
Oblivious RAM

For Programmable Cryptography and Ethereum

Presenter: Tianyao Gu Oblivious Labs

A Web2 Example


Signal Private Messenger - Contact Discovery



A Web2 Example

Signal Private Messenger - Contact Discovery

Encryption doesn't hide access patterns!




A Web2 Example

Signal Private Messenger - Contact Discovery

Naive Solution

Scan the entire DB

Requires ~500 servers.



Oblivious RAM (ORAM) to the Rescue

- First proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky in 1987.
- Obfuscates access patterns of the program.
- Only poly-log overhead and practically efficient.
- Does NOT need cryptography.



Attempt 1 — Place DB entries in random locations

DB[1]	DB[2]	DB[0]	DB[3]	
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Look, this block is accessed again. These users may share the same contact.




Attempt 2 — Move entry to a random new location after read


DB[1]	DB[2]	DB[0]	DB[3]	
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
Attempt 2 — Move entry to a random new location after read




How to hide the movement?




• Binary-tree ORAM [SCS+11] — Entries may reside in ancestor nodes




• Write entry to the root node and maintain the tree



• Write entry to the root node and maintain the tree




Write entry to the root node and maintain the tree



Track entries' locations

- Store the locations with another (smaller) ORAM.
- Recurse until linear scan becomes efficient.



Variants of Tree-based ORAM

Plenty of works based this paradigm

```
Path ORAM [SDS+13]

Circuit ORAM [WCS14] → O(log² N) overhead

Bucket ORAM [FNR+15]

Onion ORAM [DDF+15]


Ring ORAM [RFK+15]

OnionRing ORAM [CCR19]

rORAM [CAC+19]
```

Open question: O(log N) statistically-secure ORAM?

Enhancing Privacy in Ethereum



ORAM Meets with MPC

Compilers / Frameworks with ORAM

Obliv-C [ZE+13], ObliVM [LWN+15], GraphSC [NWI+15], MP-SPDZ [Keller20]

Garbled RAM [LO13, GHL+14, GLO15, LO17, HKO21, PLS22, HKO23]

Equip garbled circuit with ORAM => Constant-round 2PC / MPC.

Make large private state possible for the Frog Game.




Concrete Performance

Intel SGX w/ 100 GB key-value database:

~ **50 us** per access

(i.e., 20,000 iops)



Concrete Performance

Garbled RAM for constant-round 2PC (semi-honest)

~**15 MB** of communication per access

for memory space: 2^20 words

word width: 128 bit

security parameter: $\lambda = 128$, $\sigma = 40$

Linear scan costs 8GB for the same setup

Thank you

Open-source ORAM implementation: https://github.com/obliviouslabs/oram

