

# Macroeconomics A; EI056

## Short problems

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### 1 Drivers of the unemployment rate

#### 1.1 Getting the data

**Question:** We consider the drivers of the US unemployment rate since 2007. The first step is to get the data. To do so:

1. Go on the website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics <https://www.bls.gov/>
2. Under “subjects” in the blue banner, select “national unemployment rate” <https://www.bls.gov/cps/>
3. Scroll down to “CPI databases”, Under the “one screen” search.
4. In fields 1 to 6 select “all” (the first entry), the in field 7 take “civilian non-institutional population”, “civilian labor force”, and “employed”. Take monthly values since January 2000.

To make you life simpler, from step 2 you can scroll further down to “More tools → series report” ( <https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate> ) to just input the series codes. The codes are

- LNS10000000 for working age population.
- LNS11000000 for labor force.
- LNS12000000 for employment.

Compute the labor force participation rate, the unemployment rate, and the employment population ratio. Illustrate them as charts since January 2007.

#### 1.2 Decomposing changes in the unemployment rate: the global financial crisis

**Question:** Show that the unemployment rate  $ur_t$  can be written as a function of the labor force participation  $lfpr_t$  and the employment-population ratio  $epr_t$ :

$$ur_t = 1 - \frac{epr_t}{lfpr_t}$$

With this formula, we can compute changes in the unemployment rate from a period  $t$  forward into periods  $t + h$ . Specifically, we compute the effective change (the one in the data), the change

if  $epr_t$  remains at its value of period  $t$  (i.e. unemployment rate at constant epr), and the change if  $lfpr_t$  remains at its value of period  $t$  (i.e. constant unemployment rate at constant participation):

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta u_{t+h}^{\text{effective}} &= ur_{t+h} - ur_t \\ \Delta u_{t+h}^{\text{constant epr}} &= \left(1 - \frac{epr_t}{lfpr_{t+h}}\right) - ur_t \\ \Delta u_{t+h}^{\text{constant lfpr}} &= \left(1 - \frac{epr_{t+h}}{lfpr_t}\right) - ur_t\end{aligned}$$

Compute these three measures of unemployment rate starting from  $t$  is January 2007, until  $t+h$  being December 2016. How have changes in participation impacted the unemployment rate during the global financial crisis?

### 1.3 Decomposing changes in the unemployment rate: Covid

**Question:** Compute the same three measures of unemployment rate changes as above, but this time starting from  $t$  is January 2019, until  $t+h$  being November 2022 (the last observation) How have changes in participation impacted the unemployment rate during the Covid crisis?

## 2 Wage bargaining

### 2.1 Value of states and surpluses

**Question:** Consider the model where unemployed people and firms connect through a matching function.

A worker can be employed, which has a value  $V_E$ . In that case she gets a wage  $w$ . With exogenous probability  $\lambda$  she can become unemployed, which has a value  $V_U$ . If unemployed the person collects benefits  $b$  and with probability  $a$  can find a job. Using the discount factor  $\rho$  we write:

$$\begin{aligned}\rho V_E &= w + \lambda(V_U - V_E) \\ \rho V_U &= b + a(V_E - V_U)\end{aligned}$$

A firm can post a vacant position, which can be in two states. It can be filled, with a value  $V_F$ , in which case the firm gets output produced by the worker,  $y$ , net of the wage  $w$  and the cost of having the position (cost of the desk and computer),  $c$ . The position can be ended with exogenous probability  $\lambda$ , in which case it becomes an unfilled vacant position. When unfilled, with value  $V_V$ , the position still costs  $c$ , but can be filled by a worker with probability  $\alpha$ . Using the discount factor  $\rho$  we write:

$$\begin{aligned}\rho V_F &= y - w - c + \lambda(V_V - V_F) \\ \rho V_V &= -c + \alpha(V_F - V_V)\end{aligned}$$

We compute the surpluses of filling a position for the worker, and for the firm (the value of a filled position compared to the alternative). Show that these are, for the worker and the firm:

$$\begin{aligned}V_E - V_U &= \frac{w - b}{\lambda + \rho + a} \\ V_F - V_V &= \frac{y - w}{\lambda + \rho + \alpha}\end{aligned}$$

## 2.2 Split of surpluses

**Question:** The wage is set to allocate the total surplus (sum of the worker's and firm's surpluses) between the two parties.

Assume that the worker gets a share  $\phi$  of the total surplus, which this parameter reflecting her bargaining power.

Show that the wage is:

$$\begin{aligned}w &= b + \Phi \phi (y - b) \\ \Phi &= 1 - \frac{(\alpha - a)(1 - \phi)}{\lambda + \rho + a + (\alpha - a)(1 - \phi)}\end{aligned}$$

What is the interpretation of  $y - b$ ?

Interpret the coefficient  $\Phi$ . Think first of the case where  $\alpha = a$ , and then of the case where  $\alpha < a$ .