Bend or Break? Experimental Evidence of Voters' Punishment for Striking Political Compromises


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Abstract

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Acceptance of Political Compromises
- 3 Data, Measurement & Method

Figure 1: Descriptive Overview Dependent Variable



4 Bend or Break?

Figure 2: Balance Checks





Table 1: Descriptive Information

Variables	Mean Value	St. Dev	Min. Value	Max. Value
Treatment: Striking Compromise	0.50	0.50	0	1
Gender	0.38	0.49	0	1
Age	33.80	16.34	0	72
Region	2.92	1.39	1	5
Urbanness	2.27	1.45	1	5
Migration Background	1.30	0.90	1	5
Employment	3.35	2.62	1	8
Income	9.76	2.68	1	14
Education	1.28	0.54	1	3
Treatment: Gender Politician	0.50	0.50	0	1
Treatment: Immigration Background Politician	0.50	0.50	0	1
Treatment: Women Politician with Immigration Background	0.25	0.43	0	1
Immigration (%)	22.82	12.82	1	100
Position: Immigration	5.91	2.03	0	10
Position: Defense	2.50	1.05	0	4
Position: Education	3.12	0.83	0	4
Attitude: Women in Politics	3.41	0.92	1	5
Ideology	4.48	2.20	0	10
Political Efficacy (1)	3.13	1.03	1	5
Political Efficacy (2)	2.06	0.85	1	5
Political Efficacy (3)	3.15	0.95	1	5
Political Efficacy (4)	2.86	0.97	1	5
Political Efficacy (5)	2.83	1.00	1	5
Political Efficacy (6)	3.60	1.05	1	5
Political Efficacy (7)	3.26	1.19	1	5
Position: COVID-19	2.88	1.18	1	5
DV: Trait Evaluation	3.21	0.64	1	5
DV: Favorability	5.41	2.01	0	10
DV: Representation	5.85	1.78	0	10
DV: Career Prospects	4.64	1.97	0	10

Figure 3: Results



5 Discussion

6 References