# **GSERM 2021**Analyzing Panel Data

June 15, 2021

## One- and Two-Way "Unit Effects"

Two-way variation:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \gamma V_i + \delta W_t + u_{it}$$

→ "two-way" effects:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + \eta_t + u_{it}$$

Also: "One-way" effects:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \eta_t + u_{it}$$
 (time)

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$
 (units)

"Brute force" model:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$
  
= 
$$\mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_1 I(i=1)_i + \alpha_2 I(i=2)_i + \dots + u_{it}$$

Alternatively, decompose:

$$\bar{\mathbf{X}}_i = \frac{\sum_{N_i} \mathbf{X}_{it}}{N_i}$$

and

$$\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_{i}$$

Yields:

$$Y_{it} = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \boldsymbol{\beta}_B + \tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{it} \boldsymbol{\beta}_W + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$

## "Fixed" Effects

Means that:

$$Y_{it}^* = Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_i$$
  
 $\mathbf{X}_{it}^* = \mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i$ 

$$Y_{it}^* = \beta_{FE} \mathbf{X}_{it}^* + u_{it}.$$

ightarrow a "Fixed Effects" Model is actually a "Within-Effects" Model.

"Fixed" Effects: Test(s)

#### Standard F-test for

$$H_0: \alpha_i = \alpha_j \forall i \neq j$$

versus

$$H_A: \alpha_i \neq \alpha_j$$
 for some  $i \neq j$ 

is 
$$\sim F_{N-1,NT-(N-1)}$$
.

## Example Data: Demonstrations, 1945-2014

#### Data:

- Data are (a subset of) Banks (2019)
- N = 180 countries, T = 70 years [1945-2014]
- Variables:
  - Demonstrations: Number of social/political demonstrations in that country in that year
  - POLITY: The country's POLITY IV score that year (-10 = fully autocratic; 10 = fully democratic)
  - · POLITY<sup>2</sup>: POLITY IV squared (expected curvilinear relationship)
  - · GDP: The per capita GDP (PPP, in constant \$US) for that country / year
  - Monarch: Whether (=1) or not (=0) that country was a monarchy in that year
  - ColdWar: Indicator variable, coded 1 for the period 1945-1989, 0 otherwise


#### Regression model:

```
ln(\mathsf{Demonstrations}+1)_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathsf{POLITY}_{it} + \beta_2 \mathsf{POLITY}_{it}^2 + \beta_3 \mathsf{In}(\mathsf{GDP})_{it} + \beta_4 \mathsf{Monarch}_{it} + \beta_5 \mathsf{Cold} \, \mathsf{War}_{it} + u_{it}
```


## Data Summary

```
> summary(Demos)
     ccode
                    Year
                                   POLITY
                                                     GDP
        . 2
               Min.
                       :1945
                                      :-10.00
                                                            185
 Min.
                               Min.
                                                Min.
 1st Qu.:235
               1st Qu.:1969
                               1st Qu.: -7.00
                                                1st Qu.:
                                                          1580
 Median:451
               Median:1985
                               Median: 0.00
                                                Median:
                                                          4002
 Mean
        :456
               Mean
                      :1984
                               Mean
                                    : 0.63
                                                Mean
                                                      : 8120
 3rd Qu.:663
               3rd Qu.:2000
                               3rd Qu.:
                                         8.00
                                                3rd Qu.: 10365
 Max.
        :950
               Max.
                      :2014
                               Max.
                                      : 10.00
                                                Max.
                                                        :134040
                               NA's
                                      :111
                                                NA's
                                                        :2348
    Monarch
                   1nDemons
                                   ColdWar
                                                    1nGDP
 Min.
        :0.0
                       :0.0
                                       :0.000
                                                        : 5.2
                Min.
                                Min.
                                                Min.
                                                1st Qu.: 7.4
 1st Qu.:0.0
                1st Qu.:0.0
                                1st Qu.:0.000
                                                Median: 8.3
 Median:0.0
                Median:0.0
                                Median :1.000
 Mean
        :0.1
                Mean
                       :0.3
                                Mean
                                       :0.563
                                                        : 8.3
                                                Mean
 3rd Qu.:0.0
                3rd Qu.:0.0
                                3rd Qu.:1.000
                                                3rd Qu.: 9.2
 Max.
        :1.0
                Max.
                       :4.3
                                Max.
                                       :1.000
                                                Max.
                                                        :11.8
 NA's
        :1198
                NA's
                       :1149
                                                NA's
                                                        :2348
```

# Visualization (using panelView)




## Categorical Variable Visualization




### Demonstrations: Total Variation

```
> with(Demos, describe(lnDemons)) # all variation
  vars    n mean    sd median trimmed mad min    max range skew kurtosis    se
X1    1 8219 0.25 0.55    0    0.11    0    0 4.32    4.32 2.54    7.3 0.01
```




## Demonstrations: "Between" Variation

```
> DemonsMeans <- ddply(Demos,.(ccode),summarise,
+ DemonsMean = mean(lnDemons,na.rm=TRUE))
> with(DemonsMeans, describe(DemonsMean)) # "between" variation
vars n mean sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis se
X1 1 160 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.15 0 1.38 1.38 1.99 4.55 0.02
```



## Demonstrations: "Within" Variation



## Regression: Pooled OLS

```
> OLS<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
         data=PDF, model="pooling")
> summary(OLS)
Pooling Model
Call:
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   ColdWar, data = PDF, model = "pooling")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
Residuals:
  Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu.
                                 Max
-0.4501 -0.2930 -0.2176 -0.0754 4.1073
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -0.124639  0.058208  -2.14  0.032 *
POT.TTY
            0.006296 0.001179 5.34 9.5e-08 ***
I(POLITY^2) -0.002267  0.000255  -8.90 < 2e-16 ***
     0.057679 0.007513 7.68 1.9e-14 ***
1nGDP
Monarch -0.046393 0.028572 -1.62 0.104
ColdWar
       0.027883 0.013961 2.00 0.046 *
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Total Sum of Squares:
                      1850
Residual Sum of Squares: 1800
R-Squared:
               0.0261
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0253
F-statistic: 34.8228 on 5 and 6499 DF, p-value: <2e-16
```

## "Fixed" (Within) Effects

```
> FE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
            data=PDF, effect="individual", model="within")
> summary(FE)
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "individual", model = "within")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
Residuals:
  Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu.
-1.3556 -0.2120 -0.0768 0.0193 4.0496
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
POLITY
            0.001526 0.001553 0.98 0.32604
I(POLITY^2) -0.001942  0.000296  -6.55  6.1e-11 ***
1 nGDP
          0.054586 0.015200 3.59 0.00033 ***
Monarch 0.047976 0.068071 0.70 0.48097
ColdWar -0.035487 0.016235 -2.19 0.02887 *
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Total Sum of Squares:
Residual Sum of Squares: 1400
R-Squared:
               0.013
Adj. R-Squared: -0.0102
F-statistic: 16.7177 on 5 and 6355 DF, p-value: <2e-16
```

## A Nicer Table

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE
POLITY	0.006***	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)
POLITY Squared	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
In(GDP)	0.058***	0.055***
	(0.008)	(0.015)
Monarch	-0.046	0.048
	(0.029)	(0.068)
Cold War	0.028**	-0.035**
	(0.014)	(0.016)
Constant	-0.125**	
	(0.058)	
Observations	6,505	6,505
$R^2$	0.026	0.013
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010
F Statistic	34.820*** (df = 5; 6499)	16.720*** (df = 5; 6355)

<sup>\*</sup>p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Time-Period Fixed Effects

The model is:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \eta_t + u_{it}$$

which is estimated via:

$$Y_{it}^{**} = Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_t$$
  
 $\mathbf{X}_{it}^{**} = \mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_t$ 

$$Y_{it}^{**} = \beta_{FE} \mathbf{X}_{it}^{**} + u_{it}.$$

## Comparison: Unit vs. Time Fixed Effects

Table: FE Models of Demonstrations

	FE.Units	FE.Time	
POLITY	0.002	0.007***	
	(0.002)	(0.001)	
POLITY Squared	-0.002***	-0.002***	
•	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	
In(GDP)	0.055***	0.058***	
,	(0.015)	(800.0)	
Monarch	0.048	-0.038	
	(0.068)	(0.028)	
Cold War	-0.035**		
	(0.016)		
Observations	6,505	6,505	
$R^2$	0.013	0.028	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.010	0.018	
F Statistic	16.720*** (df = 5; 6355)	46.270*** (df = 4; 6439)	

p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Fixed Effects: Testing

The specification:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$

...suggests that we can use an F-test to examine the hypothesis:

$$H_0: \alpha_i = 0 \ \forall i$$

(and a similar test for  $\eta_t = 0$  in the time-centered case).

Arguably better are Lagrange multiplier-based tests:

- Breusch-Pagan (1980)
- King and Wu (1997)
- See (e.g.) Croissant and Millo (2018, §4.1) for details

#### FE Model Tests

```
> pFtest(FE.OLS)
F test for individual effects
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
F = 13, df1 = 144, df2 = 6355, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> plmtest(FE,effect=c("individual"),type=c("bp"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Breusch-Pagan) for unbalanced panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
chisq = 8016, df = 1, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> plmtest(FE,effect=c("individual"),type=c("kw"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - (King and Wu) for unbalanced panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
normal = 90, p-value < 2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
```

#### Same For Time Effects

```
> pFtest(FE.Time,OLS)
F test for time effects
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
F = 3, df1 = 60, df2 = 6439, p-value = 1e-13
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> plmtest(FE.Time,effect=c("time"),type=c("bp"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - time effects (Breusch-Pagan) for unbalanced
panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
chisq = 144, df = 1, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> plmtest(FE.Time,effect=c("time"),type=c("kw"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - time effects (King and Wu) for unbalanced panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
normal = 12, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
```

## Fixed Effects: Interpretation

FE models are *subject-specific* models, that rely entirely on *within-unit* variability to estimate variable effects.

• This means that:

$$\hat{\beta}_k = \frac{\partial E(Y|\hat{\alpha})}{\partial X_k}$$

- That is,  $\hat{\beta}_k$  is the expected change in E(Y) associated with a one-unit increase in observation i's value of  $X_k$
- Key: within-unit changes in X are associated with within-unit expected changes in Y.
- In a linear model, the value of  $\hat{\alpha}$  doesn't affect the value of that partial derivative...

## Fixed Effects: Interpretation

#### Mummolo and Peterson (2018) note that:

"...because the within-unit variation is always smaller (or at least, no larger) than the overall variation in the independent variable, researchers should use within-unit variation to motivate counterfactuals when discussing the substantive impact of a treatment" (2018, 829).

#### Significance:

- Predictors X in FE models typically have both cross-sectional and temporal variation
- FE models only consider within-unit variation in X and Y
- As a result, the degree of actual/observed (within-unit) variation in predictors is almost always less – and sometimes significantly less – than if cross-sectional variation were also considered

## Interpretation Example: Monarchy

#### Monarchy - All Variation:

```
> with(Demos, sd(Monarch,na.rm=TRUE))
[1] 0.2601
```

#### Monarchy - "Within" Variation:

"While the overall variation in the independent variable may be large, the within-unit variation used to estimate  $\beta$  may be much smaller" (M & P 2018, 830).

#### Pros and Cons of "Fixed" Effects

#### Pros:

- Mitigates (Some) Specification Bias
- Simple + Intuitive
- Widely Used/Understood

#### Cons (see e.g. Collischon and Eberl 2020):

- Can't Estimate  $\beta_B$
- Slowly-Changing Xs
- (In)Efficiency / Inconsistency (Incidental Parameters)
- Cannot Control for (e.g.) Time-Varying Heterogeneity
- Sensitivity to Measurement Error

From the equation above:

$$Y_{it} = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \boldsymbol{\beta}_B + \tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{it} \boldsymbol{\beta}_W + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$

...we can derive a "Between Effects" model:

$$\bar{Y}_i = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \boldsymbol{\beta}_B + u_{it}$$

This model:

- is essentially cross-sectional,
- is based on N observations,
- considers only between-unit (average) differences
- Interpretation:

 $\hat{\beta}_k$  is the expected difference in Y between two units whose values on  $\bar{X}_k$  differ by a value of 1.0.

#### "Between" Effects

```
> BE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
           data=PDF, effect="individual", model="between")
> summary(BE)
Oneway (individual) effect Between Model
Call:
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "individual", model = "between")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
Observations used in estimation: 145
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -0.30601
                    0.20837 -1.47 0.1442
POLITY
            0.00597 0.00489
                               1.22 0.2244
I(POLITY^2) -0.00302  0.00112 -2.69  0.0079 **
          0.06883 0.02734 2.52 0.0130 *
1 nGDP
Monarch -0.04966 0.10320 -0.48 0.6312
ColdWar 0.25872
                    0.08482
                               3.05 0.0027 **
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Total Sum of Squares:
Residual Sum of Squares: 7.64
R-Squared:
              0.127
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0961
F-statistic: 4.06164 on 5 and 139 DF, p-value: 0.0018
```

# A Nicer Table (Again)

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE	BE
POLITY	0.006***	0.002	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)
POLITY Squared	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.001)
In(GDP)	0.058***	0.055***	0.069**
, ,	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.027)
Monarch	-0.046	0.048	-0.050
	(0.029)	(0.068)	(0.103)
Cold War	0.028**	-0.035**	0.259***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.085)
Constant	-0.125**		-0.306
	(0.058)		(0.208)
Observations	6,505	6,505	145
$R^2$	0.026	0.013	0.127
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010	0.096
F Statistic	34.820*** (df = 5; 6499)	16.720*** (df = 5; 6355)	4.062*** (df = 5; 139)

 $^*p{<}0.1;\ ^{**}p{<}0.05;\ ^{***}p{<}0.01$ 

Model:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + u_{it}$$

with:

$$u_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \eta_{it}$$

and

$$\begin{split} E(\alpha_i) &= E(\lambda_t) = E(\eta_{it}) &= 0, \\ E(\alpha_i \lambda_t) &= E(\alpha_i \eta_{it}) = E(\lambda_t \eta_{it}) &= 0, \\ E(\alpha_i \alpha_j) &= \sigma_\alpha^2 \text{ if } i = j, \ 0 \text{ otherwise}, \\ E(\lambda_t \lambda_s) &= \sigma_\lambda^2 \text{ if } t = s, \ 0 \text{ otherwise}, \\ E(\eta_{it} \eta_{js}) &= \sigma_\eta^2 \text{ if } i = j, \ t = s, \ 0 \text{ otherwise}, \\ E(\alpha_i \mathbf{X}_{it}) &= E(\lambda_t \mathbf{X}_{it}) = E(\eta_{it} \mathbf{X}_{it}) &= 0. \end{split}$$

## "Random" Effects

If those assumptions are met, we can consider the "two-way variance components" model where:

$$Var(u_{it}) = Var(Y_{it}|\mathbf{X}_{it})$$
$$= \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} + \sigma_{\lambda}^{2} + \sigma_{\eta}^{2}$$

If we assume  $\lambda_t = 0$ , then we get a model like:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \eta_{it}$$

with total error variance:

$$\sigma_u^2 = \sigma_\alpha^2 + \sigma_\eta^2.$$

#### "Random" Effects: Estimation

The model in 1 will violate the standard OLS assumptions of uncorrelated errors, because the (compound) "errors" within each unit share a common component  $\alpha_i$ .

Consider the within-i variance-covariance matrix of the errors  $\mathbf{u}$ :

$$E(\mathbf{u}_{i}\mathbf{u}_{i}') \equiv \mathbf{\Sigma}_{i} = \sigma_{\eta}^{2}\mathbf{I}_{T} + \sigma_{\alpha}^{2}\mathbf{i}\mathbf{i}'$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_{\eta}^{2} + \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} & \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} & \cdots & \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} \\ \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} & \sigma_{\eta}^{2} + \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} & \cdots & \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} & \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} & \cdots & \sigma_{\eta}^{2} + \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

Assuming conditional independence across units, we then have:

$$\mathsf{Var}(\mathbf{u}) \equiv \mathbf{\Omega} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{\Sigma}_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{\Sigma}_2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & \mathbf{\Sigma}_N \end{pmatrix}$$

#### "Random" Effects: Estimation

We can then show that:

$$\mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1/2} = rac{1}{\sigma_{\eta}} \left[ \mathbf{I}_{T} - \left( rac{ heta}{T} \mathbf{i} \mathbf{i}' 
ight) 
ight]$$

where

$$heta=1-\sqrt{rac{\sigma_{\eta}^2}{T\sigma_{lpha}^2+\sigma_{\eta}^2}}$$

is an unknown quantity to be estimated.

Starting with an estimate of  $\hat{\theta}$ , calculate:

$$Y_{it}^* = Y_{it} - \hat{\theta} \bar{Y}_i$$
  
$$X_{it}^* = X_{it} - \hat{\theta} \bar{X}_i,$$

then estimate:

$$Y_{it}^* = (1 - \hat{ heta}) lpha + X_{it}^* eta_{RE} + [(1 - \hat{ heta}) lpha_i + (\eta_{it} - \hat{ heta} ar{\eta}_i)]$$

and iterate between the two processes until convergence.

## "Random" Effects: An Alternative View



#### Random Effects

```
> RE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar.
               data=PDF, effect="individual", model="random")
> summary(RE)
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model
   (Swamv-Arora's transformation)
Call:
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "individual", model = "random")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
Effects.
                var std.dev share
idiosyncratic 0.2197 0.4687 0.8
individual
             0.0563 0.2373 0.2
theta.
  Min. 1st Qu. Median
                        Mean 3rd Qu.
 0.108 0.708 0.736 0.724 0.757
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.131708 0.104987 -1.25
                                          0.210
POLITY
            0.002574 0.001450
                                1.78
                                        0.076 .
I(POLITY^2) -0.001953  0.000287  -6.81  9.6e-12 ***
1nGDP
            0.057117 0.012443
                                4.59 4.4e-06 ***
Monarch
           -0.006937 0.053291 -0.13 0.896
ColdWar
           -0.023580 0.015008 -1.57 0.116
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Total Sum of Squares:
                        1440
Residual Sum of Squares: 1430
R-Squared:
              0.0124
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0117
Chisq: 81.0788 on 5 DF, p-value: 4.99e-16
```

# A Nicer Table (Yet Again)

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE	BE	RE
POLITY	0.006***	0.002	0.006	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)
POLITY Squared	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
In(GDP)	0.058***	0.055***	0.069**	0.057***
, ,	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.012)
Monarch	-0.046	0.048	-0.050	-0.007
	(0.029)	(0.068)	(0.103)	(0.053)
Cold War	0.028**	-0.035**	0.259***	-0.024
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.085)	(0.015)
Constant	-0.125**		-0.306	-0.132
	(0.058)		(0.208)	(0.105)
Observations	6,505	6,505	145	6,505
$R^2$	0.026	0.013	0.127	0.012
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010	0.096	0.012
F Statistic	34.820*** (df = 5; 6499)	16.720*** (df = 5; 6355)	4.062*** (df = 5; 139)	81.080***

 $^*p{<}0.1; \ ^{**}p{<}0.05; \ ^{***}p{<}0.01$ 

# "Random" Effects: Testing

Hausman test (FE vs. RE):

$$\hat{\mathcal{W}} = (\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathsf{FE}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathsf{RE}})'(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mathsf{V}}}_{\mathsf{FE}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\mathsf{V}}}_{\mathsf{RE}})^{-1}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathsf{FE}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathsf{RE}})$$

$$W \sim \chi_k^2$$

#### Issues:

- Asymptotic
- No guarantee  $(\hat{f V}_{\sf FE} \hat{f V}_{\sf RE})^{-1}$  is positive definite
- A general specification test...

## Hausman Test: Intuition

If the data-generating process is the result of "random" effects [that is, if  $Cov(\mathbf{X}_{it}, \alpha_i = 0)$ ]:

- the random-effects estimate  $\hat{\beta}_{RE}$  will be consistent and (more) efficient
- ullet the fixed-effects / within-unit estimator  $\hat{eta}_{\it FE}$  will be consistent but inefficient

#### BUT...

If the data-generating process is in fact the result of "fixed" effects [that is, if  $Cov(\mathbf{X}_{it}, \alpha_i \neq 0)$ ]:

- ullet the fixed-effects / within-unit estimator  $\hat{eta}_{\it FE}$  will be consistent and efficient
- the random-effects estimate  $\hat{\beta}_{RE}$  will be inconsistent

#### Hausman Test Results

#### Hausman test (FE vs. RE):

> phtest(FE, RE)

#### Hausman Test

data: lnDemons  $\tilde{}$  POLITY + I(POLITY-2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar chisq = 11, df = 5, p-value = 0.05 alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

## Practical "Fixed" vs. "Random" Effects

#### Factors to consider:

- "Panel" vs. "TSCS" Data
- Nature of the Data-Generating Processes
- Importance of Non-Time-Varying Covariate Effects
- Dimension/Location of the Variance in the Data (N vs. T)

# Connections: Hierarchical Linear Models

## **HLM Starting Points**

Begin by considering a two-level "nested" data structure, with:

$$i \in \{1, 2, ...N\}$$
 indexing first-level units, and  $j \in \{1, 2, ...J\}$  indexing second-level groups.

A general two-level HLM is an equation of the form:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \mathbf{X}_{ij}\beta_j + u_{ij} \tag{1}$$

where  $\beta_{0j}$  is a "constant" term,  $\mathbf{X}_{ij}$  is a  $NJ \times K$  matrix of K covariates,  $\beta_j$  is a  $K \times 1$  vector of parameters, and  $u_{ij} \sim \text{i.i.d.} \ N(0, \sigma_u^2)$  is the usual random-disturbance assumption.

Each of the K+1 "level-one" parameters is then allowed to vary across Q "level-two" variables  $\mathbf{Z}_j$ , so that:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \mathbf{Z}_j \gamma_0 + \varepsilon_{0j} \tag{2}$$

for the "intercept" and

$$\beta_{kj} = \gamma_{k0} + \mathbf{Z}_j \gamma_k + \varepsilon_{kj} \tag{3}$$

for the "slopes" of X. The  $\varepsilon$ s are typically assumed to be distributed multivariate Normal, with parameters for the variances and covariances selected by the analyst. Substitution of (2) and (3) into (1) yields:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \mathbf{Z}_j \gamma_0 + \mathbf{X}_{ij} \gamma_{k0} + \mathbf{X}_{ij} \mathbf{Z}_j \gamma_k + \mathbf{X}_{ij} \varepsilon_{kj} + \varepsilon_{0j} + u_{ij}$$
 (4)

The form is essentially a model with "saturated" interaction effects across the various levels, as well as "errors" which are multivariate Normal.

#### **HLM** Details

#### Model Assumptions

- Linearity / Additivity
- Normality of us
- Homoscedasticity
- Residual Independence:
  - ·  $Cov(\varepsilon_{\cdot j}, u_{ij}) = 0$ ·  $Cov(u_{ii}, u_{i\ell}) = 0$

#### Model Fitting

- MLE
- "Restricted" MLE ("RMLE")
- Choosing:
  - · MLE is biased in small samples, especially for estimating variances
  - RMLE is not, but prevents use of LR tests when the models do not have identical fixed effects
  - In general: RMLE is better with small sample sizes, but MLE is fine in larger ones

#### HLMs: Attributes

Note that if we specify:

$$\beta_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \varepsilon_{0i}$$

and

$$\beta_{kj} = \gamma_{k0}$$

we get:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \mathbf{X}_{ij}\gamma_{k0} + \varepsilon_{0j} + u_{ij}$$

which is the RE model above (formally, a "one-level random-intercept" HLM).

#### In addition:

- HLMs can be expanded to 3- and 4- and higher-level models
- One can include cross-level interactions...

HLMs are widely used in education, psychology, ecology, etc. (less so in economics, political science). Also, there are many, many excellent books, websites, etc. that address HLMs

## Random Effects Remix (using 1mer)

```
> library(lme4)
> AltRE<-lmer(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar+
                  (1|ccode), data=Demos)
> summary(AltRE)
Linear mixed model fit by REML ['lmerMod']
Formula: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar +
   (1 | ccode)
  Data: Demos
REML criterion at convergence: 9005
Random effects:
Groups Name
                     Variance Std.Dev.
ccode
         (Intercept) 0.0536 0.232
Regidual
                     0.2200 0.469
Number of obs: 6507, groups: ccode, 145
Fixed effects:
            Estimate Std. Error t value
(Intercept) -0.133634 0.104246
POLITY
            0.002623 0.001447
                                1.81
I(POLITY^2) -0.001972  0.000287  -6.88
InGDP
            0.057513 0.012371
                                 4.65
Monarch
           -0.015175 0.052863 -0.29
ColdWar
           -0.022225 0.014986 -1.48
Correlation of Fixed Effects:
           (Intr) POLITY I (POLI lnGDP Monrch
POT.TTY
            0.109
T(POLTTY^2) 0.134 -0.135
InCDP
          -0.968 -0.140 -0.270
Monarch
         0.004 0.172 -0.163 -0.022
ColdWar
        -0.391 0.387 -0.210 0.351 0.014
```

# Q: Are They The Same? [A: Yes]

Table: RE Models of Demonstrations

	RE	AltRE	
POLITY	0.003*	0.003*	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
POLITY Squared	-0.002***	-0.002***	
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	
In(GDP)	0.057***	0.057***	
	(0.012)	(0.012)	
Monarch	-0.007	-0.008	
	(0.053)	(0.053)	
Cold War	-0.024	-0.023	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Constant	-0.132	-0.132	
	(0.105)	(0.104)	
Observations	6,505	6,505	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.012		
Log Likelihood		-4,496.000	
Akaike Inf. Crit.		9,009.000	
Bayesian Inf. Crit.		9,063.000	
F Statistic	81.080***		

<sup>\*</sup>p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## HLM with Country-Level Random $\beta$ s for lnGDP

```
> HI.M1<-lmer(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+(lnGDP|ccode)+
              Monarch+ColdWar, data=Demos,
              control=lmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"))
> summary(HLM1)
Linear mixed model fit by REML ['lmerMod']
Formula: InDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + InGDP + (InGDP | ccode) + Monarch +
   ColdWar
   Data: Demos
Control: lmerControl(optimizer = "bobyqa")
Scaled residuals:
   Min
          10 Median
                              Max
-2.821 -0.442 -0.175 -0.005 8.530
Random effects:
 Groups Name
                     Variance Std.Dev. Corr
 ccode
         (Intercept) 1.377
                            1.174
         1nGDP
                             0.145
                     0.021
                                      -0.98
Residual
                     0.214
                            0.462
Number of obs: 6505, groups: ccode, 145
Fixed effects:
           Estimate Std. Error t value
(Intercept) -0.21563
                    0.15416
                               -1.40
POLITY
            0.00198
                     0.00149
                                1.33
I(POLITY^2) -0.00206
                     0.00030
                               -6 88
1nGDP
           0.06938
                     0.01894
                               3.66
Monarch
        0.02635
                     0.05681
                               0.46
ColdWar
          -0.01394
                     0.01542
                               -0.90
Correlation of Fixed Effects:
           (Intr) POLITY I(POLI lnGDP Monrch
POLITY
            0.093
I(POLITY^2) 0.127 -0.096
1nGDP
           -0.984 -0.114 -0.214
Monarch
        -0.015 0.136 -0.167 0.006
ColdWar
        -0.286 0.368 -0.215 0.246 0.019
```


## Testing

```
> anova(AltRE, HLM1)
refitting model(s) with ML (instead of REML)
Data: Demos
Models:
AltRE: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar +
AltRE: (1 | ccode)
HLM1: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + (lnGDP | ccode) + Monarch +
HLM1:
         ColdWar
     npar AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
Altre 8 8959 9013 -4471
                              8943
HLM1 10 8887 8955 -4434 8867 75.6 2 <2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
> VarCorr(HLM1)
Groups Name
                    Std.Dev. Corr
ccode (Intercept) 1.174
         1nGDP
                 0.145
                           -0.98
Residual
                    0.462
```


#### Random Coefficients

```
> Bs<-data.frame(coef(HLM1)[1])
> head(Bs)
   ccode..Intercept. ccode.POLITY ccode.I.POLITY.2. ccode.lnGDP ccode.Monarch ccode.ColdWar
             0.45231
                         0.001981
                                           -0.002065
                                                         0.09778
                                                                        0.02635
                                                                                     -0.01394
20
             0.12457
                         0.001981
                                                         0.02329
                                                                        0.02635
                                           -0.002065
                                                                                     -0.01394
42
            -0.45766
                         0.001981
                                           -0.002065
                                                         0.10707
                                                                        0.02635
                                                                                     -0.01394
51
            -0.04898
                         0.001981
                                           -0.002065
                                                         0.05320
                                                                        0.02635
                                                                                     -0.01394
52
            0.44058
                         0.001981
                                           -0.002065
                                                        -0.02591
                                                                        0.02635
                                                                                     -0.01394
70
            -1.34265
                         0.001981
                                           -0.002065
                                                         0.20813
                                                                        0.02635
                                                                                     -0.01394
> mean(Bs$ccode..Intercept.)
[1] -0.2156
> mean(Bs$ccode.lnGDP)
[1] 0.06938
```


# Random Intercepts (Plotted)



# Random Slopes for lnGDP (Plotted)



## Scatterplot: Random Intercepts and Slopes



## Separating Within and Between Effects

Recall that we can decompose the variance of our regression model as:

$$Y_{it} = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \beta_B + (\mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i) \beta_W + u_{it}$$
 (5)

This raises the possibility of fitting the model in (5) directly...

- Simple to estimate (via OLS or other)
- Relatively easy interpretation
- ullet Easy to test  $\hat{oldsymbol{eta}}_B=\hat{oldsymbol{eta}}_W$

Example data: Separate effects for within- and between-country wealth (GDP)...

## Combining Within- and Between-Effects

Table: BE + WE Model of Demonstrations

	WEBE.OLS		
POLITY	0.007***		
	(0.001)		
POLITY Squared	-0.002***		
	(0.0003)		
Within-Country In(GDP)	0.082***		
- , ,	(0.016)		
Between-Country In(GDP)	0.053***		
, , ,	(800.0)		
Monarch	-0.042		
	(0.029)		
Cold War	0.040**		
	(0.016)		
Constant	-0.091		
	(0.062)		
Observations	6,505		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.027		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.026		
Residual Std. Error	0.526 (df = 6498)		
F Statistic	29.510*** (df = 6; 6498)		
*p<	<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

## Two-Way Unit Effects

Our original decomposition considered "two-way" effects:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + \eta_t + u_{it}$$

This implies that we can use (e.g.) an F-test to examine the hypothesis:

$$H_0: \alpha_i = \eta_t = 0 \ \forall i, t$$

...that is, whether adding the (two-way) effects improves the model's fit.

We can also consider the partial hypotheses:

$$H_0: \alpha_i = 0 \ \forall i$$

and

$$H_0: \eta_t = 0 \ \forall \ t$$

separately.

## Two-Way Effects: Good & Bad

#### The Good:

- Addresses both time-invariant, unit-level heterogeneity and cross-sectionally-invariant, time-point-specific heterogeneity
- May be "fixed" or "random" ...
- Two-way FE is equivalent to differences-in-differences when N=T=2 (more on that later)

#### The (Potentially) Bad:

- Ability to control for unobserved heterogeneity depends on (probably invalid) functional form assumptions (Imai and Kim 2020)
- FE requires predictors that vary both within and between both units and time points
- RE requires the (additional) assumption that Cov(X<sub>it</sub>, η<sub>t</sub>) = Cov(α<sub>i</sub>, η<sub>t</sub>) = 0
- Two-way effects models ask a lot of your data (effectively fits N + T + k parameters using NT observations)

## Example: Two-Way Fixed Effects

```
> TwoWavFE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar.
         data=PDF.effect="twoway".model="within")
> summary(TwoWavFE)
Twowavs effects Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "twoway", model = "within")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
Residuals:
  Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu.
                                  Max.
-1.4299 -0.2154 -0.0790 0.0674 3.7220
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
POT.TTY
            0.001864 0.001552
                                 1.20
                                           0.230
I(POLITY^2) -0.002135  0.000293  -7.29  3.4e-13 ***
1 nGDP
           -0.013235 0.018399 -0.72 0.472
           0.112024 0.067260 1.67 0.096 .
Monarch
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Total Sum of Squares:
                        1350
Residual Sum of Squares: 1330
R-Squared:
               0.009
Adj. R-Squared: -0.0239
F-statistic: 14.2917 on 4 and 6295 DF, p-value: 1.29e-11
```

## Two-Way Effects: Testing

```
> # Two-wav effects:
> pFtest(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar.
         data=PDF.effect="twoway".model="within")
F test for twowavs effects
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
F = 11, df1 = 204, df2 = 6295, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> plmtest(TwoWayFE,c("twoways"),type=("kw"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - two-ways effects (King and Wu) for unbalanced
panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
normal = 59, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> # One-way effects in the two-way model:
> plmtest(TwoWayFE,c("individual"),type=("kw"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - (King and Wu) for unbalanced panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
normal = 90, p-value <2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
> plmtest(TwoWayFE,c("time"),type=("kw"))
Lagrange Multiplier Test - time effects (King and Wu) for unbalanced panels
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar
normal = 12, p-value < 2e-16
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
```

## Two-Way Fixed Effects via 1m

```
> TwoWavFE.BF<-lm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+
                   factor(ccode)+factor(Year),data=PDF)
> summary(TwoWayFE.BF)
Call:
lm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   factor(ccode) + factor(Year), data = PDF)
Coefficients:
                 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
              1.353540 0.195636 6.92 5.0e-12 ***
(Intercept)
               0.001864 0.001552 1.20 0.22984
POT.TTY
I(POLITY^2) -0.002135 0.000293 -7.29 3.4e-13 ***
1 nGDP
           -0.013235 0.018399 -0.72 0.47198
Monarch
              0.112024 0.067260 1.67 0.09586 .
factor(ccode)20 -1.150899 0.082756 -13.91 < 2e-16 ***
factor(ccode)42 -1.111681 0.091558 -12.14 < 2e-16 ***
factor(ccode)51 -1.172966 0.096647 -12.14 < 2e-16 ***
factor(Year)2000 0.361636 0.088496 4.09 4.4e-05 ***
factor(Year)2001 0.249294 0.088601
                                      2.81 0.00491 **
[ reached getOption("max.print") -- omitted 10 rows ]
Signif, codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 0.46 on 6295 degrees of freedom
  (2863 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.278.Adjusted R-squared: 0.254
```

F-statistic: 11.6 on 209 and 6295 DF. p-value: <2e-16

## Example: Two-Way Random Effects

```
> TwoWayRE<-plm(lnDemons"POLITY+I(POLITY"2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
               data=PDF.effect="twowav".model="random")
> summary(TwoWayRE)
Twoways effects Random Effect Model
  (Swamy-Arora's transformation)
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
   ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "twoway", model = "random")
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
Effects:
                 var std.dev share
idiosyncratic 0.21186 0.46028 0.77
individual
             0.05647 0.23763 0.21
             0.00527.0.07258.0.02
theta:
        Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
    0.11143 0.7136 0.7406 0.7289 0.7611 0.7611
time 0.27832 0.4773 0.4942 0.4840 0.5263 0.5289
total 0.09787 0.4485 0.4720 0.4571 0.4943 0.5081
Residuals:
  Min. 1st Qu. Median
                          Mean 3rd Qu.
                                         Max.
 -0.41 -0.25 -0.18 0.03 -0.07
                                         4.09
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.003886 0.244584 -0.02 0.98732
POLITY
            0.003325 0.003132
                                 1.06 0.28847
T(PDI.TTY^2) -0.002048
                     0.000615 -3.33 0.00088 ***
1 nCDP
            0.042258 0.028693
                                 1.47 0.14082
Monarch
            0.021130 0.114872
                                  0.18 0.85405
ColdWar
           -0.045119 0.053826
                                -0.84 0.40190
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Total Sum of Squares:
Residual Sum of Squares: 1820
R-Squared:
               0.0181
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0174
Chisq: 92.4819 on 5 DF. p-value: <2e-16
```

#### A Prettier Table

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE	BE	RE	TwoWayFE	TwoWayRE
POLITY	0.006***	0.002	0.006	0.003*	0.002	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
POLITY Squared	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.001)
In(GDP)	0.058***	0.055***	0.069**	0.057***	-0.013	0.042
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.029)
Monarch	-0.046	0.048	-0.050	-0.007	0.112*	0.021
	(0.029)	(0.068)	(0.103)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.115)
Cold War	0.028**	-0.035**	0.259***	-0.024		-0.045
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.085)	(0.015)		(0.054)
Constant	-0.125**		-0.306	-0.132		-0.004
	(0.058)		(0.208)	(0.105)		(0.245)
Observations	6,505	6,505	145	6,505	6,505	6,505
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.013	0.127	0.012	0.009	0.018
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010	0.096	0.012	-0.024	0.017
Residual Std. Error	0.526 (df = 6499)					

p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01

#### Other Variations: FEIS

#### "Fixed Effects Individual Slope" models

- Cite: Bruederl, Josef, and Volker Ludwig. 2015. "Fixed-Effects Panel Regression." In *The Sage Handbook of Regression Analysis* and Causal Inference, Eds. Henning Best and Christof Wolf. Los Angeles: Sage, pp. 327-357.
- FE + unit-level slopes for (some / all) predictor variables
- Equivalent to including N-1 interactions between a predictor  ${\bf X}$  and each of the  $\alpha_i{\bf s}$
- Also can test for homogeneity of estimated slopes (Hausman-like test)
- See the feisr R package, and its accompanying vignette, or xtfeis in Stata

#### Unit Effects Models: Software

#### R:

- the plm package; plm command
  - · Fits one- and two-way FE, BE, RE models
  - · Also fits first difference (FD) and instrumental variable (IV) models
- the fixest package; fast/scalable FE estimation for OLS and GLMs
- the lme4 package; command is lmer
- the nlme package; command lme
- the Paneldata package

#### Stata: xtreg

- option re (the default) = random effects
- option fe = fixed (within) effects
- option be = between-effects