



# Superfluid Finance

## Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: **Halborn**

Date of Engagement: **February 21st, 2022 – March 15th, 2022**

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# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

[Superfluid](#) engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on February 21st, 2022 and ending on March 15th, 2022 . The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository [Superfluid repository](#).

## 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided three weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn did not detect any security vulnerabilities, but did identify an informational issue that can be addressed by the [Superfluid team](#).

## 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. ([MythX](#))
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Brownie](#), [Remix IDE](#))

#### RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

#### RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

#### RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of **10** to **1** with **10** being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10** - CRITICAL
- 9** - **8** - HIGH
- 7** - **6** - MEDIUM
- 5** - **4** - LOW
- 3** - **1** - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

## 1.4 SCOPE

### IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts:

- BatchLiquidator.sol
- ConstantFlowAgreementV1.sol
- Definitions.sol
- InstandDistributionAgreementV1.sol
- MaticBridgedNativeSuperToken.sol
- NativeSuperToken.sol
- Superfluid.sol
- SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
- SuperfluidOwnableGovernance.sol
- Superupgrader.sol
- TOGA.sol
- TokenCustodian.sol
- SuperfluidToken.sol
- SuperToken.sol
- SuperTokenFactory.sol
- AgreementBase.sol
- SuperfluidGovernanceII.sol

Commit ID: [2fb0af711479a3ca373de12d6643c0655f27b49](#)

## 1.5 WORK DONE

In addition to the manual and automated testing that can be seen in this report, during the audit, the security engineer manually reviewed the source code and focused on the host contract, which is the core of the protocol.

One of the important tests was to double-check if the previous critical vulnerability that the protocol had was properly mitigated. It has been confirmed that there is no way to exploit it anymore because you always have the transaction context hashed and stored in a state variable and then matched against the agreements contracts, which properly secures the contracts.

After taking into account all the possible attack vectors that the contracts can have, it has been shown that always having the current transaction context hashed and stored in a state variable in the host contract absolutely reduces the chances that an attack is successful. Since most transactions sent to the Superfluid protocol have to go through the same process, attack vectors are also reduced.

In summary, Halborn finds the use of this context hash very useful to have complete control over the transactions going into Superfluid smart contracts and to prevent any kind of malicious data injection and modifying the transaction context to will of the attacker.

## 1.6 FUTURE AUDITS

Halborn suggests the need for a new security audit whenever important new functionality is developed in the core of the protocol. Focusing on the host contract, and also on the main agreements (constant flow and instant distribution).

Moreover, it is essential to audit the security of new upcoming projects that use the Superfluid protocol, as the way they interface with the core protocol can create security vulnerabilities in third-party apps.


In summary, it would be very beneficial for the project to perform a security audit in the following scenarios:

- Changes have been made to the host contract
- Changes have been made to the constant flow agreement contract
- Changes have been made to the instant distribution agreement contract
- New agreement contracts have been developed
- New projects aiming to use the Superfluid protocol

## 2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	0	0	1

LIKELIHOOD




# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	Informational	-



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



### 3.1 (HAL-01) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATIONAL

#### Description:

Some functions are marked as public, but never called directly within the same contract or in any of its descendants.

#### Code Location:

##### Listing 1

```
1 - Superfluid.isAppJailed(ISuperApp) (contracts/superfluid/
↳ Superfluid.sol#396-403)
2 - TokenCustodian.flush(IERC777,address) (contracts/utils/
↳ TokenCustodian.sol#22-30)
3 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.getRewardAddress(ISuperfluid,
↳ ISuperfluidToken) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #221-230)
4 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.setRewardAddress(ISuperfluid,
↳ ISuperfluidToken,address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #232-244)
5 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.clearRewardAddress(ISuperfluid,
↳ ISuperfluidToken) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #246-256)
6 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.getCFav1LiquidationPeriod(ISuperfluid,
↳ ISuperfluidToken) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #265-275)
7 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.setCFav1LiquidationPeriod(ISuperfluid,
↳ ISuperfluidToken,uint256) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #277-289)
8 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.clearCFav1LiquidationPeriod(ISuperfluid
↳ ,ISuperfluidToken) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #291-301)
9 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.getSuperTokenMinimumDeposit(ISuperfluid
↳ ,ISuperfluidToken) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #310-318)
10 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.clearSuperTokenMinimumDeposit(
↳ ISuperfluid,ISuperToken) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol
↳ #329-336)
```

```
11 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.isTrustedForwarder(ISuperfluid,  
↳ ISuperfluidToken,address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.  
↳ sol#346-357)  
12 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.enableTrustedForwarder(ISuperfluid,  
↳ ISuperfluidToken,address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.  
↳ sol#359-371)  
13 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.disableTrustedForwarder(ISuperfluid,  
↳ ISuperfluidToken,address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.  
↳ sol#373-385)  
14 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.clearTrustedForwarder(ISuperfluid,  
↳ ISuperfluidToken,address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.  
↳ sol#387-398)  
15 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.isAuthorizedAppFactory(ISuperfluid,  
↳ address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol#420-430)  
16 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.authorizeAppFactory(ISuperfluid,address  
↳ ) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol#436-454)  
17 - SuperfluidGovernanceBase.unauthorizeAppFactory(ISuperfluid,  
↳ address) (contracts/gov/SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol#460-469)
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

If these functions are not intended to be called internally or by descendants, it is better to mark them as external to reduce gas costs.

# MANUAL TESTING

The following test cases have been executed either on a forked Ropsten network or directly on the Ropsten network.

## 4.1 Constant Flow Agreement

- After creating a constant flow agreement between two users. This test case attempts to delete it from a user who is neither the sender nor the recipient. Since the sender's account is not critical, this is not allowed.

Proof of Concept:

PoC-1:

```
Listing 2: Proof of Concept using Brownie

1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
4 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
5 # fUSDCx address
6 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
7 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
8 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
9 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
10 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory
    ())
11 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
    xAD1e87F0C74341ecAfc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
12 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
    xAD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
13 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
14 # Setting gas limit
15 network.gas_limit(6700000)
16 # Check an existing CFA beetwen user1 and user2
17 output.redd("cfa.getFlow(fUSDCx, user1, user2) -> " + str(cfa.
    getFlow(fUSDCx, user1, user2)))
18 # Delete flow using another user
19 encoded_tx = cfa.signatures['deleteFlow'] + eth_abi.encode_abi([
    address', 'address', 'address', 'bytes', ], (fUSDCx, user1, user2,
```

```

↳ b' ',)).hex()
20 bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx[:-64], 'bytes')
21 tx = host.callAgreement(cfa.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from':
↳ user})

```

## Result:

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xa02f1f7cd663f6a15742675f975cc8042b623a80')
superToken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Setting gas limit
network.gas_limit(6700000)
# Check an existing CFA between user1 and user2
output = cfa.getFlow(fUSDCx, user1, user2) → " + str(cfa.getFlow(fUSDCx, user1, user2))
encoded_tx = cfa.signatures['deleteFlow'] + eth_abi.encode_abi(['address', 'address', 'bytes'], (fUSDCx, user1, user2, b'')).hex()
bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx[:-64], 'bytes')
tx = host.callAgreement(cfa.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from': user})
cfa.getFlow(fUSDCx, user1, user2) → (1645831102, 771604938270, 2777778688622592, 0)
File <console>, line 21, in <module>
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self.transact(args)
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx['from'].transfer(
        return tx['from'].transfer(
            receipt, exc = self._make_transaction(
                File "brownie/network/account.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
                exc = VirtualMachineError()
                File "brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
                    raise ValueError(str(exc))
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: CFA: sender account is not critical'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert'

```

- After creating a constant flow agreement between two users. This test case attempts to delete it from an address that is not the host contract of the CFA contract where the agreement has been created. There is a specific requirement to prevent this case from happening.

## PoC-2:

### Listing 3: Proof of Concept using Brownie

```

1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
4 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
5 # fUSDCx address
6 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eee52A2b801625f'
7 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
8 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
9 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
10 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory)
↳ ()
11 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0

```

## Result:

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user1 = [{}]
user1 = ['0x91b1056C3104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = ['0xe860392664a818BFc31920786AB61C6C7dc'
# FUSDCx address
fusdcx = '0x072a445adF00ffF63cc0eee52A20B081625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = SuperfluidFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
SuperTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0x01e87F0C74341ecAfc1d27349D6e650f5bAdd07')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xaD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CCBD02bb23a88')
superToken = SuperToken.at(fusdcx)

network_gas_limit(6700000)
# Check if CFA between user1 and user2
output, reddc = cfa.getFlow(fusdcx, user1, user2) -> str(cfa.getFlow(fusdcx, user1, user2)))
# Delete flow using another host
cfa.deleteFlow(fusdcx, user1, user2, 0, {'from': user2})
cfa.getFlow(fusdcx, user1, user2) -> (164583102, 771004938270, 277778688622592, 0)

# <console>: Traceback (innermost last)
File "/Users/lukebrownie/.local/lib/python3.7/site-packages/brownie/network/context.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self.transact(*args)
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx['from'].transfer(
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
    receipt, exc = self._make_transaction(
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
    exc = VirtualMachineError()
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: unauthorized host'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert=True' as a transa
```

- After creating a constant flow agreement between two users. This test case attempts to delete it by injecting malicious bytes into the context ctx. Since the agreement contract is checking and comparing the current ctx with the previously hashed context in the host contract, this is not possible.

PoC-3:

**Listing 4: Proof of Concept using Brownie**



## Result:

## 4.2 Super Tokens

- This test case attempts to trigger an XSS vulnerability in the Superfluid's app by creating a new Super Token with an HTML tag in the name and adding the token to the app. Since the application correctly encodes the characters, this is not possible.

## Proof of Concept:

PoC-1:

**Listing 5: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```

12 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
↳ xAD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
13 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
14 # Deploy new SuperToken contract
15 mockT0ken = SuperToken.deploy(host, {'from': user})
16 # Init the new SuperToken
17 tx = mockT0ken.initialize(supertoken, 18, "<script>alert(1)</
↳ script>", "<script>alert(2)</script>", {'from': user})

```

### Result:

>>> mockT0ken = SuperToken.deploy(host, {'from': user})  
 Transaction sent: 0x9007fb130dec09d7bmc6ed70e73f28bics0af78e2b1b4018f4133ca5  
 Gas price: 20.515283175 gwei Gas limit: 524000 Nonce: 11  
 SuperToken.constructor confirmed Block: 12098483 Gas used: 4736424 (90.91%)  
 SuperToken deployed at: 0x6447c19d4e0f2Dae0A0F5Efcdc8543e5054cA32

>>> supertoken decimals()  
 18  
 >>> tx = mockT0ken.initialize(supertoken, 18, "<script>alert(1)</script>", "<script>alert(2)</script>", {'from': user})  
 Transaction sent: 0x7039e8c11946173652xfec0d2207ea9a1628e0a355b6e26701fa3a25ff5439  
 Gas price: 17.979264504 gwei Gas limit: 190178 Nonce: 12  
 SuperToken.initialize confirmed Block: 12098536 Gas used: 169803 (89.76%)

>>> mockT0ken  
<SuperToken Contract '0x6447c19d4e0f2Dae0A0F5Efcdc8543e5054cA32'>

Personal wallet  
0xe860...C7dc

YOUR BALANCE IN USD  
\$800.853619

Currencies

CURRENCY	YOUR WALLET BALANCE	SUPERFLUID BALANCE
USDC	0.00	800.9
ETH	0.50	0.0
DAI	1000.00	0.0
TUSD	1000.00	0.0

Add Custom Token

Anyone can create, name and deploy ERC20 tokens or related wrappers, including creating fake version of existing tokens or tokens that claim to represent projects that do not have a token.

Superfluid does not verify the authenticity of any token. It simply fetches information from the token symbol or address you provide. Do your own research before interacting with an ERC20 token and make sure the token symbol is correct.

Add <script>alert(2)</script>\* Token

INCOMING/OUTGOING PER MONTH IN USD

MONTHLY NET FLOW IN USD

+\$2.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓ +\$2.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓ +\$0.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓ +\$0.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓ +\$0.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓ +\$0.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓ +\$0.00 ↑ -\$0.00 ↓

- After wrapping some Super Tokens to an account, this test case attempts to send some tokens to an arbitrary recipient from a non-operator account. Since the Super Token contract thoroughly checks whether or not the sender of the transaction is an operator of the account sending the tokens, this behavior is not allowed.

## PoC-2:

**Listing 6: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```

1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
4 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
5 # fUSDCx address
6 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
7 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
8 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
9 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
10 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory()
11     ())
11 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
12     xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
12 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
13     xaD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
13 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
14 # Send tokens from a non operator account
15 tx = supertoken.operatorSend(user1, user2, 10, 0x0, 0x0, {'from':
16     user})

```

**Result:**

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xa02f1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Send tokens from a non operator account
tx = supertoken.operatorSend(user1, user2, 10, 0x0, 0x0, {'from': user})
File "<console>", line 15, in <module>
  File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self.transact(*args)
  File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx(*args).transact()
  File "brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
    receipt, exc = self._make_transaction(
  File "brownie/network/account.py", line 727, in _make_transaction
    raise VirtualMachineError(e) from None
  File "brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Gas estimation failed: 'execution reverted: SuperToken: caller is not an operator for holder'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, you must set the

```

- This test case attempts to upgrade more ERC20 tokens than are available in the account. Since the function that upgrades ERC20 tokens to Super Tokens securely executes the necessary transfers, this is not possible.

## PoC-3:

**Listing 7: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```

1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
4 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
5 # fUSDCx address
6 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
7 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
8 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
9 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
10 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory
11     ())
11 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
12     xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
12 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
13     xaD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
13 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
14 # Upgrade more tokens than available
15 tx = supertoken.upgrade(10, {'from': user})

```

## Result:

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xa02F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Upgrade more tokens than available
tx = supertoken.upgrade(10, {'from': user})
file "<console>", line 15, in <module>
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self.transact(*args)
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx['from'].transfer(
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
    receiver, exc = self._make_transaction(
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 727, in _make_transaction
    raise VirtualMachineError(e) from None
    raise "brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Gas estimation failed: 'execution reverted: ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, you must set the gas limit

```

- This test case attempts to downgrade more Super Tokens than are available in the account. Since the function that downgrades Super Tokens to ERC20 tokens is safely executing the necessary transfers, this is not possible.

PoC-4:

**Listing 8: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```

1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
4 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
5 # fUSDCx address
6 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
7 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
8 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
9 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
10 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory
11     ())
11 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
12     xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
12 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
13     xaD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
13 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
14 # Downgrade more tokens than available
15 tx = supertoken.downgrade(100, {'from': user})

```

Result:

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xa02F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Downgrade more tokens than available
tx = supertoken.downgrade(100, {'from': user})
File "<console>", line 15, in <module>
  File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self.transact(*args)
  File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx['from'].transfer(
  File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 644, in transfer
    raise self._make_transaction()
  File "brownie/network/account.py", line 727, in _make_transaction
    raise VirtualMachineError(e) from None
  File "brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Gas estimation failed: 'execution reverted: SuperfluidToken: burn amount exceeds balance'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, you must set the gas

```

## 4.3 Instant Distribution Agreement

- After a publisher has created an index, this test case attempts to update it from another user by injecting malicious bytes into the context ctx. Since the agreement contract is checking and comparing

the current ctx with the previously hashed context in the host contract, this is not possible.

Proof of Concept:

PoC-1:

**Listing 9: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```
1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 secondUser = a[1]
4 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
5 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
6 # fUSDCx address
7 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
8 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
9 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
10 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
11 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory
↳ ())
12 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
↳ xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
13 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
↳ xAD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
14 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
15 # Setting gas limit
16 network.gas_limit(6700000)
17 # Update index
18 encoded_tx = ida.signatures['updateIndex'] + eth_abi.encode_abi([
↳ address', 'uint32', 'uint128', 'bytes',], (supertoken.address, 0,
↳ 1, b'',)).hex()
19 bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx, 'bytes')
20 tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from':
↳ secondUser})
```

## Result:

```
>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
secondUser = a[1]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xA02F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Setting gas limit
network.gas_limit(6700000)
# Update index
encoded_tx = ida.signatures['updateIndex'] + eth_abi.encode_abi(['address', 'uint32', 'uint128', 'bytes'], (supertoken.address, 0, 1, b'')).hex()
bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx, 'bytes')
tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from': secondUser})
File "", line 20, in callAgreement
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1029, in call
    return self._call(*args, **kwargs)
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx["from"].transfer(
        File "brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
            receipt, exc = self._make_transaction(
                File "brownie/network/account.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
                    exc = VirtualMachineError()
                    exc = brownie.exceptions.VMError
                    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
                    raise ValueError(str(exc))
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: invalid ctx'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert=True' as a transaction
```

- After a publisher has created an index, this test case attempts to distribute it from another user by injecting malicious bytes into the ctx context. Since the agreement contract is checking and comparing the current ctx with the previously encrypted context in the host contract, this is not possible.

## PoC-2:

**Listing 10: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```
1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 secondUser = a[1]
4 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
5 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
6 # fUSDCx address
7 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
8 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
9 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
10 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
11 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory)
12 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
13 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
14 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
15 # Setting gas limit
16 network.gas_limit(6700000)
```

```

17 # Distribute
18 encoded_tx = ida.signatures['distribute'] + eth_abi.encode_abi([
    ↳ address', 'uint32', 'uint256', 'bytes',], (supertoken.address, 0,
    ↳ 1, b'')).hex()
19 bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx, 'bytes')
20 tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from':
    ↳ secondUser})

```

### Result:

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
seconduser = a[1]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF284E81ba39F52150b2e05B2F66f4828B8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperfluidTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xA01e87F0C7a34ecAcfc2d7349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
tfa = ContextFlowAgreementV1.at('0xA02F1Fc7d663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bB23a88')
superToken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Setting gas limit
network.gas_limit(6700000)
# Distribute
encoded_tx = ida.signatures['distribute'] + eth_abi.encode_abi(['address', 'uint32', 'uint256', 'bytes'], (supertoken.address, 0, 1, b'')).hex()
tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from': secondUser})
File "brownie/network/_contract.py", line 30, in _module_
    File "brownie/network/_contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
        return self.transact(*args)
    File "brownie/network/_contract.py", line 1502, in transact
        return tx['from'].transfer(
    File "brownie/network/_account.py", line 644, in transfer
        receipt, exec_tx = self._make_transaction(
    File "brownie/_network/_transaction.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
        exc = VirtualMachineError(e)
    File "brownie/_exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
        raise ValueError(str(exc))
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: invalid ctx'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert:True' as a transaction

```

- After a publisher has created an index and a subscription to that index, this test case attempts to update another user's subscription by injecting malicious bytes into the ctx context. Since the agreement contract is checking and comparing the current ctx with the previously encrypted context in the host contract, this is not possible.

### PoC-3:

**Listing 11: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```

1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 secondUser = a[1]
4 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
5 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
6 # fUSDCx address
7 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'

```

```

8 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
9 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
10 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
11 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory
12 ↳ ())
12 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
13 ↳ xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
13 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
14 ↳ xAD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
14 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
15 # Setting gas limit
16 network.gas_limit(6700000)
17 # Update Subscription
18 encoded_tx = ida.signatures['updateSubscription'] + eth_abi.
19 ↳ encode_abi(['address', 'uint32', 'address', 'uint128', 'bytes',], [
20 ↳ (supertoken.address, 0, user.address, 1, b''),]).hex()
21 bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx, 'bytes')
22 tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from':
23 ↳ secondUser})

```

## Result:

```

*** 2 Users to use for the test
user = []
seconduser = []
user[0] = '0x291b1b056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user[1] = '0xe8603a92664aE818BFc31920786AF616C6C7Cdc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bf63cc0eee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xA1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xA02F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Setting gas limit
network.gas_limit(6700000)
# Call Agreement
encoded_tx = ida.signatures['updateSubscription'] + eth_abi.encode_abi(['address', 'uint32', 'address', 'uint128', 'bytes',], (supertoken.address, 0, user.address, 1, b'')).hex()
tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from': secondUser})
File "console", line 20, in _module_
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self._transact(args)
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx['from'].transfer(
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
    receipt, exc = self._make_transaction()
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
    exc = VirtualMachineError(e)
File "brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: invalid ctx'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert=True' as a transaction

```

- After a publisher has created an index and a subscription to that index has been created, this test case attempts to revoke another user's subscription by injecting malicious bytes into the ctx context. Since the agreement contract is checking and comparing the current ctx with the previously encrypted context in the host contract, this is not possible.

## PoC-4:

**Listing 12: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```
1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 secondUser = a[1]
4 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
5 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
6 # fUSDCx address
7 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
8 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
9 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
10 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
11 supertokenFactory = SupertokenFactory.at(host.getSupertokenFactory
12 ↳ ())
12 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
13 ↳ xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
13 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
14 ↳ xAD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
14 supertoken = Supertoken.at(fUSDCx)
15 # Setting gas limit
16 network.gas_limit(6700000)
17 # Revoke Subscription
18 encoded_tx = ida.signatures['revokeSubscription'] + eth_abi.
19 ↳ encode_abi(['address', 'address', 'uint32', 'bytes'], (supertoken
20 ↳ .address, user.address, 0, b''),).hex()
19 bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx, 'bytes')
20 tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from':
21 ↳ secondUser})
```

## Result:

```
>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
secondUser = a[1]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
# fUSDCx address
fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
# Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349d6e650f5bAdD7')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0xD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
# Setting gas limit
network.gas_limit(6700000)
# Create tx
encoded_tx = ida.signatures['revokeSubscription'] + eth_abi.encode_abi(['address', 'address', 'uint32', 'bytes'], (supertoken.address, user.address, 0, b''))
tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from': secondUser})
File "", line 20, in <module>
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1629, in __call__
    return self.transact(args)
File "brownie/network/contract.py", line 1502, in transact
    return self._transact(*args, **kwargs)
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
    receipt, exc = self._make_transaction()
File "brownie/network/account.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
    exc = VirtualMachineError()
exc = VirtualMachineError()
File "brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: invalid ctx'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert=True' as a transaction
```

- After a publisher has created an index and a subscription to that index has been created, this test case attempts to unsubscribe from another user who is neither the publisher nor the subscriber. Since the function that removes a subscription correctly checks with a requirement whether the user submitting the transaction is the publisher or the subscriber, this behavior is not allowed.

## PoC-5:

**Listing 13: Proof of Concept using Brownie**

```
1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 secondUser = a[1]
4 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
5 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
6 # fUSDCx address
7 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
8 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
9 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
10 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
11 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory)
12 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
13 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
14 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
```

```

15 # Setting gas limit
16 network.gas_limit(6700000)
17 # Delete Subscription
18 encoded_tx = ida.signatures['deleteSubscription'] + eth_abi.
↳ encode_abi(['address', 'address', 'uint32', 'address', 'bytes'],,
↳ (supertoken.address, user.address, 0, user.address, b''),).hex()
19 bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx[: -64], 'bytes')
20 tx = host.callAgreement(ida.address, bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from':
↳ secondUser})

```

### Result:

```

>>> # Users to use for the test
user = a[0]
seconduser = a[1]
user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
user2 = '0xe8603a92664a8188F8c31928786AFB81cGCC7dc'
# fUSDx address
fUSDX = '0x2d5e872a45adF0FF65cc0eess52a2b801625f'
# list all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
host = Superfluid.at('0xF284E81ba39F52150b9e0582f66f4828B8e87FD2')
gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory())
ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0x1e87F0C74341ecAf1d27349d06e650f5bAd07')
cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0:a2F1f7cd663ff6a157a2675f975cB042bb23a88')
superToken = SuperToken.at(fUSDX)
# setting gas limit
network.gas_limit(6700000)
# Delete Subscription
encoded_tx = ida.signatures['deleteSubscription'] + eth_abi.encode_abi(['address', 'address', 'uint32', 'address', 'bytes'], (supertoken.address, user.address, 0, user.address, b''),).hex()
bytes_encoded_tx = to_bytes(encoded_tx[: -64], 'bytes')
tx = host.callAgreement(bytes_encoded_tx, 0, {'from': secondUser})
File "/Users/.../brownie/network/contact.py", line 1629, in _call_
    return self.transact(*args)
File "/Users/.../brownie/network/contact.py", line 1502, in transact
    return tx['from'].transfer(
File "/Users/.../brownie/network/account.py", line 644, in transfer
    recipient, self._set_transaction(
File "/Users/.../brownie/network/account.py", line 752, in _make_transaction
    exc = VirtualMachineError(e)
File "/Users/.../brownie/exceptions.py", line 121, in __init__
    raise ValueError(str(exc)) from None
ValueError: Execution reverted during call: 'execution reverted: IDA: E_NOT_ALLOWED'. This transaction will likely revert. If you wish to broadcast, include 'allow_revert=True' as a transact:

```

## 4.4 Transparent OnGoing Auction

- After implementing the TOGA contract and setting a user as the PIC of a Super Token, this test case attempts to change the output rate of another user who is not the current PIC of the Super Token. Since the function that makes this change correctly checks whether the sender of the transaction is the current PIC, this is not allowed.

## Proof of Concept:

### PoC-1:

#### Listing 14: Proof of Concept using Brownie

```
1 # Users to use for the test
2 user = a[0]
3 secondUser = a[1]
4 user1 = '0x291b1056C3C104205d5cf157F173E16aB3d1965f'
5 user2 = '0xe8603a92664aE818BF8c31920786AFB61C6CC7dc'
6 # fUSDCx address
7 fUSDCx = '0x2dC36872a445adF0bFf63cc0eeee52A2b801625f'
8 # Import all contracts needed from the Ropsten network
9 host = Superfluid.at('0xF2B4E81ba39F5215Db2e05B2F66f482BB8e87FD2')
10 gov = SuperfluidGovernanceII.at(host.getGovernance())
11 superTokenFactory = SuperTokenFactory.at(host.getSuperTokenFactory
↳ ())
12 ida = InstantDistributionAgreementV1.at('0
↳ xAD1e87F0C74341ecAFc1d27349dD6e650f5bAdD7')
13 cfa = ConstantFlowAgreementV1.at('0
↳ xAD2F1f7cd663f6a15742675f975CcBD42bb23a88')
14 supertoken = SuperToken.at(fUSDCx)
15 # Setting gas limit
16 network.gas_limit(6700000)
17 # <TokenCustodian Contract '0
↳ x3f22c41db59D4ae306bd8F1b5b29dFB7e8629969'>
18 tokenCustodian = TokenCustodian.at('0
↳ x3f22c41db59D4ae306bd8F1b5b29dFB7e8629969')
19 # <TOGA Contract '0xc8865b0a4f7eDa5B6E8858e6ED3f780952A14D07'>
20 toga = TOGA.at('0xc8865b0a4f7eDa5B6E8858e6ED3f780952A14D07')
21 # Change exit rate
22 tx = toga.changeExitRate(supertoken, 10, {'from': secondUser})
```

## Result:

# AUTOMATED TESTING

## 5.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABI and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

### Slither results:

#### ConstantFlowAgreementV1.sol AgreementBase.sol

```

ConstantFlowAgreementV1.changeFlowToAddress(SuperfluidToken,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.flowParams,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.flowData,bytes1,Context,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.FlowChangeType).vars (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#0)
    - token is a local variable never initialized
    - flowParams is a local variable never initialized
    - ConstantFlowAgreementV1.createFlow(isSuperfluidToken,address,intny,bytes).flowParams (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#226) is a local variable never initialized
    - ConstantFlowAgreementV1.deleteFlow(isSuperfluidToken,address,address,bytes).flowParams (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#260) is a local variable never initialized
    - depositBelt is a local variable never initialized
    - documentation is initialized
    - local variables
        - https://github.com/solidity/stubs/blob/main/Documentation/variables.md

Reentrancy in ConstantFlowAgreementV1._changeFlowToAddress(SuperfluidToken,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.flowParams,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.flowData) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#645-746):
    External calls:
        - token.updateAgreementData(flowParams,flowData,_encodeFlowData(newStateData)) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#716)
        - totalSenderFlowRate = _updateAccountFlowState(newStateData,flowParams.sender.oldFlowData,flowRate.sub(flowParams.flowRate,CFI.flowRateOverflow),depositBelt,0,currentTimestamp) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#727-728)
            - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
            - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                    - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
            Event emitted after the call();
        - flowUpdated(token,flowParams.sender,flowParams.receiver,flowParams.totalSenderFlowRate,totalReceiverFlowRate,flowParams.userData) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#738-745)
    Reentrancy in ConstantFlowAgreementV1._changeFlowToAddress(SuperfluidToken,address,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.flowParams,bytes1,SuperfluidContext,ConstantFlowAgreementV1.FlowChangeType) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#487-494):
        External calls:
            - AgreementLibrary.callAgreementForCall((chStates,ctx)) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#522)
                - (None,cbStates.applAllCensored,None) = _changeFlowToAddress(currentContext,timestamp,currentContext,applAllCensoredToken,token,flowParams.oldFlowData) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#522-525)
                    - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                        - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
                    - token.updateAgreementData(newStateData,flowParams.flowId,_encodeFlowData(newStateData)) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#716)
            Event emitted after the call();
        - flowUpdated(token,flowParams.sender,flowParams.receiver,flowParams.totalSenderFlowRate,totalReceiverFlowRate,flowParams.userData) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#738-745)
    FlowUpdate(token,flowParams.receiver,flowParams.oldFlowData,newFlow,_encodeFlowData(newStateData));
        - (None,cbStates.applAllowanceCensored,none) = _changeFlow(currentContext,timestamp,currentContext,applFlowRateToken,token,flowParams.oldFlowData) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#522-525)
    Reentrancy in ConstantFlowAgreementV1._makeLiquidationPayouts(token,availableBalance,flowParams.oldFlowData,currentContext,msgSender) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#232-237)
        External calls:
            - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
            - token.settleLiquidationPayouts(flowParams.flowId,liquidator,flowParams.sender,rewardAmount,scope,0,toInt256(),totalRewardLeft.mul(-1).toInt256()) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#796-802)
        - newCtx = _changeFlowToAddress(receiver,token,flowParams.oldFlowData,newCtx,currentContext,FlowChangeType.DELTE_FLOW) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#241-246)
            - isSuperfluidFlowing(sender).applyCallbackPop(ctx,applAllCensoredData) (contracts/agreements/agreementlibrary.sol#180-185)
            - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
            - newCtx = Superfluid(meg.sender).callAgreementCallback(token,superAppDefinitionInputs,superAppDefinitionOutputs,callData,inputs.noopBit = SuperAppDefinitions.AFTER AGREEMENT TERMINATED_NOOP,newCtx) (contracts/agreements/agreementlibrary.sol#231-238)
        - cdata = Superfluid(meg.sender).callAgreementCallback(token,superAppDefinitionInputs,callData,inputs.noopBit = SuperAppDefinitions.BEFORE AGREEMENT TERMINATED_NOOP,newCtx) (contracts/agreements/agreementlibrary.sol#299-301)
            - token.updateAgreementState(token,availableBalance,_encodeFlowData(newStateData)) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#535)
            - vars.chdr = AgreementLibrary.callAgreementForCall((chStates,newCtx)) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#540)
            - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
            - (vars.apcContext, None) = AgreementLibrary.callAgreementForCall((chStates,vars.chdr,newCtx)) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#538)
            - token.settleLiquidationPayouts(flowParams.flowId,liquidator,flowParams.sender,rewardAmount,scope,0,toInt256(),totalRewardLeft.mul(-1).toInt256()) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#796-800)
            - newCtx = Superfluid(meg.sender).callAgreementCallback(ctx,vars.apcContext,newCtx,superAppDefinitionInputs,superAppDefinitionOutputs,callData,inputs.noopBit = APP_RULE_NO_CRITICAL_RECEIVER_ACCOUNT) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#612-615)
            - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
            - token.settleBalance(flowParams.receiver,userDamagePenalty) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#626-629)
        Event emitted after the call();
        - flowUpdated(token,flowParams.receiver,flowParams.oldFlowData,newCtx,currentContext,FlowChangeType.DELTE_FLOW) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#243-246)
    Reentrancy in ConstantFlowAgreementV1._deleteFlow(isSuperfluidToken,address,bytes) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#196-208):
        - token.settleBalance(account,dynamicBalance) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
            - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
            - token.settleBalance(flowParams.oldFlowData,currentTimeContext) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424)
                - flowRate = CFI.flowRateOverflow - totalSenderFlowRate (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#435)
            - token.settleBalance(flowParams.oldFlowData,newCtx,currentContext) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424-425)
            - token.settleBalance(flowParams.oldFlowData,newCtx,currentContext) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424-425)
            - token.settleBalance(flowParams.oldFlowData,newCtx,currentContext) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#424-425)
        Event emitted after the call();
        - flowUpdated(token,flowParams.sender,flowParams.receiver,flowParams.oldFlowData,newCtx,currentContext,FlowChangeType.DELTE_FLOW) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#738-745)
    Reentrancy in ConstantFlowAgreementV1._changeFlowToAddress(SuperfluidToken,address,bytes) (contracts/agreements/constantflowagreementv1.sol#396-400):
        External calls:

```





InstandDistributionAgreementV1.sol AgreementBase.sol

# AUTOMATED TESTING

## Superfluid.sol



## SuperfluidGovernanceII.sol SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol

```

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
Constant SuperfluidGovConfigs.cFav1_1_ELECTION_PERIOD_COMMITTEE_KEY (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/Definitions.sol#107-168) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable Superfluid.superfluid (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#6) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid.MAX_APP_LEVEL (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#6) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._MAX_APP_LEVEL (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#6) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._gov (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#76) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._agreementClasses (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#73) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._superfluid (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#73) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._superTokenFactory (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#78) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._agreements (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#80) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._timestamp (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#80) is not in mixedCase
Variable Superfluid._appKeyUsed (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#80) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#solidity-naming-conventions
Superfluid._timestamp (Contracts/Interfaces/Superfluid.sol#3-104) uses literals with too many digits:
    - CALLBACK_gas_limit = 3000000 (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#3)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
SuperAppDefinitions.APP_LEVEL_FINAL (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#22) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP_LEVEL_SECON (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#25) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP_LEVEL_THIRD (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#28) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.AGREEMENT_CALLBACK_NOOP_BITMASKS (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#39) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.BEFORE AGREEMENT_CREATED_NOOP (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#43) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.BEFORE AGREEMENT_UPGRADED_NOOP (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#44) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.BEFORE AGREEMENT_UPDATED_NOOP (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#42) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.AFTER AGREEMENT_UPGRADED_NOOP (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#43) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.AFTER AGREEMENT_UPDATED_NOOP (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#44) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.AFTER AGREEMENT_TERMINATED_NOOP (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#42) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE NO_REGISTRATION_FOR_EOA (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#52) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE NO_REVERT_ON_TERMINATION_CALLBACK (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#53) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE NO_SELFDESTRUCT (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#54) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE CRITICAL_RECEIVER_ACCOUNT (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#55) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE CTR_IS_MALFORMED (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#56) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE COMPOSITE_APP_IS_NOT_WHITELISTED (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#59) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE DELEGATECALL_IS_NOT_WHITELISTED (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#60) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
SuperAppDefinitions.APP RULE LEVEL_REACHED (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#61) is never used in SuperAppDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-62)
ContextDefinitions.CALL_INFO_CALL_TYPE AGREEMENT (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#98) is never used in ContextDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-98)
ContextDefinitions.CALL_INFO_CALL_TYPE_CALLBACK (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#99) is never used in ContextDefinitions (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#7-99)
SuperfluidGovernanceConfigs.SUPERFLUID_MINIMUM_DEPOSIT_KEY (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#176-185) is never used in SuperfluidGovernanceConfig (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/Definitions.sol#182-191)
SuperfluidGovernanceConfigs.SUPERTOKEN_MINIMUM_DEPOSIT_KEY (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/definitions.sol#176-171) is never used in SuperfluidGovernanceConfig (contracts/interfaces/superfluid/Definitions.sol#182-191)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable

isApplicable(Superapp) should be declared external:
    - Proxy (contracts/superfluid/Superfluid.sol#294-403)
getCodeAtAddress() should be declared external:
    - UUPROXIMABLE.getCodeAtAddress() (contracts/upgradability/UUPROXIMABLE.sol#18)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

```

# AUTOMATED TESTING

## SuperToken.sol SuperfluidToken.sol



TOGA.sol

- No major issues were found by Slither. High-risk vulnerabilities detected are false positives.

ERC20 checks:

SuperToken.sol

The SuperToken contract is a standard ERC20 and ERC777 token.

```
# Check SuperToken
## Check functions
[v] totalSupply() is present
  [v] totalSupply() → () (correct return value)
[v] totalSupply() is view
[v] balanceOf(address) is present
  [v] balanceOf(address) is view
[v] transfer(address,uint256) is present
  [v] transfer(address,uint256) → () (correct return value)
  [v] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[v] transferFrom(address,address,uint256) is present
  [v] transferFrom(address,address,uint256) → () (correct return value)
  [v] TransferFrom(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[v] approve(address,uint256) is present
  [v] approve(address,uint256) → () (correct return value)
  [v] Approval(address,address,uint256) is emitted
[v] allowance(address,address) is present
  [v] allowance(address,address) → () (correct return value)
  [v] Allowance(address,address,address) is view
[v] name() is present
  [v] name() → () (correct return value)
  [v] Name() is view
[v] symbol() is present
  [v] symbol() → () (correct return value)
  [v] Symbol() is view
[v] decimals() is present
  [v] decimals() → () (correct return value)
  [v] Decimals() is view

## Check events
[v] Transfer(address,address,uint256) is present
  [v] parameter 0 is indexed
  [v] parameter 1 is indexed
[v] Approval(address,address,uint256) is present
  [v] parameter 0 is indexed
  [v] parameter 1 is indexed

[v] SuperToken has increaseAllowance(address,uint256)
```

As we can see above, the token properly follows the standards.

## 5.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on all the contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

### MythX results:

#### BatchLiquidator.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

#### ConstantFlowAgreementV1.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
24	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
109	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

#### Definitions.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
40	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
41	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
42	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
43	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
44	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
45	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
130	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
139	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
149	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
159	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered

#### InstandDistributionAgreementV1.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
25	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
1000	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

#### MaticBridgedNativeSuperToken.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
35	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

### NativeSuperToken.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
26	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
32	(SWC-113) DoS with Failed Call	Low	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

### Superfluid.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
301	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.
352	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.

### SuperfluidGovernanceBase.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
41	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
41	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	A call to a user-supplied address is executed.

### SuperfluidOwnableGovernance.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
13	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

### Superupgrader.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
36	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
37	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
38	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
105	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
106	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access

### TOGA.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
171	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
171	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
178	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
185	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
241	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
249	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
251	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered

### TokenCustodian.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
47	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered

- The floating pragma flagged by MythX is a false positive, as the pragma is set in the `truffle-config.js` file to the `0.7.6` version.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING  
 HALBORN