

Privacy Preserving Group Ranking

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Semester Project




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0.1 Motivation

Group ranking is a process used to find ~~a~~ the best candidate from a group. The process involves a party called the *initiator* and others parties called *participants*.  The initiator ~~usually~~ has a vector of preferences on some attributes and  participants have vectors of values, each corresponding to the attributes sought after by the initiator. At the end of the process, one or more candidates with attributes best matching the initiator preferences will be selected. This has many applications such as online marketing, personal interest matching, job recruitment and selecting candidates for medical experiment.

However, this process is more and more used in virtual environment in today's society and as a consequence privacy concerns emerge. A trivial approach to Group ranking would leak private informations about all the candidates even if some of the will not be picked at the end of the process. As an example ~~online forms~~ are used to carry such ranking. A naive implementation of  the ranking would require that the candidates provide private information  (e.g. by answering questions on the form). Since some group ranking  imply ranking candidates on based on **sensitive information**, such implementation of group ranking poses a problem to privacy.

Given the necessity of group ranking in a wide range of real world's application and the need to preserve candidates privacy, ~~is there a way to perform group ranking while preserving privacy of all the parties? How do we prevent candidates to learn informations about other candidates? How do we prevent candidates to learn information about the initiator and thus cheating in the process? This is the subject of this paper.~~

~~In this report we present and explain a protocol that performs privacy preserving group ranking and we give a Java implementation of the protocol.~~



0.2 The protocol

In this section we give a detailed explanation of the protocol.

0.2.1 Framework

The protocol is executed cooperatively by $n + 1$ parties. An initiator plus n Participant $P_0, P_1 \dots P_n$. The protocol assumes that the participants are willing to accept the initiator invitation and to submit their private information if selected eventually. The questionnaire given by the initiator is represented as a m -dimensional vector. The initiator holds a m -dimensional vector v_0 indicating the preferred values of each of the question of the questionnaire, another m -dimensional vector represents the weight associated to each questions. Furthermore, the questionnaire comprises: "Equal" questions meaning that the initiator is looking for a specific attribute. "Greater than" question means that the initiator is looking for values exceeding some threshold. We assume without loss of generality that the first t questions are "greater than" questions. Finally the answer of each candidates is also represented by a m -dimensional Vector. A complete description of the protocol framework is given below:



P_0 generates a group $\mathbb{G}_q \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\kappa)$, picks a generator g and publishes them. P_0 also publishes a vector of attribute names and an integer k , where $1 \leq k \leq n$.

Private Input: \mathbf{v}_0 and \mathbf{w} from P_0 ; \mathbf{v}_j from participant P_j , $1 \leq j \leq n$.

Secure gain computation:

- 1) P_0 chooses a random h -bit integer ρ .
- 2) Every participant P_j generates $\mathbf{w}'_j = [\mathbf{v}\mathbf{g}_j^\top, (\mathbf{v}\mathbf{e}_j * \mathbf{v}\mathbf{e}_j)^\top, \mathbf{v}\mathbf{e}_j^\top, 1]^\top$. As in the dot product protocol of Sec. IV-A, P_j computes QX , \mathbf{c}' , \mathbf{g} and sends them to P_0 .
- 3) Upon receiving $(Q_j X_j, \mathbf{c}'_j, \mathbf{g}_j)$ from a participant P_j , P_0 chooses $\rho_j \leftarrow_R \{0, 1, \dots, \rho\}$ and constructs $\mathbf{v}'_j = [\rho\mathbf{w}\mathbf{g}^\top, -\rho\mathbf{w}\mathbf{e}^\top, 2\rho(\mathbf{w}\mathbf{e} * \mathbf{v}\mathbf{e}_0)^\top, \rho_j]^\top$. P_0 computes $a_j = z_j - \mathbf{c}'_j \cdot \mathbf{v}'_j$, $h_j = \mathbf{g}_j^\top \cdot \mathbf{v}'_j$ and sends them back to P_j .
- 4) Upon receiving (a_j, h_j) from P_j , P_0 calculates $\beta_j = (a_j + h_j \cdot R_2/R_3)/b$ and converts it to an unsigned integer (see Sec. III-A).

Unlinkable gain comparison:

- 5) $\forall 1 \leq j \leq n$, P_j picks private key $x_j \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ and publishes $y_j = g^{x_j}$. P_j proves the knowledge of x_j to the rest of parties (Sec. IV-E).
- 6) Each participant P_j represents her β_j in binary bits $[\beta_j]_B = [\beta_j^l, \beta_j^{l-1}, \dots, \beta_j^1]$, encrypts and publishes them as $E(\beta_j)_B = [E(\beta_j^l), \dots, E(\beta_j^1)]$. Here, the encryption is done using joint key $y = \prod_{j=1}^n y_j$.
- 7) Each participant P_j gets encrypted data $\{E(\beta_i)_B\}_{i=1, i \neq j}^n$ from others. For each encrypted data $E(\beta_i)_B$, P_j does following calculation for $1 \leq t \leq l$:
 - $E(\gamma_i^t) = E(\beta_j^t + \beta_i^t - 2\beta_j^t\beta_i^t)$, where $\gamma_i^t = \beta_j^t \oplus \beta_i^t$;
 - $E(\omega_i^t) = E((l-t+1) - \sum_{v=t+1}^l (\gamma_i^t - \gamma_i^v) - \gamma_i^t)$;
 - $E(\tau_i^t) = E(\omega_i^t + \beta_i^t)$. P_j sends all the ciphertexts $\mathcal{E}_j = \{e : e \in E(\tau_i) \wedge 1 \leq i \leq n \wedge i \neq j\}$ to P_1 , where $E(\tau_i) = \{E(\tau_i^t)\}_{t=1}^l$.
- 8) After receiving the ciphertext sets from all the rest parties, P_1 constructs a vector $V = [\mathcal{E}_1, \mathcal{E}_2, \dots, \mathcal{E}_n]$. Starting at P_1 , each participant P_j applies following steps to each element \mathcal{E}_i ($i \neq j$) in V :
 - For each ciphertext $(c_t, c'_t) \in \mathcal{E}_i$, replaces c_t by $\tilde{c}_t = c_t/(c'_t)^{x_j}$. Picks $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ and updates the ciphertext with $((\tilde{c}_t)^r, (c'_t)^r)$.
 - Permutes the ciphertexts in each set \mathcal{E}_i . P_j then sends the permuted vector V to P_{j+1} . If P_j is the last one, P_n , she sends the element of the vector back to the corresponding participant.

Ranking Submission:

Upon receiving the final result \tilde{E}_j from P_n , participant P_j ($1 \leq j \leq n$) decrypts each element ciphertext (c, c') by using $g^m = c/c'^{x_j}$ and checks $g^m = 1$. Let d be the number of zeroes and then the ranking of P_j is $d_j = d + 1$. If $d_j \leq k$, P_j submits \mathbf{v}_j to P_0 as well as the ranking.

Figure 1: Framework

Explanation of the protocol In our implementation, the same group will be used for every iteration of the protocol. The implementation uses a prime-order group of at least 1024 bits, thus the computation of discrete log is made difficult.

```

1 package lasecbachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
   crypto;
2
3 import java.math.BigInteger;
4 import java.security.SecureRandom;
5
6 public class GroupGenerator {
7
8     private static int minBitLength;
9
10    private static int certainty;
11
12    private static BigInteger ONE = BigInteger.ONE;
13    private static BigInteger generator, prime, group;
14    private static SecureRandom secureRandom;
15
16    public GroupGenerator(int minBitLength, int certainty,
17        SecureRandom secureRandom, boolean lengthCheck){
18        if(minBitLength < 1024 && lengthCheck )
19            throw new IllegalArgumentException("Prime
20                should have at least 512 bits");
21        this.minBitLength = minBitLength;
22        this.certainty = certainty;
23        this.secureRandom = secureRandom;
24        getSafePrime();
25    }
26
27
28    private static void getSafePrime(){
29
30        BigInteger a;
31        do {
32            a = new BigInteger(minBitLength, secureRandom);
33
34            a = a.add(ONE);
35
36            group = new BigInteger(minBitLength, certainty,
37                secureRandom);
38
39            prime = a.multiply(group).add(ONE);
40        }
41        while(!prime.isProbablePrime(certainty));
42
43    }

```

```

44         boolean isGen;
45         do{
46             isGen = true;
47             generator = new BigInteger(prime.bitLength(),
secureRandom);
48             generator = generator.mod(prime.subtract(BigInteger.
ONE)).add(BigInteger.ONE);
49             generator = generator.modPow(a, prime);
50             if(generator.equals(ONE)){
51                 isGen = false;
52             }
53         }while (!(isGen && !generator.equals(BigInteger.ZERO)));
54     }
55
56
57     public static BigInteger getPrime(){
58         if(prime == null)
59         {
60             getSafePrime();
61         }
62         return prime;
63     }
64     public static BigInteger getGenerator(){
65         return generator;
66     }
67
68     public static BigInteger getGroup(){
69         return group;
70     }
71
72
73
74 }

```



Secure gain computation First we define what is the gain in the context of this protocol.

Given a criterion vector $v_0 = [v_{01}, v_{02}, \dots, v_{0m}]$ and the weight vector $w = [w_1, w_2, \dots, w_m]$. The partial gain value of P_j is $p_j = \sum_{k=t+1}^m w_k v_k^j - \sum_{k=1}^t (w_k (v_k^j)^2 - 2w_k v_k^j v_k^0)$. In terms of dot products, the partial gain is given by $wg \cdot vg_j - we \cdot (ve_j * ve_0) + 2(we * ve_0) \cdot ve_j$. The $*$ operation is an element-wise multiplication of two vectors. ve_0 is equal to part of the criterion vector and vg_0 is the greater than part. we , wg , ve_j and vg_j are defined in this similar fashion.

Steps 1 through 4 are implemented by the classes: Owner.java for the initiator.



```

1 package lasecbachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
    user;

```

```

2
3 import java.math.BigInteger;
4 import java.security.SecureRandom;
5
6 import lasecbachelorprject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
    crypto.SecureDotProductParty;
7 import lasecbachelorprject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
    helpers.Poll;
8
9 import static java.lang.Math.ceil;
10 import static java.lang.Math.log;
11 import static java.lang.System.arraycopy;
12
13
14 public class Owner {
15     //TODO: Normal users with inheritance
16     public SecureDotProductParty me;
17     private BigInteger rho;
18     private int h;
19     private BigInteger[] criterionVector;
20     public Poll myPoll;
21
22
23
24     private BigInteger[] myAttVector; // 10 for test
25     private BigInteger[] myWeightVector;
26     private BigInteger[] wPrimeVector;
27     public int l;
28     private int k = 2 ; //for now
29     private int t = 5; // for now
30     private SecureRandom random;
31     private final int greaterLength;
32     private final int equalLength;
33
34     public Owner(BigInteger criterionEqualVector [], BigInteger[]
        criterionGreaterVector, BigInteger[] weightEqualVector,
        BigInteger[] weightGreaterVector){
35         greaterLength = criterionGreaterVector.length;
36         equalLength = criterionEqualVector.length;
37
38         l = (int) ceil(log(equalLength + criterionGreaterVector.
            length)) +
39             criterionEqualVector[0].bitLength() +
40             2*weightEqualVector[0].bitLength() + 2 ;
41         random = new SecureRandom();
42
43         do{
44             h = random.nextInt() % 20;
45         }while (h <= 0);
46         //TODO: Decoment following line
47         rho = (new BigInteger(h, random)).abs();
48
49         generateOwnerVprime(criterionEqualVector,
            weightGreaterVector, weightEqualVector);

```

```

50         me = new SecureDotProductParty(rho);
51         me.setMyvector(wPrimeVector);
52
53
54
55
56     }
57
58     private void generateOwnerVprime(BigInteger[]
59 criterionEqVector, BigInteger[] weightEqualVector, BigInteger
60 [] weightGreaterVector) {
61         /*Vector of size gr + 2 *eq*/
62         wPrimeVector = new BigInteger[greaterLength + 2*
63 equalLength];
64
65         /*[vgT,..]*/
66         arraycopy(weightGreaterVector,0, wPrimeVector,0,
67 greaterLength);
68
69         BigInteger v[] = new BigInteger[equalLength];
70         /* [vgT,(ve*ve)T,..]*/
71         for (int i = 0; i < equalLength ; i++) {
72             v[i] = weightEqualVector[i].negate();
73         }
74         arraycopy(v,0,wPrimeVector,greaterLength,equalLength);
75
76         for (int i = 0; i <equalLength; i++) {
77             v[i] = weightEqualVector[i].multiply(
78 criterionEqVector[i]);
79             v[i] = v[i].add(v[i]);
80         }
81         arraycopy(v,0,wPrimeVector,greaterLength+equalLength,
82 equalLength);
83         for (int i = 0; i < wPrimeVector.length ; i++) {
84             wPrimeVector[i] = wPrimeVector[i].multiply(rho);
85         }
86
87         myAttVector = new BigInteger[wPrimeVector.length];
88         for (int i = 0; i <myAttVector.length; i++) {
89             myAttVector[i] = wPrimeVector[i];
90         }
91     }
92
93     public void initiatePoll(int Participants){
94
95         myPoll = new Poll(Participants);
96
97     }
98
99     public BigInteger[] getMyAttVector() {
100         return myAttVector.clone();
101     }

```


98
99
100
101
102 }

Participant.java for participants.

```

1 package las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    user ;
2
3
4 import java . math . BigInteger ;
5 import java . security . SecureRandom ;
6 import java . util . ArrayList ;
7 import java . util . HashMap ;
8 import java . util . List ;
9 import java . util . Map ;
10
11 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    Activities . Application ;
12 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    crypto . ElGamal ;
13 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    crypto . EncryptedBinaryComparator ;
14 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    crypto . SecureDotProductParty ;
15 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    crypto . ZeroKnowledgeProver ;
16 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    crypto . ZeroKnowledgeVerifier ;
17 import las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch . privacy preserving housing .
    helpers . DataBase ;
18
19 import static las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch .
    privacy preserving housing . crypto . ElGamal . homomorphicEncryption
    ;
20 import static las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch .
    privacy preserving housing . crypto . ElGamal .
    multHomomorphicEncryption ;
21 import static las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch .
    privacy preserving housing . crypto . EncryptedBinaryComparator .
    createBinaryArray ;
22 import static las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch .
    privacy preserving housing . crypto . EncryptedBinaryComparator .
    finalDecryption ;
23 import static las ECBachelorproject . epfl . ch .
    privacy preserving housing . crypto . SecureDotProductParty .
    copyBigIntArrayToIntArray ;
24
25 public class Participant extends Person implements User {
26
27
28     private final BigInteger prime ;
29     private final BigInteger generator ;

```

```

30     private final int k;
31     public SecureDotProductParty secureDotProduct;
32     public BigInteger[] wPrimeVector;
33     private BigInteger privateKey;
34     private BigInteger publicKey;
35     public ZeroKnowledgeProver prover;
36     public ZeroKnowledgeVerifier verifier;
37     private SecureRandom random;
38     private BigInteger group;
39     int replyEqSize;
40     int replyGrSize;
41     private BigInteger gain;
42     private BigInteger[][] cypher;
43     private int myCandidateNumber;
44     private static Map<Integer, BigInteger[][]> othersGain;
45     private static List<BigInteger[][]> encryptedComparisonList;
46     private List<List<BigInteger[][]>> list;
47     private int l;
48     private EncryptedBinaryComparator comparisonTool =
SecureBinaryComparator.getGainComparisonTool();
49     private BigInteger commonKey;
50     private List<BigInteger[][]> finalComp;
51     private int ranking;
52
53
54     public Participant(BigInteger replyGr[], BigInteger[]
replyEq, int l, int k) {
55         replyEqSize = replyEq.length;
56         replyGrSize = replyGr.length;
57         wPrimeVector = new BigInteger[replyGrSize + 2 *
replyEqSize];
58         generateWPrimeVector(replyGr, replyEq);
59         secureDotProduct = new SecureDotProductParty();
60         secureDotProduct.setMyvector(wPrimeVector);
61         group = Application.group;
62         prime = Application.prime;
63         generator = Application.generator;
64         random = new SecureRandom();
65
66         prover = new ZeroKnowledgeProver(prime, group, generator
);
67         verifier = new ZeroKnowledgeVerifier(prime, group,
generator);
68         othersGain = new HashMap<>();
69         encryptedComparisonList = new ArrayList<>();
70         this.l = l;
71         this.k = k;
72     }
73
74     private void generateWPrimeVector(BigInteger replyGr[],
BigInteger[] replyEq) {
75         copyBigIntArrayToIntArray(replyGr, 0, wPrimeVector, 0,
replyGrSize);
76

```

```

77     BigInteger[] v = new BigInteger[replyEqSize];
78
79     for (int i = 0; i < replyEqSize; i++) {
80         v[i] = replyEq[i].pow(2);
81     }
82     copyBigIntArrayToIntArray(v, 0, wPrimeVector,
83     replyGrSize, replyEqSize);
84     copyBigIntArrayToIntArray(replyEq, 0, wPrimeVector,
85     replyEqSize + replyEqSize, replyEqSize);
86 }
87
88 public BigInteger[] getReplyVector() {
89     return wPrimeVector;
90 }
91
92 public void convertGain(int l) {
93     BigInteger two = BigInteger.ONE.add(BigInteger.ONE);
94     gain = secureDotProduct.getBeta().add(two.pow(l));
95     wPrimeVector = createBinaryArray(gain, l);
96 }
97
98 public void generatePrivateKey() {
99     privateKey = (new BigInteger(prime.bitLength(), random))
100     .mod(prime);
101     publicKey = generator.modPow(privateKey, prime);
102     DataBase.getDataBase().publishElGamalPublicKey(this,
103     publicKey);
104     prover.setX(privateKey);
105 }
106
107 public void setKeyToVerify(BigInteger key) {
108     verifier.setY(key);
109 }
110
111 public void encryptWithCommonkey() {
112     ElGamal.setCommonKey(DataBase.getEncryptionKey());
113     cypher = ElGamal.encryptMany(wPrimeVector);
114 }
115
116 public void setMyCandidateNumber(int number) {
117     myCandidateNumber = number;
118 }
119
120 public void sendEncryptedComparisonToDB() {
121     DataBase.pushComparisonVector(this, comparisonTool.
122     getEncryptedComparisons());
123 }
124
125 public void getEpsilonVector(List<List<BigInteger[]>> list

```

```

126     ) {
127         this.list = comparisonTool.chainedDecryption(list,
128         myCandidateNumber, privateKey, prime, group);
129     }
130     public void sendBackDecryptedListToDB() {
131         DataBase.pushPartialListDecryption(list);
132     }
133
134
135     public void participantGain(Integer participantIndex,
136     BigInteger[][] gain) {
137         othersGain.put(participantIndex, gain);
138     }
139
140     public void compareWithParticipants() {
141         //List of encrypted bit by bit comparisons
142         encryptedComparisonList = new ArrayList<>();
143         //Procedure for candidate I
144         for (Integer index : othersGain.keySet()) {
145
146             //Computation of the gama's factors
147             List<BigInteger[]> gamas = new ArrayList<>(1);
148             //table of beta's
149             BigInteger[][] betaI = othersGain.get(index);
150             BigInteger[] tmp;
151             BigInteger[] tmp2;
152             for (int t = 0; t < 1; t++) {
153                 tmp = homomorphicEncryption(betaI[t], cypher[t])
154
155             ;
156                 tmp2 = multHomomorphicEncryption(betaI[t],
157                 wPrimeVector[t].multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(-2)));
158                 gamas.add(t, homomorphicEncryption(tmp, tmp2));
159             }
160             /*
161             * Optimisation begin with t = 1 so single loop
162             * Pull the creation outside the loops
163             */
164             BigInteger[] val;//(1 - t + 1)
165             BigInteger[][] sum = new BigInteger[1][2];
166             BigInteger[][] negGamaT = new BigInteger[1][2];
167             BigInteger[][] omegas = new BigInteger[1][2];
168             BigInteger[][] taus = new BigInteger[1][2];
169             for (int t = 0; t < 1; t++) {
170                 val = ElGamal.encrypt(BigInteger.valueOf(1 - t))
171
172             ;
173                 tmp = ElGamal.getNegativeCiphers(gamas.get(t));
174                 negGamaT[t] = multHomomorphicEncryption(tmp,
175                 BigInteger.valueOf(1 - t));
176                 sum[t] = homomorphicEncryption(gamas.subList(t +
177                 1, 1));
178                 omegas[t] = homomorphicEncryption(val, sum[t],
179                 negGamaT[t]); // E( 1-t+1 + sum of (gamav - gmai))

```

```

171         taus[t] = homomorphicEncryption(omegas[t], betaI
172         [t]);
173         }
174         encryptedComparisonList.add(taus);
175     }
176     DataBase.pushComparisonVector(this,
177     encryptedComparisonList);
178 }
179
180
181 public void receiveFinalComp(List<BigInteger [][]> comp) {
182     this.finalComp = comp;
183 }
184
185
186 private void computeSelfRanking(){
187     ranking = finalDecryption(finalComp);
188 }
189
190 private void rankingSubmission(){
191     if (ranking <= k){
192         DataBase.submitsResults(this, ranking, wPrimeVector);
193     }
194 }
195
196 }

```

SecureDotProductParty.java is used to implement the secure dot product protocol proposed by Ioanids and used in this protocol

```

1 package las ECBachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
2     crypto;
3
4 import java.math.BigInteger;
5 import java.security.SecureRandom;
6
7 /*
8  * Class that a represent parties in secure dot product protocol
9  */
10
11 public class SecureDotProductParty {
12
13     private BigInteger [][] Q;
14     private BigInteger [][] X;
15     private BigInteger factors [];
16     private BigInteger qTimesX [][];
17     private BigInteger [] cPrime;
18     private BigInteger [] g;
19
20     private int dDimension;
21     private SecureRandom secureRandom;

```

```

22     private int    sDimension;
23
24     private BigInteger b;
25     private BigInteger [] c;
26     private int    rThRow;
27     private BigInteger R1;
28     private BigInteger R2;
29     private BigInteger R3;
30
31     private BigInteger [] y;
32     private BigInteger z;
33     private BigInteger a;
34     private BigInteger h;
35     private BigInteger rho;
36     private BigInteger rhoMax;
37     private BigInteger beta;
38
39     public BigInteger [] getPrimeVector() {
40         return primeVector.clone();
41     }
42
43     private BigInteger [] primeVector;
44
45     public BigInteger dotProduct;
46     public BigInteger gain;
47
48     //TODO: Copy the values so that the vector can't be modified
49     //in the outside
50     public SecureDotProductParty(BigInteger rho){
51
52         secureRandom = new SecureRandom();
53         this.rhoMax = new BigInteger(String.valueOf(rho));
54     }
55
56     public SecureDotProductParty(){
57         secureRandom = new SecureRandom();
58     }
59
60
61     //initiate The dot product for myVector
62     public void initiateDotProduct(){
63
64
65
66         //TODO : Constant matrix dimension
67         sDimension = 100; //1 + secureRandom.nextInt(10);
68         rThRow = secureRandom.nextInt(sDimension);
69
70         //Genrate Q and compute b. TODO: Skip rth row in the
71         for an assigne later
72         Q = new BigInteger [sDimension][sDimension];
73         for (int i = 0; i < sDimension ; i++) {
74             for (int j = 0; j < sDimension ; j++) {

```

```

74         //TODO: Correct BOUNd
75         Q[i][j] = BigInteger.ONE;//new BigInteger(
String.valueOf(secureRandom.nextInt(100)));
76
77     }
78 }
79
80
81 //TODO: b!!!
82 b = BigInteger.ZERO;
83 for (int i = 0; i < sDimension; i++) {
84     b = b.add(Q[i][rThRow]); // safeAdd(b,Q[i][rThRow]);
85 }
86 //Generate X
87 X = new BigInteger [sDimension][dDimension];
88
89 for (int i = 0; i < sDimension ; i++) {
90     for (int j = 0; j < dDimension ; j++) {
91         if(i != rThRow){
92             //TODO: Ccrrect next INT LIMIT
93             X[i][j] = BigInteger.valueOf(secureRandom.
nextInt(100)+1);
94         }
95         else{
96             X[i][j] = primeVector[j];
97         }
98     }
99 }
100
101
102
103
104
105 //scalar factor to compute the "c" vector.
106 //factors[i] = sum(Qji).
107 factors = new BigInteger [sDimension];
108
109 factors[rThRow] = BigInteger.ZERO;
110 for (int i = 0; i < sDimension ; i++) {
111     factors[i] = BigInteger.ZERO;
112     if(i != rThRow) {
113         for (int j = 0; j < sDimension; j++) {
114
115             factors[i] = factors[i].add(Q[j][i]);
116         }
117     }
118 }
119
120 //Generate c
121 c = new BigInteger [dDimension];
122
123 for (int i = 0; i < dDimension ; i++) {
124     c[i] = BigInteger.ZERO;
125     for (int j = 0; j < sDimension ; j++) {

```

```

126         c[i] = c[i].add(X[j][i].multiply(factors[j]));
127     }
128 }
129
130 //Generate f
131 BigInteger [] f = new BigInteger [dDimension];
132 for (int i = 0; i < dDimension ; i++) {
133     f[i] = BigInteger.valueOf(secureRandom.nextInt(100)
+ 1);
134 }
135
136 //TODO: Change the 1
137 R1 = BigInteger.valueOf(secureRandom.nextInt(100) +1);
138 R2 = BigInteger.valueOf(secureRandom.nextInt(100) +1);
139 R3 = BigInteger.valueOf(secureRandom.nextInt(100) +1);
140
141 //Compute Q*X
142 qTimesX = new BigInteger [sDimension][dDimension];
143 for (int i = 0; i < sDimension ; i++) {
144     for (int j = 0; j < dDimension ; j++) {
145         qTimesX[i][j] = BigInteger.ZERO;
146         for (int k = 0; k < sDimension ; k++) {
147             qTimesX[i][j] = qTimesX[i][j].add(Q[i][k].
multiply(X[k][j]));
148         }
149     }
150 }
151
152 //c'
153 cPrime = new BigInteger [dDimension];
154 BigInteger R1TimesR2 = R1.multiply(R2);
155 for (int i = 0; i < dDimension ; i++) {
156     cPrime[i] = c[i].add(R1TimesR2.multiply(f[i]));
157 }
158
159 BigInteger R1TimesR3 = R1.multiply(R3);
160
161 //Generate g
162 g = new BigInteger [dDimension];
163 for (int i = 0; i < dDimension ; i++) {
164     g[i] = R1TimesR3.multiply(f[i]);
165 }
166
167 }
168
169
170
171 public void sendInitialDataToOtherParty(
SecureDotProductParty party){
172     party.receiveQTimesX(qTimesX, cPrime, g);
173 }
174
175 public void sendAH(SecureDotProductParty party){
176     party.receiveAH(a, h);

```



```

177     }
178
179     private void receiveAH(BigInteger a, BigInteger h) {
180         this.a = a;
181         this.h = h;
182         beta = (a.add((h.multiply(R2)).divide(R3))).divide(b);
183     }
184
185     public void sendBeta(SecureDotProductParty party){
186         party.receiveBeta(beta);
187     }
188
189     public void sendAlpha(SecureDotProductParty party){
190         party.receiveAlpha(rho);
191     }
192     private void receiveBeta(BigInteger beta) {
193         this.beta = beta;
194     }
195
196     public BigInteger getBeta(){
197         return beta;
198     }
199     public BigInteger getAlpha(){return rho;}
200
201
202
203     private void receiveQTimesX(BigInteger [][] qTimesX,
204     BigInteger [] cPrime, BigInteger [] g) {
205         /* if(this.cPrime.length != primeVector.length || this.g.
206         length != primeVector.length){
207             throw new IllegalArgumentException("The dot product
208             can't be computed because of dimensions mismatch. Expected
209             vector size: "+
210
211                                     myvector.length
212             + " received cPrime Size: " + (this.cPrime.length - 1) +"
213             received g size: "+ (this.g.length -1));
214         }*/
215         this.qTimesX = qTimesX;
216         this.cPrime = cPrime;
217         this.g = g;
218         BigInteger [] rhoVector;
219
220         rho = new BigInteger(rhoMax.bitLength() -1, secureRandom
221 );
222         rhoVector = primeVector.clone();
223         rhoVector [rhoVector.length - 1 ] = rho;
224
225         /*double [][] qTimesX = (double [][]) get("QtimesX");
226         double [] cPrime = (double []) get("cPrime");
227         double [] g = (double []) get("G");*/
228         y = computeY(qTimesX, rhoVector);
229         z = vectorElementsSum(y);
230         a = z.subtract(normalDotProduct(cPrime, rhoVector));

```

```

224         h = normalDotProduct(g, rhoVector);
225
226         /*this.put("Y", y);
227         this.put("Z", z);
228         this.put("A", a);
229         this.put("H", h);*/
230
231     }
232
233
234
235
236     private BigInteger [] computeY(BigInteger [][] qTimesX,
237     BigInteger [] myVectorPrime) {
238         int dim = qTimesX.length;
239         BigInteger y[] = new BigInteger [dim];
240         for (int i = 0; i < dim ; i++) {
241             y[i] = normalDotProduct(qTimesX[i], myVectorPrime);
242         }
243         return y;
244     }
245
246     public static BigInteger normalDotProduct(BigInteger [] v1,
247     BigInteger [] v2 ){
248         BigInteger res = BigInteger.ZERO;
249         for (int i = 0; i < v1.length ; i++) {
250             res = res.add(v1[i].multiply(v2[i]));
251         }
252         return res;
253     }
254
255     private static BigInteger [] vectorAddition(BigInteger [] v1
256     , BigInteger [] v2){
257         int dim = v1.length;
258         BigInteger [] v = new BigInteger [dim];
259         for (int i = 0; i < dim; i++) {
260             v[i] = v1[i].add(v2[i]);
261         }
262         return v;
263     }
264
265     public static BigInteger [] vectorsElemMult(BigInteger [] v1,
266     BigInteger [] v2){
267         BigInteger [] res = new BigInteger[v1.length];
268         for (int i = 0; i < v1.length ; i++) {
269             res[i] = v1[i].multiply(v2[i]);
270         }
271         return res;
272     }
273
274     public static BigInteger [] vectorsElemMultMod(BigInteger []
275     v1, BigInteger [] v2, BigInteger prime){
276         BigInteger [] res = new BigInteger[v1.length];
277         for (int i = 0; i < v1.length ; i++) {

```

```

273         res[i] = (v1[i].multiply(v2[i])).mod(prime);
274     }
275     return res;
276 }
277
278
279
280
281 public static BigInteger vectorElementsSum(BigInteger [] v1)
282 {
283     int dim = v1.length;
284     BigInteger res = BigInteger.ZERO;
285     for (int i = 0; i < dim; i++) {
286         res = res.add(v1[i]);
287     }
288     return res;
289 }
290
291 public static BigInteger [] vectorScalarMult(BigInteger []
292 vector, BigInteger scalar){
293     BigInteger [] res = new BigInteger[vector.length];
294     for (int i = 0; i < vector.length; i++) {
295         res[i] = vector[i].multiply(scalar);
296     }
297     return res;
298 }
299
300 public static BigInteger [] vectorScalarMultMod(BigInteger []
301 vector, BigInteger scalar, BigInteger prime){
302     BigInteger [] res = new BigInteger[vector.length];
303     for (int i = 0; i < vector.length; i++) {
304         res[i] = (vector[i].multiply(scalar)).mod(prime);
305     }
306     return res;
307 }
308
309 public static BigInteger [] vectorsElemExpo(BigInteger [] v,
310 int expo){
311     for (int i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {
312         v[i] = v[i].pow(expo);
313     }
314     return v;
315 }
316
317 public static BigInteger [] vectorsElemModExpo(BigInteger [] v
318 , BigInteger expo, BigInteger prime){
319     BigInteger [] res = new BigInteger[v.length];
320     for (int i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {
321         res[i] = v[i].modPow(expo, prime);

```

```

322
323
324     public void setAlphaMax(BigInteger alphaMax) {
325         this.rhoMax = alphaMax;
326     }
327
328
329     private void receiveAlpha(BigInteger alpha) {
330         this.rho = alpha;
331     }
332
333
334     public void getPartialGain(int l) {
335         BigInteger two = BigInteger.ONE.add(BigInteger.ONE);
336         gain = (new BigInteger(String.valueOf(dotProduct))).add(
337             two.pow(l-1));
338     }
339
340     public void setMyvector(BigInteger [] vector) {
341         dDimension = vector.length + 1;
342         primeVector = new BigInteger [dDimension];
343         System.arraycopy(vector,0,primeVector,0,vector.length);
344         primeVector[vector.length] = BigInteger.ONE;
345     }
346
347     public static void copyBigIntArrayToIntArray(BigInteger []
348     src, int srcPos, BigInteger [] des, int destPos, int number
349     ){
350         for (int i = srcPos, j= destPos; i <srcPos+number ; i++,
351         j++) {
352             des[j] = src[i];
353         }
354     }
355
356     public BigInteger getRhoForParticipant() {
357         return rho;
358     }
359
360     static final long safeAdd(long left, long right) {
361         if (right > 0 ? left > Long.MAX_VALUE - right
362             : left < Long.MIN_VALUE - right) {
363             throw new ArithmeticException("Longoverflow");
364         }
365         return left + right;
366     }
367
368     static final long safeSubtract(long left, long right) {
369         if (right > 0 ? left < Long.MIN_VALUE + right
370             : left > Long.MAX_VALUE + right) {
371             throw new ArithmeticException("Longoverflow");
372         }
373         return left - right;

```

```

372     }
373
374     static final long safeMultiply(long left, long right) {
375         if (right > 0 ? left > Long.MAX_VALUE/right
376             || left < Long.MIN_VALUE/right
377             : (right < -1 ? left > Long.MIN_VALUE/right
378               || left < Long.MAX_VALUE/right
379               : right == -1
380               && left == Long.MIN_VALUE) ) {
381             throw new ArithmeticException("Integer overflow");
382         }
383         return left * right;
384     }
385
386     static final long safeDivide(long left, long right) {
387         if ((left == Long.MIN_VALUE) && (right == -1)) {
388             throw new ArithmeticException("Integer overflow");
389         }
390         return left / right;
391     }
392
393     static final long safeNegate(long a) {
394         if (a == Long.MIN_VALUE) {
395             throw new ArithmeticException("Integer overflow");
396         }
397         return -a;
398     }
399     static final long safeAbs(long a) {
400         if (a == Integer.MIN_VALUE) {
401             throw new ArithmeticException("Integer overflow");
402         }
403         return Math.abs(a);
404     }
405
406
407
408 }

```

Unlinkable Gain comparison NEED TO DESCRIBE PRECISELY UNLINKEABLE!!!! In this phase each participant $P_i, 1 \leq i \leq n$ blindly compares his gain to others. ~~The gains are converted to binary-array β and each bits is encrypted with a modified version of ElGamal cryptosystem beforehand.~~ For the common key y , each participant picks a private key x_j , publishes the corresponding public key and proves the knowledge of that key to other participant. The proof of knowledge is done by classes `ZeroKnowledgeProver.java` and `ZeroKnowledgeVerifier.java`.

```

1 package lascbachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
   crypto;
2
3 import java.math.BigInteger;
4 import java.security.SecureRandom;

```

```

5
6 public class ZeroKnowledgeProver {
7
8     private BigInteger x;
9     private BigInteger h;
10    private BigInteger z;
11    private BigInteger prime;
12    private BigInteger group;
13    private BigInteger generator;
14    private SecureRandom secureRandom;
15    public BigInteger r;
16
17    //TODO: Group should be the published key
18    public ZeroKnowledgeProver(BigInteger prime, BigInteger
group, BigInteger generator){
19        this.prime = prime;
20        this.group = group;
21        this.generator = generator;
22        secureRandom = new SecureRandom();
23    }
24
25    public void initiateProof(){
26        generateH();
27    }
28    private void generateH(){
29        r = new BigInteger(group.bitLength(), secureRandom);
30        r = r.mod(group);
31        h = generator.modPow(r, prime);
32    }
33
34    public void sendH(ZeroKnowledgeVerifier verifier){
35        verifier.receiveH(h);
36    }
37
38    private void computeZ(BigInteger c){
39        z = (r.add(x.multiply(c))).mod(group);
40    }
41
42    public BigInteger sendZ(BigInteger c){
43        computeZ(c);
44        return z;
45    }
46
47
48    public void receiveC(BigInteger c) {
49        computeZ(c);
50    }
51
52    public void setX(BigInteger x){
53        this.x = x;
54    }
55 }

```

```

1 package lasecbachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.

```

```

    crypto;
2
3 import java.math.BigInteger;
4 import java.security.SecureRandom;
5
6 public class ZeroKnowledgeVerifier {
7     private BigInteger y;
8     private BigInteger h;
9     private BigInteger z;
10    private BigInteger prime, group, generator, qMinusOne;
11    private BigInteger c;
12    private SecureRandom secureRandom;
13
14    public ZeroKnowledgeVerifier(BigInteger prime, BigInteger
group, BigInteger generator){
15        this.prime = prime;
16        this.generator = generator;
17        this.group = group;
18        this.qMinusOne = group.subtract(BigInteger.ONE);
19        secureRandom = new SecureRandom();
20    }
21
22    public BigInteger sendC(){
23        c = new BigInteger(group.bitLength(), secureRandom);
24        return c = c.mod(group);
25    }
26
27
28
29
30    public void receiveH(BigInteger h) {
31        this.h = h;
32    }
33
34    public void receiveZ(BigInteger z) {
35        this.z = z;
36    }
37
38    public void setY(BigInteger y) {
39        this.y = y;
40    }
41
42
43    public boolean verifyWithZ(BigInteger z, BigInteger sharedC)
{
44        BigInteger gPowZ = generator.modPow(z, prime);
45        BigInteger hTimesYPowC = (h.multiply(y.modPow(sharedC,
prime))).mod(prime);
46        return gPowZ.equals(hTimesYPowC);
47    }
48 }

```

The actual comparison is executed at step 7. The comparison on Encrypted bits, using additive homomorphism of the modified ElGamal cryptosystem that we shortly describe here.

Modified Elgamal Group G_q is a prime order multiplicative group for which the DDH problem is hard and g is a generator in G_q . Then, the ModfiElGamal cryptosystem is described as: Key generation: a private key is a random element x in Z_q and the corresponding public key is $y = g^x$. Encryption: a ciphertext of a message M is of form $E(M) = (g^m y^r, g^r)$, where $r \in Z_q$. *DESCRIPTION OF DECRYPTION* *SHOW HOMOMORPHIC ADDITIVITY AND MULTIPLICATIVE IF ONE PLAIN TEXT IS KNOWN.* *SHOW THAT SINCE WE ARE ONLY WORKING WITH 0 and 1 FOR THE GAIN THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH DECRYPTION*

```

1 package las ECBachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
  crypto;
2
3 import java.math.BigInteger;
4 import java.security.SecureRandom;
5 import java.util.ArrayList;
6 import java.util.Collection;
7 import java.util.HashMap;
8 import java.util.List;
9 import java.util.Map;
10
11 import las ECBachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.user
  .Participant;
12
13 public class ElGamal {
14
15
16     private static BigInteger prime, group, generator, privateKey,
        myPublicKey;
17     private static final BigInteger ONE = BigInteger.ONE;
18     private static ElGamal cryptoSystem;
19     private static SecureRandom secureRandom;
20     private static BigInteger commonKey;
21     //TODO: Remove after test
22     private static Map<Participant, BigInteger> mySecretKey;
23     private static Map<Participant, BigInteger> myPukey;
24
25     //TODO: fix group, generator. Add method for secret key
26
27     private ElGamal(BigInteger prime, BigInteger group,
        BigInteger generator){
28         mySecretKey = new HashMap<>();
29         myPukey = new HashMap<>();
30         this.prime = prime;
31         this.group = group;
32         this.generator = generator;
33         secureRandom = new SecureRandom();

```



```

34     }
35
36     public static ElGamal getElGamal(BigInteger prime,
37     BigInteger group, BigInteger generator){
38         if (cryptoSystem == null){
39             cryptoSystem = new ElGamal(prime, group, generator);
40         }
41         return cryptoSystem;
42     }
43
44
45     public static BigInteger[] encrypt(BigInteger bit){
46         if(bit == null) {
47             throw new IllegalArgumentException("Message to
48             encrypt is null");
49         }
50         BigInteger r = new BigInteger(group.bitLength(),
51         secureRandom);
52         r = r.mod(group);
53         BigInteger gPowMessage = generator.modPow(bit, prime);
54         BigInteger yPowR = commonKey.modPow(r, prime);
55         BigInteger[] cipher = new BigInteger[2];
56         cipher[0] = gPowMessage.multiply(yPowR).mod(prime);
57         cipher[1] = generator.modPow(r, prime);
58         return cipher;
59     }
60
61     public static BigInteger[][] encryptMany(BigInteger[] bits){
62         BigInteger[][] res = new BigInteger[bits.length][2];
63         for (int i = 0; i < bits.length ; i++) {
64             res[i] = encrypt(bits[i]);
65         }
66         return res;
67     }
68
69     public static void setPrivateKey(BigInteger privateKey){
70         if(privateKey == null){
71             throw new IllegalArgumentException("Null Argument
72             to Set private key");
73         }
74
75         ElGamal.privateKey = privateKey;
76         myPublicKey = generator.modPow(privateKey, prime);
77     }
78
79     public static void setMySKey(Participant p, BigInteger key){
80         mySecretKey.put(p, key);
81         myPukey.put(p, generator.modPow(key, prime));
82     }
83
84     public static BigInteger getMyPuKey(Participant p){
85         return myPukey.get(p);
86     }

```

```

84     }
85
86     public static void setCommonKey(BigInteger commonKey){
87         ElGamal.commonKey = commonKey;
88     }
89
90
91     public static BigInteger decrypt(BigInteger[] cypher){
92         if(cypher == null || cypher.length != 2 || cypher[0] ==
93         null || cypher[1] == null ){
94             throw new IllegalArgumentException("null or bad
95             length cypher");
96         }
97
98         BigInteger msg = (cypher[0].multiply(cypher[1].modPow(
99         privateKey.negate(),prime)).mod(prime);
100
101         return msg.equals(BigInteger.ONE) ? BigInteger.ZERO :
102         BigInteger.ONE;
103     }
104
105     public static BigInteger decryptMe(Participant p, BigInteger
106     [] cypher){
107         if(cypher == null || cypher.length != 2 || cypher[0] ==
108         null || cypher[1] == null ){
109             throw new IllegalArgumentException("null or bad
110             length cypher");
111         }
112         setPrivateKey(mySecretKey.get(p));
113         BigInteger msg = (cypher[0].multiply(cypher[1].modPow(
114         privateKey.negate(),prime)).mod(prime);
115
116         return msg.equals(BigInteger.ONE) ? BigInteger.ZERO :
117         BigInteger.ONE;
118     }
119
120
121     public static List<BigInteger> decryptMany(List<BigInteger
122     []> table){
123         ArrayList<BigInteger> res = new ArrayList<>(table.size()
124         );
125         for (BigInteger[] t: table) {
126             res.add(decrypt(t));
127         }
128         return res;
129     }
130
131     public static Collection<BigInteger> decryptManyME(
132     Participant p,Collection<BigInteger[]> table){
133         ArrayList<BigInteger> res = new ArrayList<>(table.size()
134         );
135         for (BigInteger[] t: table) {
136             res.add(decryptMe(p,t));
137         }
138     }

```

```

125     }
126     return res;
127 }
128
129 public static BigInteger getmyPublicKey(){
130     return myPublicKey;
131 }
132
133
134 public static BigInteger[] homomorphicEncryption(Collection<
BigInteger[]> ciphers){
135     BigInteger[] res = new BigInteger[]{BigInteger.ONE,
BigInteger.ONE};
136     for (BigInteger[] c: ciphers) {
137         res = SecureDotProductParty.vectorsElemMultMod(res,c
,prime);
138     }
139     return res;
140 }
141
142 public static BigInteger[] getNegativeciphers(BigInteger[]
cypher){
143     return SecureDotProductParty.vectorsElemModExpo(cypher ,
BigInteger.valueOf(Long.parseLong("-1")),prime);
144 }
145
146 public static BigInteger[] homomorphicEncryption(BigInteger
[] c1, BigInteger[] c2){
147     return SecureDotProductParty.vectorsElemMultMod(c1,c2 ,
prime);
148 }
149
150 public static BigInteger[] homomorphicEncryption(BigInteger
[]... ciphers){
151     BigInteger[] res = new BigInteger []{BigInteger.ONE,
BigInteger.ONE};
152     for(BigInteger[] c : ciphers){
153         res = homomorphicEncryption(res,c);
154     }
155     return res;
156 }
157
158 public static BigInteger[] multHomomorphicEncryption(
BigInteger[] cipher , BigInteger otherWord){
159     return SecureDotProductParty.vectorsElemModExpo(cipher ,
otherWord,prime);
160 }
161
162 public static BigInteger getPrime(){
163     return prime;
164 }
165
166 public static BigInteger getGenerator(){
167     return getGenerator();

```

```

168     }
169
170     public static BigInteger getGroup() {
171         return group;
172     }
173
174 }

```

The comparison with an other participant's (WLOG P_j) gain is done as follow: First stage the participant of concern let say P_i executes a bit-wise xor with his gain vector β_i gain yielding a new vector γ .

Next stage, the participant generates a new vector ω where each elements is computed by the formula $\omega^t = (l - t + 1) - (l - t + 1) \cdot \gamma^t + \sum_{v=t+1}^l (\gamma^v)$. Last stage: The last generated vector is τ where $\tau^t = \omega^t + \beta_i^t$. At the end of the process the τ vector will have at most one 0 and if it contains on then P_i has smaller gain than P_j .

Now we show that this comparison is correct.

Proof Let $a = a_{n-1} \dots a_1 a_0$ and $b = b_{n-1} \dots b_1 b_0$ be two n bits unsigned numbers in binary form and we want to compare a to b . Let suppose W.L.O.G that the first $k-1$ most significant bits of a and b are the same, $0 \leq k-1 \leq n$. The γ vector of stage one will have $k-1$ zeros in the last $k-1$ elements. This implies that the corresponding values of the ω vector will have values of at least 1 so will be the values of the corresponding τ vector. The value of the k th element in each vectors depends on the two following cases.

Case 1: a is greater than b . In this case $a^k = 1$ and $b^k = 0$. This implies that $\gamma^k = 1$. This also means that $\omega^k = 0$ and $\tau^k = 0 + a^k k = 1$.

Case 2: a is smaller than b . We have $a^k = 0$ and $b^k = 1$. This implies that $\gamma^k = 1$. This also means that $\omega^k = 0$ and $\tau^k = 0 + a^k k = 0$.

Lastly, $\omega^j \geq 1, j < k$. This comes from the fact that $(l - t + 1) - (l - t + 1) \cdot \gamma^j \geq 0$ and also the sum is at least 1 due to the γ^k . This shows that the comparison method will give at then at most one zero and if $a \leq b$ then the comparison will yield one zero and none otherwise (i.e $a \geq b$).

These operation are done with the class EncryptedBinaryComparator.java

```

1 package las ECBachelorproject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.
   crypto;
2
3 import java.math.BigInteger;
4 import java.security.SecureRandom;
5 import java.util.ArrayList;
6 import java.util.Arrays;
7 import java.util.Collections;

```

```

8 import java.util.HashMap;
9 import java.util.List;
10 import java.util.Map;
11
12 import lascbachelorprject.epfl.ch.privacypreservinghousing.user
    .Participant;
13
14 import static lascbachelorprject.epfl.ch.
    privacypreservinghousing.crypto.ElGamal.decrypt;
15 import static lascbachelorprject.epfl.ch.
    privacypreservinghousing.crypto.ElGamal.decryptMany;
16 import static lascbachelorprject.epfl.ch.
    privacypreservinghousing.crypto.ElGamal.homomorphicEncryption
    ;
17 import static lascbachelorprject.epfl.ch.
    privacypreservinghousing.crypto.ElGamal.
    multHomomorphicEncryption;
18
19
20 public class EncryptedBinaryComparator {
21
22     private static BigInteger [][] myGain;
23     private static Map<Integer, BigInteger [][]> othersGain;
24     private static List<BigInteger [][]> encryptedComparisonList;
25     private static BigInteger [] plainGain;
26     private static BigInteger [] othersPlain;
27     private static int l;
28     private static EncryptedBinaryComparator gainComparisonTool;
29     private static Map<Participant, BigInteger [][]> selfGain;
30     private static Map<Participant, Map<Integer, BigInteger [][]>>
        selfOthersGain;
31     private static Map<Participant, List<BigInteger [][]>>
        selfCryptComp;
32     private static Map<Participant, BigInteger []> selfPlainGain;
33     public static List<BigInteger []> gamas;
34     public static BigInteger [][] betaI;
35     public static BigInteger [] tmp;
36     public static BigInteger [] tmp2;//(1 -t +1 )
37     public static BigInteger [] val;
38     public static BigInteger [][] sum;
39     public static BigInteger [][] negGamaT;
40     public static BigInteger [][] omegas;
41     public static BigInteger [][] taus;
42
43     private EncryptedBinaryComparator() {
44         selfCryptComp = new HashMap<>();
45         selfGain = new HashMap<>();
46         selfPlainGain = new HashMap<>();
47         selfOthersGain = new HashMap<>();
48         othersGain = new HashMap<>();
49     }
50
51     public static EncryptedBinaryComparator
        getGainComparisonTool() {

```

```

52         if(gainComparisonTool == null){
53             gainComparisonTool = new EncryptedBinaryComparator()
54         };
55         return gainComparisonTool;
56     }
57
58     public static void setMyGain(BigInteger [][] encryptedGain ,
59     BigInteger [] plainGain){
60         if(encryptedGain == null)
61             throw new NullPointerException("Null encryptedGain")
62         ;
63         l = encryptedGain.length;
64         myGain = encryptedGain.clone();
65         EncryptedBinaryComparator.plainGain = plainGain.clone();
66     }
67     public static void setL(int l){
68         EncryptedBinaryComparator.l = l;
69     }
70     public static void setMyGainMe(Participant p, BigInteger
71     [][] encryptedGain , BigInteger [] plainGain){
72         if(encryptedGain == null)
73             throw new NullPointerException("Null encryptedGain")
74         ;
75         selfGain.put(p, encryptedGain);
76         selfPlainGain.put(p, plainGain);
77     }
78
79     public static void setOthersGain(Integer participantIndex ,
80     BigInteger [][] gain){
81         othersGain.put(participantIndex , gain);
82     }
83
84     public static void setOthersGainMe(Participant p, Integer
85     participantIndex , BigInteger [][] gain){
86         if(selfOthersGain.get(p) == null){
87             }
88         othersGain.put(participantIndex , gain);
89     }
90     /**
91     * Compares own gain with other's
92     */
93     public static void compareWithParticipants(){
94         //List of encrypted bit by bit comparisons
95         encryptedComparisonList = new ArrayList<>();
96         //Procedure for candidate I
97         for (Integer index: othersGain.keySet()) {
98             //Computation of the gama's factors

```

```

99         gamas = new ArrayList<>(1);
100         //table of beta's
101         betaI = othersGain.get(index).clone();
102         for (int t = 0; t < 1 ; t++) {
103             tmp = homomorphicEncryption(betaI[t], myGain[t]);
104             tmp2 = multHomomorphicEncryption(betaI[t],
105 plainGain[t].multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(-2)));
106             gamas.add(t, homomorphicEncryption(tmp, tmp2));
107             //Un-comment and bring fields back in the method
108             BigInteger expe1 = plainGain[t].add(decrypt(
109 betaI[t])).mod(BigInteger.valueOf(2));
110             BigInteger expe2 = plainGain[t].add(othersPlain[
111 t]).mod(BigInteger.valueOf(2));
112             BigInteger res = decrypt(gamas.get(t));
113
114             if(!(othersPlain[t].equals(decrypt(betaI[t]))))
115                 throw new IllegalStateException();
116             if(!(othersPlain[t].equals(decrypt(othersGain.get
117 (index)[t]))))
118                 throw new IllegalStateException();
119             if(!(plainGain[t].equals(decrypt(myGain[t]))))
120                 throw new IllegalStateException();
121             if(!(expe1.equals(expe2)))
122                 throw new IllegalStateException();
123             if(!(expe2.equals(res)))
124                 throw new IllegalStateException();
125
126         }
127     }
128     /*
129     * Optimisation begin with t = 1 so singe loop
130     * Pull the creation outside the loops
131     */
132     sum = new BigInteger[1][2];
133     negGamaT = new BigInteger[1][2];
134     omegas = new BigInteger[1][2];
135     taus = new BigInteger[1][2];
136     List<BigInteger> plainGama = decryptMany(gamas);
137     for (int t = 1-1; t >= 0; t--) {
138         val = ElGamal.encrypt(BigInteger.valueOf(1-t));
139         tmp = ElGamal.getNegativeciphers(gamas.get(t));
140         negGamaT[t] = multHomomorphicEncryption(tmp,
141 BigInteger.valueOf(1-t));
142         sum[t] = homomorphicEncryption(gamas.subList(t
143 +1,1));
144         omegas[t] = homomorphicEncryption(val, sum[t],
145 negGamaT[t]); // E( 1-t+1 + sum of (gamav - gmai) - gamai)
146         taus[t] = homomorphicEncryption(omegas[t],
147 myGain[t]);
148         BigInteger expSum = BigInteger.valueOf(1-t);
149         BigInteger expeNegGama = plainGama.get(t).
150 multiply(expSum).negate();
151         BigInteger expGamSum = SecureDotProductParty.
152 vectorElementsSum((BigInteger[]) plainGama.subList(t+1,1).
153 toArray(new BigInteger[1-t-1]));

```

```

142         BigInteger expeOmeg = expSum.add(expeNegGama).
add(expGamSum);
143         BigInteger expTau = expeOmeg.add(plainGain[t]);
144         if(!compEncrypted(plainGama.get(t),(decrypt(
gamas.get(t)))))
145             throw new IllegalStateException();
146         if(!compEncrypted(expSum,decrypt(val)))
147             throw new IllegalStateException();
148         if(!compEncrypted(expeNegGama,decrypt(negGamaT[t
])))
149             throw new IllegalStateException();
150         if(!compEncrypted(expGamSum,decrypt(sum[t])))
151             throw new IllegalStateException();
152         if(!compEncrypted(expeOmeg,decrypt(omegas[t])))
153             throw new IllegalStateException();
154         if(!compEncrypted(expTau,decrypt(taus[t])))
155             throw new IllegalStateException();
156
157     }
158     encryptedComparisonList.add(taus);
159 }
160 }
161
162
163 /**
164  * Method that's compare two ElGamal encrypted numbers.
165  * Computes the XOR bit-by-bit and finally.
166  * Computation is done so that the first right most bit is
set to Zero
167  * Since the encryption Scheme is Homomorphic we can compute
: M1+M2 also M1*M2
168  * M1, M1 in F2
169  * @param cipher1
170  * @param cipher2
171  */
172 public static List<BigInteger[]> compareNumbers(BigInteger []
plain1, BigInteger [][] cipher1, BigInteger [][] cipher2){
173     if (cipher1.length != cipher2.length){
174         throw new IllegalArgumentException("Ciphers must
have the same size");
175     }
176     checkInput(cipher1);
177     checkInput(cipher2);
178     int l = cipher1.length;
179     //List of encrypted bit by bit comparisons
180
181
182
183     //Computation of the gama's factors
184     List<BigInteger[]> gamas = new ArrayList<>(1);
185     //table of beta's
186     BigInteger [] tmp;
187     BigInteger [] tmp2;
188     for (int t = 0; t < l ; t++) {

```



```

189         tmp = homomorphicEncryption(cipher1[t], cipher2[t
190     ]);
191         tmp2 = multHomomorphicEncryption(cipher2[t],
192     plain1[t].multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(-2)));
193         gamas.add(t, homomorphicEncryption(tmp, tmp2));
194     }
195     /*
196     * Optimisation begin with t = 1 so singe loop
197     * Pull the creation outside the loops
198     */
199     BigInteger[] val; //(1 - t + 1)
200     List<BigInteger[]> sum = new ArrayList<>(1);
201     List<BigInteger[]> negGamaT = new ArrayList<>(1);
202     List<BigInteger[]> omegas = new ArrayList<>(1);
203     List<BigInteger[]> taus = new ArrayList<>(1);
204     for (int t = 1 - 1; t >= 0; t--) {
205         val = ElGamal.encrypt(BigInteger.valueOf(1 - t));
206         tmp = ElGamal.getNegativciphers(gamas.get(t));
207         negGamaT.add(t, multHomomorphicEncryption(tmp,
208     BigInteger.valueOf(1 - t)));
209         sum.add(t, homomorphicEncryption(gamas.subList(t
210     + 1, 1)));
211         omegas.add(t, homomorphicEncryption(val, sum.get(t
212     ), negGamaT.get(t))); // E( 1 - t + 1 + sum of (gamav - gmai))
213         taus.add(t, homomorphicEncryption(omegas.get(t),
214     cipher1[t]));
215     }
216     return taus;
217 }
218
219 /**
220 * Check the encrypted input
221 * Mostly for size
222 * @param cipher1
223 */
224 private static void checkInput(BigInteger[][] cipher1) {
225     for (BigInteger[] c: cipher1) {
226         if (c.length != 2 || c[0] == null || c[1] == null) {
227             throw new IllegalArgumentException("Bad cipher
228     as argument either size or one of cipher compoment is Null");
229         }
230     }
231 }
232
233 public static BigInteger[][] getEncryptedCompWithCandidate(
234     Integer candidateIndex) {
235     return encryptedComparisonList.get(candidateIndex);
236 }
237
238 public static List<BigInteger[][]> getEncryptedComparisons()
239 {

```

```

234         return new ArrayList<>(encryptedComparisonList);
235     }
236
237
238     /**
239     * Method for chained decryption(i.e Phase 8)
240     * @param list V vector in the paoer
241     * @param myIndex
242     * @param privateKey
243     * @param prime
244     * @return
245     */
246     public static List<List<BigInteger[][]>> chainedDecryption(
247         List<List<BigInteger[][]>> list, int myIndex, BigInteger
248         privateKey, BigInteger prime, BigInteger group) {
249         BigInteger r;
250         for (int i = 0; i < list.size() ; i++) {
251             if(i != myIndex){
252                 for (int j = 0; j < list.size() ; j++) {
253                     r = new BigInteger(group.bitLength(),new
254                     SecureRandom());
255                     r = r.mod(group);
256                     for (int k = 0; k < l ; k++) {
257                         BigInteger ct = list.get(i).get(j)[k
258                         ][0];
259                         BigInteger ct_prime = list.get(i).get(j)
260                         [k][1];
261                         ct = (ct.multiply((ct_prime.modPow(
262                         privateKey,prime)).modInverse(prime))).modPow(r,prime);
263                         list.get(i).get(j)[k][0] = ct;
264                         list.get(i).get(j)[k][1] = ct_prime.
265                         modPow(r,prime);
266                     }
267                     Collections.shuffle(Arrays.asList(list.get(i
268                     ).get(j)));
269                 }
270             }
271         }
272         return list;
273     }
274
275     /**
276     * Returns the binary representation of a number as an array
277     * .
278     * i.e if g = abcd with a,b,c,d in {0,1}
279     * then the array is [d,c,b,a] and indexOf(d) = 0;
280     * @param gain the number to convert
281     * @return
282     */
283     public static BigInteger[] createBinaryArray(BigInteger gain
284     , int length){
285         String t = (gain.toString(2));
286         int l = t.length();

```

```

278     BigInteger[] binaryVector = new BigInteger[length];
279     for (int i = 0; i < length ; i++) {
280         if(i < 1) {
281             binaryVector[i] = new BigInteger(String.valueOf(
282                 t.charAt(1 - i - 1)));
283         }
284         else{
285             binaryVector[i] = BigInteger.ZERO;
286         }
287     }
288     return binaryVector;
289 }
290
291 public static int finalDecryption(List<BigInteger[][]> comp)
292 {
293     ArrayList<BigInteger> res;
294     int nb = 0;
295     for (BigInteger[][] b: comp) {
296         res = (ArrayList)decryptMany(Arrays.asList(b));
297         for (BigInteger c: res) {
298             if(c.equals(BigInteger.ZERO)){
299                 nb++;
300             }
301         }
302     }
303     return nb + 1 ;
304 }
305
306 public static BigInteger[] getOthersPlain() {
307     return othersPlain;
308 }
309
310 public static void setOthersPlain(BigInteger[] othersPlain)
311 {
312     EncryptedBinaryComparator.othersPlain = othersPlain;
313 }
314
315 private static boolean compEncrypted(BigInteger expected,
316 BigInteger res){
317     return (!expected.equals(BigInteger.ZERO) && res.equals(
318         BigInteger.ONE) ||
319         expected.equals(BigInteger.ZERO) && res.equals(
320         BigInteger.ZERO));
321 }
322
323 public static int findDiffindex(BigInteger n1, BigInteger n2
324 ){
325     int length = Math.max(n1.bitLength(),n2.bitLength());
326     BigInteger[] v1 = createBinaryArray(n1,length);
327     BigInteger[] v2 = createBinaryArray(n2,length);
328     int index = v1.length - 1;
329     boolean found = false;
330     while(!found){

```

```

325         if(!v1[index].equals(v2[index])){
326             found = true;
327         }
328         else{
329             index--;
330         }
331     }
332     return index;
333 }
334 }

```

Once the comparison with all of the others gain is done, the participant proceed to decrypt the comparison in a chained fashion. And at last each Participant count the number of zeros yielded by comparing his gain with others and submit his ranking and his gain to the initiator if the number of zero is less than k, meaning that the participants is amongst the kth the best participants.

0.3 Simulation and results

lllSHOW CODE FOR A SMALL APPLICATION

lllPLOT DIFFERENT RUNNING TIMES AS FUNCTION OF ONE PARAMETER: number Participant, security parameter of ELGAMAL

0.4 Conclusion

lllDESCRIPTION OF WHAT CAN BE DONE IF OWNER IS DISHONEST

lllDESCRIPTION OF WHAT CAN BE DONE IF SOME PARTICIPANTS ARE DISHONEST AND COLLARBORATES

lllMENTION THE FACT THAT THERE COULD BE A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE DOT PRODUCT PROTOCOL SO THAT AT LEAT ONE PRIVATE ATTRIBUTE CAN BE LEARNED. QUOTE PAPER PROOVING IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISTRIBUTED SECURE DOT PRODUCT

lllTHANK THE LAB FOR THE PROJECT AND HANDAN FOR A GOOD SUPERVISION.

0.5 Bibliography