Linux security mechanisms



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Identification, Authentication and Authorization

Mechanisms

- > Capabilities
- > cgroups (control groups)



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Linux management privileges

- - Privileged processes (UID = 0)
 - · Bypass all kernel permission checks
 - Unprivileged processes (UID ≠ 0)
 - Subject to permission checking based on their credentials
 - Effective UID, effective GID, secondary group list



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Unix file protection ACLs: Special protection bits

- ▷ Set-UID bit
- creator:Pictures\$ ls -la /usr/bin/passwd
 -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 59640 Mar 22 2019 /usr/bin/passwd
- Is used to change the UID of processes executing the file
- creator:Pictures\$ ls -la /usr/bin/at
 -rwsr-sr-x 1 daemon daemon 51464 Feb 20 2018 /usr/bin/at
- Is used to change the UID of processes executing the file
- Sticky bit
- creator:Pictures\$ ls -la /tmp total 108 dnwxnwxnwt 25 root root 4096 Dec 15 13:12 .
- Hint to keep the file/directory as much as possible in memory cache



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Privilege elevation: Set-UID mechanism

- ▷ It is used to change the UID of a process running a program stored on a Set-UID file
 - If a program file is owned by UID X and the set-UID bit of its ACL is set, then it will be executed in a process with UID X
 - · Independently of the UID of the subject that executed the program
- Used to allow normal users to execute privileged tasks encapsulated in administration programs
 - Change the user's password (passwd)
 - Change to super-user mode (su, sudo)
 - Mount devices (mount)



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Privilege elevation: Set-UID mechanism (cont.)

- ▷ Effective UID / Real UID
 - Real UID is the UID of the process creator
 - App launcher
 - Effective UID is the UID of the process
 - The one that really matters for defining the rights of the process
- - Ordinary application
 - eUID = rUID = UID of process that executed exec
 - eUID cannot be changed (unless = 0)
 - Set-UID application
 - eUID = UID of **exec**'d application file, rUID = initial process UID
 - · eUID can revert to rUID
 - rUID cannot change



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Privilege elevation: Set-UID/Set-GID decision flowchart

- ⊳ exec (path, ...)
 - File referred by path has Set-UID?
 - Yes
 - ID = path owner
 - · Change the process effective UID to ID
 - No
 - · Do nothing
 - File referred by path has Set-GID?
 - Yes
 - ID = path GID
 - · Change the process GIDs to ID only
 - Nc
 - · Do nothing



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Capabilities

- ▶ Protection mechanism introduced in Kernel 2.2
- ➤ They allow to divide the traditional super-user privileges into distinct units
 - · That can be independently enabled and disabled
- > Capabilities are a per-thread attribute
 - Propagated through forks
 - Changed explicitly of by execs



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List of capabilities: Examples (small sample ...)

- - Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs
- ▷ CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE / CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
 - Bypass file permission / directory transversal checks
- - Bypass permission checks for sending signals
- - · Perform various network-related operations
- ▷ CAP_SYS_ADMIN
 - · Overloaded general-purpose administration capability



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Capability management

- > Per-thread capabilities
 - They define the privileges of the thread
 - Divided in sets
- > Sets
 - Effective
 - Inheritable
 - Permitted
 - Bounding
 - Ambient



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Thread capability sets: Effective

Set of capabilities used by the kernel to perform permission checks for the thread



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Thread capability sets: Inheritable

- > Set of capabilities preserved across an exec
 - Remain inheritable for any program
- Are added to the permitted set when executing a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set



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Thread capability sets: Permitted

- > Limiting superset
 - For the effective capabilities that the thread may assume
 - For the capabilities that may be added to the inheritable set
 - Except for threads w/ CAP_SETPCAP in their effective set
- > Once dropped, it can never be reacquired
 - Except upon executing a file with special capabilities



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Thread capability sets: Bounding

- Set used to limit the capabilities that are gained during an exec
 - From a file with capabilities set
- - Now is a per-thread attribute



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Thread capability sets: Ambient

- > Set of capabilities that are preserved across an exec of an unprivileged program
 - No set-UID or set-GID
 - No capabilities set
- ▷ Executing a privileged program will clear the ambient set



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Thread capability sets: Ambient

- No capability can ever be ambient if it is not both permitted and inheritable
 - One cannot preserve something one cannot have
 - One cannot preserve something one cannot inherit
 - Automatically lowered if either of the corresponding permitted or inheritable capabilities is lowered
- Ambient capabilities are added to the permitted set and assigned to the effective set upon a exec



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Files extended attributes (xattr)

- ⊳ Files' metadata in UNIXlike systems
 - Some not interpreted by kernels
- - Keys can be defined or undefined
 - If defined, their value can be empty or not
 - Key's namespaces
 - namespace.attr_name[.attr_name]

- Namespace classes
 - Security
 - · For files' capabilities
 - setcap / getcap
 - System
 - ACL
 - Trusted
 - · Protected metadata
 - User
 - setfattr / lsattr / getfattr



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
File capabilities


- > Stored in the security.capability attribute
- > Specify capabilities for threads that exec a file
 - Permitted set
 - · Immediately forced into the permitted set
 - · Previous AND with the thread's bounding set
 - Inheritable set
 - To AND with the threads' inheritable set
 - · Can be used to reduce the effective set upon the exec
 - Effective bit
 - Enforce all new capabilities into the thread's effective set



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Capability transfer across exec (root)

- \triangleright EUID = 0 or RUID = 0
 - File sets are considered to be all 1's
- \triangleright EUID = 0
 - File effective bit considered 1
- Exception: EUID = 0, RUID ≠ 0
 - File capabilities are honored if present



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Control groups (cgroups)

- ▷ Collection of processes bound by the same criteria and associated with a set of parameters or limits
- > cgroups are organized hierarchically
 - cgroup file system
 - · Limits can be defined at each hierarchical level
 - · Affecting the sub-hierarchy underneath
- - Kernel component that modifies the behavior of cgroup processes
 - Resource controllers (or simply controllers)



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cgroups file system

- ▷ This file system is created by mounting several controllers as cgroup-type file system entities
 - Usually /sys/fs/cgroup
- - e.g. memory controller → /sys/fs/cgroup/memory



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cgroups v1 and v2

- > Currently two versions coexist
 - But controllers can only be used in on of them

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cgroup controllers

- ▷ cpu, cpuacct
 - CPU usage & accounting
- - CPU bounding
- - Memory usage & accounting
- - Device creation & usage
- - Suspend/resume groups of processes
- - Outbound packet classification

- ▷ blkio
 - Block I/O management
- ▷ perf_event
 - Performance monitoring
- - Network interfaces priorities
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 - Huge pages management
- pids
 - # of processes in cgroup
- ⊳ rdma
 - RDMA / IB resources' management



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cgroups v1: Common files

- □ cgroup.procs
 - The processes in the cgroup

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cgroups of a process

- > A process can be controlled by an arbitrary number of cgroups
- ▷ The list of a process' cgroups is given by the /proc file system
 - /proc/[PID]/cgroup



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Linux Security Modules (LSM)

- > Those extensions are not kernel modules
 - They are embedded in the kernel code
 - They can be activated or not at boot time
 - List of extensions given by /sys/kernel/security/lsm



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LSM extensions

- > AppArmor
- > SELinux
- ⊳ Smack
- > TOMOYO
- > Yama



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AppArmor

- - Profiles
 - · Applications are identified by their path
 - · Instead of i-node
- > Profiles restrict applications' actions to the required set
 - · All other actions will be denied
- > Profiles define
 - · Actions white-listed
 - · Logging actions



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AppArmor: profiles

- > Profiles are loaded into the kernel
 - Upon compilation from textual files
 - apparmor_parser
- > Profiles can be used on a voluntary basis
 - aa-exec



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