



How model checking can help

...build trust in the design of distributed protocols like Single Slot
Finality

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
Independent researcher



Casper, Gasper, SSF, 3-Slot Finality

Interplay of multiple concepts:


- chained blocks
- slots
- checkpoints: justified and finalized
- votes by validators
- FFG votes connecting checkpoints



Francesco D'Amato, Roberto Saltini,
Thanh-Hai Tran, Luca Zanolini.
3-Slot-Finality Protocol for Ethereum



Source: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00558>

Focus on Accountable Safety



If there is a fork, we should identify $N/3$ slashable nodes

Slashable nodes






Ideal solution


Executable spec in Python

```
def get_slashabe_nodes(vote_view: PSet[SignedVoteMessage]) -> PSet[NodeIdentity]:  
    return pset_map_to_pset(lambda vote: vote.sender,  
                             pset_filter(lambda vote1: not pset_is_empty(pset_filter(lamb
```

**Execution
examples**



**Automatic
proof of
Accountable safety**



Ideal solution

Executable spec in Python

```
def get_slashabe_pset_m  
    return pset_ma
```

**No off-the-shelf
solutions
(not even in sight)**

```
entity]:
```

```
t_filter(lamb
```

Execution
examples


Automatic
proof of
Accountable safety




Our research

Executable spec in Python

```
def get_slashabe_nodes(vote_view: PS  
    return pset_map_to_pset(lambda v  
        pset_fil
```



Model checker
[Apalache + Z3]



#1 Query for interesting states

Challenge the model checker with a false invariant


```
TwoFinalizedConflictingBlocks  $\triangleq$   
  LET disagreement  $\triangleq$   $\exists$  c1, c2  $\in$  justified_checkpoints:  
     $\wedge$  IsFinalized(c1, votes, justified_checkpoints)  
     $\wedge$  IsFinalized(c2, votes, justified_checkpoints)  
     $\wedge$  AreConflictingBlocks(c1[1], c2[1])  
  IN  $\neg$ disagreement
```

The model checker produces an example in 1.5 min
Communication tool with the protocol designers !

```

State6 ==
all_blocks
  = { [body |-> -1, slot |-> 1],
      [body |-> 0, slot |-> 0],
      [body |-> 1, slot |-> 2] }
/\ chain1 = { [body |-> 0, slot |-> 0], [body |-> 1, slot |-> 2] }
/\ chain1_tip = [body |-> 1, slot |-> 2]
/\ chain2 = { [body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], [body |-> 0, slot |-> 0] }
/\ chain2_fork_block_number = -1
/\ chain2_tip = [body |-> -1, slot |-> 1]
/\ ffg_votes
  = { [source |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 3>>,
      target |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 4>>],
      [source |-> <<[body |-> 0, slot |-> 0], 0>>,
      target |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 3>>],
      [source |-> <<[body |-> 0, slot |-> 0], 3>>,
      target |-> <<[body |-> 1, slot |-> 2], 4>>],
      [source |-> <<[body |-> 1, slot |-> 2], 4>>,
      target |-> <<[body |-> 1, slot |-> 2], 5>>] }
/\ justified_checkpoints
  = { <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 3>>,
      <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 4>>,
      <<[body |-> 0, slot |-> 0], 0>>,
      <<[body |-> 0, slot |-> 0], 3>>,
      <<[body |-> 0, slot |-> 0], 4>>,
      <<[body |-> 1, slot |-> 2], 4>>,
      <<[body |-> 1, slot |-> 2], 5>> }
/\ votes
  = { [ffg_vote |->
      [source |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 3>>,
      target |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 4>>],
      validator |-> "V1",
      [ffg_vote |->
      [source |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 3>>,
      target |-> <<[body |-> -1, slot |-> 1], 4>>],


```



#2 Show Acc. Safety

AccountableSafety \triangleq

```
LET disagreement  $\triangleq$   $\exists$  c1, c2  $\in$  justified_checkpoints:  
     $\wedge$  IsFinalized(c1, votes, justified_checkpoints)  
     $\wedge$  IsFinalized(c2, votes, justified_checkpoints)  
     $\wedge$  AreConflictingBlocks(c1[1], c2[1])  
IN  $\neg$ disagreement  $\vee$  Cardinality(SlashableNodes) * 3  $\geq$  N
```



5 blocks
7 checkpoints
24 votes

5 blocks
6 checkpoints
15 votes

Summary

Model checking helps 



Human ingenuity to tackle verification complexity (towers of NP?)

Tune in for the upcoming full technical report

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Thank you!

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