


# Governance Innovation '24 Edition

**Tanisha Katara**

Independent Consultant (7+ clients)

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#Innovation1



**The voter's perception is your reality.**

User experience determines this perception.





Powered by ARAGON

test-ens.eth



Dashboard

Learn

Proposals

Community Members

## Delegates

Delegates

Protocol Council

Filter by Identifier or address

Sort

7 Delegates



Not Fabrice

0xc1...5b53

Blockchain advocate and web3 maniac

No voting power



mtpoly

0x3C...F0D4

taglin2

No voting power



Top Delegate

0x9B...6F8E

Blockchain advocate

No voting power



ftb.eth

0x2d...7FAf

Looking to vote in your favor!

3 Voting power

1 Delegation



John Doe

0xBD...5BB7

Passion for decentralization

No voting power



test-ens.eth

0x35...498d

Just testing being a delegate

2 Voting power

You

### Details

Delegates represent staked token holders to vote on key technical governance decisions. Polygon PoS stakers can delegate their voting power to any address, adjusting and undelegating at any time.

### Delegates

7 delegate profiles

Total staked voting power

88.01M POL

Edit your delegate profile

Delegate

More

6 of 7 Delegates


## Polygon Governance Hub

Powered by



# Voter Turnout Disparities


On average, 65% of CRV is locked as veCRV. Out of the 65% that is locked, an average of 38% tokens is used for voting.






# Voter Turnout Disparities

On average, 54.5% of DOT is locked in multiple Polkadot lockets. Out of the 54.5% that is locked, an average of 0.11% tokens is used for voting.



# Lock Up Preferences


In Curve Finance, 67.2% opt for maximum lock up period of 4 years.





# Lock Up Preferences


In Polkadot, only 4% opt for maximum lock up period of 224 days.






# Bigger Token Holders Prefer Shorter Lock In Windows

For example, in Polkadot, 93% of Whales and 98% of Sharks tend to lock up their tokens for 14 days or less.



# **Voter Behavior Research Paper**

Authors: Wenxuan Deng, Tanisha Katara,  
David Hamoui and Mateusz Rzeszowski







#Innovation3



**Good Governance is obvious;  
Great Governance is transparent**





#IDoNotUnderstandGovernance

## Council Transparency Reports




#Innovation4



**Influence is a privilege, not a permanent right.**

By rewarding active participation and letting passive votes fade, it keeps governance dynamic, aligned and truly representative of the community's current will.





# Conditional Decay of Voting Power





#Innovation5



**With validator reputation, we prevent replicating  
the world's wealth inequality within our networks**

Check out some early but exciting work on validator reputation and admission

### **Validator Attestation Effectiveness Score**

Score = (Successful Attestations / Total Attestations) × Weight

### **Validator Block Production Score**

Score = (Blocks Produced / Expected Blocks) × Weight

### **Validator Diversity and Governance Score**

Score = (Community Engagement + Proposal Participation) × Weight



# Thank you!

Reach Out To Me  
[www.tanishakatara.com](http://www.tanishakatara.com)

