

## L3. Classical Demand Theory

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EI037: Microeconomics, Fall 2021



### Literature

- MWG (1995), Chapter 3
- Kreps (1990), Chapter 2, Varian (1992), Chapters 7 - 8



## Big Picture

We now apply the preference-based approach to demand theory in order to see what additional properties can be derived.

In this approach, we 'know' the consumer's preference over  $\forall$  commodity bundles in the commodity set  $X = \mathbb{R}_+^L$ .

We impose some assumptions on consumer's preference  $\succeq$ .

1.  $\succeq$  on  $X$  is **rational**. (preference has to be "reasonable")
2.  $\succeq$  on  $X$  is **monotone**. (desirability)
3.  $\succeq$  on  $X$  is **convex**. (trade-offs between consumption bundles)
4.  $\succeq$  is **continuous**. (ensure the existence of a utility function)

→ Assumptions 2,3,4 are new. We first get ourselves familiar with these concepts.

## Preferences and Utility Functions

**Definition 3.1** A preference relation  $\succeq$  on  $X$  is **rational** if it is **complete** and **transitive**.

### Matrix Notation

- $y \geq x$  means that  $y_l \geq x_l$  for all  $l \in \{1, \dots, L\}$ .
- $y > x$  means that  $y_l \geq x_l$  for all  $l \in \{1, \dots, L\}$  and  $y_k > x_k$  for at least one  $k \in \{1, \dots, L\}$ .
- $y \gg x$  means that  $y_l > x_l$  for all  $l \in \{1, \dots, L\}$
- $\|y - x\| = \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^L (y_l - x_l)^2}$

↳ **Euclidean Distance**




**Definition 3.2** A preference relation  $\succeq$  on  $X$  is

"Weaker"

- **strongly monotone** if  $x, y \in X$  and  $y > x$  implies  $y \succ x$ .
  - **monotone** if  $x, y \in X$  and  $y \gg x$  implies  $y \succ x$ .
  - **locally non-satiated** if for every  $x \in X$  and every  $\epsilon > 0$ ,  $\exists y \in X$  such that  $\|y - x\| \leq \epsilon$  and  $y \succ x$ .

## Interpretation and graphical illustration of monotonicity and non-satiation.

## Desirability



→ For  $T > x_*$ , from strongly monotone to non-satiation, we have weaker and weaker requirement on "sufficient" location of  $T$ .

→ i.e. Denote the Fellow area. as  $S$ . If preference is strictly monotone then  $\forall T \in S$ . We have  $T \succ X$ .

- But if  $\geq$  is monotone, this is not true, only  $\forall T \in S' (S' \subset S) \Rightarrow T \succ x$
  - If  $\geq$  is locally nonsatiated. Even  $T \in S'$  is not necessary have  $T \succ x$ .

→ Note Not in other areas. (like the orange area)  
we say nothing about

- Strong monotonicity implies monotonicity.  $\textcircled{1} \because y \gg x \Rightarrow y > x$  i.e. If  $\gg$  is strongly monotone
  - Monotonicity implies local non-satiation.  $\textcircled{2}$  we must have  $y \gg x \Rightarrow y > x$
  - Non-satiation implies that indifference curves cannot be "thick". i.e. satisfy the definition


② If  $\geq$  is monotone, then  $\forall x, y \in X. \& \Gamma \gg x \Rightarrow \Gamma \gg y$

$\therefore \forall x \in X$ , we must have  $x + \bar{E} \gg x$  ( $\bar{E} \gg \|\bar{E}\| = \varepsilon$ )

$$\Rightarrow x + \bar{e} > x. \quad \text{i.e. } \cancel{x > x}$$

let  $\gamma \equiv x + \bar{\epsilon}$ . i.e.  $\exists \gamma \in X$  such that  $\|\gamma - x\| \leq \bar{\epsilon}$ ,  $\gamma > x$ .


### ③ Proof by contradiction



**Definition 3.3** The preference relation  $\succeq$  is **(strictly) convex** if for every  $x \in X$  the upper contour set  $\{y \in X | y \succeq x\}$  is (strictly) convex; i.e., if  $y \succeq x$  and  $z \succeq x$ , then  $\alpha y + (1 - \alpha)z \succeq (\succ) x$  for any  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ .

Interpretation and graphical illustration of convexity.

- Strong but central hypothesis in micro
- implies "Diminishing marginal rate of substitution"  
or "love of variety"
- Implies a well-behaved indifference curve, so optimization problem is easy.



**Definition 3.4** The preference relation  $\succeq$  is **continuous** if for any sequence of pairs  $\{x^n, y^n\}_{n=0}^\infty$  with  $x^n \succeq y^n$  for all  $n$ ,  $x = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n$  and  $y = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} y^n$ , we have  $x \succeq y$ .

**Note**

- Continuity implies that indifference curves cannot have jumps. Show this using the definition of continuity.
- Consider the lexicographic preference relation in the two goods case, i.e.,  $X = \mathbb{R}_+^2$  and  $x \succeq y$  if and only if  $x_1 > y_1$  or  $x_1 = y_1$  and  $x_2 \geq y_2$ . Are these preferences continuous?

$$\# \quad x^n = (1 + \frac{1}{n}, 1) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n = (1, 1) = x \\ y^n = (1, 2) \quad \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} y^n = (1, 2) = y.$$

By lexicographic preference.

$x^n \succ y^n \quad \forall n$ . But  $x \not\succ y$ .  $\therefore$  violate continuity.

**Proposition 3.1** Suppose that  $X = \mathbb{R}_+^L$ . If  $\succeq$  is rational, monotone and continuous. Then there is a utility function  $u(x)$  that represents  $\succeq$ .

**Proof sketch:** We give a graphical sketch of the proof. The proof is constructive, i.e., it shows how a utility function that represents  $\succeq$  can be constructed if  $\succeq$  is rational, monotone and continuous.




Figure: Figure 3.1: Construction of a utility function

Proof by construction.

S1. Denote the diagonal ray in  $\mathbb{R}_+^L$  by  $Z$

S2. let  $e = (1, \dots, 1)$ .

Then Every point in  $Z$ , can be write as  $\alpha \cdot e$  (with  $\alpha \geq 0$ )

Let  $U(\alpha e) = \alpha$

S3. Pick  $\forall x \in X = \{x \mid x \geq 0\}$ , i.e. from the commodity set.

By monotonicity. we know  $x' > x$ .  $0 < x$ .

S4. By continuity & monotonicity. we then know there is a single value (Denote by  $x''$ ) at  $Z$ -ray, and located between  $x'$  and  $0$  such that  $x'' \sim x$ .

$\therefore U(x)$  is simply assigned to the value of  $U(x'')$ .

In the following we will assume that the consumer's preferences satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3.1 and that his utility function is continuous and at least twice continuously differentiable.

Given the consumer's utility function his decision problem can now be expressed as a **utility maximization problem (UMP)**:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{x \geq 0} u(x) \\ \text{s.t. } & p \cdot x \leq w \end{aligned}$$

**Proposition 3.2** If  $p \gg 0$  and  $u(\cdot)$  is continuous, then the utility maximization problem has a solution.

55. We can do this for all  $x \in X$ .

Hence we finished the construction.

Proof: WMG proposition 3.D.1. Page 51

Not cover in class.

Let  $x(p, w)$  be the solution to UMP. This is called the Walrasian (sometimes also Marshallian) **demand correspondence**. If  $x(p, w)$  is unique for all  $(p, w)$ , then it is called the **demand function**.

**Proposition 3.3** The demand correspondence  $x(p, w)$  satisfies the following properties:

- a) Homogeneity of degree 0 in  $(p, w)$
- b) Walras' Law
- c) If  $\succeq$  is strictly convex, then  $x(p, w)$  is unique for all  $(p, w)$ .

proof. a).  $\therefore x^* = \arg \max U(x)$   
 $\quad \quad \quad px \leq w$

when  $p \rightarrow \alpha p$ ,  $w \rightarrow \alpha w$ . the problem becomes

$$x^* = \arg \max U(x)$$
$$\alpha px \leq \alpha w$$

$\therefore \alpha$  get canceled out. the optimization prob didn't change

$$\therefore x(p, w) = x^* = x(\alpha p, \alpha w) \text{. i.e. homo. o'}$$

Proof:

b) Proof by contradiction.

If  $x^* = x(p, w)$ , and  $p \cdot x^* < w$ .

By Local non-satiation.  $\exists x' > x^*$  and  $p \cdot x' < w$

Violate  $x^* \max_u u(x)$ . s.t.  $p \cdot x \leq w$ . (Definition of  $x(p, w)$ )

c) ... contradiction. Suppose solution is not unique,  $x \neq x'$ .

then  $\geq$  strict convex implies that  $x'' = \alpha x + (1-\alpha)x' > x \sim x'$

$$p \cdot x'' = \alpha p \cdot x + (1-\alpha)p \cdot x' \leq \alpha w + (1-\alpha)w = w$$

$\therefore x'' > x, x'$  and also available at budget set

c) violate.  $x, x'$  maximize  $u(\cdot)$  s.t. constraint

How to solve the UMP:  $\rightarrow$  And derive our demand func?

1. The Lagrange function is

$$\mathcal{L} = u(x) - \lambda[p \cdot x - w]$$

2. The Lagrange Theorem ensures that

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial u(x^*)}{\partial x_i} - \lambda p_i \leq 0$$

L Eq.

$\rightarrow$  Write in matrix  
 $\nabla u(x^*) - \lambda p \leq 0$

with equality if  $x_i^* > 0$ .

$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = 0 \Rightarrow$  Budget Constraint

3. By Walras' Law,  $p \cdot x = w$  must hold,  $\therefore$  must be hold with Equality.

$\Rightarrow L+1$  equations and  $L+1$  unknowns, we can solve the system!

- Interpretation of  $\lambda$ ?

$$\lambda = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial w} |_{x^*} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial w}$$

By increase one unit of welfare. How many  $u \uparrow$   
 "shadow price" of one dollar, in terms of utility.

- Interpretation of  $[\nabla u(x^*) - \lambda p] = 0$ ?

$$\text{Notation: } \nabla u(x^*) = \left( \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1}, \dots, \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_L} \right)$$

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_i} = \lambda p_i$$

the marginal utility of buying one more unit of  $x_i$ , at optimal point

must equal to the marginal cost (i.e.  $\lambda p_i$ , the shadow price of money times how many money need to buy one unit  $x_i$ )

## The Indirect Utility Function

Let  $v(p, w) = u(x^*)$  for any  $x^* \in x(p, w)$ . Thus,  $v(p, w)$  is the highest level of utility that the consumer can achieve given  $(p, w)$ . This is called the **indirect utility function**.

**Proposition 3.4** The indirect utility function  $v(p, w) = u(x^*)$  satisfies the following properties:

- (a) Homogeneity of degree 0 in  $(p, w)$ .
- (b) Strictly increasing in  $w$
- (c) Nonincreasing in  $p_l$  for any  $l$

**Proof:**

a) Because  $x(p, w)$  is homo. 0.


$$\text{i.e. } x(p, w) = x(\alpha p, \alpha w)$$

$$\therefore v(p, w) = u(x(p, w)) = u(x(\alpha p, \alpha w)) = v(\alpha p, \alpha w)$$

b)  $\because w \uparrow$  By local non-satiation

$$\nexists x' \in B', x' > x.$$


$$\therefore v(p, w') > v(p, w)$$



c)  $p_l \uparrow$  .... local non-satiation

$$\nexists x' \in B'. x' \succ x. (x' \succ x \text{ if } x_l(p, w) \neq 0)$$

$$\therefore v(p', w) = u(x'(p', w)) \geq u(x) = v(p, w)$$



**Proposition 3.5 (Roy's Identity)** Suppose that  $v(p, w)$  is differentiable at  $(p, w)$ . Then for every  $l = 1, \dots, L$ :

$$\underline{x_l(p, w)} = -\frac{\frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial p_l}}{\frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial w}}$$

Marshallian  
Demand func.

**Proof:**

① Write down Lagrangian.

$$L = u(x) - \lambda(p_x - w)$$

By Envelope Theorem

$$\therefore \frac{\partial V}{\partial p_l} \bigg|_{\mathbb{B}} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial p_l} \bigg|_{\mathbb{B}} = -\lambda x_l \bigg|_{\mathbb{B}} = -\lambda x_l(p, w)$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial w} \bigg|_{\mathbb{B}} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial w} \bigg|_{\mathbb{B}} = \lambda$$

$$\therefore x_l(p, w) = -\frac{\partial V / \partial p_l}{\partial V / \partial w}$$

### [Recall] Envelope theorem

For a constraint maximization problem

$$\max_x f(x, \alpha) \text{ subject to } g_j(x, \alpha) \geq 0, j = 1, 2, \dots, m \text{ and } x \geq 0.$$

The Lagrangian expression of this problem is given by

$$\mathcal{L}(x, \lambda, \alpha) = f(x, \alpha) + \lambda \cdot g(x, \alpha).$$

where  $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^m$  are the Lagrange multipliers. Now let  $x^*(\alpha)$  and  $\lambda^*(\alpha)$  together be the solution that maximizes the function  $f$  subject to the  $m$  constraints. Define the value function

$$V(\alpha) \equiv f(x^*(\alpha), \alpha).$$

Envelope Theorem: Assume that  $V$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  are continuously differentiable. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial V(\alpha)}{\partial \alpha_k} &= \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^*(\alpha)}{\partial \alpha_k} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(x^*(\alpha), \lambda^*(\alpha), \alpha)}{\partial \alpha_k}, k = 1, 2, \dots, l \\ &= \mathcal{L}_x^* \underbrace{\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial \alpha_k}}_{=0 \text{ at the FOC point}} + \mathcal{L}_\lambda^* \underbrace{\frac{\partial \lambda^*}{\partial \alpha_k}}_{=0} + \mathcal{L}_{\alpha_k}^* = \mathcal{L}_{\alpha_k}^* \end{aligned}$$

### Remarks

1. To interpret the result, it is useful to write

$$\frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial p_l} = -x_l(p, w) \frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial w}$$

Suppose that price  $p_l$  is reduced marginally by  $\Delta p_l$ . This gives additional "income"  $\Delta p_l \cdot x_l(p, w)$  to the consumer. The marginal utility of a Dollar is the same for all goods and equal to  $\frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial w}$ . Hence, the price reduction increases the consumer's utility by  $\Delta p_l x_l(p, w) \frac{\partial v(p, w)}{\partial w}$ .

2. Roy's Identity is very useful. If we know the indirect utility function, then it is much easier to derive the demand function from indirect utility than from the direct utility function.

$$\begin{aligned} p_i x_i' &= p_i x_i' + \Delta p_i x_i' \\ \Delta p_i &= \Delta x_i \end{aligned}$$


## The Dual Problem: Expenditure Minimization

Instead of maximizing the utility level for a given budget constraint, the consumer could also minimize his expenditures subject to the constraint that he achieves at least a given level of utility  $u$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \min_x p \cdot x \\ \text{s.t. } u(x) \geq u \end{aligned}$$

The **expenditure minimization problem (EMP)** is the dual problem to UMP: It reverses the roles of the objective function and the constraint.

However, the EMP also characterizes the efficient use of resources by the consumer. In fact, EMP and UMP are basically equivalent:



**Proposition 3.6** Suppose that  $p \gg 0$ .

- (a) If  $x^*$  is optimal in UMP when wealth is  $w > 0$ , then  $x^*$  is optimal in EMP when the required utility level is  $u(x^*)$ .
- (b) If  $x^*$  is optimal in EMP when the required utility level is  $u$ , then  $x^*$  is optimal in UMP when wealth is  $w = p \cdot x^*$ .

**Proof:** We only prove (a).


- a) i). Suppose  $x^*$  is not optimal in EMP with required utility level being  $U(x^*)$ . Then  $\exists x'$  such that  $U(x') \geq U(x^*)$ , and  $p \cdot x' < p \cdot x^* \leq w$ . i.e. there are some other  $x'$  is less costly than  $x^*$ , and yet deliver no lower utility than  $x^*$ .

ii) By local <sup>non-</sup>satiation. We can then find  $x''$  very close to  $x$ , such that  $U(x'') > U(x')$ , &  $p \cdot x'' < w$ . But this implies

$x'' \in B_{p,w}$ , and  $U(x'') > U(x^*)$ , contradicting the optimality of  $x^*$  in EMP.

Q.E.D.

- b) Can be proved in similar way.



The solution to EMP is denoted by  $h(p, u)$  and is called the **Hicksian (or compensated) demand correspondence**, or function, if  $h(p, u)$  is single-valued. Illustrate  $h(p, u)$  graphically.

**Proposition 3.7** For any  $p \gg 0$  the Hicksian demand correspondence  $h(p, u)$  has the following properties:

- (a) Homogeneity of degree 0 in  $p$ .
- (b) No excess utility: For any  $x \in h(p, u)$ ,  $u(x) = u$
- (c) If  $\succeq$  is strictly convex then there is a unique solution to EMP for all  $(p, u)$

**Proof:** Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.3.

- a). Given  $u$ , slope of  $p$  not change  $\Rightarrow$  same  $x^*$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{or } \arg \min_x p \cdot x \\ \text{s.t. } u(x) \geq u \end{aligned} \Leftrightarrow \begin{aligned} \arg \min_x \alpha \cdot p \cdot x \\ \text{s.t. } u(x) \geq u \end{aligned}$$

c) ... contradiction

If  $x, x' \in h(p, u)$

then  $x'' = \alpha x + (1-\alpha)x'$ ,

$u(x'') > u(x) = u(x')$

$p \cdot x'' = p \cdot x = p \cdot x'$

From b). No excess utility.

$\exists x''$  such that  $u(p \cdot x'') \geq u$ .

$p \cdot x'' < p \cdot x$

Violate  $x$  is EMP solution

- b). Proof By contradiction. ~~If  $u(x) \geq u$~~ . Then by  $p \gg 0$ , and  $\geq$  is monotone. Suppose  $\exists x \in h(p, u)$  such that  $u(x) > u$ . Consider a bundle  $x' = \alpha x$  ( $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ ). By continuity, for  $\alpha$  close enough to 1,  $u(x') \geq u$  and  $p \cdot x' < p \cdot x$ . contradict  $x$  is the EMP solution

An important property of the Hicksian demand function is that it satisfies the **compensated law of demand**.

**Proposition 3.8** Suppose that  $h(p, u)$  is single valued for all  $p \gg 0$ . Then the Hicksian demand function satisfies the compensated law of demand, i.e., for all  $p'$  and  $p''$

$$(p'' - p') \cdot [h(p'', u) - h(p', u)] \leq 0.$$

**Proof:**

$\because h(p, u)$  solves  $E(p, u)$  for price vector  $p \gg 0$

Then:

$$\begin{cases} p'' h(p'', u) \leq p'' h(p', u) & \text{①} \\ p' h(p', u) \geq p' h(p'', u) & \text{②} \end{cases}$$

① - ②. We get our results.

By definition of  $h(p, u)$ , i.e.  
 $h(p'')$  must be the ... bundle  
 that cost the least under price  
 $p''$ , and  
 utility object  
 $u$ .

Let  $e(p, u) = p \cdot x^*$ , where  $x^* \in h(p, u)$ , be the **expenditure function** of the consumer.

**Proposition 3.9** The expenditure function  $e(p, u)$  is

- (a) homogenous of degree one in  $p$ ,
- (b) strictly increasing in  $u$ ,
- (c) nondecreasing in  $p_l$  for any  $l$ ,
- (d) concave in  $p$ .

Intuition for these results? Explain (d) graphically.

(a) to (c) are straightforward and left as an exercise. We only prove (d),

a)  $\because h(p, u)$  is homogenous 0.

$$\begin{aligned} e(\alpha p, u) &= \alpha p \cdot h(\alpha p, u) & [\text{Definition of } e] \\ &= \alpha p h(p, u) & [h \text{ ... 0}] \\ &\text{i.e. homo... 1.} \end{aligned}$$

b. c.) proof by contradiction (similar to  $v(p, w)$ )

**Proof:** Consider two price vectors  $p'$  and  $p''$ . Let  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$  and  $\bar{p} = \alpha p' + (1 - \alpha)p''$ . We have to show:

$$e(\bar{p}, u) \geq \alpha e(p', u) + (1 - \alpha)e(p'', u)$$


Let  $x', x''$  and  $\bar{x}$  be the solutions to EMP at prices  $p', p''$ , and  $\bar{p}$  respectively. It must be the case that:

$$\sum_{l=1}^L p'_l x'_l = e(p', u)$$

$$\sum_{l=1}^L p''_l x''_l = e(p'', u)$$

$$\sum_{l=1}^L \bar{p}_l \bar{x}_l = e(\bar{p}, u)$$

Since  $x'$  and  $x''$  minimize expenditures at prices  $p'$  and  $p''$ , we have:



$$\sum_{l=1}^L p'_l \bar{x}_l \geq \sum_{l=1}^L p'_l x'_l$$

$$\sum_{l=1}^L p''_l \bar{x}_l \geq \sum_{l=1}^L p''_l x''_l$$

Example.

You prefer supermarket.

15 days. have price

[3, 1]

15 days

[1, 3]

or Always [2, 2]?

① Start from  $\bar{p}$

If  $p \rightarrow p'$ . But stay in consumption bundle  $\bar{x}$

$p' \bar{x}$ . But consumer can do better

Multiplying the first inequality with  $\alpha$  and the second one with  $(1 - \alpha)$  and adding up both inequalities yields:

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha e(p', u) + (1 - \alpha)e(p'', u) \\ & \leq \alpha p'_l \bar{x}_l + (1 - \alpha)p''_l \bar{x}_l \\ & = \bar{p}_l \bar{x}_l \end{aligned}$$

Hence:

$$\sum_{l=1}^L [\alpha p'_l \bar{x}_l + (1 - \alpha)p''_l \bar{x}_l] \geq \sum_{l=1}^L \alpha p'_l x'_l + \sum_{l=1}^L (1 - \alpha)p''_l x''_l$$

$$\begin{aligned} e(\bar{p}, u) &= \sum_{l=1}^L \bar{p}_l \bar{x}_l \\ &\geq \sum_{l=1}^L \alpha p'_l x'_l + \sum_{l=1}^L (1 - \alpha)p''_l x''_l \\ &= \alpha \cdot e(p', u) + (1 - \alpha)e(p'', u) \end{aligned}$$

Q.E.D.



intuition. ①  $p' = \beta p''$   
then  $\bar{x}$  does not change.

$e' = \beta e'' \quad \because e = \alpha e' + (1 - \alpha)e''$   
Hold.

case ②  $p' \neq \beta p''$ . there are some relative price changes

The expenditure function can easily be derived from the Hicksian demand function by  $e(p, u) = p \cdot h(p, u)$ . However, the following result shows that we can also derive the Hicksian demand function from the expenditure function:

**Proposition 3.10 (Shephard's Lemma)** Suppose that  $h(p, u) \gg 0$  is single valued and differentiable. Then

$$h_l(p, u) = \frac{\partial e(p, u)}{\partial p_l}$$

for all  $l = 1, \dots, L$

**Proof:**

$$\begin{aligned} & \min p \cdot x \\ \text{s.t. } & u(x) \geq u \\ \therefore L = & p \cdot x + \lambda [u - u(x)] \\ \text{By Envelope Theorem.} \\ \therefore \frac{\partial e}{\partial p_l} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial p_l} \Big|_{*} & = x_l \Big|_{*} = h_l(p, u) \end{aligned}$$

**Remarks:**

1. Interpretation: In finite approximation Shephard's Lemma says:

$$\Delta e(p, u) = h_l(p, u) \cdot \Delta p_l$$

If the price for good  $l$  increases by  $\Delta p_l$ , then the consumer has to pay  $\Delta p_l h_l(p, u)$  in addition, in order to buy the same consumption bundle that he consumed before the price change. If  $\Delta p_l$  is very small, then this is also the amount necessary to get back to the old utility level  $u$ . The reason is that for small price changes and starting from an optimally chosen consumption bundle the substitution effects can be ignored.

2. Shephard's Lemma is very useful. If we know the expenditure function, it is much simpler to derive the Hicksian demand function via  $e(p, u)$  than to derive it from the direct utility function.

Shephard's Lemma has several important implications that are summarized in the next proposition.

**Proposition 3.11** Suppose that  $h(p, u)$  is single valued and continuously differentiable at  $(p, u)$ , and denote its  $L \times L$  derivative matrix by  $D_p h(p, u)$ . Then

- (a)  $D_p h(p, u) = D_p^2 e(p, u)$
- (b)  $D_p h(p, u)$  is a negative semidefinite matrix,
- (c)  $D_p h(p, u)$  is a symmetric matrix,
- (d)  $D_p h(p, u) \cdot p = 0$

a) Directly from Shephard's lemma  
as " $h(p, u) = D_p \cdot e(p, u)$ "

b) Comes from the fact that  
 $e(p, u)$  is concave, and twice  
continuously differentiable.

⇒  $D_p^2 e(p, u)$  is a symmetric & ... matrix  
(WMG Appendix C)

**Proof:**

d). Note  $h(p, u)$  is of homo. 0° in  $p$ .

$$\therefore h(\alpha p, u) - h(p, u) = 0, \forall \alpha$$

Differentiate this Expression w.r.t.  $\alpha$

$$\Rightarrow D_p h(\alpha p, u) \cdot p = 0, \forall \alpha$$

$$\text{Let } \alpha = 1 \Rightarrow D_p h(p, u) \cdot p = 0$$

d)'s Matrix Notation

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial h_1}{\partial p_1} & \dots & \frac{\partial h_1}{\partial p_L} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial h_L}{\partial p_1} & \dots & \frac{\partial h_L}{\partial p_L} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} p_1 \\ \vdots \\ p_L \end{bmatrix} = 0$$

ith entry :=  
 $\sum_L \frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_L} p_L = 0$

**Remarks:**

1. Negative semidefiniteness of  $D_p h(p, u)$  is again the compensated law of demand. See Lecture 2! In particular, it implies that  $\frac{\partial h_i(p, u)}{\partial p_i} \leq 0$ , i.e., the own substitution effect is non-positive.
2. Symmetry of  $D_p h(p, u)$  requires that

$$\frac{\partial h_i(p, u)}{\partial p_k} = \frac{\partial h_k(p, u)}{\partial p_i}$$

This is not obvious and it is difficult to give an intuitive explanation for this unexpected result. We know already that symmetry of this matrix is not implied by the weak axiom. It is an additional property of the preference based approach.

3. If  $\frac{\partial h_i(p, u)}{\partial p_k} \geq 0$  then goods  $i$  and  $k$  are substitutes. If  $\frac{\partial h_i(p, u)}{\partial p_k} < 0$ , then they are called complements. Property (d) implies that for each good there exists at least one substitute. This follows immediately from  $\frac{\partial h_i(p, u)}{\partial p_i} \leq 0$ .

Note all these as d) implies  $\sum_i \frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_L} p_L = 0 \quad \forall i$

is under condition

$\bar{u}$  stay the same. As  $\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_i} p_i \leq 0$ . must have at least one  $i$   $\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial p_L} p_L > 0$

intuition:  $p_k \triangleright$  own substitution effect  
(Proof by contradiction) is negative,  $\therefore x_k \downarrow$

If all goods are complements,  $x_i \downarrow$  for all  $i$ , then  $x^{\text{new}} \subset x^{\text{old}}$ ,  $u$  must  $\downarrow$  by preference

next lecture

The Hicksian demand function is a very useful concept. It is particularly important when it comes to the evaluation of welfare changes. But, the Hicksian demand function is not directly observable. However, the following proposition shows that the Hicksian demand function  $h(p, u)$  can be derived from the observable demand function  $x(p, w)$ .

**Proposition 3.12 (Slutsky Equation)** Suppose that  $h(p, u)$  and  $x(p, w)$  are single valued and differentiable. Then for all  $(p, w)$  and  $u = v(p, w)$  we have

$$\frac{\partial h_l(p, u)}{\partial p_k} = \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial w} \cdot x_k(p, w).$$

Proof:

$$h_l(p, u) = x_l(p, \underbrace{e(p, u)}_{w \equiv e(p, u) \text{ as the dual problem}})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \therefore \frac{\partial h_l}{\partial p_k} &= \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial p_k} \\ &= \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial w} \underbrace{\frac{\partial e(p, u)}{\partial p_k}}_{\downarrow} \\ &= \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_l}{\partial w} \cdot \underbrace{x_k(p, w)}_{\text{shephard's lemma}} \end{aligned}$$

QDE

## Remarks

1. The Slutsky Equation shows how the properties of the unobservable Hicksian demand function translate to the observable demand function.

2. In particular, the Slutsky Equation implies

$$\frac{\partial h_l(p, u)}{\partial p_l} = \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial p_l} + \frac{\partial x_l(p, w)}{\partial w} \cdot x_l(p, w) \leq 0 \quad (\text{recall } \frac{\partial h}{\partial p} \text{ negative semi-definite})$$

3. If good  $l$  is a normal good ( $\partial x_l / \partial w > 0$ ), then an increase in  $p_l$  reduces the Hicksian demand by less than the (Walrasian) demand. In the usual demand diagram (with  $p$  on the vertical axis), the Hicksian demand function is steeper than the (Walrasian) demand function.

4. If good  $l$  is an inferior good ( $\partial x_l / \partial w < 0$ ), then an increase in  $p_l$  reduces the Hicksian demand by more than the (Walrasian) demand. In the usual demand diagram (with  $p$  on the vertical axis), the Hicksian demand function is less steep than the (Walrasian) demand function. A good can be a Giffen good only if it is inferior.

5. The Slutsky Equation implies that the matrix of price derivatives of the Hicksian demand function,  $D_p h(p, u)$  is equal to the Slutsky matrix  $S(p, w)$  that we know already from Lecture 2. Note, however, that we derived the Slutsky matrix in Lecture 2 by using a different compensation rule for the consumer:

point 3. 4


$$\frac{\partial X}{\partial p} = \frac{\partial h}{\partial p} - \frac{\partial X_L}{\partial w} X$$

Note :  $\frac{\partial h}{\partial p} < 0$

$\frac{\partial x}{\partial p} < \frac{\partial b}{\partial p}$  if  $x$  is normal good , Also ,  $\frac{\partial x}{\partial p}$  for sure  $< 0$

$\frac{dX}{dp} > \frac{dh}{dp}$  if  $X$  is interval good,  $\frac{dX}{dp}$  could be  $< 0$ , or  $> 0$

⇒ Usual Demand Diagram (P on vertical axis)



- In Lecture 2 (choice based approach), we compensated the consumer for the price change by adjusting his wealth level so that he can still afford his old consumption bundle (Slutsky compensation). VIP

- Here (preference based approach) we compensate the consumer by adjusting his wealth so that he can still afford his old utility level (Hicks compensation).

$$(p', w') \geq u^{\text{old}}$$

Nevertheless, Proposition 3.12 shows that for small price changes the effect of both compensation rules is identical!

## Putting it All Together

Because UMP and EMP are basically equivalent, we have:

$$1. x_I(p, w) = h_I(p, v(p, w))$$

The Walrasian demand at wealth  $w$  is equal to the Hicksian demand if the consumer wants to achieve at least the utility  $v(p, w)$ .

$$2. h_I(p, u) = x_I(p, e(p, u))$$

The Hicksian demand at utility level  $u$  is equal to the Walrasian demand if the consumer's wealth is equal to  $e(p, u)$ .

$$3. v(p, e(p, u)) = u$$

The indirect utility function is strictly increasing in  $w$ . Thus we can invert  $v(p, \cdot)$  which is simply the expenditure function.

$$e = v^{-1}(p, u)$$

$$4. e(p, v(p, w)) = w$$

The expenditure function is strictly increasing in  $u$ . Thus we can invert  $e(p, \cdot)$  which is simply the indirect utility function.

$$v = e^{-1}(p, w)$$

Let us now summarize the relationship between UMP and EMP, between Hicksian and Walrasian demand and between indirect utility and expenditure function in the following diagram:




Figure: Figure 3.2: Putting it all together

$$= w = v^{-1}(p, u)$$

inverse relationship

We have shown that the preference based approach to consumption theory has the following implications for the (Walrasian) demand function  $x(p, w)$ :

1. Homogeneity of degree zero
2. Walras' Law
3. Compensated Law of Demand (Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite)
4. Symmetry of the Slutsky matrix

↳ only new they come from  
preference approach.

#### Remarks

1. A natural question is, whether there are any other properties of the demand function that are implied by the preference based approach.

The answer is no. It can be shown that for any demand function that satisfies (1) to (4) there exists utility function (representing a rational preference relation) such that the demand function is generated by this utility function. This is known as the Integrability Problem (See MWH, Chapter 3.H). It also shows, how the preferences of the consumer can (almost, but not quite) be recovered from his observed demand behavior.

2. Properties (1) to (3) are also implied by the Weak Axiom of the choice based approach. Hence, symmetry of the Slutsky matrix is the only additional property that the preference based approach gives us.

3. One could ask whether it is possible to impose an additional assumption in the choice based approach that also yields a symmetric Slutsky matrix. This assumption is the **Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference**.

**Definition 3.5** The demand function  $x(p, w)$  satisfies the **Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference** if for any list


$$(p^1, w^1), \dots, (p^N, w^N)$$

with  $x(p^{n+1}, w^{n+1}) \neq x(p^n, w^n)$  for all  $n \leq N - 1$ , we have  $p^N \cdot x(p^1, w^1) > w^N$  whenever  $p^n \cdot x(p^{n+1}, w^{n+1}) \leq w^n$  for all  $n \leq N - 1$ . B

This definition says, that if  $x(p^1, w^1)$  is directly or indirectly (through the chain of  $x(p^n, w^n)$  revealed preferred to  $x(p^N, w^N)$ , then  $x(p^N, w^N)$  cannot be revealed preferred to  $x(p^1, w^1)$ , because  $x(p^1, w^1)$  is not affordable at  $(p^N, w^N)$ .

The Strong Axiom is essentially equivalent to the preference based approach presented here.

A. " $p^n \times (p^{n+1}, w^{n+1}) \leq w^n$ " means:



And:  $x_1 \geq x_2$


$$x_2 > x_3$$

$$x_4 > x_3$$

•

B. then

$P^N X$  (pl.  $W$ )  $\geq X^N$  means we can't have a  $\checkmark$  loop



i.e. when

$$x_1 \geq x_2$$

$$x_2 \geq x_3$$

$$x_4 > x_1$$

14

We can't have  $x^4 \geq x$ ,

i.e. this definition de facto equiv to transitivity in preference based approach. Just we

4. While most positive results of consumption theory can also be derived from the choice based approach, the normative evaluation of welfare changes requires the preference based approach.

ch. Just we  
define thigs  
on " behavior ",  
Not on  
" preference "