

UNIVERSITATEA "ALEXANDRU-IOAN CUZA" DIN IAȘI

FACULTATEA DE INFORMATICĂ



LUCRARE DE DISERTAȚIE

**Streamlining Blockchain security audits
through desktop applications**

propusă de

Marius Enache-Stratulat

Sesiunea: Iulie, 2025

Coordonator științific

Conf. Dr. Andrei Arusoaie

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Conf. Dr. Andrei Arusoaie

Avizat,
Îndrumător lucrare de disertație,
Conf. Dr. Andrei Arusoaie.

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Motivation

The Blockchain Technology is relatively new if we consider the release of Bitcoin cryptocurrency blockchain network which took place in 2009. However, its foundation was formed decades ago, in 1989, when Leslie Lamport developed the Paxos protocol (to be continued...)

Abstract

The Blockchain, despite its popularity and presence on the internet and in the financial sector, is a relatively new technology and this fact is proved by the large amount of attacks that took place on such networks. This situation raises the need for secure and robust networks that can keep the clients' financial assets safe. Fortunately, there are various solutions to this category of problems, like Slither or Manticore, which take different approaches towards finding vulnerabilities. The aim of our paper is to highlight the strenghts of Slither as a static analysis tool and present a solution that integrates it in a streamlined manner and eases the process of scanning blockchain projects for beginner and intermediate developers.

Introduction

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Chapter 1

Threats of Blockchain

The Blockchain [14] is a technology used in various applications, such as cryptocurrencies, Internet of Things, electronic voting and many others. Its transparent, fully distributed, peer to peer and append-only nature are its most notable strengths. The transactions, which may have a different meaning depending on the application they are used for, are publicly visible and cannot be modified after they are published. This means the users may verify any transaction with no need of a centralized authority.

Bitcoin, the most popular cryptocurrency at this moment, takes advantage of these characteristics, creating a decentralized financial system. Unfortunately, there are also significant shortcomings in terms of security. One of the most notorious instances where these vulnerabilities had been exploited is known as “The DAO” [14], where in 2016, an unknown attacker managed to drain \$50 million USD through a *Reentrancy Attack*.

This thesis will first present the variety of attacks that blockchain networks are vulnerable to, their manner of work and potential effects to its victims. The Quadriga Initiative [9] - a community-based platform - hosts a list of most of the attacks and frauds that involve cryptocurrency exchanges. Among the most well-known attacks, the database of case studies includes instances of Reentrancy Attacks, Replay Attacks and Short Address Attacks.

Reentrancy Attacks [6] can take place whenever the developers of the targeted network do not update the balances before sending the funds. In this case, an attacker could recursively call the `withdraw()` method and drain all the available funds.

Replay Attacks [16] are specific to the case where a cryptocurrency is forked into

two separate currencies. In such a scenario, it is possible to sniff a regular transaction from any of the chains and “replay” it on the other. Processing both transaction causes the user to lose the same amount of assets twice (for example, paying two ether instead of one for the same product or service). This attack was easily possible in the Ethereum blockchain before the implementation of chainID in transactions.

Short Address Attacks [14] represent the exploit of a bug in the EVM – Ethereum Virtual Machine – used to obtain extra tokens on purchases. This category of attacks requires creating an Ethereum wallet with its address ending with a 0 byte. The attacker makes a purchase on the address by removing the last digit and causes the contract to try to append the missing byte to the incomplete address, but it ends up appending it to the paid amount. In this case, the contract pays 256 times more tokens than intended.

In terms of prevention and detection of such attacks, there are numerous tools that serve this purpose. As Kaixuan Li et al. describe in their article [11], a significant category of such tools detect vulnerabilities in the code through either static analysis or symbolic execution.

Technology	Tool	Analysis Level	Stars
Static Analysis	Securify2		529
	Slither	Source Code	4 500
	SmartCheck		315
Symbolic Execution	Manticore		3 500
	Osiris	Bytecode	50
	Oyente		1 300

Table 1.1: List of the main static analysis and symbolic execution tools, adapted from Kaixuan Li et al. [11]

According to table 1.1, the static analysis tools, primarily represented by Slither, enjoy a higher popularity than the symbolic execution tools, represented by Manticore. This fact is shown by the number of stars on GitHub, which indicate how popular a tool is. These types of tools share the principle of scanning the code without executing it, but do so in different ways.

Generally, static analysis tools [5] are automatic methods that determine the runtime properties of a program without running it. In Slither’s [8] case, the analysis’ purpose is to detect security vulnerabilities within the smart contract and to point out

potential optimizations, which result in a lower gas consumption, an essential aspect in this field. As such, this category of security tools should be considered the opposite of Dynamic Analysis tools, which rely on running the target program and can also monitor its performance among other aspects.

On the other hand, symbolic execution tools [1] take a similar approach of analyzing the given program without running the code, based solely on its bytecode. Essentially, Manticore [12] uses the bytecode of a smart contract to map out all the execution paths of the program. Afterwards, all the paths get explored and the tool determines what kind of inputs determine each possible outcome. Two of the main components of Manticore are the Core Engine and the Event System. The Core Engine is responsible with operating and managing the state of a program at a certain point in the execution. The Execution Module has the purpose to emulate a system that runs the target program, with a CPU, system memory and an operating system like Linux.

```
int foobar(int a, int b) {  
    int x = 1, y = 0;  
    if (a != 0) {  
        y = 3 + x;  
        if (b == 0) {  
            x = 2 * (a + b);  
        }  
    }  
    assert(x - y != 0);  
}
```

Figure 1.1: Example of code to analyze. From Roberto B et al. [1]

The figure above shows a simple example of function that a symbolic execution tool can operate on. A tool like Manticore can trace all the possible paths the execution may go at run-time. The assertion at the end is the possible point of failure for this function, in case x and y are equal.




Figure 1.2: Example of symbolic execution tree of function `foofoo`. Each state shows the symbolic store σ , the path constraint π , and the current statement. From Roberto B. et al [1]

As shown in this graph, σ contains all the symbols stored in the context of the function, π is a statement that represents the path constraint and below it is the line of code that gets executed at a given time. State *B* is the first one to fork in two hypothetical states, based on the value of the first parameter, as shown by π in the states *C* and *D*. If $a == 0$, the function skips to the final assert and returns with no failure. Otherwise, the program would continue with state *E* and the following ones. Finally, a symbolic execution tool can reveal that the function will throw an error in case $a == 2$ and $b == 0$.

Tool	# Success	# Failure		
		# Timeout	# Compilation	# Total
Slither	767 (97.34%)	2	19	21
Manticore	112 (14.21%)	626	50	676

Table 1.2: Success rate and failures summary of Slither and Manticore. Adapted from Kaixuan Li et al. [11]

Finally, to address Manticore’s performance, as shown above, its exhaustive approach causes it to fail most of the tests due to timeout. Even if we were to ignore the timeout fails, Slither is visibly more consistent, having less compilation failures. The main flaw and reason of Manticore’s high timeout rate may be the fact that it has to process large amounts of possible paths in order to find the ones where a security flaw is exploited. As such, Slither is the more consistent and better performing in comparison to Manticore.

1.1 Slither

Considering the performance metrics discussed in the first section, this section will be dedicated to Slither [8], a static analysis tool catered to smart contracts written in Solidity and designed to offer granular information about smart contract code. This tool specializes in vulnerability detection, but also manages to point out potential optimizations that lower the gas consumption of a smart contract. In order to facilitate the usage of this tool, Slither leverages printers to help the user better understand the contract’s functionality and structure. This is done through representations such as the control flow graph or the inheritance graph or summaries of the contract and the issues detected in its code.

In opposition to dynamic analysis [3] tools, which rely on executing the contract’s code to find security weaknesses, static analysis tools detect vulnerabilities without running the smart contract. Such approaches include parsing and decompiling the EVM bytecode and translating it into semantic facts. These semantic facts are then matched with predefined patterns meant to reveal common issues.

Slither [8] proceeds in a similar manner by taking the Solidity Abstract Syntax Tree generated by the compiler and extracting information such as the control flow graph and transforms the code given into SlithIR, its internal representation language.

After these two initialization stages, the actual code analysis takes place. In this stage, Slither identifies the reads and writes of variables, analyses the data dependency and determines whether the methods are protected from unauthorized use (for instance, only the owner of a contract may create new tokens).

This tool [8] helps auditors detect various vulnerabilities and potential security threats, such as reentrancy attacks or uninitialized storage variables. Its approach of quickly translating and analyzing large codebases makes it significantly faster than symbolic execution engines, as shown Table 1.2, a great feature for fast development workflows.

Furthermore, its set of detectors are able to find obvious and subtle vulnerabilities alike while providing useful educational resources to help developers fix and prevent future attacks. All these factors make Slither a great solution for quick and automated daily audit processes, preventing many critical security vulnerabilities.

Another essential topic in blockchain development, beside security concerns, is optimization, the techniques used to lower the “gas” consumption. Slither includes a set of detectors specialized in finding ways to optimize code [7] from different perspectives. They are able to find issues such as dead code, as in methods or code branches that are never called or executed, unused state variables or variables that should be declared constant to save gas.




Figure 1.3: Slither overview. From Josselin F. et al. [8]

As to how it works [8], Slither uses a multi stage procedure to parse and process the codebase of a blockchain project. First, it uses the Solidity compiler to generate the Abstract Syntax Tree of the contract, from which it recovers important information: inheritance graph, control flow graph and the list of expressions. Next, the contracts get translated to SlithIR, the internal representation language. The following step is the ac-

tual code analysis, in which Slither processes data dependencies, read/write variables and protected functions to output detected vulnerabilities and optimization opportunities.

Chapter 2

Slither's performance analysis

This chapter will be dedicated to assessing Slither's performance in terms of vulnerability detection. The metrics used to determine how well security scanning tools work are: detection rate (how often a tool can correctly flag a vulnerability), analysis speed and attacks coverage (the variety of attacks that a tool can prevent).

		Slither	Securify	SmartCheck	Solhint
Accuracy	False Positive Rate	10.9%	25%	73.6%	91.3%
	Flagged contracts	112	8	793	81
	Detections per contract	3.17	2.12	10.22	2.16
Performance	Execution time(s)	0.79 ± 1	41.4 ± 46.3	10.9 ± 7.14	0.95 ± 0.35
	Time out rate	0%	20.4%	4%	0%
Robustness	Failure rate	0.1%	11.2%	10.22%	1.2%
Reentrancy examples	DAO	Yes	No	Yes	No
	Spankchain	Yes	No	No	No

Table 2.1: Performance comparison between Slither, Securify, SmartCheck and Solhint.
From Josselin F. et al. [8]

The table above covers the first two performance criteria: the detection rate and analysis speed. The experiment was done by analyzing 1000 contracts focusing only on reentrancy detectors. Slither's results are visibly better than the ones obtained by its counterparts. Firstly, its false positive rate is far lower, at just 10.9%, while Securify falls in the second place with 25%. Secondly, its average execution time is also significantly lower than those of Securify and SmartCheck. In short, Slither is by far faster, more accurate and more consistent than the other three tools. Another important aspect is the time out rate of 0% for Slither and Solhint, which further supports Slither's

consistency in the detection of reentrancy attacks. Also, while this results do not conclude Slither’s attack coverage, we can see it is the only tool that managed to detect attacks similar to the ones that targeted DAO or Spankchain, which are notorious for the amount of funds stolen and its effect on people’s perception towards blockchain’s security.

Vulnerabilities	Read	TP	TN	FP	FN
Re-entrancy	29/31	28	0	0	1
Access Control	18/18	14	0	0	3
Arithmetic	15/15	0	0	5	0
Unchecked LLC	26/26	26	0	0	3
Total	88	68	0	5	7

Table 2.2: Slither’s coverage of security attacks. Adapted from Senan B. [2]

This table shows how Slither can detect four types of vulnerabilities: Reentrancy, Access Control, Arithmetic and Unchecked LLC and covers 4 output categories: True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). Out of the 90 test cases given, 88 passed the reading phase, 68 had got correctly flagged as vulnerable, five ended up as False Positives and seven as False Negatives. That equates to a rate of 77.27% for True Positive, 5.68% for False Positive and 7.95% for False Negative. Therefore, while in almost 6% of cases the user is falsely lead to believe a section of his code is vulnerable, a case that has no impact on the project’s security, the rate at which Slither misses a vulnerability is almost 8%.

Vulnerabilities	Slither	SmartCheck
Bad Randomness	2.99s	8.9s
Access Control	2.98s	10s
Reentrancy	2.48s	*32.2s
Arithmetic	3.09s	21.16s

Table 2.3: Detection rate of Slither compared to SmartCheck, another static analysis tool. *SmartCheck registered a significantly lower detection rate for reentrancy attacks. Adapted from [10]

According to the table above, Slither is by far faster than SmartCheck at detecting vulnerabilities across all four types included. Also, both tools properly detected the

vulnerabilities, so the quality of Slither's detection is just as high as SmartCheck's, except for reentrancy attacks, where SmartCheck missed a significant part of the issues. In short, Slither is much faster and more reliable than SmartCheck.

Among the included attacks, there are two new types: bad randomness and arithmetic. Bad randomness [13] attacks may take place when a contract generates random numbers through unsafe methods, such as using the block's timestamp as the seed for essential operations, like asset transfer. If the attacker is able to predict the seed (for example, by initiating a transaction at a certain time), they may get an undeserved advantage over honest users and could obtain more funds, depending on the attacked application.

Arithmetic attacks [15] are specific to smart contracts that use versions of Solidity older than Solidity 0.8. This type of attack is done by overflowing or underflowing a variable. Overflowing a variable is done by incrementing it over its limit (for an uint8 variable, adding one to 255 will return 0). Underflowing is done similarly through decrementation. Fortunately, newer versions of Solidity throw errors in these cases and the older ones have access to the SafeMath library, so these vulnerabilities are easy to solve.

As seen in the previous paragraphs, Slither is a great tool for detecting security vulnerabilities, consistently finding issues almost regardless of their category. This high detection rate is backed up by its high speed of processing smart contracts, which is another strong point of Slither. Furthermore, unlike its competition, this tool is also able to detect optimization opportunities in smart contracts.

Smart contract optimization, while not a major security concern, used to be an important subject for Ethereum-based smart contracts developers. This was the case before The Merge, when Ethereum transitioned from the Proof-of-Work consensus to a Proof-of-Stake one. The Proof-of-Work model relied on validators using large amounts of electricity through mining in order to verify transactions and an inefficient smart contract on top of that would only have worsened the problem. However, the shift towards the Proof-of-Stake consensus meant that Ethereum would dramatically lower its energy consumption by over 99.9% on september 14th 2022 [4].

Now, because the energy consumption is not as threatening, optimizing a smart contract is more of a matter of reducing the risk of intruders using inefficient code as backdoors for their attacks and ensuring a fast and responsive application for its users. As far as the latest researches go, Slither [8] had been tested for detecting constant

variables that were not declared accordingly. A properly declared constant variable will take no space in the storage of the contract and can be accessed with fewer instructions when needed. However, a non-constant variable that acts as a constant (it doesn't change its value under any circumstance) could unnecessarily increase the code size and the usage cost. Slither was tested on a total of 36.000 contracts and up to 56% of them were found to have variables that acted as constants or variables that ended up not being used at all. These findings prove that Slither is able to detect basic, but useful, code optimization.

Thanks to its optimization detection and coverage of various categories of attacks, Slither is a great tool for security audits. However, it can also be used for educational purposes in blockchain related courses, where the students could run it on their projects and see its security vulnerabilities. The usage of Slither in such early stages of learning smart contract development raises awareness of the most common attacks and helps the student avoid leaving the project vulnerable in the future.

Another subject of great importance when discussing Slither, or any similar tool, are the legal aspects and the ethical considerations of using it. The first and most important matter is the fact that, while the developers of a smart contract may run Slither on their project to find and fix its vulnerabilities, intruders may do the same to find exploitable pieces of code to focus their attack on. Of course, this is mostly possible in the case of an open-source project, unless the developers are quick enough to detect and fix all the security problems before any attacker manages to exploit them. In other words, Slither may be both the guard that points out security issues and the complice that helps the attacker find the right way to exploit the contract.

Similarly, Slither can be used by regular users on open-source smart contracts to assess whether they are safe to use and may contact the developers in case they find glaring problems. In the meantime, developers should take responsibility for the security of their project and conduct manual analysis of the code on top of using automated tools. In the end, security analysis tools are far from perfect and are subject to throwing false positives or negatives. As such, the developers are the only ones responsible with avoiding security attacks to the best of their abilities.

Chapter 3

SmartScan

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Concluzii

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