



Minimal Anti Collusion Infrastructure

- Increased collusion resistance only the coordinator can be certain of the validity of a vote
- Receipt-freeness cannot prove how you voted
- **Privacy** only user and coordinator can decrypt a vote
- Non-censorable no one can censor votes
- Non-repudiation cannot edit or delete a vote, but can be nullified
- Correct execution cannot produce false output




Why do we need private voting

- Voting in general is susceptible to bribery/collusion
- In QF/QV the majority of people can make the difference
- If collusion is easy, then results can be gamed
- Public votes could condition other voters
- If a briber cannot be certain of your vote, why would they bribe you?
- Goal is more democracy in voting




Architecture

- Smart contracts EVM compatible only
- Circom circuits
 - o Process messages validation of votes
 - Tally votes summing them up
- TypeScript
 - Smart contracts clone for local coordinator processing
 - SDK to integrate with the protocol
 - Primitives (maci keys, encryption, hashing algorithms, Ballots, etc.)



User Flow






MACI Votes

- Shared key
 - ECDH ephemeral key and Coordinator public key
- Message is signed with EDdSA
- Nonce to track message order can be used to invalidate previous votes
- Vote weight
- User public key (can pass in a new public key to change identify key)
- Vote option
- The encryption public key (ephemeral key)



Poll Finalisation





Our Plans

- Improve adoption
- Improve ease of integration
- Decentralisation of the coordinator with MPC
- Research more anti collusion detection techniques
- Research new voting mechanisms that can be integrated into MACI
- Rethink the architecture and how (where) it fits with other protocols (Semaphore, RLN, Excubia)



Devcon Round

Come and vote @ vote.devcon.org

