



**WYŻSZA SZKOŁA BANKOWA
w Poznaniu**

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BACHELOR THESIS

The Mango Messenger

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*A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Computer Science*

in the

Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa w Poznaniu
Department of Computer Science

July 8, 2021

Declaration of Authorship

We, Petro Kolosov, Serhii Holishevskyi, Illia Zubachov, Arslanbek Temirbekov, declare that this thesis titled, “The Mango Messenger” and the work presented in it are my own. We confirm that:

- This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University.
- Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated.
- Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed.
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- I have acknowledged all main sources of help.
- Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself.

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“I fear not the man who has practiced 10,000 kicks once, but I fear the man who has practiced one kick 10,000 times.”

Bruce Lee

WYŻSZA SZKOŁA BANKOWA W POZNANIU

Abstract

Computer Science
Department of Computer Science

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The Mango Messenger

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Among many types of social network applications, instant messaging is one of the applications that consider the privacy and the security are two crucial features due to that data exchanged between users are often private and not for public. In this work, a secure Instant Messenger (IM) mobile application is designed and implemented. Many techniques are used to provide privacy and another to achieve security through suitable cryptographic method. The limited and varied specifications of users' mobile devices are considered for implementing the concept of end-to-end encryption. The application also providing the main functions of instant messaging applications such as profile creation, access control management, and finding friend.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank our mentor Szymon Murawski for his useful comments and suggestions and support over the whole process of writing this thesis.

Contents

Declaration of Authorship	i
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgements	v
1 Introduction	1
1.1 General overview of IM systems	1
1.2 Security vulnerabilities of IM systems	1
1.2.1 Revealing confidential information	1
1.2.2 Spreading viruses and worms	1
1.2.3 Exposing the network to backdoor Trojans	2
1.2.4 Denial of Service Attacks	2
1.2.5 Hijacking Sessions	2
1.2.6 Legal Liability resulting from downloading copyrighted materials	2
2 Build secure IMS	3
2.1 Functional requirements	3
2.2 Non-functional requirements	3
2.3 Application architecture and UML modeling	3
2.3.1 General assumptions	3
2.3.2 Initial concept diagram	3
2.3.3 Initial concept and discussion	3
2.3.4 Planned technologies	3
3 Secure IMS Implementation	4

List of Abbreviations

LAH List Abbreviations **Here**
WSF What (it) Stands For

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 General overview of IM systems

Nowadays, the Instant Messaging Systems (IMS) became the most widely-used and convenient way of communication between people via Internet. These systems offer a simple and inexpensive way to continuance existing relationships and forming new by providing an attractive means for sharing information and digital social interactions. The quick development of IMS and the widening of their popularity sometimes moves the focus from possible security risks. In the worst case, IMS exposes vulnerable to security and privacy channels to hackers and intruders [1] [2]. In existing IMS, there are multiple privacy and security issues that need to be resolved in order to protect user's confidential information and shared data via these messaging applications [3]. Source [3] gives an analysis of Telegram Messenger and the related MTProto Protocol with cryptography behind Telegram. Moreover, an overview of current security status for some major IMS is provided. Meanwhile, the researchers in [6] discussed types of threats on privacy of IMS and ranges of threat effects for both, user and provider. In this thesis, the most major security threats of IMS is described. In order to reflect best practices we provide a prototype-application written as example.

1.2 Security vulnerabilities of IM systems

There are numerous risks associated with the use of IM and as with any form of electronic communication one must take certain steps to mitigate those risks. Such risks include:

1.2.1 Revealing confidential information

Revealing confidential information over an unsecured delivery channel. Public Instant Messaging transmits unencrypted information, so it should never be used for sensitive or confidential information. The information is on the Internet and may be accessed by anyone.

1.2.2 Spreading viruses and worms

Instant Message (IM) programs are fast becoming a preferred method for launching network viruses and worms. The lack of built-in security, the ability to download files and built-in "buddy list" of recipients create an environment in which viruses and worms can spread quickly. The threat is growing so fast that IM is quickly catching up to e-mail as a primary point of attack.

1.2.3 Exposing the network to backdoor Trojans**1.2.4 Denial of Service Attacks****1.2.5 Hijacking Sessions**

Hijacking Sessions - Information received by IM is not authenticated. There is no way to verify that a message really originated from the sender with whom the recipient believes he or she is communicating during the session. Chat sessions can be hijacked and users can be impersonated.

1.2.6 Legal Liability resulting from downloading copyrighted materials

Chapter 2

Build secure IMS

2.1 Functional requirements

2.2 Non-functional requirements

2.3 Application architecture and UML modeling

2.3.1 General assumptions

2.3.2 Initial concept diagram

2.3.3 Initial concept and discussion

2.3.4 Planned technologies

Chapter 3

Secure IMS Implementation