

# Proving Liquidity of an AMM

How to show your contract can't get rekt

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Section 1

# AMM and Liquidity



# Automated Market Maker(AMM)

An AMM is a decentralized exchange having two major actors.


- **Traders**
- **Liquidity Providers**

Liquidity Providers are the most vulnerable

- The AMM smart contract has custody over their funds.
- Their tokens are automatically traded by the contract.
  - We ignore “impermanent losses” from trading, though.
- Bugs in contract can be catastrophic for liquidity providers.



# Desired Property: Contract is always liquid



**Liquid means:  
Money can always be  
withdrawn**

Even during a bank run, liquidity providers can withdraw their fair share.

1. Contract has enough funds
2. Withdraw never reverts



# Formal Verification for Uniswap v4



Uniswap v4 has “scary” features

- Permissionless: everybody can add a new pool.
- All tokens of all pools are kept in a single contract.
- Hooks provide a mechanism to customize pools.

Attack Vectors from Unknown Code


- Malicious ERC-20 token,
- Malicious Custom Hooks.

Section 2

# Formal Verification



# Static Code Analysis



# Assumptions for Unknown Code

## ERC-20

- Balance only changed by transfer/mint/burn
- Only owner and approved accounts can transfer/burn
- Only receiver pays fees (if any)
- Transfer succeeds if balance sufficient
- Balance doesn't change when transferring other tokens.

## Hook

- For liquidity: no withdraw hook.



## Proof Method: Inductive Invariants


Desired Property:

**Contract has enough funds**

Inductive invariant:

**enough funds + consistent accounting**

All states



# Challenges when Proving Uniswap v4

## Problems

- Rounding errors break invariant
- Need to reason about sums
$$\sum_{\text{Pos } p} \sum_{\text{Tick } t} a(p, sp, t) = \sum_{\text{Tick } t} \sum_{\text{Pos } p} a(p, sp, t)$$
- Undecidable non-linear math:  
`amount_delta`, `tick2sqrtprice`
- Calls to external hooks  
with potential callbacks

## Solutions

- Spec uses high-precision fixed point  
 $\forall i < 2^{256} : \text{PRECISION} \bmod i = 0$
- Use arrays to store partial sums,  
update when a position is changed.
- Abstract with uninterpreted functions.  
+ axioms for monotonicity
- Strong invariants (preserved by hooks).  
Start with arbitrary state after hook.



**Enough Funds + Consistent  
Accounting  
is an inductive invariant**

# Thank you!

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