deployed between cooperating entities
   No "involuntary backdoors"
- Policy violations remain at the human level

How do users know *what* policy is? More interesting future work.

#### **Conclusions**

- ✓ RONs improve packet delivery reliability
- Overlays attractive spot for resiliency:
   development, fewer nodes, simple substrate
- Single-hop indirection works well
- Small confederations respond quickly
- → RON libraries are good platform for development, research

http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/ron/