



# Demscore Codebook

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**For data enquiries:** [contact@demscore.se](mailto:contact@demscore.se)

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# 1 Explanatory Notes

## 1.1 Release Notes v5

Demscore provides worldwide free access to harmonized data on Democracy, Environment, Migration, Social Policy, Conflict and Representation from several of the world's most prominent social science research institutes. The interdisciplinary nature of Demscore data facilitates large-scale comparative analyses. This is essential to advance adequate policy responses to complex societal challenges associated with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and beyond, facing Sweden, Europe, and the world today.

With a firm commitment to transparency and openness, Demscore v5 enables users to gain comprehensive insights into various topics across the social sciences. The joint infrastructure ensures data integrity and quality at the highest international standards and maximizes usability in the measurement of contextual data with 25.000 variables across nearly all countries in the world, from 1750 to the present.

This creates critical time- and cost saving advantages in data collection, management, distribution, and not the least for end-users in the scientific community. Demscore's unique approach to translating and merging data scales up to more than 410.000 variable versions available in the infrastructure, storing more than 10 billion non-missing observations.

This collaborative effort between leading Swedish universities pushes the scale of social science data to a new level and offers unprecedented possibilities for interdisciplinary research and knowledge advancement.

These are the key features of Demscore:

1. **Customized Download:** A fully normalized, joint PostgreSQL database, sophisticated programming, and a user-friendly web-based interface for users to generate custom-designed datasets and codebooks for download.
2. **Translations and Data Merges:** Demscore currently offers more than 1100 merge options between datasets.
3. **Metadata:** Demscore takes information on and organization of metadata to new heights with the inclusion of customized codebooks, a detailed methodology document, and a comprehensive handbook.
4. **Handling of Missing Data:** Demscore pioneers in developing an innovative approach to tackle missing data. Researchers can now account for missing values with increased precision, leading to more robust and reliable analyses.
5. **Merge Scores:** Demscore introduces a unique merge mechanism. This powerful tool enables researchers to combine datasets effortlessly, uncovering connections and patterns that were previously hidden in isolated data silos.
6. **Thematic Datasets:** Demscore provides researchers with curated thematic datasets, each focused on a specific topic. These datasets bring together relevant variables from across the Demscore partners, facilitating in-depth investigations and comprehensive analyses of specific domains.
7. **Interactive Web Portal:** In addition to all the above, Demscore's web portal offers interactive visualization tools, user support and additional information on all partners and data sources.

For more information, please visit <https://www.demscore.se/> or contact [contact@demscore.se](mailto:contact@demscore.se).

## 1.2 New in Demscore version 5

A detailed description of changes and additions made for version 5 compared to version 4 can be found in the Methodology Document.

## 1.3 The Demscore Codebook

The autogenerated Demscore Codebook lists variable entries for those variables chosen by the user along with citation guidelines and licenses per variable.

The meta data is extracted from the codebooks per dataset stored in a table in the Demscore PostgreSQL database with one row per variable for all datasets. This table includes codebook entries, variable tags, labels, and other variable information in LaTeX format used to generate an automated codebook.

Demscore maintains a single set of standard entries for metadata across all datasets, to which all project members contribute their information. Additionally, variables within different datasets may have varying sets of additional information requirements specific to each dataset. These dataset-specific entries are also included, but they are presented as variable-specific metadata beneath the standard entries.

At the outset of the harmonization process, Demscore underwent a thorough variable name cleanup. This involved tasks such as replacing spaces or dots in variable names with underscores and converting all letters to lowercase. Notably, the original tags remain preserved and stored in the PostgreSQL table. Each variable in Demscore is accessible in both short and long forms. The short form comprises the cleaned version of the original variable tag, while the long form starts with the dataset name from which it originates, followed by the cleaned variable name.

For instance, the original name of the variable *MinisterPersonalID* from the H-DATA Foreign Minister Dataset is included as *ministerpersonalid* (short form) and *hdata\_fomin\_ministerpersonalid* (long form) in Demscore.

In addition, each dataset includes Demscore unit-identifier variables which are named according to the following naming scheme: Beginning with *u\_*, followed by the name of the primary unit and finally the variable tag. The *year-* variable from the COMPLAB SPIN The Out-of-Work Benefits Dataset (OUTWB), which is part of the primary unit *u\_complab\_country\_year* has the Demscore unit identifier name *u\_complab\_country\_year\_year*.

## 1.4 Methodology

For details on our methodology please see the Demscore Methodology document available for download on the Demscore website.

## 1.5 Citations

The Demscore project does not have a formal citation of its own. Hence, when using Demscore, we suggest that you cite the respective projects and datasets. We indicate how every dataset is to be cited in the autogenerated codebook you retrieve with your data download, both in the dataset description and the codebook entry for each variable. Most often it is sufficient to cite the dataset a variable originates from, but sometimes there is a variable specific citation listed in the codebook entry in addition to that. For these cases, please also add the variable specific citation to the reference list of your publication. Full references are linked in the codebook entries of the variables and listed in the codebook's bibliography. We suggest you to also cite the Demscore Methodology Document when using data retrieved through Demscore.

## 1.6 Missing Data

Demscore indicates different types of missingness for observations in the customized datasets:

**Missing in original data** = Whenever an observation in the original variable is a missing (NA, missing code such as 7777, blank cell), we preserve this missing value. When the original source has special codes for various types of missing, those are preserved.

**Missing code: -11111** = Demscore code for observation is missing due to the translation/merge, i.e., missing data due to no data being included for this combination of identifiers in the end Output Unit.

**Missing code: -22222** = No observation is merged/translated, but the original data contains information for these identifier combinations elsewhere. For these cases, we use a different code. The

user needs to consult the reference documents (Methodology Document Section 5.1. or the Demscore Handbook) to clarify why the translation to the identifier combinations in the end Output Unit was not possible.

Please note that an observation that is missing in its original output unit does not take the value -11111, but appears as NA/blank cell in the customized dataset.

## 1.7 Download ID

The download ID can be shared with other users for replication purposes. A user can type the download ID into the Demscore website and retrieve the same download selection and files as the original user. This ID is autogenerated for each download from the Demscore website and will always retrieve the same data, even if the Demscore version was updated in the meantime.

Download ID: 895dcc51-3082-442c-bddb-53c22a9de9e5

## 1.8 Unit Identifier Variables

An Output Unit is defined as an output format in which variables can be retrieved from one or more datasets through a strictly defined output grid. A unit table defining this output grid contains unit identifier columns with `u_` prefixes and the table is sorted based on these unit identifier columns and has a fixed number of rows. Unit columns are based on the columns that constitute the unit of analysis in a dataset. They are added to the original dataset and marked by a unit prefix (consisting of a `u_` and the dataset unit name) before the original variable name. Unit columns can contain slightly modified data, e.g., missing values are replaced by a default value. Sometimes we add additional columns to the unit table, for instance if a dataset includes both a `country_id` column with a numeric country code, we add the variable storing the full country name to the unit table as well for better readability.

## 1.9 Output Unit Identifier Variables in the Chosen Unit

`u_vdem_country_year_country`: The column is a duplicate of *country\_name* in the V-Dem Country Year Dataset as well as in the V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset.

`u_vdem_country_year_country_id`: The column is a duplicate of *country\_id* in the V-Dem Country Year Dataset as well as in the V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset.

`u_vdem_country_year_country_text_id`: The column is a duplicate of *cowcode* in the V-Dem Country Year Dataset as well as in the V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset.

`u_vdem_country_year_cowcode`: The column is a duplicate of *country\_text\_id* in the V-Dem Country Year Dataset as well as in the V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset. If the original column has missing values, they are replaced by the default value -11111 in the unit identifier column.

`u_vdem_country_year_year`: The column is a duplicate of *year* in the V-Dem Country Year Dataset as well as in the V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset.



## 2 QOG

The **Quality of Government (QoG)** Institute was founded in 2004 by Professor Bo Rothstein and Professor Sören Holmberg. It is an independent research institute within the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. QoG is comprised of about 30 researchers who conduct and promote research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions. QoG's award-winning datasets focus on concepts related to quality of government, transparency, and public administration. The main objective of QoG's research is to address the theoretical and empirical problem of how political institutions of high quality can be created and maintained. A second objective is to study the effects of Quality of Government on a number of policy areas, such as health, the environment, social policy, and poverty. The QoG datasets draw on a number of freely available datasources. More information on how the variables are compiled for different QoG datasets can be found in the respective QoG codebooks available on their website. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government>

### 2.1 QoG Standard Dataset Time-Series

**Dataset tag:** qog\_std\_ts

**Output Unit:** QoG Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year. That means there is one row for each combination of country and year in the dataset. This unit is identified using the cname column and the year column.

**Description:** The QoG Standard dataset is our largest dataset. It consists of approximately 2100 variables from more than 100 data sources related to Quality of Government. In the QoG Standard TS dataset, data from 1946 to 2024 is included and the unit of analysis is country-year (e.g., Sweden-1946, Sweden-1947, etc.).

**Dataset citation:** Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, Cem Mert Dalli, Rafael Lopez Valverde, Victor Saidi Phiri Lauren Gerber. 2025. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan25. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogstdjan25. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogstdjan24

**Link to original codebook**

[https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook\\_std\\_jan25.pdf](https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_std_jan25.pdf)

**License:** The QoG datasets are open and available, free of charge and without a need to register your data. You can use them for your analysis, graphs, teaching, and other academic-related and non-commercial purposes. We ask our users to cite always the original source(s) of the data and our datasets.

We do not allow other uses of these data including but not limited to redistribution, commercialization and other for-profit usage. If a user is interested in such use or has doubts about the license, they will have to refer to the original source and check with them if this is allowed and what requirements they need to fulfill.

Be mindful that the original data sources are the only owners of their data and they can adjust their license without previous warning.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/standard-dataset>

### 2.1.1 Civil Society, Population and Culture

This category includes variables that relate to social capital, personal beliefs, size and distribution of the population as well as ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.

#### 2.1.1.1 Ethnic Fractionalization (fe\_etfra)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fe\_etfra

*Original tag:* fe\_etfra

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* Fearon (2003)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 11793, Percent: 77.12

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10788, Percent: 38.9

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1005 Percent: 8.52

*Description:*

Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and 'ethnoreligious' groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented). The values are assumed to be constant for all years.

#### 2.1.1.2 Population, total (wdi\_pop)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_pop

*Original tag:* wdi\_pop

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 10490, Percent: 68.6

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9491, Percent: 34.22

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 999 Percent: 9.52

*Description:*

Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.

#### 2.1.1.3 Population density (people per sq. km of land area) (wdi\_popden)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_popden

*Original tag:* wdi\_popden

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 10117, Percent: 66.16

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9152, Percent: 33

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 965 Percent: 9.54

*Description:*

Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes.

#### 2.1.1.4 Rural population (percent of total population) (wdi\_poprul)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_poprul

*Original tag:* wdi\_poprul

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 10490, Percent: 68.6

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9491, Percent: 34.22

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 999 Percent: 9.52

*Description:*

Rural population refers to people living in rural areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated as the difference between total population and urban population.

#### 2.1.1.5 Urban population (percent of total population) (wdi\_popurb)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_popurb

*Original tag:* wdi\_popurb

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 10490, Percent: 68.6

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9491, Percent: 34.22

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 999 Percent: 9.52

*Description:*

Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. The data are collected and smoothed by United Nations Population Division.

### 2.1.2 Education

This category includes a variety of indicators related to education, such as key characteristics of the educational system (public expenditure, gross enrollment, number of teachers), the students (age, gender, educational level), and educational outcomes (mean scores, literacy rates, numbers of researchers and scientists).

#### 2.1.2.1 Human Development Index (undp\_hdi)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_undp\_hdi

*Original tag:* undp\_hdi

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* United Nations Development Program (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5480, Percent: 35.84

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5045, Percent: 18.19

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 435 Percent: 7.94

*Description:*

The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes. These contrasts can stimulate debate about government policy priorities.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The closer the score is to 1, the better the country is doing.

The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean. Refer to Technical notes for more details.

The HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development entails. It does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc. The HDRO offers the other composite indices as broader proxy on some of the key issues of human development, inequality, gender disparity and human poverty.

### 2.1.3 Public Economy

This category includes economic indicators that reflect the involvement of the government in the economy (taxes, tariff rates and government expenditures), economic key figures of a state (GDP, inflation, and economic inequality), and indicators that characterize the state of the economy (aid-flows, debt).

#### 2.1.3.1 GDP per capita (constant 2015 US dollar) (wdi\_gdpcapcon2015)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_gdpcapcon2015

*Original tag:* wdi\_gdpcapcon2015

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 9116, Percent: 59.62

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8326, Percent: 30.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 790 Percent: 8.67

*Description:*

GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2015 U.S. dollars.

#### 2.1.3.2 GDP per capita growth (annual percent) (wdi\_gdpcapgr)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_gdpcapgr

*Original tag:* wdi\_gdpcapgr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 9132, Percent: 59.72

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8314, Percent: 29.98

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 818 Percent: 8.96

*Description:*

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

### 2.1.3.3 Oil rents (percent of GDP) (wdi\_oilrent)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_oilrent

*Original tag:* wdi\_oilrent

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 7845, Percent: 51.3

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7346, Percent: 26.49

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 499 Percent: 6.36

*Description:*

Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production.

## 2.1.4 Energy and Infrastructure

This category includes indicators that cover descriptions of different energy sources (production, consumption and trade) and variables related to quality and quantity of different sectors of infrastructure (transportation and communication).

### 2.1.4.1 Individuals using the Internet (percent of population) (wdi\_internet)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_internet

*Original tag:* wdi\_internet

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 6010, Percent: 39.3

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5414, Percent: 19.52

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 596 Percent: 9.92

*Description:*

Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc.

## 2.1.5 Health

This category includes indicators describing the health of a population in a given country. These include reports about self-perceived health (state of health), policies and provided infrastructure concerning health (expenditure, number of hospitals), the prevalence of diseases (HIV, tuberculosis), and indicators such as birth rate, death rate and life expectancy.

**2.1.5.1 Infant mortality rate, Total (who\_infmortt)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_who\_infmortt

*Original tag:* who\_infmortt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2025)

*Variable citation:* World Health Organization (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 10392, Percent: 67.96

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9541, Percent: 34.4

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 851 Percent: 8.19

*Description:*

Infant mortality rate - Total (probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1000 live births)

### 3 V-DEM

Based at the University of Gothenburg, the **Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)** Research Project takes a comprehensive approach to understanding democratization. This approach encompasses multiple core principles: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each Principle is represented by a separate index, and each is regarded as a separate outcome in the proposed study. In this manner V-Dem reconceptualizes democracy from a single outcome to a set of outcomes. In addition, V-Dem breaks down each core principle into its constituent components, each to be measured separately. Components include features such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, executive constraints, gender equality, media freedom, and civil society. Finally, each component is disaggregated into specific indicators. This fundamentally different approach to democratization is made possible by the V-Dem Database, which measures 450+ indicators annually from 1789 to the present for all countries of the world. The V-Dem approach stands out, first, as a large global collaboration among scholars with diverse areas of expertise; second, as the first project attempting to explain different varieties of democracy; and third, thanks to the highly disaggregated V-Dem data, the first project to explore causal mechanisms linking different aspects of democracy together. With five Principal Investigators, 19 Project Managers with special responsibility for issue areas covered in the V-Dem dataset, around 23 Regional Managers, 134 Country Coordinators and more than 4000 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the world's largest social science data collection projects on democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.v-dem.net/>

#### 3.1 V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others v15

**Dataset tag:** `vdem_cy`

**Output Unit:** V-Dem Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year. That means each row in the dataset can be identified by one country in combination with a year, using the columns `country_name` and `year`. The unit can also be expressed through a combination of the columns `country_id` or `country_text_id` and `year`.

**Description:** All 531 V-Dem indicators and 245 indices + 60 other indicators from other data sources. For R users, we recommend to install our `vdemdata` R package which includes the most recent V-Dem dataset and some useful functions to explore the data.

**Dataset citation:** Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Linnea Fox, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorff, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Marcus Tannenberg, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Felix Wiebrecht, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2025. "V-Dem Codebook v15" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2025. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 10th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

**Link to original codebook**

<https://v-dem.net/documents/55/codebook.pdf>

**License:** CC-BY-SA 4.0 International

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://v-dem.net/data/reference-documents/>

### 3.1.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 3.1.1.1 Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_polyarchy

*Original tag:* v2x\_polyarchy

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Teorell et al. (2019), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26595, Percent: 95.89

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26595, Percent: 95.89

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_freexp\_altinf v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff

DATA RELEASE: 1-15. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altinf), elected officials (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one



exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2x\_polyarchy &= \& .5 * MPI + .5 * API \\
 \& &= .5 * (v2x\_elecoff * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * \\
 & \& v2x\_suffr * v2x\_freexp\_altinf) \\
 \& &+ .5 * ((1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel\_frefair \\
 & \& + (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr \\
 & \& + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf)
 \end{aligned}$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: Teorell et al. (2019); Coppedge et al. (2025b)  
YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.1.2 Liberal Democracy Index (v2x\_libdem)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_libdem

*Original tag:* v2x\_libdem

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Coppedge et al. (2015), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 25350, Percent: 91.4

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 25350, Percent: 91.4

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

CLARIFICATION: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_liberal v2x\_polyarchy

DATA RELEASE: 1-15. Release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

AGGREGATION: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_libdem = .25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_liberal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_liberal$$

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Coppedge et al. (2015); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.2 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 3.1.2.1 Judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x\_\_jucon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_\_jucon

*Original tag:* v2x\_\_jucon

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26176, Percent: 94.38

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26176, Percent: 94.38

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

DATA RELEASE: 1-15.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

#### 3.1.2.2 Legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg\_\_legcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xlg\_\_legcon

*Original tag:* v2xlg\_\_legcon

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 21486, Percent: 77.47

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 21486, Percent: 77.47

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies *e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

DATA RELEASE: 1-15.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 3.1.2.3 Equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xeg\_eqaccess

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqaccess

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Sigman & Lindberg (2017), Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27530, Percent: 99.26

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27530, Percent: 99.26

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is access to power?

CLARIFICATION: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal *de facto* capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2pepwrngen v2pepwr soc v2pepwr ses

DATA RELEASE: 7-15.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwr ses), power distributed by social group (v2pepwr soc), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwr gen).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Sigman & Lindberg (2017); Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.2.4 Equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg\_eqdr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xeg\_eqdr

*Original tag:* v2xeg\_eqdr

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Sigman & Lindberg (2015), Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19368, Percent: 69.83

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19368, Percent: 69.83

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How equal is the distribution of resources?

CLARIFICATION: This component measures the extent to which resources — both tangible and intangible — are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services *i.e.* means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth

DATA RELEASE: 5, 7-15. Release 7 modified: v2pepwrses, v2pepwrsoc and v2pepwrgen now form a separate subcomponent index.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps, means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl, educational equality v2peedueq and health equality v2pehealth.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Sigman & Lindberg (2015); Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1900-2024

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 3.1.3 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels,

referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

**Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables**

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously \*\_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously \*\_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecparl is 1.

**3.1.3.1 Election type (v2eltype)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2eltype

*Original tag:* v2eltype

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4994, Percent: 18.01

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4994, Percent: 18.01

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A\*

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

QUESTION: What type of election was held on this date?

CLARIFICATION: Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

RESPONSES:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_2] (Not yet coded)

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_3] (Not yet coded)

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_8] (Not yet coded)

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_9] (Not yet coded)

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

ANSWER-TYPE: Multiple selection.

SOURCE(S): ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?;

NOTES: All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Direct elections for prime minister (*e.g.* Israel in 1996-2001) are coded under category 6. Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i.e. when the HOS alone is

selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

DATA RELEASE: 1-15.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Maximum

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates.

CITATION: Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.4 V-Dem Indicators - Political Parties

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Political parties:**

A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

#### 3.1.4.1 Opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2psoppaut

*Original tag:* v2psoppaut

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 23100, Percent: 83.29

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 23100, Percent: 83.29

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

CLARIFICATION: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

RESPONSES:

0: Opposition parties are not allowed.

1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.

2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-15.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).  
YEARS: 1789-2024

#### 3.1.4.2 Party competition across regions (v2pscomprg)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2pscomprg

*Original tag:* v2pscomprg

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 24643, Percent: 88.85

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 24643, Percent: 88.85

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Allen Hicken

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 percent of the vote)?

CLARIFICATION: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

RESPONSES:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.

1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.

2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-15.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 1789-2024

#### 3.1.5 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

### 3.1.5.1 Internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecenefi

*Original tag:* v2mecenefi

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5227, Percent: 18.85

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5227, Percent: 18.85

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

CLARIFICATION: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

RESPONSES:

0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.

1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.

2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.

3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-15.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 1993-2024

### 3.1.5.2 Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecrit

*Original tag:* v2mecrit

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27166, Percent: 97.95

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27166, Percent: 97.95

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C



PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge  
ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr  
QUESTION: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?  
RESPONSES:  
0: None.  
1: Only a few marginal outlets.  
2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.  
3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 1-15.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).  
YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.6 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civic and Academic Space:**

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

#### 3.1.6.1 Freedom of peaceful assembly (v2caassemb)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caassemb

*Original tag:* v2caassemb

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18995, Percent: 68.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18995, Percent: 68.49

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

CLARIFICATION: This question focuses on the ability to assemble publically in practice. An assembly is “an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose” (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.

RESPONSES:

0: Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them.

1: Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them.  
2: Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.  
3: Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.  
4: Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations.  
SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
DATA RELEASE: 10-15.  
CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).  
COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean  
CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).  
YEARS: 1900-2024

### 3.1.6.2 Mass mobilization (v2cagenmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cagenmob

*Original tag:* v2cagenmob

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18933, Percent: 68.27

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18933, Percent: 68.27

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?

CLARIFICATION: This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-15.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 1900-2024

### 3.1.6.3 Mobilization for democracy (v2cademmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cademmob

*Original tag:* v2cademmob

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18820, Percent: 67.86

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18820, Percent: 67.86

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-democratic if they are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins.

RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-15.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 1900-2024

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 3.1.6.4 Mobilization for autocracy (v2caautmob)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caautmob

*Original tag:* v2caautmob

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 18897, Percent: 68.14

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18897, Percent: 68.14

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Sebastian Hellmeier

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-autocratic aims been?

CLARIFICATION: Events are pro-autocratic if they are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

## RESPONSES:

0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-15.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 1900-2024

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

**3.1.7 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Regimes of the World (RoW)**

The *Regimes of the World Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

**3.1.7.1 Regimes of the world - the RoW Measure (v2x\_regime)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_regime*Original tag:* v2x\_regime*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)*Variable citation:* Lührmann et al. (2018), Coppedge et al. (2025b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19401, Percent: 69.95*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19401, Percent: 69.95*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Marcus Tannenbergh, Staffan I Lindberg

QUESTION: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

## RESPONSES:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).

2: Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

3: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's

Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

SCALE: Ordinal.

SOURCE(S): v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmulpar\_osp\_ex  
v2elmulpar\_osp\_leg v2elmulpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex  
v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal  
v2clacjstm\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp v2exaphogp

DATA RELEASE: 9-15.

AGGREGATION: Electoral democracies score above 2 on the indicators for multi-party (v2elmulpar\_osp) and free and fair elections (v2elfrfair\_osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy). Liberal democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component index (v2x\_liberal), as well as a score above 3 on transparent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw\_osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm\_osp) and women (v2clacjstw\_osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de-jure multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmulpar\_osp). Closed autocracy if either no multiparty elections for the legislature take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) or the chief executive is not elected in direct or indirect multiparty elections. To identify whether this is the case, we take into account if there is no basic multiparty competition in elections (v2elmulpar\_osp lt; 1) and the relative power of the Head of State (HoS) and the Head of Government (HoG) as well as the appointment procedures. The V-Dem variable v2ex\_hosw identifies if the HoS (v2ex\_hosw gt; 0.5) or HoG (v2ex\_hosw lt; or equal to 0.5) is the chief executive. If the HoG is the chief executive, the variable v2expathhg indicates whether the HoG is directly (8) or indirectly (7) elected or appointed by the HoS (6). In the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg == 0) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) and in the third case how HoS is selected as follows. The variable v2expathhs indicates whether the HoS is directly (7) or indirectly (6) elected. Thus, in the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place and the legislature approves on HoG (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0 and v2exaphog == 0). This also applies for the cases if the HoS is the chief executive.

CITATION: Lührmann et al. (2018); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1900-2024

### 3.1.8 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties

The *Civil Liberties Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 3.1.8.1 Civil liberties index (v2x\_civlib)

Long tag: vdem\_cy\_v2x\_civlib

Original tag: v2x\_civlib

Dataset citation: Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

Variable citation: Coppedge et al. (2025b)

Merge scores:

Non-missing observations in original unit: Sum: 27303, Percent: 98.45

Non-missing observations in chosen unit: Sum: 27303, Percent: 98.45

Lost observations in chosen unit: Sum: 0 Percent: 0

Description:

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

CLARIFICATION: Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_clpriv v2x\_clphy v2x\_clpol

DATA RELEASE: 6-15.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the average of physical violence index (v2x\_clphy), political civil liberties index (v2x\_clpol), and private civil liberties (v2x\_clpriv).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.8.2 Political liberties index (v2x\_clpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_clpol

*Original tag:* v2x\_clpol

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27393, Percent: 98.77

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27393, Percent: 98.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are political liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

DATA RELEASE: 6-15.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.9 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Corruption

The *Corruption Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all

indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 3.1.9.1 Executive corruption index (v2x\_execorr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_execorr

*Original tag:* v2x\_execorr

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* McMann et al. (2016), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27038, Percent: 97.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27038, Percent: 97.49

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

CLARIFICATION: The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2exbribe v2exembezz

DATA RELEASE: 5-15.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembezz).

CITATION: McMann et al. (2016); Coppedge et al. (2025b)

YEARS: 1789-2024

### 3.1.10 Digital Society Survey - Digital Media Freedom

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

### 3.1.10.1 Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovfilprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilprc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein et al. (2024), Coppedge et al. (2025b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4278, Percent: 15.43

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4278, Percent: 15.43

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.

1: Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.

2: Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political



content.

3: Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.

4: Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-15.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Day-weighted mean

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024); Coppedge et al. (2025b).

YEARS: 2000-2024

### 3.1.11 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators - Political Regimes

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

#### 3.1.11.1 Democracy (BMR) (e\_boix\_regime)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_boix\_regime

*Original tag:* e\_boix\_regime

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Miller et al. (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17855, Percent: 64.38

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 17855, Percent: 64.38

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Is a country democratic?

CLARIFICATION: Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.

RESPONSES:

0: No

1: Yes

SOURCE(S): Boix et al. (2013); Miller et al. (2022).

NOTES: This variable is taken from version 4 of the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset. Last update, January 2022.

DATA RELEASE: 5-15.

CITATION: Miller et al. (2022).

YEARS: 1800-2020

#### 3.1.11.2 Democratic transition (e\_democracy\_trans)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_democracy\_trans

*Original tag:* e\_democracy\_trans

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Boix et al. (2013)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 17855, Percent: 64.38

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 17855, Percent: 64.38

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: Was there a democratic transition?

RESPONSES:

-1: Democratic breakdown

0: No change

1: Democratic transition

SOURCE(S): Boix et al. (2013); Miller et al. (2022).

NOTES: This variable is taken from version 4 of the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset. Last update, January 2022.

DATA RELEASE: 5-15.

CITATION: Boix et al. (2013).

YEARS: 1800-2020

### 3.1.12 Background Factors (E) - Education

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

#### 3.1.12.1 Education 15+ (e\_peaveduc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_e\_peaveduc

*Original tag:* e\_peaveduc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2025b), Coppedge et al. (2025a)

*Variable citation:* Clio-Infra (2018), along with other sources listed above

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 14729, Percent: 53.11

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14729, Percent: 53.11

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: E

QUESTION: What is the average years of education among citizens older than 15?

CLARIFICATION: The Average years of education in the total population aged 15 years and older.

SOURCE(S): ? drawing on ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?; ?.

NOTES: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation for each country. In addition to this, from the last recorded data point to nowadays the data is extrapolated.

DATA RELEASE: 2-15.

CITATION: ?, along with other sources listed above.

YEARS: 1820-2010

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