Abstract. In this paper, we present a survey and our study of block cipher named RECTANGLE. This cipher is a SPN block cipher with 16, 4×4 S-Box for substitution and 3 rotations for permutation layer. A strong Sbox which has good hardware performance is chosen. A permutation layer of 3 rotations which provides good diffusion and is fast is used. RECTANGLE is made such that it can be efficiently implemented using bit slicing techniques. As a result it has good performance in both software and hardware. This paper covers overview, specifications, implementations, and attacks on this cipher. We also implemented both versions, bit slicing and normal-one in software (in Rust) and analyzed their performance. A lot of figures are added for easy visualization of the cipher's working and underlying operations.

Keywords: lightweight cryptography · RECTANGLE · bit-slice · survey

RECTANGLE Cipher

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1 Introduction

RECTANGLE was proposed as an improved lightweight symmetric cipher that performs well in both software and hardware.[1] Prior to RECTANGLE there were many lightweight ciphers but none of them (except PRESENT which has some security weaknesses)[2] had good performance in both software and hardware. Rectangle uses bit-slice techniques for fast execution; bit-slicing was used in improving software speed of DES and in implementation of Serpant cipher[3][4].

Because of rapidly increasing usage of embedded devices, IoT (Internet of Things) and other things, which require cipher for securing the data that is stored, transmitted and received, there is a huge demand for lightweight cipher[5]. These devices generally have data that needs to be encrypted with moderately good cipher; using a good secure cipher like AES is not possible because of hardware limitations. These devices often run on low output low power or battery that has small capacity. Also these devices need to be small and fast so small circuits are used. At the time the time RECTANGLE was introduced there were no good lightweight ciphers that had good software performance. There were several good ciphers that had good hardware performance but their software performance is not good. Because of increased usage of lightweight ciphers there was a demand for new lightweight cipher that has good software performance. [6]

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the specification of the cipher and algorithm in detail. Section 3 describes bit slice technique. Section 5 describes several attacks on the cipher. Section 6 presents performance of the cipher. Section 7 concludes the paper. Section 8 has nominations for Brownie point.

2 The Cipher

Rectangle uses Substitution and Permutation Network (SPN) with each round consisting of S layer of 16.4×4 Sbox, P layer of 3 rotations and addition of round key (XOR of state matrix and round key).

Block length: 64 bits Key length: 80 or 128 bits

Encryption procedure:

The input is 64 bit plain-text which is written as 4×16 matrix. This matrix represents the "state". This matrix is iterated over several rounds and the initial state of this matrix

is given plain-text. And the final "state" matrix is the cipher text. Let the given plain-text be $v_{79}||v_{78}||v_{77}||\dots v_0$. Then state matrix will be:

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} v_{15} & v_{14} & v_{13} & \dots & v_2 & v_1 & v_0 \\ v_{31} & v_{30} & v_{29} & \dots & v_{18} & v_{17} & v_{16} \\ v_{47} & v_{46} & v_{45} & \dots & v_{34} & v_{33} & v_{32} \\ v_{63} & v_{62} & v_{61} & \dots & v_{50} & v_{49} & v_{48} \end{bmatrix}$$

We also use the following notation for state matrix:

```
\begin{bmatrix} a_{0,15} & a_{0,14} & a_{0,13} & \dots & a_{0,2} & a_{0,1} & a_{0,0} \\ a_{1,15} & a_{1,14} & a_{1,13} & \dots & a_{1,2} & a_{1,1} & a_{1,0} \\ a_{2,15} & a_{2,14} & a_{2,13} & \dots & a_{2,2} & a_{2,1} & a_{2,0} \\ a_{3,15} & a_{3,14} & a_{3,13} & \dots & a_{3,2} & a_{3,1} & a_{3,0} \end{bmatrix}
```

Where $row_i = a_{15,i}||a_{14,i}||a_{13,i}||..a_{0,0}$ The algorithm for encryption is as follows:

```
state = PlainText;
subkey = IV_key;
for i in 0..26 {
    AddRoundKey(state, subkey);
    SubColumn(state);
    ShiftRow(state);
    subkey = NextSubKey(subkey, i);
}
AddRoundKey(state, subkey);
CipherText = state;
```

There are 25 rounds and a final XOR. Following functions are used in each round:

AddRoundKey: State matrix is XORed with round subkey.

SubColumn: Each column of state is passed through Sbox (Substitution layer)

ShiftRow: Each row of the state is rotated (Permutation layer)

NextSubKey: Next round's subkey is obtained using key schedule, see 2.1 for more details. Detailed working of algorithm is described in 2.3.

2.1 Key Schedule

2.1.1 80 bit key version:

Make a key state matrix that is 5×16 matrix from the given initial key (KeyIV). Let the given key be $IV = v_{79}||v_{78}||v_{77}||\dots v_0$. Then the initial key state matrix will be as follows:

```
\begin{bmatrix} v_{15} & v_{14} & v_{13} & \dots & v_2 & v_1 & v_0 \\ v_{31} & v_{30} & v_{29} & \dots & v_{18} & v_{17} & v_{16} \\ v_{47} & v_{46} & v_{45} & \dots & v_{34} & v_{33} & v_{32} \\ v_{63} & v_{62} & v_{61} & \dots & v_{50} & v_{49} & v_{48} \\ v_{79} & v_{78} & v_{77} & \dots & v_{66} & v_{65} & v_{64} \end{bmatrix}
```

Let us the following notation for elements of the key matrix:

```
\begin{bmatrix} k_{0,15} & k_{0,14} & k_{0,13} & \dots & k_{0,2} & k_{0,1} & k_{0,0} \\ k_{1,15} & k_{1,14} & k_{1,13} & \dots & k_{1,2} & k_{1,1} & k_{1,0} \\ k_{2,15} & k_{2,14} & k_{2,13} & \dots & k_{2,2} & k_{2,1} & k_{2,0} \\ k_{3,15} & k_{3,14} & k_{3,13} & \dots & k_{3,2} & k_{3,1} & k_{3,0} \\ k_{4,15} & k_{4,14} & k_{4,13} & \dots & k_{4,2} & k_{4,1} & k_{4,0} \end{bmatrix}
```

 i^{th} row is $row_i = k_{15,i} ||k_{14,i}|| k_{13,i} ||...k_{0,0}|$

The following operations are applied i times to obtain subkey of i^{th} round: (NextSubKey() function)

1. S-box is applied to 4 rightmost columns and 4 rows i.e.,

$$k'_{3,i}||k'_{2,i}||k'_{1,i}||k'_{1,i}| = Sbox[k_{3,i}||k_{2,i}||k_{1,i}||k_{1,i}]$$

for $i = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$. The below figure represents sbox operation. In this figure each block represents 4 bits. After the sbox operation it can be seen that top 4 rows of right most column are darkened because they are modified by the sbox.




Figure 1: Sbox

2. Feistal transformation is applied as follows:

 $row'_0 = (row_0 \ll 8) \oplus row_1$ $row'_1 = row_2$ $row'_2 = row_3$ $row'_3 = (row_3 \ll 12) \oplus row_4$ $row'_4 = row_0$

The below figure shows Feistal transformation. Matrix on the top right is the original matrix with rows circularly rotated by one(downward). Matrix on the left bottom is the original matrix with all rows deleted except 0th and 3rd, which are left shifted by 8 and 12 respectively. (note here each block represents 4 bits)




Figure 2: Sbox

3. Last five bits of 0th row of key-state are XORed with round constant of current round.



Figure 3: Sbox

2.1.2 For 128 bit version:

Procedure for 128 bit is similar to 80 bit with minor differences, here key state matrix is 4×32 matrix instead of 5×16 .

- 1. S-box is applied to 8 rightmost columns.
- $2.\ {\it Feistal}$ transformation is applied as follows:

$$row_0 = (row_0 \ll 8) \oplus row_1$$

```
row_1 = row_2

row_2 = (row_2 \ll 16) \oplus row_3

row_3 = row_0
```

3. XOR is same as that in 80 bit version i.e., last five bits of key-state are XORed with round constant of current round.

2.2 **S-box**

Only one Sbox is used to reduce the hardware area required. Using more than one Sbox requires increases the hardware area and also doesn't improve security of the cipher. A 4×4 Sbox is very compact in hardware and can be used to make a secure cipher. There are total 16! possible 4×4 Sbox and a good Sbox is chosen from these by following a set of mathematical guidelines that make Sbox resistant to linear cryptanalysis, differential cryptanalysis and other attacks.

Table 1: S-box of RECTANGLE 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 a d f 2 S(x)6 5 1 7 9 b 0 3 d

2.3 Rounds

Following operations are applied in each round.

AddRoundKey

State matrix is XORed with roundkey.

(Note: In the following figures used for Rounds section, each block represents one bit)



Figure 4: AddRoundKey

SubColumn

Each column of state is passed through Sbox. This operation (SubColumn) can be efficiently implemented using bit-slicing instead of using Sbox on each column.




Figure 5: SubColumn

ShiftRow

0th row is unmodified. 1st row is left (circular) shifted by 1. 2nd row is left (circular) shifted by 12. And 3rd row is left (circular) shifted by 13.




Figure 6: ShiftRow

3 Bit slicing

SubColumn is significantly faster if bit-slicing techniques are used instead of using lookup table for sbox. Let S be the state before Subcolumn and S' be the state after applying SubColumn. $T_1, T_2, ... T_{11}$ are temporary variables. ith row of S is A_i where i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and ith row of S' be B_i where i = 0, 1, 2, 3

Then following 12 steps are calculated for SubColumn to obtain S' from S:

where "¬" is NOT (negation), "&" is bit-wise AND and "|" is bit-wise OR. Also bit-slice implementation is safe against side channel attacks such as cache and timing attacks.[?] (See 6.1 for details of performance with bit-slicing techniques)

4 Implementation

Both bit-slicing and normal versions of RECTANGLE cipher are implemented in Rust (no dependencies). see "implementations" directory for implementation files. "implementation/RECTANGLE-cipher" contains implementation with bit slicing. And "implementation/without_bit_slice" contains implementation without bit slicing. "implementation/timings" contains code used for measuring times/speed of RECTANGLE and for drawing graphs.

5 Cryptanalysis

5.1 S-box

A good (no security weakness) S-box is chosen that has smallest hardware and good hardware performance (See 2.2 for more details).

5.2 DDT

We can see that the Sbox is good as there are no combinations of input-output difference for which there more than 4 pairs.

See "attacks" directory for code of DDT (Implemented in python3).

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	2
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	2	0	2	4	0	2
3	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	4	2	2	2	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
5	0	2	0	0	4	2	0	0	4	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
6	0	2	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	2
7	0	0	4	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	2
8	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2
9	0	2	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	4	0
a	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	2	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
b	0	4	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	2	2	0	0	0
c	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	4	0
d	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	2	4	0
е	0	0	4	2	2	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
f	0	2	4	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0

Table 2: DDT of S-box

5.3 LAT

We can see that the Sbox is good as there are no bias values exceeding ± 4 . See "attacks" directory for code of LAT (Implemented in Rust).

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	е	f
0	+8															
1				+4		-4			+2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	+2	-2
2							+4	+4			+4	-4				
3				-4	+4				-2	+2	-2	-2	-2	-2	+2	-2
4							-4	+4							+4	+4
5			-4			-4			-2	+2	-2	-2	+2	+2	-2	+2
6									+4	+4			-4	+4		
7			-4		-4				-2	+2	+2	+2	-2	-2	+2	-2
8				-4	-2	-2	+2	-2		-4			-2	+2	+2	+2
9					-2	+2	+2	-2	+2	+2	-2	-2	+4		+4	
a				-4	-2	-2	-2	+2	+4				+2	-2	-2	-2
b		•			+2	-2	+2	-2	+2	+2	+2	+2		-4		+4
c		+4			-2	+2	-2	-2				-4	-2	-2	-2	+2
d		+4	+4		-2	-2	+2	+2	-2	+2	-2	+2				
e		-4			-2	+2	+2	+2			-4		-2	-2	-2	+2
f		+4	-4		+2	+2	+2	+2	+2	-2	-2	+2				

Table 3: LAT of S-box

5.4 Linear Cryptanalysis

RECTANGLE is resistant to linear cryptanalysis attacks. Maximum number of rounds that can be attacked using linear cryptanalysis is 14. Also there is no clustering of linear trails which can make effective distinguish-er for more than 15 rounds.

These estimations are obtained as follows. If ϵ is the bias for a liner trail then the correlation contribution is 2ϵ . A liner propagation is made of liner trails. Below theorem is used for estimation of correlation potential.

Theorem 1. The square of a correlation (or correlation contribution) is called correlation potential. The average correlation potential between an input and an output selection pattern is the sum of the correlation potentials of all linear trails between the input and output selection patterns:

$$E(C_t^2) = \sum (C_i)^2$$

where C_t is the overall correlation, and C_i is the correlation coefficient of linear trail. Best linear trails from round 1 to round 15 are obtained using search algorithm(see 5.5). Results of the search program are as follows:[1][7]

- 1. There are 128 best linear propagation's with an average correlation potential $1860 \times 2^{-80} \approx 2^{-69.14}$ each, which is lower than 2^{-64} . Each is composed of 891 linear trails. Among the 891 trails, 2 with correlation potential 2^{-74} each, 26 with correlation potential 2-76 each, 151 with correlation potential 2^{-78} each, and 712 with correlation potential 2_80 each.
- 2. Among all the linear propagation's, the maximum number of trails of a linear propagation is 891. Actually, the best linear propagation's have the maximum number of trails.

Since there are no clustering that can be used to construct a linear propagation, RECT-ANGLE(25 rounds) is resistant to linear attacks.

5.5 Differential Cryptanalysis

RECTANGLE is resistant to differential cryptanalysis attacks. Maximum number of rounds that can be attacked using differential cryptanalysis is 18, 18 round distinguish-er(using

14 round different propagation).

Since we are using a 64 bit key we need a difference propagation with probability of at-least 2^{-63} . The authors of RECTANGLE's paper used a modified version of M. Matsui's search algorithm for finding all differential/linear trials which uses branch and bound method. Best differential trials from round 1 to round 15 are obtained using this algorithm. Results of the search are as follows [1]:

- 1. here are 32 best difference propagation's with probability $1300 \times 2^{-76} \approx 2^{-65.66}$ each. Each is composed of 7 differential trails. Among the 7 trails, one with probability 2^{66} , two with probability 2^{69} each, one with probability 2^{75} , and two with probability 2^{76} each.
- 2. Among all the difference propagation's, the maximum number of trails of a difference propagation is 131,i.e., a difference propagation is composed of at most 131 different differential trails. For such a difference propagation, the probability is $421 \times 2^{76} \approx 2^{67.28}$

We can see that there are no difference propagation's that have probability higher than 2^{-63} and there is low clustering of trails. Therefore we can not construct a difference propagation for more than 14 rounds. And RECTANGLE(25 rounds) is resistant to differential attacks.

5.6 Difference Propagation

Full dependency is reached after 4 rounds and highest rounds that can be attacked are 18, therefore 7 rounds are used as security margin. Following figures show a difference propagation when rightmost bit is altered in 0th row. (Darkened colors means they are affected by the difference)




Figure 7: Example Difference propagation 1




Figure 8: Example Difference propagation 2

6 Performance

6.1 Performance with Bit slicing Techniques

Time with bit-slicing: $34.661 \pm 1.186 \mu s$ Time without bit-slicing: $118.429 \pm 1.148 \mu s$

(for one encryption of 64 bit)

Measured with implementation in Rust. These statistics are obtained with implementation running on a machine with Intel Core i5-8250U CPU @ 1.60Ghz x 8, with 8GB memory (DDR4), using Ubuntu 20.04 64 bit (5.4.0-54-generic Linux kernel).




Figure 9: Comparison of RECTANGLE with and without bit-slicing

6.2 Hardware Implementation Performance

Performance statistics obtained (by authors of RECTANGLE) using implementation in Verilog HDL and Mentor Graphics SE PLUS 6.6d for functional simulation. Hardware designs were synthesized with Synopsys Design Compiler D-2010.03-SP4 to the UMC's 0.13 μ m.1P8M low leakage standard cell library with the following values: 1.2V and temperature of 25°C. Round-based architecture is used which provides direct mapping of the algorithm.[1]

Comparing with other lightweight ciphers in 5 we can see that RECTANGLE has a very good throughput per area and per gates used. Also area used in RECTANGLE is given in detail in 4. As expected the S-layer takes low area and the total area is low.(Note: p-layer is just wiring so it's effective area is 0 GE)

	80 bit		128 bit					
module	Area(GE)	%	Area(GE)	%				
data state	400	25.01	400	19.38				
s-layer	307	19.19	300	14.54				
p-layer	0	0	0	0				
key XOR	176	11.00	176	8.53				
key schedule	713.5	44.61	1184.5	57.4				
FSM	3	0.19	3	0.15				
sum	1599.5	100	2063.5	100				

Table 4: Area consumption of round-based RECTANGLE 80 and 120

	Key	Block	Cycles	Tech	Area	Throughput
	size	size	per Block	(μm)		(Kbps)
AES-128	128	128	226	0.13	2400	56.6
LED-64	64	64	1248	0.18	966	5.1
PICCOLO-80	80	64	27	0.13	1496	237
PRESENT-80	80	64	32	0.18	1570	200
RECTANGLE-80	80	64	26	0.13	1599.5	246
RECTANGLE-128	128	64	26	0.13	2063.5	246

Table 5: Area vs Throughput of different lightweight ciphers

6.3 Software Implementation Performance

Authors of RECTANGLE implemented RECTANGLE on a 2.5GHz Intel Core i5-2520M CPU - 64 bit C++ compiler and achieved a speed of 30.5cycles/byte.[1]

Our implementation of RECTANGLE (unoptimized, Rustc compiler) gave us a good speed and performance. See "implementation" directory for our implementation and timing measurements.

7 Conclusion

We have done a survey of lightweight cipher, RECTANGLE. Algorithm, rounds and key schedule of the cipher are covered in detail. An implementation in Rust is also made along with speed measurements. Various observations are made on the design of cipher, Sbox, difference propagation. Linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis, the most powerful techniques for attacks are covered. Review on performance of RECTANGLE in software and hardware is done. Finally unique aspects of this paper are summarized in Brownie point section.

8 Brownie Point Nomination

- 1. A lot of images are used to help visualize the operations applied.
- 2. Performance comparison of bit-slicing vs normal version is done in software implementation.
- 3. Encryption Algorithm is explained in much more detailed way and is easy to understand.

9 Contribution

Sl.no.	Task / Area	Members involved
1	Introduction	Abhiram & Kausheek
2	The Cipher	Kausheek & Manu
3	Performance	Manu & Abhiram
4	Security and Cryptanalysis	All
5	Implementation Bitslicing	Manu
6	Implementation without bitslicing	Kausheek
7	Timing Analysis	Abhiram
8	Term paper - Drawings	All
9	Presentation	All

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