# Tool-independent Licensing and Code Encryption of Modelica Libraries

## Revision history

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| --- | --- | --- |
| Version | Changes/Comments | Author/Date |
| 0.1 | Initial version | Jesper Mattsson, 2015 |
| 0.2 | Restructuring to separate out requirements and examples as appendices, minor wording updates | Hubertus Tummescheit, April 9th 2021 |

This specification describes a container for distributing Modelica libraries and a protocol for how a Modelica tool should communicate with an executable for licensing and decryption of the library. The following scenarios are supported:

* Both code encryption and licensing are supplied by library vendor.
* Licensing is handled through a Modelica tool’s licensing mechanism, and code encryption is supplied by library vendor.
* Library is open-source, no encryption or licensing is used.

The executable for licensing and decryption of the library is supplied by the library vendor and will hereafter be referred to as the “LVE” (Library Vendor Executable). The LVE should handle decryption and may optionally handle licensing. The LVE is packaged together with the library in a container. Several LVE may be included in the container for different platforms.

## Library Container

The container is a zip file, with a .mol file extension. It contains one top-level directory for each contained top-level package (“library”), named and structured according to section 13.2.2 of the Modelica Language Specification version 3.2r2. In addition, each such top-level directory should contain a directory “.library”. Each “.library” directory should contain:

* An XML file “manifest.xml”, containing meta-data about the library.
* If the library is encrypted, an LVE.
* Additional directories containing any extra files needed by the LVE or a Modelica tool. The names of each such directory should be the name of the vendor that introduces it.

### Manifest file

An example for the manifest file (“manifest.xml”) can be found at the end of this document. *A DTD (Document Type Definition) or an XML schema will be specified*. Here is an overview of its structure, with filled bullets denoting XML elements and outlined bullets denoting attributes:

* *archive*
  + *manifest*
    - *version* – version of the manifest format (this is version 1.0)
  + *library*
    - *id* – name of the top-level package
    - *enabled* – (optional) if the library should be loaded by default in the tool
    - *title* – (optional) official title of the library
    - *description* – (optional) description of the library
    - *version*
      * *number* – the version number
      * *build* – (optional) the build number
      * *date* – (optional) the release date
    - *language*
      * *version –* the version of the Modelica language that the library uses
    - *copyright – (*optional) textual copyright information
    - *license – (*optional) textual license information
    - *encryption* – (optional) only for encrypted libraries
      * *executable* – (multiple) one for each LVE
        + *path* – relative path from the top-level directory of this library to the executable
        + *platform* – the platform that this executable should be used for, the values are the same as in the Modelica Language Specification, currently “win32”, “win64”, “linux32”, “linux64”
        + *licensing* – (optional, default is true) true if this executable can handle licensing of the library
    - *icon* – (optional) an icon to use for the library
      * *file* – relative path from the top-level directory of this library to an image file containing the icon
    - *compatibility* – (optional) a list of Modelica tools that this library is compatible with
      * *tool* – (multiple)
        + *name* – the name of the tool
        + *minversion* – minimum version of the tool
    - *dependencies* – (optional) libraries that this library depends on
      * *dependency* – (multiple)
        + *id* – name of the top-level package of the library that is the target of the dependency
        + *versions* – list of compatible versions

*version* – (multiple)

*number* – the version number

*providers* – (optional) list of locations that the target library can be downloaded from

*provider* – (multiple)

*name* – human-readable name of provider

*uri* – direct-download URI to the target library

## Installing libraries

When installing a library archive, the tool must for each library it installs from the archive extract either only the “.library” folder, or the entire contents of the directory tree. When extracting the entire contents of the directory tree, The directory structure and file names of the content of the library directory must be the same as in the archive, except that the top-level directory may be placed wherever and named however the tool decides. It is recommended that the directory is placed in a directory on the MODELICAPATH and named “*PACKAGENAME*” or “*PACKAGENAME VERSION*”, as per the Modelica Language Specification.

## Reading open-source library

Reading a library without encryption is done in the same way as a library stored on disk as described by the Modelica Language Specification.

## Reading an encrypted library

1. Read the XML file with metadata (“manifest.xml”) from the “.library” directory, specifically the path to the LVE suitable for the current platform.
2. Start LVE.
3. Communicate with LVE through its stdin & stdout, according to the protocol described below.
4. Modelica files with a “.moc” file extension are read through the LVE instead of from disk. Other files in the library may also be read through the LVE, if desired.

## Communication Protocol


### Overview

This protocol is intended to be used for proprietary libraries. Open-source libraries are stored as plain text within the library archive. The communication protocol is through stdin and stdout of the LVE and uses encryption of the communication channel to prevent eavesdropping. For this encryption, both the tool and the LVE need a public-private key pair.

The protocol has three phases. The first phase is a TLS (Transport Layer Security, the successor of SSL) cryptographic handshake that sets up a secure communication between the tool and the LVE. In the second phase, what version of the protocol to use is established. The third phase is decryption of Modelica code and/or licensing. Note that the encryption used in the communication is entirely separate from the encryption used for storing the library.


For authentication, the LVE contains a list of the public keys of the tools that it trusts. The tool implicitly trusts that the LVE has permission to license the library because it can decrypt the library.

The picture below shows the parties involved in the communication and the keys used. The LVE reads the encrypted files in the library archive file, decrypts them, and sends them through the encrypted communication tunnel to the tool.



### Communication flow

The picture below details the flow of the communication between the tool and the LVE.



### Handshake

1. The tool initiates a cryptographic handshake according to TLS 1.2 (see reference [1]).
2. The tool gives the highest version of this protocol that it supports. The version is an integer, and this is version 1 of the protocol – “VERSION <version>”.
3. The LVE gives the highest version of this protocol that it supports – “VERSION <version>”. If the version given by the tool is lower than the lowest supported version, it instead replies “NO <reason>”.
4. The tool gives a path – “LIB <path>”. Depending on how the library was installed, it will be either a path to the archive containing the library or a path to the top-level directory of the library. If only the “.library” folder was extracted from the library archive, then the tool gives the path to the library archive. If the entire contents of the library was extracted, the tool gives the path to the top-level directory of the library (i.e. the one containing the “.library” directory).
5. The LVE acknowledges – “YES”.

### License check

**Check for a feature:**

1. Tool asks if the user is allowed to use a specific license feature – “FEATURE <feature name>”
2. LVE answers yes or no – “YES” or “NO <reason>”

**Simplified license check (optional):**

In the case where licensing is handled by the LVE, it may optionally allow a simplified license check. In the simplified check, tool only asks for permission for the user to use an entire top-level package, including all contents.

1. Tool asks if the user is allowed to use a specific top level package – “LICENSE <package name>”
2. LVE answers yes, no, or that it does not allow simplified license check – “YES”, “NO <reason>”, or “NOTSIMPLE”

These steps are repeated as needed.

The <reason> part of the “NO <reason>” response is a message suitable for displaying to the user that explains why the request was denied.

### Authentication

For authentication, the LVE contains a list of the public keys of the tools that it trusts. The public key of the tool is extracted by the LVE during the TLS handshake and compared against the list of trusted keys that it holds.

If the tool is not in the trusted list, it can still use all the commands to communicate. The difference is that the FILE command will be answered with an error.

### Return of licenses

**Return a feature**

1. Tool returns a feature – “RETURNFEATURE <feature name>”
2. LVE answers yes – “YES”.

**Return a simplified license**

1. Tool returns a simplified license – “RETURNLICENSE <package name >”
2. LVE answers yes – “YES”.

### Decryption

This part of the protocol lets the tool request decryption of encrypted files in the library. The LVE can decide to refuse any FILE command, irrespective of what paths it has previously allowed access to. All paths used are interpreted as relative to the directory containing the package.mo file of the top level package of the library, and use “/” as the path element separator. The standard special path elements “.” and “..” may not be used. When specifying the path of a directory, the path may but does not have to end with “/”.

**Getting the contents of a file:**

1. Tool asks for the contents of a file – “FILE <path>”
2. LVE sends the content of the file – “FILECONT <content>”

These steps are repeated as needed.

### Error handling

In addition to the responses specified above, the LVE may respond to any command with “ERROR <error code> <error message>”, where <error message> is an error message suitable for displaying to the user, and <error code> is interpreted as:

1. Command not understood
2. Too low version of the protocol – only after VERSION
3. The LVE doesn’t handle licensing – only after FEATURE or LICENSE
4. File not found – only after FILE or LIB
5. This tool is not allowed to decrypt that file – only after FILE
6. File I/O error
7. License error
8. Other error

### General information

The tool may, after the cryptographic handshake, query the LVE for general information about the LVE.

**List of supported tools:**

1. Tool asks for the list of supported tools – “TOOLS”
2. LVE sends the list of supported Modelica tools, formatted as a string with one line for each tool (using the line feed character as the line terminator). Each line consists of the public key of the tool as a hexadecimal number string (without any prefix, e.g. “0x”), followed by a space character, and then the textual name of the tool – “TOOLLIST <list>”

### License information

For solving license configuration problems.

1. Tool asks for license information – “LICENSEINFO”
2. LVE sends information about the licensing solution and configuration as a string – “TEXT <info>”.

### Encoding

All messages in the protocol follow one of the following forms, where “LN” is the line feed character. The messages are encoded using 8-bit ASCII for all messages, except for the <data> part of the third and fourth form below:

* <command>LN
  + A simple message with no arguments
  + Above rendered as e.g. “YES”
  + Commands using this form: “LICENSEINFO”, “NOTSIMPLE”, “TOOLS”, “YES”
  + <command> = the command name, in all caps
* <command> <number>LN
  + A message with a decimal integer as data.
  + Above rendered as e.g. “VERSION <version>”, where <version> is the <number> part
  + Commands using this form: “VERSION”
  + <command> = the command name, in all caps
  + <number> = the data, as a decimal number – must fit in a 32-bit signed integer
* <command> <length>LN<data>
  + A message with variable length data
  + Above rendered as e.g. “PUBKEY <key>”, where <key> is the <data> part and <length> is the length of <key> in bytes
  + Commands using this form: “FEATURE”, “FILE”, “FILECONT”, “LIB”, “LICENSE”, “NO”, “PUBKEY”, “RETURNFEATURE”, “RETURNLICENSE”, “TEXT”, “TOOLLIST”
  + <command> = the command name, in all caps
  + <length> = the length of the data in raw bytes, as a decimal number – must fit in a 32-bit signed integer
  + <data> = the data, as raw bytes
* <command> <number> <length>LN<data>
  + A message with an integer number and variable length data.
  + Above rendered as e.g. “ERROR <error code> <error message>”, where <error code> is the <number> part, <error message> is the <data> part and <length> is the length of <error message> in bytes
  + Commands using this form: “ERROR”
  + <command> = the command name, in all caps
  + <number> = data, as a decimal number
  + <length> = the length of the data part in raw bytes, as a decimal integer – must fit in a 32-bit signed integer
  + <data> = the data, as raw bytes

# References

[1] TLS 1.2 official specification: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>

# Appendix A: Example “manifest.xml” file

This is an example of what the “manifest.xml” file could look like for an example encrypted library:

<?xml version=*"1.0"* encoding=*"utf-8"*?>

<archive>

<!-- All paths in the file are interpreted as relative to the directory of the top-level

package (e.g., the path to this file would be ".library/manifest.xml"), and allows

only forward slashes as directory separators. -->

<manifest version=*"1.0"*/>

<!-- The id attribute is the actual Modelica identifier of the library. The file attribute

from SMA is no longer needed, as it will always be "package.mo" or "package.moc"

(and the tool will need the logic of checking for both .mo and .moc anyway).

The enabled attribute (optional, default value is true) indicates whether the library

should be enabled/loaded by default. -->

<library id=*"ExampleLib"* enabled=*"true"*>

<!-- Official title of the library (optional) -->

<title>Example Encrypted Library</title>

<!-- Description (optional) -->

<description>

Dummy library showing directory structure for an encrypted library (with empty files)

</description>

<!-- The version of the library. Version information is formatted according to the

Modelica language specification. The build and date attributes are optional. -->

<version number=*"1.0"* build=*"1"* date=*"2013-08-04"*/>

<!-- Version of the Modelica language that is used in this library. -->

<language version=*"3.2"* />

<!-- Copyright notice (optional)-->

<copyright>

Copyright © 2014, Modelon AB.

</copyright>

<!-- License information (optional) -->

<license>

Some license information.

</license>

<!-- Encryption/license check information (only for proprietary libraries).

If this is present, then the library is encrypted. -->

<encryption>

<!-- Library vendor executable. May be repeated - one for each supported platform.

path: the path to the executable

platform: the OS/platform to use this executable on, must be unique among

executable nodes

licensing: if this executable handles licensing (optional, default is true)

The executable shall be placed under the vendor-specific directory

(i.e. .library/VENDORNAME/). The normal case is that licensing has the same

value for each executable node, but it is allowed to have different values

for different platforms. -->

<executable path=*".library/Modelon/vendor.exe"* platform=*"win32"* licensing=*"true"* />

<executable path=*".library/Modelon/vendor32"* platform=*"linux32"* licensing=*"true"* />

<executable path=*".library/Modelon/vendor64"* platform=*"linux64"* licensing=*"true"* />

</encryption>

<!-- Icon for the library (PNG format) (optional) -->

<icon file=*"Resources/Images/el.png"* />

</library>

<!-- Leaving out optional compatibility and dependencies in this example. -->

</archive>

# Appendix B: Discussion of Weaknesses

There are several cryptographic keys involved. If someone were to extract a key from an executable or alter the executable to change the key, then that would have different consequences depending on what key it is:

* The private key of the tool
  + Finding this key would allow decryption of all libraries that trust that key. It would be possible to replace the key, but that would require new releases (or at least new distributable) of all libraries that trust that tool.
  + Altering this key would not be useful for an attacker.
* The private key of the LVE
  + It might be possible to eavesdrop on the communication between tool and LVE with this key. Requires additional study of chosen crypto scheme to determine. With private key of tool as well, it is definitely possible (but uninteresting if you have that key).
* The session key
  + Generated for each communication session, but could be extracted for a specific communication by debugging the tool or LVE.
  + Finding this would allow eavesdropping on the communication.
  + Altering this key is not possible.
* List of public keys that the LVE trusts
  + Finding this list would not be useful for an attacker.
  + Altering this list would allow adding your own and thus allow decryption of the library.
* The key/keys used by the LVE to decrypt the library
  + Finding this key would allow decrypting the library.
  + Altering this key would not be useful for an attacker.

Note that both the public/private key pair in the LVE and the key used to decrypt the library could be newly generated for each build of the library distributable.

All of these keys should be protected with some sort of obfuscation of the object code to make them harder to extract. It would, however, be impossible to completely protect against such attacks.

In conclusion, the most serious breach would be if an attacker obtained the private key of the tool, allowing decryption of any library released for that tool. The current situation is that the same vulnerability necessarily exists in any tool that supports encrypted libraries.

Since Modelica tools need access to the Modelica source code by the nature of the language specification, theses weaknesses have been considered acceptable by all commercial parties that so far have made use of this feature. The weaknesses are identical to those of tool-specific encryption schemes.

# Appendix C: Requirements considered for the design of SEMLA

The following requirements for commercial libraries were considered in the design of this proposal:

## Library Vendor

* Library vendor needs to be able to define which libraries that should be available on which tools, i.e. explicit encoding of supported tools. *Yes, through list of trusted keys.*
* Library vendor needs to be able to enable/disable parts (features) in any given library based on standardized annotations. *Not hindered, standard license annotations are used.*
* Library vendor needs to be able to specify visibility of components based on the standardized annotations. *Not hindered, standard license annotations are used.*
* The solution should offer a means to check the license for the library as a whole without parsing the Modelica code. *Yes, optional alternate licensing mechanism can be used for tools that do not understand license annotations.*
* Library vendor needs to be able to license/protect external libraries written in e.g. C and Fortran 77 independently of the licensing mechanism for the library. *Not affected by this specification, such checks can be added to the external libraries themselves.*
* Library vendor needs to be able to make new releases of existing libraries and release new libraries without any action from the tool vendor. *Yes, when licensing is supplied by library vendor.*
* Encryption mechanism shall be possible to use with or without the licensing mechanism of the protocol. *Yes.*
* Encryption mechanism shall ensure protection of library vendor IP. (In this case, this is defined only as Modelica source code.) *In part. It is not possible to fulfill this completely, since everything necessary to decrypt the code must be available to the client computer. Protection is also limited by what the tool does or does not expose to the user. Extracting any IP that is not shown by the tool requires using decompilation and/or debugging tools to extract cryptographic keys from either the tool or the LVE (see Weaknesses below). This is similar to the current situation.*
* The solution shall be not be limited to a specific licensing mechanism. *Yes, license mechanism is not specified. It is required that feature names are used, but this is also assumed by the description of licensing annotations in the Modelica language specification.*
* The protocol shall offer means to with reasonable effort replace encryption keys, or equivalent, in cases of security breaches. *All involved keys belonging to library vendors can be switched for any library release. Changing the key pair used by the tool could be done by adding a second key pair during a transition period. Library vendors could then replace the compromised key with the new one in their list of trusted tools. A tool may have more than one key pair. For tools that have more than one key pair, the LVE needs to be restarted in between trying different key pairs.*

## Tool Vendor

* A tool may store all files except Modelica source code on disc in unencrypted form, e.g., in order to support linking with library files during compilation. *Yes.*
* The solution shall support standardized mechanisms for enabling/disabling parts of a library, by means of annotations defined in the Modelica specification. *Not hindered, standard license annotations are used.*
* Well documented low-level API for licensing and encryption for easy integration in applications. *Documented above.*
* Solution shall enable customizations and tailored functionality on top of the low-level API. *API is fairly generic and uses file-system model, this enables customizations through special files or folders.*
* Error messages must be supported by the API. *Yes, error messages can be passed back to tool.*
* Alternative, tool specific, licensing mechanisms shall not be prevented by the API. *Yes, license checking is controlled by tool.*
* It shall be possible to store/ship several libraries/top-level packages in a single file. *Yes.*

## User

* The API shall enable convenient to installation procedures for libraries. *Possible with tool support, library is distributed as a single file with a well-defined file extension.*
* Error messages should enable users and support personnel to isolate errors related to licensing and encryption. *Yes, error messages can be passed back to tool.*