Math 445 Homework 3 Solutions

9. Our description of RSA assumed that for n=pq, that (a,n)=1. But we don't control a, the sender does! Show that in any event, the RSA algorithm works even if (A,n)>1:

Show that if n = pq is a product of distinct primes and $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$, then $a^{de} \equiv a \pmod{n}$ for any a.

We'll show that $A^{de} \equiv A \pmod{p}$ and $A^{de} \equiv A \pmod{q}$, i.e., p and q both divide $A^{de} - A$. Then since p and q are distinct primes, (p, q) = 1, and so $n = pq|A^{de} - A$.


By hypothesis, de-1=k(p-1)(q-1), so de=1+k(p-1)(q-1). Given A, one of three things is true: (1) (A,p)=(A,q)=1, (2) exactly one of p,q divides A, WOLOG p|A (since there is no distinction between them) and (A,q)=1, or (3) p,q|A, so n=pq|A.

In case (1), Fermat's Little Theorem tells us that $A^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod p$ and $A^{q-1} \equiv 1 \pmod q$, so $A^{de} = (A^{p-1})^{k(q-1)}A \equiv 1^{k(q-1)}A \equiv A \pmod p$ and $A^{de} = (A^{q-1})^{k(p-1)}A \equiv 1^{k(p-1)}A \equiv A \pmod q$ as desired. In case (2), $A \equiv 0 \pmod p$, so $A^{de} \equiv 0^{de} \equiv 0 \equiv A \pmod p$, while, as in (1), $A^{de} \equiv A \pmod q$. Finally, in case (3), $A \equiv 0 \pmod p$ and $A \equiv 0 \pmod q$, so $A^{de} \equiv 0^{de} \equiv 0 \equiv A \pmod p$ and the same for q. So in all cases, $A^{de} \equiv A \pmod p$ and $(\mod q)$, so $A^{de} \equiv A \pmod p$.

10. Our argument for "square root of work for half the chance of success" in the Pollard ρ method was a little imprecise; make a better estimate of the number of starting points in a $K \times K$ grid whose lines of slope -1 will hit the "success" lines of slope -1/2, -2 emanating from (0,0), to make a better estimate of the fraction of success we are trading less work for. (Note: lines starting from the upper right/lower left corners may miss the success lines before we stop computing $(a_i - a_{2i}, n)$.)

We know that if $(a_j - a_i, n) > 1$, then $(a_{j+k} - a_{i+k}, n) > 1$ for all $k \ge 0$. If we focus on the set of pairs (j, i) with $1 \le i, j \le K$ and j > i, we wish to estimate the sie of the set of such points for which the sequence of pairs (j + k, i + k) intersects the sequence of pairs (2m, m) before m exceeds K. [By setting j > i, we will work with the upper right half of the $K \times K$ square, the other half would interact with the "line" of pairs (m, 2m), instead, and give an identical estimate.]

But the set of pairs whose line of successors meet the (2m,m) line inside of the $K \times K$ square are precisely the points lying in the triangle of points lying up the slope -1 lines from the line x+2y=0 of slope -1/2 emanating from the origin (0,0); see the figure below. We need to determine what fraction of the pairs (j,i) above the line x+y=0 lie in that triangle. But this is a matter of computing areas:



The triangle of all pairs (j,i) has base K and height K, so has area $B=K\cdot K/2=K^2/2$. The traingle of all pairs whose slope -1 lines will meet our success line (the shaded triangle above) has base K/2 and height K/2, so has area $(K/2)(K/2)/2=K^2/8$. So the fraction of pairs that could be detected by our success line is $(K^2/8)/(K^2/2)=1/4$. So roughly 1/4 of the pairs we could test and find $(a_j-a_i,n)>1$ wild be detected by instead testing for $(a_{2i}-a_i,n)>1$. So we have 1/4 the chance of succeeding (over testing all pairs) by doing roughly square root (test K pairs, instead of K(K-1)/2 pairs) work. Which for large K is a very good trade-off!

11. [NZM p.83, # 13] When applying the Pollard ρ method, starting from a_1 , suppose we find that $a_i - a_j$, for $1 \le i \ne j \le 17$, are coprime to n, but then $a_{18} - a_{11}$ shares a factor with n. What is the smallest k that we then know of that will have $a_{2k} - a_k$ sharing a factor with n?

Essentially, we are asking: what is the smallest k so that (2k, k) = (18 + m, 11 + m) for some $m \ge 0$? We therefore want

2k = 18 + m, k = 11 + m, which, subtracting, gives k = 7. But this is ridiculous; this yields the point (14,7) which is <u>behind</u> (18,11), and we <u>can't</u> conclude that $(a_{14} - a_7, n) > 1$. My bad.

But as the text points out, we know that even more is true: if we set $d = (a_{18} - a_{11}, n)$, then $a_{18} \equiv a_{11} \pmod{d}$, so $a_{18+k} \equiv a_{11+k} \pmod{d}$ for every $k \geq 0$. But when k = 7, this gives $a_{25} \equiv a_{18} \equiv a_{11}$, and so $a_{25+k} \equiv a_{11+k}$ as well. Essentially, after r = 11, a_k cycles through 7 values mod d, i.e., $a_{11+j+7k} \equiv a_{11+j+7l}$ for every $0 \leq j \leq 6$ and $k, l \geq 0$. So to find an i for which $d|a_{2i} - a_i$, so (since d|n) $d|(a_{2i} - a_i, n)$ and $(a_{2i} - a_i, n) > 1$, we need to find an i so that 2i = 11 + j + 7l and i = 11 + j + 7k for some j, k, and l. Subtracting, we get i = 7(l - k). The smallest i will be when k = 0 (i.e., i = 11 + j + 7k is in the first round of cycling), so we need i = 7l and i = 11 + j with $0 \leq j \leq 6$, so j = 3 and i = 14, 2i = 28. So $(a_{28} - a_{14}, n) > 1$ giving, usually, a proper factor of n.

In the end, since 18-11=7, we seek a pair (2i,i) with $2i \ge 18$, $i \ge 11$, and 2i-i=i a multiple of 7; the first such i is i=14.

12. [NZM p.83, # 15] Show that if (a, m) = 1 and there is a prime p with p|m and (p-1)|Q, then $(a^Q - 1, m) > 1$.

We show, in fact, that $p|^Q - 1, m$, so $(a^Q - 1, m) \ge p > 1$. We know, by hypothesis, that p|m, so it is enough to show that $p|A^Q - 1$. But since p - 1|Q, Q = (p - 1)k for some k, and then $a^Q = a^{(p-1)k} = (a^{p-1})^k \equiv 1^k = 1 \pmod{p}$, by Fermat's Little Theorem, so $p|(a^{p-1})^k - 1 = a^Q - 1$, as desired. So $(a^Q - 1, m) \ge p > 1$.

[N.B. This fact is the basis for Pollard's p-1 Test: if m has a prime factor such that p-1 is a product of "small" primes, then (p-1)|N! for some relatively small value of N, so, e.g., $(2^{N!}-1,m)>1$ can be computed relatively quickly, usually finding a factor of m. In most implementations of RSA, for example, the program generates industrial-grade primes p,q, but also checks that (p-1), (q-1) each have at least one large prime factor, to protect against this method of finding a factor of m=pq.]