



Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich  
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

*Distributed  
Computing*



# Polymarkets Hybrid Exchange System and Prediction Market Arbitrage

Bachelor's Thesis

Mario Cattaneo

[mcattane@ethz.ch](mailto:mcattane@ethz.ch)

Distributed Computing Group  
Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory  
ETH Zürich

## Supervisors:

Prof. Dr. Lucianna Kiffer, Oriol Saguillo  
Prof. Dr. Roger Wattenhofer

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# **Abstract**

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## CHAPTER 1

# Introduction

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## 1.1 Speculation

Classifying and regulating speculation on uncertain events has historically been challenging. A common classification hinges on the purpose of the speculation, whether it serves to hedge risk and provide insurance, to enable price discovery for information aggregation and forecasting, or to function as entertainment akin to gambling.

### 1.1.1 Market Integrity

This regulatory ambiguity can undermine market integrity through two primary risks: direct manipulation and exploitation.

A moral hazard arises when market participants can directly influence an event's outcome. Match-fixing in sports provides an illustrative example: a boxer might have an economic incentive to lose deliberately if betting returns on their defeat exceed the prize for winning.

A related issue is asymmetric information. Not all informational advantages are malicious, some are an unavoidable consequence of information diffusion. However, the asymmetry becomes exploitative, potentially amounting to insider trading, when it arises from privileged access that allows a few actors to profit from unfairly obtained information without altering the outcome.

Both risks extend to more severe scenarios, from corporate managers taking positions that benefit from a project failure they can influence to insiders profiting from foreknowledge of military actions.

### 1.1.2 Modern Regulation

To mitigate these risks, regulators can prohibit speculation on events that present particularly high moral hazard or exploitation risks. For example, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) implements 17 C.F.R. § 40.11,

which states that a registered entity "shall not list for trading or accept for clearing" contracts that, among other things, "involve, relate to, or reference terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under any State or Federal law" and permits the Commission to identify similar activities it deems contrary to the public interest [1]. This rule was the primary battleground that Kalshi challenged in order to list specific political prediction markets [2] and is a primary reason for Polymarkets restricted access for U.S. users [3]

## 1.2 Prediction Market Exchanges

Polymarket and Kalshi are two exchanges popularizing prediction markets and making them accessible globally. A prediction market is derived from the outcomes of a real-world event. On both exchanges, a prediction market is exclusively designed for binary events with YES and NO shares, which are quoted in USD, or on Polymarket, more specifically, USDC, a USD-backed ERC-20 token managed by Coinbase through a reserve such that its value is identical to USD. An example is the event "Will the Republican Party win the House in 2026?", which is hosted on both exchanges. A position in a prediction market refers to a specific quantity of YES or NO shares held. The process of deciding the outcome of the underlying event and assigning terminal values for a YES and NO share is called resolution, and once the values are determined, the market is deemed resolved.

Kalshi specifies an explicit expiration date and central resolution source on its legally binding trading contracts for the YES and NO shares and states that if the market resolves to YES, then every YES shares has value of one USD, otherwise if the market resolves to NO then every NO share has a value of one USD [?]. It is not explicitly stated that a market is unambiguously resolved to either YES or NO, and their rulebook states that the final outcome is decided at their discretion [?], but for the purpose of this thesis we assume that markets can only resolve to either YES or NO.

Polymarket uses the Gnosis Conditional Tokens contract (CFT) to define the YES and NO shares as ERC-1155 tokens and to enforce their combined value at 1 USDC, and it uses UMA's optimistic oracle framework for resolution 4.2. In this system, a prediction can resolve to UNKNOWN, rendering the value of YES and NO shares 0.5 USDC each 4.3.

In both cases, the combined value of a YES and NO share for a prediction is exactly 1 USD at all times, as enforced by the trading contract on Kalshi and by the CFT smart contract on Polymarket 4.1. This does not hold for the market price of the YES and NO shares on the exchange, which are determined by a Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) on both exchanges ?. This is what makes market internal arbitrage possible.

Events with more than two discrete outcomes can be constructed using multiple prediction markets. For example, the event “Which party will win the House in 2026?” is decomposed into the prediction markets for the questions “Will the Democratic Party win the House in 2026?” and “Will the Republican Party win the House in 2026?”. This provides powerful information aggregation capabilities built on top of the information efficiency of markets. A common pattern on both exchanges is to define an event with more than two possible discrete outcomes exhaustively, using a prediction market for all mutually exclusive outcomes. The event “Which party will win the House in 2026?” is an example of this. Polymarket labels these as *Negrisk* and provides a full suite of smart contracts dedicated to these events, including a distinct settlement smart contract deployment *Negrisk CTFE* and an atomic swap operation for converting a set of mutually exclusive outcome positions to the complement position of the complement outcomes 4.5.

### 1.2.1 Growth




Figure 1.1: Quarterly trade volume on Polymarket. Source: Author’s own compilation using Dune Analytics (<https://dune.com/queries/6298071>).




Figure 1.2: Quarterly trade volume on Kalshi. (<https://tokenterminal.com/explorer/projects/kalshi/metrics/trading-volume?interval=max&granularity=quarter>).

The figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the quarterly USD trading volume. For Polymarket we additionally can distinguish between the trading volume on the Negrisk CTFE and Basic CTFE 4.4.

### 1.2.2 US Market

The immediate flat line in Polymarket's trading volume begins immediately after the CFTC action in January 2022. Kalshi operated exclusively within the U.S. until October 2025. This includes the first three quarters of 2025 and the last quarter of 2024 in figure 1.2.

The 47th U.S. presidential election was a major event on both exchanges. There have been various studies comparing the forecasting ability and information efficiency of the prediction markets on Kalshi and Polymarket for this event, specifically compared to other forecasting methods like New York Times polls [4, 5]. Besides that, you can clearly see the spike in trading volume in the fourth quarter of 2024. On Kalshi, markets related to politics and election accounted for roughly 1 billion USD volume in November alone [6], while on Polymarket, the main market for the presidential election accumulated a total volume of 3.5 billion USDC [7].

However, a recent study using two unsupervised network models suggests that around 18% or less of the volume traded on Polymarket is "washed" (i.e., likely orchestrated to inflate activity). One method reported that around 60%

of December 2024 volume was washed [8], which was the month after the U.S. election markets concluded and which showed an immediate decline of over 50% in total trading volume [9].

### 1.2.3 Accessibility

Kalshi has officially expanded to over 140 countries in October 2025 [10] and Polymarket has expressed intentions to reenter the U.S. On July 21, 2025, Polymarket acquired QCX LLC, a company that had registered as a Designated Contract Market (DCM) with the CFTC earlier that month [11]. This entity was subsequently rebranded as “Polymarket US” [12]. As of December 4, 2025, Polymarket is not yet available in the U.S. Both exchanges face regulatory headwinds in many jurisdictions. In many countries they are banned for usage by gambling authorities. This includes Switzerland, where the Swiss Gambling Supervisory Authority (GESPA) has blacklisted their DNS domains, making them irresolvable through Swiss ISPs [13].

Even with CFTC approval, Kalshi faces regulatory issues on a regional level in the U.S. An example is the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) issuing a cease-and-desist order preventing Kalshi from operating in Illinois for allegedly defying state gambling regulation. Kalshi argues that national oversight by the CFTC preempts these claims. This ongoing case demonstrates that the regulatory landscape surrounding speculation remains conflicted [14].

By design, Polymarket remains widely accessible even if banned, since it does not enforce identification on its main trading platform (Know-Your-Customer, KYC). Even if KYC were enforced, Polymarket’s traded base assets—the ERC-1155 tokens for YES or NO shares defined through the Gnosis Conditional Tokens contract—can also be obtained using *splitPosition*, swapped for USDC using *mergePosition*, and, after resolution, redeemed using *redeemPosition* for the value reported by Polymarket.

## CHAPTER 2

# Objective and Methodology

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The first objective was to design a data collection client for Polymarkets off chain endpoints. The second objective was to analyze market life cycle on Polymarket. Lastly, the third objective was to analyze slippage on Polymarket and prediction market arbitrage.

## 2.1 Methodology

Both Polymarket and Kalshi provide WebSocket endpoints to subscribe to orderbook state changes and trades, as well as HTTP endpoints to request the orderbook state. To use these endpoints, the orderbooks of interest must be identified first. For this, both exchanges define market objects and provide HTTP endpoints to query historical market objects, as well as WebSocket endpoints to subscribe to market lifecycle events. Both exchanges use JSON for endpoint communication and define rate limits for request throughput. Due to Polymarket's poor documentation, a lot of important information had to be discovered through testing and response analysis. These findings, along with continuous endpoint changes and discovered state inconsistencies, resulted in multiple client iterations. The final clients are tailored for the events "Which party will win the House in 2026?" and the cyclical 15-minute event "Bitcoin up or down?". This is covered in chapter 3.

To analyze the market lifecycle, first the statically available information of on-chain smart contracts is analyzed in chapter 4. This consists of essential smart contract control flow, events emitted, and immutable contract storage, which allows important links to be made between contracts and their intended use, as well as also help identify what can only be deduced or inferred from the emitted events. For this purpose a client for the Infura *eth\_getLogs* endpoint was implemented. These events and the historical market objects, which are fetchable through Polymarket's endpoints, are then used to further analyze how the market lifecycle is coordinated in chapter 5.

In chapter 6 the orderbook for prediction markets is formalized to define

how slippage and arbitrage can be measured. Then the data collected from the Polymarkets and Kalshis endpoints, and emitted events are used to analyze slippage and arbitrage by these measures.

Finally, chapter [7](#) discusses and interprets the findings of this thesis.

## CHAPTER 3

# Endpoints and Clients

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## 3.1 Polymarket Event and Market Endpoints

Polymarket has a market object for every prediction market, with a unique market id. Additionally, every market is also part of an *event*, and every event can be associated with multiple *tags*. The *gamma-api.polymarket.com* domain hosts a handful of HTTP endpoints to query market objects, event objects or tag objects in pages. The documentation only provides an example use case along with list of the query parameters for the request and attributes in the response with a sample request and response. The most essential query parameters are *offset* and *limit* which enable accessing objects in batches, where the limit specifies how many objects are in a requested batch and the offset specifies the starting object for that batch. This implicitly assumes that the objects are somehow ordered, with the first object starting at offset zero. Additionally, an order parameter exists, without further specification. Testing has shown that using the order parameter for many attributes either does not order the attribute to be ordered, misses some markets or returns duplicate markets at separate offsets. Querying the event objects ordered by event id seems to work without any of the anomalies mentioned above, and has recently been added as an example use in their documentation. However, ordering the market objects by id is not possible. Additionally, unspecified and found through testing is that the limit parameter can at most be 500, any value greater will simply always return 500 objects starting at the specified offset. Before December 2025, it was also not specified what the response would be if an offset was requested beyond the amount of available offsets. This was found, and sometime in December 2025 clarified in the example use case, to be an empty JSON array.

### 3.1.1 Event and Market Objects

The market object is listed with over 100 attributes in the documentation. Initial testing has shown that there is a mismatch between attributes that appear in responses and those listed in the documentation and also differs by response.

For this reason all event objects which also contain associated market and tag objects obtainable by querying the *events* endpoint are analyzed. Since JSON is specified by a deterministic context free language, we can parse it unambiguously into a tree of nodes, where every node has a type. Now for every event object we construct a tree, where every node, except for the root, either is the child of node of type object or array. In the case that it is the child of an object, it must have a string key associated. A node is a leaf if it is an empty array or object, or of type scalar; number, string, boolean or null. For a more representative type analysis the numbers are further broken down into IEEE 754 floating point and integers, whilst the strings are divided into empty strings, only spaces, JSON encoded, standardized timestamp formats, numbers, hexadecimal, case insensitive “null”, “none”, “nan”, “true”, “false”, or a *general* string otherwise. The resulting table with the type makeup and appearance percentage for every tree path can be found in the Appendix C.1.

## 3.2 Polymarket Orderbook and Trade Endpoints

Polymarket provides a *book* HTTP endpoint, to request the current orderbook state, under the *clob.polymarket.com* domain and a *market* Websocket endpoint, to receive events for state changes, under the *ws-subscriptions-clob.polymarket.com* domain, which is referred to as the *market feed*. Every prediction market is associated with two orderbooks, one for the YES outcome and one for the NO outcome. An orderbook has a side for the prices of buying the underlying outcome token, also known as *bids*, and a side for the prices of selling the underlying outcome token, also known as *asks*. The orderbooks underlying outcome *token id* or also referred to as *asset id*, uniquely identifies it and every market object contains two asset ids inside of a JSON array encoded string, under the key “clobTokenIds” C.1.

### 3.2.1 Book Endpoint

The specification for the book endpoint only consists of list of the request and response JSON attributes with sample for both. This endpoint returns the orderbook state objects for the requested asset ids. The documentation does not specify the amount of asset ids that can be requested or orderbooks that can be returned, nor what happens if the orderbook of an already resolved market is requested. Testing shows that the orderbooks states for requested asset ids are returned in the order they were requested, any orderbook state object requested for an asset id, whos market is already resolved will not be in the response, and the response consists of at most 500 orderbook state objects.

The orderbook state object in the appendix ?? is from the sample Polymarket provides in its documentation. Importantly, the timestamp attribute in the

response is listed as a string, but is actually a string of an integer unix millisecond timestamp in the responses.

### 3.2.2 Falsely Missing Orderbook State Objects

An initial client which made concurrent requests to the book endpoint, revealed an anomaly in the state provided from the endpoint, in which for some asset ids the endpoint would not return the order book state objects for one or multiple requests and then in later request include it again in the response. Essentially making order book state unavailable or seem as if its market has been resolved. Importantly, this could not have been a result from infringing the rate limit, as the endpoint would send regular bad response statuses, which was not the case here. The same set up was run for a couple of hours, but now making strictly serialized requests, and this anomaly was not detected. To investigate this further, every asset id was mapped to a *false miss* counter, which was incremented whenever the orderbook state object for requested asset id was not in the response and if it was in the response then the order book state object and counter are stored and this counter was set to 0.

This revealed an initial burst of false misses for many asset ids, but with false miss counts below 13. After this initial burst, the amount of asset ids with false misses decreased significantly, but the reported miss counts had a much larger variance, some with over 1000 false misses.

### 3.2.3 Market Feed

The market feed sends out different event messages for subscribed markets. Before December 17 2025 this endpoint only allowed for subscription once on an established Websocket connection. This means that if any markets were resolved or created, a new Websocket connection had to be established to adapt for this change. This was not documented, and testing simply revealed that attempting to send more than one subscription message would stop any events from arriving. Even with a timeout of 30 seconds the server was still keeping the underlying persistent TCP and Websocket connection alive and no other messages were sent, essentially turning it into a zombie.

On December 17th dynamic subscriptions and unsubscription messages were announced through their discord server, confirming that this in fact was not possible beforehand. This was a game changer, as the prior client had to create a new Websocket connection whenever new markets were created. Another significant improvement was introduced around January 5th 2026, where life cycle updates were added to the market feed. Before this the market or events endpoint had to be scraped continuously, to check if a new market was created or an existing market was resolved. This introduced unnecessary latency and complexity.

Comparing the market objects found on the long lived connection, which was continuously scraped for market life cycle changes, to a separate one time exhaustive scrape on a different connection revealed that some market objects were never returned at any offset on the market endpoint for the long lived connection. This anomaly was only measurable after 3 days.

Unlike for the book, market and event endpoint, the documented response attributes appear in every response and are of the correct type. The documented sample message can be found in the appendix ?? for the price change event, ?? for the book event, ?? for the trade event, ?? for the new market event and ?? for the market resolved event. However, for the last trade price event, there is a missing attribute *tx\_hash* of type string, which always is hexadecimal and has the length of an ethereum transaction hash. The timestamp of the market feed events are a string of an integer unix millisecond timestamp, just like the one found in the actual responses of the order book state object requests. However the fact the timestamps are only in millisecond resolution and there are no other attributes to order the events by, would render state ambiguous after a millisecond with multiple conflicting events.

### 3.2.4 Ambiguous Event Ordering

The most obvious conflict, is between events of the same type at the same millisecond with different resulting state. For price change events, this is the case when two or more price change events have the same timestamp, side, price and asset id, but different sizes, as then it is unclear exactly what the size is at the given price, side and asset id after or at the timestamp. Book events are conflicting if they share the same timestamp and asset id, but not the same bids and asks, and last trade events are conflicting when they share the same timestamp, asset id, side and price, as we can then no longer differentiate between which trade got filled using which size and price. Table 3.1 illustrates that this is not just theoretically possible, but actually also happens.

Table 3.1: Bitcoin Up or Down — January 7, 11:00AM-11:15AM ET

Message Type	Total	Ambiguous (%)	Duplicate (%)
<b>Asset ID:</b> 113615...8317859			
Last Trade Prices	3,562	24 (0.67%)	0 (0.0%)
Price Changes	158,662	3'228 (2.04%)	1'336 (0.84%)
Books	6,074	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)

If we additionally consider the ambiguity that arises when a price change message and book summary message share the same timestamp, i.e unclear whether the price change applied before or after the book state summary, we find that 7'160 price changes are ambiguous.

### 3.3 Final Polymarket Client

The initial client was intended to subscribe to the market feed and make order book state requests for all existing unresolved markets. This involved over 30 thousand orderbooks. Since only 500 orderbooks can be requested at once, there is a clear trade off between how many orderbooks are used for requests and how frequently we can request an orderbook. Additionally, the fact that the market feed events can not unambiguously be ordered, makes requesting the actual orderbook state frequently even more valuable. For these reasons the final client was designed to use less than 500 orderbook, and request their state strictly serially, with at least 500ms between requests. The documentation specifies a rate limit of 500 requests/s, so this setup is very conservative. For the event “Which party will win the house in 2026?” there are 4 order books and for the cyclical 15 minutes “Bitcoin up or down?” there seem to be less than 100 active order books.

The final client initially scrapes the events endpoint for all currently available 15 min cyclical “Bitcoin up or down?” markets. Then subscribe to the market feed using these and the 4 known orderbooks from the ‘Which party will win the house in 2026?’ to subscribe to the market feed, and listen for newly created or resolved “Bitcoin up or down?” markets, to then subscribe or unsubscribe to. We also start making the orderbook state requests as specified above, and obviously store the price change, book, last trade price events, and orderbook state objects persistently in a database table.

### 3.4 Kalshi Endpoints

Kalshi provides endpoints similar to those on Polymarket. Namely the *events* endpoint for scraping any market ever created and a websocket endpoint with different channels, like *trades*, *orderbook updates* and *market lifecycle*. Markets are uniquely identified through their *market\_ticker*. Dynamic subscription and unsubscription for the channels of interest, on the websocket endpoint, can be done using these *market\_tickers*.

However unlike Polymarket, the events are not in the same format as on Polymarket, more importantly, Kalshi provides a single orderbook for both outcomes of a prediction market, where one side is for the YES prices and the other is for the NO prices, as can be seen in the documented order book delta ?? and order book snapshot ?? response. The other documented responses can also be found in the appendix ?? for the event objects, ?? for the market lifecycle event, and ?? for the trade update.

The JSON objects in the inside of the messages sent by the orderbook update and trade channel contain a unique integer sequence identifier, which can be used unambiguously order the events for a given channel and spot any missing

events, since the first event after subscription has sequence identifier zero, and for all other events the sequence identifier is the sequence identifier of the event happening right before it, incremented by one. Even though kalshis docs for the trade update message is missing the seq attribute, the messages do effectviely contain it. However, this does not make ordering the trade events among the orderbook events unambiguously possible, as for this we would have to rely on the timestamps alone, for which the trades only specified in seconds.

### 3.5 Kalshi Client

Because of the sequence identifieres provided by kalshi, there is no need to additionally request the orderbook state, as it can be used to unambiguously maintain the state of the orderbook. The Kalshi client therefor simply does exactly what the Polymarket client does, but without the orderbook state requests.

# CHAPTER 4

# Smart Contracts

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Polymarket has a dedicated github account with over 90 repositories. There are many individual repositories containing the solidity source for smart contracts and their deployment status. They also have a dedicated repository which lists any deployment address that seemingly can be found elsewhere, the associated contract and a security audit, if present [15]. It is not explicitly mentioned if it is an exhaustive list, but at least looking through the entire documentation on the website and all repositories on github, does not reveal any undeclared deployment, since there is no other authoritative source overriding this, it will be used as the reference of the disclosed deployments.

## 4.1 Conditional Tokens

The Gnosis Conditional Tokens contract (CTF) extends the ERC-1155 standard, utilizing it to construct tokens representing the outcomes of an event or condition. This enables transferring, minting, and burning multiple outcome tokens within a single transaction.

The contract defines the relationship between the value of the  $n$  outcome tokens ( $O_1, \dots, O_n$ ) for an event and the ERC-20 collateral token  $Q$  as:

$$Q = \sum_{i=1}^n O_i \quad (4.1)$$

The *splitPositions* method atomically swaps an amount  $n$  of collateral  $Q$  for  $n$  units of each outcome token and emits the *PositionSplit* event. The *mergePositions* method performs the reverse atomic swap and emits the *PositionsMerge* event.

Before these methods can be utilized, the condition must be prepared using the *prepareConditions* method with an oracle address, a question ID, and an outcome count. This emits the *ConditionPreparation* event. Every condition is

assigned a unique identifier defined as:

$$condition_{id} := keccak(oracle \parallel question_{id} \parallel \text{outcome count}) \quad (4.2)$$

Subsequently, only the oracle can report the payouts using the *reportPayouts* method by passing an array of unsigned integers  $payouts = (p_1, \dots, p_n)$  for the  $n$  outcome tokens respectively. This emits the *ConditionResolution* event and assigns each outcome token  $O_i$  a value new value:

$$O_i := Q \cdot \frac{p_i}{\sum_{k=1}^n p_k} \quad (4.3)$$

After this assignment we still have that (4.1) holds.

Finally, after the payout is reported, anyone can redeem the outcome tokens they own for the value assigned to them in (4.3) using the *redeemPositions* method, which emits the *PayoutRedemption* event.

## 4.2 UMA framework

UMA designs protocols for oracles and deploys ethereum based contracts on various block chains like polygon. These deployments are connected to UMAs dedicated web application, which allows users actively to participate in solving price requests.

Polymarket exclusively used UMAs OptimisticOracleV2 (OOV2) deployment up until August 2025, where the UMIP-189 governance proposal passed and UMA deployed a ManagedOptimisticOracleV2 (MOOV2) dedicated only for Polymarket usage. The ManagedOptimisticOracleV2 is based on the same protocol, but with additional access control configurations [16].

Polymarket atomically sets the requested prices to be event based in its *UmaCtfAdapter* contract. Which starts with a price request. This emits the *RequestPrice* event. For a price request to be settled, the effective price must first be determined, this requires an initial price proposal to be made by suggesting a price for the request. This emits the *ProposePrice* event. After a price proposal is made, the price can be disputed within the liveness period which by default is two hours. If the proposal remains undisputed during this period, then it becomes the effective price for the request and the request can be settled. Both the proposals and disputes have no access control in OOV2. If the proposal is disputed, the *DisputePrice* event is emitted and then a stake based voting process starts. The contract for this is deployed on the Ethereum blockchain and therefore involves an off chain coordinated message relayer. After the price is determined the request can be settled, to reward or slash the proposer and disputer if existent, depending on the correctness of their proposals compared to the final outcome. This emits the *Settle* event.

The OOV2 does not specify what the prices exactly mean. So in the context of Polymarket the ancillary data has to formally specify semantic meaning of the integer price values. Polymarket does not explicitly state this, but analyzing the emitted events shows that virtually all ancillary data extends the UMIP-107 standard, such that the requested price identifier is *YES\_OR\_NO\_QUERY* and the ancillary data is a utf-8 encoded dictionary, which specifies the question using the *q*:; the associated market by the *market id* key and the 4 possible prices through the *p1*:; *p2*:; *p3*: and *p4*: keys. Which specify which price is mapped to the outcomes *YES*, *NO*, *UNKNOWN* and *EARLY PROPOSAL* [17].

### 4.3 UmaCtfAdapter

This is Polymarkets custom contract, built on top of the CFT and OOV2, which it stores as immutable references by address. It provides an *initialize* which atomically prepares the condition on the CFT, using itself as an oracle and a hard coded outcome slot count of two, and also makes the price request to the OOV2. The *initialize* method is permissionless and emits the *QuestionInitialized* event. The other permissionless method *resolve*, emitting the *QuestionResolved* event, can only be invoked if the markets requested price has been determined and it is not paused. It calls the OOV2 to settle and get the *int256* price and if the price is not that of the *EARLY PROPOSAL* outcome then uses this price to report the payouts in the CTF. The *EARLY PROPOSAL* outcome is hard coded as the least *int256* value for comparison, a price of 0 is considered as *NO*, a price of 0.5 Ether is considered as *UNKNOWN*, any other price is considered *YES*. If the outcome is *NO* then the payout array passed to the CFT is [0,1], if the outcome is *UNKNOWN* then the it is [1,1] and otherwise it is [1,0] for the outcome *YES*.

The rest of the public methods in this contract all have access restricted to either *onlyAdmin* or *onlyOracle*. This also includes the *resolveManually* method which directly reports the payouts array passed without settling any price request.

### 4.4 CTFExchange

The CTFExchange is another custom contract by Polymarket it provides the *matchOrders* method used for settling a match on the CLOB between a taker order and *n* maker orders and emits one *OrdersMatched* event, and *n + 1* *OrderFilled* events. One OrderFilled event is for the taker facing the exchange and the other *n* are for the makers facing the taker. There are three types of matches; split, merge and complementary. A split match is when the taker and maker are both buyers, one for YES shares and the other for NO shares. Analogously, a merge match is when the taker and maker are both sellers, one for YES shares

and the other for NO shares. When the taker is selling the shares the maker is buying, or vice versa, then it is a complementary match. The match type and also the amount of the instruments exchanged can be deduced from the order filled events.

## 4.5 Negrisk

The Negrisk framework builds on top of the UmaCtfAdapter to create multiple markets with mutually exclusive outcomes and thereby provide the *convertPositions* method, which enables atomically swapping a set YES shares to the complementary set of NO shares or vice versa. This is implemented in the Negrisk Adapter, but the framework also entails a Negrisk Operator, which is used by the Negrisk UmaCtfAdapter as immutable reference for the conditional tokens contract interface, but the Negrisk Operators conditions prepared method does literally nothing and its reportPayouts method does not call any other contract, but it has other public methods which relay to the adapter, which actually references the CFT. Additionally a dedicated Negrisk CTFExchange deployment exists, which is simply another instance of the CTFExchange contract.

figure for immutable deployment references

## 4.6 Polygon Collection

The polygon collection is tailored for the Infura eth\_getLogs endpoint. Infura has a rate limit of 500 credits/s, with a request to the eth\_getLogs requiring 255 credits according the documentation. However, testing showed that the actual rate limit between requests without getting rate limited is more around 1s. The rtt for a single eth\_getLogs request can be over 30s long, which is why its suited for concurrent requests. Besides the request frequency, there also is limit of 10'000 events that can requested. But the request is specified using a block range. For this purpose we can use alpha estimation with a margin 500 to converge to the block density for requesting the block expected to return 9'500 events. This seems to be effective as for most events the block density does not seem to have strong variance. But the margin can be increased if some events have a greater block density variance. As a sanity check the amount of events returned have been compared to the amount of events returned to that found in dune over the same block range. The full list of collectected events can be found int the appendix B.2

## CHAPTER 5

# Market Lifecycle

---

To analyze the ma block numbers 79172086 inclusive and 81225971 inclusive, which is November 18th 2025 7:00:03 UTC to January 5th 2026 00:00:01 UTC, from polygon through the Infura client specified in [4.6](#) and historically fetchable market objects on Polymarkets endpoints we can analyze the market lifecycle.

## 5.1 Market Creation

### 5.1.1 Reporting Oracles

In section [4.1](#) we saw that the reporting oracle for a condition is passed as an argument for condition preparation on the CFT, and is the only address which can report payouts for the final YES and NO share value after resolution. Which is why it is essential to analyze which the reporting oracles being used by Polymarket.

Out of the 128'003 ConditionPreparation events, 124'340 have a matching off chain market object with the same condition id. These matched ConditionPreparation events have three distinct reporting oracles, two of which are not documented. Namely the *MOOV2 Adapter* and *Centralized Adapter* in Appendix [B.1](#).

The MOOV2 Adapter is an UmaCtfAdapter instance described in section [4.3](#). The MOOV2 Adapter uses the MOOV2 instead of the OOV2. Interestingly, no condition has been prepared with the Basic Adapter as reporting oracle. This aligns with the umip-189 proposal and suggests that the MOOV2 Adapter replaced the Basic Adapter, even though Polymarket has not disclosed anything on this matter.




Figure 5.1: Cumulative count of conditions found over time

In figure 5.1 we can see that around December 17th 2025 some market objects start to appear without an acceptingOrders timestamp, as can also be seen in the appendix C.1. Additionally, this is where the 3'663 conditions were prepared on the CFT with no matching off chain market object, out of which virtually all use the Centralized Adapter as reporting oracle, which also had a change in the rate at which new conditions were prepared with it as reporting oracle.

### 5.1.2 Centralized Adapter

The bytecode for the Centralized Adapter is not recognized by prominent bytecode to source indexers like Polygonscan or Etherscan. However, we can still use the matched market objects to analyze this adapter more in depth.

Table 5.1: Label frequency in 41'016 market objects matched with Centralized Adapter as reporting oracle

Label	Appeared in (%)
Up or Down	41,016 (100%)
Crypto Prices	41,016 (100%)
Hide From New	41,016 (100%)
Recurring	41,016 (100%)
Crypto	41,016 (100%)
5M	21,630 (52.7%)
15M	18,270 (44.5%)
Solana	10,263 (25.0%)
Ethereum	10,257 (25.0%)
XRP	10,256 (25.0%)
Ripple	10,256 (25.0%)
Bitcoin	10,240 (25.0%)
4H	1'116 (2.7%)

Every market object has a set of labels assigned by polymarket to categorize the event. Table 5.1 shows the frequency of all labels in market objects matched with the conditions prepared with the Centralized Adapter as reporting oracle. Clearly, all labels are tied to crypto asset price related events. If we look up individual matched markets on polymarkets web application, we find that none of them have a link to the UMA resolution status on the UMA webapplication, which for other markets exists. Instead they link to a source which tracks the underlying crypto asset price, which is directly used as the ground truth for resolution. An example for this are the cyclical 15 minute “Bitcoin up or down?” markets.

### 5.1.3 Resolution Source

Whilst the MOOV2 Adapter makes a price request atomically with the condition preparation through the initialize method, a condition prepared for a Negrisk does not atomically make a price request and condition preparation atomically unless some hidden method is used for this, as explained in section 4.5. The ConditionPreparation events and RequestPrice events have nothing that can be used to match them directly. However, virtually every Ancillary data contains a market id key, which can be used to match price requests to market objects and then to ConditionPreparation events. Out of the 84,684 RequestPrice events, 83,743 have a matching off-chain market object and 83,652 have a matching ConditionPreparation.

Table 5.2: Resolution Source and Reporting Oracle Pairs

Resolution Source (ids)	Matches	Oracle (Conditions)
MOOV2	57'502	MOOV2 Adapter
OOV2	70	MOOV2 Adapter
OOV2	26'080	Negrisk Adapter

A curious anomaly is that 70 out of the price requests made to the OOV2 matched with conditions prepared using the MOOV2 Adapter as reporting oracle, and 50 out of the requests made to the OOV2 matched with the MOOV2 Adapter as reporting oracle do not share the same transaction hash and are therefore not atomically executed using the initialize method.

The conditions prepared with the Negrisk Adapter as reporting oracle matched exclusively with price requests made to the OOV2. Out of these matches non share the same transaction hash, which means they are not executed atomically, but 21,672 (83.10%) share the same block number, which demonstrates that they mostly are executed in a timely manner, but coordinated through separate transactions.

## 5.2 Exchange Registration

For matched orders on the CLOB to be settled on the on-chain exchange, first the condition id and two token ids of the prediction market must be registered as explained in section 4.4.




Figure 5.2: CLOB markets and registered tokens unique condito

In figure 5.2 we can see after some point in time, markets are consistently being created without being registered with the on chain exchange. This happens around the same time at which market objects start being created without acceptingOrder timestamps.

### 5.2.1 Unregistered Traded Outcomes

If we match the ConditionsPrepared events to the RegisteredToken events, we find that virtually all unregistered markets were prepared using the Centralized Adapter as reporting oracle. Additionally, less than half of the conditions are registered.

Table 5.3: Matched conditions of 134,424 Conditions Prepared and 215,152 TokensRegistered over Nov 18 - Jan 08

Oracle (Conditions)	Matches	Exchange (Conditions)
Centralized Adapter (48'896)	20'425	CTFE (83'262)
MOOV2 Adapter (62'857)	61'439	CTFE (83'262)
Negrisk Adapter (27'728)	23'545	Negrisk CTFE (24'209)

Strangely, there are provably markets, which are visible on the web application, listed as active in the market object and have trade events being sent out on the websocket market feed, but do not have any registered token events nor orders matched or order filled events emitted from either the CTFE nor Negrisk CTFE. An example for this, are some of the 15 minute cyclical “bitcoin up or down?” markets.

## 5.3 Resolution

### 5.3.1 Disputes

As described in section 4.2 the UMA OOV2 and MOOV2 protocol allows for price proposals to be disputed within a liveness period.

Table 5.4: Ten Most Frequent Tags in Matched Disputes

Label	Appeared In (%)
Politics	104 (32.00%)
Culture	99 (30.46%)
Sports	74 (22.77%)
Games	72 (22.15%)
Hide From New	49 (15.08%)
Recurring	45 (13.85%)
Weather	44 (13.54%)
Best of 2025	41 (12.62%)
Trump	40 (12.31%)
Geopolitics	39 (12.00%)

There are a total of 74,833 matched proposals and 340 matched disputes. Table 5.4 shows the ten most frequent labels assigned to the markets objects matched with the disputes. Out of the 340 matched disputes, 145 are on the OOV2 and 195 on the MOOV2. This is ironic, because according to the umip-189 proposal, the MOOV2 was explicitly designed with a propososer whitelist, which Polymarket manages. Yet, the MOOV2 has more disputes than the OOV2. However, its important to note that the MOOV2 also has 53,818 proposals, compared to the OOV2 which has 21,015 proposals.

### 5.3.2 Reported Unknown Outcome

The terminal value for the YES and NO shares is determined by the payout array passed from the reporting oracle to the CFT, which emits a ConditionResolution event, containing the condition id and the payout array. Out of 112'638 ConditionResolution events, 283 (0.25%) reported an Unknown outcome, 46,373 (41.17%) reported a YES outcome and 66,982 (58.58%) reported a NO outcome. If the YES and NO outcomes were uniformly distributed, we would expect them to be reported equally, but most negrisk events are designed to have one prediction market resolve to YES and the rest to NO. In fact out of the 19'541 ConditionResolution events with a Negrisk Adapter as reporting oracle, only 2,616 (13.39%) reported a YES outcome, 16,925 (86.61%) reported a NO outcome and none reported an UNKNOWN outcome. All of the UNKNOWN outcomes were reported by the MOOV2 Adapter.

Table 5.5: Ten Most Frequent Tags For Markets resolved to UNKNOWN

Label	Appeared In (%)
Games	272 (96.11%)
Sports	259 (91.52%)
Esports	102 (36.04%)
Basketball	51 (18.02%)
NCAA	42 (14.84%)
UFC	39 (13.78%)
Dota 2	35 (12.37%)
NCAA Basketball	31 (10.95%)
Rocket League	30 (10.60%)
Tennis	29 (10.25%)

Table 5.5 shows what kind of labels are associated with markets reported to have an UNKNOWN outcome.

### 5.3.3 Manual Resolutions

In sections ?? it was mentioned that the UmaCtfAdapter and Negrisk Operator have administrative methods, which can be used to manually resolve markets without UMA price requests being settled. All of the relevant methods emit events, including the *resolveMarketManually* method in the UmaCtfAdapter and the *emergencyResolveQuestion* method in the Negrisk Operator. However, there no events for either of these methods was emitted in any of the UmaCtfAdapter instances or the single Negrisk Operator instance. This does not fully exclude the possibility of manual resolution, but if this is the case, then it must be done through a delegate call from a hidden proxy contract, such that the events are emitted from the proxy contract.

## CHAPTER 6

# Orderbook and Trading

---

In section 1.2 we explained how a prediction market consists of YES and NO shares whose price is denoted in USD. The CLOB used by Polymarket and Kalshi captures the intention of traders through market and limit orders, which are placed through HTTPS requests to *order* endpoints and are matched based on price-time priority [?]. A limit order allows the trader to specify price at which they want to buy or sell shares, but this price can not cross other resting limit orders, otherwise it becomes marketable. A marketable order is either executed immediately against the best possible resting limit orders by price-time priority, or is aborted [?].

## 6.1 State, Ordering and Matching

A trader can either buy or sell YES or NO shares, which creates four possible orders; Sell Yes, Sell No, Buy Yes, Buy No. However, among these four orders there are only two intentions, which are either to speculate on the YES outcome by buying YES shares or selling NO shares, or to speculate on the NO outcome by buying NO shares or selling YES shares.

Kalshi maintains a single orderbook for each prediction market, which captures the order intentions through a YES and NO side. Polymarket on the other hand documents and provides separate orderbooks for the YES and NO shares, with bid and ask sides. However, analyzing the state of the orderbook, reveals that the bid share amount at any given price  $p$  for the YES shares are always the same as the ask share amount for the NO shares at price  $1 - p$ . The analogous also holds for the YES asks and NO bids.

The state of the CLOB can be defined through the resting limit orders. A limit order can be defined as a tuple  $(p, v, s, i)$ , where  $p \in \mathbb{R}^+$  is the price for an outcome share,  $v \in \mathbb{R}^+$  is the quantity of the shares,  $s \in \{\text{YES}, \text{NO}\}$  is the outcome and  $i \in \mathbb{N}$  is the priority it has to be selected for matching with market orders at price  $p$  and side  $s$ , a lower  $i$  has a higher priority. This guarantees a unique ordering for both buy and sell limit orders which is used for matching.

Formally, for limit orders we have that:

$$((p_1, v_1, s_1, i_1) > (p_2, v_1, s_2, i_2)) \iff p_1 < p_2 \vee (p_1 = p_2 \wedge i_1 < i_2) \quad (6.1)$$

Where the best price for the taker is:

$$p_{market} = \max\{p | (p, v, s, i)\} \quad (6.2)$$

If the quantity for a marketable order can not be fully filled at market price, then the taker would suffer from **price slippage**, if the order is executed. If the marketable order can't be filled with limit orders at any price, then the taker order remains partially or fully unfilled. Depending on the market order specification, a partially unfilled market order is either executed or canceled.

## 6.2 Slippage

In general, Slippage occurs when the trade is executed at a different price than what the market suggested at the time where the intent to trade was submitted. This was already covered for fully Automated Market Makers in section ??.

Slippage in the CLOB can occur when a taker order for  $x$  shares is not filled entirely at the market price when the order was submitted, resulting in a less favorable execution cost for the taker. The CLOB is designed to allow this, with the core principle being the taker is guaranteed timely order execution but not price, whilst the maker is guaranteed order price but not timely execution. We can define the slippage for a taker buying or selling  $x$  base assets and getting matched with maker orders  $M$ , we have:

$$Slippage(x, M) = \left| \sum_{(p, v, s, i) \in M} p * v - p_{market} \cdot x \right| \quad (6.3)$$

The least limit order  $(p, v, s, i) = \min\{M\}$  might only be part of a limit order such that another limit order  $(p, v', s, i)$  now exists where the previous limit order was  $(p, v'', s, i)$  for  $v'' = v' + v$  and:

$$x = \sum_{(p, v, s, i) \in M} v \quad (6.4)$$

### 6.2.1 Slippage Rate on Polymarket

Using the Orderfilled events emitted by the CTFExchange, we can measure the slippage for all 1'443'953 settlements, since we have the USDC amount that

the taker paid or received in the fill where taker is facing the exchange, and the amount of shares and their price for every fill where the maker is facing the taker. We can now construct a set  $A$  of tuples  $(x, y, t)$  for every settlement, where  $x$  is the USDC amount the taker paid or received,  $y$  is the slippage and  $t$  is the timestamp of the settlement.




Figure 6.1: Cumulative Taker USDC Divided by Cumulative Slippage

In figure 6.1 we can see that the cumulative taker USDC amount divided by the cumulative slippage up until time  $t$  for all settlements, converges to some value around 100. This can be explained by the law of large numbers, if we assume that the  $x$  and  $y$  values in the tuples in  $A$  are i.i.d. and that the expected value of  $x$  is finite and non zero, then we have that:

$$\frac{\sum_{(x,y,t) \in A} x}{\sum_{(x,y,t) \in A} y} \xrightarrow{a.s.} \frac{E[x]}{E[y]} \quad (6.5)$$

Fitting  $y = \alpha x + \beta$  for  $y$  as the cumulative Slippage amount and  $x$  as the cumulative Taker USDC amount, for the 1'412'812 settlements after one day in, to avoid the initial artifact, we find that  $\alpha = 0.00126$  and  $\beta = 2.04$  with a standard error  $SE = 5.65 \cdot 10^{-6}$  and  $R^2 = 0.01765$ . This means that for the aggregate of all settlements we have an extremely good fit, but for individual settlements this is a poor predictor of slippage given the total USDC amount of the taker.

### 6.3 Arbitrage

#### 6.3.1 Bitcoin up or down?

In the prior section we saw that the event “Which party will win the house 2026?” had low expected price discrepancies. However, it is important to also consider that the price for the event itself did not move much, as illustrated by the range of the prices throughout the entire time period in table ??, and also was not close to being resolved yet. With the cyclical 15 minute “Bitcoin up or down?” event, we can also see how price discrepancies relate to the timeline in the market life cycle.




Figure 6.2: Poly Internal




Figure 6.3: Kalshi Internal




Figure 6.4: Yes Mirror




Figure 6.5: No Mirror

The tables above create a heat map using the 15 minute cyclical “Bitcoin up or down?” events, to visualize the distribution of price discrepancies at a given time in the life cycle of the market.

better illustrate how cross exchange (mirror arb) are more variant with higher expected value. Also how in general variance decreases at start and increases at the end of the market life cycle.

## CHAPTER 7

# Discussion

---

Love is the answer.

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# APPENDIX A

## Endpoint Documented JSON responses

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Listing A.1: Polymarkets Documented Orderbook State Object Sample

```
1 \label{lst:orderbook_state}
2 {
3     "market": "0x1b6f76e5b8587ee896c35847e12d
4     11e75290a8c3934c5952e8a9d6e4c6f03cfa",
5     "asset_id": "1234567890",
6     "timestamp": "2023-10-01T12:00:00Z",
7     "hash": "0xabc123def456...",
8     "bids": [
9         {
10            "price": "1800.50",
11            "size": "10.5"
12        }
13    ],
14     "asks": [
15         {
16            "price": "1800.50",
17            "size": "10.5"
18        }
19    ],
20     "min_order_size": "0.001",
21     "tick_size": "0.01",
22     "neg_risk": false
23 }
```

---

Listing A.2: Polymarkets Documented Book Event

```
1 \label{lst:book_event}
2 {
3     "event_type": "book",
4     "asset_id": "65818619657568813474341868652308942079804919
5     287380422192892211131408793125422",
6     "market": "0xbd31dc8a20211944f6b70f31557f1001557
7     b59905b7738480ca09bd4532f84af",
8     "bids": [
9         { "price": ".48", "size": "30" },
```

---

```

10     { "price": ".49", "size": "20" },
11     { "price": ".50", "size": "15" }
12 ],
13 "asks": [
14     { "price": ".52", "size": "25" },
15     { "price": ".53", "size": "60" },
16     { "price": ".54", "size": "10" }
17 ],
18 "timestamp": "123456789000",
19 "hash": "0x0...."
20 }
```

---

Listing A.3: Polymarkets Documented Price Change Event

```

1 \label{lst:price_change_event}
2 {
3     "market": "0x5f65177b394277fd294cd75650044e32
4 ba009a95022d88a0c1d565897d72f8f1",
5     "price_changes": [
6         {
7             "asset_id": "71321045679252212594626385532706912
8 750332728571942532289631379312455583992563",
9             "price": "0.5",
10            "size": "200",
11            "side": "BUY",
12            "hash": "56621a121a47ed9333273e21c83b660cff37ae50",
13            "best_bid": "0.5",
14            "best_ask": "1"
15        },
16        {
17            "asset_id": "521143195012459155160551060468842
18 09969926127482827954674443846427813813222426",
19            "price": "0.5",
20            "size": "200",
21            "side": "SELL",
22            "hash": "1895759e4df7a796bf4f1c5a5950b748306923e2",
23            "best_bid": "0",
24            "best_ask": "0.5"
25        }
26    ],
27    "timestamp": "1757908892351",
28    "event_type": "price_change"
29 }
```

---

Listing A.4: Polymarkets Documented Last Trade Price Event

```

1 \label{lst:last_trade_event}
2 {
3     "asset_id": "114122071509644379678018727908709560
4 226618148003371446110114509806601493071694",
5     "event_type": "last_trade_price",
6     "fee_rate_bps": "0",
7     "market": "0x6a67b9d828d53862160e470329ffea5246f3
8 38ecffffdf2cab45211ec578b0347",
```

```

9 "price": "0.456",
10 "side": "BUY",
11 "size": "219.217767",
12 "timestamp": "1750428146322"
13 }
```

Listing A.5: Polymarkets Documented New Market Event

```

1 \label{lst:new_market}
2 {
3     "id": "1031769",
4     "question": "Will NVIDIA (NVDA) close above
5     $240 end of January?", ,
6     "market": "0x311d0c4b6671ab54af4970c06fcf
7     58662516f5168997bdda209ec3db5aa6b0c1",
8     "slug": "nvda-above-240-on-january-30-2026",
9     "description": "This market will resolve to \"Yes\" if the
        official closing price for NVIDIA (NVDA) on the final
        trading day of January 2026 is higher than the listed price
        . Otherwise, this market will resolve to \"No\".\n\nIf the
        final trading day of the month is shortened (for example,
        due to a market-holiday schedule), the official closing
        price published for that shortened session will still be
        used for resolution.\n\nIf no official closing price is
        published for that session (for example, due to a trading
        halt into the close, system issue, or other disruption),
        the market will use the last valid on-exchange trade price
        of the regular session as the effective closing price.\n\n
        The resolution source for this market is Yahoo Finance
        specifically, the NVIDIA (NVDA) \"Close\" prices available
        at https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/NVDA/history, published
        under \"Historical Prices.\"\\n\\nIn the event of a stock
        split, reverse stock split, or similar corporate action
        affecting the listed company during the listed time frame,
        this market will resolve based on split-adjusted prices as
        displayed on Yahoo Finance.",
10    "assets_ids": [
11        "76043073756653678226373981964075571318
12        267289248134717369284518995922789326425",
13        "316909342633857276642020992785456880077
14        99199447969475608906331829650099442770"
15    ],
16    "outcomes": [
17        "Yes",
18        "No"
19    ],
20    "event_message": {
21        "id": "125819",
22        "ticker": "nvda-above-in-january-2026",
23        "slug": "nvda-above-in-january-2026",
24        "title": "Will NVIDIA (NVDA) close above ___ end of January
25        ?",
25        "description": "This market will resolve to \"Yes\" if the
            official closing price for NVIDIA (NVDA) on the final
```

```

trading day of January 2026 is higher than the listed
price. Otherwise, this market will resolve to \"No\".\n
\nIf the final trading day of the month is shortened (
for example, due to a market-holiday schedule), the
official closing price published for that shortened
session will still be used for resolution.\n\nIf no
official closing price is published for that session (
for example, due to a trading halt into the close,
system issue, or other disruption), the market will use
the last valid on-exchange trade price of the regular
session as the effective closing price.\n\nThe
resolution source for this market is Yahoo Finance
specifically, the NVIDIA (NVDA) \"Close\" prices
available at https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/NVDA/history, published under \"Historical Prices.\n\nIn
the event of a stock split, reverse stock split, or
similar corporate action affecting the listed company
during the listed time frame, this market will resolve
based on split-adjusted prices as displayed on Yahoo
Finance."
26 },
27 "timestamp": "1766790415550",
28 "event_type": "new_market"
29 }

```

Listing A.6: Polymarkets Documented Market Resolved Event

---

```

1 \label{lst:market_res}
2 {
3     "id": "1031769",
4     "question": "Will NVIDIA (NVDA) close above $240
5     end of January?",
6     "market": "0x311d0c4b6671ab54af4970c06fc
7 f58662516f5168997bdda209ec3db5aa6b0c1",
8     "slug": "nvda-above-240-on-january-30-2026",
9     "description": "This market will resolve to \"Yes\" if the
          official closing price for NVIDIA (NVDA) on the final
          trading day of January 2026 is higher than the listed price
          . Otherwise, this market will resolve to \"No\".\n\nIf the
          final trading day of the month is shortened (for example,
          due to a market-holiday schedule), the official closing
          price published for that shortened session will still be
          used for resolution.\n\nIf no official closing price is
          published for that session (for example, due to a trading
          halt into the close, system issue, or other disruption),
          the market will use the last valid on-exchange trade price
          of the regular session as the effective closing price.\n\n
          The resolution source for this market is Yahoo Finance
          specifically, the NVIDIA (NVDA) \"Close\" prices available
          at https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/NVDA/history, published
          under \"Historical Prices.\n\nIn the event of a stock
          split, reverse stock split, or similar corporate action
          affecting the listed company during the listed time frame,
          this market will resolve based on split-adjusted prices as

```

```

10     displayed on Yahoo Finance." ,
11   "assets_ids": [
12     "760430737566536782263739819640755713182
13     67289248134717369284518995922789326425",
14     "316909342633857276642020992785456880077
15     99199447969475608906331829650099442770"
16   ],
17   "winning_asset_id": "7604307375665367822637398196407
18 5571318267289248134717369284518995922789326425",
19   "winning_outcome": "Yes",
20   "event_message": {
21     "id": "125819",
22     "ticker": "nvda-above-in-january-2026",
23     "slug": "nvda-above-in-january-2026",
24     "title": "Will NVIDIA (NVDA) close above ___ end of January
?",
25     "description": "This market will resolve to \"Yes\" if the
official closing price for NVIDIA (NVDA) on the final
trading day of January 2026 is higher than the listed
price. Otherwise, this market will resolve to \"No\".\n\nIf the final trading day of the month is shortened (
for example, due to a market-holiday schedule), the
official closing price published for that shortened
session will still be used for resolution.\n\nIf no
official closing price is published for that session (
for example, due to a trading halt into the close,
system issue, or other disruption), the market will use
the last valid on-exchange trade price of the regular
session as the effective closing price.\n\nThe
resolution source for this market is Yahoo Finance
specifically, the NVIDIA (NVDA) \"Close\" prices
available at https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/NVDA/history,
published under \"Historical Prices.\n\nIn
the event of a stock split, reverse stock split, or
similar corporate action affecting the listed company
during the listed time frame, this market will resolve
based on split-adjusted prices as displayed on Yahoo
Finance."
26   },
27   "timestamp": "1766790415550",
28   "event_type": "new_market"
}

```

Listing A.7: Kalshi Documented Orderbook Delta

```

1 \label{lst:orderbook_delta}
2 {
3   "type": "orderbook_delta",
4   "sid": 2,
5   "seq": 3,
6   "msg": {
7     "market_ticker": "FED-23DEC-T3.00",
8     "market_id": "9b0f6b43-5b68-4f9f-9f02-9a2d1b8ac1a1",
9     "price": 96,

```

```

10     "price_dollars": "0.960",
11     "delta": -54,
12     "delta_fp": "-54.00",
13     "side": "yes",
14     "ts": "2022-11-22T20:44:01Z"
15   }
16 }
```

Listing A.8: Kalshi Documented Orderbook Snapshot

```

1 \label{lst:orderbook_snapshot}
2 {
3   "type": "orderbook_snapshot",
4   "sid": 2,
5   "seq": 2,
6   "msg": [
7     "market_ticker": "FED-23DEC-T3.00",
8     "market_id": "9b0f6b43-5b68-4f9f-9f02-9a2d1b8ac1a1",
9     "yes": [
10       [
11         8,
12         300
13       ],
14       [
15         22,
16         333
17     ],
18   ],
19   "yes_dollars": [
20     [
21       "0.080",
22       300
23     ],
24     [
25       "0.220",
26       333
27     ]
28   ],
29   "yes_dollars_fp": [
30     [
31       "0.0800",
32       "300.00"
33     ],
34     [
35       "0.2200",
36       "333.00"
37     ]
38   ],
39   "no": [
40     [
41       54,
42       20
43     ],
44     [

```

```

45      56,
46      146
47    ]
48  ],
49 "no_dollars": [
50   [
51     "0.540",
52     20
53   ],
54   [
55     "0.560",
56     146
57   ]
58 ],
59 "no_dollars_fp": [
60   [
61     "0.5400",
62     "20.00"
63   ],
64   [
65     "0.5600",
66     "146.00"
67   ]
68 ]
69 }
70 }
```

Listing A.9: Kalshi Documented Trade Update

```

1 \label{lst:trade_update}
2 {
3   "type": "trade",
4   "sid": 11,
5   "msg": {
6     "trade_id": "d91bc706-ee49-470d-82d8-11418bda6fed",
7     "market_ticker": "HIGHNY-22DEC23-B53.5",
8     "yes_price": 36,
9     "yes_price_dollars": "0.360",
10    "no_price": 64,
11    "no_price_dollars": "0.640",
12    "count": 136,
13    "count_fp": "136.00",
14    "taker_side": "no",
15    "ts": 1669149841
16  }
17 }
```

Listing A.10: Kalshi Documented Market Lifecycle V2

```

1 \label{lst:market_lifecycle_v2}
2 {
3   "type": "market_lifecycle_v2",
4   "sid": 13,
5   "msg": {
```

```

6   "market_ticker": "INXD-23SEP14-B4487",
7   "event_type": "created",
8   "open_ts": 1694635200,
9   "close_ts": 1694721600,
10  "additional_metadata": {
11    "name": "S&P 500 daily return on Sep 14",
12    "title": "S&P 500 closes up by 0.02% or more",
13    "yes_sub_title": "S&P 500 closes up 0.02%+",
14    "no_sub_title": "S&P 500 closes up <0.02%",
15    "rules_primary": "The S&P 500 index level at 4:00 PM ET...",
16    "rules_secondary": "",
17    "can_close_early": true,
18    "event_ticker": "INXD-23SEP14",
19    "expected_expiration_ts": 1694721600,
20    "strike_type": "greater",
21    "floor_strike": 4487
22  }
23}
24

```

---

Listing A.11: Kalshi Documented Event Object

```

1 \label{lst:event_object}
2 {
3   "event": {
4     "event_ticker": "<string>",
5     "series_ticker": "<string>",
6     "sub_title": "<string>",
7     "title": "<string>",
8     "collateral_return_type": "<string>",
9     "mutually_exclusive": true,
10    "category": "<string>",
11    "available_on_brokers": true,
12    "product_metadata": {},
13    "strike_date": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
14    "strike_period": "<string>",
15    "markets": [
16      {
17        "ticker": "<string>",
18        "event_ticker": "<string>",
19        "market_type": "binary",
20        "title": "<string>",
21        "subtitle": "<string>",
22        "yes_sub_title": "<string>",
23        "no_sub_title": "<string>",
24        "created_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
25        "updated_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
26        "open_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
27        "close_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
28        "expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
29        "latest_expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
30        "settlement_timer_seconds": 123,
31        "status": "initialized",
32        "response_price_units": "usd_cent",

```

```
33     "yes_bid": 123,
34     "yes_bid_dollars": "0.5600",
35     "yes_ask": 123,
36     "yes_ask_dollars": "0.5600",
37     "no_bid": 123,
38     "no_bid_dollars": "0.5600",
39     "no_ask": 123,
40     "no_ask_dollars": "0.5600",
41     "last_price": 123,
42     "last_price_dollars": "0.5600",
43     "volume": 123,
44     "volume_fp": "10.00",
45     "volume_24h": 123,
46     "volume_24h_fp": "10.00",
47     "result": "yes",
48     "can_close_early": true,
49     "open_interest": 123,
50     "open_interest_fp": "10.00",
51     "notional_value": 123,
52     "notional_value_dollars": "0.5600",
53     "previous_yes_bid": 123,
54     "previous_yes_bid_dollars": "0.5600",
55     "previous_yes_ask": 123,
56     "previous_yes_ask_dollars": "0.5600",
57     "previous_price": 123,
58     "previous_price_dollars": "0.5600",
59     "liquidity": 123,
60     "liquidity_dollars": "0.5600",
61     "expiration_value": "<string>",
62     "tick_size": 123,
63     "rules_primary": "<string>",
64     "rules_secondary": "<string>",
65     "price_level_structure": "<string>",
66     "price_ranges": [
67       {
68         "start": "<string>",
69         "end": "<string>",
70         "step": "<string>"
71       }
72     ],
73     "expected_expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
74     "settlement_value": 123,
75     "settlement_value_dollars": "0.5600",
76     "settlement_ts": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
77     "fee_waiver_expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
78     "early_close_condition": "<string>",
79     "strike_type": "greater",
80     "floor_strike": 123,
81     "cap_strike": 123,
82     "functional_strike": "<string>",
83     "custom_strike": {},
84     "mve_collection_ticker": "<string>",
85     "mve_selected_legs": [
86       {
```

```
87         "event_ticker": "<string>",
88         "market_ticker": "<string>",
89         "side": "<string>",
90         "yes_settlement_value_dollars": "0.5600"
91     }
92 ],
93     "primary_participant_key": "<string>",
94     "is_provisional": true
95   }
96 ]
97 },
98 "markets": [
99   {
100     "ticker": "<string>",
101     "event_ticker": "<string>",
102     "market_type": "binary",
103     "title": "<string>",
104     "subtitle": "<string>",
105     "yes_sub_title": "<string>",
106     "no_sub_title": "<string>",
107     "created_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
108     "updated_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
109     "open_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
110     "close_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
111     "expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
112     "latest_expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
113     "settlement_timer_seconds": 123,
114     "status": "initialized",
115     "response_price_units": "usd_cent",
116     "yes_bid": 123,
117     "yes_bid_dollars": "0.5600",
118     "yes_ask": 123,
119     "yes_ask_dollars": "0.5600",
120     "no_bid": 123,
121     "no_bid_dollars": "0.5600",
122     "no_ask": 123,
123     "no_ask_dollars": "0.5600",
124     "last_price": 123,
125     "last_price_dollars": "0.5600",
126     "volume": 123,
127     "volume_fp": "10.00",
128     "volume_24h": 123,
129     "volume_24h_fp": "10.00",
130     "result": "yes",
131     "can_close_early": true,
132     "open_interest": 123,
133     "open_interest_fp": "10.00",
134     "notional_value": 123,
135     "notional_value_dollars": "0.5600",
136     "previous_yes_bid": 123,
137     "previous_yes_bid_dollars": "0.5600",
138     "previous_yes_ask": 123,
139     "previous_yes_ask_dollars": "0.5600",
140     "previous_price": 123,
```

```
141     "previous_price_dollars": "0.5600",
142     "liquidity": 123,
143     "liquidity_dollars": "0.5600",
144     "expiration_value": "<string>",
145     "tick_size": 123,
146     "rules_primary": "<string>",
147     "rules_secondary": "<string>",
148     "price_level_structure": "<string>",
149     "price_ranges": [
150         {
151             "start": "<string>",
152             "end": "<string>",
153             "step": "<string>"
154         }
155     ],
156     "expected_expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
157     "settlement_value": 123,
158     "settlement_value_dollars": "0.5600",
159     "settlement_ts": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
160     "fee_waiver_expiration_time": "2023-11-07T05:31:56Z",
161     "early_close_condition": "<string>",
162     "strike_type": "greater",
163     "floor_strike": 123,
164     "cap_strike": 123,
165     "functional_strike": "<string>",
166     "custom_strike": {},
167     "mve_collection_ticker": "<string>",
168     "mve_selected_legs": [
169         {
170             "event_ticker": "<string>",
171             "market_ticker": "<string>",
172             "side": "<string>",
173             "yes_settlement_value_dollars": "0.5600"
174         }
175     ],
176     "primary_participant_key": "<string>",
177     "is_provisional": true
178   }
179 ]
180 }
```

APPENDIX B

## Smart Contracts

---

Table B.1: Contract Aliases, Deployment Addresses, and Event Tables

<b>Alias</b>	<b>Deployment Address</b>	<b>Contract Table Name</b>
Base CTFExchange	0x4bf841d5b3570de fd03c39a9a4d8de6b d8b8982e	CTFExchange
Negrisk CTFExchange	0xC5d563A36AE78 145C45a50134d48A 1215220f80a	CTFExchange
CTF	0x4d97dc97ec945f 40cf65f87097ace5ea 0476045	(Gnosis) Conditional Tokens
Negrisk Operator	0x71523d0f655b41e 805cec45b17163f52 8b59b820	Negrisk Operator
Negrisk Adapter	0xd91e80cf2e7be2e 162c6513ced06f1dd 0da35296	Negrisk Adapter
Negrisk Adapter	0x2F5e3684cb1F31 8ec51b00Edba38d7 9Ac2c0aA9d	UmaCtfAdapter
Base UmaCtfAdapter	0x6A9D222616C90 FcA5754cd1333cF D9b7fb6a4F74	UmaCtfAdapter
MOOV2 Adapter	0x65070BE9147746 0D8A7AeEb94ef92f e056C2f2A7	UmaCtfAdapter
MOOV2	0x2C0367a9DB231 dDeBd88a94b4f646 1a6e47C58B1	(UMA) Managed Optimistic Oracle V2
Oracle Child Tunnel	0xac60353a54873c4 46101216829a6A98 cDbbC3f3D	Oracle Child Tunnel
FxTunnel	0x8397259c983751 DAf4040079006393 5a11afa28a	FxTunnel
OOV2	0xeE3Afe347D5C74 317041E2618C4953 4dAf887c24	(UMA) Optimistic Oracle V2

Table B.2: Contract Event Signatures

<b>Contract / Event Signatures</b>
<b>CTFExchange</b>

Table B.2 – continued from previous page

---

<b>Contract / Event Signatures</b>
<pre> FeeCharged(receiver(address), tokenId(uint256), fee(uint256)) NewAdmin(admin(address), newAdmin(address)) NewOperator(operator(address), newOperator(address)) OrderCancelled(orderHash(bytes32)) OrderFilled(orderHash(bytes32), maker(address), taker(address), makerAssetId(uint256), takerAssetId(uint256), making(uint256), taking(uint256), fee(uint256)) OrdersMatched(orderHash(bytes32), maker(address), makerAssetId(uint256), takerAssetId(uint256), making(uint256), taking(uint256)) ProxyFactoryUpdated(oldProxyFactory(address), newProxyFactory(address)) RemovedAdmin(admin(address), oldAdmin(address)) RemovedOperator(operator(address), oldOperator(address)) SafeFactoryUpdated(oldSafeFactory(address), newSafeFactory(address)) TokenRegistered(token0(uint256), token1(uint256), conditionId(bytes32)) TradingPaused(trader(address)) TradingUnpaused(trader(address)) </pre>
<b>Conditional Tokens</b>
<pre> ConditionPreparation(conditionId(bytes32), oracle(address), questionId(bytes32), outcomeSlotCount(uint256)) ConditionResolution(conditionId(bytes32), oracle(address), questionId(bytes32), outcomeSlotCount(uint256), payoutNumerators(uint256[])) PositionSplit(stakeholder(address), collateralToken(address), parentCollectionId(bytes32), conditionId(bytes32), partition(uint256[]), amount(uint256)) PositionsMerge(stakeholder(address), collateralToken(address), parentCollectionId(bytes32), conditionId(bytes32), partition(uint256[]), amount(uint256)) PayoutRedemption(redememer(address), collateralToken(address), parentCollectionId(bytes32), conditionId(bytes32), indexSets(uint256[]), payout(uint256)) URI(value(string), id(uint256)) </pre>
<b>Neg Risk Operator</b>
<pre> MarketPrepared(marketId(bytes32), feeBips(uint256), data(bytes)) </pre>

---

Table B.2 – continued from previous page

**Contract / Event Signatures**


---

```

NewAdmin(admin(address), newAdmin(address))
QuestionEmergencyResolved(questionId(bytes32), result(bool))
QuestionFlagged(questionId(bytes32))
QuestionPrepared(marketId(bytes32), questionId(bytes32),
requestId(bytes32), questionIndex(uint256), data(bytes))
QuestionReported(questionId(bytes32), requestId(bytes32),
result(bool))
QuestionResolved(questionId(bytes32), result(bool))
QuestionUnflagged(questionId(bytes32))
RemovedAdmin(admin(address), oldAdmin(address))

```

**Neg Risk Adapter**

```

MarketPrepared(marketId(bytes32), oracle(address),
feeBips(uint256), data(bytes))
NewAdmin(admin(address), newAdmin(address))
OutcomeReported(marketId(bytes32), questionId(bytes32),
outcome(bool))
PayoutRedemption(redeemer(address), conditionId(bytes32),
amounts(uint256[]), payout(uint256))
PositionSplit(stakeholder(address), conditionId(bytes32),
amount(uint256))
PositionsConverted(stakeholder(address), marketId(bytes32),
indexSet(uint256), amount(uint256))
PositionsMerge(stakeholder(address), conditionId(bytes32),
amount(uint256))
QuestionPrepared(marketId(bytes32), questionId(bytes32),
index(uint256), data(bytes))
RemovedAdmin(admin(address), oldAdmin(address))

```

**UmaCtfadapter**

```

AncillaryDataUpdated(questionId(bytes32), creator(address),
ancillaryData(bytes))
NewAdmin(admin(address), newAdmin(address))
QuestionFlagged(questionId(bytes32))
QuestionInitialized(questionId(bytes32), timestamp(uint256),
creator(address), ancillaryData(bytes), rewardToken(address),
reward(uint256), proposalBond(uint256))
QuestionManuallyResolved(questionId(bytes32), payouts(uint256[]))
QuestionPaused(questionId(bytes32))
QuestionReset(questionId(bytes32))

```

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Table B.2 – continued from previous page

<b>Contract / Event Signatures</b>
QuestionResolved(questionId(bytes32), price(int256), payouts(uint256[]))
QuestionUnflagged(questionId(bytes32))
QuestionUnpaused(questionId(bytes32))
RemovedAdmin(admin(address), oldAdmin(address))
<b>Managed Optimistic Oracle V2</b>
MessageSent(data(bytes))
PriceRequestAdded(identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), childRequestId(bytes32))
PriceRequestBridged(requester(address), identifier(bytes32), time(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), childRequestId(bytes32), parentRequestId(bytes32))
PushedPrice(identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), price(int256), childRequestId(bytes32))
ResolvedLegacyRequest(identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), price(int256), childRequestId(bytes32), parentRequestId(bytes32))
AllowedBondRangeUpdated(proposer(address), minBond(uint256), maxBond(uint256))
CustomBondSet(identifier(bytes32), proposer(address), ancillaryData(bytes32), data(bytes), currency(address), bond(uint256))
CustomLivenessSet(identifier(bytes32), proposer(address), ancillaryData(bytes32), data(bytes), liveness(uint256))
CustomProposerWhitelistSet(identifier(bytes32), proposer(address), ancillaryData(bytes32), data(bytes), newProposer(address))
DefaultAdminDelayChangeCanceled()
DefaultAdminDelayChangeScheduled(delay(uint48), newDelay(uint48))
DefaultAdminTransferCanceled()
DefaultAdminTransferScheduled(newAdmin(address), time(uint48))
DefaultProposerWhitelistUpdated(newWhitelist(address))
DisputePrice(requester(address), proposer(address), disputer(address), identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), proposedPrice(int256))
Initialized(version(uint64))
MinimumLivenessUpdated(minimumLiveness(uint256))

Table B.2 – continued from previous page

<b>Contract / Event Signatures</b>
<pre>ProposePrice(requester(address), proposer(address), identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), proposedPrice(int256), expirationTime(uint256), currency(address))  RequestManagerAdded(requestManager(address)) RequestManagerRemoved(requestManager(address)) RequestPrice(requester(address), identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), currency(address), reward(uint256), finalFee(uint256)) RequesterWhitelistUpdated(newWhitelist(address)) RoleAdminChanged(role(bytes32), previousAdminRole(bytes32), newAdminRole(bytes32)) RoleGranted(role(bytes32), account(address), adminRole(bytes32)) RoleRevoked(role(bytes32), account(address), adminRole(bytes32)) Settle(requester(address), proposer(address), disputer(address), identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), resolvedPrice(int256), payout(uint256)) Upgraded(implementation(address))</pre>
<b>Oracle Child Tunnel</b>
<pre>PriceRequestBridged(requester(address), identifier(bytes32), time(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), childRequestId(bytes32), parentRequestId(bytes32))  ResolvedLegacyRequest(identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), price(int256), childRequestId(bytes32), parentRequestId(bytes32))  PriceRequestAdded(identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), childRequestId(bytes32))  PushedPrice(identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), price(int256), childRequestId(bytes32))  MessageSent(data(bytes))</pre>
<b>FxTunnel</b>
<pre>NewFxMessage(rootMessageSender(address), receiver(address), data(bytes))</pre>
<b>Optimistic Oracle V2</b>
<pre>RequestPrice(requester(address), identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes), currency(address), reward(uint256), finalFee(uint256))</pre>

Table B.2 – continued from previous page

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**Contract / Event Signatures**

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```
ProposePrice(requester(address), proposer(address),
identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes),
proposedPrice(int256), expirationTime(uint256), currency(address))

DisputePrice(requester(address), proposer(address),
disputer(address), identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256),
ancillaryData(bytes), proposedPrice(int256))

Settle(requester(address), proposer(address), disputer(address),
identifier(bytes32), timestamp(uint256), ancillaryData(bytes),
resolvedPrice(int256), payout(uint256))
```

---

## APPENDIX C

# Polymarket Event Object JSON Tree Analysis

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Table C.1: JSON Tree Structure Analysis of `/events` Endpoint Responses. For each entry, the Path and Total Count are on the first line, with Presence and Type Makeup on the indented second line.

<b>Path</b>	<b>Total Count</b>
ROOT	126558
<i>Presence: 100.0%    Type: Object (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.tags	126555
<i>Presence: 100.0%    Type: Object (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.tags. []	126555
<i>Presence: 100.0%    Type: Array (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.markets	126523
<i>Presence: 100.0%    Type: Object (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.markets. []	126523
<i>Presence: 100.0%    Type: Array (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.series	105820
<i>Presence: 83.6%    Type: Object (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.series. []	105820
<i>Presence: 83.6%    Type: Array (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.markets. []. clobRewards	9805
<i>Presence: 7.7%    Type: Object (100.0)</i>	
ROOT.markets. []. clobRewards. []	9805
<i>Presence: 7.7%    Type: Array (100.0)</i>	

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.eventCreators Presence: 0.1%    Type: Object (100.0)	87
ROOT.eventCreators. Presence: 0.1%    Type: Array (100.0)	87
ROOT.tags. slug Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:general (100.0), str:integer (0.0)	740323
ROOT.tags. requiresTranslation Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	740323
ROOT.tags. label Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:general (100.0), str:integer (0.0)	740323
ROOT.tags. id Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:integer (100.0)	740323
ROOT.tags. updatedAt Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	740162
ROOT.tags. createdAt Presence: 98.8%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	731578
ROOT.tags. forceShow Presence: 88.6%    Type: bool (100.0)	655610
ROOT.tags. publishedAt Presence: 40.7%    Type: str:general (100.0)	301036
ROOT.markets. approved Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets. active Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets. clearBookOnStart Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets. createdAt Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets. cyom Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets. feesEnabled Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets. umaResolutionStatuses Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:json_encoded (100.0)	294240

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .deploying Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .description Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .funded Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .archived Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .bestAsk Presence: 100.0% Type: float (59.7), int (40.3)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .manualActivation Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .id Presence: 100.0% Type: str:integer (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .holdingRewardsEnabled Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .pagerDutyNotificationEnabled Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .pendingDeployment Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .question Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .ready Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .rewardsMaxSpread Presence: 100.0% Type: int (82.9), float (17.1)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .outcomes Presence: 100.0% Type: str:json_encoded (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .rfqEnabled Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .rewardsMinSize Presence: 100.0% Type: int (100.0), float (0.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .spread Presence: 100.0% Type: float (83.4), int (16.6)	294240

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .requiresTranslation Presence: 100.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .restricted Presence: 100.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .slug Presence: 100.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .conditionId Presence: 100.0%   Type: str:hexadecimal (99.97), str:empty (0.03)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .closed Presence: 100.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .negRiskOther Presence: 100.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .marketMakerAddress Presence: 100.0%   Type: str:empty (91.1), str:hexadecimal (8.9)	294240
ROOT.markets.[] .new Presence: 100.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	294209
ROOT.markets.[] .clobTokenIds Presence: 99.9%   Type: str:json_encoded (100.0)	294080
ROOT.markets.[] .image Presence: 99.8%   Type: str:general (99.6), str:empty (0.4)	293596
ROOT.markets.[] .icon Presence: 99.7%   Type: str:general (99.6), str:empty (0.4)	293371
ROOT.markets.[] .updatedAt Presence: 99.6%   Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	293018
ROOT.markets.[] .hasReviewedDates Presence: 99.3%   Type: bool (100.0)	292264
ROOT.markets.[] .questionID Presence: 99.3%   Type: str:hexadecimal (100.0)	292192
ROOT.markets.[] .enableOrderBook Presence: 99.1%   Type: bool (100.0)	291620
ROOT.markets.[] .endDate Presence: 99.0%   Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	291388
ROOT.markets.[] .startDate Presence: 98.7%   Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	290272

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .orderMinSize Presence: 98.4% Type: int (100.0), float (0.0)	289522
ROOT.markets.[] .orderPriceMinTickSize Presence: 98.4% Type: float (100.0), int (0.0)	289520
ROOT.markets.[] .endDateIso Presence: 98.2% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	288839
ROOT.markets.[] .acceptingOrders Presence: 97.0% Type: bool (100.0)	285530
ROOT.markets.[] .negRisk Presence: 96.8% Type: bool (100.0)	284707
ROOT.markets.[] .outcomePrices Presence: 95.5% Type: str:json_encoded (100.0)	280947
ROOT.markets.[] .automaticallyActive Presence: 95.4% Type: bool (100.0)	280826
ROOT.markets.[] .featured Presence: 94.7% Type: bool (100.0)	278588
ROOT.markets.[] .startDateIso Presence: 91.5% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	269084
ROOT.markets.[] .volume Presence: 91.4% Type: str:float (77.1), str:integer (22.9)	268901
ROOT.markets.[] .volumeNum Presence: 91.4% Type: float (77.0), int (23.0)	268901
ROOT.markets.[] .acceptingOrdersTimestamp Presence: 90.4% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	266051
ROOT.markets.[] .volumeClob Presence: 89.8% Type: float (76.6), int (23.4)	264197
ROOT.markets.[] .groupItemThreshold Presence: 89.6% Type: str:integer (100.0)	263602
ROOT.markets.[] .closedTime Presence: 88.3% Type: str:general (100.0)	259848
ROOT.markets.[] .lastTradePrice Presence: 88.0% Type: int (78.0), float (22.0)	258812
ROOT.markets.[] .umaResolutionStatus Presence: 87.6% Type: str:general (100.0)	257686

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .umaEndDate Presence: 87.4% Type: str:timestamp (96.9), str:general (3.1)	257309
ROOT.markets.[] .automaticallyResolved Presence: 84.7% Type: bool (100.0)	249301
ROOT.tags.[] .updatedBy Presence: 32.7% Type: int (100.0)	241730
ROOT.markets.[] .resolvedBy Presence: 81.8% Type: str:hexadecimal (100.0)	240654
ROOT.markets.[] .resolutionSource Presence: 80.4% Type: str:general (74.5), str:empty (25.5)	236453
ROOT.tags.[] .isCarousel Presence: 31.2% Type: bool (100.0)	231335
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1yrClob Presence: 77.1% Type: float (61.6), int (38.4)	226919
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1yr Presence: 77.1% Type: float (61.6), int (38.4)	226919
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1moClob Presence: 77.0% Type: float (61.5), int (38.5)	226441
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1mo Presence: 77.0% Type: float (61.5), int (38.5)	226441
ROOT.markets.[] .submitted_by Presence: 76.7% Type: str:hexadecimal (99.7), others (0.3)	225800
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1wkClob Presence: 76.0% Type: float (60.6), int (39.4)	223602
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1wk Presence: 76.0% Type: float (60.6), int (39.4)	223602
ROOT.markets.[] .umaBond Presence: 74.5% Type: str:integer (98.7), str:float (1.3)	219274
ROOT.markets.[] .umaReward Presence: 74.5% Type: str:integer (98.6), str:float (1.4)	219274
ROOT.markets.[] .negRiskRequestID Presence: 70.9% Type: str:empty (54.9), str:hexadecimal (45.1)	208566
ROOT.markets.[] .groupItemTitle Presence: 69.9% Type: str:general (91.6), others (8.4)	205672

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .oneDayPriceChange Presence: 68.4% Type: float (75.7), int (24.3)	201115
ROOT.markets.[] .deployingTimestamp Presence: 64.6% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	189939
ROOT.markets.[] .customLiveness Presence: 61.3% Type: int (100.0)	180461
ROOT.markets.[] .bestBid Presence: 58.7% Type: float (71.6), int (28.4)	172631
ROOT.markets.[] .oneHourPriceChange Presence: 53.9% Type: float (52.6), int (47.4)	158604
ROOT.markets.[] .competitive Presence: 47.1% Type: int (85.3), float (14.7)	138520
ROOT.markets.[] .liquidity Presence: 47.1% Type: str:integer (80.6), str:float (19.4)	138485
ROOT.markets.[] .liquidityNum Presence: 47.1% Type: int (82.3), float (17.7)	138485
ROOT.markets.[] .showGmpOutcome Presence: 46.8% Type: bool (100.0)	137594
ROOT.markets.[] .showGmpSeries Presence: 46.8% Type: bool (100.0)	137593
ROOT.markets.[] .liquidityClob Presence: 45.4% Type: int (84.3), float (15.7)	133631
ROOT.markets.[] .oneWeekPriceChange Presence: 42.4% Type: int (60.2), float (39.8)	124819
ROOT.active Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.title Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	126558
ROOT.pendingDeployment Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.requiresTranslation Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.negRiskAugmented Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	126558

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.image Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:general (99.8), str:empty (0.2)	126558
ROOT.icon Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:general (99.8), str:empty (0.2)	126558
ROOT.id Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:integer (100.0)	126558
ROOT.deploying Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.closed Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.cyom Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.createdAt Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	126558
ROOT.enableNegRisk Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.showAllOutcomes Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.showMarketImages Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126558
ROOT.slug Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:general (100.0)	126558
ROOT.ticker Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:general (100.0)	126556
ROOT.archived Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126550
ROOT.restricted Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126550
ROOT.featured Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126534
ROOT.startDate Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	126529
ROOT.new Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	126520

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.updatedAt Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	126495
ROOT.creationDate Presence: 99.9%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	126461
ROOT.endDate Presence: 99.9%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	126388
ROOT.description Presence: 99.5%    Type: str:general (100.0), others (0.0)	125876
ROOT.commentCount Presence: 99.3%    Type: int (100.0)	125633
ROOT.openInterest Presence: 98.7%    Type: int (100.0)	124935
ROOT.enableOrderBook Presence: 97.5%    Type: bool (100.0)	123449
ROOT.closedTime Presence: 94.8%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	119928
ROOT.automaticallyResolved Presence: 90.5%    Type: bool (100.0)	114539
ROOT.negRisk Presence: 89.2%    Type: bool (100.0)	112947
ROOT.resolutionSource Presence: 88.3%    Type: str:general (87.2), str:empty (12.8)	111781
ROOT.seriesSlug Presence: 83.7%    Type: str:general (100.0)	105868
ROOT.series.[] .id Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:integer (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .closed Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .createdAt Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .requiresTranslation Presence: 100.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .commentCount Presence: 100.0%    Type: int (100.0)	105820

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.series.[] .active Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .archived Presence: 100.0% Type: bool (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .ticker Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .slug Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .title Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .updatedAt Presence: 100.0% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	105820
ROOT.series.[] .seriesType Presence: 99.9% Type: str:general (100.0)	105750
ROOT.series.[] .recurrence Presence: 99.9% Type: str:general (99.9), str:empty (0.1)	105750
ROOT.volume Presence: 82.8% Type: float (95.9), int (4.1)	104840
ROOT.automaticallyActive Presence: 81.5% Type: bool (100.0)	103195
ROOT.markets.[] .secondsDelay Presence: 34.2% Type: int (100.0)	100673
ROOT.markets.[] .gameStartTime Presence: 33.4% Type: str:general (100.0)	98324
ROOT.markets.[] .negRiskMarketID Presence: 32.0% Type: str:hexadecimal (100.0)	94024
ROOT.markets.[] .oneMonthPriceChange Presence: 30.5% Type: int (83.6), float (16.4)	89813
ROOT.startTime Presence: 69.7% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	88272
ROOT.series.[] .featured Presence: 79.2% Type: bool (100.0)	83843
ROOT.series.[] .restricted Presence: 78.7% Type: bool (100.0)	83242

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.series.[] .image Presence: 76.6% Type: str:empty (58.4), str:general (41.6)	81104
ROOT.series.[] .icon Presence: 76.6% Type: str:empty (58.4), str:general (41.6)	81104
ROOT.markets.[] .eventStartTime Presence: 26.5% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	78103
ROOT.tags.[] .createdBy Presence: 10.4% Type: int (100.0)	76858
ROOT.series.[] .liquidity Presence: 71.8% Type: float (100.0)	75989
ROOT.series.[] .volume Presence: 71.6% Type: float (98.6), int (1.4)	75775
ROOT.markets.[] .oneYearPriceChange Presence: 25.6% Type: int (99.9), float (0.1)	75186
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1wkAmm Presence: 25.5% Type: int (100.0)	75118
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1yrAmm Presence: 25.5% Type: int (100.0)	75118
ROOT.markets.[] .volume1moAmm Presence: 25.5% Type: int (100.0)	75118
ROOT.volume1yr Presence: 58.7% Type: float (77.3), int (22.7)	74284
ROOT.volume1mo Presence: 58.7% Type: float (77.3), int (22.7)	74274
ROOT.volume1wk Presence: 58.5% Type: float (77.1), int (22.9)	74043
ROOT.markets.[] .sportsMarketType Presence: 22.9% Type: str:general (100.0)	67474
ROOT.tags.[] .forceHide Presence: 8.2% Type: bool (100.0)	60671
ROOT.competitive Presence: 47.9% Type: int (92.0), float (8.0)	60616
ROOT.liquidity Presence: 47.8% Type: int (91.0), float (9.0)	60435

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.liquidityClob Presence: 47.7%    Type: int (91.1), float (8.9)	60431
ROOT.markets.[] .volume24hr Presence: 18.9%    Type: int (85.6), float (14.4)	55570
ROOT.liquidityAmm Presence: 43.5%    Type: int (99.9), float (0.1)	55028
ROOT.markets.[] .volume24hrClob Presence: 17.3%    Type: int (84.3), float (15.7)	50866
ROOT.markets.[] .line Presence: 14.8%    Type: float (98.3), int (1.7)	43542
ROOT.markets.[] .seriesColor Presence: 14.1%    Type: str:empty (99.0), str:general (1.0)	41612
ROOT.markets.[] .volumeAmm Presence: 14.1%    Type: int (98.7), float (1.3)	41454
ROOT.markets.[] .volume24hrAmm Presence: 14.0%    Type: int (100.0)	41306
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .rewardsAmount Presence: 100.0%    Type: int (100.0)	32054
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .id Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:integer (100.0)	32054
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .endDate Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	32054
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .conditionId Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:hexadecimal (100.0)	32054
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .assetAddress Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:hexadecimal (100.0)	32054
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .startDate Presence: 100.0%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	32054
ROOT.markets.[] .clobRewards.[] .rewardsDailyRate Presence: 100.0%    Type: int (100.0), float (0.0)	32054
ROOT.eventDate Presence: 21.4%    Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	27116
ROOT.markets.[] .fpmmLive Presence: 9.0%    Type: bool (100.0)	26535

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .wideFormat Presence: 8.8% Type: bool (100.0)	25839
ROOT.markets.[] .fee Presence: 8.8% Type: str:integer (100.0), str:float (0.0)	25829
ROOT.eventWeek Presence: 18.6% Type: int (100.0)	23516
ROOT.markets.[] .readyForCron Presence: 7.8% Type: bool (100.0)	22819
ROOT.period Presence: 16.6% Type: str:general (94.1), str:empty (5.9)	20964
ROOT.markets.[] .sentDiscord Presence: 7.0% Type: bool (100.0)	20529
ROOT.ended Presence: 16.1% Type: bool (100.0)	20316
ROOT.live Presence: 16.0% Type: bool (100.0)	20290
ROOT.score Presence: 15.1% Type: str:general (99.6), str:empty (0.4)	19084
ROOT.markets.[] .notificationsEnabled Presence: 6.2% Type: bool (100.0)	18372
ROOT.sortBy Presence: 14.4% Type: str:general (100.0)	18208
ROOT.gameId Presence: 13.5% Type: int (100.0)	17121
ROOT.elapsed Presence: 13.4% Type: str:empty (96.5), others (3.5)	16898
ROOT.finishedTimestamp Presence: 10.9% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	13752
ROOT.negRiskMarketID Presence: 9.2% Type: str:hexadecimal (99.9), str:empty (0.1)	11614
ROOT.series.[] .new Presence: 10.1% Type: bool (100.0)	10705
ROOT.markets.[] .gameId Presence: 3.5% Type: str:hexadecimal (55.1), str:integer (44.9)	10354

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .marketType Presence: 3.4%   Type: str:general (100.0)	10072
ROOT.markets.[] .creator Presence: 3.4%   Type: str:empty (100.0)	10072
ROOT.deployingTimestamp Presence: 6.7%   Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	8511
ROOT.volume24hr Presence: 6.2%   Type: int (65.4), float (34.6)	7886
ROOT.series.[] .layout Presence: 7.4%   Type: str:general (100.0)	7868
ROOT.series.[] .volume24hr Presence: 7.4%   Type: int (100.0)	7816
ROOT.series.[] .publishedAt Presence: 7.4%   Type: str:general (100.0)	7816
ROOT.series.[] .competitive Presence: 7.4%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	7816
ROOT.series.[] .commentsEnabled Presence: 7.4%   Type: bool (100.0)	7816
ROOT.series.[] .updatedBy Presence: 7.3%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	7710
ROOT.series.[] .createdBy Presence: 7.3%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	7710
ROOT.series.[] .startDate Presence: 6.6%   Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	7013
ROOT.gmpChartMode Presence: 5.4%   Type: str:general (100.0)	6866
ROOT.homeTeamName Presence: 4.6%   Type: str:general (100.0)	5770
ROOT.awayTeamName Presence: 4.6%   Type: str:general (100.0)	5770
ROOT.markets.[] .commentsEnabled Presence: 2.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	5772
ROOT.markets.[] .updatedBy Presence: 1.9%   Type: int (100.0)	5544

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .umaEndDateIso Presence: 1.7%   Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	5124
ROOT.published_at Presence: 4.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	5089
ROOT.markets.[] .category Presence: 1.5%   Type: str:general (99.9), str:empty (0.1)	4353
ROOT.markets.[] .takerBaseFee Presence: 1.1%   Type: int (100.0)	3313
ROOT.markets.[] .makerBaseFee Presence: 1.1%   Type: int (100.0)	3312
ROOT.markets.[] .twitterCardLocation Presence: 1.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	3026
ROOT.markets.[] .twitterCardLastRefreshed Presence: 1.0%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	3003
ROOT.category Presence: 2.2%   Type: str:general (100.0)	2837
ROOT.markets.[] .mailchimpTag Presence: 0.9%   Type: str:integer (90.0), str:null_like (10.0)	2668
ROOT.commentsEnabled Presence: 1.8%   Type: bool (100.0)	2246
ROOT.markets.[] .marketGroup Presence: 0.7%   Type: int (100.0)	2092
ROOT.parentEventId Presence: 1.3%   Type: int (100.0)	1603
ROOT.markets.[] .twitterCardLastValidated Presence: 0.5%   Type: str:float (100.0)	1435
ROOT.negRiskFeeBips Presence: 0.8%   Type: int (100.0)	999
ROOT.series.[] .description Presence: 0.6%   Type: str:general (100.0)	628
ROOT.updatedBy Presence: 0.4%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	530
ROOT.featuredImage Presence: 0.4%   Type: str:general (66.2), str:empty (33.8)	518

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.series.[] .cgAssetName Presence: 0.5% Type: str:general (100.0)	512
ROOT.series.[] .pythTokenID Presence: 0.5% Type: str:hexadecimal (100.0)	512
ROOT.series.[] .subtitle Presence: 0.5% Type: str:general (100.0)	512
ROOT.featuredOrder Presence: 0.3% Type: int (100.0)	373
ROOT.markets.[] .categoryMailchimpTag Presence: 0.1% Type: str:null_like (83.1), str:integer (16.9)	308
ROOT.createdBy Presence: 0.1% Type: str:integer (100.0)	182
ROOT.countryName Presence: 0.1% Type: str:general (99.3), str:empty (0.7)	140
ROOT.electionType Presence: 0.1% Type: str:general (100.0)	137
ROOT.tweetCount Presence: 0.1% Type: int (100.0)	134
ROOT.totalsMainLine Presence: 0.1% Type: float (100.0)	99
ROOT.spreadsMainLine Presence: 0.1% Type: float (100.0)	99
ROOT.eventCreators.[] .id Presence: 100.0% Type: str:integer (100.0)	87
ROOT.eventCreators.[] .creatorImage Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	87
ROOT.eventCreators.[] .creatorHandle Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	87
ROOT.eventCreators.[] .creatorUrl Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	87
ROOT.eventCreators.[] .creatorName Presence: 100.0% Type: str:general (100.0)	87
ROOT.eventCreators.[] .createdAt Presence: 100.0% Type: str:timestamp (100.0)	87

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .subcategory Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (89.2), str:empty (10.8)	74
ROOT.markets.[] .lowerBound Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:integer (78.1), str:float (19.2), others (2.7)	73
ROOT.markets.[] .upperBound Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:integer (79.2), str:float (19.4), others (1.4)	72
ROOT.markets.[] .disqusThread Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	68
ROOT.subcategory Presence: 0.1%   Type: str:general (98.5), str:empty (1.5)	68
ROOT.markets.[] .formatType Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	66
ROOT.markets.[] .twitterCardImage Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	62
ROOT.sportsradarMatchId Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	47
ROOT.turnProviderId Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	35
ROOT.disqusThread Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	28
ROOT.gameStatus Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (100.0)	23
ROOT.markets.[] .groupItemRange Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:json_encoded (100.0)	22
ROOT.color Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:general (95.2), str:integer (4.8)	21
ROOT.estimateValue Presence: 0.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	4
ROOT.cantEstimate Presence: 0.0%   Type: bool (100.0)	4
ROOT.carouselMap Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:json_encoded (100.0)	4
ROOT.markets.[] .teamBID Presence: 0.0%   Type: str:integer (100.0)	4

Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Path	Total Count
ROOT.markets.[] .teamAID Presence: 0.0% Type: str:integer (100.0)	4
ROOT.estimatedValue Presence: 0.0% Type: str:float (100.0)	3
ROOT.markets.[] .sponsorImage Presence: 0.0% Type: str:empty (100.0)	2
ROOT.markets.[] .createdBy Presence: 0.0% Type: int (100.0)	1
ROOT.markets.[] .denominationToken Presence: 0.0% Type: str:empty (100.0)	1

Table C.2: Raw Pairwise Comparison Statistics for CLOB Market Timestamps

$T_1$	$T_2$	Pairs ( $N$ )	$P(T_1 < T_2)$	$P(T_1 = T_2)$	$P(T_1 > T_2)$
acceptingOrdersTimestamp	closedTime	233 087	100.00	0.00	0.00
acceptingOrdersTimestamp	createdAt	266 051	0.00	0.00	100.00
acceptingOrdersTimestamp	endDate	263 251	98.36	0.00	1.64
acceptingOrdersTimestamp	startDate	263 888	99.69	0.00	0.31
acceptingOrdersTimestamp	umaEndDate	233 022	100.00	0.00	0.00
acceptingOrdersTimestamp	updatedAt	266 051	100.00	0.00	0.00
closedTime	createdAt	259 848	0.00	0.00	100.00
closedTime	endDate	258 742	16.98	0.00	83.02
closedTime	startDate	256 120	0.02	0.00	99.98
closedTime	umaEndDate	257 286	1.06	98.07	0.87
closedTime	updatedAt	259 848	99.99	0.01	0.00
createdAt	endDate	291 388	97.87	0.00	2.13
createdAt	startDate	290 272	93.83	0.19	5.98
createdAt	umaEndDate	257 297	99.90	0.00	0.10
createdAt	updatedAt	293 018	100.00	0.00	0.00
endDate	startDate	287 460	2.24	0.72	97.04
endDate	umaEndDate	256 223	82.24	0.88	16.89
endDate	updatedAt	290 166	77.45	0.00	22.55
startDate	umaEndDate	254 373	99.21	0.77	0.02
startDate	updatedAt	289 086	99.58	0.42	0.00
umaEndDate	updatedAt	257 297	99.91	0.00	0.09