

# Mark Seliternikov

## picoCTF - b00tl3gRSA2 [400 points]

Challenge details:

b00tl3gRSA2

 | 400 points 

Tags: Category: Cryptography

AUTHOR: INVISIBILITY

### Description

In RSA  $d$  is a lot bigger than  $e$ , why don't we use  $d$  to encrypt instead of  $e$ ?

Connect with `nc jupiter.challenges.picoctf.org 19566`.

### Hints

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What is  $e$  generally?

When using netcat this is the output:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nc jupiter.challenges.picoctf.org 19566
c: 14028562178353331139256557253036287120869993756952073510169469088990462791734941425448842580697089302371671043187
07530847750706333232356895440178456501933587530136224792804203548438150688648523821393630395853290605504445958193144
5102521813494794267262455146681771187602763710514698644436410855004589899235348
n: 56633146082651701119215146385772086992433149281691386515878541149169865152017913164083484639840044696605279127850
50250846588345492640611027438866431854628989746155623726609938549297395186358259563019254313907555441073742337139254
1951241418575260251451012068940785601268678606469201955735931015190199560525443
e: 15350583746772431125650210726717050724530913283183023178785516654315172872735190952389932727194082029853306962893
27138197335785423978330016500969273776120397640203315211300790890701066098425413747680623433352567139885899160915234
4400764776152093865127931955507943752108691972407131838965464338923104549526593
```

When I was researching RSA vulnerabilities I've stumbled upon a vulnerability that you can infer when you encounter a ridiculously large  $e$ . Which is called "Wiener's attack". The most common value for a key is '65537' Which is supposed to be the encrypting key! But in this challenge we were told that it is switched... So before trying the "Wiener's attack" I've tried this value:

```
from codecs import decode

c = 9258166184219499767314626483784426752698473218995301326400231066149757946364931996424572355121718075783702229132
74002079272423958892727320910156379799867473942208038552163297256681849369476565145894485002795021361031175497346221
2597092121323941175971120375461923327558343331181090297372899648944802081793935
n = 1058175355851581917243495792582943818333808093818953986090597054493138793758184172986018193299290595173439932081
03541567351179226558211151165085888175003484356119839239156436905456184576469673491514515351601470486810874520137248
415528183249232855368905653046478212190329456117673443020014023179395209699335001
e = 5864794459709326026524787169688918979101715274087288956889811375307731572345167419224428770802772828857722912702
66405290278298220283794443408977328254367883850788664047070922728591818691216747466634467149507607769737733566241179
90883162808836194344984618881144853830559206116825438331712395645328410886227841

text = decode(hex(pow(c, 65537, n))[2:], 'hex')

print(str(text)[2: -1])
```

The result:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
$ python3 test.py
picoCTF{bad_1d3a5_2438125}
```

IT ACTUALLY WORKED!

Source of where I've learned of this attack's existence: <https://github.com/JohnHammond/ctf-katana>