Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

The word "*cryptography*" derives from the Greek *kryptos*, meaning hidden. Its origin is usually dated in 2000 B.C., with the Egyptian practice of hieroglyphics which full meaning was only known to an elite few.

Formally, cryptography is the science of protecting information between two or more parties. It has advanced exponentially by taking advantage of the most developed mathematical theories and it has became more secure by relying on hard mathematical problems. Its algorithms are designed around computational complexity assumptions: it is theoretically possible to break a cryptosystem but it is infeasible in practice due to excessively long running times. These schemes are therefore said computationally secure.

Introduced in the early 19-th century, Modern Cryptography is a wider field than pure cryptography since it embraces additional properties vital to modern communications that can be summed up in:

- Authenticity - ensures that the information comes from the source it claims to be from;

- Confidentiality - ensure that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes;

- Integrity - ensures the information sent is exactly the same information received;

- Non Repudiation - provides proof of the integrity and origin of transmitted information.

In modern cryptography, Symmetric Key and Public Key encryption schemes are the best known and world-wide used. The symmetric key algorithms make use of a single key to both encrypt and decrypt messages. This key is shared by the communication parties hence the name symmetric. Public key algorithms use a pair of keys: the public key serves to encrypt messages, the private one to decrypt it. These special algorithms are also known as Asymmetric since encryption and decryption keys are different and not shared by the parties.

These schemes are commonly implemented in a 2-parties version in which the users Alice and Bob want to communicate without revealing their messages' content to others. Many protocols have been proposed to this purpose such that today we have RSA as the most world spread algorithm and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) as most recent and efficient scheme implemented.

In 1982 Richard Feynman observed that simulating quantum physics on classical computers seemed an intractable task. He then followed up by conjecturing that physical devices relying on quantum phenomena would have been good candidates for simulating quantum mechanics. Soon after, David Deutsch formalised the notion of a quantum Turing machine and showed that it was universal: a quantum Turing machine can simulate any quantum mechanical process with small overhead and independently of the substrate.

The basic idea behind a quantum computer is to exploit quantum bits, or qubits for short. As opposed to binary bits, qubits can exist in additional states in between the two binary states. This is defined as a superposition of the digital states.

With these premises it was undeniable wondering about whether quantum computers could solve natural computational problems faster than classical computers. To this question Shor answered in 1994 with a paper in which he presented polynomial-time quantum algorithms to solve the integer factorisation and discrete logarithm problems for which no efficient classical algorithms exist. The impact on modern public key cryptography is obvious: large enough quantum computers will break factorisation-based cryptosystems, such as RSA, as well as cryptosystems based on

the discrete logarithm, such as elliptic curve cryptosystems.

1.1 Post-Quantum Cryptography

With the term *"Post-quantum cryptography"* we refer to the science of protecting information against both quantum and classical attacks, as well as to the collection of tools that accomplish this task. Unfortunately, the adoption of post-quantum cryptography is not cost-free. The post-quantum hard problems, except for hash inversion, have been studied less than integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem. Consequently a post-quantum hard problem inevitably conveys less security assurance compared to a classic alternative. The reason is due to the greater potential of future improvements on quantum attacks. Additionally, many of the hard problems that hold promise of resisting attacks on quantum computers require far greater memory and bandwidth impeding their adoption into cryptosystems for low-cost devices.

1.1.1 Shor's algorithm

Theorised in 1994 by Peter Williston Shor, his algorithm stays at the core of post-quantum cryptography. By making use of a quantum computer, Shor's algorithm can efficiently solve both the integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem.

The idea behind Shor's algorithm [4, 5] is to utilise quantum computing to compare the phases of prime numbers as sinus waves to factorise great integers. Using number theory, the problem of number factorisation can be converted into a search for the period of a really long sequence, or rather, the length at which a sequence repeats itself. Then this periodic pattern is run through a quantum computer which functions as a computational interferometer creating an interference pattern. This will output the period, which can be processed using a classical computer, finally being able to factorise the initially given number.

1.1.2 NIST's Standardisation Challenge

Over the last decade there has been an intense research effort to find hard mathematical problems that would be at the same time quantum resistant and could be used to build new efficient cryptosystems.

Of great importance we can cite "*The Post-Quantum-Cryptography Standardization Challenge*" a competition started by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in April 2016 accepting proposals for post-quantum protocols. It entered a first evaluation stage in November 2017 when NIST stopped accepting new algorithms for consideration. On 30 January 2019, the project went into the second evaluation stage, said *Round 2*, with NIST announcing 26 out of 69 original submissions as final competitors. This round may take up to 18 months before completion, after which there may be a third round and only then official standard algorithms will be chosen.

The final algorithms will be rated into a five level list which can be represented as below:

Level	Security	Reference protocol
I	Comparable to or greater than a block cipher with a 128-bit key against an exhaustive key search	AES128
II	Comparable to or greater than a 256-bit hash function against a collision search	SHA256
III	Comparable to or greater than a block cipher with a 192-bit key against an exhaustive key search	AES192
IV	Comparable to or greater than a 384-bit hash function against a collision search	SHA384
V	Comparable to or greater than a block cipher with a 256-bit key against an exhaustive key search	AES256

As a final note, most published post-quantum public-key schemes are focused on the following approaches [1]:

- Hash-based cryptography (e.g. Merkle's hash-tree public-key signature system);

- Multivariate quadratic-equations cryptography (e.g. HFE signature scheme);

- Lattice-based cryptography (e.g. NTRU encryption scheme);

- Code-based cryptography (e.g. McEliece encryption scheme, Niederreiter encryption scheme).

Another possible scheme is the newer *"Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny"*-based cryptography, central point of this thesis.

1.2 This Thesis

In this thesis we want to present a C implementation of a post-quantum protocol introduced in [9] by Vitse. The proposed algorithm exploits the supersingular isogeny problem, which is quantum resistant, for the key generation. Thereafter it exploits a zero knowledge protocol to exchange some data between the parties without revealing unnecessary information.

By implementing this protocol first we show that classical computers are still effective in a post-quantum reality or, viceversa, quantum computers are not compulsory when implementing post-quantum algorithms. Most importantly we adapted an open source library and created something new, useful and effective against the upcoming developments in the cryptography field.

Chapter 2

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

An elliptic curve is a cubic, smooth, projective, algebraic curve of genus one defined over a field $\mathbb{K}$ and has a K-rational point. It is important to note that said K-rational point can be the point at infinity expressed as $\mathcal{O} = [0 : 1 : 0]$. The curve has then a projective form described in equation 2.1 called Tate-Weierstrass extended form:

$$Y^2Z + a_1XYZ + a_3YZ^2 = X^3 + a_2X^2Z + a_4XZ^2 + a_6Z^3 \tag{2.1}$$

Another possible equation for an elliptic curve is the affine form which needs to be complemented by a smoothness condition and the point at infinity $\mathcal{O}$ as expressed in 2.2:

$$Weierstrass\ equation: \begin{cases} y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \\ 4a^3 \neq 27b^2 \end{cases} \bigcup \{\mathcal{O}\} \tag{2.2}$$

We may now briefly list some of the most important properties for an elliptic curve from a cryptography point of view:

- Its points form a group with group law known as Point Addition. It allows to sum two different points $A = (x_A, y_A)$ and $B = (x_B, y_B)$ of the curve obtaining a third point $C = (x_C, y_C) = A + B$ computed as follows:

$$\begin{cases} m = \frac{y_A - y_B}{x_A - x_B} \\ x_C = m^2 - (x_A + x_B) \\ y_C = m(x_A - x_C) - y_A \end{cases}$$

- Whenever trying to sum a point to itself the group law behaves slightly different. In this case it is called Point Doubling and only the slope coefficient m changes to $m = \frac{y_A - y_B}{x_A - x_B}$;

- The curve points form an *abelian group* meaning that the group law is commutative, hence $C = A + B = B + A$;

- By joining both cases of group law it is possible to compute a scalar multiplication by a scalar k and a given point P. This operation can be written as $[k]P$;

- Given a cyclic generator G of an elliptic curve, its order is the minimum number k such that $[k]G = \mathcal{O}$. The curve generated by G is denoted as $E : \langle G \rangle$ and has cardinality equal to G's order;

- The discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve is then defined as: "*given the points G and $P = [k]G$, find the scalar k*";

- Finally, an elliptic curve, defined in a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$ with p prime greater than 3, having cardinality $p + 1$, is said *Supersingular*, otherwise is said Ordinary.

In figure 2.1 we can see two common affine representation of an elliptic curve: on the left $a = -3$, $b = 1$, on the right $a = -2$, $b = 2$.

Figure 2.1: Two affine elliptic curves

2.1 Important concepts

In this section are listed many fundamental mathematical concepts that will be used in the next chapters.

2.1.1 m-torsion group

Given an elliptic curve E defined over a field K with characteristic p, an integer $m \neq 0$, the m-torsion group $E[m]$ is defined as follows:

$$E[m] \simeq (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^2 \ \textit{if } p \nmid m$$

Otherwise we have $m = p^i$ hence:

$$E[p^i] \simeq \begin{cases} \mathbb{Z}/p^i\mathbb{Z} & \forall i \geq 0 \text{ if E is Ordinary} \\ \{\mathcal{O}\} & \forall i \geq 0 \text{ if E is Supersingular} \end{cases}$$

As consequence of above, a supersingular curve has no points of order p.

10

2.1.2 Isomorphic curves

Given two groups $(G, \circ)$, $(H, *)$, the function $\phi : G \to H$ is said homomorphism if holds:

$$\phi(g \circ h) = \phi(g) * \phi(h) \quad \forall g, h \in G$$

If the homomorphism is also bijective then it is called *Isomorphism*, it is represented as $G \simeq H$ and the two groups have the same algebraic structure.

j-invariant

Given the elliptic curve $E : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ its j-invariant is defines as follows:

$$j(E) = 1728 \cdot \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}$$

Two elliptic curves are said *Isomorphic* over an algebraic closure $\overline{\mathbb{K}}$ if and only if they have the same j-invariant.

2.1.3 Isogenies

An isogeny is a surjective group morphism between two elliptic curves. Moreover, given two elliptic curves E, E' and the map $\phi : E \to E'$ acting on the two curves, the following hold:

- ϕ is a surjective group morphism said *isogeny*

- ϕ is a group morphism with finite kernel

- ϕ is an algebraic, non constant map of projective varieties which maps the point at infinity $\mathcal{O}$ of E on the point at infinity $\mathcal{O}'$ of E'.

Two elliptic curves E, E' are thus said *Isogenous* if there exists an isogeny between them. Moreover, the isogeny preserves the cardinality of each curve hence we can say that two elliptic curves are isogenous if and only if they have the same cardinality $\#E = \#E'$.

The isogeny equation can be computed via Velù's formulae: let $E : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ be an elliptic curve, P a generic point of E, $\langle K \rangle$ a cyclic group generated by K; let $E' \simeq E/\langle K \rangle$ is the quotient elliptic curve such that $\phi : E \to E'$ is the isogeny between the two curves, with kernel $\langle K \rangle$. The isogeny has equation:

$$\phi(P) = \left(x(P) + \sum_{Q \in \langle K \rangle \backslash \{\mathcal{O}\}} \Big(x(P+Q) - x(Q) \Big), \, y(P) + \sum_{Q \in \langle K \rangle \backslash \{\mathcal{O}\}} \Big(y(P+Q) - y(Q) \Big) \right)$$
(2.3)

Note that with $x(P)$ and $y(P)$ we define respectively the x and y coordinate of P. The image curve $E' \simeq E/\langle K \rangle : y^2 = x^3 + a'x + b'$ has parameters a', b' defined as follows:

$$a' = a - 5 \cdot \sum_{Q \in \langle K \rangle \backslash \{\mathcal{O}\}} \Big(3x(Q)^2 + a \Big)$$
$$b' = b - 7 \cdot \sum_{Q \in \langle K \rangle \backslash \{\mathcal{O}\}} \Big(5x(Q)^3 + 3ax(Q) + b \Big)$$

An example of isogeny is shown in figure 2.2 where the left curve $E/\mathbb{F}_{11} : y^2 = x^3 + x$ is mapped on the right one $E'/\mathbb{F}_{11} : y^2 = x^3 - 4x$. The kernel is the point $(0,0)$ on E and the isogeny has parameters:

$$\phi(x,y) = \left(\frac{x^2 + 1}{x}, \, y\frac{x^2 - 1}{x^2} \right).$$

Degree

Following [6], let $\phi : E \to E'$ be an isogeny defined over a field $\mathcal{K}$, and let $\mathcal{K}(E)$, $\mathcal{K}(E')$ be the function fields of E, E'. By composing ϕ with the functions of $\mathcal{K}(E')$ we obtain a subfield of $\mathcal{K}(E)$ that we denote by $\phi * \mathcal{K}(E')$. The isogeny ϕ is said to be separable if the extension of function fields is. In this case its degree is equal to its kernel's: $deg\ \phi = \#ker\ \phi$.

Let E be an elliptic curve and G a finite subgroup of E then there is a *unique* elliptic curve $E' : E/G$ and a unique separable isogeny ϕ such that $ker\ \phi = G$ and $\phi : E \to E'$.

Figure 2.2: Isogeny mapping between E and E'

Dual Isogenies

For any isogeny $\phi : E \to E'$ between elliptic curves there exists a dual isogeny $\widehat{\phi} : E' \to E$ such that $\widehat{\phi} \circ \phi = \phi \circ \widehat{\phi} = [deg \, \phi]$. Furthermore it is important noting that: $deg \, \widehat{\phi} = deg \, \phi$ and $\widehat{\widehat{\phi}} = \phi$.

Finally, given a curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with $p = l_A^{e_A} l_B^{e_B} \pm 1$ prime, an isogeny $\phi : E \to E/\langle R \rangle$ for some point $R \in E[l_A^{e_A}]$; we have $ker \, \widehat{\phi} \circ \phi = E[deg \, \phi] = E[l_A^{e_A}] \simeq \langle R, S \rangle$, with $S \in E[l_A^{e_A}]$. Since $ker \, \phi = \langle R \rangle$ then $ker \, \widehat{\phi} = \langle \phi(S) \rangle$. As a consequence, the isogeny ϕ can be hence decomposed as a sequence of l_A-isogenies: $\phi = \phi^{e_A - 1} \circ \ldots \circ \phi^0$.

2.1.4 Endomorphism

Isogenies from a curve to itself are called *endomorphisms*. Given an elliptic curve E, a point P of E and an integer m, the scalar multiplication-by-m defined by $[m] : P \to [m]P$ is the endomorphism of E. Its kernel is exactly the m-th torsion subgroup $E[m]$.

Frobenius Endomorphism

Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field $\mathcal{K}$ with q elements, its Frobenius endomorphism is the map $\pi : (X : Y : Z) \to (X^q : Y^q : Z^q)$.
It also holds:

- $ker\ \pi = \{\mathcal{O}\}$

- $ker(\pi - 1) = E(\mathcal{K})$

2.1.5 Bases and Weil Pairing

Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite prime field $\mathbb{F}_p$, it is possible to find a pair (P, Q) of independent points of E such that they form a basis of said curve. If both points have the same order k then the set of all their linear combinations form an elliptic curve of order k denoted as $E[k] = \langle P, Q \rangle$.
It is possible to check for linear independence of a pair (P, Q) via Weil Pairing. This particular pairing is a map defined as $e : E[k] \times E[k] \to \mu_k$ where μ_k is the group of k-th root of unity. The Weil pairing returns one root of unity μ; the order k of μ is also the order of the pairing, consequently the input pair generates a cyclic group of order k.

2.2 Various optimisations

This section aims to sum up all the many optimisations applied.

2.2.1 Montgomery Curves

A Montgomery curve over $\mathbb{F}_q$ is a special form of an elliptic curve with affine equation:

$$M_{(A,B)} : By^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1) \tag{2.4}$$

where the parameters A, B are in $\mathbb{F}_q$ and satisfy $B \neq 0$, $A^2 \neq 4$. In projective coordinates $(X : Y : Z)$ with $x = X/Z$, $y = Y/Z$ the equation becomes:

$$M_{(A,B)} : BY^2Z = X(X^2 + AXZ + Z) \tag{2.5}$$

The latter has a unique point at infinity $\mathcal{O} = (0 : 1 : 0)$ and it is the **only** point where $Z = 0$.

There are many improvements on choosing a Montgomery curve over a simple Weierstrass elliptic curve. For a complete discussion about these special curves it is recommended to check [8]; for this thesis the most relevant speed up are:

- reduced number of operations for the group law;

- only x-coordinates operations are possible thus halving the overall operations when computing the scalar multiplication;

- the Point Addition can be further improved: when adding the points P, Q, a third point should be provided namely $Q - P$. In this case we talk about Differential Addition.

Other important improvements rely on a different curve equation and precomputing some constants used in scalar multiplication and j-invariant calculation [10]. First of all it is important to remember that the notation $(X_p : Z_p)$ represents a projective tuple in $\mathbb{P}^1$ over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ and also the affine coordinate $x_p = X_p/Z_p$. Now, starting from the affine curve $E_a/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} : y^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + x$, we can write it into projective form and finally apply the equivalence $(A : C) \sim (a : 1)$ which transforms the curve into:

$$E : CBy^2 = Cx^3 + Ax^2 + Cx \tag{2.6}$$

This new equation allows to reduce the number of inversions, the most costly operation, with the little disadvantage of slightly increasing the total operations needed. The pair $(A_{24} : C_{24})$ denotes the projective form of the constant $(a - 2)/4$ in $\mathbb{P}^1$ which can be expressed as:

$$(A_{24} : C_{24}) \sim (a - 2 : 4)$$

Lastly the constants used in practice are:

$$(A_{24}^+ : C_{24}) \sim (A + 2C : 4C)$$
$$(A_{24}^+ : A_{24}^-) \sim (A + 2C : A - 2C)$$
$$(a_{24}^+ : 1) \quad \sim (A + 2C : 4C)$$

j-invariant

The j-invariant of a standard projective Montgomery curve depends only on the parameter A and is computed as follows:

$$j(M_{(A,B)}) = \frac{256(A^2 - 3)^3}{A^2 - 4}$$

In implementation scenarios we use the equation 2.6 which requires the computation of $(A : C)$ to compute the new j-invariant:

$$j(M_{(A,B)}) = \frac{256(A^2 - 3C^2)}{C^4(A^2 - 4C^2)}.$$

2.2.2 Weil Pairing

The base algorithm for the Weil Pairing requires, roughly, $\mathcal{O}(n)$ operations which is greatly inefficient for large order bases; as an example, typical orders are 2^{250} and 3^{159}. We now show a faster way to run the algorithm as described in [7].

Let P, Q be two points both of order $m \cdot n$ so that they are in $E[mn]$; the n-th power of the pairing $e_{mn}(P,Q)$ can be computed as follows:

$$e_{mn}(P,Q)^n = e_m([n]P, [n]Q)$$

We now consider an example: let be $m = 4$, $n = 2^{370}$ such that $mn = 2^{372}$, it is easy to show that

$$e_{mn}(P,Q)^n = e_{4 \cdot 2^{370}}(P,Q)^{2^{370}} = e_4([2^{370}]P, [2^{370}]Q)$$

If P and Q have order 2^{372} then it is also true that $P' = [2^{370}]P$ and $Q' = [2^{370}]Q$ both have order 4.

Another speed up: all the involved checks are possible considering the only x coordinates of input basis.

After computing $x(P')$ and $x(Q')$ it is mandatory to check that $x(P') \neq x(Q')$ via a projective cross-multiplication. The last two steps consist in checking:

- Said $(X : Z) = x([2]P')$, then it must hold true that $Z \neq 0$;

- Said $(\overline{X} : \overline{Z}) = x([4]P')$, then it must hold true that $\overline{Z} = 0$.

Same checks have to be performed on Q'.

The pair (P, Q) is then a basis of order mn if it passes all checks.

16

2.2.3 Isogenies

We have seen in section 2.1.3 that, said $\langle K \rangle$ a cyclic group, the worst drawback of Velù's formulae is that they require $\mathcal{O}(\#\langle K \rangle)$ operations hence making their implementation intractable. A great improvement is possible when the order of K is smooth, meaning it is a power of a prime number, via composition of small degree isogenies [7, 9] obtaining a cost drop to $\mathcal{O}\Big(\log\left(\#\langle K \rangle\right) \cdot \log\left(\log\left(\#\langle K \rangle\right)\right)\Big)$. Since typical applications use kernels of order 2^n or 3^m, said speed up is achievable.

Given an elliptic curve E, a cyclic subgroup $\langle R \rangle \subseteq E[l^e]$ of order l^e, with l prime, there is a unique isogeny $\phi_R : E \to E / \langle R \rangle$ of degree l^e defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with kernel $\langle R \rangle$. Such isogeny can be computed by composing e l-isogenies, in this way we iteratively compute $E_{i+1} \simeq E_i / \langle [l^{e-i-1}]R_i \rangle$ for $0 \le i < e$. Note that the point R_i is an l^{e-i}-torsion point and the point $\langle [l^{e-i-1}]R_i \rangle$ has order l. The resulting isogeny is then $\phi = \phi_{e-1} \circ \ldots \circ \phi_0$ having degree l^e as required.

By doing so, the resulting structure is called *isogeny graph*, a (multi)-graph whose vertices are the j-invariants of isogenous curves and whose edges are the isogenies between them. In order to compute a large degree isogeny it is fundamental to know how to "navigate" the graph. Two concepts are required at this point: an isogeny walk and a traversing strategy.

The isogeny walk, as shown in figure 2.3, starts with the isogeny kernel R, of order l^e, at the root and descends via isogenies (right edges) and scalar multiplications (left edges). The figure also shows the equivalence between ϕ_i and $[l^{e-i}]R_i$.

Figure 2.3: l-isogeny walks up to degree l^5

A traversing strategy is a non-cyclic path from the root to its leaves at the bottom of the walk. For the given walk there are seven well formed strategies as shown in figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4: Well formed strategies for $e = 4$

Among all strategies, there are optimal ones which minimise the number of operations and these can be precomputed offline. As result of all these improvements, large smooth degree isogeny computations, say l^e-isogeny, are done with complexity $\mathcal{O}(e \log e)$.

Small degree isogenies

In this section we show the alternative formulae to Velù's used in real applications. Since we are talking about 2-parties protocols, only two different isogenies should be studied: 2- and 3-isogenies. In the former case, a further speed up is possible if we consider 4-isogenies thus halving the total operations needed [11].

2-isogenies

Let $E_{A,B}$, $E_{A',B'}$ be two elliptic curves, $(x_2, y_2) \in E_{A,B}$ be a point of order 2 having $x_2 \neq 0$. Let $\phi_2 : E_{A,B} \to E_{A',B'}$ be the (unique) 2-isogeny with kernel $\langle (x_2, y_2) \rangle$. The image curve can be computed as follows:

$$E_{A',B'} : \left(A', B' \right) = \left(2 \cdot \left(1 - 2x_2^2 \right), \quad Bx_2 \right)$$

For any point $P = (x_P, y_P) \notin \langle (x_2, y_2) \rangle$ of $E_{A,B}$, its image $\phi_2 : (x_P, y_P) \mapsto (x_{\phi_2}, y_{\phi_2})$ can be computed as:

$$x_{\phi_2} = \frac{x_P^2 x_2 - x_P}{x_P - x_2}$$
$$y_{\phi_2} = y_P \cdot \frac{x_P^2 x_2 - 2x_P x_2^2 + x_2}{\left(x_P - x_2 \right)^2}$$

4-isogenies

Let $E_{A,B}$, $E_{A',B'}$ be two elliptic curves, $(x_4, y_4) \in E_{A,B}$ be a point of order 4 having $x_4 \neq \pm 1$. Let $\phi_4 : E_{A,B} \to E_{A',B'}$ be the (unique) 4-isogeny with kernel $\langle (x_4, y_4) \rangle$. The image curve can be computed as follows:

$$E_{A',B'} : \left(A', B' \right) = \left(4x_4^4 - 2, \quad -x_4(x_4^2 + 1) \cdot B/2 \right)$$

For any point $P = (x_P, y_P) \notin \langle (x_4, y_4) \rangle$ of $E_{A,B}$, its image $\phi_4 : (x_P, y_P) \mapsto (x_{\phi_4}, y_{\phi_4})$ can be computed as:

$$x_{\phi_4} = \frac{-x_P(x_P x_4^2 + x_P - 2x_4) \cdot (x_P x_4 - 1)^2}{(x_P - x_4)^2 \cdot (2x_P x_4 - x_4^2 - 1)}$$
$$y_{\phi_4} = y_P \cdot \frac{-2x_4^2(x_P x_4 - 1)\left(x_P^4(x_4^2 + 1) - 4x_P^3(x_4^3 + x_4) + 2x_P^2(x_4^4 + 5x_4^2) - 4x_P(x_4^3 + x_4) + x_4^4 + 1 \right)}{(x_P - x_4)^3(2x_P x_4 - x_4^2 - 1)^2}$$

3-isogenies

Let $E_{A,B}$, $E_{A',B'}$ be two elliptic curves, $(x_3, y_3) \in E_{A,B}$ be a point of order 3. Let $\phi_3 : E_{A,B} \to E_{A',B'}$ be the (unique) 3-isogeny with kernel $\langle (x_3, y_3) \rangle$. The image curve can be computed as follows:

$$E_{A',B'} : \left(A', B' \right) = \left(\left(Ax_3 - 6x_3^2 + 6 \right) x_3, \quad Bx_3^2 \right)$$

For any point $P = (x_P, y_P) \notin \langle (x_3, y_3) \rangle$ of $E_{A,B}$, its image $\phi_3 : (x_P, y_P) \mapsto (x_{\phi_3}, y_{\phi_3})$ can be computed as:

$$x_{\phi_3} = \frac{x_P(x_P x_3 - 1)^2}{(x_P - x_3)^2}$$
$$y_{\phi_3} = y_P \cdot \frac{(x_P x_3 - 1)(x_P^2 x_3 - 3x_P x_3^2 + x_P + x_3)}{(x_P - x_3)^3}$$

2.3   Isogeny-based Cryptography

Traditional Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) relies its security on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) which can be stated as: "*Let E be an elliptic curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_p$ with p prime greater than 3. Given two points P, Q of said curve, find an integer k such that $Q = [k]P$*".

That said, Shor's algorithm presents a threat to DLP based cryptography since it can compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time. A quantum resistant solution involves the use of the *computational supersingular isogeny problem* stated as follows: "*given two supersingular elliptic curves E and E', find an isogeny ϕ such that $\phi : E \to E'$*". While for ordinary elliptic curves there exists a sub-exponential quantum attack, for the given problem does not exist thus making it post-quantum resistant.

Chapter 3

SIDH-based OT

The protocol studied and implemented in this thesis relies on an adaptation of Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) as a base structure for an Oblivious Transfer protocol. By joining these two protocols together it is possible to construct a post-quantum multi-party scheme.

First things first, we explain how SIDH and OT work, then how it is possible to merge them into a new procotol.

3.1 SIDH Key Exchange

The Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman is a protocol developed by Jao and De Feo in 2011 which offers a great ratio efficiency-security having keys smaller than other post-quantum protocols (lattice-based and code-based), moreover they are smaller than traditional Diffie-Hellman public keys.

The scheme begins with a shared supersingular elliptic curve and two parties, Alice and Bob, who get assigned two different torsion groups. After few isogenies and data exchanges both parties have two curves with the same j-invariant. The latter is then used a shared key hence used to encrypt and decrypt data between the parties. Let's now describe the protocol deeper in details.

All the supersingular elliptic curves used in SIDH are defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ where $p = l_A^{e_A} l_B^{e_B} \pm 1$ prime, l_A and l_B small primes, e_A and e_B integers such that $l_A^{e_A} \approx l_B^{e_B}$.

Typical choices for e_A fall within the range $[100, 500]$ according to the security level desired. All SIDH implementations consider $l_A = 2$, $l_B = 3$ and so we will henceforth. In order to simplify the notation we will be using $e_A = n$ and $e_B = m$ and assign $l_A^{e_A} = 2^n$ to Alice, $l_B^{e_B} = 3^m$ to Bob.

Initial public parameters:

- A supersingular elliptic curve $E \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with $p = 2^n 3^m \pm 1$ prime;

- A bases $(U, V) \subset E[2^n]$ in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$;

- A bases $(P, Q) \subset E[3^m]$ in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$.

The protocol proceeds as follows:

Alice	**Bob**
Chooses $x_A, y_A \in \mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$ randomly, at least one of them coprime to 2	Chooses $x_B, y_B \in \mathbb{Z}/3^m\mathbb{Z}$ randomly, at least one of them coprime to 3
Computes $R_A = x_A \cdot U + y_A \cdot V$	Computes $R_B = x_B \cdot P + y_B \cdot Q$
Computes the curve $E_A \simeq E/\langle R_A \rangle$	Computes the curve $E_B \simeq E/\langle R_B \rangle$
Computes the isogeny $\phi_A : E \to E_A$	Computes the isogeny $\phi_B : E \to E_B$

$$\xleftarrow{\hspace{2cm}} \text{Exchange their new curves } E_A, E_B \xrightarrow{\hspace{2cm}}$$

Computes $P' = \phi_A(P)$, $Q' = \phi_A(Q)$	Computes $U' = \phi_B(U)$, $V' = \phi_B(V)$

$$\xleftarrow{\hspace{2cm}} \text{Exchange their new points } U', V', P', Q' \xrightarrow{\hspace{2cm}}$$

Computes $E_{BA} \simeq E_B/\langle x_A U' + y_A V' \rangle$	Computes $E_{AB} \simeq E_A/\langle x_B P' + y_B Q' \rangle$

At the end of the protocol both parties have $E_{AB} \simeq E_{BA}$ having the same j-invariant which can be used as shared secret.

3.1.1 Correctness

Alice computes:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E_{BA} &\simeq E_B \big/ \langle x_A U' + y_A V' \rangle \\
&\simeq E_B \big/ \langle x_A \phi_B(U) + y_A \phi_B(V) \rangle \\
&\simeq E_B \big/ \langle \phi_B(x_A U + y_A V) \rangle \\
&\simeq E_B \big/ \langle x_A U + y_A V \rangle \\
&\simeq E_B \big/ \langle R_A \rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ \langle R_B \rangle \big/ \langle R_A \rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ E[3^m] \big/ E[2^n]
\end{aligned}
$$

Bob computes:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E_{AB} &\simeq E_A \big/ \langle x_B P' + y_B Q' \rangle \\
&\simeq E_A \big/ \langle x_B \phi_A(P) + y_B \phi_A(Q) \rangle \\
&\simeq E_A \big/ \langle \phi_A(x_B P + y_B Q) \rangle \\
&\simeq E_A \big/ \langle x_B P + y_B Q \rangle \\
&\simeq E_A \big/ \langle R_B \rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ \langle R_A \rangle \big/ \langle R_B \rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ E[2^n] \big/ E[3^m]
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore $E_{BA} \simeq E\big/E[3^m]\big/E[2^n] \simeq E\big/E[2^n]\big/E[3^m] \simeq E_{AB}$ proving that Alice and Bob now share a curve isomorphic to their party's curve.

3.1.2 Security

Before introducing SIDH's security problem it is important to state the *Standard Isogeny* problem: "Given a prime $p = 2^n 3^m \pm 1$, two supersingular elliptic curves E, E_A over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, determine the 2^n-isogeny $\phi_A : E \to E_A$".

SIDH's security is similar to the *Standard Isogeny* problem but it adds some information to the attacker. One can express SIDH's problem [13] as follows: "Given a prime $p = 2^n 3^m \pm 1$, two supersingular elliptic curves E, E_A over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, determine the

2^n-isogeny $\phi_A : E \to E_A$ **also** knowing the basis $(P, Q) \subset E[3^m]$ and $P' = \phi_A(P)$, $Q' = \phi_A(Q)$".

This problem is assumed to be as hard as the *Standard Isogeny* problem. The fastest known attack is Tani's Claw Finding attack which requires $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt[4]{p})$ operations on a classical computer and $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt[6]{p})$ on a quantum computer. SIDH's primes p had initially been selected on accounting only a simplified running time of the Claw Finding attack without considering its spacial cost amounting to $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt[6]{p})$ qubits. As an example [17], in NIST's Challenge's Round 1 introduced in 1.1.2, in order to achieve a b-bit security level against known classical and quantum attacks SIDH primes p were selected with bitlength of approximately $6b$. Hence the 751-bit prime $p = 2^{372}3^{239} - 1$ was proposed for the 128-bit classical security level, respectively Quantum Level I. Moreover the 964-bit prime $p = 2^{486}3^{301} - 1$ was proposed for the 160-bit classical security level.

By NIST's Challenge Round 2, few revisions were made thus reaching: p_{434} for 128-bit classical and Quantum Level II security, p_{503} for 160-bit classical and Quantum Level III security, p_{610} for 192-bit classical and Quantum Level IV security, finally p_{751} for 256-bit classical and Quantum Level V security. The 964-bit curve was hence discarded.

A full disclosure about attacks and examples can be found in [14–16].

3.2 Oblivious Transfer

The *oblivious transfer*, or **OT**, is a multi-party cryptography scheme in which two or more parties are involved. A typical OT application is the secure function evaluation where every party holds an input for a given function. In this scenario, the output should be computed in a way such that no party has to reveal unnecessary information about their input. Correctness of the protocol is usually proved with a zero knowledge proof.

The oblivious transfer has many different implementations each of them achieving different yet similar goals. The base idea is to send one of many pieces of information to a second party while the sender has no knowledge of which piece has been sent. A classical implementation is the *Rabin OT* in which Alice, with a probability

of 1/2, sends a simple bit to Bob. This scheme leaves Alice "oblivious" of whether Bob has received it or not.

There exists another variation proposed by Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich and Abraham Lempel called "*1 out of 2 Oblivious Transfer*", often written as $\binom{2}{1}$-OT, which can easily be generalised to "*1 out of n OT*". In this variation, a party say B, receives one out of two (alternatively n) piece of information but the sender party, say A, does not know which piece B has received.

As shown in figure 3.1, A sends the pieces b_0, b_1 to B which, in turn, chooses a random integer c. At the end of the transfer B will have knowledge of the c-th piece b_c of A.

Figure 3.1: Simple $\binom{2}{1}$-OT

3.3 SIDH-based OT

Initial public parameters:

- A supersingular elliptic curve $E \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with $p = 2^n 3^m \pm 1$ prime;

- A bases $(P, Q) \subset E[3^m]$ in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$;

- A secure symmetric encryption protocol *Enc* such that: $c = Enc(m, k)$, $m = Enc^{-1}(c, k)$;

- A key derivation function *KDF* such that $k = KDF(seed)$.

For simplicity we assume a $\binom{2}{1}$-OT in which Alice has *two* secrets $\{s_0, s_1\}$. The protocol then proceeds as follows:

Alice   **Bob**

Computes *two* basis:

$(U_0, V_0) \subset E[2^n]$,

$(U_1, V_1) \subset E[2^n]$

Computes *two* curves and isogenies:

$E_{A,0} \simeq E / \langle R_0 \rangle, \ \phi_{A,0} : E \to E_{A,0}$

$E_{A,1} \simeq E / \langle R_1 \rangle, \ \phi_{A,1} : E \to E_{A,1}$

Computes *two* pairs of points:

$P_0 = \phi_{A,0}(P), \ Q_0 = \phi_{A,0}(Q),$

$P_1 = \phi_{A,1}(P), \ Q_1 = \phi_{A,1}(Q)$

$\xrightarrow{\text{Sends Bob } \textit{two} \text{ tuples } \{E_{A,0},\, P_0,\, Q_0\},\, \{E_{A,1},\, P_1,\, Q_1\}}$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ Chooses an integer $k \in [0, 1]$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ Chooses an integer $b \in \mathbb{Z}/3^m\mathbb{Z}$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ Computes the curve and j-invariant:

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $E_B \simeq E / \langle P + bQ \rangle, \ j_B = j(E_B)$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ Computes *two* basis:

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $(U_0, \ V_0) \subset E_{A,0}[2^n]$,

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $(U_1, \ V_1) \subset E_{A,1}[2^n]$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ **all** having the same Weil Pairing:

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $e(U_0, \ V_0) = e(U_1, \ V_1)$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ Computes the curve and isogeny:

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $E'_B \simeq E_{A,k} / \langle P_k + bQ_k \rangle, \ \phi'_B = E_{A,k} \to E'_B$

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ Computes the points:

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $U'_k = \phi'_B(U_k), \ V'_k = \phi'_B(V_k)$

$\xleftarrow{\text{Sends Alice } \{E'_B,\, U'_k,\, V'_k\} \text{ and the } \textit{two} \text{ basis } (U_0,\, V_0),\, (U_1,\, V_1)}$

Computes *two* pairs x_i, $y_i \in \mathbb{Z}$:

$(x_0, y_0) \mid \phi_{A,0}(T_0) = x_0 U_0 + y_0 V_0$

$(x_1, y_1) \mid \phi_{A,1}(T_1) = x_1 U_1 + y_1 V_1$

Computes *two* curves and j-invariants:

$F_0 \simeq E'_B \big/ \langle x_0 U'_k + y_0 V'_k \rangle$, $j_0 = j(F_0)$

$F_1 \simeq E'_B \big/ \langle x_1 U'_k + y_1 V'_k \rangle$, $j_1 = j(F_1)$

Encrypts her *two* secrets:

$S_0 = Enc(s_0, KDF(j_0))$

$S_1 = Enc(s_1, KDF(j_1))$

$$\xrightarrow{\text{Sends Bob the \textit{two} encrypted secrets } S_0,\, S_1}$$

Decrypts its chosen k-th secret:

$$s_k = Enc^{-1}(S_k, KDF(j_B))$$

What explained above can be generalised to a $\binom{n}{1}$-OT: every "*two*" in the sketch should be changed to n; Bob's k should be chosen in $[0, n-1]$ range.

3.3.1 Correctness

How can be able to decrypt the k-th Alice's secret? Since Alice encrypts her secrets with j_i, Bob must have that $j_k = j_B$. In order for this to happen, Alice's curve F_i must be isomorphic to E_B computed by Bob. We now show the correctness of the

protocol. For the sake of simplicity we assume $i = k = 0$ without loss of generality.

$$
\begin{aligned}
F_0 &\simeq E'_B \big/ \left\langle x_0 U'_0 + y_0 V'_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E'_B \big/ \left\langle x_0 \phi'_B(U_0) + y_0 \phi'_B(V_0) \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E'_B \big/ \left\langle \phi'_B(x_0 U_0 + y_0 V_0) \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E'_B \big/ \left\langle x_0 U_0 + y_0 V_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E'_B \big/ \left\langle \phi_{A,0}(T_0) \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E_{A,0} \big/ \left\langle P_0 + bQ_0 \right\rangle \big/ \left\langle \phi_{A,0}(T_0) \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E_{A,0} \big/ \left\langle P_0 + bQ_0 \right\rangle \big/ \left\langle T_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ \left\langle R_0 \right\rangle \big/ \left\langle P_0 + bQ_0 \right\rangle \big/ \left\langle T_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ \left\langle R_0, T_0 \right\rangle \big/ \left\langle P_0 + bQ_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ E[2^n] \big/ \left\langle P_0 + bQ_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E \big/ \left\langle P_0 + bQ_0 \right\rangle \\
&\simeq E_B
\end{aligned}
$$

3.3.2 Security

For this section it is important to first introduce few hard problems [9, 12] in order to ease the analysis.

XDSSI - *Extended Decisional Supersingular Isogeny* problem

Given two supersingular elliptic curves E and E' defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, the pairs U, V, U', V' such that they both form a 2^n-order basis of E, and the having Weil Pairing $e(U,V)^{3^m} = e(U',V')$, determine if there exists a 3^m-isogeny $\phi : E \to E'$ such that $\phi(U) = U'$ and $\phi(V) = V'$.

CSSI - *Computational Supersingular Isogeny* problem

Given a supersingular elliptic curve $E \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, the bases $(U,V) \subset E[2^n]$ and $(P,Q) \subset E[3^m]$, an integer $a \in \mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$, the isogeny $\phi_A : E \to E_A$ with kernel $ker\,\phi_A = \langle U + aV \rangle$, finally given E_A and the points $\phi_A(P)$, $\phi_A(Q)$; determine the isogeny kernel $ker\,\phi_A$.

SSCDH - *Supersingular Computational Diffie-Hellman Isogeny* problem

Let $\phi_A : E_0 \to E_A$ be an isogeny with kernel $\langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A \rangle$ where m_A and n_A are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$ and not both divisible by 2. Let $\phi_B : E_0 \to E_B$ be an isogeny with kernel $\langle [m_B]P_B + [n_B]Q_B \rangle$ where m_B and n_B are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}/3^m\mathbb{Z}$ and not both divisible by 3.

Given the curves E_A, E_B and the points $\phi_A(P_B)$, $\phi_A(Q_B)$, $\phi_B(P_A)$, $\phi_B(Q_A)$, find the j-invariant of $E_{AB} \simeq E_0 / \langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A, [m_B]P_B + [n_B]Q_B \rangle$.

SSDDH - *Supersingular Decision Diffie-Hellman* problem

Given a tuple sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:

- $\Big(E_A, E_B, \phi_A(P_B), \phi_A(Q_B), \phi_B(P_A), \phi_B(Q_A), E_{AB} \Big)$, where all the parameters are in the *SSCDH* problem and $E_{AB} \simeq E_0 / \langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A, [m_B]P_B + [n_B]Q_B \rangle$;

- $\Big(E_A, E_B, \phi_A(P_B), \phi_A(Q_B), \phi_B(P_A), \phi_B(Q_A), E_C \Big)$, where all the parameters are in the *SSCDH* problem and $E_C \simeq E_0 / \langle [m'_A]P_A + [n'_A]Q_A, [m'_B]P_B + [n'_B]Q_B \rangle$ and m'_A, n'_A (resp. m'_B, n'_B) are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$ (resp. $\mathbb{Z}/3^m\mathbb{Z}$) and not both divisible by 2 (resp. 3);

determine form which distribution the tuple is sampled.

2-inv-CSSI - *2-inverse Computational Supersingular Isogeny* problem

Let E, E_0, E_1 be three supersingular elliptic curves defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ such that E_0 and E_1 are 2^n-isogenous to E with the corresponding isogenies $\phi_0 : E \to E_0$, $\phi_1 : E \to E_1$. Let (P, Q) be a basis of $E[3^m]$ and for each $i = \{0, 1\}$, let (U_i, V_i) be a basis of $E_i[2^n]$ and (x_i, y_i) be the coordinates in this basis of a generator of the dual isogeny $\widehat{\phi}_i$. Given the points $P, Q, U_0, V_0, U_1, V_1, \phi_0(P), \phi_0(Q), \phi_1(P), \phi_1(Q)$, find three supersingular elliptic curves E', F_0, F_1 and a basis $(U', V') \subset E'[2^n]$ such that $F_0 \simeq E' / \langle x_0 U' + y_0 V' \rangle$ and $F_1 \simeq E' / \langle x_1 U' + y_1 V' \rangle$.

2-inv-DSSI - *2-inverse Decisional Supersingular Isogeny* problem

This problem uses the same notations of *2-inv-CSSI* problem for the following parameters: curves E, E_0, E_1, points $P, Q, U_0, V_0, U_1, V_1, \phi_0(P), \phi_0(Q), \phi_1(P), \phi_1(Q)$. Given the following settings:

- Bob sends the challenge oracle a supersingular elliptic curve E' and a basis $(U', V') \subset E'[2^n]$;

- the oracle computes the supersingular curves $F_0 \simeq E'/\langle x_0 U' + y_0 V' \rangle$, $F_1 \simeq E'/\langle x_1 U' + y_1 V' \rangle$, $F_0 \simeq E'/\langle W_0 \rangle$, $F_0 \simeq E'/\langle W_1 \rangle$, where the points W_0 and W_1 are random points of $E'[2^n]$;

- the oracle chooses randomly, uniformly and independently two bits b_0, b_0. Then it outputs two pairs (C_0, C_0') and (C_1, C_1') of supersingular curves such that:

$$(C_0, C_0') = \begin{cases} (F_0, F_0') \text{ if } b_0 = 0 \\ (F_0', F_0) \text{ if } b_0 = 1 \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad (C_1, C_1') = \begin{cases} (F_1, F_1') \text{ if } b_1 = 0 \\ (F_1', F_1) \text{ if } b_1 = 1 \end{cases}$$

- Bob must answer whether $b_0 = b_1$ or $b_0 \neq b_1$.

Bob's advantage in this game is defined as *"$\mathcal{P}$(correct answer) - 1/2"*. Then the *2-inv-DSSI* problem is hard if no algorithm can achieve a non-negligible advantage for Bob in probabilistic polynomial time.

Malicious Alice

With Bob's message, Alice knows $\{E_B', U_k', V_k'\}$, even more she knows that E_B' is 3^m-isogenous to one of her $E_{A,i}$: she might be able to recover Bob's secret k by finding which of her curves is isogenous to E_B'. This problem is addressed as *Decisional Supersingular Isogeny* (*DSSI*) problem and is expected to be computationally intractable. Nevertheless Alice has more information at her disposal: $\phi_B'(U_k)$, $\phi_B'(V_0)$ and the n pairs (U_i, V_i). It is possible now to consider a Weil Pairing's property such that:

$$e(\phi_B'(U_k), \phi_B'(V_k)) = e(U_k, V_k)^{deg\,\phi_B'} = e(U_k, V_k)^{3^m}$$

What would happen if Bob had calculated his n bases with different pairings? Alice would be now able to check all bases until she finds the correct one which holds the condition above, as consequence she would know Bob's k. In order to prevent this scenario, [9] introduces the *XDSSI* problem, and according to the protocol settings, this is completely analogous to the *CSSI* problem. Since the latter is considered a hard problem consequently the former *XDSSI* is hard too and the presented protocol is secure with respect to Bob's secret k.

Malicious Bob

The security of the random oracle model relies on the hardness of *2-inv-CSSI* problem since if the generators of $ker\,\phi_0$ and $ker\,\phi_1$ can be efficiently computed, then it would be easy to obtain x_0, y_0, x_1, y_1 and solve said problem. However there is no reduction to the *SSCDH* problem since the curves E_0 and E_1 and their associated points are not 3^m-isogenous to E. The difficulty in solving the *2-inv-CSSI* problem actually depends upon the Oblivious Transfer hardness. In fact it would require to find a curve E' and points U', V' such that U' (resp. V') is related to both U_0, V_0 (resp. V_0, V_1) although this is expected to be computationally infeasible even on a quantum computer.

There could be another way for Bob to break the scheme and it requires him to send Alice a pair (U', V') that is not a $E'[2^n]$ basis. In this way Bob is limiting the possible values of $x_i U' + y_i V'$. In order to avoid this situation, Alice should always perform a safety check on the received basis before proceeding further.

Ultimately it is assumed that the combination of the symmetric encryption scheme *Enc* and the *KDF* is IND-CPA (Indistinguishable under Chosen Plaintext Attack), hence the *2-inv-DSSI* problem must be computationally hard. Even though this problem is easier than its computational version *2-inv-CSSI* there is no known reduction to the *SSDDH* problem.

Chapter 4

Implementation details

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