### What are we weighting for?

A mechanistic model for probability weighting

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
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
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Ergodicity

Estimation

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


- 1 inverse-S shape can be explained by difference in uncertainty
- 2 cautious estimation of probabilities generates such differences

► PW K&T 1979



### Definition of Probability Weighting (PW)



(Tversky and Kahneman 1992, p. 310, Fig. 1. relabelled axes)

- low probabilities treated as higher: high probabilities treated as lower
- stable empirical pattern: inverse-S shape

#### Received wisdom:

 PW = maladaptive irrational cognitive bias

#### In search of a mechanism

- → How does this pattern emerge?
- (rather than fit a function)?





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Task: model payout, x, of a gamble as a random variable.

### Disinterested Observer (DO)



DO assigns probabilities p(x)CDF  $F_p(x)$ 

#### **Decision Maker (DM)**



DM assigns different probabilities w(x) (decision weights) CDF  $F_w(x)$ 



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
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
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### Possible model differences








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
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ODFs ...






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ODFs ...





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
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ODFs ...

F<sub>o</sub>(x)

F<sub>w</sub>(x)






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ODFs ...





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
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ODFs ...

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
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
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ODFs ...






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
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ODFs ...

F<sub>o</sub>(x)

F<sub>w</sub>(x)





Numerically easy for any pair of distributions (models):

- 1 list values of DO's CDF,  $F_p(x)$ , at set  $x_i$
- 2 list values of DM's CDF,  $F_w(x)$ , at same  $x_i$
- 3 plot  $F_w(x)$  vs.  $F_p(x)$




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### Asymmetry from different locations





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
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
#### Interim conclusion

- DM's greater scale gives inverse-S shape (unimodal distributions)
- difference in locations gives asymmetry
- reproduces observations of probability weighting

Job done. Thank you for your attention;)

► Functional Forms







### The Ergodicity Question

Probability

Ergodicity Question

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#### Typical DO concern

What happens on average to the ensemble of subjects?



### Typical DM concern

What happens to me on average over time?



## Why DM's greater scale?

- iviain Kesui
- Ergodicity
- Estimatio

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- DM has no control over experiment
- experiment may be unclear to DM
- DM may not trust DO
- . .



### Experiencing probabilities

- Ergodicity Question
- Estimation

- probabilities are not observable
- probabilities encountered as
  - known frequency in ensemble of experiments (DO)
  - frequencies estimated over time (DM)
- → estimates have uncertainties cautious DM accounts for these

### Estimating probabilities

#### Rare Event

- p(x) = 0.001
- 100 observations
- $\sim$  99.5% of such time series will contain 0 or 1 events
- Naïve estimation:  $\hat{p}(x) = 0$  or  $\hat{p}(x) = 0.01$
- $\hookrightarrow$  1000% error in  $\hat{p}(x)$

#### **Common Event**

- p(x) = 0.5
- 100 observations
- $\sim$  99.5% of time series would contain between 35 and 65 events,
- Naïve estimation:  $0.35 < \hat{p}(x) < 0.65$

 $\hookrightarrow$  < 50% error in  $\hat{p}(x)$ 

 $\hookrightarrow$  small p(x), small count  $\hookrightarrow$  small count, big uncertainty



### Relative estimation error is large for rare events

Asymptotic probability	Most likely count	Standard error in count	Standard error in probability	Relative error in probability
0.1	1000	32	0.003	3%
0.01	100	10	0.001	10%
0.001	10	3	0.0003	30%
0.0001	1	1	0.0001	100%

Table:  $T=10\,000$ , assuming Poisson statistics, relative estimation errors  $\sim 1/\sqrt{count}$ 

 $\hookrightarrow$  small p(x), small count  $\hookrightarrow$  small count, big uncertainty



### DMs don't like surprises

To avoid surprises, let's say DMs add estimation uncertainty  $\varepsilon[p(x)]$  to every estimated probability, then normalize, s.t.

$$w(x) = \frac{p(x) + \varepsilon \left[ p(x) \right]}{\int \left( p(s) + \varepsilon \left[ p(s) \right] \right) ds}$$

This allows us to derive a functional form, e.g. for the Gaussian case

$$w(p) = p^{\frac{1}{\alpha^2}} \frac{\left(2\pi\sigma^2\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha^2}{2\alpha^2}}}{\alpha} ,$$

where DM's scale is  $\alpha\sigma$ 

- $\alpha < 1 \rightarrow \mathsf{S}$  shape
- $\alpha > 1 o \text{inverse-S shape}$

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
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### Estimating probabilities for two Gaussians



ToDo: Make inverse-S more pronounced



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#### Ergodicity Economics and probability weighting

- inverse-S shape appears as neutral indicator of a difference in opinion
- reported observations consistent with DM's extra uncertainty
- may arise from DM estimating probabilities over time
- → Probability weighting is rational cautious behaviour under uncertainty over time
  - Manuscript at https://www.researchers.one/article/2020-04-14
  - Interactive code at https://bit.ly/lml-pw-count-b



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### Thank you for your attention!



Back Up References

# **BACK UP**



Back Up

### Probability Weighting as an Estimation Issue

"It is important to distinguish overweighting, which refers to a property of decision weights, from the overestimation that is commonly found in the assessment of the probability of rare events. [...] In many real-life situations, overestimation and overweighting may both operate to increase the impact of rare events." (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 281)

- - uncertainty estimation and
  - "weighting"


we analyse the former and find very good agreement with the empirical inverse-S pattern

→ How big is the residual "probability weighting" after accounting for uncertainty estimation?






## Estimation Error Explains 99% of Probability Weighting



0.2



• similar fits of Gaussian & t-distributed model

 $CDF F_p$ 

0.6

0.4

0.8

Tversky & Kahneman (1992)

→ How big is the residual "probability weighting" after accounting for estimation errors?

1.0



0.0

0.0



Back Up

### Functional Forms Gaussian

Tversky and Kahneman (1992,  $\gamma=$  0.68)

$$\tilde{F}_{w}^{TK}\left(F_{\rho};\gamma\right) = \left(F_{\rho}\right)^{\gamma} \frac{1}{\left[\left(F_{\rho}\right)^{\gamma} + \left(1 - F_{\rho}\right)^{\gamma}\right]^{1/\gamma}} \tag{1}$$

Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992)

$$\tilde{F}_{w}^{L}\left(F_{p};\delta,\gamma\right) = \frac{\delta F_{p}^{\gamma}}{\delta F_{p}^{\gamma} + \left(1 - F_{p}\right)^{\gamma}}\tag{2}$$

We derive decision weight as a function of probability with  $(\alpha\sigma)^2$  as the DM's scale

$$w(p) = \rho^{\frac{1}{\alpha^2}} \frac{\left(2\pi\sigma^2\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha^2}{2\alpha^2}}}{\alpha} , \qquad (3)$$

which is a power law in p with a pre-factor to ensure normalisation





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References



Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk". *Econometrica* 47 (2), pp. 263–291. DOI:10.2307/1914185 (cit. on p. 29).



Lattimore, Pamela K., Joanna R. Baker, and A. Dryden Witte (1992). "Influence of Probability on Risky Choice: A Parametric Examination". *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 17 (3), pp. 377–400. DOI:10.1016/S0167-2681(95)90015-2 (cit. on p. 31).



Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1992). "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty". *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 5 (4), pp. 297–323. DOI:10.1007/BF00122574 (cit. on pp. 3, 31).