Macroeconomics A; EI060

Technical appendix: uncertainty

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1 Optimization under uncertainty

1.1 States of nature and optimal consumption path

Two period model, where the agent maximizes an expected utility:

$$u(C_1) + \beta E u(C_2)$$

Uncertainty regarding period 2. We can be in various states of nature k, of probability $\pi(k)$. Consumption in a state is denoted by $C_2(k)$. The utility is the:

$$u(C_1) + \beta \sum_{k} \pi(k) u(C_2(k))$$

Can invest in bond giving and interest rate r. There is one budget constraint for period 1 and for for each state in period 2:

$$C_1 + B_2 = Y_1$$

 $C_2(k) = (1+r) B_2 + Y_2(k)$

The Lagrangian is:

$$\mathcal{L} = u(C_1) + \beta \sum_{k} \pi(k) u(C_2(k)) + \lambda_1 [Y_1 - C_1 - B_2] + \sum_{k} \lambda_2(k) [(1+r) B_2 + Y_2(k) - C_2(k)]$$

The optimality conditions for C_1 , $C_2(k)$ and B_2 are:

$$0 = u'(C_1) - \lambda_1$$

$$0 = \beta \pi (k) u' (C_2 (k)) - \lambda_2 (k)$$

$$0 = -\lambda_1 + \sum_k \lambda_2 (k) (1 + r)$$

Combining, we get the Euler condition:

$$\lambda_{1} = \sum_{k} \lambda_{2}(k) (1+r)$$

$$u'(C_{1}) = \sum_{k} (1+r) \beta \pi(k) u'(C_{2}(k))$$

$$u'(C_{1}) = \beta (1+r) \sum_{k} \pi(k) u'(C_{2}(k))$$

$$u'(C_{1}) = \beta (1+r) E[u'(C_{2})]$$

1.2 Simple case of precautionary savings

There are two states of nature with equal probability. In one $Y_2\left(k\right)=Y_1+\Delta$, and in the other $Y_2\left(k\right)=Y_1-\Delta$. We consider $\beta\left(1+r\right)=1$. The Euler condition is:

$$u'(Y_1 - B_2) = \frac{1}{2} [u'((1+r)B_2 + Y_1 + \Delta) + u'((1+r)B_2 + Y_1 - \Delta)]$$

If we take a log utility:

$$\frac{1}{Y_1 - B_2} = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{(1+r)B_2 + Y_1 + \Delta} + \frac{1}{(1+r)B_2 + Y_1 - \Delta} \right]
\frac{1}{Y_1 - B_2} = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{(1+r)B_2 + Y_1 - \Delta + (1+r)B_2 + Y_1 + \Delta}{[(1+r)B_2 + Y_1 + \Delta][(1+r)B_2 + Y_1 - \Delta]} \right]
\frac{1}{Y_1 - B_2} = \frac{(1+r)B_2 + Y_1}{[(1+r)B_2 + Y_1]^2 - [\Delta]^2}$$

Note the following derivatives:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial}{\partial B_2} \left[\frac{1}{Y_1 - B_2} \right] &= \frac{1}{\left[Y_1 - B_2 \right]^2} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial}{\partial B_2} \left[\frac{(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1}{\left[(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1 \right]^2 - \left[\Delta \right]^2} \right] &= -(1+r) \, \frac{\left[(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1 \right]^2 + \left[\Delta \right]^2}{\left[\left[(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1 \right]^2 - \left[\Delta \right]^2 \right]^2} < 0 \\ \frac{\partial}{\partial \Delta} \left[\frac{(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1}{\left[(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1 \right]^2 - \left[\Delta \right]^2} \right] &= \frac{(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1}{\left[\left[(1+r) \, B_2 + Y_1 \right]^2 - \left[\Delta \right]^2 \right]^2} 2\Delta \end{split}$$

The last is 0 when $\Delta = 0$, but positive when $\Delta > 0$.

Absent uncertainty ($\Delta = 0$) we have:

$$\frac{1}{Y_1 - B_2} = \frac{1}{(1+r)B_2 + Y_1}$$
$$Y_1 - B_2 = (1+r)B_2 + Y_1$$

$$0 = (2+r)B_2$$

hence $B_2 = 0$. With uncertainty ($\Delta = 0$) the right hand-side of the Euler gets larger, hence it must be that $\frac{1}{Y_1 - B_2}$ gets larger, i.e. $B_2 > 0$.

1.3 Case of certainty equivalence

Consider that the utility is:

$$u(C) = C - \frac{a}{2}C^{2}$$

$$u'(C) = 1 - aC$$

The Euler condition is then:

$$1 - aC_{1} = \beta (1+r) E [1 - aC_{2}]$$

$$-C_{1} = \frac{\beta (1+r) - 1}{a} - \beta (1+r) EC_{2}$$

$$EC_{2} = \frac{\beta (1+r) - 1}{a\beta (1+r)} + \frac{1}{\beta (1+r)} C_{1}$$

If $\beta(1+r)=1$ this simplifies to $EC_2=C_1$.

2 Complete asset markets

2.1 Budget constraints and Euler conditions

Enrich the two period model. In addition to the bond, the consumer can purchase contingent securities. A state k security pays off 1 unit if that state occurs, and zero otherwise. The cost of the security is $p_1(k)/(1+r)$.

Complete financial market: there is a security for each possible state (Arrow-Debreu set of complete contingent securities). The budget constraints are:

$$C_1 + \sum_{k} \frac{p_1(k)}{1+r} B_2(k) + B_2 = Y_1$$

 $C_2(k) = (1+r) B_2 + B_2(k) + Y_2(k)$

Note that buying the bond guarantees a payoff, as does buying the same amount of all securities. The cost of the two strategies must be then the same:

$$\sum_{k} \frac{p_1(k)}{1+r} = \frac{1}{1+r}$$

$$\sum_{k} p_1(k) = 1$$

The Lagrangian is:

$$\mathcal{L} = u(C_1) + \beta \sum_{k} \pi(k) u(C_2(k))$$

$$+ \lambda_1 \left[Y_1 - C_1 - B_2 - \sum_{k} \frac{p_1(k)}{1+r} B_2(k) \right]$$

$$+ \sum_{k} \lambda_2(k) \left[(1+r) B_2 + B_2(k) + Y_2(k) - C_2(k) \right]$$

The optimality conditions for C_1 , $C_2(k)$, $B_2(k)$, and B_2 are:

$$0 = u'(C_1) - \lambda_1$$

$$0 = \beta \pi(k) u'(C_2(k)) - \lambda_2(k)$$

$$0 = -\lambda_1 \frac{p_1(k)}{1+r} + \lambda_2(k)$$

$$0 = -\lambda_1 + \sum_k \lambda_2(k) (1+r)$$

Combining these, we get two Euler conditions. The one for the bond is:

$$\lambda_{1} = \sum_{k} \lambda_{2}(k) (1+r)$$

$$u'(C_{1}) = \sum_{k} \pi(k) \beta u'(C_{2}(k)) (1+r)$$

$$u'(C_{1}) = \beta (1+r) E[u'(C_{2})]$$

The one for a state k security is:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \lambda_{1} \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} & = & \lambda_{2}\left(k\right) \\ u'\left(C_{1}\right) \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} & = & \beta\pi\left(k\right) u'\left(C_{2}\left(k\right)\right) \\ \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} & = & \pi\left(k\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}\left(k\right)\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}\right)} \end{array}$$

Note that:

$$1 = (1+r) E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}\right)}\right]$$

Combining the two Eulers, the expected discounted excess return of an asset is zero:

$$E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}\right)}\left(1+r\right)\right] = E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}\right)}\frac{1}{p_{1}/\left(1+r\right)}\right]$$

Note that summing up the budget constraints implies that consumption is equal to output when added up over time, and pricing the future consumptions and outputs with the state contingent

security prices:

$$C_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} C_{2}(k) + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} B_{2}(k) + B_{2} = Y_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} ((1+r) B_{2} + B_{2}(k) + Y_{2}(k))$$

$$C_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} C_{2}(k) + B_{2} = Y_{1} + B_{2} \sum_{k} p_{1}(k) + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} (Y_{2}(k))$$

$$C_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} C_{2}(k) = Y_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}(k)}{1+r} (Y_{2}(k))$$

2.2 Gain from international financial trade

In autarky, consumption is equal to output. If we have complete securities, the Euler with each of them gives the autarky asset price:

$$\frac{p_1^A(k)}{1+r^A} = \pi(k) \frac{\beta u'(Y_2(k))}{u'(Y_1)}$$

When agents can trade financial assets, it must be that the resulting consumption allocation is not affordable at the autarky asset prices, otherwise there would be no gains from trade:

$$C_{1}^{\text{asset trade}} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} C_{2}^{\text{asset trade}}\left(k\right) = Y_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} Y_{2}\left(k\right)$$

$$C_{1}^{\text{asset trade}} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}^{A}\left(k\right)}{1+r^{A}} C_{2}^{\text{asset trade}}\left(k\right) \geq Y_{1} + \sum_{k} \frac{p_{1}^{A}\left(k\right)}{1+r^{A}} Y_{2}\left(k\right)$$

Taking the difference:

$$\sum_{k} \left[\frac{p_{1}^{A}\left(k\right)}{1+r^{A}} - \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} \right] C_{2}^{\text{asset trade}}\left(k\right) \geq \sum_{k} \left[\frac{p_{1}^{A}\left(k\right)}{1+r^{A}} - \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} \right] Y_{2}\left(k\right)$$

$$\sum_{k} \left[\frac{p_{1}^{A}\left(k\right)}{1+r^{A}} - \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} \right] \left[C_{2}^{\text{asset trade}}\left(k\right) - Y_{2}\left(k\right) \right] \geq 0$$

The country is a net buyer of securities in states of nature where such securities are expensive (i.e. consumption is valuable) under autarky.

2.3 General equilibrium

Introduce a foreign economy, denoted by F. The Home Euler conditions and the Foreign Euler conditions are:

$$\begin{split} \frac{1}{1+r} &= E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}\right] = E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{F}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{F}\right)}\right] \\ \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} &= \pi\left(k\right)\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)} = \pi\left(k\right)\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right)\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{F}\right)} \end{split}$$

The Euler for the state contingent securities imply that the ratios of marginal utilities are equalized across states:

$$\frac{u'\left(C_2^H\left(k\right)\right)}{u'\left(C_2^F\left(k\right)\right)} \ = \ \frac{u'\left(C_1^H\right)}{u'\left(C_1^F\right)}$$

With a CRRA utility $u\left(C\right)=\frac{(C)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$. The Euler conditions imply:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \frac{p_{1}\left(k\right)}{1+r} & = & \beta\pi\left(k\right)\left(\frac{C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)}{C_{1}^{H}}\right)^{-\sigma} = \beta\pi\left(k\right)\left(\frac{C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right)}{C_{1}^{F}}\right)^{-\sigma} \\ \frac{C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)}{C_{1}^{H}} & = & \frac{C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right)}{C_{1}^{F}} = \left[\frac{\beta\left(1+r\right)}{p_{1}\left(k\right)}\pi\left(k\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \end{array}$$

The clearing of the good market are:

$$\begin{split} C_{1}^{H} + C_{1}^{F} &=& Y_{1}^{H} + Y_{1}^{F} = Y_{1}^{W} \\ C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) &=& Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) = Y_{2}^{W}\left(k\right) \end{split}$$

Combining with the Euler:

$$\begin{split} C_2^H\left(k\right) + C_2^F\left(k\right) &= Y_2^W\left(k\right) \\ \left[\frac{\beta\left(1+r\right)}{p_1\left(k\right)}\pi\left(k\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}\left(C_1^H + C_1^F\right) &= Y_2^W\left(k\right) \\ \left[\frac{\beta\left(1+r\right)}{p_1\left(k\right)}\pi\left(k\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}Y_1^W &= Y_2^W\left(k\right) \\ \frac{p\left(k\right)}{1+r} &= \beta\pi\left(k\right)\left[\frac{Y_2^W\left(k\right)}{Y_1^W}\right]^{-\sigma} \end{split}$$

The price of a security paying off in state k reflects the relative likelihood and scarcity of output in that state

Add up across state to solve for the interest rate, which reflects output growth:

$$\begin{split} \sum_{k} \frac{p\left(k\right)}{1+r} &= \beta \sum_{k} \pi\left(k\right) \left[\frac{Y_{2}^{W}\left(k\right)}{Y_{1}^{W}}\right]^{-\sigma} \\ \frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{k} p\left(k\right) &= \beta E \left[\frac{Y_{2}^{W}}{Y_{1}^{W}}\right]^{-\sigma} \\ \frac{1}{1+r} &= \beta E \left[\frac{Y_{2}^{W}}{Y_{1}^{W}}\right]^{-\sigma} \\ \beta \left(1+r\right) &= \frac{\left[Y_{1}^{W}\right]^{-\sigma}}{E \left[\left(Y_{2}^{W}\right)^{-\sigma}\right]} \end{split}$$

The cross-country ratios of consumption are equalized across states. Using the clearing of good

market, each country consumes the same share of world output:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \frac{C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)}{C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right)} & = & \frac{C_{2}^{H}\left(g\right)}{C_{2}^{F}\left(g\right)} \\ \\ \frac{C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)}{C_{2}^{H}\left(g\right)} & = & \frac{C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right)}{C_{2}^{F}\left(g\right)} = \frac{Y_{2}^{W}\left(k\right)}{Y_{2}^{W}\left(g\right)} \end{array}$$

2.4 In nominal terms

To bring the exchange rate into the picture, we consider some state-contingent assets that pay off in Home currency, and others that pay off in Foreign currency.

S is the nominal exchange rate, expressed in terms of units of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency, so a higher value is a weaker Home currency. The CPI faced by the Home agent is P^H (Home currency) and the one by the Foreign agent is P^F (Foreign currency).

At time t agents can buy state contingent securities in two currencies. A security paying off one unit of Home currency in state k_{t+s} at time t+s costs $p_t^H(k_{t+s})$ units of Home currency. A security paying off one unit of Foreign currency in state k_{t+s} at time t+s costs $p_t^F(k_{t+s})$ units of Foreign currency.

From the point of view of time t the Home agent maximizes:

$$u\left(C_{t}^{H}\right) + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \beta^{s} \left[\sum_{k_{t+s}} \pi\left(k_{t+s}\right) u\left(C_{t+s}^{H}\left(k_{t+s}\right)\right) \right]$$

The budget constraints are (focusing on the first two periods):

$$P_{t}^{H}C_{t}^{H} = P_{t}^{H}Y_{t}^{H} - \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{k_{t+s}} \frac{p_{t}^{H}(k_{t+s})}{1+r} B_{t}^{H}(k_{t+s}) - \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{k_{t+s}} \frac{S_{t}p_{t}^{F}(k_{t+s})}{1+r} B_{t}^{F}(k_{t+s}) - B_{t+1}^{H} P_{t+1}^{H}(k_{t+1}) C_{t+1}^{H}(k_{t+1}) = (1+r) B_{t+1} + B_{t}^{H}(k_{t+1}) + S_{t+1} B_{t}^{F}(k_{t+1}) + P_{t+1}^{H}(k_{t+1}) Y_{t+1}^{H}(k_{t+1})$$

The Lagrangian is:

$$\mathcal{L}_{t} = u\left(C_{t}^{H}\right) + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \beta^{s} \left[\sum_{k_{t+s}} \pi\left(k_{t+s}\right) u\left(C_{t+s}^{H}\left(k_{t+s}\right)\right)\right]$$

$$+ \lambda_{t} \left[P_{t}^{H} Y_{t}^{H} - P_{t}^{H} C_{t}^{H} - \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{k_{t+s}} \frac{p_{t}\left(k_{t+s}\right)}{1+r} B_{t}^{H}\left(k_{t+s}\right) - \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{k_{t+s}} \frac{S_{t} p_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+s}\right)}{1+r} B_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+s}\right) - B_{t+1}^{H}\right]$$

$$+ \sum_{k_{t+1}} \lambda_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right) \left[\frac{(1+r) B_{t+1} + B_{t}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right) + S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right) B_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{+P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right) Y_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right) - P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right) C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \right]$$

The optimality conditions for C_{t}^{H} , $C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)$, $B_{t}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)$, $B_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)$ and $\mathbf{B}_{-}\{\mathbf{t}+1\}$ are:

$$0 = u'(C_t^H) - \lambda_t P_t^H$$

$$0 = \beta \pi (k_{t+1}) u'(C_{t+1}^H(k_{t+1})) - \lambda_{t+1} (k_{t+1}) P_{t+1}^H(k_{t+1})$$

$$0 = -\lambda_{t} \frac{p_{t}(k_{t+1})}{1+r} + \lambda_{t+1}(k_{t+1})$$

$$0 = -\lambda_{t} \frac{S_{t}p_{t}^{F}(k_{t+1})}{1+r} + \lambda_{t+1}(k_{t+1})S_{t+1}(k_{t+1})$$

$$0 = -\lambda_{t} + \sum_{k_{t+1}} \lambda_{t+1}(k_{t+1})(1+r)$$

Combining these, we get the Euler conditions:

$$\frac{p_{t}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{1+r} = \pi\left(k_{t+1}\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)/P_{t}^{H}}$$

$$\frac{S_{t}p_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{1+r} = S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\pi\left(k_{t+1}\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)/P_{t}^{H}}$$

$$1 = \left(1+r\right)\sum_{k_{t+1}}\pi\left(k_{t+1}\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)/P_{t}^{H}}$$

We derive the Euler conditions for the Foreign agent following similar steps:

$$\begin{split} \frac{p_{t}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{1+r} \frac{1}{S_{t}} &= \frac{1}{S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \pi\left(k_{t+1}\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right) / P_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right) / P_{t}^{F}} \\ \frac{p_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{1+r} &= \pi\left(k_{t+1}\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right) / P_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right) / P_{t}^{F}} \\ \frac{1}{S_{t}} &= \left(1+r\right) \sum_{k_{t+1}} \frac{1}{S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \pi\left(k_{t+1}\right) \frac{\beta u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right) / P_{t}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right) / P_{t}^{F}} \end{split}$$

Combining the Euler conditions for state contingent securities, we get:

$$\frac{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)/P_{t}^{H}} \quad = \quad \frac{S_{t}}{S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \frac{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right)/P_{t}^{F}} \\ \frac{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)/P_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \quad = \quad \frac{S_{t}}{S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \frac{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)/P_{t}^{H}}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right)/P_{t}^{F}} \\ \frac{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)}{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)\right)} \frac{S_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)P_{t+1}^{F}\left(k_{t+1}\right)}{P_{t+1}^{H}\left(k_{t+1}\right)} \quad = \quad \frac{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right)} \frac{S_{t}P_{t}^{F}}{P_{t}^{H}}$$

Hence, in any state of nature:

$$\frac{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t+1}^{F}\right)} \frac{S_{t+1}P_{t+1}^{F}}{P_{t+1}^{H}} = \frac{u'\left(C_{t}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{t}^{F}\right)} \frac{S_{t}P_{t}^{F}}{P_{t}^{H}} = \Gamma_{t}$$

3 International portfolio choice

3.1 Budget constraints

Consider a two period model with w countries, H and F. Agents can invest in a bond, and in equity in the two countries. Equity is a claim on the country's endowment.

The expected utility for the Home and Foreign agents are:

$$u\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)+\beta Eu\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)$$
; $u\left(C_{1}^{F}\right)+\beta Eu\left(C_{2}^{F}\right)$

The Home household purchases x_2^{HH} units of the Home equity, with a price V_1^H . Each unit pays of the endowment Y_2^H . She also purchases x_2^{HF} units of the Foreign equity, with a price V_1^F . Each unit pays of the endowment Y_2^F . The Foreign household purchases x_2^{FH} and x_2^{FF} units of equity. The budget constraints of the Home households are:

$$C_{1}^{H} = Y_{1}^{H} + V_{1}^{H} - B_{2}^{H} - x_{2}^{HH}V_{1}^{H} - x_{2}^{HF}V_{1}^{F}$$

$$C_{2}^{H}(k) = (1+r)B_{2}^{H} + x_{2}^{HH}Y_{2}^{H}(k) + x_{2}^{HF}Y_{2}^{F}(k)$$

The constraints for the Foreign household are:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} C_{1}^{F} & = & Y_{1}^{F} + V_{1}^{F} - B_{2}^{F} - x_{2}^{FH}V_{1}^{H} - x_{2}^{FF}V_{1}^{F} \\ C_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) & = & \left(1 + r\right)B_{2}^{F} + x_{2}^{FH}Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + x_{2}^{FF}Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) \end{array}$$

Bonds are in zero net supply, and the total holdings of any equity must be equal to the available quantity, which is normalized to 1. The clearing of asset markets implies:

$$x_2^{HH} + x_2^{FH} = 1$$

$$x_2^{HF} + x_2^{FF} = 1$$

$$B_2^H + B_2^F = 0$$

3.2 Optimization

Consider a two period model with w countries, H and F. Agents can invest in a bond, and in equity in the two countries. Equity is a claim on the country's endowment.

The Lagrangian is:

$$\mathcal{L} = u\left(C_{1}^{H}\right) + \beta \sum_{k} \pi\left(k\right) u\left(C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)\right)$$

$$+\lambda_{1} \left[Y_{1}^{H} - C_{1}^{H} - B_{2}^{H} - x_{2}^{HH}V_{1}^{H} - x_{2}^{HF}V_{1}^{F}\right]$$

$$+\sum_{k} \lambda_{2}\left(k\right) \left[\left(1 + r\right) B_{2}^{H} + x_{2}^{HH}Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + x_{2}^{HF}Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) - C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)\right]$$

The optimality conditions for C_{1}^{H} , $C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)$, B_{2}^{H} , x_{2}^{HH} , and x_{2}^{HF} are:

$$0 = u'(C_{1}^{H}) - \lambda_{1}$$

$$0 = \pi(k) \beta u'(C_{2}^{H}(k)) - \lambda_{2}(k)$$

$$0 = -\lambda_{1} + \sum_{k} \lambda_{2}(k) (1 + r)$$

$$0 = -\lambda_{1} V_{1}^{H} + \sum_{k} \lambda_{2}(k) Y_{2}^{H}(k)$$

$$0 = -\lambda_1 V_1^F + \sum_{k} \lambda_2 \left(k \right) Y_2^F \left(k \right)$$

Combining these, we get three Euler conditions. The one for the bond is:

$$\lambda_{1} = \sum_{k} \lambda_{2}(k) (1+r)$$

$$u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right) = \sum_{k} \pi(k) \beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}(k)\right) (1+r)$$

$$u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right) = \beta(1+r) E\left[u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)\right]$$

The one for Home equity is:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \lambda_{1}V_{1}^{H} & = & \displaystyle\sum_{k}\lambda_{2}\left(k\right)Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) \\ u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)V_{1}^{H} & = & \displaystyle\sum_{k}\pi\left(k\right)\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)\right)Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) \\ u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right) & = & \displaystyle\beta\sum_{k}\pi\left(k\right)u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)\right)\frac{Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)}{V_{1}^{H}} \\ u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right) & = & \displaystyle\beta E\left[u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)\frac{Y_{2}^{H}}{V_{1}^{H}}\right] \end{array}$$

The one for Foreign equity is:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \lambda_{1}V_{1}^{F} & = & \displaystyle\sum_{k}\lambda_{2}\left(k\right)Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) \\ u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)V_{1}^{F} & = & \displaystyle\sum_{k}\pi\left(k\right)\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right)\right)Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) \\ u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right) & = & \displaystyle\beta E\left[u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)\frac{Y_{2}^{F}}{V_{1}^{F}}\right] \end{array}$$

Combining the Eulers, the expected discounted excess return of an asset is zero:

$$E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}\left(1+r\right)\right] \quad = \quad E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}\frac{Y_{2}^{H}}{V_{1}^{H}}\right] = E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}\frac{Y_{2}^{F}}{V_{1}^{F}}\right]$$

hence:

$$0 = E \left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)} \left(\frac{Y_{2}^{H}}{V_{1}^{H}} - (1+r) \right) \right]$$
$$0 = E \left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)} \left(\frac{Y_{2}^{F}}{V_{1}^{F}} - (1+r) \right) \right]$$

3.3 Asset pricing

The last two Euler give a partial solution for the asset prices:

$$V_{1}^{H} = E \left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)} Y_{2}^{H} \right] \qquad ; \qquad V_{1}^{F} = E \left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)} Y_{2}^{F} \right]$$

As E(ab) = E(a) E(b) + Cov(a, b) we write:

$$V_{1}^{F} = E\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}\right] E\left[Y_{2}^{F}\right] + Cov\left[\frac{\beta u'\left(C_{2}^{H}\right)}{u'\left(C_{1}^{H}\right)}, Y_{2}^{F}\right]$$

As there are two equities, each linked to a specific output, we have complete asset markets. This means that Foreign consumption is a constant proportion of Home consumption. As the two consumption must add up to the worldwide good supply, this implies that Home consumption is a constant share μ^H of world output, a share that we still have to solve for.

Consider that the utility is a CRRA specification:

$$u\left(C\right) = \frac{\left(C\right)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

The asset prices are then:

$$\begin{split} V_1^H &= E \left[\beta \left(\frac{C_2^H}{C_1^H} \right)^{-\sigma} Y_2^H \right] \\ V_1^H &= E \left[\beta \left(\frac{\mu^H Y_2^W}{\mu^H Y_1^W} \right)^{-\sigma} Y_2^H \right] \\ V_1^H &= E \left[\beta \left(\frac{Y_2^W}{Y_1^W} \right)^{-\sigma} Y_2^H \right] \end{split}$$

and:

$$V_1^F \quad = \quad E \left[\beta \left(\frac{Y_2^W}{Y_1^W} \right)^{-\sigma} Y_2^F \right]$$

We get the interest rate from the Euler condition for the bond:

$$1 = (1+r) E \left[\beta \left(\frac{C_2^H}{C_1^H} \right)^{-\sigma} \right]$$

$$1 = (1+r) E \left[\beta \left(\frac{\mu^H Y_2^W}{\mu^H Y_1^W} \right)^{-\sigma} \right]$$

$$1 = (1+r) E \left[\beta \left(\frac{Y_2^W}{Y_1^W} \right)^{-\sigma} \right]$$

$$1 = (1+r) \beta \left(\frac{1}{Y_1^W} \right)^{-\sigma} E \left[(Y_2^W)^{-\sigma} \right]$$

$$1 + r = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{\left(Y_1^W\right)^{-\sigma}}{E\left[\left(Y_2^W\right)^{-\sigma}\right]}$$

3.4 Consumption and portfolio shares

As Home consumption is a constant share of world output, we write consumption in period 2 as:

$$\begin{split} C_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) &= \left(1+r\right)B_{2}^{H} + x_{2}^{HH}Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + x_{2}^{HF}Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) \\ \mu^{H}\left(Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right)\right) &= \left(1+r\right)B_{2}^{H} + x_{2}^{HH}Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + x_{2}^{HF}Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) \\ 0 &= \left(1+r\right)B_{2}^{H} + \left(x_{2}^{HH} - \mu^{H}\right)Y_{2}^{H}\left(k\right) + \left(x_{2}^{HF} - \mu^{H}\right)Y_{2}^{F}\left(k\right) \end{split}$$

This can only be true in general if $B_2^H = 0$ and $x_2^{HH} = x_2^{HF} = \mu^H$. This implies that the Home investor holds the same share of each stock market, and this share corresponds to her share of world consumption

Home consumption in period 1 is:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} C_1^H & = & Y_1^H + V_1^H - B_2^H - x_2^{HH}V_1^H - x_2^{HF}V_1^F \\ \mu^H \left(Y_1^H + Y_1^F \right) & = & Y_1^H + V_1^H - \mu^H V_1^H - \mu^H V_1^F \\ \mu^H \left(Y_1^H + Y_1^F + V_1^H + V_1^F \right) & = & Y_1^H + V_1^H \\ \mu^H & = & \frac{Y_1^H + V_1^H}{Y_1^H + Y_1^F + V_1^H + V_1^F} \\ \mu^H & = & \frac{Y_1^H + V_1^H}{Y_1^W + V_1^W} \end{array}$$

The share of the Home investor in world consumption and in any stock market is her share in world wealth.

The current account is then:

$$CA_{1} = Y_{1}^{H} - C_{1}^{H}$$

$$CA_{1} = Y_{1}^{H} - \frac{Y_{1}^{H} + V_{1}^{H}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} Y_{1}^{W}$$

$$CA_{1} = Y_{1}^{H} - \frac{Y_{1}^{H}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} Y_{1}^{W} - \frac{V_{1}^{H}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} Y_{1}^{W}$$

$$CA_{1} = \frac{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W} - Y_{1}^{W}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} Y_{1}^{H} - \frac{Y_{1}^{W}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} V_{1}^{H}$$

$$CA_{1} = \frac{V_{1}^{W}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} Y_{1}^{H} - \frac{Y_{1}^{W}}{Y_{1}^{W} + V_{1}^{W}} V_{1}^{H}$$