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What Moves Markets?

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The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

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What M	oves Markets	?				

Theoretically: News

Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Asset prices reflect all publicly available information and react instantly to new information

Empirically: Mostly not news

"even with hindsight, the ability to explain stock price changes is modest"

Roll (JoF, 1988)

"difficulty of linking [..] volatility to observed measures of information" Mitchell & Mulherin (JoF, 1994)

This paper

roughly half of all market movements are "explained" by news

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Basic ide	a					

Use continuous high-frequency asset price changes

- bond yields (2y, 5y, 10y) and stock prices
- for the US and euro area (EA)
- starting 2002
- Collect a vast time-stamped event database
 - covering scheduled news
 - and ad hoc events

Compute share of market movements occurring around news


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Main as	sumption					

market movements are caused by the news event around which they occur

 \Rightarrow strong assumption, but

- standard in event study literature
- e we weed out irrelevant news first
- in line with Gürkaynak, Kısacıkoğlu, and Wright (2020, GKW) Details






Important News: (1) FI Exports & Imports & Trade Balance, BoJ: Press Release, (2) FR Trade Balance, (3) SE Budget Balance, (4) US Employment Report, (5) Fitch downgrades Italy from AA- to A+, (6) Fitch downgrades Spain AA+ to AA+, (7) US Consumer Credit. Unimportant News: (1) CH Unemployment Rate, JP Cabinet Office Indices, JP Official Reserve Assets, (2) FR Budget Balance, (3) DK Industrial Production and Orders, (4) AT Wholesale Price Index (5) NO Ind Prod Manufacturing & NO Industrial Production, (6) UK Price Indices, (7) DE Industrial Production, (9) EU Official Reserves, (9) US Inventories and Trade Balance.

50% of market movements occur in tight windows around important news (in the above example almost 80%)





Conditional on tight event windows, all market movements due to news But unconditional R^2 much lower

GKW example: only roughly one 20min event window every other trading day

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Asset p	rice changes					

stocks (S&P 500 and Eurostoxx) and bond yields (2y, 5y, 10y, US & DE)

- derived from futures prices
- sources: Thomson Reuters Tick History for US data, Eurex for EA data
- using nearest-to-maturity contracts, rolling over on day of expiration
- bond yield changes approximated using CTD bond
- 15-minute frequency
 - overnight window and up to 55 intraday windows (14h from 2 a.m. to 4 p.m. US Eastern Time)
 - >230,000 observations from March 2002 to September 2020

Further Details

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News						

macro data releases

- from Bloomberg, covering 22 countries (US, EA, UK, ..)
- 382 news, covering >1,000 individual series
- >76,000 events
- Ø bond auctions
 - auction announcements and publication of results
 - for the US, DE, FR, IT, ES
 - >10,000 auction-related news events

central bank announcements


- 8 central banks (Fed, ECB, BoE, BoJ, SNB, Riksbank, BoC, RBA)
- press releases, press conferences, speeches, etc.
- >7,000 central bank news events

ad hoc events

- elections, fiscal policy announcements, natural catastrophes, OPEC announcements, terrorist attacks, etc.
- >1,000 events


Motivation 00000	Data and Method ○O●OO	Results 00000			Appendix 0000000	References
Example	: Central Ban	k News				

Figure: Number of Central Bank Events



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Example	: Central Bank	k News				

Figure: Number of Central Bank Events



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Ad Hoc I	Events					

extend previous literature whenever possible:

٩	Iraq War	Rigobon and Sack (200	5); Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009)
٩	Global Financial Crisis	Guillen	(2009); Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012)
٩	European Sovereign Debt Ci	sis	Bahaj (2020)
٩	OPEC "oil supply news"		Känzig (2021)
٩	Trump news re trade conflicts	and US Fed	Bianchi et al. (2019)
٩	Sovereign Credit Ratings		
٩	Covid-19		
+	other news		

- election outcomes, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, etc.
- \Rightarrow over 1,000 time-stamped events

Motivation	Data and Method	Results	Robustness	Conclusion	Appendix	References
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Event W	/indow Length					

- usually 45min window: -15min till +30min, except for
- central bank press conferences/speeches and ad hoc events
 - \rightarrow -15min till event end +15min
 - \rightarrow if exact event end unknown (rare), -15min till +60min
- intraday timestamps from Factiva and/or Bloomberg
- overnight events are allocated to first 30min of next trading day

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Largest	Market Move	ments (1-	20)			

Date	Time	y _{2y} US	y ^{US} y _{5y}	y ^{US} y _{10y}	y_s^{US}	y _{2y} EA	y _{5y}	y ^{EA} 10y	y _s EA	unsch.	Event
24.06.2016	ON	-24	-28	-26	-4	-13	-18	-27	-12	1	Brexit referendum
15.09.2008	ON	-34	-30	-20	-3	-21	-18	-13	-3	1	Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
09.03.2020	ON	-21	-20	-18	-4	-16	-17	-18	-8	1	Covid-19 spreads, quarantine imposed on
											Northern Italy; oil price war escalates between Russia and Saudi Arabia
26.06.2002	ON	-34	-27	-19	-5	-11	-11	-9	-6	1	Worldcom accounting scandal
22.01.2008	ON	-19	-15	-10	-5	-19	-15	-10	-11	0	-
16.03.2020	ON	-9	-20	-21	-5	-7	-8	-9	-9	1	Covid-19 spreads, quarantine imposed in Spain
10.05.2010	ON	12	13	12	3	17	15	13	6	1	ECB's Securities Markets Programme announcement
18.03.2009	14:30	-10	-28	-37	2	-7	-12	-14	1	0	FOMC Statement, QE1 announcement
08.09.2008	ON	18	22	17	3	13	13	8	2	1	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac taken over by the
											US government
22.01.2003	ON	-11	-14	-12	-3	-9	-13	-12	-6	0	
29.06.2015	ON	-10	-14	-13	-1	-5	-14	-22	-5	1	Greek debt crisis, capital controls announced
29.01.2004	ON	20	22	16	-1	11	12	9	-1	0	FOMC statement omits promise to hold rates steady for a "considerable period"
15.03.2011	ON	-9	-12	-11	-2	-11	-15	-12	-3	1	Fukushima nuclear disaster, explosion at reactor 3
27.10.2008	ON	-12	-10	-8	-5	-7	-8	-5	-5	0	
12.12.2008	ON	-9	-11	-11	-4	-7	-10	-9	-3	1	USD14bn auto bail-out deal fails in US Senate
10.03.2020	ON	9	16	14	1	9	11	13	2	1	Covid-19, negotiations about emergency relief
											package in US advance
26.06.2003	ON	17	15	11	-2	10	11	9	-1	0	Fed cuts policy rate by 25bp
06.05.2010	14:45	-9	-9	-10	-4	-5	-7	-7	-6	1	Greek parliament approves EU/IMF bailout
											package amid major riots
25.03.2008	ON	13	19	14	2	9	7	6	2	1	JPMorgan takes over Bear Stearns
07.04.2003	ON	10	12	8	2	10	9	7	5	1	Iraq War, US troops enter Bagdad

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Largest	Market Move	ments (21	-30)			

Date	Time	y_{2y}^{US}	y_{5y}^{US}	y ^{US} 10y	y_s^{US}	y_{2y}^{EA}	y_{5y}^{EA}	y_{10y}^{EA}	y_s^{EA}	unsch.	Event
02.04.2004	08:45	18	19	17	1	9	-8	6	1	0	US Employment Report
05.03.2004	08:45	-15	-19	-14	-0	-13	-9	-5	-1	0	US Employment Report
07.05.2004	08:45	23	20	13	-0	7	7	7	-0	0	US Employment Report
17.10.2002	ON	10	14	9	3	8	7	4	5	0	
03.10.2003	08:45	12	14	10	1	11	11	8	1	0	US Employment Report
07.10.2002	ON	-9	-18	-12	-3	-7	-6	-6	-2	1	Iraq War, US Pres. Bush: "use of force may
											become unavoidable"
24.03.2003	ON	-12	-11	-8	-1	-7	-7	-6	-5	1	Iraq War, coalition forces face apparent
											setbacks over preceding weekend
15.08.2002	ON	2	8	7	4	9	11	7	4	0	
24.04.2017	ON	7	9	8	1	10	11	11	3	1	Macron beats Le Pen in first round of French
											presidential election
10.06.2008	ON	17	12	8	-1	12	11	6	-1	1	Fed speech by Bernanke: "upside risks to
											inflation"

Dates and Times refer to US Eastern Time. Bond yield changes $(y_{2y}, ..., y_{10y})$ are in basis points, stock price changes (y_s) are in percent. For overnight events (Time=ON), market movements refer to the previous trading days' close till the stated day's opening price. Unscheduled events, i.e. either unscheduled monetary policy announcements or ad hoc events are marked as *unsch.* = 1. The ordering is based on average normalized market movements.

 \Rightarrow ad hoc events are important but often neglected, since no easy-to-use dataset available

Motivation 00000	Data and Method	Results 00●00	Robustness 000000	Conclusion OO	Appendix 0000000	References
Identifyin	g Important S	Schedulec	News			


$$|\Delta y_t| = lpha + \sum_{i}^{N_i} eta_i \cdot D_{it} + \lambda \cdot FE + \gamma \cdot vol + \epsilon_t$$


- Δy_t are yield changes or stock returns
- $D_{it} = 1$ if news *i* is released, $N_i = 434$
- FE are time and calendar-based fixed-effects

$$vol = \gamma^{15m} \sigma^{15m} + \gamma^{1h} \sigma^{1h} + \gamma^{2h} \sigma^{2h} + \gamma^d \sigma^d + \gamma^w \sigma^w + \gamma^m \sigma^m + \gamma^q \sigma^q$$

• σ are "realized power" measures, i.e. cumulated past absolute returns over different horizons

Goal: find out which *regular* scheduled news move markets. Hence: drop periods with unscheduled news





The first entry on the horizontal axis shows the share of explained variance around unscheduled events. The next entries sequentially add the most important scheduled news for each asset, according to the dummy regression. The last entry adds all the remaining news, i.e. even those without a significant impact on an asset's volatility. The grey lines show the percent of observations covered.

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Robustr	ness Checks a	and Furthe	er Results			

Robustness Checks

- Falsification Exercise
- Tighter Event Windows
- Wider Event Windows
- Lower Frequencies
- Excluding Overnight Windows


Further Results (Appendix)

- Economic Type of News
- Domestic vs. Foreign News
- Large vs. Small Market Movements

➡ skip to conclusion

Motivation 00000	Data and Method	Results 00000	Robustness O●OOOO	Conclusion OO	Appendix 0000000	References
	ation Exercise				∢ b	ack to overview


Draw same number of "pseudo event windows" per week as in baseline results, but randomly



For each calendar week in our sample, we randomly draw as many "pseudo event windows" as there are actual event windows in that week. We repeat this 1,000 times and compute the "explained" variance share of the artificial event windows each time. For reference, the dashed black line shows the percent of observations covered, which is identical across all bootstrap draws.

Motivation 00000	Data and Method	Results 00000	Robustness 000000	Conclusion OO	Appendix 0000000	References
•	Event Window ws too wide? No.	/S			∢ b.	ack to overview


 R^2 drops by only ~ 10 percentage points when using very tight event windows.



Share of explained variance using the tightest possible windows, given our 15 minute data frequency. For macroeconomic data releases, we include only the 15min window in which the release occurs, i.e. we use [-0,+15] instead of [-15,+30] minute windows. For central bank press conferences, speeches, and ad hoc events, we use [-0,+45] instead of [-15,+60] minute windows. For reference, the black lines show the percent of observations covered.




 R^2 \uparrow the wider the windows, but just mechanically. R^2 increases less than sample coverage.



Share of explained variance using longer event windows. Our benchmark choice assumes that most news are entirely reflected in prices within 30 minutes. The figure shows how the *H2* changes when we extend each window by an additional 15, 30, 45 or 60 minutes. For reference, the solid black lines show the percent of observations covered.

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	requencies	encies?			∢ b	ack to overview


Altavilla et al. (2017) show R^2 of news \uparrow at lower frequencies. Same here? Could be, if prices *drift* after news. But no: $R^2 \downarrow$ i.e. prices slightly *reverse* after news (initial overreaction).



Estimate $\sum_{j=0}^{H_k} \Delta y_{t-j} = \alpha + \sum_{j=0}^{H_k} \Delta y_{t-j}^* + \epsilon_t$ for different horizons H (e.g. H = 0 for intradaily and H = 56 for daily frequency) where Δy_t^* are the "explained" asset price changes, i.e. all changes around unscheduled news or around "important" scheduled releases.

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	ght vs. Intrada				∢ b	ack to overview				
$\rightarrow R^2$ much	$\rightarrow R^2$ much higher for overnight windows (due to Brexit, Lehman Brothers, etc.)									

But: overnight windows are only a small fraction of observations. Even entirely dropping them would reduce R^2 only by roughly 10 percentage points



Share of market movements "explained" in overnight and intraday windows.

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Conclus	ion					

- \sim 50% of asset price variation occurs around clearly identifiable news
- and in this sense can be "explained" by news
- more than most previous studies find
 - · asset prices not entirely disconnected from macro news
- but still half of all movements unexplained
 - despite vast event database, strong causality assumption, and agnosticism re mechanism (discount rate vs. cashflows)
- what else is moving markets?
 - sentiment, private info (through trading), noise traders, capital flows, ...?
- \rightarrow our database isolates non-news driven market movements
 - one example: market turmoil on 21 January 2008
 - largest unexplained movement in our sample
 - coincides with unwinding of Societe General's "rogue trader" positions
 - → anecdotal evidence for importance of flows see Gabaix and Koijen (2021)'s "Inelastic Markets Hypothesis"

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Thank you for your attention

The database will be made publicly available, check the preview at https://markkersen.github.io/WhatMovesMarkets/

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Discuss	ion of Main R	esult				


Reasons we could overestimate the explanatory power of news

- causality assumption too strong (no movement without news?)
- erroneously identify ad hoc "news" based on subsequent market reaction? (post hoc ergo propter hoc)

Reasons we could <u>under</u>estimate the explanatory power of news

- neglect private info about macro news (early releases, leaks by central bank officials)
- neglect events with unclear timing that diffuse only gradually
- focus on "important" news according to dummy regression, neglect time-variation
- neglect corporate news


Motivation 00000	Data and Method	Results 00000	Robustness 000000	Conclusion OO	Appendix OOOOOO	References
	nic Type of Ne		t			



Decomposition of "explained" market movements into economic categories. We classify each news type into one or multiple economic categories: growth (expectations), inflation, fiscal (e.g. bond auction news), and money (e.g. central bank announcements). We then simply allocate the market movement around a given news to its economic category. If multiple news occurred simultaneously, we use the t-statistics from our dummy regression as weights, assigning zero weight to releases not significant at the 10% level. If a news type belongs to multiple economic categories, we allocate the movement equally to each category. If an ad hoc event took place (e.g. Brexit), we assign the entire market movement to the "ad hoc" category.

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Domest	tic vs. Foreian	News				


ightarrow Foreign news more important for bonds than stocks, and more for euro area assets than US



Decomposition of "explained" market movements into domestic and foreign news. For the Euro area, domestic news include all country-level news of member states. Movements around ad hoc events are omitted.


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Motivation	Data and Method	Results	Robustness	Conclusion	Appendix	References

 \rightarrow Share of explained observations highest in the tails of the distribution



Share of market movements "explained" by news at different percentiles of the distribution. The first entry e.g. shows what fraction of the .01% largest yield and stock price declines occurred around news (.01% of the sample corresponds to 23 observations).





The first entry on the horizontal axis shows the share of explained variance around all unscheduled news by the Federal Reserve (such as ad hoc press releases and speeches). The next entries on the x-axis sequentially add other unscheduled news, namely by the European Central Bank (e.g. Draghi's "whatever it takes" speech), by the six other central banks in our dataset and non-monetary ad hoc events ("GFC" refers to the Global Financial Crisis, "SDC" to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, and "Ratings" to Sovereign Credit Ratings).



 $\underbrace{\Delta y_t}_{t} = \alpha + \beta \qquad \underbrace{\mathbf{S}_t}_{t} + \epsilon_t \qquad \Rightarrow \mathbf{R}^2 \sim 20 - 30\%$ vield change macro surprise

Low R^2 due to measurement problem, example US jobs report:

- st is headline figure (non-farm payrolls) minus survey expectation
- but jobs report is a 40p PDF doc, containing much more info
- other info is not surveyed, hence not observable as "surprise"

Solution: combine OLS and hetereoskedasticity-based methods

- use yield changes in event and non-event control windows
- keep observable surprises (= 0 during control windows)
- capture unobserved news as latent factors
- $\rightarrow R^2 \sim 100\%$

market movements are caused by the news event around which they occur

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High Frequency Futures Data					∢ b	ack to overview

Figure: Covered Trading Hours in US Eastern Time




Table: Length of Windows

15min	10:15h	\leq 24h	\leq 48h	\leq 72h	\leq 96h	> 96h
232303	2544	1112	21	883	56	36

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